Jacob Wackernagel
*Lectures on Syntax*
Jacob Wackernagel

Lectures on Syntax

with special reference to Greek, Latin, and Germanic

Edited with notes and bibliography by

David Langslow
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EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION

JACOB WACKERNAGEL

Jacob Wackernagel was born on 11 December 1853 in Basel. His father, Wilhelm Wackernagel, was a native of Berlin and a former pupil of the classicist and Germanist Karl Lachmann, but had been for twenty years already Professor of German Language and Literature in Basel. Jacob’s mother was his father’s second wife, Maria Salome, née Sarasin, daughter of a well-to-do old Basel family. Jacob was named after his godfather, Jacob Grimm (1785–1863), one of the Brothers Grimm, and one of the pioneers of modern Germanic philology and linguistics, best known for his monumental dictionary and grammar of German (Deutsches Wörterbuch and Deutsche Grammatik).2 As a child, Jacob enjoyed at best uncertain health, a fact which surprises those who knew him in his robust later life. He was sixteen when his father died.

It was customary in the second half of the nineteenth century for Basel professors to teach the final-year students at the high school (Pädagogium), so that while still at school Wackernagel enjoyed the tuition of the historian Jacob Burckhardt, the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, and the Germanist Moritz Heyne, who worked with Grimm on his dictionary. He pursued his university studies at Basel (1871–2), Göttingen (1872–4), and Leipzig (1874–5), and took his doctorate at Basel in 1875 with a philological thesis on the beginnings of the study of ‘pathology’ (in a sense, a rudimentary study of speech sounds) in the Greek grammarians (Wackernagel 1876); his examiners included Nietzsche and Heyne.

For all the illustriousness of his teachers—and at Leipzig, he had visited the classes of the Indo-Iranianist Ernst Kuhn, and the Indo-Europeanists Georg Curtius and August Leskien—Wackernagel was from the first notably independent in his thinking and in his approach to his disciplines (cf. Schwyzer 1938: 227; Von der Mühl 1938: 12), and was seriously influenced only by the Sanskritist Theodor Benfey, under whom he studied at Göttingen and who caused him to accord Vedic and Sanskrit a central place in his work henceforth.

1 In the following paragraphs on Wackernagel’s life, work, personality, and teaching, I have used in particular Rüdiger Schmitt’s deft and penetrating assessment (1990b; in English), the engaging reminiscences of Josef Delz and Georg Landmann (1990), Johannes Lohmann (1942), Peter Von der Mühll (1938), Hanns Oertel (1938), Giorgio Pasquali (1938), August Rüegg (1939), and Eduard Schwyzer (1938), and the very insightful essay on Wackernagel and Indo-European linguistics by Bernfried Schlerath (1990b). Debrunner’s list (1939) of commemorative articles and obituaries is supplemented by Bernhard Forssman’s pages of ‘personal information about Jacob Wackernagel’, part of his editor’s introduction to the third volume of Kl. Schr. (III, xviii).

2 It was Jacob Grimm’s intervention that secured Wilhelm Wackernagel’s appointment at Basel in 1833; see Mathias Stauffacher in Eichner & Rix (1990: ix).
After a short study-visit to Oxford, Wackernagel began lecturing in Greek and Sanskrit unpaid (as Privatdozent) at Basel in the winter semester 1876/7, and in 1879, at the age of twenty-six, he succeeded Nietzsche as Professor of Greek (Extraordinarius at first, Ordinarius from 1881). He married Maria Stehlin in 1886 and by her had eight children, two of whom, Jakob and Hans Georg, became in their turn Basel professors, of respectively law and history. He played a prominent role in the governance of his church, his city, and his university, where he held the office of Rector twice, first in 1890.

In 1902, having the year before turned down the invitation to succeed the late Johannes Schmidt in the Berlin chair of Indo-European, Wackernagel accepted the offer of the Göttingen chair of comparative philology vacated by Schmidt’s successor Wilhelm Schulze. He flourished in this remarkable centre of linguistic and classical studies, where his colleagues included the polymath classicist and ancient historian Eduard Schwartz, the theologian Rudolf Smend, the Latinist Friedrich Leo, the Iranianist Friedrich Carl Andreas, and the Sanskritists Franz Kielhorn and Hermann Oldenberg, and where he numbered among his pupils the future Hellenists Peter Von der Mühll and Giorgio Pasquali, the Latinist Eduard Fraenkel, the Indo-Iranianist Herman Lommel, the comparativist Johannes Lohmann. Here, too, he played a leading role in university life, and was Pro-Rector in 1912/13, but, because of German foreign policy in World War I, he resigned his Göttingen chair in 1915 and returned to Basel.

Back in Basel, he briefly resumed the chair of Greek before being appointed in 1917 to the chair of linguistics and classical philology, which he held until his retirement in 1936, after sixty years of university teaching. Early in his second Basel period, in 1918 and 1919 (the years in which he delivered his first two series of lectures on syntax), he was again Rector of the university. He died peacefully at home in Basel on the night of 21/22 May 1938.

It has been well observed that Wackernagel’s academic authority was, especially for a linguist, unusually profound and widespread among classicists and historians, and that in his lifetime he was more widely and more highly honoured than any historical-comparative linguist before or since (by eleven foreign academies and learned societies, in Europe and America, not to mention his honorary degrees).4 The importance of Wackernagel’s work is attested less in the numerous superlatives in obituaries and assessments of his life and career (imposing as these descriptions are5) than in the repeated claim that the value of his works is

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3 The Göttingen years are repeatedly said to have been Wackernagel’s best (‘most important’, according to Oertel 1938: 541; ‘most successful and valuable’, according to his daughter E. Wackernagel 1938: 537), partly thanks to his colleagues and students, partly because he could devote himself more than in Basel to his university work without additional demands from church and city; cf. Pasquali (1938: 10).

4 His honours are listed by Oertel (1938: 543), Forssman (KL. Schr. III, xviii).

5 So, for example: ‘in the humanities, where one is so easily led into the construction of vanities, there will always be few so rarely led astray’ (Von der Mühll 1938: 13–14); ‘linguistics has lost its greatest and
timeless, that they still prompt their readers to dialogue and debate with their author, that they remain still today on countless topics indispensable points of reference for those having to do with the philological and linguistic and hence historical interpretation of ancient texts.\(^6\)

It is easy for a specialist in Greek familiar with Wackernagel’s books and articles on the text and language of Homer, on the Greek perfect, on Greek accentuation, on Greek and Latin word formation, to forget or to be unaware of the fact that his magnum opus was his (unfinished) grammar of Sanskrit (\textit{Altindische Grammatik}), and that his contributions to the field of Old Indo-Aryan studies, and of comparative Indo-European linguistics more broadly, were at least as substantial and significant as those in classical philology (Greek and to a lesser extent Latin\(^7\)). As Peter Von der Mühll (1938: 14) put it in his address to mourners in St Martin’s Church in Basel two days after Wackernagel’s death: linguists, Sanskritists, and classicists alike, each group regarded Wackernagel as one of their own. When, in 1896, the first volume of the Sanskrit grammar appeared, it was remarked with wonder and amusement (cf. Schwyzer 1938: 227) that while the Zurich professor of Sanskrit had written a grammar of Greek,\(^8\) now the Basel professor of Greek was writing a Sanskrit one!

The approach and style of Wackernagel’s research have been tellingly characterized in general terms by friends, colleagues, students, and later admirers—among the last, at greatest length and to best effect by Bernfried Schlerath (1990\(^b\)) and Rüdiger Schmitt (1990\(^b\)). In a way, these accounts all serve as commentaries on, or amplifications of Wackernagel’s reported description of himself as someone who did research on languages with the methods of a classicist, ‘a linguist with a philological approach’ (‘Sprachforscher philologischer Richtung’).

In the first place, it has been repeatedly observed that Wackernagel was not given to general discussion of theory or method in linguistics. It is surely telling of his own approach that in his published congratulation of Wilhelm Schulze on his seventieth birthday, Wackernagel highlighted with approval Schulze’s silence

\(^6\) Cf. Schwyzer (1938: 228), Panagl (1990: 54–5), Risch (1990: 234), Schlerath (1990\(^b\): 10), Schmitt (1990\(^b\): 485): ‘that [the philological foundation of all linguistic research] is what we can learn best from Jacob Wackernagel even today’.

\(^7\) Indeed, in the foreword to the \textit{Kleine Schriften} of Eduard Wolfflin, the father of the \textit{TdLL} (cf. I, 31 \& n. 10, p. 46 below), which he says he undertook to write for personal reasons, Wackernagel prefaces his assessment of Wolfflin’s achievements with the disclaimer (Wolfflin 1933: viii) that he himself was ‘not a Latin specialist’ (‘nicht latinistischer Fachmann’).

\(^8\) That is, the ‘Greek Grammar for Schools’ (\textit{Griechische Schulgrammatik}) of Adolf Kaegi (1st edn Berlin 1884; 64th edn Zurich 1899).
on methodology, and his ignoring of general linguistic questions! Even in the Lectures, which offer numerous opportunities and occasions for more general discussion and speculation about the causes and conditions of language change, he makes only relatively brief gestures in this direction, often in throwaway remarks tied to a bibliographical reference. In a manuscript note for the unpublished third series (quoted by Lohmann 1942: 58, and Schmitt 1990b: 484), he states the general principle that ‘the tendencies at work in the history of a language are perceived better by studying what the language has inherited than from preconceived theories [about the prehistoric ancestor language]’. Unlike many linguists, he drew his material not from dictionaries and grammars but, in Sanskrit as well as in Greek and Latin, from his knowledge—his reading and teaching—of the texts themselves. He typically started from an anomalous, often overlooked, point of detail, a concrete problem in an individual language, which he first described and analysed minutely, and then set and explained in its wider context, with illuminating consequences for the larger picture. His focus was always on the individual language at issue, and, if space was allowed for reconstruction of prehistoric phases of the language, then on internal (i.e., based on evidence from within the language) rather than comparative reconstruction.

The last point is well observed, and important for Wackernagel’s reception among scholars working on texts in individual languages, Greek, Latin, Sanskrit, Gothic, Irish, and so on. From an Indo-European point of view, it is true, both his teaching and his published research were extremely narrow. In his teaching, the languages named in the titles of his courses included, apart from Sanskrit and Greek, only Latin and Iranian. Not a single course, not a single published article took as its focus, or mentioned in its title, Germanic, Celtic, Baltic, Slavic, or Armenian. Wackernagel neither taught nor—with the important exception of his long article on a law of Indo-European word order (1892)—wrote anything expressly about Indo-European as such. And this is true not just in respect of

9 Wilhelm Schulze (1863–1935), a linguist with an even clearer classical background than Wackernagel’s, is the scholar with whom Wackernagel has been most frequently compared: note e.g. Pasquali (1938: 8), Forssman (Kl. Schr. III, xiii), Lloyd-Jones in von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1982: xvi–xvii), and Fraenkel (1935: 217) in his appreciation of Schulze’s work, ‘the combination of Sprachgeschichte and classische Philologie achieved in the works of Wilhelm Schulze and Jacob Wackernagel . . . cannot be abandoned without serious loss’. Schlerath (1990b: 20) quotes Wackernagel’s congratulation of Schulze, and reproduces (1990b: 22) Schulze’s long-lost handwritten appreciation of Wackernagel on the fiftieth anniversary of the latter’s doctorate. Here, Schulze notes that Wackernagel in his youth, in the 1870s, had lived through the ‘neogrammarian rebirth’ of Indo-European studies, and so hails him as ‘both Nestor and true leader of contemporary Indo-European linguistics’. Schwzyzer (1938: 227) also mentions Wackernagel’s neogrammarian connections, above all his semester as a student in Leipzig, with August Leskien in particular, in order to stress Wackernagel’s intellectual independence and the fact that he did not himself become a Neogrammarian; on the Neogrammarians, cf. pp. 69 n. 9, 198 n. 8, and 409 n. 1 below.

10 This is of course absolutely not to say that his command and control of all the Indo-European languages then known was anything less than total: it is worth remembering that he had published nothing worth speaking of on Sanskrit before the appearance of vol. 1 of Ai. Gr. in 1896.
the main topics announced in his title and addressed in his lectures, books, and articles (which mention exclusively Greek, Latin, and Indo-Iranian) but also when one has regard to the extent to which other languages are adduced as supporting evidence.\footnote{Schlerath (1990b: 12) illustrates this tellingly by pointing out that the indices to the 1880 pages of Wackernagel's \textit{Kleine Schriften} contain only 26 Slavic, 28 Baltic, and 10 Celtic words.}

Accordingly, moreover, Wackernagel employed very few reconstructed (asterisked) forms; those which he did use are mainly in his works on Greek, and they very rarely represent a phase of the language earlier than Common Greek. This fact contributes to the ageless quality of his work: in the absence of reconstructed forms, which, given the dramatic progress that has been made in Indo-European historical phonology and morphology since the 1920s, would inevitably have appeared dated long before today, his readers are at liberty to imagine either the reconstructions proper to their own age and place, or no reconstructions at all. If this position strikes an Indo-Europeanist nowadays as unduly cautious, it is important to note that it not only allowed Wackernagel to avoid a number of problems, which would have distracted him and his readers from his main purpose,\footnote{Such as arbitrary reconstructions in chronologically unclear cases, and anachronisms, 'virtual' words which may or may not have been realized; see Schlerath (1990b: 14–15) on the advantages of Wackernagel's avoidance of asterisked forms.} but that it also enabled his works to hold the attention, and even to win the trust and respect of classicists—a considerable achievement in view of the acrimonious exchanges between Indo-European linguists and classical philologists which were the order of the day in the generation before Wackernagel. Classicists and ancient historians were—and, in my experience, to a large extent still are—deterred from engaging with Indo-European studies by the frequent appeal to generally unfamiliar Indo-European languages: this makes it impossible for those without some acquaintance with, say, Sanskrit, Avestan, Old Irish, and so on, to use critically comparative-historical accounts of even the classical languages, while the perceived use of asterisked forms as if they were no less secure than the transmitted forms\footnote{This habit is criticized by Ed. Hermann (1907: 63), in his long article on reconstruction; cf. Schlerath (1990b: 13), who suggests that Wackernagel would have echoed Hermann's criticism here.} leads classicists to regard Indo-European reconstructions as based on over bold, purely speculative hypotheses.

Schlerath rightly characterizes (1990b: 15) Wackernagel's highest article of faith as the conviction that 'secure results are guaranteed only by the most exact and complete comprehension of all details of a linguistic phenomenon in a given language in the first instance—this alone holds out the prospect of tracing the ways and means of the structure and development of a language'. Probably as a result of the teaching that he received in Basel and Göttingen (and of the first courses that he gave in Basel, which included close studies of many Greek and some Latin texts), and in spite of what he saw and heard as a student in Leipzig,
Wackernagel decided for the sort of Indo-European that starts from the texts and returns to them, and which justifies itself by yielding results that the study of the texts in isolation could not have provided. So, for example, perhaps the most important lesson of his *Studies in the Language of Homer* (1916) is that textual criticism is impossible without knowledge of the history of the language in question. As practised by Wackernagel, the purpose of historical-comparative linguistics is not the reconstruction of a complete grammar and vocabulary of the parent language, but rather to throw light on the daughter languages, and to contribute to the intellectual and cultural history of their speakers.

Wackernagel comes across in his writings as modest and sober, and he is said to have been so also in his character and personality. That his results are left to speak for themselves without being theorized, generalized, or placed in wider contexts may reflect in part the contemporary academic intellectual and political environment, which placed much less pressure on scholars then than nowadays to present and justify themselves and their work. On the other hand, terseness was a characteristic of Wackernagel the man, too: he never wasted a word, also in administrative contexts producing reports and references which were always very brief (he bemoaned the verbosity of those of others), but which always hit the nail on the head (cf. Von der Mühll in Delz & Landmann 1990: 3).

As a person, Wackernagel inspired extreme respect, even reverence, to the extent that Peter Von der Mühll, who was successively his pupil, his protégé, and eventually his colleague—in 1917 he succeeded Wackernagel in the chair of Greek at Basel—felt simply unable to accept Wackernagel’s offer of the ‘Du’ (the familiar pronoun, first-name terms). Others tell of his unstinting generosity and concern for students and colleagues in need: so Von der Mühll recalls how, in Basel, in the first half of the 1890s, Wackernagel would try, ultimately in vain, to distract his close colleague Ferdinand Dümmler (Professor of Greek 1890–6) from the addictions, to alcohol and work, which eventually led to his premature death, by taking him on long walks. Wackernagel himself was sober, even puritanical, in his life and his work habits. He was noted for his hospitality to his colleagues and students, even if occasionally a touch of eccentricity showed: in Göttingen, where he often entertained at home, where academic conversation was to be enjoyed at the highest level, he would regale his guests with recitals of

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14 ‘Wackernagel represents the conquest of linguistics by the methods of classical philology ...the humanistic treatment of Indo-European studies’ (Von der Mühll 1938: 13).

15 To lose sight of the historical and the human aspects—and purposes—of language study was to risk generating mere ‘paper’, Wackernagel’s own term of opprobrium (‘Papier’, ‘papieren’), which he allegedly used in private to deprecate not the quality but the subject matter of the published work of so prominent a linguist as the Neogrammarian Hermann Osthoff (see Schlerath 1990b: 21); cf. p. 409 n. 1 below.

16 These two anecdotes are attributed to Von der Mühll by his pupil Josef Delz, in Delz & Landmann (1990: 2–3). Oertel (1938: 541) and Rüegg (1939: 17), among others, also write eloquently of Wackernagel’s unstinting readiness to help others in need of whatever sort.
the endless Alemannic poems of J. P. Hebel (cf. II, 8 and n. 22, p. 408 below), which North Germans including Eduard Fraenkel, from Berlin, found strange. Even after his eventual retirement from Basel, in his 84th and 85th years, he would still invite students to his home.\textsuperscript{17}

Wackernagel’s colleagues as well as his students have written with enormous enthusiasm and respect of his teaching. A high-school student by the name of Wilhelm Burckhardt (quoted by Mensching 1987: 40–1), whose neglected and demoralized Latin class was reinvigorated by the arrival of Wackernagel to teach them, speaks simply but eloquently of the respect, the commitment to study, and the devotion to their teacher that he inspired;\textsuperscript{18} Oertel, for example, stresses (1938: 541), with reference to his Göttingen years, his close combination of research with teaching; Rüegg (1939: 9) goes so far as to elevate his greatness as a teacher above all other aspects of his work.

In the classroom, he is said to have spoken rapidly, but with clear and dignified diction.\textsuperscript{19} He lectured largely from memory, with very few notes, and once apologized at the end of a lecture for quoting some of his examples with less than perfect accuracy, having, he explained, left all of his notes on his desk at home. This independence of paper aides-memoires went hand in hand with (whether as cause or effect of) lively movement about the classroom, a habit described vividly by both Pasquali (1938: 12), of the Göttingen years, and Rüegg (1939: 12), of the second Basel period.

In seminars, he was notoriously demanding and unbendingly strict, not only in his younger years, but also in those at Göttingen, where the requirements and challenges of his classes surpassed even those of his austere classicist colleagues and were still the subject of anecdotes eight years after he had left Göttingen to return to Basel (Lohmann 1942: 61; Schlerath 1990b: 11). Later on, Wackernagel seems to have mellowed in his classroom manner, according to Georg Landmann, who as a young student at Basel took Sanskrit (in a class of three, with two young women) from Wackernagel then in his seventies. At all events, those who knew Wackernagel as a teacher write of their experiences with genuine affection as well as with respect and admiration.

Probably the most important features of Wackernagel’s teaching, however, were its lucidity and the passion that lay behind it (both qualities vividly and

\textsuperscript{17} ‘Wackernagel was a deeply religious character, a patriotic and self-sacrificing citizen, a foe of every kind of pretence and ostentation, a liberal patron of his University upon which he shed the glory of his fame, a noble and always generous friend, an inspiring example to all those who were privileged to know him, withal the best type to the true gentleman and scholar’ (Oertel 1938: 543).

\textsuperscript{18} In 1886, the class sent Wackernagel a wedding-gift of a vase and received his thanks expressed in five Horatian Sapphic stanzas composed on honeymoon in Tivoli.

\textsuperscript{19} Depending on one’s point of view, his German was unaccented (Landmann in Delz & Landmann 1990: 7) or with very strong Swiss colouring (Pasquali 1938: 12). Rüegg (1939: 16) recalls that he spoke ‘in fits and starts, with explosive emphasis, and with pauses for reflection’.
enthusiastically described by Pasquali, Rüegg, Landmann, and others). Landmann attended in addition to Wackernagel’s Sanskrit classes his lectures on linguistics, on these occasions together with all the classicists, and, sixty years after sitting at his feet, he recalls, in a series of evocative examples, the masterly skill with which the most complicated states of affairs would be made wonderfully clear (Delz & Landmann 1990: 7–8). Landmann was at Basel shortly after the students who put together the basic text for the Lectures on Syntax. He was one of a group of students who typed up and proffered to the master with a view to its publication their version of Wackernagel’s lectures on word formation—that typescript got no further, since the author of the lectures thought them insufficiently developed for publication.

THE LECTURES ON SYNTAX

The Lectures that Wackernagel did see fit to publish are based on two successive courses on ‘the elements of syntax with special reference to Greek, Latin and German’, which he delivered in the summer of 1918 and the following winter (while Rector of the university in very difficult times). At the urging of students, friends, and colleagues, (‘practically under duress’, according to Lohmann 1942: 69), the first series, based on a text reconstructed by two members of the audience from notes taken during the oral delivery (see the author’s preface to the 1st edn of vol. 1, p. 4 below), was published in 1920. To the surprise of its author more than of anyone, this was so well received that the second series followed in 1924, and the subsequent success of both volumes called forth a second edition of each in 1926 and 1928, respectively.

The Lectures on Syntax as they stand are not about syntax. For all the greatness of this work, and in spite of its title, it is important to realize that we have in print only about half of what we might have had, and that the Lectures on Syntax are essentially about morphosyntax—that is, about the meaning and syntactic properties of morphological categories and markers, together with the special word classes of prepositions and negatives. Furthermore, as Wackernagel stresses in the prefaces to the two volumes, the treatment of the subjects covered is

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20 ‘There can be no more lucid, charming or fascinating account of grammar’ (Von der Mühll 1938: 15). The clarity of the presentation and explanations is highlighted also by the reviewers of the Lectures (n. 23, p. xvi below) and by Debrunner (1922/3: 268) in his short celebration of Wackernagel’s 70th birthday.

21 Panagl (1990: 35) raises the appealing, but undocumented, idea that the (in this case, alas, posthumous) publication in 1916 of the course of lectures in general linguistics (Cours de linguistique générale) delivered in 1911 at Geneva by Wackernagel’s fellow-linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) may have served as a model.

22 They are called a ‘torso’ by Panagl (1990: 36); Schmitt (1990b: 482) uses the same word of Wackernagel’s Sanskrit grammar, which (although continued by Albert Debrunner) still lacks the syntactic part.
uneven, and, although the account given is up to date and based on recent research and scholarship, specialists should not expect to find much that is new, since the lectures are intended especially for classicists beginning linguistics and above all school teachers (to whom, Wackernagel hopes, the lectures may suggest new ways of teaching Greek and Latin).

In spite of all this, the Lectures received extremely favourable reviews at the hands of specialists. Some of these reviews are quite long and detailed, and Wackernagel frequently takes account of them either to maintain or to concede his position in the second edition. In spite of Wackernagel’s disclaimer, his reviewers found a great deal that was new and exciting, both on points of detail and in general approach. They enthused also about the lively lecture-room style of the printed version, which gives, according to Oertel (1938: 542) ‘perhaps the most intimate picture of Wackernagel’s skill as a teacher’. The great Wilamowitz (1928: 289) described the Lectures as the very model of lectures about grammar, and wrote that reading them made him wish that he could even in old age sit at Wackernagel’s feet. Giorgio Pasquali, Götttingen pupil and lifelong friend, devoted two pages of his reminiscences of Wackernagel (1938: 12–13) to the Lectures, calling them his masterpiece (‘capolavoro’), and emphasizing the extent and importance of their influence on professional scholars as well as students, above all on Syntactica (1st edn of vol. 1, 1928; vol. 2, 1933), the magnum opus of Einar Löfstedt, the doyen of the Swedish school, the school pre-eminent at that time in the linguistic study of Latin. Even in a review of Wackernagel’s contributions to Indic studies, the leading French Sanskritist of the twentieth century Louis Renou (1938: 281–2) felt obliged to include the Lectures, ‘which contain so many new insights presented in such a suggestive way that no linguist could possibly afford to ignore this book’.

In the first two series, Wackernagel repeatedly refers ahead to future lectures on ‘syntax proper’, on clause structure, word order, the syntax of the complex

23 Important in this regard are, for example, the reviews of both volumes by Hofmann (1926), Jacobsohn (1926), Reiter (1923; 1925), and by Rupprecht (1926) of vol. 2: the last-named was writing especially for school teachers, and it is surely an indication of the success of vol. 1 (which received just eight lines in Rupprecht (1924), a small part of a notice covering several books) that vol. 2 received in the same journal its own detailed four-page review.

24 ‘Wackernagel’s Lectures on Syntax aim expressly to serve the teaching of grammar in school…but they offer specialists, too, much that is new and a mass of information that goes beyond this practical purpose’ (Reiter 1923: 249). ‘The book offers, and will continue to offer for many years, a source of supremely rich instruction, a vast supply of intellectual nourishment, both to the beginner and to the professional researcher, in schools and universities alike…In the end, what gives the book the enormous charm that it has is the way its substance is shaped by the personality of its author’ (Jacobsohn 1926: 369–70). J. B. Hofmann (1926: 37) lists some of the ‘true gems’ to be found in the Lectures, many of them stemming from the author’s own research, and stresses the breadth and depth of Wackernagel’s knowledge which ‘enables him to combine interpretation of the facts with speculation so happily that he always keeps his feet on the ground of hard reality, and remains aware that in language a single end point can be reached in the most various ways’.
sentence. In the winter of 1923/4, a third course was indeed delivered, ‘the study of Greek and Latin sentence structure (with consideration also of German)’, and this was followed in 1926/7 and 1930/1—the lecturer now in his middle and late seventies—with two further courses, both entitled ‘selected topics in the sentence structure of Greek and Latin’. Already in the preface to the 1st edn of the second series (1924), Wackernagel is less than confident that he will be able to achieve the publication of a third volume. Already then, this hope lay ‘in the lap of the gods’, and there it lies still. A huge amount of material, on 6862 pieces of paper in 127 folders, ranging in size and type from a single reference to an example or study of a syntactic phenomenon scribbled on the back of a bus-ticket to large sheets filled with closely written manuscript notes. It would be an immense task even to transcribe this material for the projected third volume of the Lectures on Syntax, and much more so to breathe into this material the life with which Wackernagel’s teaching animated the first two volumes.25

Wackernagel continued to annotate and add supplementary material to all three volumes of the Lectures—the two published and the one unpublished—until the year of his death. This is clear from references to works published in 1937 and 1938 both among his papers (the addenda to the Lectures, vols 1 and 2, and the material assembled for vol. 3) and in the copious handwritten notes that fill most of the blank pages of his personal, interleaved copy of both 1st and 2nd editions of volumes 1 and 2.26

Although one can think of works by Wackernagel in which syntactic issues are important,27 they are few and far between, and Panagl is quite right to suggest (1990: 54) that the name of Wackernagel is more readily associated with grammatical study at the level of the word or constituents of the word (lexicon, derivational and inflectional morphology, accentuation) than with clause and

25 Cf. Josef Delz’s pessimistic assessment of this desideratum ever being realized (Delz & Landmann 1990: 2); at Wackernagel’s death, his friend Hanns Oertel (1938: 542) regarded it as more attainable than the compilation of the volume on syntax of the Sanskrit grammar.

26 These notes are highly informative and suggestive and for the most part easily legible—although, after reading several hundred pages of Wackernagel’s manuscript, I readily forgive the poor typesetter the frequent misreading of his numeral signs which led to the many wrong references to ancient and modern works, which persist in the 2nd edn (I have done my best to correct them in the present edition.) In June 2007, I transcribed a large number of the most obviously interesting ones, especially from Wackernagel’s copy of the 2nd edition, and I reproduce some of these in the present work (cf. p. xx below).

27 Apart from the article on Indo-European word order (1892), Schwyzer (1938: 227) compares only the article on the dual (1877) and the short monograph on the perfect (1904), both morphosyntactic categories covered in the published Lectures, while Panagl lists the articles on genitive and adjective in the Mélanges… Saussure (1908a), on the word-position of numerals in the Festschrift Bins (1935), and on Indo-European *-kwe as a subordinating conjunction (1942). The last of these, however, is a small, posthumous fragment of what would have been the third course of Lectures, and it is artificial to include, as Panagl does, the Studies in the Language of Homer (1916) as a syntactic work. It may simply be that the high standards of comprehensiveness (well-nigh exhaustiveness) that Wackernagel set himself in the compiling and mastering of primary material and related scholarship effectively precluded him from completing to his own satisfaction a longer or more systematic work on syntactic structures.
sentence structure. Events conspired to ensure that the published *Lectures on Syntax* remained confined to the level of the word forms and their use, and any serious hope of realizing the third series of lectures in book form was relatively soon given up. This did not diminish the fascination held for generations of scholars and students by the first two series, which, remarkably, were retained in print in German until 1996.

**THE PRESENT EDITION**

Quite by chance, I began work on the present edition in the very year, 1996, in which the Basel publisher Birkhäuser decided to reprint the *Lectures* no longer. The translation was made a page at a time, so that the first draft was completed only in February 2002. This was revised between then and July 2003, and in the same period work began on Wackernagel’s bibliography, that is, on listing, identifying, and verifying his references. A start was made on the annotation in 2004/5, but about 80 per cent remained to be accomplished in 2006/7 and was achieved thanks to two semesters of research leave granted specifically for this purpose.

In the translation, I have tried to preserve something of the lively, oral, occasionally even colloquial feel of the original. Here and there, I have made minor additions, mainly in order to fill out an elliptical form of expression in the interests of clarity; in the same spirit, I have sometimes added an author’s dates or place of origin or a short phrase about the nature of the work quoted. I have added to the main text a translation of all examples drawn from foreign languages ancient and modern which Wackernagel did not translate; inserted translations are in parentheses, Wackernagel’s are not. I have translated even titles of books and articles which Wackernagel names in the original. I have (silently) added also many references, chiefly to Greek and Latin texts, in cases where Wackernagel gave just the name of the author or no reference at all. Very rarely, I have changed or removed a word or a phrase or an example from the translation, either because Wackernagel has corrected it in a handwritten note in his personal copy of the *Lectures*, or because it seemed to me to be erroneous; in either case, I have added an explanatory note (for the conventions used, see p. xx below).

Wackernagel’s rather brief Tables of Contents are reproduced in translation on pp. v–vii above, but readers may find in the new ‘running header’ a quicker way of finding their way from topic to topic. I have retained Wackernagel’s highlighting of the first mention of a new subject, and have emphasized more frequently than he did the forms and constructions at issue in quoted examples; in both situations, bold type is used. In preparing the edition I found it helpful to have highlighted in SMALL CAPS the names of scholars referred to by Wackernagel,
and have retained this in the main text but not in the footnotes. I have retained all of Wackernagel’s cross-references, and added a few more, including some to footnotes as well as lectures. Volume and page references to the 2nd edition of the Lectures are printed in the outside margin in order to facilitate comparison with Wackernagel’s German. The indices are based on Wackernagel’s own, and cover both series of Lectures.

The single list of items in the Bibliography at the end of the book includes those referred to in this introduction and the footnotes as well as those works referred (or alluded!) to in the Lectures themselves; a few of the latter are, I confess and regret, at this point still untraced. On the whole, in the text of the lectures reference is made in the case of ancient authors to current standard editions, but for modern scholarship to the editions that Wackernagel would have used: in the bibliography, I mention, if rather unsystematically, later editions, reprints, and English translations known to me. My own choice of references in the notes has been affected accidentally by knowledge and ignorance, and deliberately in that I have tended (although not at all costs) to favour recent, readily available publications in English in the first instance.

In the notes, I have tried to keep four aims in mind: (i) to provide some brief, basic, dictionary-style information and bibliography about people and things mentioned in the lectures which I expect to be less familiar to the readers of this edition than to Wackernagel’s original audience (at least in his estimation); (ii) to explain Wackernagel’s comments and assumptions and to relate them to their contemporary scholarly contexts in classical studies and linguistics; (iii) to update the scholarship where this materially affects the argument; and (iv) where appropriate, to add further observations from the vantage point of modern understanding of Greek and Roman literary and social history, and especially of the history and linguistics of Greek and Latin.

In his prefaces, Wackernagel expresses regret that he has taken no, or insufficient, account of recent publications central to his themes. I similarly regret, in particular, referring all too little to Clackson (2007) and Weiss (forthcoming), and not at all to Clackson & Horrocks (2007) and Colvin (2007). In his prefaces, Wackernagel also apologizes—in my view, unnecessarily—for his uneven coverage of the topics addressed; I fear that my annotation is no less uneven, and for this apology is due. The notes are inevitably selective in what they respectively touch on and ignore. Every reader will find the annotation by turns superfluous and inadequate. The reader for whom I have tried to annotate is keenly curious about language, language change, grammar both descriptive and historical, and the history of scholarship, but may have little prior knowledge of the languages and topics treated in the Lectures. But my guesses as to what this reader may or may not wish or need to be told have been coloured by my own ignorance and knowledge, in respect both of what the notes include (‘I didn’t know that! I must write a note
about it.”) and of what they leave unremarked (‘This is surely familiar stuff: let’s move on!’). Attempting to annotate Wackernagel has been a deeply humbling experience. My highest hope for the notes taken together is that they will enhance readers’ appreciation of the Lectures and make them wish to read more about the topics addressed and the questions raised.

CONVENTIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

References to Greek and Latin authors and works where they are abbreviated—and often I have deliberately given them in full, especially in the text of the Lectures—follow the conventions of LSJ and the OLD, respectively. Works of modern scholarship, in lectures and notes alike, are referred to in the Author (date: page) format, except a few standard reference works for which an abbreviation seemed preferable as being less cumbersome.

[Add.] encloses each of the addenda printed at the end of the 2nd Swiss edition, each of which is now in its proper place in the text of the lectures. The solitary footnote printed in the Swiss edition is also here in main text (pp. 476–7).

‘ms. add.¹’, ‘ms. add.²’, and ‘ms. add.³’ refer to Wackernagel’s handwritten notes in his personal copy of respectively the 1st and 2nd Swiss edition of the Vorlesungen and on the leaves of paper stored in the folders, ‘Mappen’ (cf. p. xvii and n. 26 above).

‘[.. . . .]’ indicates that I have removed some words from the text of the original into the accompanying footnote (cf. p. xviii above).

In the notes, I refer to Jacob Wackernagel as ‘W.’. ‘OHG’, ‘MHG’, and ‘NHG’ stand for respectively Old, Middle, and New [i.e. modern] High German; ‘IE’ is often used for Indo-European.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Finally, it is a pleasure to record the many debts of gratitude and more that I have incurred in the making of this edition. Their number reflects both the varied subject matter of the Lectures and the long years that have elapsed since I started translating them. Together the people and institutions mentioned below have made the present work better than it would have been without their help and support, and I am profoundly grateful to them all. Of course, for all the errors and imperfections that remain in this edition I am alone responsible.

At the very outset, Jasper Griffin and Gregory Hutchinson gave me, independently, valuable encouragement in my belief that the project was in itself worthwhile. The decision to proceed having been taken, Wolfgang Wackernagel
generously gave his permission to publish a translation. The Public Library of the University of Basel and the Institute for Classical Philology of the University of Basel have been no less generous in granting permission to reproduce the images on the dust jacket.

The edition is indebted for vital financial support: to the University of Oxford for the award of a Special Lecturership in 1997/8, thanks to which subsidy I was able to begin with Iveta Mednikarova the work of verifying Wackernagel’s references ancient and modern; to the University of Mainz for sharing with me in 2002/3 the research assistance of Olaf Schneiß, who helped me to complete a basic list of Wackernagel’s references; to the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, and the University of Manchester for help with my maintenance in autumn 2006; and above all to the Arts and Humanities Research Council for funding a second semester of research leave in 2006/7 through a Research Leave Award.

In the drafting of the notes (and sometimes in the tracking down of some of Wackernagel’s more allusive and elusive references), I received prompt and friendly help, advice and information on individual points of substance or bibliography or both from the following friends and colleagues: Jim Adams, Philip Alexander, Richard Ashdowne, Peter Barber, Athina Bazou, Mary Beagon, Jim Benson, Joan Booth, John Briscoe, Wiebke Brockhaus-Grand, Peter G. McC. Brown, Felix Budelmann, David Butterfield, Vanessa Champion, James Clackson, Amy Coker, Tim Cornell, Jason Crowley, Adrian Curtis, David Denison, Martin Durrell, Patrick Finglass, Harriet Flower, Bruce Fraser, Inge Genee, Coulter George, Bruce Gibson, Roy Gibson, Jean-Yves Guillaumin, Rolf Gutiérrez, John Healey, Stephen Heyworth, Gregory Hutchinson, Joshua Katz, Valerie Knight, Daniel Kölligan, Csaba La’da, Anne Langslow, Luca Larpí, Daryn Lehoux, Peter Liddel, Polly Low, Martin Maiden, Regine May, Ruth Morello, Anna Morpurgo Davies, Andrew Morrison, Peter Oakes, Costas Panayotakis, Robert Parker, Tim Parkin, Mair Parry, Caroline Petit, Harm Pinkster, Eric Pratt, Philomen Probert, Antonia Ruppel, Alison Sharrock, James Sickinger, Heinrich von Staden, Catherine Steel, James Thorne, Stephen Todd, Elizabeth Tucker, Nigel Vincent, Rudolf Wachter, Michael Weiss, Andreas Willi, Jo Willmott, Roger Wright.

To some of these individuals I owe further debts of gratitude: to Jim Adams, Tim Cornell, Stephen Heyworth, Costas Panayotakis, and Michael Weiss for letting me see portions of forthcoming works in typescript. And I am especially grateful to (in chronological order) Anna Morpurgo Davies, Michael Weiss, Valerie Knight, and Eric Pratt for reading and giving me the benefit of their valuable comments on substantial portions of the translation and notes, and to David Butterfield for identifying or explaining in the past ten months more items on my ‘loose ends’ list (vague allusions, incorrect references, etc.) than I had dared to hope possible.
The Director of the Institute and the Faculty of the School of Historical Studies, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, elected me to a Membership of their earthly paradise for the first term of 2006/7, where this project benefited greatly from the wonderfully ‘can-do’ approach and the expert and generous help of all the staff of the Historical Studies–Social Sciences Library, especially Marcia Tucker (Librarian), Karen Downing (Interlibrary Loan), and Gabriella Hoskin (Liaison with Princeton University Firestone Library), of the Members Secretary Terrie Bramley, and of the School’s Administrative Officer Marian Zelazny. At the John Rylands University Library Manchester, Paul Holder (Head of Stock Management & Logistics, and Academic Liaison Librarian for Classics & Ancient History) and Joanne Crane (Store Supervisor) did their utmost to help me through various problems.

Ueli Dill, Head of the Department of Manuscripts of the Public Library of the University of Basel, gave me generous assistance, during my visit in June 2007 and since, with access to and interpretation of the catalogues and materials of Wackernagel’s academic papers. Dominik Hunger, in the Reproductions Department of the same library, took great care over the image for the dust jacket.

Oxford University Press has been from this editor’s point of view the ideal publisher. I fear that I have severely tested the forbearance of Hilary O’Shea, for more years than I care to recall, and Dorothy McCarthy’s, too, but they have both been unwaveringly kind and encouraging, and given excellent professional advice and direction. The book’s final form has benefited greatly also from the high competence, accuracy, and patience of Charlotte Green (production editor), Jess Smith (copy editor), Richard Ashdowne (proofreader), and last but not least Kathleen Fearn, who very kindly checked and corrected the last two sets of revises. (It was unfortunately impossible to correct in detail the spacing of the Greek letters in Index 4.1). The efficiency of all concerned at OUP led to the perhaps appropriate coincidence that the last words in this edition of the Lectures were written on the seventieth anniversary of the death of their author.

DRL
Manchester, 22 May 2008
I

First Course of Lectures
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AUTHOR’S PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

Contrary to expectation, it has become necessary to prepare a second impression of my *Lectures on Syntax*. The whole layout of the work told against a radical revision, and I have had to confine myself to polishing here and there the form of expression and to correcting the misprints and errors which disfigured the first edition: to these ends I have made grateful use of all the points made by reviewers and those who kindly wrote to me. I have also made some additions to the material presented, together with references to recent publications, although these supplements are scarce and very brief [editor’s note: on the treatment in the present edition of this additional material, on p. [I,] 313 of the original, see p. xx above]. I much regret the fact that I have not discussed in detail (on pp. [I,] 63–4) Sommer’s *Comparative Syntax of the School Languages* [Sommer 1921], nor (on p. [I,] 107) his article in *Antidoron* on the use of εγινο with αιματικ, etc. [Sommer 1924]. On the other hand, in the section on the infinitive (p. [I,] 263), I was able to refer, albeit very briefly, to the new volume of Mayser’s grammar of the papyri dealing with part of the syntax [Mayser II.1.1] (cf. p. [I,] 37 below), which appeared while the present volume was in press.—In consequence of the above, the size of this book is almost unchanged; even the page numbers of this new edition match almost exactly those of the old. The indices, however, are completely new and much more comprehensive than those of the first edition.

Let me repeat the remark I made in the preface to the first edition, that this work, arising as it does directly from lectures, neither aims at completeness nor pretends to offer much that is new. I hope therefore that readers will not take exception to the patchiness of the coverage.

J. Wackernagel
Basel, June 1926
AUTHOR’S PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

In the syntactical lectures printed in the present volume, those who know the field will not encounter much that is particularly new. They will also find many of the chapters too brief and patchy, perhaps even superficial, and they will miss especially evenness of treatment. In delivering the lectures, my concern was to offer my audience something of an overview and to try to show them syntax in its engaging aspects.

The lectures are now printed by and large in the form in which they were delivered orally, and for this fact I am bound to say the main responsibility lies with my younger friends and colleagues. They believed that a gap would be filled given the lack of a relatively new account of the subject which concentrated on the essentials without being limited to the merely elementary. They would be particularly pleased if this short book were able to serve the teaching of grammar in schools and here and there help to enliven and deepen it. To this extent, it is offered above all to my revered colleagues who teach in Swiss schools.

The original intention was to publish the lectures in the more modest form of photocopied typescript using the text reconstructed with devoted industry by Drs phil. Brender and Sulser. In the end, for technical and financial reasons, we decided on printed publication. That is not to say that the work is intended for a global readership.

I would observe explicitly that I have for the most part given references only to particularly important specialist works or to those which have appeared within the last few years and are therefore not signalled in the handbooks. I should add the further note that in the section on Lat. *priusquam* (‘before’, pp. [I,] 246–7) I have made use of observations which R. Thurneysen sent me many years ago—although that does not mean that I may impose on him any responsibility for what is said there. And one more thing: my comment on Draeger on p. [I,] 31 came out in a more caustic form than is due to a scholar who has in any case done meritorious work.

In the present volume, publication is achieved of a first part, based on a course given in the summer of 1918. A second part, based on lectures given in the Winter Semester 1918/19, and concentrating on syntactic problems in the narrower sense, will be published if the sale of this first series indicates any interest in the work.
For untiring assistance with the preparation of the text, which went far beyond the correction of misprints, I owe a debt of thanks to Peter Von der Mühll; Dr Sulser contributed to the work also by composing the Indices.

Jacob Wackernagel
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Lecture I, 1

We must begin our account with the question, often posed in recent times, **What is syntax?** If we go simply by its etymology, the answer is easy: syntax is the ancient Greek word σύνταξις, abstract derivative of συντάσσω (‘put in order together, organize, arrange’).

The word is attested already in the fifth century in several senses derived from the verb, which do not concern us here. We shall confine ourselves to the use of the word among those who conducted research on language. They use σύνταξις in the first place of the joining together of the letters of the alphabet. Herodian (2nd c. AD), one of the most eminent of the grammarians, who had perhaps more influence than any on later centuries, wrote a monograph entitled Περὶ συντάξεως τῶν στοιχείων (‘Concerning the Conjunction of the Letters’).1 In it he asks what sort of letter combinations are possible and, in particular, how syllables are to be divided. Secondly, and analogously, the word σύνταξις was applied to the combining of words in a sentence. In the Roman Imperial period this is standard, the reference being sometimes simply to the purely formal act of stringing words together, sometimes to the syntactic structure. The word may have been used in this sense already in the linguistic theory of the Stoics.2

At all events, the term ‘syntax’ achieved significance and acknowledged currency—and, I would add, renown—through a frequently cited work written by the father of Herodian, Apollonius Dyscolus, who taught in Alexandria. His nickname refers to the difficulty that he caused his pupils in his writings and lectures, and for us, too, his explanations are far from easy to understand.3 Beside a great many other works, he wrote four books Περὶ συντάξεως. This work has

1 Aelianus Herodianus of Alexandria was active at Rome under Marcus Aurelius, to whom he dedicated his *tagmēn oris*, the *Katholikē proseutēia*, on the accentuation of Greek in 20 books. The monograph to which W. here refers (*GG* III.2, 390–406) was probably part of a larger work on orthography; for an introduction to research on Herodian since 1890, see Dyck (1993).

2 It occurs in the title of two works ascribed (by Diog. Laërt. 7. 192–3) to Chrysippus, head of the Stoa from 232 BC and the most influential of the Stoics after their founder Zeno of Citium (335–263 BC), especially in Stoic logic, which included what we would call grammar. On Stoic linguistic theory, see I, 14–15 and nn. 6–7, pp. 24–5 below.

3 The view that Διόσκολος means ‘difficult to understand’, of his writings is only one of three competing explanations of Apollonius’ cognomen, all of them in the ancient *Life* (*GG* II.3, xi–xii). The suggested alternatives are (a) ‘difficult, peevish’, of Apollonius’ ill temper, and (b) ‘difficult to answer’, of Apollonius’ posing of impossible questions in grammatical contests in the gymnasium.
been in print since the sixteenth century, but the only edition worth considering today is that of UHLIG (1910), which has a reliable text and a brief running summary of the contents, which makes it possible to follow the difficult train of thought. Apollonius sets himself the task of explaining how independent sentences can arise through the joining together of words, and this involves him in going through the functions of the parts of speech one by one. One indication of the great regard in which this work was held is the fact that Priscian (for us the most important of the Roman grammarians, who lived, taught, and wrote in Constantinople in the first decades of the sixth century), after presenting the phonology and inflectional morphology of Latin in sixteen books, followed these in books 17 and 18 with a Latin version of Apollonius Dyscolus, applying to Latin, of course, what Apollonius had taught for Greek. Priscian translated σύνταξις as constructio (‘putting together, arrangement’; 17. 1 = GL III, 108. 1–2).4

Thanks to Apollonius, the term ‘syntax’ became established roughly in the sense of sentence structure. I cannot say to what extent it remained alive over the centuries, but at all events nineteenth-century grammarians operated with it. More important is the question how we are to use the term and what we should treat under the heading ‘syntax’. This has been much debated in the last few decades. Since the question ‘What is syntax?’ had already led many scholars to better-focused reflection on matters of principle, particularly great attention was paid to the book bearing the question as its title, published in 1894 (2nd edn 1927) by John RIES (1857–1933), a Germanist engaged in independent research in this area. In fact, nobody before RIES was ever quite clear what was supposed to be included under what was called ‘syntax’.5 Here are some of the ways in which syntax has been defined. I confine myself to the most important.

A serviceable system—in particular because of its perfect consistency—is that of the Syntax of the Slavic Languages (1868–75, 2nd edn 1883) by Franz MIKLÓSICH (1813–91), a leading Slavist, who has done great service also in his work on the Gypsy languages. He begins this book, the fourth volume of his Comparative Grammar of the Slavic Languages, with the sentence, ‘Syntax is the study of the meaning of word-classes and word-forms.’ He accordingly sets out to determine the meaning of the grammatical forms, and carries this through with perfect consistency. He has produced an extraordinarily instructive set of material, although it must be said that in this approach much goes by the board about which we should like to hear and about which we should justifiably expect to be


5 W. cannot be wholly serious here: on 19th-c. syntax in general, see Morpurgo Davies (1998: 304–11) and esp. the excellent monograph by Graffi (2001).
informed: we learn nothing about sentence types as such, nothing about the
accentuation of the sentence, nothing about word order, nothing about connec-
tions between sentences.

A second system is presented in the work of the classicist Christian Carl Reisig
(1792–1829), whose lectures on the Latin language were edited (1839) by his pupil
Friedrich Haase in Breslau. Reisig divided his whole grammar into three parts.
In the first, he presented the morphology, which he called ‘etymology’; in the
second, ‘semasiology’, the theory of meaning, where he deals with the meaning of
the grammatical forms; and in the third part comes the syntax, the theory of
the combination of words. The substance of his second part is roughly what
Miklosich presents in his ‘syntax’, while in Reisig’s third part the means of
combining and joining words are explicitly addressed.

A third, related, form of presentation is that which Krüger chooses in his
Greek grammar for schools. He divides his syntax into two parts (1873–91: 1. 2. 1).
The ‘Analysis’ treats in turn (a) the noun—gender, number, case—and the article,
and (b) voices, tenses, and moods of the verb, and infinitive and participle. In the
second main part, the ‘Synthesis’, Krüger discusses the combining of nouns and
adjectives; sentence structure; relations of agreement; the construction of simple
and complex sentences. So Krüger’s ‘Analysis’ corresponds more or less to
Reisig’s ‘Semasiology’, his ‘Synthesis’ to Reisig’s ‘Syntax’.

In contrast with these lucid systems, most accounts are characterized by
complete confusion, comments on sentence structure being made both before
and after those on the functions of the individual forms. Obviously, such a lack of
system cannot possibly be of any benefit to the description itself. In no scholarly
discipline is untidiness more out of place than in grammar. But what Miklosich
offers is not satisfactory either, because he says nothing about combinations. And
now Ries has championed the view that the only proper business of ‘Syntax’ is
what Krüger calls ‘Synthesis’, and that the meaning of case-forms, etc. must be
treated as part and parcel of morphology. Ries’s vote has had great influence. In
particular, the leading contemporary exponent of systematic comparative gram-
mar, Karl Brugmann, has sided with Ries and treated the meaning of the
inflectional forms under morphology. Strictly speaking, there is of course some-
ting nonsensical in saying first of all that this form is the genitive of, say, lucrum,
and then in another place that the genitive has such and such a set of functions.
Consideration of function cannot be separated from that of form because not all
forms which bear the same name have the same value; this very form, for
example, the so-called genitive lucri, occurs in usages unattested for third-declen-
sion genitives (cf. II, 217 below). Or, again, it can be shown that the plural of

6  Note also the later edition, in three volumes, Reisig (1881–90).
7  On Krüger’s Greek grammar, see further I, 30–3 below.
neuter nouns is not identical in function with plurals of masculine and feminine gender (I, 89 below). In Greek the same sort of thing is true of the aorist passive (I, 137–9 below).

In principle, the procedure advocated by Ries and followed by Brugmann is absolutely right: also the boundary that Ries has proposed between grammar and stylistics deserves, on the whole, our approval. But of course we do have to take account of the actual state of affairs: in nearly all existing grammar books, and in lectures on grammar, the meaning of the inflectional forms is not dealt with under morphology proper, and consequently ‘syntax’ has to fill in the gaps. I shall therefore treat not only Krüger’s ‘Analysis’ and Reisig’s ‘Semasiology’ but also what is understood as ‘syntax’ in the narrower sense—this is the approach taken also by the most eminent syntactician of the present age, Berthold Delbrück (1893–1900: I, 73–86). In the interests of clear presentation, however, we shall do well, as Delbrück does, to keep these two subjects separate.8

With this in mind, I intend to present a swift overview of the syntax of Greek, Latin and German. I am presupposing no specialist knowledge of these subjects, merely the knowledge you bring with you from school. I have thought it important to deal with German alongside the classical languages because we shall thereby enjoy the benefit of being able to refer to our own native-speaker intuitions, and because one of the tasks of the grammarian is to illuminate living languages and not to have his eye only on the past.9 This does not mean that I am

8 In fact, Berthold Delbrück (1842–1922) had died a few years before the publication of the 2nd edn of the Vorlesungen. Note the biography of Delbrück by Eduard Hermann (1923a), and especially on his Introduction (1880), see Morpurgo Davies (1998: 235, 245–6); on Delbrück and Karl Brugmann (1849–1919), note also Sebeok (1966: I, 489–96 and 575–80). Delbrück confronts John Ries explicitly in the opening of the third volume of his comparative syntax (1893–1900: III, 1–5). There is illuminating discussion of the individuals mentioned in the last few paragraphs in Morpurgo Davies (1998) and Graffi (2001), both with further references: of the classicists Reisig and Haase, now regarded as the founders of German Semasiologie, the systematic study of meanings and their interrelations and developments; of Miklosich and his (de facto) identification of syntax with morphosyntax; and especially of John Ries, his reaction against Miklosich, and his influence. Morpurgo Davies characterizes (1998: 311) Ries’s ‘final aim’ as ‘an integrated theory of form and meaning in which syntax implicitly acquires a primary role since the meaning and function of words can only be established starting from the utterance’. She sees (335 n. 47) Ries’s influence also in e.g. Meyer-Lübke’s introduction to vol. 3, on syntax, of his grammar of the Romance languages (1890–1902), and she quotes an essentially Riesian definition of syntax from a recent standard work on English syntax (McCawley 1998). Brugmann ‘sides with’ Ries’s ‘Analysis’ as ‘the word-forms and their use’ and the formation of phrases and sentences (623 ff.) and the second edition of the Grundriss (1917–1916), part 2 of which is devoted again to ‘the word-forms and their use’. In Brugmann & Thumb (1913: 414–16), the important practical point is made that, while Ries’s strict partition of the study of (a) the form and (b) the meaning of (1) single word-forms (‘Wortlehre’) and (2) combinations of words (‘Syntax’) is in theory all well and good, it is not always easy or even possible to keep 1b and 2b neatly apart. For a contemporary British reaction against the separation of syntax from stylistics, note e.g. Lawton (1900): W. would have sympathized with Lawton’s main point that ‘nothing can be understood or enjoyed aright when torn out of its proper place. . . . Linguistics is biology, not anatomy’.

9 Linguists recognized already in the 19th c. that this is one of the grammarian’s tasks partly because the benefits are in fact mutual, that the study of living languages—and the development of synchronic and
undertaking always to do justice in equal measure to all three languages. Sometimes one language, sometimes another may tend to hold centre stage. I also reserve the right to discuss some features in more detail than others, and occasionally even to seize on other languages, if it serves our purpose.

It is a very valuable thing in a linguistic account such as this not to be restricted to a single language but to take several together. The solving of a problem benefits immeasurably from a **comparative approach**. The comparative method has shown itself to be fruitful and indispensable in other disciplines, too. Making comparisons between languages presupposes a certain degree of similarity and relatedness, but even for the languages which are our present concern, three types of relatedness come into question, just as in other fields, such as law, there can be three types of relatedness between different peoples.

(i) Relatedness based on human nature, on general laws of the human psyche, fundamental relatedness. There is no doubt that there are phenomena of a syntactic nature (syntactic in the broadest sense) which may be traced across many languages of the world, without there being any connections between the peoples who speak these languages. These features are best described precisely in terms of their universality, and they show that some expressions that we find in Greek, Latin, and German are deeply rooted in the nature of human speech.10

Let me pick out a couple of examples. When you study Latin, you learn—and may be surprised by—the rule that after a comparative adjective the noun denoting the thing compared goes in the ablative. And if you later on come to learn Greek, you are told that Greek possesses an analogous short form of the comparative construction, except that it then puts the noun in the genitive. In the old days, when languages were studied in isolation, that Latin ablative was understood as being in instrumental function and, for example, *maior fratre* (‘greater than his brother’) was interpreted as literally ‘greater by means of, or through, his brother’. The genitive in the Greek construction, on the other hand, was identified with the genitive that is found with the superlative and viewed as a partitive genitive.11

**Comparing Syntax Across Languages**

10 Today, this form of linguistic comparison is called ‘(language) typology’ and makes prominent reference, including in the titles of textbooks, e.g. Comrie (1989), Croft (2003), to ‘(language) universals’. Croft (2003: i) distinguishes ‘typological classification’ (‘the classification of structural types across languages . . . having to do with cross-linguistic comparison of some sort’) from ‘typological generalisation’ (‘the study of patterns that occur systematically across languages’, generally involving language universals). On linguistic typology and classification in the 19th c. and before, see Robins (1973) and Morpurgo Davies (1998: 212–19).

11 This account was perhaps encouraged by the apparent (strictly illogical) use of the superlative for the comparative with a genitive plural, as e.g. in the parodos of Sophocles’ *Antigone* ΤΟΥ ΚΑΛΛΙΣΤΟΝ τῶν προτέρων φῶς lit. ‘light loveliest of previous (lights)’, i.e. lovelier than any previous. This is memorably imitated by Milton, *Paradise Lost* 4, 323 ‘Adam the goodliest man of men since born | His sons, the fairest of her daughters Eve’.
In fact, however, the relationship between the Greek and Latin expressions can be explained only by the fact that Greek genitive forms generally have ablative function. The comparison makes clear that we must see an ablative force in this form of expression, and this is made certain by Sanskrit, where, in the corresponding construction, a pure ablative is usual, a case formally distinct from the Sanskrit instrumental. Indeed, the use of an ablative expression with a comparative adjective is grounded in human nature, a fact that can be demonstrated from later forms of the classical languages. First, an example from modern Greek, where we commonly find expressions of the type πλουσιότερος ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄδελφον, lit. ‘richer from his brother’, exactly like Latin dītior fratre (abl.).

The comparative relation is felt as a distance, as a departure. By being richer, the rich man distances himself from the poor man. It is a form of expression that cannot be regarded as a sort of imitation of earlier Greek but which springs directly from the natural language instinct. Something similar occurs in later Latin in the writings of the gromatici (or agrimensores ‘land-surveyors’), where we find expressions such as plus a quattuor lapidibus, ‘more than four stones’, literally ‘more from four stones’ (p. 250, 8 Campbell = p. 344, 8 Lachmann).12

Among cognate languages, Slavic, for example, has an identical usage, e.g. in Polish mi mniej od nich, ‘I have less than they’; od normally means ‘from, away from’ (see now Ernst Fraenkel 1921: 20–5);13 so, too, does modern Persian with az ‘from, out of’ (cf. I, 303 below). And if we turn to an unrelated language like Hebrew, we find an analogous use of the preposition min ‘away from’ with the comparative; similarly in Turkish, where ‘than’ is expressed with the ablative suffix.14

You may know from reading Homer that, while the direct object is usually in the accusative, when it is just a part of something, the genitive is used, so e.g. at Iliad 9. 214 πάσοσεν ἀλὸς ‘he sprinkled some salt (gen.)’; similarly in Thucydides at 4. 80. 2 εἴλώτων ἐκπέμψατο ‘to send out some of the helots (gen.)’. In exactly the same way in Finnish it is usual to mark an object in its entirety with the accusative, a part of it with the genitive.15 In Homer, even the subject can be expressed in the genitive like this (see Homer, Iliad 11. 278 ἀργός ἄλος ‘he sprinkled the salt (abs.)’).

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12 On the Roman land-surveyors, see now Guillaumin (1996) and Campbell (2000). For the addition of prepositions, note already Ovid, Heroides 16. 98, 17. 69. It has been suggested that the retention of the bare ablative of comparison in Latin was due to Greek influence; see Coleman (1977: 143), with references.

13 In Polish, the construction with od is ‘less bookish’ than that with niż ‘than’ (+ nom.), but is used only when (a) the terms of comparison are noun phrases, and (b) the first term is either the grammatical subject of the sentence or the logical subject of the comparative’ (see Rothstein 1993: 706–7).

14 On the reconstruction of the syntax of comparison in Proto-Indo-European, see Andersen (1980). The ‘separative’ (i.e. ablative) construction emerges as the most prominent in Stassen’s recent study (1985) of the comparative construction in a sample of 110 languages; cf. the surveys of comparative constructions in Andersen (1983) and Crookston (1999).

15 Or rather, with the partitive, another of the many cases of Finnish, distinct from the genitive; as in W.’s next example, the Finnish partitive alternates also with the nominative in subject function. See further Sulkala & Karjalainen (1992: 210–12), Abondolo (1998a: 156–8), and on the Finnish cases, I, 301 below and n. 2, p. 502.
stand in the genitive if only part of it is involved, as in the negative clause at *Iliad* 13. 191 ὀὐ πηχρόδες εἰσαρχὸν ‘nowhere was (any of) his skin (gen.) visible’.  

Comparison is fruitful not only in that it makes us recognize similarities but also in that it helps us to see variations, and thus saves us from thinking that what is familiar to us must necessarily be as it is. There is a difference between our three languages, on the one hand, and the Semitic languages, on the other, with regard to tense. When we use a verb form, we think above all of the time of the action, or tense (‘Zeitstufe’). Anyone familiar with the Semitic languages, however, knows that this distinction between tenses is foreign to them. A Semitic speaker cannot directly represent distinctions of time. He distinguishes only between complete and incomplete actions.  

—Or again, one of the most important rules of word order in the Indo-European languages is that the determiner precedes the thing determined. We say, for instance, *Gottes Haus* (‘God’s house’), Greek says Ἰωνίς πόλεως (‘Zeus’s city’), while the Semitic expression is fundamentally reversed: *beth-el* ‘house—of God’.

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16 Cf. Janko (1994: *ad loc*). With a negative, this use of the gen. is apparently inherited from IE; without, it is not found in Greek before the 5th c. (Herodotus 3. 102); cf. Schwyzer & Debrunner 102. Chantraine (1953: 50–1) compares *Il* 22. 319, 325; Schwyzer adds Arist. *Wasps* 352.

17 In Biblical Hebrew, for example, the perfect (of punctual aspect) is used of complete actions, e.g. הָלְבָא יָרֵא אֶת הָעָנָה ‘I wrote’, as opposed to the imperfect (of durative aspect), which is used of ongoing or future actions, e.g. מְלַכְתָּה יָרֵא אֶת הָעָנָה ‘I write; will write; am writing’; on Hebrew, see further McCarter (2004: 347–8). These contrasting verbal conjugations are traditionally called ‘tenses’, at least with reference to the West Semitic languages, although ‘aspect’ would be more appropriate; for surveys of this immensely complicated and controversial area of Semitic linguistics, see Moscati *et al.* (1964: §§16.28–31), Lipiński (1997: 332, 334), and Stempel (1999: 124–30).

18 On this Indo-European pattern, which some believe goes hand in hand with the placement of the verb after its object (1, 7 below), see Lehmann (1974: esp. ch. 3) on nominal modifiers, Adams (1976) with special reference to Latin, and more generally Lehmann (1992: ch. 12). In Indo-European the rule is more controversial than one would guess from W., placement depending vitally on the nature of the determiner (see e.g. Pinkster 1990a: 184–8, with further references); in Semitic, things are more straightforward, though again not without principled exceptions; cf. Lipiński (1997: 494–504) on attributive, appositional and genitival or subjoining relations in the nominal phrase.
Lecture I, 2

(2) A second type of relatedness between languages is what one tends to think of first, namely that which is based on ethnic kinship and so on common linguistic inheritance. It is the business of those occupied with this field to set side by side what is common to the related languages, and to establish and trace back to an original form what speakers of Greek, Latin, and German inherited and, in turn, handed on. In this course on syntax, we shall have constantly to deal with inherited material, which is to be found in even the smallest details and in oddities concerning which one would hardly think in terms of inheritance. For example, at *Iliad* 3. 276–7, in a prayer to Zeus and the Sun-god, we read: Ζεύς πατέρ... Ῥῆλιος τε (‘Zeus father (voc.)... and Helios (the Sun) (nom.)’), i.e. in the invocation one god is named in the vocative, the other in the nominative. It would be superficial simply to refer this to the requirements of the metre, since the poet would have had other means at his disposal for turning out a correct hexameter. From the point of view of Greek this is an oddity, particularly as vocatives elsewhere occur in coordination. This puzzle was solved by an outstanding philologist, Theodor Benfey (1809–81). He showed (1872: 30–4) that in the *Rigveda*, the oldest written remains of an Indo-European language, when two forms of address are joined together with the little word *ca* (corresponding to Greek *κα* ‘and’) (corresponding to Greek τε ‘and’), the second is in the nominative rather than the vocative. So Homer’s use of the nominative instead of the vocative is conditioned by the little word τε. This tiny detail reveals the power of linguistic habit and the influence of inheritance.¹

Another example: in the stringing together of words, certain rules of placement apply. We are not free in our use of these rules; we order the words just as we heard them from those who taught us our language. Even if many rearrangements occurred, a rule of word order would be passed on from generation to generation for millennia, so that a regularity of the present day might possibly be

¹ Benfey’s main thesis was that the voc. was originally the same as the nom. Cf. Monro (1891: 155), Schwyzer & Debrunner 63, Chantraine (1953: 36). The composition of the Vedas may have begun as early as c.1500 BC and continued until c.500, although they were not written down until much later (Jamison 2004a: 673). Note that we now have written remains in other Indo-European languages as old as and older than those in Vedic Sanskrit, namely in Mycenaean Greek (c.1350–1200 BC) and Hittite (c.1650/1600–1200 BC); for bibliographical orientation, see Watkins (2004) on Hittite, and Bartoněk (2003) and Woodard (2004a: 651–2) on Mycenaean.
traced back into the mists of prehistory. In fact, there is a genetic connection between the German habit in a subordinate clause of putting the verb at the end, and the Latin rule that the normal position for the verb is at the end of the sentence. The same rule holds, more or less, in Sanskrit prose, too.2

On the other hand, it has to be said that it is not only the establishment of similarities and of what is inherited that is instructive; no less informative is the establishment of disagreements, of those instances in which something is different from how it was originally, where a usage can be shown to have been altered or given up. This is particularly valuable for showing us what sort of new tendencies were operative in historical times. For example, in early Greek, to a very high degree in Homer and still in Herodotus, too, there is the rule that small, weakly accented words, no matter what their syntactic relations, must be placed immediately after the first word of the sentence. As a result, it can happen that a τις or τι (‘some(one, -thing), any(one, -thing)’), or a genitive μου or σου (‘of me’, ‘of you’ sg.) stands a long way away from the constituent of the sentence with which it belongs syntactically. In Attic Greek this often fails to apply, and even enclitic words are usually moved close to the words they belong to syntactically. The Homeric pattern is inherited and can be illustrated also from (e.g.) Sanskrit. In Attic, therefore, we see an innovation, which teaches us that for Attic speakers the requirements of logic were stronger than rhythmical tendencies.3

(3) Lastly, a word to the type of similarity that arises from borrowing. In the last few decades, awareness has increased of the extraordinarily strong effect that can be exerted by one language on another; see now especially Vendryes (1921: 341–8).4 This is easiest for us to understand when it involves the borrowing of individual words, but the use of particular forms of words, and regularities of sentence structure, can also be determined by the model of foreign languages.5 I want to begin with the most obvious case of translation from a foreign language. It is so easy to take over constructions from the foreign language! I am thinking of German, and of how full of Latinisms school translations from

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2 The German rule admits only a few, principled exceptions. In Latin, the verb is more likely to be final in a subordinate than in a main clause, but even then this is a tendency only; for some statistics and discussion, see Pinkster (1990: 168 ff.). For descriptive surveys of the placement of the verb in German, including its history, see Dal (1962: 172–7), Lockwood (1968: ch. 11); some scholars take the view that this agreement in word order is an instance of syntactic borrowing by German from Latin, standardized by humanist grammarians in the early modern period; cf. Bach (1970: §142), Waterman (1976: 121), Drux (1984), Henkel (2004). On Sanskrit, Delbrück (1878) is still unsurpassed.

3 This pattern has long been called ‘Wackernagel’s Law’. For details and bibliography, see Collinge (1985: 217–19), Janse (1994), Harris & Campbell (1995: Index, s.v.), and, on Homer, Ruijgh (1990).


5 It is important to be reminded how pervasive linguistic borrowing can be, the astonishing range of linguistic phenomena that can be borrowed. Campbell (1993) demolishes all but one of a set of proposed universal constraints on borrowing.
Latin can be! Particularly instructive on this topic is the Greek text of the Bible. The Septuagint is literally full of syntactic Hebraisms, and those parts of the New Testament for which we can assume a Semitic—specifically Aramaic—background, are by no means free of Aramaisms. Let me illustrate this with one passage from the text that is closest to its Aramaic original, the Gospel of Mark. In the story of the Feeding of the Five Thousand, we read at Mark 6: 39–40: ἐπέταξεν αὐτοῖς ἀνακλιθῆναι πάντας συμπόσια συμπόσια... καὶ ἀνέπεσαν πρασιᾶ πρασιαὶ. ‘And he commanded them to make all sit down in parties (lit. in drinking-groups) ... and they sat down in companies (lit. garden plots) ...’. In good Greek this would have been κατὰ συμπόσια καὶ κατὰ πρασιάς. Instead we find the distributive sense expressed by means of a repeated nominative. Greek does not admit such a construction and the repetition of the nouns makes no sense. But the expression makes perfect sense if we translate it back into Aramaic, where a distributive relationship is expressed by repeating the noun.6

A slightly different case, also of relevance for us, is when someone speaking not his native language but a learned language habitually transfers to the latter the structures of his own language. Because a German speaker uses the present with future reference in his own language, he will be unduly inclined to do the same when he speaks French or English. People are not good at observing in a foreign language distinctions that are foreign to their own. It is well known how imperfectly the French speak German when it comes to the gender of nouns!

By and large, errors of this kind, made while translating or, conversely, speaking foreign languages, have no effect on ordinary linguistic usage. Occasionally, however, such foreign influences can have more far-reaching consequences. In Jeremiah 36 (= 29): 11, we read (literally) ‘Concerning you I have thoughts of peace (gen.)’. This genitive construction is un-Greek and would never have arisen from within Greek. It is rather a Hebrew expression reproduced word for word. Now, for the writers of the New Testament the language of the Greek Old Testament was a venerable idiom, and they liked to sample its turns of phrase. Consequently we find in Paul, too, phrases with the genitive, such as ὁ θεός τῆς εἰρήνης, ὁ κύριος τῆς εἰρήνης (‘the God of peace’, ‘the Lord of peace’), which are not pure Greek and which can be explained only as imitations of the Old Testament. WELLHAUSEN (1911: 7–9) has recently shown that the language of the Gospel of John shows strong Semitic influence; its author, without probably being himself a Semitic speaker, and without basing himself on a Semitic original,

6 For surveys of work on Semiticisms in the Greek New Testament from Wellhausen to the present day, see Wilcox (1984) and esp. Piñero & Peláez (2003: 176–82). The latter urge (127–8) caution on the notion of ‘translation Greek’ or ‘Jewish Greek’ as a general characterization of the language of the New Testament. On Mark’s Gospel, see Wellhausen (1908: 133–40); on Semiticisms in the Synoptic Gospels, Wellhausen (1911: 7–32). W.’s example is listed by Moule (1963: 182) as an example of ‘literal translation’, although Thumb (1901: 128) denies that it is un-Greek.
as the Synoptic writers in large part do, let himself be influenced by Semitic idiom because it was holy idiom. In the same way, because of the influence of the Bible, Semitic idioms appear even today in the language of sermons. Here you see the far-reaching effects of translations.7

Another effect occurs in the learning of languages, especially in border areas or in areas where large parts of a population speak several languages at one time. Languages which come into contact in either situation are then saturated with borrowings. The best discussion of this is in the book by the Romance philologist Hugo SCHUCHARDT, Slawo-Deutsches und Slawo-Italienisches (1884), where he shows what a vigorous exchange is taking place between Slavic and German and Slavic and Italian, not only of vocabulary but also of constructions.8 Or take a related case. While in the Germanic languages it is otherwise normal to refer to the future with the present, English is very strict and always denotes future time with a form distinct from the present. It is not unthinkable that this strictness of English is based on French, which, as is well known, has influenced English in countless ways, having been spoken alongside it in the Middle Ages.9

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7 On ‘Septuagintalisms’ in particular in the New Testament, see Piñero & Peláez (2003), 182–3. The grammar of Septuagint Greek by Conybear & Stock (1905) is still valuable; in general on the language and style of the Septuagint, see the handbooks by Jellicoe (1968: ch. 10, esp. 329–37) and Fernández Marcos (2000: chs 1–2), and the thesis on translation technique by Olofsson (1990: esp. 33–42); in particular on the syntax of the verb in the Septuagint, note Evans (2001), who gives a succinct introductory survey with rich bibliography. Note, however, that Wellhausen (1908: 133–46), is at pains to distinguish the language of John from that of the Synoptic Gospels and from Semitic. Relevant to W.’s theme here is Wellhausen’s observation (146) that in John ‘the parataxis of the Biblical style is imitated to give an impression of solemnity’. On Wellhausen and John, note Gregory (1910), and on the life and work of Julius Wellhausen (1844–1918), one of Germany’s greatest Protestant theologians and Biblical scholars, and one of the founders of modern Bible criticism, note Schwartz (1918) and Bauer (2005).

8 On German and Italian influence on Slavic languages, see the numerous entries in Comrie & Corbett (1993: Index, s.vv. ‘German’, ‘Italian’). On the influence of both languages on (e.g.) Slovene and Ukrainian, see Priestly (1993: 442, 448–9) and Shevelov (1993: 900–1); on esp. German syntactic influence on Sorbian, Cassubian, and Polabian, see respectively Stone (1992a: 668–9), Stone (1992b: 785), and Polášek (1993:798). On the life and work of Hugo Schuchardt (1842–1927), a principal pioneer of Romance philology and of the study of mixed languages and the effects of language contact, see Sebek (1966: I, 304–11).

9 W. exaggerates the use in English of expressions of future time with will/shall + infinitive/progressive infinitive or be going to + infinitive. According to Quirk et al. (1985: 4. 47), the order of frequency of the five constructions used for referring to future time is: 1. will/shall; 2. the simple present (e.g. The plane leaves at 8), but esp. in dependent clauses (e.g. When the plane leaves, we shall start); 3. be going to; 4. the present progressive (e.g. The plane is leaving at 8); 5. will/shall + progressive infinitive (e.g. The plane will be leaving at 8). In French also, the present is used to refer to future time (e.g. L’avion part à 8 heures), although not in most dependent clauses (Quand l’avion partira, nous commencerons). Note, conversely, the use in both languages of the future with reference to present time in e.g. He will be there by now/Il sera déjà là (cf. Price 1993: 320–2). Middle English has famously been said (Bailey & Maroldt 1977) to have been creolized through intensive contact with French after the Norman Conquest, but more recent work has shown that the influence of French was ‘neither extreme nor special’ (Fennell 2001: 150) and that French was affected as much as or more than English; see Fennell (2001: 123–33) for a good survey, and Thomason & Kaufman (1988) for more detailed information.
Well, now we come specifically to the relationship between Latin and Greek.

Here, too, I wish to begin with the translation of the Bible. In the earliest period, Christian texts in Latin are almost exclusively translations from Greek texts, translations, moreover, which were made not by the intellectual elite but by simple people of limited education and learning, for whom the wording of the original was surrounded by a sacred halo. As a result, when they produced versions of holy texts, they committed gross infringements of the rules of their own language. For example, in an old translation of the New Testament, which is known in fragments—i.e., not in the Vulgate—we read at Mark 4: 11 omnia dicitur, ‘all things (pl.) is said (sg.).’ In Latin it is a glaring solecism to use a singular verb with a plural subject. This is explained by the fact that the Greek original has πάντα γίνεται ‘everything (pl.) comes to pass (sg.),’ with the familiar Greek construction (neuter plural subject with singular verb; cf. I, 101–3 below). Similarly, in the so-called Clementina, Greek participles in the genitive absolute are rendered with genitives in the Latin, e.g. §43 contendentium tribuum, ‘while the tribes were disputing’. Or again, in just the same way it can happen that in texts of the Bible even Hebraisms enter Latin. Several times in the Old Testament we have the expression ἄνηρ αἵματων (lit. ‘man of bloods (pl.)’: 2 Kings 16: 7, 8; Psalms 5: 7, 25: 9, etc.; Proverbs 29: 10). From a Greek point of view the descriptive genitive is anomalous and so, too, is the plural, ‘bloods’ (αἵματα occurs only in poetry). Both features are conditioned by the Hebrew original, and accordingly the phrase used in the Latin text is vir sanguinum. This is particularly striking because sanguis in Latin has otherwise no plural at all; the grammarians, who take no notice of Christian Latin, make this an explicit rule (Servius on Aen. 4. 687; Priscian 5. 54 = GL II, 175).

Here, too, however, we have the secondary phenomenon whereby what was originally common only in translations spread to ordinary speech. The ordinary Latin word deus ‘god’ has no distinctive vocative form, the nominative deus having always to function as the form of address. This is thoroughly un-Latin, and is due to the fact that in the Greek Bible God is addressed always in the form

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10 The numerous Latin translations of Old and New Testament books made before Jerome, formerly known collectively as the Italula, are now generally called Vetus Latina, ‘(the) Old Latin (version)’ (French scholars also use, more sensibly, the plural, Veteres Latinae); HLL IV, §468. For a survey of work on the Old Latin New Testament, see Metzger (1977), Elliott (1992), and on the Old Latin Gospels in particular, Burton (2000). A still-useful concordance to the Septuagint and other Greek translations of the Old Testament is Hatch & Redpath (1897).

11 The Clementina that W. refers to are three anonymous letters attributed to St Clement, an early (the fourth?) Bishop of Rome, and in particular the (probably) 2nd-c. Latin translation (discovered only in 1894) of the First Letter of Clement (c. AD 96–100) from the Roman Church to the Church in Corinth (for excellent introductions with bibliog., see Knopf (1899: 8–11, 39–63), on Grecisms esp. p. 46, Altaner (1960: 99–106), HLL IV, §471.8, and the recent edition of Schneider (1994); the Greek text and English tr. are in vol. 1 of the Loeb Apostolic Fathers, ed. K. Lake, 1912–13).

12 On such genitive absolutes in Latin, see Coleman (1977: 144).
δ θεός (lit. ‘the God’ (nom.)). This Greek usage is also abnormal, and is determined in its turn by the fact that Hebrew has no vocative and uses instead the nominative with the article. This was taken over by the Greek, and, from them, the Latin, translators and, through their influence, it became a piece of standard Church Latin. It should be noted here that the word for ‘God’ in Greek and Latin is used as a form of address at all only in the mouths of Christians (cf. I, 297 below).\footnote{W.'s account of the forms of address to God, including his appeal to Hebrew—already in W.'s monograph on forms of address (1912a: 5–7, 11)—although accepted by (e.g.) Löfstedt (1942: 91–6), is contested by Svennung (1958: 234–6), who advances an explanation of voc. Ł/C229/C252/C242 in purely Greek terms. See now, on Greek, Dickey (1996: 188–9, 308–9), citing a single attestation of θεί, from Josephus, Jewish Antiquities 14. 24, and on Latin, Dickey (2002: 319–21), citing pre-Christian examples of dea, din/die, diue/diue, and especially Dickey (2000: esp. 33–6), who persuasively treats the situation of Lat. deus as distinct from that of Gk θεός and as connected with a general avoidance in Latin, at any rate until the late empire, of voc. sg. masc. in -ee to nouns and adjectives in -eus.}

Furthermore, it is well known how important the influence of Greek was on Latin poetic language, and in the latter we can indeed observe both of the above phenomena, sometimes literal translation, sometimes formal imitation of Greek. For example, take the Homeric collocation δία θεάων (II. 6. 305, etc., lit. ‘(most) brilliant of goddesses’). Ennius, who, like Livius Andronicus (although in a different sense) brought Greek epic to Rome, translated this literally with δία dea rum (Ann. 19 Skutsch) but then he did not stop there, venturing also sancta dearum, pulchra dearum, magna dearum (lit. ‘(most) holy, beautiful, great of goddesses’ Ann. 53, 15, 445 Sk.), all quite un-Latin!\footnote{On these Ennian examples, see O. Skutsch (1985: 173). The construction is imitated by Vergil at Aen. 4. 376 sancte deorum ‘(most) holy of Gods’; cf. KS I, 425 and Diggle (2006: 104).}

The poets of the Ciceronian and above all the Augustan age also display imitations of this sort. For example, at Aeneid 2. 355 the hexameter ends with the words lupi ceu, ‘like wolves’. This is not really Latin, since by Latin rules ceu should precede the thing compared; it is rather a literal imitation of the common Homeric line-end λύκοι δός (II. 11. 72, 16. 156). Here, then, it is in the order of the words that Greek influence is seen. Vergil was able to be so daring, because ceu (‘like, as’) was no longer current in Latin, so that he was doing no violence to his hearers’ and readers’ feelings for their language.\footnote{Probably obsolete already in Ennius’ day, ceu was revived by Lucretius and taken up by Vergil and other Augustan poets, and in the 1st c. AD it enjoyed some currency even in prose (notably that of the younger Seneca, the elder Pliny, Suetonius, and Apuleius); Hofmann & Szantyr 644. Vergil softens his lupi ceu for Latin speakers by following it immediately with raptores, which functions as an adj. with lupi.}

Scholars have often fought shy of assuming syntactic borrowings in the poets—but wrongly so. Our task is simply to explain how the poets could come to find beauty in such things. Let me mention a couple of instances which are beyond dispute. Catullus’ poem 4 begins, 1–2: phaselus ille... jait fuisse nauium celerrimus, ‘that boat . . . claims it was the fastest of all vessels’. We have here a nominative + infinitive construction after an active verb of saying. This is not Latin, and nothing comparable is to be found, whether in Ciceronian prose or in Plautus
and the colloquial language of early Latin. And yet this nominative + infinitive enjoyed great popularity in literary verse. It imitates Greek usage, but the imitation was possible because in other circumstances in Latin a nominative + infinitive was normal. It was not, then, something completely new but rather an extension and modification of a Latin usage.¹⁶

Let us move on to a couple of constructions in Horace, beginning with Odes 3. 30. 12 regnauit populorum, ‘he ruled over peoples’. No Latin-speaker before Horace ever used regnare with the genitive in this way; but in Greek δικαιούσθη to rule took the genitive. That is what Horace was copying, and he could allow himself to do so because some semantically related Latin verbs, such as potiri (‘make oneself master of’), did take the genitive. The same account holds for Odes 2. 9. 17–18 desine . . . querelarum, ‘cease from laments’, Satires 2. 3. 27 morbi purgatus, ‘purged of disease’, Odes 3. 27. 69 abstineto . . . irarum, ‘then abstain from anger’. All these are un-Latin, introduced because of the corresponding genitive constructions in Greek, and rendered admissible by the fact that e.g. Latin egere (‘be in need of’) takes the genitive. But all Latin sentence structure, including that of literary prose, is unthinkable without the model and influence of Greek.¹⁷

In German, again the cross-border influences mentioned above call first for comment: they give rise to Romance features in the south and west of the German-speaking area, and Danish features in the north. In the language of the elite, Latin has always played an important role. Behaghel has some nice examples of Latin influence on German chancery language (1911a: 85; 1911b: 88). In court protocols from the fifteenth century on, we encounter expressions such as: Kläger tritt auf, Beklagter erklärt, Zeuge bezeugt (‘(the) plaintiff presents himself’, ‘(the) defendant gives evidence’, ‘(the) witness testifies’). The absence of the article is quite un-German, so how did it occur to people to leave the article out? Originally, the parties in the trial were referred to by their Latin terms: reus tritt vor, testis gibt Erklärung ab (‘the defendant takes the stand’, ‘the witness gives

I, 12

¹⁶ Cf. Catul. 1. 16. The normal Latin construction (acc. + infin.) would have produced ait se fiuisse celeririmum. Catullus’ construction here (parodied by Verg. Cat. 10. 1–2, and imitated also in post-classical prose) is usual Latin after a passive verb of saying, believing, etc. in a non-periphrastic tense, e.g. dicitur fiuisse celeririmum ‘is said to have been the fastest’ (for details, see Gildersleeve & Lodge § 528) or after, say, uolebat ‘wished’ (see Coleman 1977: 139–40). The agreement of celeririmum with phaselus rather than with nauis—with which commentators, most recently D. Thomson (Toronto 1997), have compared Cic. ND 2. 130—may suggest a comparative rather than superlative meaning (‘faster than ships’); cf. n. 11, p. 11 above.

¹⁷ On Hor. Odes 3. 10. 11–12 (noted already by Servius commenting on Aen. 11. 126: see Horsfall (2003) on Aen. 11. 126 and 280), see Mayer (1999: 162, 170), and Nisbet & Rudd (2004: ad loc.). For an overview of Greek influence on Latin syntax, see Coleman (1977), with discussion of several of W.’s examples at 139–42, Coleman (1999: passim), and Mayer (1999); for further recent bibliography, see Traina et al. (2002: 306–8). On the development of Latin literary prose, see Palmer (1954: 118 ff.)—on the development of the period, esp. 129–33—and, on archaic Latin prose, Courtney (1999), an anthology with commentary.
evidence’); when these were later transformed into German, the Latin absence of article was retained. Subsequently, this habit had the further effect of bringing about expressions such as Schreiber dieser Zeilen (‘the writer of these lines’, ‘the present author’). But not only the chancery language, but ordinary German too has never been entirely free from Latin influence. It is generally supposed, for example, that the accusative + infinitive construction came into German through imitation of Latin.18

Everyone knows phrases such as Knabe sprach (‘the boy spoke’) in Goethe’s poem beginning Sah ein Knab’ ein Röselein stehn (‘A boy saw a rose standing’), or Schiller’s Meister muß sich immer plagen (‘Master must ever slave away’).19 Here again we have striking cases of omission of the article; but there can be no question of Latin influence in this sort of poetry. Some say it is meant to strike a colloquial note, but colloquial German knows no such omission of the article. How then did it occur to the poets? The answer emerges from the fact that it is especially common in Herder’s translations of English ballads. Where Herder omits the article, it is because it is omitted in the English, too. In English we have expressions such as when day was gone, and night was come. Herder translates this with und Nacht war da, and because it gave the impression of a gentle, colloquial tone, Goethe and others imitated it; see Behaghel (1911a: 85; 1911b: 86–7). We may speak then of a stylistic influence of popular poetry in English on high poetry in German.20

18 Of virtually every aspect of the field known today as ‘contact linguistics’ Goebel et al. (1996–7) offers a vast survey with extensive bibliography; for the latest surveys of contact between German and other languages, including Romance and Danish, see the various contributions to Besch et al. (1998–2004: IV, chs 19 and 20). Note also, on Romance influence on German, Brunt (1983); on Danish influence, Søndergaard (1997); in general on Latin influence on European syntax, Blatt (1957). On this type of omission of the article, cf. Bach (1970: §142); Hammer & Durrell (1991: §4.9.5). On the acc. + infin. as a syntactic borrowing from Latin in Old High German, see Bach (1970: §78) (also §142 on renewed Latin influence in the early modern period); Waterman (1976: 73). On the construction in the modern language, see Hammer & Durrell (1991: §§13. 2.2a, 3.1b, 3.2c).

19 The first is from Goethe’s Heidenroßlein (‘Little Rose on the Heath’, published 1789), line 8; the second, from Schiller’s Das Lied von der Glocke (‘The Song of the Bell’, published 1800), line 273.

20 The English line quoted is from the folksong ‘Fair Margaret and Sweet William’ (line 17), included by Bishop Thomas Percy in his great ballad collection Reliques of Ancient English Poetry (1765), which played an important role in European Romanticism by inspiring collections of folklore in Britain and other European countries, especially Germany, where it strongly influenced the literary theory of among many others, the philosopher, critic, and poet Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803); see Clark (1969: esp. ch. 8). This is not in Hammer & Durrell’s list (1991: §4.9) of types of omission of the article.
Lecture I, 3

Of earlier research on syntax down to the present day, I can give only a brief outline, interesting though its development is. The main point of relevance for us is what survives of the work of earlier centuries. Especially in our grammatical terminology we are dependent on the preliminary work carried out over more than two millennia since the Greek grammarians coined the original forms of our grammatical vocabulary.

You can find a history of research on syntax, from its beginnings in the West to the present day, in the first volume of Berthold Delbrück's great comparative syntax of the Indo-European languages (1893–1900). It contains a great many fine judgements, which can guide us. On Latin in particular, Golling (1903) gives a thorough account, down to the present day, in Landgraf's historical grammar of Latin, the volume containing the Syntax (1894–1908: III.1, 1–87). And for antiquity, especially on the Greek side, the best account probably still has to be Steinthal's great history of linguistics among the Greeks and Romans (1890–1), which displays both learning and profound thinking.¹

If we ask, when did the Greeks begin theorizing about their language, we are referred back to the fifth century BC. Here I am leaving to one side the observations that the Greeks had made even earlier about the sounds of their language, not to mention the reflection and the lively debates on the great question of the nature and origin of language, which culminated in the two opposing doctrines that language had meaning either φύσει or θέσει (‘by nature’ or ‘by assignment’). As you know, we have a remarkable monument to this contest in Plato's Cratylus.

¹ The standard English short history of linguistics is that by R. H. Robins (1st edn 1967, 4th edn 1997), with excellent critical bibliography. Also to be recommended is the history of linguistics edited by Giulio Lepschy (1994–), published first in Italian (Bologna 1990–4). Four vols in English have so far appeared, with notable contributions by Peter Matthews on classical antiquity, Edoardo Vineis and Alfonso Maierù on the Middle Ages, and Anna Morpurgo Davies on the 19th century. (On the 19th century, Pedersen (1959) is notable for its illustrations of notable linguists and of scripts and documents.) An excellent recent textbook treatment of linguistics in Europe from Plato to 1600 is Law (2003). Vol. 13 (1975, in 2 parts) of the immense Current Trends in Linguistics, edited by Thomas Sebeok, contains numerous chapters by experts on the history of linguistics in different periods and parts of the world, with extensive bibliography as far as the mid 1970s; similarly conceived but more up to date are Koerner & Asher (1995) and, on a much larger scale, the monumental History of the Language Sciences (Auroux et al. 2000–6), of which most of the chapters are in English. A good recent article-length survey of work on syntax in particular is Campbell (1995).
forms and of syntax proper. And in fact we can actually name the first significant figure to concern himself with such questions: Protagoras of Abdera (c. 490–420 BC). He is in a sense the founder of western linguistics. He was the first, for example, to reflect on the genders of nouns—and in this connection we shall return to him later (cf. II, 4–5, 41 below). A remarkable testimony to his teaching is preserved in the Clouds of Aristophanes, where theories are put into Socrates’ mouth which belong to Protagoras. He also expressed views on the meaning of the moods of the verb and on types of clauses.2

The first project addressed was the task of categorizing the vocabulary and giving an account of what types of words occur in language in general, to enable them to be classified according to their meaning and their function in the sentence. The first distinction made was that between ὄνομα and ῥῆμα, that is between noun and verb. These two words are attested many times already in Plato’s Cratylus, although without precise reference to word classes. ὄνομα is used of names for things, including verbal ideas as well, while ῥῆμα denotes rather what is said about them or in certain cases roughly the predicate. But during Plato’s lifetime, the latter word must have come to be restricted to what we call the verb, since in the Sophist (262a) ὄνομα and ῥῆμα are quite definitely used to denote classes of words. This was the first step towards categorizing the vocabulary, towards the differentiation of the μέρη τοῦ λόγου, the partes orationis, the parts of speech. Designations of nominal ideas were called ‘names’, while ῥῆμα as the term for the verb appears to have arisen from the definition of the verb as the part serving as the predicate.3 A remarkable parallel is found in a grammatical tradition quite independent of the Greek, namely the Indian. Quite independently, the ancient Indians also arrived at a division of the parts of speech and labelled noun and verb in exactly the same way.4

In the works of Aristotle, we find not only the terms ὄνομα and ῥῆμα but also a third part of speech distinguished, the σύνδεσμος (‘binding’, ‘conjunction’); this

2 On the insights into the phonological structure of Greek that underlie the invention of the alphabet, see Robins (1997: 16–17), Matthews (1994: 3, 9 ff.). The earlier νόμος vs φόνος debate (on which see Guthrie (1962–81: III, ch. 4) centred on the question whether language reflects reality or imposes an arbitrary structure on it. The later, Alexandrian and Middle- / Neo-platonic θέας vs φόνος framework alluded to by W. conflates this question with that of the origin of language (see Pinborg 1975: 69–70). For a refutation of the view that the Cratylus is about the origin of language, see Anagnostopoulos (1973/4); there are good critical summaries of the argument of the Cratylus in Guthrie (1962–81: V, 5–31) and Matthews (1994: 15–21), and note Sedley’s important article (1998). On Protagoras, note Diog. Laërt. 9. 52–3, and see Guthrie (1962–81: III, 205, 219–21) on types of utterance and correctness of names (and 262–9 in general), Sluiter (1990: 7–11), and Matthews (1994: 44) with references. On the grammar scene in Clouds, see II, 1–4 & nn. below.

3 On Plato’s Sophist, esp. 266b and 261c–3 containing the oldest surviving analysis of a sentence construction, see Guthrie (1962–81: V, 154–6), and Matthews (1994: 26–9, esp. 28).

4 The commentary Nirukta (‘etymology’) on the anonymous Nyāyantara (lists of difficult Vedic words made for the use of teachers) by the grammarianYāṣka (probably close in time to Pañini, 4th c. BC) distinguishes, in addition to ‘prefixes’ and ‘particles’, nominal forms (नाम, lit. ‘name’) from verbal forms (अक्षयतम, lit. ‘what is said/told’); these terms were known to Pañini (Scharfe 1977: 112 n. 104). For a wonderfully lucid and succinct overview of the Indian grammatical tradition, see Burrow (1955: 47–51); cf. more recently Scharfe (1977: esp. 119–21), and Cardona (1994: 31–2).
was used to denote whatever could not be regarded either as a designation or as a proposition about a designation. This more or less completed the dividing up of the vocabulary, although perhaps already in Aristotle’s day beside σώνθεσμος stood a fourth part of speech, the ἀρθροποι— in Latin, articulus—the ‘article’; it seems that originally all pronouns were so labelled. The ἀρθρομα—to retain the metaphor—are joints, in other words they, too, are just connectives, though more substantial than the σώνθεσμος, the mere bindings.

A great advance was made in the study of language by the Stoics, who, in the context of their work on logic, considered also linguistic means of expression and rendered great service in this area. As for the parts of speech, they built on what had been done already. Most significantly, perhaps, Chrysippus divided the ὀνόματα into two classes: ὀνόμα, later ὄνομα κύριον, i.e. nomen proprium (‘proper name’), the designation of an ἱδία ποιότης (lit. ‘private, individual quality’); and προσηγορία or ὄνομα προσηγορικῶν (i.e. appellative, common noun) denoting a κοινή ποιότης (lit. ‘common quality’), a quality shared by any number of tokens. More important were the Stoics’ observations on the manifestations of the individual parts of speech. Above all they hit upon a term that is still important for us: πτώσις ‘falling, fall’ in the sense ‘grammatical case’. As early as the fourth century, those who concerned themselves with words spoke of each ὀνόμα—and also each ῥήμα!—as having its own πτώσεις, i.e. as occurring in forms other than its normal basic form | (viz. the nominative singular for the noun, and the first person singular present for the verb), as occurring in other πτώσεις ‘instances of falling’. The image here is that of a word in its normal form representing, say, a peg standing vertically; a form that departs from the straightforward meaning represents a leaning, a falling away of the peg in one direction or another. Originally, as I say, the expression πτώσις was understood more generally. In Stoic doctrine, however, it was restricted in meaning to what we call ‘case’, i.e. the inflection of the noun. And it was the Stoics, too, who first considered and

5 The key passages of Aristotle are De interpretatione 16a19–b (on meaningful parts of speech) and Poetics 1456b–7b (on all segments of speech, from the ‘segment’ or ‘element’ (στοιχεῖον) to the sentence (λόγος)). The term ἀρθροποι is found only in the Poetics; σώνθεσμος is also at Rhetoric 1413b32. On Aristotle’s analysis, see McKeon (1946–7), Pinborg (1975: 72–7), Matthews (1994: 29–30). On the history of the parts of speech, with bibliography, see Engels in Ueding (1992–), s.v. ‘Partes orationis’.

6 Stoic philosophy comprised logic, ethics, and physics; logic was divided between dialectic and rhetoric; dialectic, ‘the general science of rational discourse and of language’ (Long 1996: 85), included grammar. There are good introductions to Stoic linguistic theory in Matthews (1994: 30–5, 44–9), and Law (2003: 38–42); for further discussion, see Lloyd (1971). Long (1986: 131–9), R. T. Schmidt (1979) [German translation of the texts with commentary and bibliography], Sluiter (1990: ch. 1)—all of these works with ample further references. It is important to remember that for Stoic theory we have only secondary sources from a much later date, notably Apollonius Dyscolus (2nd c.) and Diogenes Laerti us (early 3rd c.); the standard edition of the approx. 1250 fragments on Stoic dialectic is Hulsler (1987–8). Note Matthews’ salutary ‘mutatis mutandis’ warning (1994: 32–3), to the effect that if we had only these sources for Peripatetic teaching, we should seriously misunderstand Aristotle. For this account of the parts of speech, cf. Apollonius Dyscolus, fr. 9 (GG II.3, 30–7), Diog. Laert. 7. 57–8, and Matthews (1994: 33–4).
established what sort of inflectional forms and syntactic meaning nouns can have. Of particular interest, however, is their treatment of the verb. Their theory of the tenses attests some extremely refined observation. Aristotle already lays stress precisely on the fact that the verb, unlike the noun, makes reference to the χρόνος (‘time’). But in fact the Stoics have an elaborate theory. The six tenses of Greek are distinguished as follows: χρόνος ὀρισμένος ‘definite time’ comprises, on the one hand παραστατικός ‘extending, continuing’, with its subtypes ἐνεστῶς ‘present’ (i.e. the present) and παρωχύμενος ‘past’ (the imperfect), on the other hand τέλειος or συντελικός ‘completed’, with the same division between ἐνεστῶς (the perfect) and παρωχύμενος (the pluperfect). Opposed to all this are the χρόνοι ἄριστοι ‘indefinite times’, παρωχύμενος (the aorist) and μέλλων ‘future’ (the future). So, for example, παῖδευοι—present, ‘I train’—is παραστατικός ἐνεστῶς (‘present extending’) and ἐπαιδευοι—imperfect, ‘I was training’—is παραστατικός παρωχύμενος (‘past extending’). What we understand by ‘present’ is called ‘an action extending itself over the present time’. Our terms are just abbreviations. The concept of imperfectness applies in the original theory as much to the present as to the imperfect itself. In opposition to this stands the τέλειος ἐνεστῶς, the tense expressing an action in a state of completion in present time; action completed in the past is termed ὑπεραντελικός ‘pluperfect’. These are the four χρόνοι ὀρισμένοι, their special characteristic being that they are either ongoing (durative) or completed. All this reflects a very fine feeling for language.—In the aorist and future, the distinction made in the other tenses between ongoing and finished does not apply; hence the terms ‘past/future indefinite, without distinction’ (ἄριστος). Latin had no aorist, so that the Latin grammarians had no reason to translate this term, which is why we, too, still say ‘aorist’.8—Another very remarkable thing is that in their definition of the verb the Stoics have regard to its function in the sentence, to its relationship with the other constituents of the clause: rather difficult but very fine observations, to which we shall return.9 | Compared with beginnings such as these the treatment of grammar by the scholars of Alexandria represents a sort of concluding summary. For us this is codified in a work attributed to Dionysius Thrax, a work of no significance as an intellectual achievement but quite remarkable in terms of the practical effect it

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7 The term πτώσις is already in Arist. De interpr., with the important difference that the nom. sg. of the noun (and the 1 sg. pres. of the verb) is not a πτώσις but the noun (verb) itself. On πτώσις in Aristotle and in Stoic theory, see Pinborg (1975: 76 f., 80–5) and Robins (1997: 33–6).

8 W.’s hierarchy presents implicitly the three ‘kinships’ between tenses (pres.-imperf., pl.-plupf., aor.-fut.) mentioned by Dionysius Thrax (GG I.1, 53) and Priscian 8.39, 51 (GL II, 405–6, 414); cf. Matthews (1994: 46). It is doubtful whether these, or the hierarchy, go back to the Stoics. Pinborg (1975: 92–4), argues rather for a simpler analysis on two dimensions, past—present—future and complete—neutral—incomplete; cf. Versteegh (1980) and Robins (1997: 36, 44–5). It is noteworthy that Zeno’s first language was a Semitic one (Robins 1997: 22), which might have affected his analysis of the Greek verb.

9 Alas, this intention was never realized.
had. This man lived and worked around the year 100 BC, and under his name we have an outline of linguistic theory including the parts of speech and the then-prevailing terms for the forms in which the different types of words appear. This little book enjoyed canonical status; it was a school book for more than a thousand years, was the object of numerous commentaries and even became known in the East. The best edition is that of Gustav Uhlig, whom I mentioned earlier as the editor of Apollonius Dyscolus (I, 1 above).10 Dionysius presents a further elaboration of the theory of the parts of speech, using the division that has become standard.11 We find that further subdivisions have been made within those parts of speech that we have already met. First, something that goes against our own usage, the μετοχή (lit. ‘sharing’) is mentioned as a separate part of speech. This Greek term is familiar to us in the Latin form participium, which was first translated into German, by Notker, as Teilnemunga (lit. ‘part-taking’).12

The participle is so called because it ‘partakes in, shares’ properties of both noun and verb at the same time, because it can express the πτώσις of the noun and the χρόνος of the verb.13 This term, then, is not without justification. Another part of speech was added to the earlier ones by dividing the ἄρθρα into ἄρθρον and ἀντώνυμα (also called ἀντώνυμον or ἀντωνομασία = Lat. pronomen ‘pronoun’).

As their name shows, pronouns were regarded as standing ‘in place of’ (Gk ἀντί, Lat. pro) the noun. They were taken to include only personal, possessive, and demonstrative pronouns; the relative pronoun on account of its form was left in with the article, the interrogative with the 

10 W. alludes to the existence of an Armenian and a Syriac translation of the Τέκνη γραμματική (on the Armenian version, see Clackson 1993). For an English translation with notes, see Kemp (1987); for an annotated French version, Lallot (1989). Note that the authorship of this grammar ascribed to Dionysius Thrax (c.170–c.90 BC, a pupil of the Analogist Aristarchus, who was head of the Library in Alexandria from c.153) was questioned by Pinborg 1975: 104 ff.; Pfeiffer (1998: 660–72) defends the authenticity, but see now Di Benedetto (1990), Law (1990) and Robins (1991): the alternative view is that it belongs to the 4th century AD. This remains a problem, especially as the traditional account of grammatical theory in the Hellenistic period assumes that Dionysius’ grammar is genuine and Varro trustworthy (on the latter, see below): see Pinborg (1975: 111), Matthews (1994: 6, 44, 107, nn. 15, 128), Robins (1997: 37–9), Law & Sluiter (1999), and Law (2003: 55–7), who assumes (56) a sort of middle position, that the status of the Τεκνή γραμματική is analogous to that of Donatus’ two grammars in the Roman world—the outcome at a fairly late date of several centuries of consolidation and abbreviation, and the definitive textbook in the Byzantine world throughout the Middle Ages.


W. transposes επίρρημα and πρόβασις, and omits σύνθεσις, which comes last in Dionysius and Apollonius. Robins (1997: 42) has a marvellous tree showing the parts of speech (or of the λόγος ‘sentence’) from Plato to the present, by way of Aristotle, the Stoics, the Τεκνή attributed to Dionysius Thrax, and Priscian.

12 That is Notker III Laboe, or Teutonicus, (c.950–1022), poet, scholar, teacher, Old High German translator, and head of the monastery school of St Gall. This and other translations of Latin grammatical terms, the first in any Germanic language, appear in an 11th-c. St Gall ms. (Sangall. 356, p. 491) in a short piece now called ‘the St Gall schoolwork’ (Sonderegger 1970: 77–8), formerly ‘Ruodpert’s letter’ (Piper 1882–3: III, 862, 16). On Notker’s development of an orthography for OHG, see Waterman (1976: 79–80).

13 This is the version in Varro (L. 8. 58) and Charisius, pp. 231–2 Barwick = GL I, 180; cf. Schad (2007: s.v.).
since outside grammatical theory $\epsilon\pi\iota\rho\pi\eta\mu\alpha$ means ‘postscript’—and I mention finally the $\pi\rho\delta\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ = Lat. $praesentio$ ‘preposition’. These last three terms are less valuable and appropriate than the old terms because they are much more superficial. This superficiality is most seriously evident in the case of $\pi\rho\delta\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ (lit. ‘placement in front’). We need only glance at classical Greek to see that this name is nonsensical. Think of anastrophe, in which a preposition is placed after its noun: a postposed preposition amounts to a contradiction in terms! (Cf. II, 153, 196 below.) All these terms then passed into Latin, where, by and large, they gained acceptance (see Quintilian I. 4. 18–21). The Romans added only the interjection as a further separate part of speech.14 | Attempts were made even after the Stoics to do justice to the actual construction of sentences, but these amount to no more than inadequate beginnings.15

Greek grammatical theory was then transplanted onto Roman soil; we may take it that this occurred in the course of the second century BC. Greek grammarians came to Rome and there taught grammar.16 There gradually emerged a large number from among the native population who studied the discipline and applied it to their own language. On Roman linguistic theory the essentials are to be found in the On the Latin Language of M. Terentius Varro (116–27 BC). Varro wrote twenty-five books on the subject, of which we have about a quarter preserved. The work contains a great deal of learned material, but its author was not equal to his task. It is of value only where the linguistic theory involves points of antiquarian interest; on the philosophical side it is completely inadequate, as Varro did not have a clear understanding of the opposing theories.17 In contrast, the popular compendium of linguistic theory that Quintilian presents in the first book of his Institutiones (1. 4–7) is very engaging and stimulating. I refer you also to the Grammaticae Romanae fragmenta collected by H. Funaioli (1907), and to H. Keil’s great collection of the Grammatici Latini (seven vols, 1857–80), the most copious of whom is Priscian (GL, vols II and III).18 But all Latin grammars are in principle based on the little book of Dionysius Thrax.

14 Note that the $\epsilon\nu\deltarho\beta\rho$ is dropped, as Latin has no article. Dionysius Thrax treats interjections under adverbs (§19, 7–10, GG I.1, 76–8; cf. Lallot 1989: 224–5), but Priscian reports (2. 17 = GL II, 54) that some Greek grammarians treated them as a separate category. The Latin tradition presents the parts of speech in a slightly different order, but Priscian makes it follow that of Apollonius Dyscolus. For an excellent concise survey of the theory of the parts of speech, see Matthews (1994: 29–43); for a detailed treatment of the interjection, note Sluiter (1990: ch. 4).

15 An odd remark, in view of W.’s admiration for Apollonius Dyscolus.

16 On the emergence of grammarians’ schools in Rome, see Kaster (1988: 51ff.).

17 More recently, Varro has been attacked by Fehling (1956–7) as incompetent and unreliable, and defended as important and original by Taylor (1975), (1988), Robins (1997: 60–7), and Law (2003: 43–9), a particularly clear and sympathetic introduction. See Matthews (1994: 60–6, nn. 97, 128); his summary judgement, (1994: 37) is close to W.’s: ‘Unfortunately, Varro’s mind is not as good as a modern summary of his doctrine may suggest.’

18 Latin writings on grammar have been very helpfully indexed by Lomanto & Marinone (1990).
I mentioned (at the end of the last lecture) that the Greek system of grammar and associated terminology travelled to Rome in the second and first centuries BC, and that Roman scholars made efforts to apply these terms to phenomena in their own language, and to dress them in Latin garb. To illustrate what was accomplished by those scholars, the problems that beset the transposition and the mistakes that were made, let us take the treatment of the cases as we find it in the earliest grammatical texts. When attempts were made to accommodate to Latin the Greek account of the cases, as formulated by Dionysius Thrax, there was the immediate difficulty that Latin possessed at least one case more than Greek, the so-called ablative. How did they proceed? I must first say a word about the order which the Greeks always gave to the cases and of how the Romans dealt with that. The Greeks put the cases in the same order as we do in German: nominative, genitive, dative, accusative, and this was no accidental or arbitrary order but well considered. At the top of the list they placed the case of the subject, the nominative; then, apparently under the influence of a localistic theory (i.e. with regard to spatial relations), first the case that serves to mark motion from, the genitive; then the dative, in which the noun can denote place where; and finally the accusative, in which the noun represents the goal. This is a rational and perfectly understandable order. The Stoics limited themselves to these four cases. They did not recognize the vocative as a proper case because the vocative does not serve to express a relationship between the noun and another part of the sentence; it presents rather an element that stands outside the structure of the sentence. The Stoics regarded the vocative as ‘an activity consisting in an address’, a προσαγορευτικὸν πρᾶγμα (Diog. Laert. 7. 67). The Hellenistic scholars, however, who cared less about the concept than about its form, took the vocative as a case and put it in fifth place (cf. the quotation from Cleocharis, I, 312 below). The Romans took over this order. But they, of course, had in addition the ablative and had no alternative but to call it casus sextus (‘the sixth case’), or casus Latinus (‘the Latin case’), and to add it on at the end. Of course, this produced an absurd order, as the vocative came to stand between the accusative and the ablative, when it plainly belonged either at the beginning or at the end of the list.1

1 The Stoics, to whom later grammar owes both the number and the order of the cases, appear to have recognized five cases in Greek (Diog. Laert. 7. 192 cites the title of a work by Chrysippus on five cases), but
But how were the new names coined? The Greeks had given the first case two names, depending on two different points of view: on the one hand, ὀρθή or ἐθνεία πτώσις, rendered in Latin as *casus rectus* (‘the straight, or upright, case’). Behind this name lies the image mentioned earlier (I, 15 above) that, when a noun is in the nominative case, its meaning is standing vertically, suffering no deviation from its normal position. On the other hand, to call it in that situation a πτώσις is a contradiction in terms, although the term ‘case’ was illogically extended to the nominative. Its other designation was δυσμαστική πτώσις, the nominative being regarded as the case you use when you want simply to give someone’s name, and of this Latin *nominatius* is the most exact and faithful translation.²

Next comes the γενική πτώσις. Now, this name from the outset gave rise to much debate and we are not quite certain what it means. Priscian already says (5. 72 = GL II, 185) that the name can mean two things: either, in keeping with the usual meaning of γενικός, simply ‘generic, general’, and it was the general case because derivatives of nouns were formed from the genitive. But the Stoics cannot have meant that. If they called the genitive ‘general’, it was because they regarded it as the case that expresses the most general relationship, which would come close to the current view of the genitive. The other explanation is more ‘etymological’, holding that the genitive is so called because it denotes the genus, or family, to which the noun determined by the genitive belongs. At all events, the Latin rendering *genetius* (and the spelling with e in the second syllable is the right one) is extremely odd. The word is derived from *gignere*. Varro (in Macrobius’ *Saturnalia* 3. 6. 5) translated γενετωρ, the Greek epithet of Apollo as worshipped on Delos, as *Apollo genetius*, i.e. using the word in the sense of ‘the begetter’. The word is also found in Ovid (Met. 3. 331, Pont. 3. 2. 107) with the meaning ‘connected with, acquired at birth’, and Suetonius (Aug. 80) has nota genetia meaning ‘birthmark’. Obviously, the Roman scholar who translated γενική took it to mean ‘begetting’ and related it to Greek γίγνομαι, Latin *gigno*. When we use the term ‘genitive’, then, we are following a notorious mistranslation based on a misunderstanding.³

Things are simpler with the next case. The name δοτική = Lat. *datius* is indisputably correct. Many case relations expressed by a dative can be related to it is unclear which was the fifth—the adverb or the vocative; see Pinborg (1975: 85–7). On the ‘sixth’ or ‘Latin’ case, see Varro, *Lat. Lang*. 10. 62 and e.g. Diomedes, GL I, 302. 5 (citing Varro), Donatus, GL IV, 377. 18 (citing ’some people’); on all six cases (listed in a different order), Varro, *Lat. Lang*. 8. 16.

² For Aristotle, the nominative was not a πτώσις (cf. n. 7, p. 25 above). Varro alludes to this question at *Lat. Lang*. 8. 16. See further on all the cases Pinborg (1975: 85–7), Matthews (1994: 45), Schad (2007: s.vv.).

³ Note the alternative possibility that as a grammatical term *genetius* is quite unrelated to earlier uses of the word, and is rather in effect a new word formed as a loan-translation of Gk γεν + ιός (gene + ius), with the (for Latin) unusual addition of -iūs to a nominal rather than a verbal stem. On the use of Lat. *-iūs* (and *-torius*) to translate Gk *-ιός*, see André (1963) and Langslow (2000: 333–61) with further references; on the notion of such ‘re-formations’, Langslow (2000: 145–6).
the action of giving; the Indian grammarians also designated giving as the main function of the dative. So the name of this case is appropriate to it.

And now comes the oddest case name, the accusative, the $\textit{ai\grave{t}iati\acute{k}h} \ \textit{pt\hat{o}\acute{e}sis}$. Varro (Lat. Lang. 8. 66) calls it also $\textit{accusandi casus}$ (‘the case of accusing’). Now, admittedly after $\textit{accusare}$ the person accused is in the accusative, but there are hundreds of verbs which are transitive in the same way and it is quite impossible to see why such a specific idea as that of accusing should have been chosen as the representative. The solution to this problem was found ninety years ago by a philosopher, Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg (1802–72): $\textit{ai\grave{t}iati\acute{k}h}$ is derived not from $\textit{al\acute{e}ti\acute{a}sbai}$ ‘to accuse’, but from $\textit{al\acute{e}ti\acute{a}t\acute{o}n}$ ‘effect’, a word that is found in Aristotle. As the counterpart of $\textit{ai\acute{e}ti\acute{a}t\acute{o}n}$ ‘that which causes, brings about’, $\textit{ai\acute{e}ti\acute{a}t\acute{o}n}$ means ‘that which is caused, brought about’. Now, it is clear how $\textit{ai\grave{t}iati\acute{k}h}$ must have been derived: it is the case-form used to express what is effected by the action contained in the clause. From this it follows that the Romans should have translated it with $\textit{effectius}$. Priscian (§ 72 = GL II, 185. 25) has also the term $\textit{causati\acute{u}us}$, but his example shows that this is still rooted in the idea of accusing.

The vocative is the $\textit{k\acute{e}n\acute{t}ik\acute{i}}$ (or $\textit{pros\acute{a}g\acute{a}ren\acute{e}tik\acute{i}}$) $\textit{pt\hat{o}\acute{e}sis}$, rendered in Latin as $\textit{vocati\acute{u}us}$, which is immediately intelligible.

The case peculiar to Latin was named in Latin $\textit{ablati\acute{u}us}$ (from $\textit{auferre}$ ‘carry away’). Here, too, there is an interesting parallel in Indian grammar, which designates as the chief function of the corresponding Sanskrit case removal or taking away. At the same time we must remember an important observation, which to some extent anticipates a discovery of modern linguistics. Quintilian remarks (Inst. 1. 4. 26) that a proper linguist (ille praeceptor acer atque subtilis) should really investigate whether a sixth case is to be recognized in Greek as well, and, corresponding to it, a seventh case in Latin: ‘For when I say $\textit{hasta percussi}$, “I wounded someone with a spear”, non utor ablati\acute{u} natura, nec si idem Graece dicam, dati\acute{u}i’ (lit. ‘I am not using the nature of the ablative, nor, if I say the same thing in Greek, of the dative’), i.e. ‘the ablative, contrary to its true meaning, does not express a separation (but rather a means, an instrument), and when I put the same expression into Greek (say, $\varepsilon\gamma\chi\epsilon\iota\upsilon \varphi\lambda\alpha\sigma\alpha\varsigma$), it is no true dative either.’ So, it had been observed that a Latin ablative often corresponds to a Greek dative and precisely in those instances fails to show ablativeal meaning; and simply by means of acute reflection people had come to realize that there was actually another case out there! And this suspicion, or inference, has in fact been confirmed: we know that another distinct ancient case—the instrumental—is continued in the Latin

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4 On Sanskrit grammatical terminology, see above all Renou (1957). In Indian grammar, the seven cases were given in a fixed order—nom. acc. instr. dat. abl. gen. loc.—and named ‘first’, ‘second’, ‘third’ . . . ‘seventh’. As in Stoic theory, in the Indian tradition too, the vocative was not recognized as a case; on Paññi’s account of the $\textit{ka\acute{r}m\acute{k}as}$ (‘factors’ of the action), which omits the elusive genitive as well as the vocative, cf. Scharfe (1977: 94–6). The term $\textit{effectius}$ (for $\textit{acusatius}$) was suggested by Trendelenburg (1836).
ablative and the Greek dative, as well as in the dative in German. Such a fine observation deserves this honourable mention. (On this, cf. Prisc. 5. 78 ff. = GL II, 190–1.)

I will not spend any longer on the Latin grammarians, but I wish to say just a few words more about two types of ancient work on syntax, starting with the σχήματα (‘figures’; on the term, see Schrader 1904). The word σχήμα is generally known as a term of rhetoric, where a distinction is made between σχήματα λόγου and σχήματα λέξεως, patterns of argument vs patterns of speech; an example of a σχήμα λόγου would be aposiopesis, a σχήμα λέξεως might be rhyme or something of that sort. Different from both types are the schemata grammatica, which denote syntactic departures from linguistic norms. Solcisms also represent infringements of the rules of syntax, but are distinguished from grammatical schemata in that they are errors committed by the linguistically uneducated, by barbarians, while a schema means the liberty taken by a poet, by a recognized artist of language, to achieve the elevation of his diction above that of every day. And so the grammarian’s task consists in identifying and explaining deviations in poetic texts from standard norms. If you are familiar with the Homeric scholia, you will know that they contain countless remarks of this sort. Most of them go back to Aristonicus, a grammarian of the Augustan period, who wrote a monograph elucidating the critical signs added by Aristarchus to the text of Homer. He comments for example: ‘here the infinitive is used instead of the imperative’, ‘here the verb | with a neuter plural subject is in the plural, instead of the singular’, and so on. A collection of his remarks of this type is given by Friedländer in the foreword to his Aristonicus (1853).

But ancient scholars did not merely establish the existence of these deviations, they went further and in the first place assigned to many such figures an origin-

5 The instrumental case of Indo-European underwent syncretism (merger) in Latin with the (IE) ablative, and in part the (IE) locative, to yield the single Latin case that we call ‘ablative’, which retains all the functions of its earlier separate ingredients; similarly, in the prehistory of Greek, the IE instrumental fell together with the dative and locative, resulting in the single ‘dative’ case of Greek. Quintilian anticipates both this historical insight and more generally the distinction between case as morphological form and case as semantic relation. See further I, 301–3 and the notes, pp. 377–80 below.

6 Aposiopesis (in Latin, reticentia) is ‘the omission of the expression of an idea, made known by breaking off a sentence already begun’ (Lausberg 1998: §§ 887–9).

7 The classic account of the rhetorical figures is Volkmann (1885), and see now D. Hansen (1998). On the broad categories of ancient schemata, see Quint. Inst. 1. 7. 16, 9. 3. 2, and (with special reference to Donatus) Holtz (1981: ch. 5), Matthews (1994: 77–8). Bk 3 of Donatus’ Ars maior has a special place in the history of the ‘virtues and vices of speech’: in Law’s words (2003: 69), it ‘popularised the study of these figures as a part of the grammatical curriculum, for their usefulness in textual analysis, whether of the Aeneid or of the Bible, was obvious. Even in the central and late Middle Ages, when Books I and II of the Ars maior fell from favour, Book III was copied and recopied, often in conjunction with Books XVII and XVIII of Priscian’s Institutiones grammaticae. Together these two texts provided a complete course in syntax, both figurative (Donatus) and non-figurative (Priscian).’ Aristonicus’ remarks are compiled from the Homeric scholia; see the editions of Erbse (1969–88) and van der Valk (1971–87); on Aristonicus and Aristarchus, see van der Valk (1963–4: II, 533–92 and ch. 11) and for bibliographical orientation Dickey (2007: Index, s.v.v.).
ator or a specific domicile. Let me mention two well-known figures of this type. First, the σχήμα Ἀλκμανικόν, named after the poet Alcman (7th c.), which occurs when the verb of a sentence with two subjects, each singular, agrees with both, i.e. is in the dual or plural, but is placed immediately after the first subject, as e.g. at Ἰλιάς 20. 138 ei δέ κ’ Ἀρης ἀρχωσι μάχης καὶ Φοίβος Ἀπόλλων ‘if Ares set (pl.) battle in motion and Phoebus Apollo’. The verb ἀρχωσι is in the plural because it has a two-part subject, but it comes straight after the first element in the singular. Because this type of word order occurred with particular frequency in Alcman, it was named after him. A second famous schema, the σχήμα Πιθανικόν, consists in the use of a singular verb in a sentence with a plural subject; but it should be noted this occurs only when the verb comes before the subject, especially when it stands at the head of the clause, e.g. Pindar, fr. 78 Machler (225 Boeckh) (Ἀλαλά . . . ὑάτει τὸν ἄνδρα ‘(Battle Cry, . . . to whom) is sacrificed (sg.) men’). What lies behind this phenomenon is the fact that at the moment of uttering the verb the speaker has not yet decided what form he wants to give the subject and puts the verb in the singular as the unmarked form. Pindar furnishes a series of examples, although the usage is not confined to his work (ms. add. 2: cf. Frisk 1932). 8

But the ancients did not stop even there, but probed deeper and proclaimed (Quint. Inst. 9. 3. 3) that a poet’s use of such a figure was no arbitrary departure from the standard form but always based on a particular ratio, or principle, and it was precisely this that justified the schema, as serving to embellish and elevate the poet’s language. This is very cleverly presented in the work Περὶ σχημάτων (On Figures) falsely ascribed to Herodian (in Spengel 1853–6: III, 83–104, esp. 100 on Pindar). The author tries to show that the poets with their deviations are often more rational than the ordinary language. Cicero, who often gives indications of his grammatical learning, speaks in the same terms (Tusc. 3. 20) of a passage of Accius in which the verb invidere (‘to envy’) governs an accusative, instead of the usual dative. 10

The second point worth mentioning here is the fact that the ancients already possessed a form of punctuation. This served in the first place as an aid to recitation, with the purpose of indicating to the reader where to pause, where to raise or lower the voice, but it was organized not merely for reading purposes but

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8 On both figures, note Wilpert (1878), van der Valk (1963–4: I, 67 nn. 168–9), Braswell (1988: 35–6), with reference to Pi. Py. 4. 57, 179, 246 (and see his commentary on these passages); on the syntax of Pindar, note Hummel (1993). For Alcman’s figure, cf. II. 5. 703, 770, 774, Od. 10. 513. At II. 20. 138, van der Valk (1963–4: II, 213–14) argues for reading sg. 3 ἀρχωσι in ‘the archaic text’ of Homer. (West prints ἀρχωσι, and ὦ for W.’s καὶ.)

9 This work, which comprises two independent treatises, has been recently re-edited by Hajdu (1998) together with an ancient epitome of it (cf. Dickey 2007: 77).

10 In the line from Accius’ much-quoted play Melanippus (427 Warmington)—quisnam florem liberum inuidit meum? ‘who has blighted the flower of my children?’—Cicero says that the poet asserts himself courageously (audacius): in fact, he was merely following the usage of his day.
also in accordance with the syntactic relations in the text. In the little textbook of Dionysius Thrax (I, 16 above), two or three signs are referred to (§4, *Περὶ στιγμῆς*), one to mark the boundary between two main clauses, a second for the boundary between main clause and subordinate clause; cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1409b3 ff., Cic. *De orat.* 3. 173, Quint. 11. 3. 35 ff., on pauses in pronunciation. An especially finely developed system is to be found in the work of the grammarian Nicanor (2nd c. AD). His theory is known to us mainly through extracts in the Homeric scholia taken from the work in which he punctuated the text of Homer; see Friedländer’s edition of his work on the *Iliad* (1857) and Steinthal’s history of linguistics (1890–1: II, 249).¹¹

¹¹ Nicanor’s system was finely developed indeed, involving eight different pause-marks, five (στιγμαί) marking off complete sentences, and three marking different sorts of weaker pause before or after an incomplete sentence; for a lucid account of the system and its antecedents, see Blank (1983) and, for bibliographical orientation, Dickey (2007: 19, 22, 23). Nicanor’s work on the *Odyssey* was edited by Carnuth (1875). On Dionysius Thrax, see Lallot (1989: 91–2).
Lecture I, 5

We turn now to the Middle Ages. It is not legitimate to speak with any disrespect of medieval linguistics, to which in the area of syntax in particular we owe precious insights and terminology absolutely indispensable for us today. Even the Byzantine grammarians made a few individual discoveries, one, for example, proposing a localistic theory of the cases: that the genitive answers the question πόθεν ‘where from?’, the dative the question ποῦ ‘where?’, and the accusative the question πός ‘where to’.1

More relevant to our purposes, however, are the achievements of linguistics in the West from the eleventh and twelfth centuries on, especially what is known as Scholasticism. We are served by a major source in this area in the extremely valuable collection of material on teaching and theory compiled by the French scholar Thurot fifty years ago (in his extracts from various manuscripts). Also important are Delbrück’s brief summary remarks in the introduction to his comparative syntax (1893–1900: I, 12–18) and those at greater length of Golling (1903: esp. 18–37). You will find valuable things also in Kaufmann’s history of the German universities (1888–96: I, 1–97).2

First, it is important to emphasize the unity of scholarly activity which was the norm in those days, a unity that we can certainly never restore and that we can only with difficulty imagine. From the point of view of scholarship, Germany, England, France, and Italy were as one country; scholarship advanced through shared endeavour, and everywhere the same textbooks were used. For example, the classic manual throughout the West for the teaching of Latin was the Doctrinale (1199) of Alexander de Villa Dei (of Ville-Dieu near Avranches in Normandy), now excellently edited by Reichling (1893).3

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1 On the Carolingian Renaissance, passed over by W., see Law (1997a) and (1997b). On the Byzantine grammarians, see Robins (1993) and (1997: 49–51), where he notes the re-emergence in the 10th c. of localist theories of case. W. alludes to the work On Syntax of Maximus Planudes (c.1255–c.1305), ‘the most distinguished Byzantine scholar in linguistic science’ (Robins 1993: 201). On Planudes, see Robins (1993: ch. 11, esp. 216–27) on the localist interpretation of his theory of the oblique cases, which has become controversial in recent years.


3 Written in 2,645 (often faulty) Ionine hexameters, based largely on Priscian and Donatus, and presenting elements of late or medieval and especially ecclesiastical Latin, the Doctrinale puerorum
What tendencies governed the study of language in this period, and what were its achievements? At that time Roman Law was studied because it was believed to be the absolute form of law. In just the same way, at that time and for those scholars, Latin was the language, in which everything was taught, the rules of which were held to apply to all other languages, too. Furthermore, the essence of Scholastic thinking lies in the endeavour to fix in one’s view not particular objects but the universal. So that people were not interested in particular linguistic forms but rather aimed at grammatical concepts, universals, and the idea prevailed that grammatical concepts were prior to the particular forms of Latin and other languages: non ergo grammaticus sed philosophus . . . grammaticam innévit (‘it is therefore not the teacher of grammar but the philosopher who . . . discovers grammar’). Of course, this view of things is at best one-sided, but it was beneficial for syntactic theory. In this period a well-articulated theory of case was developed; then, for the first time, a sharp distinction was taught between noun and adjective. A series of important terms were coined, such as the new concept of apposition. Petrus Helias, who taught in Paris around 1150, was the first to use the expression ‘ablative absolute’. And one learned to distinguish between agreement (concordantia), on the one hand and government (regimen), on the other. Peter Abelard (1079–1142) introduced the term ‘copula’ to denote esse in its syntactic function.

constituted a new approach to teaching through mnemonic verses. It was a prescribed text at the universities of Toulouse, Paris, Heidelberg, and Vienna, and widely used in the Oxford School as late as the early 15th century. Although widely criticized, including by Roger Bacon in 1271, the text has survived in some 250 ms. copies and about 270 printed editions from before 1600. See Pfeiffer (1976: 52), Vineis (1994: 181–4 and nn.), A. J. Davis, in DMA Suppl. I, s.v. ‘Alexander de Villa Dei’; note Law’s (2003: 180) characterization of the Doctrinale: ‘What it focuses on are just those awkward bits of information, mostly morphological, which do not sit well in a logically structured work. It totally lacks the hierarchical structure and the discussion of universal properties characteristic of the Schulgrammatik genre from Donatus on.’ Reichling’s edition was reprinted in 1974.

4 From an anonymous work in a Paris manuscript (BN, lat. 16297, fol. 131), reproduced by Thurot (1869: 124); cf. Robins (1951: 77 n. 2). Central to the history of linguistics in this period (the ‘12th-century renaissance’) was the reuniting of grammar with logic, which was due in large part to the rediscovery of many of Aristotle’s works on logic; see Robins (1951: 74–9), Waterman (1960), Covingon (1984: 8–12), Law (2003: 138–65). Adjectives and nouns were distinguished by William of Conches (1114); cf. Maieriù (1994: 281–3). It should be noted that the terms ‘apposito’, ‘appositum’ denoted rather the object or predicate; see Bursill-Hall (1980: Index, s.v. ‘apposito’). On the ablative absolute, see e.g. Hunt (1950: 36). A pupil of William, and a teacher of John of Salisbury, Petrus Helias was the author of the Summa super Priscianum (‘Compendium on Priscian’; ed. L. Reilly, Toronto 1993). This work enjoyed great influence throughout the Middle Ages, including among the Modistae (n. 6 below). Its clusters of mnemonic verses anticipate the Doctrinale (n. 3 above), but Petrus’ work was also central to the early growth of the movement known as ‘speculative’ (i.e. theoretical, in contrast with ‘practical’) grammar; ‘the newest aspect in Petrus Helias’ work concerns the deepening, in a speculative sense, of Priscian’s definitions of the parts of speech, as well as of the problems concerning syntax’ (Vineis 1994: 178–9); see also Vineis’s notes, Hunt (1984: ch. I), Reilly’s edition (1993), Auroux et al. (2000–6: I, chs XIII, XIV), and Law (2003: 172–3).

6 On government and agreement, see Covingon (1984: 12–19). On the copula in Abelard, see Tweedale (1982: esp. 144–7). W. seems to pass over the Modistae (the ‘modist’ grammarians, one of the groups within the speculative tradition, which flourished mainly in Paris between about 1270 and 1310), although their
This medieval approach was continued to a certain extent in a famous work, which long dominated the study of Latin after this period, by the Spaniard Franciscus Sanctius Brocensis (Francisco Sánchez de las Brozas, 1523–1600), Minerva, sive: De causis linguae latinae commentarius (‘Minerva, or On the underlying principles of the Latin language’), a second edition of which appeared in 1587. Sanctius enriched the theories transmitted from the Middle Ages by adding those passed down in the Arab grammatical tradition. He contributed in addition certain valuable insights of his own, for example, by referring to the participle as ‘adiectivum verbale’ (verbal adjective).7

You see in what various ways our syntactic vocabulary gradually came into being, worked on by various peoples and ages, and subject to such diverse theories and influences. It is with this collection of terms that we usually work still today. Are we right to do so? Can we still use these expressions that have come down to us? This question is currently of almost daily concern to linguists. An extensive discussion of it appeared very recently in the book by the Anglicist Gustav Krüger on the difficulties of English (Schwierigkeiten des Englischen, 1897–1904, 2nd edn 1910–19), probably the most complete account in existence of modern English. In the second part of the second edition (1910–19: II, 2156 ff.), the author deals with the technical terms of linguistic theory. The criticism that Krüger, like so many others before him, levels at the prevailing grammatical terminology is justified by his demonstration that it is often based on theories that we can no longer recognize, and that it includes many mistranslations from one language into another: the term ‘to conjugate’, for example, is based on a complete misunderstanding.8 Now, the view of Krüger, and of others too, is that we have got to try to replace this old nonsense with new German terms. From time immemorial, attempts have been made to germanize terminology; I noted earlier (I, 16 above) that we find examples in the learned works of the monks of St Gall. Quite a bit has even passed into use in the schools;

two major achievements are both relevant to syntax. These are, first, the elaboration of Petrus Helias’ theory of the modi significandi (whence their name Modistae), the more general meanings of the parts of speech on which the syntax depends; and secondly, they developed an elaborate theory of syntax from which some concepts, such as government and dependency, have survived to the present day’ (Covington (1984: 1). On speculative grammar in general, see Law (2003: 171–9); on the Modistae in particular, Covington (1984).

7 On Sanctius and his Arab connections, Delbrück (1893–1900: I, 16) refers to W.’s teacher Benfey (1869: 188). See now Law (2003: 262–4). In her words (263), Sanctius’ Minerva was ‘the first in a series of widely read philosophical grammars which prepared the way for the more celebrated Grammaire générale et raisonnée (1660)’.

8 The Latin grammatical term coniugatio denoted a set of verbs which were ‘conjoined’ or ‘cognate’ in that they followed the same pattern of inflection. The pattern of inflection itself was called declinatio (hence, e.g., ‘declinatio primae coniugationis’, the inflection of the first conjugation), but in modern times the use of coniugatio was extended to include the sense ‘the set of inflected forms of a given verb’, and the verb coniugare was back-formed to mean ‘to make the set of inflected forms of a given verb, to conjugate’. Cf. Madvig (1841: §99), Schad (2007: s.v. ‘coniugatio’).
many, if not most, language teachers replace the word *Pronomen* (‘pronoun’) with *Fürwort*, and *Participium* (‘participle’) with *Mittelwort*. Now, it is clear that both these translations are thoroughly unsatisfactory. Latin *pronomen*, which translates Greek ἀντωνυμία, is in fact derived from pro nomine just like proconsul (‘proconsul’) from pro consule, where pro means ‘in the place of, as a replacement for’, while *Fürwort* simply cannot mean ‘standing in place of a word’. Probably, what is meant is *Ersatzwort* (‘replacement word’), but *Fürwort* is much less transparent than the ancient term, and an ugly formation to boot. Other, easier, translations, on the other hand, have admittedly turned out well. There is nothing objectionable about e.g. *Einzahl* and *Mehrzahl* (‘singular’ and ‘plural’, lit. ‘one-number’ and ‘more [than one]-number’). But then again, translating *genus* (‘gender’) by *Geschlecht*, although strictly correct, has the disadvantage that the German word also means ‘sex, a sex’. Worst of all, however, are translations which imitate terms based themselves on a mistranslation, such as *Klagefall* (lit. ‘accusing case’) for ‘accusative’ (cf. I, 19 above).

Attempts have also been made to form new independent names for things. Here the question at once arises: how is one to agree on a term, and what is going to win acceptance? And then, is the new term better than the old one? An expression such as *Eigenschaftswort* (‘adjective’, lit. ‘quality-word’) is unobjectionable. But some of KRÜGER’s own offerings are grisly and horrifying: for example, he wants to call the comparative the ‘*Höhergradform*’ (‘higher-degree-form’), and the participle, the ‘*eigenschaftswörtliche Zeitwortform*’ (lit. ‘quality-word-like time-word-form’, i.e. the form of a time-word which is like a quality-word, or the part of the verb which has the form of an adjective). A further objection to new formations is that they are always based on a very particular point of view. When a new theory comes along, they will suffer from the same defect as the maligned ancient terms. Just how wrong-headed new formations can be is seen in, e.g., the earlier popular designation of the article as *Geschlechtswort* (lit. ‘gender word’).9

I am, I confess, rather sceptical of all these new coinages and efforts at germanizing. The old expressions have two advantages: first, they have no literal meaning attached to them, they are simple tokens, mere signs. There is a good recent treatment of this general question from the medical point of view by a pathologist, ORTH. By way of example, he adduces (1917: 581–2) the term *cirrhosis*. The etymology as such is clear: the word is from Greek κυρρός ‘yellow’. It was used first of all to denote only liver conditions associated with jaundice. Today the term is used for any atrophy of any organ and is not hampered by its etymology because nobody knows the word it is derived from. In the second place, it is extremely useful if technical terms are formed in such a way that

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9 On the history of linguistic terminology in German, see Jellinek (1906) and (1913–14), Leser (1914), and Kürschner (1988).
they have currency in every language: scholarship and science are, after all, international. Mutual exchange is the order of the day and mutual comprehension is necessary. To be sure, one can move more freely if it is permitted to coin terms for new concepts, and for such creations the obvious source is one’s own language. Let me refer you especially to some wonderful coinings of Jacob Grimm, such as Ablaut, Umlaut, strong and weak, Lautverschiebung. But even these suffer from the disadvantage that they cannot serve as international currency. Hence French apophonie for Ablaut; English Grimm’s Law for Lautverschiebung. Latin and Greek will always be the best source of new scientific terms.10

One drawback attends the use of any linguistic term, namely that it will never have precisely the same value when applied to different languages. For example, we speak of an ‘imperfect’ in Greek, Latin, and German, but ἔλεγε, dicebat, sagte (‘said, was saying’), or ἐποίει, faciebat, tat (‘did, was doing’) express three different kinds of past time. This is unavoidable.

We can quickly skim over the centuries that followed the Middle Ages, since they saw no significant advance in the study of Greek and Latin syntax. Practically the only activity was the gathering and laborious arrangement in monographs of an immense number of individual observations, the traditional grammatical scheme being retained.11 A particular shortcoming of this approach was that more attention was paid to the abnormal than to the normal. Typical of this was the most popular book on the Greek language, On Peculiarities of Greek Expression (idiotismi), by the Frenchman François Viger (Franciscus Vigerius, 1591–1647). It was a collection of departures from what was thought to be normal, the norm being taken to be given by Latin usage!12 The English classicists were really the first to put forward the right view. Richard Dawes (1708–66) deserves special mention. His Miscellanea critica, first published in 1745, contain a remarkable wealth of original observations reminiscent of the style of the present day. What particularly caused a stir—and it is of lasting significance—was his contention (1745: 82–3) on the strength of close readings, that some rule applied to the use of subjunctive and optative in Greek which corresponded to some extent to the sequence of tenses in Latin (cf. I, 238 below). Philippe Brunck was the first to

10 Grimm did not coin ‘ablaut’ or ‘umlaut’: see Morpurgo Davies (1998: 149 n. 20), and on the set of sound-changes affecting consonants in Germanic known as ‘Grimm’s Law’, in which Jacob Grimm was anticipated by the work of the Dane Rasmus Rask (1998: 142–4, 149–50 nn. 22–4).
use this doctrine, the so-called *Canon Dawesianus* (or ‘Dawes’s Canon’) as a guiding principle in textual criticism.\(^{13}\)

Isolated glimmerings, which anticipate the better findings of later times are in evidence in a couple of inconspicuous works of the eighteenth century. Golling (1903) refers in these terms to the works of Hasse (*Grammatologie*, 1792) and of Rath (*De elocutionis Romanae praeceptis*, 1798).\(^{14}\) There already one finds for example the observation that strictly it is not right to say that a given preposition governs such and such a case, but that these little words were rather added to the cases because the cases were no longer able to express all the relations that may exist between two constituents of a phrase, and that the prepositions served to specify precisely the sense of the individual cases. No less new and no less correct were the observations that Lat. *quod* had developed from the neuter of the relative pronoun, and that Lat. *quin* contained a negation—which shows how so often an impartial mind may anticipate something that wins general acceptance only much later.

We come now to work of contemporary interest. From the first half of the nineteenth century, three names confront us of men who did important research on the Greek language, names which still today are to be mentioned with respect and reverence: BUTTMANN, LOBECK, and G. HERMANN. From the point of view of grammatical studies, the one who achieved most and is of greatest significance is Philipp BUTTMANN (1764–1829). His *Ausführliche griechische Sprachlehre* (1830–9; 1st edn 1819–27) is still today indispensable for anyone who wishes to go more deeply into the history of the Greek language. But for all the greatness of his contribution in the area of Greek morphology, BUTTMANN had little to spare for syntax; its problems did not interest him so much. So that unfortunately we must for present purposes rule out the man who could have spoken best.

Next to BUTTMANN comes Christian August LOBECK (1781–1860), who taught classics in Königsberg. That he was not only a linguist is evident from his *Aglaophamus* (1829), a book in which he treated with stunning erudition | and exemplary love of truth, the Orphic theology of the Greeks and related matters.\(^{15}\)

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\(^{13}\) Dawes’s famous observation (on pp. 133–40 of the 4th edn (1817), by Thomas Kidd, of the *Miscellanea critica* was essentially that, in subordinate clauses taking a finite verb in the subjv. or opt., which were previously thought to occur interchangeably, the opt. is used only with a past-tense main verb (he compares Lat. *amarem*), the subjv., only with a pres. or fut. (cf. Lat. *amen*). Dawes completed not a single monograph; the *Miscellanea* comprise various of his articles on Greek grammar. Dawes famously opposed the reintroduction by Richard Bentley (1662–1742) of digamma into the text of Homer; see Pfeiffer (1976: 157 and ch. 11), and Wilamowitz (1982: 78–82, with Lloyd-Jones’s nn. 319 and 327). On Richard François Philippe Brunck (1729–1803), best known for his work on the tragedians, esp. Sophocles, and the Alexandrians, esp. Apollonius, see F. Jacobs’s article in the *Allgemeine Encyclopädie*, I.13, 220–2; Sandys (1906–8: II, 395–6), and Wilamowitz (1982: 87–8); Pökel (1882) lists his editions.

\(^{14}\) Rudolph Gotthold Rath (1755–1814) was Rector of the Latin Hauptschule and later professor extraordinarius at the University of Halle (Pökel 1882: s.v.).

\(^{15}\) On Lobeck’s *Aglaophamus*, see Pricoco (1989: 267–9).
But he dedicated the greater part of his life’s work to the Greek language. Nobody, before or since, could have matched his knowledge of Greek literature, from Homer to the authors of the Byzantine age, so that one can say with absolute certainty that it is impossible to work in the area of Greek grammar without having LOBECK’s works constantly to hand; you will always find a wealth of examples. More or less the same complaint can be made of LOBECK as of BUTTMANN. LOBECK’s works are devoted mainly to phonology and word formation, and to some extent to the vocabulary; syntax, by contrast, and the semantics of the inflectional forms received practically no attention from him and for us this represents an immense loss—although in strictly linguistic terms LOBECK was inferior to BUTTMANN, who was a real historian of language and took a more open view of things. Nevertheless his work does yield some rich pickings even for our present concerns. Particularly relevant in this connection is his edition of the Ecloga of Phrynichus (2nd c. AD), who gave rules for writing correctly in the Attic manner (on Atticism, see I, 80 below).16 To this brief manual LOBECK added a commentary brimful of learning, and also took the opportunity to state his views on certain syntactic phenomena, such as the construction of the verb μέλλω (1820: 745–56) He goes somewhat further in the Paralipomena, in the section on the figura etymologica (1837: 499 ff.), and on individual points, in particular, nowhere is so much of value to be found as here. Finally, mention should be made also of his learned commentary on Sophocles’ Ajax (1st edn 1809).17

The third great figure I named, beside BUTTMANN and LOBECK, is Gottfried HERMANN (1772–1848), who taught classics in Leipzig for many years and was sought out by hundreds of pupils. He achieved much as a commentator on the Greek poets and in his teaching of metre, but he regarded grammar, too, as another major object for his endeavours, and in him we find just what we miss in the other two, in that his work was centrally concerned with what we are calling syntax. However, it must be said straightaway that as a grammarian he has to be ranked far below BUTTMANN and LOBECK, notwithstanding his other great achievements and the genius he demonstrated in other areas. Of relevance in

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17 Pfeiffer (1976: 185–6) complements W.’s assessment of Buttmann with the observation that he ‘remained a pure grammarian without any inclination towards the philosophy of language or comparative linguistics’. Nevertheless, his Lexilogus (written in the tradition of F. A. Wolf) was one of the most influential books on the language of Homer. Wilamowitz (1982: 115–16), remarks memorably that, ‘Before Buttmann there existed no doctrine of Greek accidence and word-formation worthy of the name. But for the advent of comparative philology, grammar for us would have remained forever exactly as Buttmann left it; his stimulating ideas make Lobeck seem no more than a compiler.’ On Lobeck, who was distrustful of the new comparative philology, see Sandys (1906–8: III, 103–8, 205), and Wilamowitz (1982: 111–12).
Hermann’s case are, on the one hand, a fundamental, and celebrated, work *On the Need for a New Theory of Greek Grammar* (*De emendanda ratione grammaticae Graecae*, 1801), on the other, specialized works on particular questions, such as the *Four Books on the Particle ἄν*, which occupy half of the fourth volume of his *Collected Works* (1827–39).
Lecture I, 6

The first-mentioned work had a great impact and its influence was long-lived. This fact, and HERMANN’s importance as a classical scholar, justifies our going briefly into the content of the book. It comprises not so much a presentation and statement of facts of Greek grammar as an attempt at setting out a programme. With the certainty and conviction of youth, HERMANN sees himself as the one who will set Greek grammar to rights and believes that he can elevate it to a yet higher level. The book is in two parts. The first part deals with formal matters, questions of accentuation, etc., and for these purposes the author recognizes that one must allow oneself to be guided by ‘experientia’, and adhere to what has been handed down. In the area of syntax, on the other hand, the starting point of one’s consideration must be ‘ratio’ (‘reason’): here ‘experientia’ is of relevance only as an assistant. HERMANN’s aim, then, is to gain for ‘ratio’ admittance to the grammar. It is remarkable how enthusiastically the young scholar professes the philosophy of KANT. Often the real aim of his discussion is to show that KANT’s insights find expression even in language and hence that the key to much of the structure of the classical languages is to be found in KANT’s teaching.1

I should like to pick out three chapters, starting with the one on sentence structure. HERMANN teaches that every sentence must necessarily contain three elements: subject, predicate, and copula. Following a popular theory of his day, he is of the view that e.g. Lat. *sol oritur* (‘the sun rises’) is really just an abbreviated form of *sol oriens est* (‘the sun is rising’), and *uivo* (‘I live’) likewise of *uiuus sum* (‘I am alive’). This same theory later had great influence on the development of comparative linguistics and on the early work of Franz BOPP. Convinced that the verb *esse* must be present as the copula in every sentence, BOPP sought to show in his *Conjugationssystem* (1816) that the forms of the verb which require an *s* for their

1 Gottfried Hermann was a great Latin scholar as well as a Hellenist, and was called ‘pater studiorum’ by Karl Lachmann (1793–1851) (see Ed. Fraenkel 1948); his pupils included also Karl Reisig (I, 3 above) and the lexicographer Franz Passow (1786–1833) (see Morpurgo Davies 1998: 85), Pfeiffer (1976: 78–9, 190), likens him to Richard Bentley; see also Wilamowitz (1982: 109–11), and Schmidt (1990). Although praised by August Pott for his influence on linguistics at the start of the 19th c., G. Hermann was occasionally hostile to the new comparative (Indo-European) linguistics, which found a warmer reception among more general classicists (see Morpurgo Davies 1998: 15, 153). On Immanuel Kant’s ‘all-pervasive’ influence in discussion of language in early 19th-c. Germany, see Morpurgo Davies (1998: 26 et passim).
formation in fact contain the verb esse. That was a mistake, albeit a productive one. From a historical point of view, the use of the verb esse has turned out to be a relatively recent phenomenon: for instance, a sentence like Gk ὁ δὲ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανή ("the rule of many is not a good thing") represents in fact the ancient state of affairs; originally a nominal predicate was attached to the subject without the help of esse.

Hermann then combines this theory of the sentence with the partition of the vocabulary, deriving from the Arabic grammarians, into noun, verb, and particle (indeclinabile), and claims that the true form of the predicate is an indeclinabile. On his account, the German clause type with an endingless adjective as predicate, such as der Mann ist tüchtig ("the man is clever") would represent the original type, while Greek and Latin would represent departures from the normal state by using an adjective with masculine or feminine ending. We now know that this type of clause in modern German is based on recent developments and that the oldest speakers of Germanic languages treated the predicative adjective just as in Greek and Latin. So you see how Hermann’s reconstructions are diametrically opposed to the real state of affairs. But there’s better (or worse!) to come!

Characteristic of his theory of the cases is the sentence that we read on p. 137, that ‘ueri praesagitio’ ("representation of reality"), traces of which are to be seen everywhere in the formation of languages, manifests itself above all in the invention of the cases, especially since no more than six cases exist and there cannot be fewer than six. Here Hermann is thoroughly in line with Scholasticism: he, too, regards Latin as the language. He sees the various case-forms as expressions of the three modalities, reality, possibility, and necessity. The

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2 This is part of Bopp’s express aim set out in his introductory chapter (‘On verbs in general’), Bopp (1816: 8): ‘The purpose of this essay is to show how in the conjugation of the Sanskrit verbs the relations between subject and predicate are expressed by corresponding modifications of the root, and how at times the verbum abstractum [i.e., the verb ‘to be’ is fused with the stem syllable to make a single word.’

3 Spoken by Odysseus at Il. 2. 204 (and commented on by Aristotle at Pol. 1292a13). Independently, Kirk comments of the phrase (1985: ad loc.), ‘perhaps a traditional poetic epigram’. On Franz Bopp (1791–1867), one of the central founders of Indo-European comparative linguistics, professor of Sanskrit and comparative grammar in Berlin from 1821, see Sebeok (1966: I, 200–50), Schlerath (1990a), and Morpurgo Davies (1998: 129–36), esp. 134 on the theory that any verb-form somehow contains the verb ‘to be’. Lehmann (1967: 38–45) includes brief selections (in English) from Bopp’s famous book referred to by W., in which he compares the conjunctival system of Sanskrit with those of Greek, Latin, and other IE languages.

4 For an excellent introduction to Arabic linguistics, see Fleisch (1994), esp. 179–80 on the three parts of speech in (noun), fi’l (verb), and harf (particle), and on the controversial hypothesis of Greek influence on the Arab grammarians (on which cf. Versteegh 1977); on Arabic syntactic theory, see Owen (1993) and (1997); on the Near East in general, Versteegh, Koerner, & Niederehe (1985); on the Hebrew grammatical tradition, see Schippers (1997). In Germanic, there is on the other hand the opposition between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ inflection of adjectives, and predicative adjectives tend to take the ‘strong’ inflection, less well characterized for gender than the ‘weak’, but still with a recognizable ending. Occasional endingless adjectives appear early in Germanic, but not only in predicative function; see further on Gothic, Old Icelandic, and Old High German, Krahe & Seebold §§69–72, Heusler (1921: §§268 ff., 385 ff.), and Braune & Reiffenstein §§244 ff.
nominative expresses the modality of reality, the vocative that of possibility, and
the other cases that of necessity, the genitive and accusative conveying the
relation of inherence, the ablative and dative, that of causality. Of course, in
intellectually imperfect ages (so HERMANN) people confused cause and effect and
hence merged ablative and dative, so that in Greek the ablative disappeared. All
this stands in glaring contradiction to the linguistic facts: we know that Greek
and Latin derive from a language with seven or eight cases.5

Or take his theory of the tenses! HERMANN is not content with the fine
discipline of the Stoics in the matter of tense (cf. I, 15 above). He believes one can
go much further than that: gearing everything to temporal sequence, he distin-
guishes independent and dependent time-points and all possible relations be-
tween them, he makes the paradigm of a Latin verb serve as the basis for it all,
and, on the assumption that the periphrastic conjugation (i.e. the participle
combined with finite forms of the verb ‘to be’) is original, he attempts to
reconstruct this in Greek. He thereby arrives at an original state with sixteen
different tenses! This too could hardly be more at odds with history.

So, you see, his syntax is not founded on real, factual material but constructed
in a completely a priori fashion, as if in the formation of language Logic alone had
done all the talking, as if a philosopher had invented language. Modern linguistic
research indicates the exact opposite, although it may be that HERMANN’s
consistent application of what was wrong did serve the cause of truth.|n

Besides, HERMANN has positive merits, too. He pointed out, for example, that
it is not legitimate to treat the Greek language as a homogeneous mass of
linguistic features. Open a pre-1800 grammar and you will find a complete jumble
of illustrative examples, instances from Homer, Lucian, and the New Testament
standing side by side. HERMANN was one of the first to teach that one has to
distinguish periods and styles.

The ever-increasing application of this basic principle is one of the major
services rendered by the generation after HERMANN. For the characterization of
pure Attic as distinct from poetic and post-classical Greek, I draw your attention
to the achievements of Karl Wilhelm KRÜGER (1798–1874; cf. I, 3 above) in his
grammar and of the Dutch scholar Carolus Gabriel COBET (1813–89) as a textual
critic.6

5 Indo-European is standardly thought to have had eight cases (incl. voc.), viz. nom., voc., acc., gen.,
dat., abl., loc., instr. (cf. I, 300 & n. 1, p. 377 below). The first grammars of Sanskrit could have informed
Hermann that Sanskrit has eight cases, which refutes his insistence, derived from Kant’s philosophy, on six
cases (see Morpurgo Davies 1998: 180 n. 8).

6 On Krüger and his grammar, see I, 32 below and n. 13 in this lecture. On Cobet, see Sandys (1906–8:
III, 282–7), esp. Janssen (1990), and also Wilamowitz (1982: 89–91), who also juxtaposes—more pointedly
than W.—a paragraph on the advent of an historical dimension, which concludes, ‘It was only with the help
of this last [i.e. the historic method] that the “grammar” of the ancients was finally left behind and the way
opened to a real understanding of the past, not merely of antiquity.’
To this were added, in time, **studies with a historical dimension**. Buttmann had led the way in the field of Greek morphology; and Jacob Grimm (1785–1863) in his *Deutsche Grammatik* (of which the 1st edn of vol. 1 appeared in 1819) had given a wonderful example of a truly historical presentation setting the facts out in all their abundance and in the proper order. This has become increasingly the norm, and nowadays ‘historical grammar’, ‘historical syntax’ have become almost fashionable. Let me mention first a few works that concern Greek.

First of all, the book by Stahl that appeared fifteen years ago, the ‘Historical-critical syntax of Greek’ (1907), a work that I can recommend only with some reservation. In fact, it has the right to be called historical only in so far as the examples are given in chronological order within Greek; but chronology is not history. The author has not concerned himself with the starting point of the phenomena he considers, with their motivation and root cause, nor has he pursued their further development. Developments after Aristotle are not considered. The book is the product of admirable industry, its presentation is clear and precise, but, as far as I can see, it has yielded no real profit for serious scholarly research.

Next, I must mention the very useful collection of articles edited by Martin Schanz in Würzburg, ‘Contributions to the historical syntax of Greek’ (1882–1912), which includes some very good pieces, alongside some very ordinary ones. Here belong also the infinitely precise observations of Tycho Mommsen (1819–1900) in his ‘Contributions to the study of the Greek prepositions’ (1886–95), which, starting from small findings in a limited area, grew into a magnum opus. It had been observed that ‘with’ in the orator Isocrates is always μετά + genitive, never σων, and Mommsen developed this kind of observation further for the whole period from Homer to Byzantine Greek.

From this work and from Schanz’s, too, it emerges that historical study in particular was leading to a much sharper style of observation, to the ‘static’ method which is not content to note what is striking and remarkable but rather endeavours to collect and to order an absolutely complete set of all available material.

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8 For detailed contemporary criticism of parts of Stahl (1907), see Gildersleeve (1908–9) (the same ref. is given by ms. add. 2).

9 It is interesting to compare W.’s lists (above and below) with those works and scholars appreciated by Goodwin in the preface to the revised edition of his *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb*. They overlap substantially: though often in different terms from W., Goodwin also expresses appreciation of Madvig, Delbrück, Schanz, Monro, Krüger, Kühner and, above all, Gildersleeve. I have put ‘static’ between quotation marks in the translation (of W.’s ‘der statistischen Methode’), as in this context the German adjective *statisch*, which alternates with *statistisch*, means not so much static, much less statistical, as synchronic or descriptive (cf. Morpurgo Davies 1998: 250 and 273 n. 40). Notice, however, that Goodwin also notes (p. vii), with express gratitude, the emergence of what he calls the ‘statistical method’.
Similar efforts were made in the area of Latin grammar. Draeger’s *Historical Syntax* (two vols, 1878–81) deserves only a mention, as it was rather hastily composed, not based on profound research, and hence unable to exercise any lasting influence. Of great value, by contrast, are the numerous works undertaken in this direction by Eduard Wölfflin and his school, set forth, or at least registered, in the *Archiv für lateinische Lexikographie und Grammatik*, which first appeared in 1884. While Wölfflin himself is always interesting, even captivating, most of these studies, like those of Schanz’s school, have a rather superficial conception of the historical view and are too often content with simply stringing the data together in chronological order.—At the same time, there is an understanding of the fact (emphasized already by Gottfried Hermann) that apart from chronology it is necessary to attend to differences of style, and in particular to evaluate differently poetry and prose—and even within what is called prose, it is imperative to distinguish the plain from the poetically coloured, the educated from the vulgar, the written language from the colloquial.  

I wish now to give you an overview of the most important works, apart from those already mentioned, which can serve us today as aids in the area of Latin and Greek syntax, though this must necessarily involve only a selection of what is of real use. First, the comprehensive treatments. The two best full-length accounts, although they deserve no more than a mention (and with considerable reservations at that), both derive from the work of a schoolmaster from Hannover, Raphael Kühner (1802–78). He published comprehensive grammars of both Greek (1834–5) and Latin (1878). Kühner was not only hard-working but also willing to learn. If something needed fetching, he fetched it, and he also confronted recent research in an unprejudiced way. He was also really the first to take an interest in comparative grammar. But he cannot be said to have been gifted as a linguist, and his intellect was limited. Both the Greek and the Latin grammar have been very well revised. For Greek, the new edition of the syntactic part (1898–1904) was undertaken by Bernhard Gerth (1844–1911), whose revision represents a much more competent achievement than the rather careless job that Blass made of the first two volumes (1890–2). Gerth was, admittedly, constrained by the clumsy arrangement of the original, but his presentation is clear and copious. The same is true on the whole of Carl Stegmann’s revised edition of the syntactic part of the Latin grammar; see, however, Kroll’s remarks in *Glotta* for 1915 and 1917.  

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10 From 1884 to 1908, 15 volumes of the *Archiv* appeared under Wölfflin’s energetic editorship (see Warren’s enthusiastic reviews (1883–4) of the first two numbers), as first preliminaries and then supplements to the *Thesaurus linguae Latinae* (the first fascicles of which appeared in 1900).  
11 Pfeiffer (1976: 188) calls Kühner ‘the foremost teacher of the traditional Greek grammar’, while his openness to developments in general linguistics is stressed in the short introduction to the proceedings of the 1986 conference held to mark the 150th anniversary of the publication of his Greek syntax (Rijksbaron, Mulder, & Wakker 1988: 1–3). Wilhelm Kroll, while sympathetically disposed towards Stegmann, finds his
Other comprehensive accounts, such as Schmalz’s Latin syntax (in Stolz & Schmalz 1910), I cannot present as entirely satisfactory, though many judge Schmalz in particular very favourably. On the other hand, two other, somewhat sketchier treatments are very fine, indeed outstanding, both of them extremely stimulating and full of new points of view. These are: Delbrück’s Grundlagen der griechischen Syntax (‘Foundations of Greek Syntax’—vol. 4 of Syntaktische Forschungen, 1879) and the syntactic parts of Brugmann’s Greek grammar, which appeared in Iwan Müller’s Handbuch, the latest (4th) edition having been revised by Thumb (Brugmann & Thumb 1913).12 Almost half a century older than these works, but still not really out of date, is the Greek Grammar for schools of Karl Wilhelm Krüger, mentioned earlier (cf. I, 3, 30 above), an extremely shrewd scholar, whose mastery of Greek achieves a rare level of perfection, and to whom we owe, among other things, a masterly edition of Thucydides (3rd edn 1858–61). The first part of his Sprachlehre deals with Attic, and he shares the credit for sharply separating Attic from the rest of Greek, though he errs in holding Xenophon up as the major representative of Attic. The second part gives a brief grammar of the literary dialects. In both parts, syntax strongly predominates.13

Finally, we should remember honoris causa the Syntax of Classical Greek published some years ago, on the strength of a lifetime’s preoccupation with syntactic problems, by B. L. Gildersleeve, the acknowledged doyen of classical scholarship in the US (vol. 1 1900, vol. 2 1911, further volumes still to appear).14 This work is based throughout on material collected by the author. No attempt is made at a diachronic account. The starting point of the presentation is the usage of the Attic orators; this is established for them and then compared with the usage of earlier prose and of the poets. Except in so far as they appear in the great authors, the non-Attic dialects | are ignored. The organization of the book is

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12 On Delbrück and Brugmann, see I, 4 with n. 8 on p. 10 above.

13 Krüger’s grammar comprises two works in one, covering as it does the same grammatical scope twice, first for Attic prose and then for poetry from Homer to Aristophanes, and Herodotus. The grammar and its author are appreciated by Sandys (1906–8: III, 119) and Wilamowitz (1982: 148 with Lloyd-Jones’s n. 58), and Krüger’s syntax (his chs 43–69) has recently been translated into English, revised and greatly expanded by Guy L. Cooper III in four volumes (1998–2002). Cooper helpfully retains all the headings and numeration of the latest edition of Krüger (1873–91) by which reference is commonly made to Krüger in 19th- and early-20th-century scholarship; see the reviews by Wyatt (1999) and Probert (2004). Note also Cooper’s Zurich doctoral thesis (in German, supervised by Ernst Risch) on syntactic theory and the textual criticism of Attic writers (1973).

14 The further volumes never did appear. On the life and works of Basil Gildersleeve (1831–1924), professor at Charlottesville, Virginia, and then Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, see Briggs (1990).
peculiar, the form of presentation brief in the extreme, and most of the space is taken up by the examples.

In the field of Latin I must mention a work that has just been started, namely Landgraf’s great historical grammar of Latin. The phonology and stem formation, by Stolz (1894–5), appeared some twenty years ago, the syntax is forthcoming. Thus far it has been in the hands of a very good team of collaborators, including C. F. W. Müller, but only fragments are in place and the arrangement is atrocious. I should also mention the great Danish classicist J. N. Madvig (1804–86), who was above all a Latinist. He may be set alongside Krüger, although I cannot accord the same high regard to his works, especially those on systematic grammar. His value lies more in the individual remarks in his philological works, though he did have a streak of philosophy of language in him, witnessed by a number of rich and penetrating articles to be found in his Kleine Schriften (1875). He followed his well-known Latin grammar (1841) with a syntax of Attic (1846, 2nd edn of the German translation 1857), which was never likely to be influential.16

Beside these comprehensive treatments, a number of monographs should be considered. These involve accounts of particular varieties of language, about which, for their own sake, I must say a little more at this point. From time immemorial, it has been the classical form of the language that has formed the chief object of syntactic description, in both Greek and Latin: i.e. on the one hand Attic, on the other the form of Latin that prevailed in the period from Cicero to the second century ad. It was left to more recent research to deal with these matters rather more sharply and precisely. Within Attic, for example, we have to distinguish different degrees of purity. The purest Attic we encounter in Aristophanes on the one hand and in Isocrates on the other. Plato presents a very vivid form of Attic, close to the spoken language, but often with an admixture of poetic colour, and Thucydides, too, can be called an Attic author only in a

15 Note Stolz & Schmalz (1910), which combines Stolz’s phonology and morphology with Schmalz’s syntax and stylistics in a single volume entitled ‘Latin Grammar’ (with an appendix by Heerdegen on lexicography). This was soon superseded by Leumann’s phonology and morphology (1928, 2nd edn 1977) and Hofmann’s syntax and stylistics revised and completed by Szantyr (1965).

16 In Morpurgo Davies’s history of 19th-c. linguistics, Madvig emerges as a more prominent figure than W.’s remarks would suggest; and on Greek syntax, note also Madvig (1848). In the words of Morpurgo Davies (1998: 154), he ‘not only counts as one of the great classicists of the century and had a considerable role to play in linguistic thought, but also was well acquainted with the principles of comparative linguistics and lectured on the subject.’ His school grammars, which were translated into several European languages, constituted a bridge between practical pedagogical works and more detailed scholarship; as a founder of the new textual criticism, he embraced, along with Lachmann and Ritschl, the new comparative linguistics, although he rejected, together with linguists including Pott, Steinhall, Ascoli and Bréal, Schleicher’s organic view of language; he made important contributions through theoretical reflection in the areas of etymology and semantics as well as syntax. See Morpurgo Davies (1998: 190–3, 303, 323, 336 n. 35), and note the bibliography by Spang-Hanssen (1966), the recent collection of his linguistic articles in Madvig (1971), and Mejer (1990) on his life and works.
Not until quite recently did scholars realize that it is not legitimate to restrict attention to Attic literature and that account must be taken also of the thousands of inscriptions left by speakers of Attic on stone. For the study of the language, the inscriptions have two advantages over the literary evidence: first, the transmission is absolutely authentic; secondly, they reflect, better than literature can, the language of everyday life. This was recognized for phonology and morphology already half a century ago; for syntax, the first to draw attention to it was probably Delbrück in his *Grundlagen der griechischen Syntax* (‘Foundations of Greek Syntax’, 1879). Many remarkable facts emerge from this source, and in particular rules of word order receive some welcome illumination. Often we encounter genuinely popular language in Attic inscriptions, especially in those written on old vases, where we find e.g. instances of strikingly drastic ellipsis.

Similar statements can be made for ‘High’, literary Latin, which, from the time of Terence on, developed as something distinct from the popular language. We have gradually learnt to appreciate even the language of the master, the Latin of Cicero, rather from a historical point of view and with respect to its special features. Of great value are Lebretón’s studies (1901) of the grammar and language of Cicero. Cicero himself presents no straightforwardly homogeneous idiom. We can observe in numerous features how his language gradually changed during the forty years of his active career; for, particularly in such turbulent times, a language is exposed to strong pressures to change. It can be shown that the speeches he delivered against Antony and the works that he composed under Caesar differ widely in form and sentence structure from what we know of the speeches of his youth; e.g. the future participle appears for the first time in the works of his old age. More important still is that we distinguish between his various genres of writing. Cicero was a polyphonic author; he understood how to exploit very different styles. On the one hand, in the speeches and in his great didactic works, like the three books *De oratore*, he writes a very refined and elevated Latin; then again, in another part of his literary output he has given a

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18 On Attic inscriptions, including those on vases, see now on their phonology and morphology Threatte (1980) and (1996), and on their writing Immerwahr (1990). On the language of dialect inscriptions, cf. I, 36 below and the notes.

19 This is a strikingly late dating of the beginnings of literary Latin. Contrast Palmer (1954: 84): ‘In grammatical structure there is little which distinguishes Plautus’ language from Classical Latin’, and compare I, 36 and n. 7, p. 52 below.
faithful representation of the language of everyday—not, though, the vulgar language, but that of the conversation of the educated: we have few such pure witnesses to the conversational language of Rome in her greatest age than the letters that he addressed to Atticus; the other letters often have a refined style, while towards Atticus he was quite unrestrained and wrote as he spoke. I shall often refer to these letters, for they present us with the most intimate Latin of the classical age.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{20} On the styles of Cicero and their development, see now von Albrecht (2003), esp. the introductory survey of scholarship since the 19th c., and ch. 1 ‘Differences of genre’.
I have still to say something about the aids at our disposal for other types of Greek and Latin. One of the peculiarities, or tastes, of the nineteenth century was to devote special attention to what was pre-classical, to what was older and dialectal. To take Greek first, the lion’s share of research, with reference to the language as well, was claimed by Homer, and it certainly cannot be denied that for any study of Greek syntax—one might even say Indo-European syntax—a thorough and detailed investigation of Homeric usage is absolutely fundamental and essential. In this area, too, a number of special publications have appeared. It is a pleasure to mention in laudatory terms the work of an English scholar, the *Homerian Grammar* by Monro of Oxford (1891), valuable because Monro pays particular attention to semantic and syntactic aspects and reports findings which were not generally known or easily accessible. More specialized is the masterly account of the use of the moods of the verb by Delbrück (1871), the first in his series of great syntactic works, the *Syntaktische Forschungen* (‘Syntactic Investigations’). Mutzbauer’s study of the tenses in Homer (two vols, 1893, 1909) is valuable in virtue of the completeness of its collection of material, although the judgement of the author leaves something to be desired.1

With your permission I shall spend a little while longer on Homer, and consider the question: is Homer an entirely reliable and really fruitful source for the study of syntax? In the first place, it must be stressed that he is invaluable not only because of the wealth of data that he offers but also frequently because of the great fidelity with which he has preserved extremely ancient features. It is remarkable, for instance, how important rules of word order may be elicited from him, despite his metrical form.2 On the other hand, it is necessary to pay attention to the conditions shaping the Homeric linguistic tradition: the metre had a constraining effect or led the poet into venturesome language; the impulse of the tradition, the dependence of younger poets on their predecessors, the fact that the Homeric language was not in the full sense a living language for those who wielded it—all this led to artificiality, and even in many cases to what one can

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1 The best handy book-length account of Homeric syntax is now Chantraine (1953), the second volume of his Homeric grammar. Chantraine gives bibliography in the footnotes, esp. at the head of each chapter. Also of great value is L. R. Palmer (1962) (esp. 128–78 on syntax).

2 Notably ‘Wackernagel’s Law’, on which see p. 15 n. 3 above and p. 643 n. 5 below.
only call error. It can be shown, for example, that with regard to the distinction between aorist and imperfect, Homeric departures from actual usage are sometimes due simply to the fact that some particular model has tempted a younger poet to a usage that for him was not real (cf. e.g. Debrunner 1921: 202ff.).—This applies particularly to the dual, as we shall see in detail later (I, 73–84 below). The dual formed a part of the epic linguistic tradition, but speakers of Ionic, who gave the epic its form, had lost it from their own living speech and were therefore unsure in their use of this inherited feature. And it may be that the Attic tradition then worked in the opposite direction, inking in to the text of Homer duals in place of plurals. |

Next to Homer, the most rewarding dialect apart from Attic is Ionic. Herodotus, for example, offers the student of syntax an exceptional amount of interesting material, thanks to the simple naturalness and diversity of his style of expression.4

The use of inscriptive evidence for the dialects other than Attic is made difficult by the fact that most inscriptions date from the fourth century or later still; from the earlier period we have little more than very short inscriptions or mere fragments. The inscriptions of the fourth century, however,—no less than the third-century poets Theocritus and Herondas—even though they are essentially written in a specific dialect, are in their sentence structure completely permeated by the influence of the contemporary Koine, based on Attic, so that it is impossible to construct a syntax of the dialects on the basis of this evidence. This accounts for the fact that research into the Greek dialects has to date been confined almost entirely to phonology and morphology.5 Even so, some lessons

3 Debrunner suggests that imperfect βαινον for aor. at H. 1. 437 was prompted by the use of the transitive aor. βήσων in the next line and is therefore probably the model for βαινον at Od. 15. 499, where there is no such motivation for the avoidance of βήσω (Od. 15. 497–9 = H. 1. 435–7). On H. 1. 437 Kirk comments, 'the imperfect βαινον is unnatural, but the provision of an aorist, e.g. βαινον, would require a kind of remodelling which was evidently not considered worthwhile.' At Od. 9. 150, 547 and 12. 6, the verb is pl. 1 βῆμα (of the same metrical shape as βήσων), and the problem does not arise. For surveys and bibliography on the nature of the Homeric tradition, and the adaptation of formulae in particular, see most recently the pieces by Clark and Dowden in Fowler (2004), those by Russo and Edwards in Morris & Powell (1997) and in addition Hainsworth (1993: 1–31), and Edwards (1986) and (1988). On the Homeric language and the history of its study, see the complementary introductions by L. R. Palmer (1962), Hainsworth in Heubeck, West, & Hainsworth (1988: 24–32), and Horrocks (1997b).

4 On aspects of Herodotus' style reflecting respectively orality and literacy, see Slings (2002) and Rösler (2002). Literary Ionic was the dialect conventionally used for early literary prose generally: Halicarnassus, Herodotus' birthplace, was Doric-speaking, as was Cos, home of Hippocrates, and yet both historian and doctor wrote in Ionic. In this and the next paragraph, W. appears to draw no firm distinction between the literary dialects and the epichoric. This may reflect the influence of ancient views of Greek dialectology on modern thinking at least to the end of the 19th c.; on this, see Hainsworth (1967).

5 Almost a quarter (pp. 195–259) of the grammar of Attic inscriptions by Meisterhans & Schwyzter (1900) is devoted to (morpho)syntax, but its recent replacement by Threatte (1980; 1996) covers only phonology and inflectional morphology. The syntactic and morphosyntactic similarity between the dialects is observed also by Morpurgo Davies (in OCD, s.v. 'Greek language') and Woodard (2004a: 669), with the important difference from W. that Koine influence is not invoked.
have been learned; the Cretan inscriptions have proven to be a particularly fruitful source, above all the famous Law Code of Gortyn in central Crete (c. 450 BC). Some excellent studies of them have appeared: first, Jacobsthal’s study of the tenses and moods in the Cretan dialect inscriptions (1907), then Karl Meister’s of the genitive in Cretan inscriptions (1905), and important for Greek dialect studies as a whole is the instructive work of the late R. Günther (1906/7) on the prepositions, and of Eduard Hermann (1912) on subordinate clauses in Greek dialect inscriptions.6

The same passion for the pre-classical language is to be found in work on Latin, too, and has yielded a rich harvest in this area. The point of reference for most of the work here has been Plautus. The plays of Terence, who shows already signs of the transition to the classical language, are a much less fertile field because of the greater uniformity of his language; in Plautus, by contrast, we find no artificial poetic language but the language of everyday life; from him we really get to know the language that prevailed around the end of the Second Punic War. And although his spelling and phonology have been strongly modernized in the process of transmission, this has not affected the sentence structure or the functions of the words.7—On the syntax of Old Latin there are various useful

6 On Eduard Hermann’s place in the history of historical-comparative linguistics, see Morpurgo Davies (1998: 261–3). On the Gortyn Code, see Buck no. 117, Meiggs & Lewis no. 41, and Willetts (1967); it is strange that W. does not mention Bicheler & Zitelmann (1885). The non-Attic vase inscriptions have been beautifully published and commented on by Wachter (2001). The Guide de l’épigraphiste (Bétard et al. 2000) contains systematic bibliography also on the dialect inscriptions; periodic supplements to it are published online at http://www.antiquite.ens.fr/txt/dsa-publications-guideepigraphiste-en.htm. For an excellent ‘potted history’ of the study of the Greek dialects, esp. through the inscriptions, see Morpurgo Davies (1992: 415–20). The last comprehensive publications collecting all the dialects together were Thumb & Kieckers (1932) and Thumb & Scherer (1959). These, and Buck’s handbook (1955) are still the most useful, even though they are inevitably out of date, above all in their ignorance of Mycenaean, which is naturally included in the much briefer surveys of Schmitt (1977), Palmer (1980), and Duhoux (1985). For the major development in Greek dialectology since W. is undoubtedly the decipherment of Linear B by Michael Ventris and John Chadwick in 1952 (see Ventris & Chadwick 1973). This momentous event added a new (2nd-millennium BC) dialect requiring to be related to the five groups of dialects familiar from 1st-millennium, alphabetic inscriptions. On Greek dialectology in the light of Mycenaean, see Cowgill (1966); on the possibility of dialectal differentiation even within Mycenaean, an idea proposed by the Swiss scholar Ernst Risch (1966), see most recently Woodard (1986) and Hajnal (1997) and on the Greek dialects in general, Hajnal (ed.) (2007) and Colvin (2007).

7 Views of Terence and Plautus have changed. Compare Peter Brown’s assessment of the former, that ‘Terence’s greatest contribution to the development of literary Latin was the creation of a naturalistic style far closer to the language of everyday conversation than that of Plautus’; on the other hand, ‘he did also sometimes use a more ornate and repetitive style...above all in the prologues’ (Brown, OCD, s.v. ‘Terence’), and Gratwick (1982: 127), characterizes him as ‘important in establishing the taste and diction of the classical period’. Of Plautus, a master of every style and register of Latin, the modern view would be that we find all sorts of language in his plays, including artificial poetic language, which is often there for parody or for some other comic effect. Since Haftter (1934), a crucial distinction has been drawn between the more conversational iambic senarii and the more high-flown longer measures. Note, however, Palmer’s conclusion (1954: 88) that ‘the language of Plautus even in his senarii is far removed from the everyday speech of the Hannibalic age’. On the style of Plautus and Terence, see also Palmer (1954: ch. 4), Gratwick (1982: esp. 111–12, 123–4), and most recently Karakasis (2005).
things. There is a very recent work by an American, Charles Bennett, on the syntax of early Latin, of which so far two volumes have appeared (on the verb, 1910, and the cases, 1914). Its value lies in its very clear presentation of purely theoretical matters, such as the determination of the meaning of the various word forms, and in the wealth of illustrative material that it contains; on the other hand, the author has not taken enough trouble over philological fundamentals and fails to take sufficient account of developments within Latin. Next, I would mention the collection of articles on early Latin authors (Studia in priscos scriptores Latinos collata) edited by Studemund (1873–91), which contains some extremely valuable pieces. Particularly worth highlighting is E. Becker’s article on the mood of the verb in indirect questions, in which—as generally in the use of the moods—Plautus differs strikingly from Classical Latin. Also fruitful and profitable, on the questions that concern us here, are Langen’s Plautine studies (1886); the commentaries, too—most recently Lindsay’s on the Captivi (1900)—have many splendid things to offer. 8

While in Greek the dialects constitute an important linguistic source, in Latin there is no such thing. 9 Nevertheless, we must remember the Osco-Umbrian group of languages, which we know from inscriptions, some of them very long. The language of these documents is described most fully by von Planta in his grammar of the Osco-Umbrian dialects (1892–7), and then in a brief but very good overview by Buck in his (1st edn 1904; German edition, 1905). 10 Both contain a section on syntax, and it emerges that much that has been thought to be peculiar to Latin is in fact normal in all the Italic dialects. 11

8 On indirect questions, see now Stephens (1985) and Bodelot (1987). Lindsay produced a school edition of his Captivi commentary (rev. edn Oxford 1926); the full version was reprinted in 1961, and is arguably still the best commentary for information on the language of Plautus. For more recent bibliography on Plautus, see Peter Brown’s article in OCD.

9 This statement is reminiscent of Quintilian, Inst. 1. 5. 29.

10 For an appreciation of the work of Carl Darling Buck (1866–1955), from 1892 professor of Sanskrit and Indo-European at Chicago, see Sebeok (1966: II, 266–77).

11 The key question concerning similarities between Latin and Oscan, etc. is whether they reflect common inheritance or, broadly, borrowing (interference, or imitation of one sort or another). Some shared features may well derive from Proto-Italic, but the alternative is often more probable: it is well stated by Adams as one of his general findings at the end of his survey of contacts between Latin and Oscan, Umbrian, etc., where the dominant trend is towards the Latinization of Italy and the marginalization of the other languages: “it cannot be concluded from [the use of an Indo-European construction] in an Oscan text of official character that it had survived independently in Oscan from the Indo-European period; the writer may simply have been imitating Latin official inscriptions, in which the construction also appears”; see Adams (2003: 112 ff., here at 155). Italic studies have advanced considerably since W. wrote. The most recent edition of the inscriptions is Rix (2002), which contains some 300 items more (about 50% more) than the previous standard edition, Vetter (1953) supplemented by Poccetti (1979). On the dominant view today, the Italic branch of IE comprises Latino-Faliscan on the one hand and Osco-Umbrian on the other; the alternative view is that the similarities between these groups of languages are recent results of contact and that it is the differences which go back to Indo-European—on the question of Italic unity, see Rix (1994b); it is possible that Venetic is an Italic language, but, if it is, it is a distant relative within that branch of the IE family, whether through an early split or for some other reason—on Venetic, see Wallace (2004b).
A little later, after the pre-classical forms of the languages had been studied for a while, attention began to turn to the **post-classical** forms, and over the last few decades this has become a popular area of research. It is absolutely clear that the later development of linguistic usages has no less a claim on our interest than their early stages, especially since it is in these post-classical periods that the language of everyday is heard more and more clearly. As far as Greek is concerned, it is well known that, besides the inscriptions and the literary texts, we have important sources of evidence in the numerous papyri, which better than anything else give us insights into real life and at the same time into the real living language. It is from the papyri that we learn some very remarkable things about colloquial word order. We have at our disposal an excellent grammar of the language of the pre-Christian papyri by **Mayser** of Württemberg, although the second part, on syntax, has yet to appear.  

But then literary texts, too, can be very informative. I wish to mention just three examples, starting with the Greek historian **Polybius** (2nd c. BC), who is really the chief exponent of the literary language in the earlier post-classical period; his manuscript tradition is also first-rate. The first in the series of monographs on historical syntax edited by **Schanz** is a very good syntactic study by **Krebs** (1881) of Polybius’ use of the prepositions. Also of great importance is the **Greek Bible**, although for our purposes the Old Testament is useful only in a very qualified way, in that practically every verse is marked by the linguistic form of the original and the structure of the prose is heavily dependent on that of the Hebrew text (cf. I, 8 above). As for the language of the New Testament, its treatment has been taken almost entirely out of the hands of the theologians. A good grammar of New Testament Greek was published by the well-known classicist **Blass** (1st edn 1896), which in its excellent new edition by our fellow-citizen **Debrunner** (1913) offers the best account of the syntax of post-classical Greek. Finally, let me mention as one of the finest exponents of a
rather more popular style the well-known first/second-century AD Stoic Epictetus, who repays study for other reasons as well.\textsuperscript{15}

**Post-classical Latin** has had more attention paid to it than post-classical Greek, especially in its substandard, vulgar, forms. Here, too, I want just to allude to particularly significant representatives of departures from classical idiom. First, to the famous work of Petronius, the *Satyricon*, in which especially the section called the *cena Trimalchionis* gives voice in thrilling fashion to vulgar speech and sentence structure; for our present purposes there is much to learn also from Friedländer’s commentary on the work.\textsuperscript{16} Next, the whole of Christian Latin literature is of enormous importance, especially the early translations of the Bible, which bear a very vulgar linguistic stamp (cf. I, 10 above, with the references in n. 10). Then there are numerous inscriptions in language close to that of everyday speech. The best information on the linguistic habits of the later period is to be found in the works of an outstanding Swedish scholar, Einar Löfstedt. I should mention in particular his comprehensive linguistic commentary on the *Peregrinatio Aetheriae*, the first-person account by a woman of a journey to the holy sites of Palestine. Its linguistic level is midway between classical written Latin and popular speech. In his commentary, Löfstedt throws light in an exquisite fashion not merely on this type of literature but on everything in any way related to it. Then, in Diehl’s little collection of Vulgar Latin inscriptions (1910), especially useful is part 6, in which he assembles some 300 inscriptions which show deviations from classical syntactic norms.\textsuperscript{17}

Switzerland (mainly, 1920–5 and 1935–54, as Professor of Indo-European and Classical Philology at Bern). He was a student of W. in Göttingen, and was given by W. the task of revising Blass. The result (Blass & Debrunner 1913) was Debrunner’s Habilitationsschrift; it was dedicated to W. and is listed by Debrunner (1939: 450) as one of those works on which W. collaborated by reading proofs or giving advice or both. It is still the standard reference, and has run to many editions, the latest (14th and 15th) by F. Rehkopf. There is an English translation by R. Funk (Blass, Debrunner, & Funk 1961), which includes in the introduction a helpful overview of the history of the work. There is a brief autobiography written by Debrunner shortly before his death at <http://pages.unibas.ch/klaphil/idg/allg/debrunner.html>. On syntactic variation in later (5th c.) Greek, note Hult (1990), and on the relation between morphology and syntactic change in medieval and modern Greek, Joseph (1990).

\textsuperscript{15} Presumably, W. means for his Stoicism. The influence of Epictetus (c. AD 55–135) was immense, including on early Christian writers, among them Clement of Alexandria and Basil the Great, and early monasticism. See Hershbell (1989) and Long (1991). Note, however, that we have not Epictetus’ own words but those attributed to him by his pupil Arrian (cf. Xenophon’s portrayal of Socrates).

\textsuperscript{16} On the language of the freedmen in Petronius, the most remarkable sustained imitation of colloquial Latin speech, see Boyce (1991) and Adams (2005). Martin Smith’s commentary (Oxford 1975) does good justice to the language of the *Cena* as a whole. Stefenelli (1962) is excellent on the foreshadowing of the Romance languages in Petronius’ work.

\textsuperscript{17} Ernst Diehl’s little collection is still valuable, as is the broader anthology of Rohlfs (1969), which contains other texts beside inscriptions. Diehl went on to publish the standard edition of Latin Christian inscriptions (1925–31; and edn 1961–7); note also his anthology of archaic Latin inscriptions (4th edn 1959) and of Pompeian wall-inscriptions (2nd edn 1930). On the Pompeian graffiti, a surprising omission by W. at this point, given their importance for Vulgar Latin, note Väänänen (1966); the graffiti are collected in *CIL* IV with its supplements, work on which continues under the editorship of H. Solin. On the
From the period that separates Antiquity from the Middle Ages, we have the authors of the **Merovingian age** writing a Latin that is sometimes extremely wild and wayward. The principal work to know in this context is **Bonnet's** (1890) on the Latin of Gregory of Tours (AD 538–94, Bishop of Tours from 572).\(^\text{18}\)

Finally we must spare a word more on the modern continuations of the classical languages, as it is necessary to talk about the use of modern Greek and Romance syntax for insights into ancient Greek and Latin. On **modern Greek** there is still little published work available. Nevertheless, **Thumb**, the author of the best grammar of modern Greek, added a section on syntax to the second edition of his grammar (1910: 170–96). Very well worth reading is **Schwyzer’s** short article (1908), where the syntactic relations between ancient and modern Greek are illustrated with interesting examples.\(^\text{19}\)

As for the **Romance** languages, I would refer you to the comprehensive treatment in vol. III of the well-known grammar of the Romance languages by the Romance philologist **Wilhelm Meyer-Lübke** (1890–1902). On many individual points, of French in particular, **Adolf Tobler’s** *Vermischte Beiträge* (‘miscellaneous contributions’) to French grammar (5 vols, 2nd edn 1902–12) are still, thanks to the manner of his treatment, extremely instructive.\(^\text{20}\)

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\(^{18}\) Max Bonnet’s great work was reprinted in 1968 and is still unrivalled. It is based, however, on the text of Krusch (1888), which attributes to Gregory all the linguistic vagaries and barbarisms of the early manuscripts and makes his Latin appear ‘wild and wayward’ indeed. For an exciting and overdue reappraisal of the Latinity of Gregory and other Late Latin writers, see Haverling (2008), Galdi (2008) on Iordanes, both with further references. The ‘Merovingian age’ is the period of the domination in Gaul of the Frankish royal family (Latin *Merovingi* descended from Merovech. It lasted almost three centuries from (appx.) the end of the Roman Empire in the West (AD 476)—the first Merovingian king, Childerich, died in 481—to the Carolingian usurpation in 751. See Murray (1908), and Esders’ article in *DNP* 8, s.v., with further bibliography; Vessey (1992) is a valuable review article of recent social-historical studies of literacy in this period. The ‘Middle Ages’ have been and are still defined very variously. For a recent survey, with mainly historiographical bibliography, see Kaden’s article in *DMA Suppl. 1*, s.v. ‘Middle Ages’. On the relation of Medieval Latin to Classical and Late Latin and the Romance languages, Löfstedt (1959: 59–67) is still to be recommended.

\(^{19}\) Now fundamental on the continuation of ancient into medieval and modern Greek are Browning (1981) and Horrocks (1997a), both with extensive bibliography. The best recent accounts of the modern language are Mackridge (1985) and Holton et al. (1997). On the (relatively recent) coming to prominence of Greek, esp. medieval and modern, in modern linguistic and syntactic theory, see (e.g.) Joseph, Horrocks, & Philippaki-Warburton (1998) and Alexiadou, Horrocks, & Stavrou (1999).

\(^{20}\) Gröber (1904–6), on the other hand, has next to nothing on syntax. Both Tobler (1835–1910) and Meyer-Lübke (1861–1936) are well known also for monumental and still-standard dictionaries of, respectively, Old French (Todler et al. 1915—) and Romance etymology (*REW*; 1st edn 1911–20). For an appreciation of the work of Meyer-Lübke, see Sebeok (1966: II, 174–82). Good recent general surveys of the Romance languages, which pay attention to the relation between Latin and Romance syntax, include Harris & Vincent (1988) and Posner (1996); note also Maiden & Smith (forthc.).
The study of these most recent forms of Greek on the one hand, and of Latin on the other, is important in three connections. First, we find living in the modern languages features which seem odd, to, say, a speaker of modern German, but which can be shown to have been proper to Latin or Greek. Take the use of the tenses, for example: modern Greek distinguishes aorist and imperfect no less sharply than did Lysias and Herodotus; this distinction, then, has remained fully alive. Equally, the best way of understanding the differences between the Latin imperfect and the imperfect in Greek and German is from the way it is used in the Romance languages.21—Secondly, we can often observe in modern Greek and Romance the end points of developments which began much earlier, in the post-classical periods of the respective languages. For instance, it is characteristic of New Testament Greek to use ἐνα + subjunctive after verbs of wishing and commanding, where in classical Greek the infinitive is used. This use has been extended so far in modern Greek that the old infinitive has been completely lost and replaced by ἔρα + subjunctive.22—Thirdly, and finally, these later stages of the languages are significant because they demonstrate particularly well the nature of the specifically modern part of their linguistic history, since we are able to compare this with the ancient part. It is striking what strong parallels can be shown to exist between modern Greek and Romance: in both, the case system has been reduced to a minimum, and the perfect is rendered by means of a periphrasis including the verb ‘to have’ (this second feature is shared also with the modern Germanic languages).

21 German has just one synthetic past tense, so that e.g. fuhr (past of fahren ‘go, drive’) does service for both the Greek imperfect (ἐναντὶ) and the Greek aorist (ἐναντὶ). The oppositions alluded to by W. here are discussed at length below, I, 171–91.

22 On the encroachment of ἐνα (ἐνα) on the infinitive, see Browning (1983: 43, 80). On the demise of the infinitive in Greek more generally, see Joseph (1983: ch. 3, esp. 74–80), defending a category ‘infinitive’ for medieval Greek but not for the modern language (after the 15th/16th c.). On the modern Greek future θά + subjunctive, from earlier θέλω ἐνα + subjv., see I, 195–6 below, with nn.
Lecture I, 8

At this point I must make a few supplementary comments on two works which, although not belonging in the fullest sense within the scope of syntax, are still of use for the syntactician. Hand, Tursellinus seu de particulis latinis commentarii (1829–45) is the best thing written on Latin particles, with a fine realization of the different shades of meaning. Unfortunately, in four volumes it gets no further than the letter p, so that the difficult particles beginning with q are not dealt with.1—The other work I should like to mention is the Lateinische Stilistik (‘Latin Style’) by Carl Friedrich Nägelsbach (1806–59), a scholar who has distinguished himself also in the area of Homeric studies. The work, which first appeared in 1846, has since been continued by Iwan Müller (1830–1917) in numerous editions (9th edn 1905). The Stilistik is composed in the form of a comparison between the expressive means of Latin and those of German. Its treatment of all matters of sentence structure is very detailed, and it offers in general a very great deal that must concern us in this course. Both author and editor are among the finest commentators on the Latin language.2—The various commentaries, too, contain a great many excellent observations. Some I have already named, here I should like to recommend as particularly worthy of study Madvig’s edition of Cicero’s De finibus (3rd edn 1876), and perhaps even more so Seyffert’s edition of the Laelius in the revised version (1876) by C. F. W. Müller, who counts among the best Latinists of all time. We met him earlier (I, 33 above) as one of the collaborators on the great historical grammar of Latin (Landgraf (ed.) 1894–1908). Not quite of the same rank, but still valuable, especially for its consideration of the development of the language of Cicero over time, is Landgraf’s commentary on Cicero’s speech Pro Sex. Roscio Amerino, many times republished.—On Greek literature I could

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1 Hand got no further than puta ‘say, suppose’. Note that he treats prepositions and interjections as well as modal and connective particles. On particles in Latin, see now Kroon (1995), who gives (34–57) a review of the various approaches that have been taken to date, and who stresses (54) Hand’s influence on standard modern works including the ThLL, Kühner & Stegmann, and Hofmann & Szantyr.

2 Systematic comparison of Latin/Greek with the student’s first language was and remains a common mode of instruction. It is a prominent feature of the great handbook of Latin syntax and semantics by Hermann Menge (1841–1939), which has recently been revised and expanded (Menge et al. 2005), with an immense online bibliography at <http://www.menge.net/lit.html>. Nägelsbach published important books on Homeric and post-Homeric theology (1857 and 1884).
name hardly a single commentary as rich and as profitable for study of the language as these treatments of works of Cicero. Still, Thucydidus in particular has been the subject of commentaries by outstanding observers of linguistic usage, such as K. W. Krüger (I, 30 above) and Classen (eight vols, 1882–1908). The commentary on Aristotle’s *Poetics* (1885) by Johannes Vahlen (1830–1911) is comprehensive and full of very fine observations (if marred by ugly polemics), but the text treated is too short for many points concerning the way the language worked to offer themselves for discussion. Extremely valuable, also on the linguistic side, is von Wilamowitz’s edition of Euripides’ *Heracles*. To the above I should perhaps add a reference to the mass of extremely fine remarks on individual points which have been published in collections of textual criticism, such as the *Miscellanea critica* of Dawes (I, 25–6 above), the *Adversaria* of Richard Porson (1759–1808) and Peter Dobree (1782–1825), or the *Variae lectiones* and *Novae lectiones* of Cobet (I, 30 above).

I move now to the third language that we are wanting to consider, German. Not that I mean to give here a history of German grammatical studies; any who are interested in this will find the best account in the ‘History of Germanic Philology’ with which Paul prefaced his *Grundriss*. We want to concern ourselves only with those works which must still be studied today. Here belongs first and foremost the *Deutsche Grammatik* of Jacob Grimm (1st edn 1819), the first of the great works in which the master presented the manifestations of life of the Germanic peoples. After Grimm’s death a new edition, enriched by numerous additions compiled from Grimm’s surviving notes, was published by Scherer, Roethe, and Schröder (1870–98). The parts of relevance to us here are volumes III and IV. Volume III deals among other things with the parts of speech and the form of question and answer. Volume IV is devoted entirely to syntax, and discusses all the forms in which the verb and the noun can appear. A very great deal, however, of what we must count as syntax is missing. Grimm was not at all aiming at a complete or systematic presentation; his strength lay in his ability to make observations of unrivalled breadth and scope. Linguistic treasures are there displayed as nowhere else. Grimm understood the art of combining material in a charming fashion; and his ability to lose himself in his subject through love of it marks also the works that he devoted to other fields.

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4 On the great Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, see Fowler (1990).
5 On Porson’s life and works, see Dawe (1990).
6 This is in fact the second of the first three sections, all by Paul (the first being on the definition of ‘Philologie’, the third, on method). See Learned’s review in *American Journal of Philology* 12 (1891), 355–62.
7 Grimm himself regarded the individual observation as ‘the soul of research into language’ (preface to the 2nd edn of vol. 1 (1822), vi) and was not given to theorizing; see Pfeiffer (1976: 185 and n. 3), who places Grimm in ‘[W. von] Humboldt’s school’. The form of the grammar influenced many later large-scale works, including importantly Friedrich Diez’s grammar of the Romance languages (1st edn 1836–44).
These merits are seen also in some articles included in the third volume (1866) of his *Kleinere Schriften*. With your permission, I shall spend a little longer on these and add something to them. One of them is about the use and variation of grammatical person in speech, the other is about ‘some instances of attraction’ (I, 51 below). Both are very illuminating also of non-Germanic languages. In the first article, on changes of person (1866a), Grimm deals with personal pronouns and personal forms of the verb which have undergone certain shifts and are not used simply in their proper and original meaning. Here is revealed all the strength and all the individuality of Grimm’s approach. With the most wide-ranging erudition, he deals first with the tendency, very noticeable in modern German, in addressing another person to replace the usual *Du* form with one more cumbersome or formal. Grimm traces this usage back to its roots and draws comparisons between German and other languages. He shows beautifully how *Ihr* arises alongside and in place of *Du*, and further how the ugly use of *Er* and *Sie* grew out of circumlocutions such as *Euer Gnaden wollen genehmigen* (‘if your Grace permit’). This is an opportunity to catch glimpses of social customs and private life. This research has been taken further for German by other scholars; I refer especially to the articles by Ehrismann and Keller in the first six volumes of the *Zeitschrift für deutsche Wortforschung* (‘Journal for German Lexicology’) edited by Friedrich Kluge, where, on the model of Grimm, the relevant phenomena are traced from the earliest times down to the present day. 8

In another part of the same article, Grimm deals first with the use of the second person for an indefinite subject, and then, with special enthusiasm, with the use of pl. for sg. He starts from accounts to be found especially in school-histories from the eighteenth century, when it was particularly common in school for the teacher, in addressing a student in the age of adolescence and being unsure whether to use *Du* or *Sie*, to avoid the issue and use *wir*. Grimm produces various anecdotes, such as one of a teacher saying to a student, *Wir haben zwar Talente und sind nicht müßig, aber unsere Sitten haben diese Belohnung nicht verdient* (‘We are talented and not idle, but our habits have not deserved this reward’), or again, *Wir sind ein Esel* (‘We are an ass’), to which the student replied, *Ich meinerseits protestiere* (‘For my part, I object’ (to being included)) (Grimm 1866a: 259–60)9. The usage led almost inevitably to absurdities. Cf. Wagner (1869–70: I, 13) on Austrian monastic life: the Master of Novices receives a new arrival with the words, *Wir sind aus Böhmen? Ich hab gehört, dass uns Reverendissimus aufgenommen hat.* (‘Are we from Bohemia? I heard that the Most Reverend Abbot has admitted us’.) But what is mentioned here for its use in schools has deeper roots: if a German wants to express a rebuke or an admonition, he gladly includes himself in

8 cf. D. Wb., s.vv. ‘Er’ (10), ‘Sie’ (II, 1, h).
9 cf. D. Wb., s.v. ‘Wir’ (2).
the rebuke or admonition, to avoid being hurtful or insulting, and to soften the reproach. This goes back to the Middle Ages, and Goethe and Schiller also used this form of expression. In Goethe’s *Torquato Tasso*, act 2, scene 1, when the princess says to the poet, *Auf diesem Wege werden wir wohl nie Gesellschaft finden* (‘On this road we’ll never find company’), here too the ‘we’ basically means only the person addressed, but the speaker wishes to express herself gently and so includes herself. Cf. Schiller’s *Kabale und Liebe* act 4, scene 7 (Louisa to Lady Milford:) *Was werden wir dann machen?* (‘What shall we do then?’, i.e. when your beauty has faded). 10 Alternatively, it can convey tender regret, e.g. in the well-known poem of Eduard Mörike, *Der alte Thurmhahn*, v. 61: *Wür’s soweit mit uns, armer Hahn?* (‘Is this it for us, poor cock?’)—Not that this phenomenon is by any means confined to German; instances can be produced from English, French, and Russian. 

This usage that we know as modern we meet also in the classical languages. Take the passage in the first-century satirist Persius where the poet addresses a lazy student. The words are (Pers. 3. 3, 15–16): ‘Already the light of day is flooding through the window; while that is happening, stertimus. . . . Hucine rerum ueni- mus?’ (‘we are snoring. . . . Have we really reached such a pass?’), but the speaker certainly does not mean to say of himself that he is snoring or that he has descended to such depths. Plato has an interesting instance in the *Republic*, book 8: as Socrates comes out with a bold claim, his interlocutor says, 8. 562c πῶς . . . τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγομεν; (‘how can we say such a thing?’). Equally, in tragedy, e.g. in Sophocles, at *Oedipus at Colonus* 1627–8 (messenger quoting Apollo:) ὁ ὁντὸς ὁντος, Ὀλίδπονοι, τί μέλλομεν χωρεῖν; (‘you there, Oedipus, why do we delay to go?’), or at *Philoctetes* 835–6 (Chorus:) δρῆς ἤδη. πρὸς τί μένομεν πράσσειν; (‘now you see. What are we waiting for? What shall we do?’), where the commentators already give the correct explanation. From the ancient *Life* of Homer (*Vita s* (Proclus) and 8 (Anon. 2), pp. 420, 442 West) I would mention the well-known question that Homer addresses to the fishermen returning home: ἃ ῥ’ ἐξομέν τι; (‘have we caught anything?’). Homer himself, finally, shows a number of notable examples. When in the *Iliad* a brave man has to take to task a lazy fellow-warrior—and such occasions are frequent—direct speech is normally used. But at *Iliad* 15. 553 the words are (Hector to a cousin:) ὁντὸς δή, Μελάνιππε, μεθήσομεν; (‘are we going to slacken like this, Melanippus?’). Or when someone is asked whether he knows something, the word is not οἶθα (‘you (sg.) know’) but οἴμεν (‘we know’)—so e.g. at *Odyssey* 4. 138 (Helen to Menelaus), 632 (Noemon to Antinous). Then there is the common expression: ὁς ἄν ἐγὼν εἴπω, πειθόμεθα πάντες (‘let us all do (lit. be persuaded, obey) as I suggest’); here, of course, those

10 In the Schiller-Nationalausgabe (Weimar 1943–), with book and stage versions on facing pages, pp. 134–5, 18–19.
addressed are intended, but the speaker out of politeness includes himself in the act of obeying, which strictly is a nonsense. Stranger still is *Iliad* 18. 273 (Polydamas to the Trojan army:) \textit{ei' d' àn émois épéssai πιθώμεθα 'if we obey my words'.} These passages are very significant; we see in them examples of that chivalrous politeness which characterizes the Homeric heroes; they include themselves when they speak of the mistakes of others or make a demand of others. Let me illustrate this type of Homeric politeness with one more passage, which strictly speaking does not belong here. At *Odyssey* 12. 374, when Odysseus is telling the Phaeacians of his wanderings, we have the words: ‘Swiftly Lampetie came as messenger to Helios and reported to him \textit{δὴ ὁ βόσκει ἕκταμεν ἥμεις} (‘that we had killed his oxen’). Now, here there was an old variant reading, \textit{ἐκταν ἑταῖροι} (‘my companions had killed’), but there is no doubt that only \textit{ἐκταμεν ἥμεις} can belong to the old tradition. The reason for the variant is clear: Odysseus played no part in the slaughter of the cattle of the Sun, so that strictly the first person plural form \textit{ἐκταμεν} is incorrect and therefore a critic wanted to get rid of it. But the hero actually expressed himself in solidarity with his comrades\(^{11}\)—compare *Odyssey* 7. 307 (Odysseus to Alcinous) \textit{ἐμέν} (‘we are’). This linguistic usage received attention already in antiquity; \textit{Pasquali} refers me to Plutarch’s essay \textit{Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur} (‘How to tell a flatterer from a friend’) \textit{71F–72A}, where there is discussion along these lines of *Iliad* 11. 313 and 8. 234–5, and of Socrates’ method of teaching.

To be sure, this type of expression can also lead to complications, if a form of address in the second person intrudes; so, e.g. at *Iliad* 15. 553 (above), *Eur. Iph. Aul.* 815 ff., *Persius* 3. 15–16. \textit{Grimm} (1866a: 260) presents something similar from the sermons of Johannes Geiler of Kaisersberg (1445–1510), e.g.: ‘An der heiligen Zeit sind wir am allerlieftigsten. Es ist \textit{euer} Gewonheit . . . am Eschermittwochen sind wir am allerverruchtesten’ (‘At the holy time we are readiest of all. It is \textit{your} wont . . . on Ash Wednesday for us to be at our most villainous’). We have the same thing in French, e.g. at the start of Molière’s \textit{Le médecin malgré lui}, in passages such as (act 1, scene 1, Sganarelle to Martine:) ‘Ma femme, \textit{allons} tout doucement, s’il \textit{vous} plaıˆt’ (‘Lady, let \textit{us} go quietly, if \textit{you} please’).

After Jacob \textit{Grimm}’s \textit{Deutsche Grammatik}, the best German grammar is that of Wilhelm \textit{Wilmanns} (1906–22), which gives for the verb and the noun not only their forms but the functions of their forms. The presentation is extremely clear and attractive, and it is a pleasure to learn from it. It is, though, a pity that the author never got as far as presenting sentence structure proper, also that in

\(^{11}\) W.’s view is that of Aristarchus. \textit{Van der Valk} (1949: 136) argues on religious grounds for pl. 3. \textit{Heubeck} in Heubeck & Hoekstra (1989: \textit{ad loc.}) is unsure, but notes that the whole speech has been suspected of being an interpolation.
keeping with the field of study of Lachmann’s school he confined himself so strictly to Gothic and the various stages of High German.  

Perhaps one should add that it tends rather to reproduce existing findings than to come up with new things. Less commendable is Oskar Erdmann’s Grundzüge der deutschen Syntax (‘Essentials of German syntax’, 1886–98); noteworthy is Hermann Wunderlich’s book, Der deutsche Satzbau (‘German sentence construction’, 3rd edn, 1924–5). Now Otto Behaghel’s Deutsche Syntax (1923–32) deserves particular mention.  

One should also consult by way of supplement a number of studies on Germanic syntax, which deal with varieties of the language not discussed by Wilmanns, above all another work of Behaghel, Die Syntax des Heliand (1897). This book is probably the first absolutely complete summary of the syntax of a Germanic language, but it is valuable not just because of its completeness but also because it rests on a great deal of thought and is thought-provoking in turn. You find in it a great many questions which have never appeared in a syntax; it is indispensable for anyone doing research on syntax. Admittedly, it is difficult to find your way around in it, and for all the laudable sharpness of his presentation, Behaghel is excessively sharp in his distinctions. Moreover, some important chapters are missing.  

Of the other Germanic languages the one to which most study has been devoted is English, on account of its richness and its modern character, and some excellent works are available on it. I referred earlier (I, 23 above) to Gustav Krüger’s work on the difficulties | of English (2nd edn of Part 2, on syntax,  

12 Karl Lachmann (1793–1851), from 1823 professor of classical and German philology at the Humboldt University, Berlin (the home of his ‘school’), exerted perhaps more influence than any other 19th-c. scholar on the development of philological studies, not only classical and Germanic but quite generally, esp. in the area of textual criticism, which he established as a rigorous method. To Germanists he is best known for his work on Old and Middle High German, including on the Nibelungenlied (see von Raumer 1870: 457–61, 540 ff., 595, 697); to classicists, for his studies of Homer and his editions of the New Testament and, above all, Lucretius; see Sandys (1906–8: III, 127–31) and Unite (1990). One of his first pupils in Berlin was W.’s father Wilhelm.  

13 Vols 3 and 4, which appeared after the Vorlesungen, treat simple and complex sentences and word order. Behaghel’s work remains an essential reference, as do vols 3 and 4 of Paul (1916–20). I have found very helpful Dal (1962) and Lockwood (1968).  

14 The Heliand is an epic poem telling the Gospel story in Old Saxon. It is the only literary text surviving in this Ingvaenic, West Germanic language, the language of the Saxons in NW Germany and Denmark (9th–12th c.). It was commissioned by Louis the Pious (r. AD 814–40) and based on pseudo-Tatian’s Harmony of the Gospels. Good, recent English editions include Murphy (1992) and Cathey (2002), with bibliography, an outline of Old Saxon grammar and a glossary. The standard edition is still that of Behaghel himself (1882, 10th edn 1996 containing [since the 1902 edn] also the Old Saxon fragment of the Genesis story). What Behaghel’s Syntax lacks above all is an index! Behaghel confesses (pp. v–vi) to defining syntax more broadly than Ries (I, 3 & n. 8, pp. 9–10 above) and consequently to omitting much of what in his own view belongs to morphology (‘Wortlehre’). Even so, he makes no claim to completeness, and regrets (p. vi) the omission of a section on word order. His novelty is seen in his partition of syntactic structures, and in their overwhelming dominance in his presentation (well over two thirds of the c. 380 pages).
1914–17). It is, however, largely descriptive, and questions of the origin of usages are raised only in passing. Among more strictly scholarly presentations, I would like to mention, first, parts 2 and 3 of Eduard Maetznér’s English grammar (1880, 1885) and then, in particular, two more recent works: first, that of Otto Jespersen, the outstanding Danish linguist, on English syntax, which appeared as the second volume (1914) of his *Modern English Grammar*, and, secondly, the very recent book on the system of modern English syntax (1917) by the Anglicist Max Deutschbein, not a very large book, one that sets out principles rather than presenting material, but for this very reason extremely instructive on syntax in general.

Among the other Germanic languages, the *old Scandinavian* languages are very fruitful, especially Old Icelandic with its wonderful prose literature. Most of Delbrück’s more recent work concerns this group. I would expressly draw your attention to the supremely clear primer of Old Icelandic by Andreas Heusler (1913, 2nd edn 1921), where sentence structure in particular is treated with the finest understanding.

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15 This was the first of five volumes (2–5, and 7) on syntax. The name of Otto Jespersen (1860–1943) is still a household name to all students of the English language. He was professor of English at Copenhagen from 1893 to 1925, co-founder of the International Phonetic Association (1886–9), a proponent and developer of artificial international languages (including Ido and—his own invention—Novial, praised by Bernard Shaw), and author of several other influential books, still in print, including *The Philosophy of Grammar* (1924), *Language* (1922), and *Growth and Structure of the English Language* (1905), which W. might have mentioned at this point. His teachers included Karl Verner, Hermann Møller, the Norwegian Johan Storm, and Henry Sweet. He published significant and influential work also on phonetics, language teaching, and language change. Note the brief account of his life by Haislund (1943), who completed and published vol. 7 of Jespersen’s *Modern English Grammar*, and see further Sebek (1966: II, 148–73). A volume of selected writings was published in 1933. His autobiography (1938) was published in English translation as recently as 1995.

16 Of recent work on the history of English syntax, note (e.g.) Denison (1993) on verbal constructions; the chapter on syntax in each of the volumes of *CHEL*, viz. Traugott (1992), Fischer (1992), Denison (1998), Rissanen (1999); and the chapter by Fischer & van der Wurff in Hogg & Denison (2006).

17 W. must have in mind Delbrück (1904, 1907) and especially his five ‘Contributions to Germanic Syntax’, (1910a), (1912), (1919a). The Scandinavian (or Nordic, or North Germanic) languages all derive from Ancient Nordic (attested in Runic inscriptions from the 2nd c. AD), and comprise two subgroups, East (Swedish and Danish) and West (Norwegian, Norn [extinct], Faroese, and Icelandic). For recent surveys of the Scandinavian languages, see Haugen & Markey (1972), a critical bibliography going back to 1918; Haugen (1976) and (1982: ch. 6); and the monumental Bandle et al. (2002); on Ancient Nordic (not to be confused with Old Norse, the language of the 12th- and 13th-cent. Old Icelandic sagas), note also Faarlund (1994), where he calls it ‘Ancient Scandinavian’ and (2004b), where he uses the term ‘Ancient Nordic’.
A word more needs to be said about books on that type of comparative syntax which consists in the comparison of attested Indo-European languages (see I, 6–8 above). A century ago, when Indo-European studies were beginning to blossom, what one did was to compare words, sounds, and endings in the relevant languages and thus demonstrate relationships and the manner of the historical development. In a sense, this was already extending into the area of syntax, as we are understanding it here for practical purposes. When Bopp showed in 1816 (ch. 3, pp. 65–6; cf. nn. 2–3, p. 380 above) that Greek and Sanksrit make their aorists in the same way, the formal existence of a particular tense was proved to be Indo-European. Equally, another of the earliest results was the demonstration that Indo-European had a locative case; it is seen in (e.g.) Latin in forms such as Romae (‘at Rome’), domi (‘at home’), words that look like genitives but which answer the question ‘where?’ (cf. II, 221 below). 1

But for a long time no one ventured to investigate the particular uses of the formal categories, or to explain differences in use between the various languages of the family. A few initial attempts were made around the middle of the nineteenth century, which appeared in the Zeitschrift für die Wissenschaft der Sprache (‘Journal for the Science of Language’), edited by Albert Höfer. 2 But not until about fifty years ago did a discipline really get going that one can call comparative syntax. Berthold Delbrück began first of all to delve into the origins of the uses of the cases in the languages that are of concern to us. Then he started to edit, in collaboration with Ernst Windisch, the Syntaktische Forschungen (‘Syntactic Investigations’) the first volume of which appeared in 1871, although before this

1 A locative case is taken for granted by Bopp in his comparative grammar (1833–52: I, 229). According to Bopp (cf. Devine 1970: 64), the first to identify Latin Romae and domi as locatives was Friedrich August Rosen (1826: 12 n. 1), Bopp’s best pupil, professor of oriental languages at the newly founded University College of London from the age of 23, and in his short life (1805–37) an influential teacher of a number of classicists in London. Some (including Rosen and Bopp) held incorrectly that the Latin gen. sg. of the 1st and 2nd declensions (the types illustrated by W. here) derived from the locative, but this was rejected already by Pott (1833–6: II, 635 ff.). W. (who had published (1908) what became for a long time the standard theory of the origin of the Latin gen. sg. ending -i), is probably employing teacher’s irony here, being deliberately vague and provocative. For a blow-by-blow history of research on Latin gen. sg. -i, see Devine (1970: 64–84). I owe much of the information in this note to Anna Morpurgo Davies.

2 Only four numbers of this journal appeared (1846, 1850, 1851, and 1853). The pieces on syntax are: Schömann (1846), Schweizer (1850) and (1851), Höfer (1853), Schömann (1853).
Windisch had published, in Curtius’ Studien on Greek and Latin Grammar, vol. 2 (1869), an attempt to explain the origin of relative clauses. That first volume of Syntaktische Forschungen was devoted to the use of the moods, especially the subjunctive and optative. It had been known for a very long time that these two modal forms were inherited, and that Old Indic and Old Iranian, like Greek, had two such moods, while all the other languages contented themselves with one, the so-called subjunctive; it was therefore taken as given to begin with a comparison of Greek and Indic. This volume was the first to make clear the basics of the uses of the moods, and in it the relevant terminology was coined.—Volumes 2 and 3 followed in 1876 and 1878. In terms of material dealt with, they were confined entirely to Sanskrit and presented a careful analysis of (respectively) the use of tenses and word order in Sanskrit prose, but both have turned out to be enormously useful for the other Indo-European languages as well, as we shall see when we come to consider the tenses and word order. They reveal the way in which many ancient inherited features have been continued right across the family of languages. One small example: Homer often uses the phrase τῶς μν ἐξεσάμενος προσέφη (‘in this disguise he addressed him’). It is odd that μν stands between τῶς and ἐξεσάμενος, when it belongs with προσέφη. But it would be belittling the skill of the poet to say that he used an impossible word order for the sake of the metre. Besides, something very similar occurs with just this pronoun in the relatively simple prose of Herodotus, e.g. at 5. 46. 2 οἱ γάρ μν Σελινοῦσαι ... ἀπέκτειναν (‘for the inhabitants of Selinous . . . killed him’). Here again, we have μν not with the word it goes with but in a word order which from a logical point of view is monstrous, as it breaks up the whole phrase. Without going into Greek instances of this kind, DELBRÜCK provided the solution for them. In Sanskrit prose he discovered the rule (1878: 47–8, 76) that enclitics are placed preferably, and sometimes obligatorily, immediately after the first word in the sentence, even if the constituent structure of the sentence would call for a completely different position, in a later part of the sentence. Countless phenomena are thus instantly explained.—In volume 4 (1879), DELBRÜCK devoted a whole series of chapters to Greek syntax (I, 32 above), and in volume 5 (1888), he gave an all-embracing account of Sanskrit syntax.

In this context, alongside DELBRÜCK I need to mention BRUGMANN. He concerned himself with syntactic questions more in passing, but in the process he established many excellent points, in his Greek grammar (I, 32 above), in his short comparative grammar, and most recently in the new edition of the
Grundriss (1897–1916). I wish to pick a small detail out of his work (Grdr. II.3.2: §651; cf. already 1883: 169–73). At one point in the Iliad we have a conversation between Thetis and Hephaestus, and Hephaestus says to Thetis (18. 386), πάρος γε μὲν οὐτὶ θαμιζεις. In order to get the sense, we have to translate: ‘formerly you didn’t come at all often to me’, or ‘until now you have made yourself scarce’. It is striking that, though the talk is of the past, the poet makes the god use a present-tense verb. Well, then enter Brugmann, who shows that, in exactly the same way, it is normal in Sanskrit to use the present of an action in the past if a certain particle is used that indicates past time, a word related to Gk πάρος. So, this usage turns out to be an old, inherited form of expression. But not only that: as we shall see later (I, 158 below), this also throws considerable light on the true meaning of the present-tense forms of the verb.6

Establishing what is older and inherited is, however, not the whole story. The basis of an actual usage is provided not merely by inherited material of this sort; also important is, as I noted earlier (I, 5 above), what languages have in common on the strength of a more fundamental relatedness. To this end, so-called primitive languages and also child-language, which is to an extent similar, are very useful, since in them we meet the points of origin of the developed usage. For generally we must dig a bit deeper, and when we find that something is more ancient, ask, What kind of sense does the older form have, and why does it have this force? and, further, Why was the old form sometimes preserved and sometimes abandoned and replaced with something new? And again, How does the current form acquire its legitimacy and its ability to be understood? In other words, our task is not merely to proceed historically but to investigate also as best we can the essence of the phenomena in question.

Let me here in passing draw your attention to one important point. Occasionally, a feature is preserved only because it has been possible in a later phase of the language to reinterpret it. This, too, is a sort of inheritance. Let us take an example from English. In modern English you can say e.g. The King was offered a seat. Here it is striking that when the verb to offer is converted into the passive, it is not the thing offered that appears as subject, but the person receiving it. This is in complete contradiction with the conventional meaning of the verb to offer, but even so native speakers of English treat the King as the subject. Now, historical research has shown that in earlier English this sentence had not the nominative king but the dative kinge, and that the sentence meant simply to the King was offered a seat. But once the dative had lost its ending through sound-change and had fallen together with the nominative, if the construction was employed at all, king could be understood only as nominative, and accordingly

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6 Edwards (1991: ad loc.) calls θαμιζεις a ‘timeless present’, and refers to W. here. In his note on ll. 17. 586–8, he observes that the combination πάρος γε contrasts the past with the present.
in the end original nominative forms were used as subjects of the passive of offer, so that one says, for example, He (nominative) was offered a seat.\footnote{The classic account of this phenomenon is van der Gaaf (1929). For a recent survey with discussion of the syntactic development, see Fischer (1992: 383–7) and cf. I, 142 & n. 11, p. 183 below; on the Old English case system, Hogg (1992); and on the loss of the cases in Middle English, Lass (1992: esp. 108–12), all with further references. W.’s example is used by Lightfoot (1979: 229–39) and by Harris & Campbell (1995: 31–2), the latter refuting Lightfoot’s inexpressible claim (1988: 303) that ‘the 19th-century linguists . . . made no attempt to posit general principles of syntactic change’.
}

All well and good, but what are the actual factors at work in the creation of a new syntactic usage? If we follow the Scholastics (I, 22–3 above) or Gottfried Hermann (I, 29–30 above), say, then we see in a syntactic usage a reflection of logic: everything is built upon ratio (‘reason’). This view has long dominated not only syntax but linguistic studies generally, and often the prevailing aim has been to explain all linguistic habits as logical and as arising from ratio. To a certain degree such explanations will stand; the logical ability of the human mind plays a big and important part in the development of language. But we have gradually come to see that logic alone is not enough, that in order to explain linguistic phenomena we must invoke not just one aspect of our psychology, but all aspects of it. Just as in all other types of action and thought a human being simply does not proceed merely in accordance with ratio, so we cannot presuppose that in speech he is guided always by ratio. The first scholar to advance the principle, with both special vigour and illuminating material, that linguistic study should be grounded in psychology, was Heymann Steinthal (1823–99). He has maintained this view both in monographs and then also in the Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft (‘Journal for Ethno-Psychology and Linguistics’), which he edited from 1860.\footnote{Steinthal’s co-editor was his brother-in-law Moritz Lazarus, professor of psychology at Bern. Steinthal was a pupil of Wilhelm von Humboldt (I, 74 and n. 5, p. 103 below), whose linguistic works he edited, to whose linguistic thought he devoted his first book (1848), and whose linguistic programme of language classification and language typology he continued. His principal works on the psychological approach to language include ‘Grammar, Logic and Psychology’ (1855) and ‘Introduction to Psychology and Linguistics’ (= vol. 1 of ‘Outline of Linguistics’; 1871, 2nd edn 1881); his papers on linguistic theory were published in 1970. For an excellent survey, also of Völkerpsychologie, see Morpurgo Davies (1998: 201–7) with further references; note her observation at 223 n. 25 that, while, in general, 19th-c. psychology was part of philosophy (and not experimental), for Lazarus and Steinthal it was an empirical field, dealing ‘only with establishing facts and carefully representing them’, and without need of theoretical discussion and dissenion.
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Particularly influential among Steinthal’s followers is the Germanist Hermann Paul (1846–1921) in his famous Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte (‘Principles of Language History’). I do not wish to go into the whole of the intellectual movement to which this enormously important book belongs, but I would stress that, since its publication, those working in the area of syntax have got into the habit of regarding more seriously the illogical element as an influential factor in syntactic phenomena.\footnote{Hermann Paul was professor of German first in Freiburg and then in Munich, and at the heart of the Junggrammatiker, or ‘Neogrammarians’, the group of young German scholars connected with August Leskien at Leipzig who transformed Indo-European studies in the last third of the 19th c. Paul contributed
I, 49

no special significance but of great industry has done us the service of collecting together many instances of these illogical usages: I mean Hermann Ziemer (1845–1910) in his book ‘Neogrammarian Forays in the Area of Syntax’ (1883), and in another book on grammatical comparison (1884).

A few points that are relevant here I should like to present straightaway, so that we become aware of the factors that have influenced the form that expressions have. I draw your attention first of all to something that has always received notice. Earlier scholars called it ‘attraction’; now it is more usual to speak of ‘assimilation’. Teachers of grammar have had to deal with this from the word go, since, when it came to making comparisons between, say, Greek and German, it was the obvious thing to do. But they failed to draw the proper conclusions from the observation. It was not until the psychological element achieved prominence in studies of language that assimilation began to be understood. One of the strong driving forces, dominating speech and influencing the reproduction of the substance of a language is the tendency to make adjacent items more similar, either by anticipation through something that foreshadows a later part of the utterance, or by letting the form of an earlier expression affect what follows. When a later element is anticipated one speaks of ‘regressive assimilation’; when an element already uttered persists, this is ‘progressive assimilation’. Some recent research looking for general principles (Weise 1902: 11) has turned up some colloquial examples of this, for instance the deformation in the German dialect of Cologne of the popular expression klipp und klar (‘plainly, in no uncertain terms’) to klipp und klapp, or the Berlin version of grand merci: kranzi manzi (both regressive and progressive!).

This is the basic motivation of the phenomena before us. It has also been noticed that in coordinated words or word groups the same means of word formation are used even if they really suit only one of the items. So, for example, Aulus Gellius (Attic Nights 3. 12. 1) brings up the adjective bibosus (¼ bibax ‘given to drinking, fond of drink’) as being a completely anomalous formation; he points out quite correctly that adjectives in -osus are normally derived from nouns. But of the deviant word there is actually only one instance attested, in a mime of Decimus Laberius (first half 1st c. BC) where a woman is described as (com. 80) non mammosa, non annosa, non bibosa, non procax (‘she isn’t

significantly to the early understanding of Grimm’s Law (p. 38 n. 10 above), and his phenomenal output included, beside the Prinzipien, a massive Grundriss (‘outline’) of Germanic philology, a dictionary and a grammar of German (both recently reprinted), and a still-standard grammar of Middle High German. The Prinzipien, which Paul repeatedly updated and revised until his death, has been called ‘the Bible of the contemporary linguist’, and ‘fundamental for the neogrammarians’ thought’ (Morpurgo Davies 1998: 235, 246). See further Morpurgo Davies (1998: 246–51, and Index, s.v. ‘Paul, H.’), and Graffi (1988); note also Sebeok (1966: I, 549–54).

10 A nice example of the teacher’s use of ‘we’ for ‘you’ touched on by W. above (I, 42)!
11 Weise (1902) mentions also Bavarian Lames dames for Te Deum laudamus.
bosomy, wrinkly, boozy, or brash\textsuperscript{12}). This explains the formation: \textit{bibosa} is used rather than \textit{bibax} to follow the form of the preceding \textit{mammosa, annosa}. The \textsc{ThLL} furnishes another adjective in \textit{-osus} that arose in a very similar way: in the Latin Bible and the Church Fathers, including Augustine, the normal word for ‘devilish’, on the countless occasions when they need such an adjective, is the regularly formed \textit{diabolicus}; in one sermon, however, Augustine says (171. 2), \textit{diabolosa et perniciosa consilia} (‘devilish and pernicious advice’). Or take another example: Plautus, at \textit{Captivi 85–7}, is speaking of various types of dog; he mentions first (at the end of 85) \textit{uenatici} ‘hunting-dogs’, a regular formation, then (at the end of 86) \textit{Molossici} ‘Molossian’, from Epirus, again the normal word, but then he continues (87), \textit{odiossicique et multum incommodestici},\textsuperscript{13} here adding the suffix \textit{-ici} in an abnormal fashion, carrying on, as it were, with the suffix of \textit{uenatici} and \textit{Molossici}. In this sort of area, known as word formation, there are countless similar cases that one could mention.

Under this heading belong also expressions like German \textit{wennst} (for \textit{wenn}) \textit{du kommst} (‘when you come’), or \textit{obst} (for \textit{ob}) \textit{du gebst} (‘whether you are going’). Here the \textit{-st} ending of the following verb is anticipated, and similarly, in Italian, the pronouns \textit{egli, elle} ‘they’ (masc., fem.) were extended to \textit{eglino, elleno} because the verb shows this ending in the 3rd person plural.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12} That is, fr. 52 Panayotakis (forthc.), from the mime \textit{Salinator} (‘The Salt-dealer’). I am grateful to Costas Panayotakis for allowing me to use his translation in advance of the publication of his new edition of \textit{Laberius}; see his comm., \textit{ad loc}.

\textsuperscript{13} Paul Nixon’s Loeb translation tries to capture the rhyme with ‘hound’: ‘So long as the holidays last, we parasites are greyhounds: when they’re over, we are wolf-hounds and dear-hounds and bore-hounds, very much so.’ As for \textit{bibosus}, Aulus Gellius takes to task P. Nigidius for using such an ill-formed, and otherwise unattested word.

\textsuperscript{14} Both \textit{eglino} and \textit{elleno} are now antiquated; the former is now \textit{essi} (GDI, s.vv.).
Lecture I, 10

Following on from the phenomena discussed in the last lecture, I should like to mention a use of the diminutives in Latin. Latin has an advantage over Greek in being able to make diminutive forms to adjectives as well as nouns. Now, quite often one sees beside a diminutive noun an adjective with the same formation, e.g. at Catullus 25. 2 in the phrase *imula oricilla* ‘the lobe of an ear’.¹ In cases like this we can generally sense a certain meaning for the diminutive suffix; by being repeated it evokes more strongly the image of smallness and expresses more clearly a certain affectionate tenderness. On the other hand, in a case such as Plautus, *Amph.* 737 (Alcmena to Amphitruo:) *primulo diluculo* ‘at first light’, the diminutive suffix on the adjective has no sense; it gets the *-ulo* suffix simply by assimilation to the noun it goes with.

On these points let me refer you to an interesting article by the American scholar Hanns Oertel (1912/13) on what he calls ‘grammatical perseveration-phenomena’; as an experienced psycholinguist he takes a realistic view of them.²

But the striking and remarkable thing about these word assimilations is that they occur not only in this harmless way, where they do not interfere with the sense of the expression; they often spoil the clarity of the logical connections between the words in a clause by replacing a form that agrees with the intended meaning with one that goes against it. The ancient grammarians, in so far as they considered them at all, dealt with instances of this kind simply under the schemata (I, 20 above). The modern term ‘attraction’ goes back to the Spaniard Sanctius (properly, Sanchez), who in his book *Minerva* (I, 23 above) used the phrase ‘alter casus ab altero attrahitur’ (‘the one grammatical case is attracted by the other’), where he had in mind the image of a magnet. The noun attractio is formed for the first time in the *Port Royal* grammar of 1660.³ In the nineteenth

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¹ This phrase creates a jingle with that at the end of line 1, in a passage replete with diminutives: *Cinaede Thalle, mollior cuniculi capillo vel anseris medullula vel imula oricilla* (‘Effeminate Thallus, softer than rabbit’s fur or down of goose or lap of ear’, tr. Cornish & Goold [Loeb]).

² W.’s friend Hanns Oertel (1868–1932), Indologist, classicist and linguist, was born in Germany, but moved to the United States as a student in 1886 (he studied under William Dwight Whitney). He became professor at Yale in 1900, but he had returned to Germany in 1917 and held posts first in Basel, then in Marburg and (1925–35) Munich. Oertel’s *Lectures* (1901) is included in Brugmann’s list of books indispensable for a first approach to the subject; see Morpurgo Davies (1998: 228; also 297, 339 n. 66).

³ This ‘general and reasoned’ grammar, reflecting the work of scholars including grammarians and philosophers in a monastic community outside Paris, was published anonymously but is generally ascribed
century, scholars such as Böttmann and Gottfried Hermann brought the term into favour and since then it has enjoyed great popularity among classicists. The study of attraction was raised to a higher level first by Jacob Grimm in the article I mentioned earlier (1866b; I, 41 above) in vol. 3 of his Kleinere Schriften: in this work I would highlight as being especially important, and in broad terms right, his comparison of so-called attraction with cases of phonetic assimilation. Secondly, Steinthal in an article entitled ‘Assimilation and attraction’ (1860b) has thrown light on these phenomena from a psychological point of view. 4

Among instances of attraction and assimilation we are able to identify a series of degrees of integration. Some are nonce formations, or at least restricted to one individual, which are thus errors affecting a single person and perceived by his hearers as errors; then there is the type of expression that goes beyond the idiosyncratic mistake so as to be used more widely but without ousting the normal form of expression; finally, it quite often happens that a non-standard form imposes itself to such an extent that it comes to be perceived as normal, so that only historical study can show that it is the result of a change running counter to logic.

Let me begin my illustration with the use of grammatical number. A harmless and unremarkable instance of this kind is the so-called plural of concinnity, observed particularly in Latin. In a pair of adjacent nouns of which normally the first would stand in the plural and the second in the singular, it often happens that the second, obviously influenced by the first, is put into the plural. In On the Orator 1. 11, for example, Cicero has the phrase studiis . . . doctrinisque. While the plural studia is quite common, doctrina is normally singular; it should really be studiis doctrinae, but the speaker got stuck in the plural. 5 This sort of thing can lead to nonsensical expressions that quite fly in the face of logic. Take an example from English (from Jespersen 1894: 289–90): she is both their mothers, i.e. she is the mother of them both. The subject is singular (she), so the predicate (mother) should be singular, too. But in spite of this it is quite common to use the plural mothers. Both is a plural word, and the speaker mechanically hangs onto this plural producing the illogical plural mothers. 6

4 Steinthal’s piece was prompted by Grimm’s, Steinthal’s aim being ‘to take the historical facts back to their psychological causes’ (1866b: 93).

5 On this phenomenon in Latin, see further Hofmann & Szantyr 18 with further references.

The process is similar in the case of assimilation of gender. Grammars of French inform us that already the historian Jean de Joinville (c.1224/5–1317) called the Feast of St Nicholas la Sainte Nicolas. The feminine of the adjective is wrong. Only the Feast is feminine, the saint himself is a man, so it should be la Saint Nicolas. But the assimilation of the adjective to the gender of the la was all too easy. It is not so clear whether we can give the same account of the phrase de guerre lasse ‘war-weary’, used in this form (with fem. lasse) also of men.7

Particularly well known, and much discussed, is the assimilation found in various languages of words for ‘whole’ or ‘all’ used predicatively. In Theocritus’ Idyll 15, two female speakers are talking together about their husbands, and one of them says of hers (line 148) χώνηρ ὅξος ἄπαν (‘and the fellow is all vinegar’). We do not need to go into what that is supposed to mean. The word for ‘all’ agrees grammatically with ὅξος (‘vinegar’, neut.) but refers semantically to the man: he consists, in his whole being, of vinegar. So ‘all’ really ought to be ἄπασ (masc.).8

Obviously, we cannot just emend the text, nor even say that the poet is representing an especially vulgar departure from linguistic norms, as we find exactly the same thing in other Greek authors. Two of the most elevated writers present analogous expressions. Thucydides offers instances such as 4. 116. 2 τὴν Λῆψου... τέμενος ἀνήκεν ἄπαν ‘he [Brasidas] dedicated all of Lecythus as a sanctuary’. ‘All’ goes with Lecythus and should therefore be ἄπασαν (fem.) but concern for the sense was outweighed by the influence of the neuter gender of τέμενος. Similar things are common in Plato, e.g. Philebus 28a1 οὔδέ γ’ ἄν... λόπη πάν κακόν ‘nor would pain be absolute evil’. The same is very often to be observed in the Romance languages, and on this I refer you to Tobler (1895) and Ebeling (1905: 51–87). There are examples in Plattdeutsch and colloquial High German, too.

More strikingly than in these examples of wrong gender, in this same context of expressions for ‘all’ or ‘whole’, the outstanding French linguist Arsnè Darmesteter, in his study of the formation of compound words (1894: 69 ff.), has emphasized something that impinges on shift of case. He draws attention to the bizarre fact that the feminine of tout-puissant ‘all-powerful’ (lit. ‘controlling everything’) is toute-puissante and that the abstract is accordingly toute-puissance.

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7 The only mention of the day of St Nicholas in Joinville is in The Life of St Louis, §185, where his editors, including N. de Wailly (Paris 1874) and most recently N. L. Corbett (Quebec 1977), print la Saint-Nicholas and record no variant readings (cf. §§180, 188 la Saint-Remy). W.’s source, whatever it was, was in error or the victim of an inferior edition. Grevisse §223 agrees that de guerre lasse shows ‘un faux concord’ (and not, pace Littré, a transferred epithet!) and suggests that it was caused by the pronunciation of the -s of (masc.) las before a pause.

8 Gow (1950) appears to take a different view, commenting on Theocr. 3. 18 τὸ πᾶν λίθος ‘all of stone’ that it is ‘probable that πᾶν even with neuter nouns was felt to be adverbial, as with nouns of other gender and adjectives it must be’ (emph. mine).
Although it is a neuter accusative object, *tout* changes its gender so as to agree with the adjacent word, by which, strictly speaking, it is governed.  

It is still more disturbing for one’s syntactic sensibilities when even case-relations fail to be maintained. I should like to present three instances from Latin, starting with a very blatant example! In his valuable commentary on Cicero’s speech for Sextus Roscius, Gustav Landgraf (1914: 109–10), commenting on 48 *a patribus familias* ‘by heads of household’, points out that one finds here and there in vulgar texts the expression *matribus familiis* for ‘mothers of the household, matrons’. This is quite illogical but one can forgive it. The collocations *pater familias*, *mater familias*, *filius* and *filia familias* were inherited from a time when the gen. sing. of 1st-declension nouns was still in -ās. The ancient grammarians had recognized the real meaning of the forms in -ās by comparison with Greek (Charisius, pp. 16–17 Barwick = GL I, 18–19; Servius, *Aen.* 11. 801), but, for ordinary speakers of Latin, *familias* was a sort of indeclinable noun or an acc. plur. used without a construction; so it was unable to resist the pressure towards assimilation. Perhaps the deformation into *familiis* was influenced also by the fact that apart from *familias* one also used *familiae* (the normal genitive form) and, when the head noun was in the plural, *familiarum*. From here arose in some circles forms showing false agreement between the two elements of the compound, nom. pl. *matres familiae*, gen. *matrum familiarum* (both attested by Servius on *Aen.* 11. 801), and acc. *matres familias*; this declension gave rise inevitably to dat.-abl. *matribus familiiis*.

A second example: if you have much acquaintance with Plautus, you will know the demonstrative form *eccum* that he is so fond of, along with *eccistum* and *eccillum* ‘this one here’, ‘the one by you’, ‘that one over there’; (*eccum* is from *ecce* + *hnum* which we see in *hunc* with the addition of the deictic particle -ce.) These forms are eliminated from the classical language, but *eccum* survived in popular speech in the sense of *ecce* ‘look!’, as we see both in inscriptions and in literary texts from the 2nd century AD on; it used to be erroneously read in Varro, *Rust.* 3. 17. 10 for *et cum*! It survives still in Italian *eccio*, etc. and even passed into early Germanic languages, as Schulze shows (1913: 341). The accusative of the pronouns contained in these forms is conditioned by *ecce*, which in the pre-classical language always stood with the accusative of the thing pointed at (cf. Köhler 1888: 22–3). Now, if something is said about the thing pointed at, it

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10 Servius must have had *auras* (for gen. sg. *aurae*) in his ms. at this point, hence his remarks on the Old Latin gen. in -ās; see Horsfall (2003: ad loc.) with further references.

11 Schulze’s point is that it is attested in Germanic (Old High German [Otfrid, 4. 24. 12] *eggo* and Old Low Frankish *eccio*) before Romance!
sometimes happens that the rest of the sentence keeps its normal form, as e.g. at *Rudens* 663 *eccas ipsae huc egrediuntur* ‘here they are, they’re coming out in person this way’. Often, however, the sentence that follows an *eccum* has its syntax disturbed. We find for example at *Miles* 1290 *eccum Palaestri*ōnem *stat cum milite* ‘here is Palaestrio (acc.) standing with the soldier’, or at *Amphi*trono*em aduenit* ‘here comes Amphitruo’. These can only be instances of assimilation.

Another striking case is that of *suus quisque*. As you know, the possessive *suus* likes to go beside *quisque* when the possessive relationship is distributive, as in *suum cuique* (‘each has his own thing’). And in this position *quisque* can through carelessness acquire the case of *suus*. Let me give three classical examples: *Caes. Civ. I. 83. 2 primam aciem quaternae cohortes ex quinque legionibus tenebant, has subsidiariae ternae et rursus aliae totidem suae cuinuisque legionis subsequebantur* ‘the front line was held by four cohorts from each of five legions, these were followed each by three (cohorts) in support, and then by the same number again, each following a cohort of its own legion’. A moment’s thought will tell you that it ought to be *suae quasque legionis*. But the preceding *suae* causes *quisque* to appear illogically in the genitive singular rather than the logically correct accusative plural. Similarly in *Cicero, Tusc. I. 28 haec procliuitas ad suum quodque genus (uitii) ‘this tendency that each person has to his own particular failing’—for expected *ad suum cuinisque*; and *De orat. I. 216 (uox) est suo quque in genere mediocris* (‘between all of these (kinds of voice) in their several kinds there is a medium note’), with *quique* for *quaeque*.12 There is a similar instance in *Xenophon’s Cyropaedia 6. I. 51 τοὺς δ’ ἵππους . . . χαλκοῖς πᾶσι προβλήμασι κατεσκεύασατο* ‘he equipped the horses all with bronze armour’, where we find *πάσι* instead of *πάντας*.13

Special attention has been paid to the attraction of the relative, chiefly because of the great wealth of examples of this construction in Greek. Every grammar has had to deal with it, and there is no syntax of Greek that can ignore it. Its earliest scholarly treatment was at the hands of Richard *Foerster* in his dissertation on attraction in relative clauses (1868). Here for the first time the attempt was made to record the situation that we find and its historical development on the basis of considerations of principle, and it is a groundbreaking work. We find the beginnings of this attraction in a small way already in Homer, and it occurs in two forms. In the first place, the relative pronoun can appear in the case

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12 The mss. here have *quaeque*, which is retained by Kumaniecki in his Teubner edition (Leipzig 1969). It seems that *quique* goes back to Lachmann (1882) on *Lucr. 2. 371* (see Wilkins 1892: *ad loc.*).

13 Recent editions and translations all take *πάσι* with *προβλήμασι*, i.e. ‘with armour all in bronze’. Indeed, the only edition known to me (and I am grateful for help here to D. J. Butterfield) which takes *πάσι* as W. does with the horses is that of Thomas Hutchinson (4 vols, Glasgow 1764), who translates the Greek as (III, 217) ‘equos autem curru junctos, toto aereis tegumentis instruxit’.
of its antecedent (instead of the case it should have in the structure of its relative clause) if the relative clause has no verb. It is easy to see that assimilation was likely to take place in these circumstances: when there was no verb, there was no opposition to the assimilation. This applies especially to short clauses introduced by οἶος, e.g. *Iliad* 1. 262–3 οὗ γὰρ πῶς τοῖος ἵδον ἀνέρας οὐδὲ ἰδομαί, | οἶον Πειρίθους ‘never have I seen nor shall I ever see such men as Pirithous (acc.)’. The oddity of the original is lost in the translation, but clearly what was intended is οἶος Πειρίθους ἦν ‘such as Π. (nom.) was’. But the verb is understood and since οἶος Πειρίθους is not supported by a verb it goes into the accusative. Exactly the same occurs in short clauses with ὅσοι. I am afraid we cannot here follow in detail how this spread in later Greek to include, e.g., ὃσιος ‘whoever’ (note e.g. Semonides 7. 49 ἑλθὼν ἐταῖρον ὄντων ἐδέξατο ‘she accepts a companion who comes along, whoever (acc.) [he may be]’ 14).  

The other type of relative attraction in Homer, attraction in the strict sense, is to be seen at *Iliad* 5. 265–8 τῆς γὰρ τοι γενέης, ἦς Τροί . . . Ζεὺς δῶκε . . ., τῆς γενέης ἐκλεφθεν . . . Ἀγχύσης ‘from the breed of horses which Zeus gave to Tros, from that breed Anchises stole’. Since the antecedent (‘breed’) occurs twice in the genitive, before and after the relative clause, ἦς is used instead of ἦν. 15 This is the oldest example of the attraction of the relative in Greek, and it becomes a hard habit to break.

14 ὄντων (the Ionic form of ὄντων, which the mss. have) acc. for nom. ὅσιον with the verb to be understood. The iambic poet Semonides of Amorgos (7th c. BC) is not to be confused with Simonides of Ceos (6th/5th c. BC).

15 Alternatively, one may take ἦς as an ablative gen., ‘out of which Zeus gave . . . ’; cf. Kirk (1990: *ad loc.*), who characterizes the first and third genitives as ‘partitive’. 
Lecture I, 11

First of all it is necessary to define the phenomenon. We are not talking here about cases where the relative has no antecedent in the main clause and is treated as a part of the main clause, standing in the appropriate case (e.g. όθ instead of τοῦτον ὅ)—though this form of expression may have promoted the spread of attraction (see E. Hermann 1912: 331 ff.). Assimilation of this kind affects only those relative pronouns which would normally have been in the accusative. The accusative is the case most prone to be displaced because it is the most common and the relations it expresses are the least well defined. On the other hand, the replacement form can only be a genitive or a dative, i.e. again an oblique case; assimilation to a nominative is unheard of. And there is the further condition that the relative clause must be of the type required to complete the sense of the main clause, in other words that there must be a very close relation between the two clauses. So defined, the attraction of the relative runs right through Greek literature. I should stress in particular that even the Greek translation of the Old Testament has this idiom, e.g. at Sirach 12: 5 ἐν πᾶσιν ἀγαθοῖς ὦς ἀν ποιήσῃς αὐτῷ ‘in all the benefits that (dat.) you may do for him’.

What we find here affecting true case-forms occurs occasionally also with those adverbs that are functionally similar to cases. Take, for instance, a passage of Sophocles, an author who in general throws up a great many difficult problems for syntactic research1 (note E. Brühn’s valuable appendix to Nauck’s edition2): Trach. 701–2 ἐκ δὲ γῆς, ὅθεν προσκεῖτ’, ἀναζύων θρομμάδες ὄφροι ‘from the earth where (lit. whence) it lay exposed boiled up clots of foam’. Logically ὅθεν is wrong; we would expect ὅπου every time. ὅθεν is used simply because ἐκ γῆς suggested a ‘from where’. (So, too, Callim. Hymn. 2. 48 ἐξέτι κείνου ἔστε for ὅτε ‘ever since the time when’.)

This type of attraction is as unusual in Latin as it is common in Greek. In the whole of Latin literature there are at most a few dozen examples (cf. Foerster

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1 Cf. H. Lloyd-Jones and N. G. Wilson in the preface to their recent edition (Oxford 1990, p. v): ‘There are many passages where it is scarcely possible to know what the author wrote, since he took pleasure in experimenting with the syntactic resources of Attic Greek’ (translated and quoted in the preface to de Jong & Rijksbaron (2006), a valuable collection of essays on Sophocles’ language, including four on syntax).

2 That is, Bruhn (1899), published as vol. 8 of Nauck’s revision of Schneidewin’s Sophokes, and comprising §§268 of syntactic, stylistic, and lexical peculiarities of Sophocles compared with other literary authors.
Furthermore, attraction is found only where the language is close to informal speech, such as in Cicero’s letters, e.g. *Fam.* 5. 14. 1 (L. Lucceius to Cicero, no. 251 Shackleton Bailey) *aliquid eorum agas quorum consuesti* (‘while engaged in one of your usual occupations’), or Horace’s satires, e.g. 1. 6. 14–15 *notante* | *indice, quo nosti, populo* (‘in the opinion of the people, that judge you know so well’).

Attraction is rare also in the Germanic languages, though Wulfila has some examples, including cases where the Greek original does not show attraction, e.g. at 2 Corinthians 13: 10 *bi waldufnja* (dat.), *fanmei* (dat.) ... *fragaf* translating Gk *dià toûtò . . . kata τὴν ἔξοικαν, ἣν . . . ἔδωκεν* ‘...according to the permission which (acc.) ... he gave’.

In addition to this type of attraction of the relative is another, the so-called *attractio inversa* (inverted attraction), which involves the opposite, namely the attraction of the antecedent to the relative. This is not nearly so common in Greek as attraction proper, and really occurs just in isolated instances. But it is there already in the *Iliad*, where we find, at 14. 75–6 *vîes* ὃσα πρῶτα ἐληφται ἄγχι θαλάσσης, | ἐλκομεν ‘let us drag down to the water the *ships* (nom.)! drawn up closest to the sea’. Instead of *vîes* we should have *vîas* (which is in fact a variant; cf. also *Iliad* 14. 371–2, 10. 416). There are further examples in Herodotus, and also in Sophocles, *Oed. Tyr.* 449–51 τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον, δὲν πάλαι ξητεῖς . . . ὁτὸς ἐστὶν ἐνθάδε ‘this man (acc.) whom you have been seeking for a long time . . . here he is’. This phenomenon again persists until the Septuagint, e.g. Psalms 118: 22 λίθον, δὲν ἀπεδοκίμασαν οἱ οἰκοδομοῦντες, ὁτὸς ἐγενήθη ἐς κεφαλὴν γωνίας ‘the stone (acc.) that the builders rejected has become the cornerstone’, with λίθον for λίθος. It is the same in the quotations of this passage in the New Testament, and the Latin Vulgate (*lapidem quem*) and several translations into Germanic languages also keep the accusative, though Wulfila and Luther use the nominative required by the sense; see the fine presentation of this by Jacob Grimm (1866b: 324–5).

A necessary condition for the appearance of inverse attraction is that the relative clause is preceded by so little of the main clause that the construction to which the antecedent will belong is not yet clear. The indeterminacy affecting the antecedent makes its assimilation to the following relative quite natural. Only when this condition is fulfilled may we assume an attraction, though this is not always observed. Even so excellent a Hellenist as Immanuel Bekker⁵ ventured (1865–72: I, 314) to present as attraction an instance where this condition is not fulfilled, to wit *Iliad* 6. 395–6 Ἀνδρομάχη θυγάτηρ μεγαλήτορος Ηετίωνος, | Ηετίων, ὅς ἐναίεν . . . (‘Andromache, the daughter of great-hearted Eëtion, Eëtion (nom.),

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⁵ On the prodigiously prolific philologist and critic August Immanuel Bekker (1785–1871), the greatest of the pupils of F. A. Wolf, professor of philosophy in Berlin from the age of 25, and best known as editor of the first modern edition of the complete works of Aristotle, see Sandys (1906–8: III, 85–7), and cf. p. 699 n. 18 below. He contributed significantly also to Byzantine and Romance studies (cf. Bekker 1974).
who dwelled...'). But the nominative *Hepíon* is not due to attraction. Rather, we have here an interesting example of so-called haplology within the sentence, that is to say, *Hepíon ós* is a shortening from *Hepíonis ós*. When two identical syllables come to be adjacent, the second is often dropped.4

Latin has a greater liking for inverse attraction than has Greek. Does this, I wonder, reflect the differences between the two languages in the ways in which they organize thought? Plautus has a mass of examples. The very first lines of *Captivi* begin (1–2) *hos quos uidentis stare hic captius duos... hi stant ambo non sedent* ‘these men whom you can see standing here, they’re both standing and not sitting’. *hos* announces a constituent of the sentence which will eventually be the subject; the correct form does not come until the *hi* in the next clause. Similar is *Amphitruo* 1009 *Nauicratem quem conuenire uolui in nau non erat* (*‘Naucratis (acc.), whom I wished to visit, was not on the boat’*, except that here no correction is made by a subsequent nominative. There is very good discussion of this construction in Latin by Bach (1888), Lindskog (1896a: 54–6), and Löfstedt (1911: 222–9).

Occasionally, inverse attraction is found in adverbial expressions, too, just like attraction proper (I, 55 above). A famous passage, which has prompted much debate, is Sophocles, *OC* 1226–7 *βῆναι κείθεν ὁθὲν περ ἤκει* (*‘to go thence whence he has come’*). Like it or not, we have *κείθεν* ‘thence’ for expected *ἦκε* ‘thither’, and it is especially hard because it follows a verb which requires an answer to the question ‘where to?’5 Another example is Plato, *Crito* 45b καὶ ἄλλοσε ὃποι ἀν ἀφίκῃ (lit. ‘to another place whithersoever you may arrive’ i.e. ‘wherever else you may arrive’), instead of ἄλλοθι ὃποι *in* another place whither...; and equally in Plautus we find *Cist.* 62 *indidem unde oritur facito ut facias stultitiam sepelibilem* (lit. ‘from the same place whence it arises see that you give foolishness a funeral’) for *ibidem unde* *in* the same place whence (*cf. Mercator 511 illim unde ‘thence whence’, for *illec unde* ‘there whence’).

Assimilation of this sort occurs also before other kinds of inserted clause, as, e.g., in the simile at *Iliad* 4. 433–6 *Τρώαις δ', ὅς ῥ’ ὅις..., ὅς Τρώων ἀλαλητός...* (*‘and the Trojans (nom.), just as ewes..., so the clamour of the Trojans...’*). *Τρώαις* is used instead of expected *Τρώων* under the influence of the nominative ὅις, which is the subject of the simile clause and denotes the idea—the ewes—that is compared with the Trojans. (There is a similar case in Herodotus 4. 149. 1 before an inserted γάρ-clause.)

4 The idea that this is an instance of attraction is already in the oldest of the Homeric scholia, and may go back to Aristarchus. Kirk (1990: ad loc.) takes the nom. as an ‘emotive epanalepsis’.
5 Jebb, in his commentary on the *Oed. Col.* (Cambridge 1907: ad loc.) refuses to accept *κείθεν*, since *βῆναι* and ἤκει are sharply opposed (while in the *Crito* passage, as he observes, there is only one verb of motion). Jebb prefers to emend the text, with Blaydes, to read *κείδ' ὃποίθεν*. 
Jacob Grimm shows that inverse attraction was very popular in colloquial German, too. I will do no more than remind you of the well-known old folksong that begins: *Den liebsten Buhlen, den ich han, der liegt beim Wirt im Keller* (‘the favourite sweetheart (acc.) that I have, he lies in the cellar of the tavern’).

Many illogical usages related to the above became so well established that their illogicality could no longer be felt. This is the only possible explanation of the use of the dative of Gk ἀυτός meaning ‘together with’, as at *Iliad* 23. 8 ἀυτός ἔποισι καὶ ἀρμασάν ἄσσον ἱόντες ‘drawing near with our horses and chariots’. This idiom persists into later Greek literature, with ἀυτός always first in the dative singular or plural, followed by a noun in the dative (ms. add.2: with the article between at Arist. *Knights* 849); not until the imperial period is ἀυτός sometimes placed after the noun (ms. add.2: cf. LOBECK 1820: 100). Occasionally, especially in the poets, σῶν is added (ms. add.2: in prose, already in Polybius, e.g. 16. 32. 6). This idiom shows two archaic features: first, the use of the dative with sociative meaning without a preposition, as in this function it is usually supported by the preposition σῶν; and, secondly, the absence of the article almost without exception until counterexamples start to appear in the third century bc. Both features imply that the construction is very old, but what is the ἀυτός supposed to be doing? I am not going to grapple with the many silly explanations that have been proposed. The key point has to be that the nouns in the dative refer to people or things accompanying the principal person. Now, an idiomatic use of ἀυτός in any case-form in Homer is to set main characters alongside their goods and chattels, as in ἄντων καὶ τεκέων ‘themselves and their children’, and accordingly it has been rightly suggested that the pronoun ἀυτός was originally in the nominative in such phrases, i.e. that the Homeric example above would have been ἀντοι ἔποιοσ καὶ ἀρμασά σῶν Πιγρητί...καὶ άλλοις τρισίν ‘Cyrus driving along the line (in person) with Pigres...and three others’). Subsequently, as the role of ἀυτός was no longer properly understood, it was unthinkingly assimilated to the following dative. 6

Next, it is important not to forget the familiar assimilation of mood and tense; this involves the use, after an optative in the main clause, of the same mood in the subordinate clause as well. The two clauses involved in the assimilation do not have to be in a dependent relation one on the other. In the famous iambi in which Semonides of Amorgos chastizes womankind (fr. 7. 81–2 West), we read πάσαν ἡμέρην βουλεύται, ὅκως τι κώς μέγιστον ἔρξειν κακών (‘she plots every day how she can do the greatest possible harm’). Given only this context,

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6 W.’s explanation has stood the test of time and the decipherment of Linear B. The fact that in Mycenaean the instrumental is used adnominally with comitative meaning suggests that the construction seen in the type ἀυτόσ ἔποιοσ arose after the Mycenaean period; see most recently Morpurgo Davies (1985: 88–9 and n. 31).
the optative is completely unmotivated and quite inexplicable, but it is no longer so if we read the line before, ὅπως ἂν τῷ ἐδρέξειν (‘neither will she do a man any kindness’). Obviously, the poet still had this optative in mind and was induced by it to use ἐδρέξειν instead of the indicative in line 82. Or take the first marriage song of Catullus, 61. 71–3 quae tuis careat sacris, | non queat dare praesides | terra finibus ‘the land which failed to sacrifice to you would not be able to find defenders of its borders’. Here queat is perfectly justified, but the poet continues: at queat te volente. Here we firmly expect quit ‘it is able’, but the queat of line 72 was imprinted on the poet’s mind.7

The influence of neighbouring words, similar to that seen in assimilations of this kind, shows itself in cases where a word is robbed of its normal form in order to be put in a governing relation with a neighbouring word. This account can fairly be given of the vulgar phrase κάτω τῶν ‘at the neighbours’, for κατά γείτόνων.

The attraction of a noun that precedes an inserted γάρ-clause (cf. I, 57 above) is a case in point. Take, for example, Herodotus 1. 109. 2 τῇ δὲ, κακῶς γάρ ἐδει πανοικίᾳ γενέσθαι, ἐπε... ‘but she (dative!), since all her house was to be afflicted, said...’. τῇ for ἦ for ἦ is construed with the γενέσθαι of the γάρ-clause though it does not belong in this clause at all, as the position of γάρ shows. (So, too, Hdt 1. 24. 5; 4. 200. 1; Thuc. 1. 72. 1, 115. 4; 8. 30. 1.)

Sometimes a falsely construed case form of this sort becomes fixed: e.g. propediem ‘at an early date, very soon’, attested from Plautus on, is comprehensible only on the assumption of an illogical assimilation of construction. Originally, this time-phrase was a little clause that was inserted: prope dies ‘the day is close’; the Latin for ‘the day before yesterday’ was an inserted clause in exactly the same way: nu-dius tertius was literally ‘now is the third day [from that point]’, again without the copula est. But since prope was otherwise always followed by an accusative, a nominative coming after it looked incongruous and was altered giving rise to propediem, which is really nonsensical. In a similar fashion, in the Augustan age, postmodum arose to take the place of postmodo ‘later, presently’, which actually contains the adverb modo ‘soon’.8

Sometimes in a similar way the verb is made to agree not with its true subject but with the subject of an intervening clause. For example, Ovid, Tristia, 1. 2. 1 quid enim nisi uta supersunt? ‘for what but prayers are left?’ has supersunt instead of superest because the true subject, quid, has been forgotten and the plural uta is closest to the verb. Or again, after an inserted clause containing a verb of thinking or saying, in what is left of the main clause the finite verb is replaced by an infinitive, which strictly speaking renders the sentence incomplete. There are several such cases in Herodotus and the tragedians, e.g. Soph. Trach. 1238–9

7 Cf. Kroll (1923: ad loc.); Friedrich (1908: 268) also defends queat, but without invoking attraction.
8 On the lexicalization of old clauses or phrases of these kinds, see Leumann (1977: 270–1).
âνήρ ὁδί ός ἐοικεν οὐ νεμεῖν ἐμοί | ... μοίραν ‘this man, it seems, will not pay me... my due’. What we expect is νεμεῖ but it has come under the sway of ός ἐοικεν. Even prose writers like Plato and the Attic orators, and Cicero in his elevated writings, are guilty of ‘mistakes’ of this kind. Note, e.g., Cic. Rep. 1. 58 si, ut Graeci dicunt, omnes aut Graios esse aut barbaros ‘if, as the Greeks say, all human beings are either Greeks or barbarians’.
If a speaker deviates from a normal expression because he has in mind another of a similar kind, we may speak of syntactic interference by association of ideas. There are many instances of this kind to do with the use of the moods. Cicero, e.g., says at *De finibus* 1. 24. *Macedonum legatis accusantibus, quod pecunias praetorem in provincia cepisse arguerent* (‘as the Macedonian envoys were making accusations, because they were alleging (subjunctive) that the praetor had taken money in the province’). The second verb of accusing, *arguerent* in the *quod* clause, should be in the indicative, since the accusation was in fact being made. But because the speaker of this sentence had the reported-speech version of the allegation in mind (*quod pecunias praetor in provincia cepisset* ‘because the praetor had (allegedly) taken money in the province’), he put the verb of saying itself into the subjunctive. In sentences with *dicere* and verbs of thinking, this is common in Classical Latin prose. Compare Caesar, *Gallic War* 5. 6. 3, where the illogical *diceret* was encouraged by the logical *timeret* of the parallel subordinate clause.\(^1\)

This can help us to understand a German expression. In modern German, *ich will* (‘I wish’) is an ordinary present right the way through its paradigm. But the 1st sg. in Old High German is *willu*, in Old Icelandic *wilia*, in Gothic *wiljau*, clearly with the ending of the past optative.\(^2\) In these languages, the verb ‘to wish’ in general is no present indicative: it inflects as a past optative (called ‘subjunctive’) but its meaning is exactly that of *ich will*, so that it can serve straightforwardly to translate Gk βούλομαι and θέλω. People have anguished over the question how the Germanic peoples could have come to replace the indicative of this verb with the optative. The account that has gained widest assent is that of Rudolf Hildebrand (1897), to the effect that the expression of a wish here is simply being put in the most careful form; cf. Havers (1925: 17–19), (1931: 188–9,

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\(^1\) *ille* (Dumnorix) . . . *petere contendit ut in Gallia reliqueretur, partim quod insuetus nauigandi mare timeret, partim quod religionibus impediri sse dicret* ‘he (Dumnorix) asked to be left in Gaul, partly because he had no experience of sailing and was (he said) afraid of the sea, partly because he said he was prevented by religious admonitions’.

\(^2\) Cf. the past optative of Gothic *niman* ‘take’: *nemian*. Proto-Germanic merged the subjunctive and optative moods of Indo-European into one (variously called in Germanic grammars ‘subjunctive’ or ‘optative’), of which the endings continue those of the IE optative. See Jasanoff (2004) on Gothic, and Braune & Reiffenstein §301.3 on Old High German.
But the most secure solution comes from comparison with some Greek and Latin expressions. Take, for instance, Pind. *Pyth.* 11. 50 θεόθεν ἔραίμαν καλῶν ‘I wish (lit., may I wish [opt.]) for beauty from the gods’. The optative is not potential, as it would then have to have ἄν or κε. Anyway, the sentiment excludes the possibility that it is potential: the desire is actually there. The same applies to *Theocr.* 16. 67 πρόσθεν ἐλοίμαν ‘I prefer’. Or again, Plautus commonly uses *uelim, nolim, malim* (all subjunctive) to mean ‘I wish’, ‘I wish not’, ‘I prefer’. Morris, the distinguished American grammarian, has rightly said (1897: 137–40, 285–6) that these cases of *uelim*, etc. have to be regarded as optatives since they are used mostly of real and not hypothetical wishes. And Kroll hits the nail on the head when he writes of these Latin subjunctives (1916: 129): ‘the whole idea lies in the sphere of wishing and this causes even the verb that expresses the wish to appear in the mood used for a wish’. This illuminates the other examples: since wishes are expressed in the optative, the verb that expresses the wish to appear in the mood used for a wish. So Pindar writes ἔραίμαν καλῶν because, without a verb of wishing here, he would have said τύχομι καλῶν (‘would that I might achieve beauty’). And what was occasionally admitted by the classical authors was made a regular feature of the verb of wishing in early Germanic, until later generations changed it back to a regular indicative. Comparable with this is Pindar’s tendency to use the future of verbs that express an intention aimed at action in future time, even if the intention lies in present time; he will use for example ἔθελησω to mean ‘I wish’ (*Olymp.* 7. 20), or ἐγγυνάσωμαι for ‘I pledge’ (*Olymp.* 11. 16). On the analogous use of Lat. *debeat* and *debeo* instead of *debet*, for which Hildebrand’s account fails completely, see Löfstedt (1924: 336–8).

In other ways, too, it is very common for expressions that have for us internal associations to become confused and remodelled by mutual analogy. This will come up again when we consider the grammatical cases (I, 294 ff. below). At this point, I should like just to remind you of such well-known examples as German *über etwas nachdenken* instead of *dem nachdenken* (‘to think about something’), or Latin *tractare de aliqua re* for *tractare aliquid* (‘to treat of something’, e.g. Quint. *Inst.* 2. 20. 10; cf. French *traiter de*), or German *trotz* (‘in spite of’) with the genitive instead of dative. In all these cases, the models are easy to find. Occasionally, transferred constructions of this sort lead to hard anacolutha. Here, again, Sophocles offers some remarkable instances: look, for example, at the commentaries on *Ajax* 378 οὖ γὰρ γένοιτ’ ἂν ταῦθ’ ὡπος οὐχ ὡθ’ ἔχειν (‘it is

3 Or is it the desire that is wished for, as a goal worth praying for? Both Burton (1962: 70) and W. H. Race (in the new Loeb Pindar, 1997) take the optative at face value (‘may I desire’); on the other hand, Slater (1969: s.v. ἔρμαί’) refers to W. on this passage.

4 Cf. Gow (1950), ‘I would fain choose’.

5 That is, instances of anacoluthon, lack of grammatical sequence or coherence.
impossible that these things should be other than they are’) and 356–7 δει σ’ ὀπισθος . . . δειείςεις (‘you will have to show’).

Another topic that belongs here is the frequent misuse of the **negatives**. For a century now, people have read without a second thought the phrase *nicht ohne Missfallen* in Gotthold Lessing’s play *Emilia Galotti* (of 1772; act 2, scene 6), which in the context must mean ‘with considerable pleasure’, although, if you count them, you find that the expression contains three negatives and so denies pleasure. What has happened is that the phrases *nicht ohne Wohlgefallen* and *ohne Missfallen* have contaminated each other. In the same way, *haud impigre* (lit. ‘not unlazily’) in Livy, 32. 16. 11 means ‘energetically’, i.e. the opposite of *pigre* is expressed twice over. (ms. add. 2: Cf. Lucan 1. 642 nulla sine lege. condemned by Priscian 18. 255=GL III. 337, 12 [cf. II, 299 & n. 15, p. 775 below].) Still to be explained is the famous instance at the beginning of Sophocles’ *Antigone*, 4–5 ἄτης ἄτερ | ὀυτ' ἀλχείνων ὀυτ' ἄτης ἄτερ (‘there is nothing painful or without bane or shameful or dishonouring (among your sorrows and mine that I have not witnessed’)).

Running counter to a strictly logical form in language is the ubiquitous tendency to put two statements loosely side by side although one of them is subordinate to the other, in other words to use a paratactic rather than a hypotactic expression. The fine Latinist C. F. W. MÜLLER has an extremely interesting discussion of this (1895) in connection with Caesar, *Civil War* 1. 53. 2 magni domum concursus ad Afranium . . . fiebant (‘there were . . . great gatherings at the house (acc.) of Afranius (acc.)’). What we expect here is *ad domum Afrani* (gen.), but MÜLLER first shows that the phrase *domum ad aliquem* was a careless speech form established in Latin from Plautus on, and then gives numerous other examples showing the dramatic extent to which Latin expressions of place and time prefer **coordination above subordination**. Even a sequence of three place expressions is sometimes coordinated in this way rather than subordinated, e.g. in | CIL XI. 1420, 1 Pisis in foro in Augusteo ‘in the Augusteum situated in the forum at Pisae’. Time expressions such as tertio die prima luce (‘on the third day at first light’, Caes. Civ. 3. 37. 1) fail to strike us only because we permit ourselves

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6 The second is a blend of ὀπισθος + future indic. ‘see to it that’ with δει + acc. + infin. ‘it is necessary for you to . . . ’. In the first, we should more usually have ὀπισθος + fut. indic. or ὠπτε + infin. or the bare infin. See the commentaries of R. Jebb (Cambridge 1896), J. Kamerbeek (Leiden 1953), and W. B. Stanford (London 1963).  
7 This is a stock example, for it is mentioned also by Chr. Bartholomae in his Altiranisches Wörterbuch (Berlin 1904–6, repr. 1979), s.v. ‘ἀνὰ’druxtay’ (‘not lying’), where a similar overuse of the negative arises, and in numerous contemporary and earlier linguistic and pedagogical journals (cf. Löfstedt 1933: 216). Michael Weiss reminds me of current English *irregardless* meaning ‘regardless’, where the superfluous negative may be prompted in part by contamination of *regardless* and *irrespective*.  
8 Löfstedt (1933: 215–17) takes the same view, but most commentators on Livy are for deleting *haud*; see J. Briscoe’s commentary on Books 31–5 (Oxford 1976: ad loc.), with further references.  
9 Logically, ‘without bane’ sits ill in a list of woes, and scholars remain divided whether to explain or emend. See the excellent discussions of this vexed problem in the editions of R. Jebb (Cambridge 1906: ad loc. and Appendix, 243–6) and J. Kamerbeek (Leiden 1978).
similar laxness in modern German. MÜLLER (1895: 544 & n. 1) rightly compares the well-known Homeric σχίμα καθ' δολον και κατὰ μέρος, of which, incidentally, there are plenty of good examples in Latin, too.10

Another related phenomenon is the much-discussed figure of hendiadys. It would be wrong to recognize a hendiadys simply whenever a pair of coordinated words in, say, Latin corresponds to a single expression in our language—C. F. W. MÜLLER, mentioned a moment ago, has given a very good account of it in *Philologus* for 1852, and in his commentary on Cicero’s *Laelius* (SEYFFERT & MÜLLER 1876: 209–10, et passim); see also NÄGELSBAUCH (1905: § 73.2). A real hendiadys involves the substitution of a ‘complement phrase’ (‘Ergänzungsgruppe’)—to use a popular modern term11—for the ‘determining phrase’ (‘Bestimmungsgruppe’) that logic requires; in other words, a subordinate idea, which ought to be used as a determiner of another, is simply added to it. The classic example, often quoted, is Vergil, *Georgics*, 2. 192 *pateris libamus et auro* (lit. ‘we make drink-offerings from bowls and gold’); Servius comments *ad loc.*: ‘εν διὰ δυνουν ut molemque et montes [= *Aen*. 1. 61]’ (‘a hendiadys, as in *and massive mountains* [lit. *a mass and mountains*]’).12) The poet means *libamus pateris aureis* ‘we make drink-offerings from golden bowls’, but he simply juxtaposes container and material—he could of course have said *libamus auro*, too. And then there is *Tac. Ann.* 12. 27. 1 *ueteranos coloniamque deduci* ‘that a veteran colony be established there’ (lit. ‘veterans and a colony’—Cologne, in fact). It is remarkable that Vergil of all people, and an author like Tacitus given to affectation, should use such a form of expression. It is in fact colloquial, but it pleased refined stylists because of its somewhat archaic character.

We are used to doing something very similar in German expressions such as *sei so gut und komme* (‘be so good and come’), *tu mir den Gefallen und bring mir das* (‘do me a favour and bring me that’). Clearly, the ‘come’ and the ‘bring’ should appear as subordinate, i.e. in the infinitive: *sei so gut zu kommen* (‘be so good as to come’). Using a coordinated expression is a form of slackness and laziness. This is common in every age. Almost identical with the above examples is Plato, *Rep.* 351c και τόδε μοι χάρισαι και λέγε (‘do me this favour also and speak’). BEHAGHEL (1904/5) has discussed this phenomenon in German, and has shown that when great authors imitate the popular language they too use expressions of this kind. Schiller, for example, in *Die Räuber* of 1781 (act 3, scene 1, Franz to Amalia) *Wenn du es wagst und*

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10. This is the grammatical schema (sometimes called the schema Ioniaum) in which a whole and a constituent part stand in the same phrase in the same grammatical form, e.g. in Latin *mihi animo* lit. ‘to me to the mind’, i.e. ‘to my mind’, in Greek οἱ τοιχίς δὲ μὲν . . . ἣ δὲ (of) the parents the father . . . while the mother’; see Müller (as cited by W.), Schmid (1887–97: II, 67–8; III, 95) on its use as an Atticism, and Lausberg (1998: §§ 521, 573).

11. In Behaghel (1897), the corresponding term is ‘Erweiterungsgruppe’ (vs ‘Bestimmungsgruppe’).

12. Conversely, Servius comments on *Aen*. 1. 61 with a reference to *Georgics* 2. 192!
über die Gasse gehst (‘when you dare and cross the street’). The Swedish linguist Persson (1918) demonstrates the same for Latin, e.g. in phrases such as, in Plautus, *ibo et cognoscam* (‘I shall go and find out’, *Amph. 1075*), *abi et renuntia* (‘go and report back’, *Bacch. 592*), *festina et fuge* (‘hurry and escape’, *Asin. 157*), and he adduces valuable parallels from the modern | Scandinavian languages. On English, see Krüger (1910–19: II.5, 1580 ff. §§3158 ff.), and Deutschbein (1917: 56); on the German dialects, see Weise (1911: 352–5) with further references.—Earlier still, Vahlen (1885: 197–9) offered some remarks on the subject in his commentary on Aristotle’s *Poetics* 1456a11 μεμνημεία καὶ μὴ ποιεῖν (‘to remember [and?] not to do’); he compared Cic. *De orat.* 1. 187 *experiar et dicam, si potero, planius*, which means ‘I shall try to state it more clearly if I can’ but is literally ‘I shall try and state . . . ’, and corresponds exactly to Plato, *Phileb.* 13c πειρασώμεθα δὲ καὶ ἔρημους (‘but we shall try and say’), where πειρασώμεθα (‘we shall comply’) has been needlessly conjectured.13

In popular speech, even compounds are sometimes split up. So, for example, Schiller in *Wallenstein’s Lager* (act 7) uses *Kram und Laden* (‘wares and shop’) in the sense of *Kramladen* (‘general store’) (cf. Müller 1904/5). Also relevant here is the frequent independent use of a subordinate clause, a phenomenon to which we shall return. I can do no more than mention the existence of many other phenomena which could be studied from the same point of view, such as the numerous different forms of **ellipse**. But let me make one more general remark. Recent linguistic research tends to lay special emphasis on the illogical element; occasionally, you even hear it claimed that all speech is illogical. This is no less wrong than the other overstatement, of an earlier age, which presented all language as the result of a logical operation (cf. Deutschbein 1917: 2). Our account must be rather that in a living language the most diverse currents manifest themselves, and their relative strengths will determine the development of the language in one direction or another. Naturally, educated speech and prose are more precise and logical than colloquial speech and poetry. In this connection I wish to stress that there really is such a thing as progress in a language’s development—note Jespersen’s splendid book, *Progress in Language* (1894).14 This is especially true in that newer expressions tend in general to satisfy the requirements of logic more closely than older ones. For example, word order is more logical in modern languages than it was earlier on.15

13 It was conjectured by C. Badham in his edition (London 1878) on the basis of the variant πειρασώμεθα (in one ms., πειράσωμεθα), and seems to have been generally accepted since.

14 Note, however, the questioning subtitle of Jean Aitchison’s excellent introductory survey of language change (Aitchison 2001), ‘Progress or Decay?’, and her discussion of the alternative viewpoints in ch. 1.

15 W. is probably thinking most immediately of Jespersen (1894: ch. 4 ‘The history of Chinese and of word-order’), esp. perhaps §83, ‘Languages tend on the whole more and more to utilise word-position for grammatical purposes; and this is really a progressive tendency… The substitution of word-order for flexions means a victory of spiritual over material agencies’. Note also, in the same part of that chapter, §82,
By way of conclusion to my introductory lectures, I feel obliged to say a word about three recent works which aim mainly to offer introductions to syntactic research, and to acquaint newcomers to the field with its aims and problems.

1. Paul Cauer (who has served the discipline well with his studies of Homer and his efforts in promoting humanistic education and classical teaching) published in 1898 the first edition of a little book with the title *Grammatica militans* (‘Grammar on Campaign’), which is now in its third edition. [1] The work arose from the needs of teaching and the struggle to save the Gymnasium under threat. In the clear and attractive style for which Cauer is known, the book offers some good hints as to how linguistic difficulties and oddities can be made palatable for the school classroom. I refer you, for example, to the section on the gnomic aorist (pp. 100–6 of the 2nd edn; cf. I, 179 below)—although I cannot share the view there advanced. He has some very sensible things to say about terminology. [16]

2. The second book goes more deeply into purely scholarly problems. In the series entitled *Sprachwissenschaftliche Gymnasialbibliothek* (‘Linguistic Library for Schools’) edited by Max Niedermann, which includes a number of excellent things, there appeared in 1914 a book entitled *Einführung in die Syntax* (‘Introduction to Syntax’) by Rudolf Blümel, a young linguist interested mainly in Germanic, a pupil of Hermann Paul; he has also published some more specialized work, of relevance to our present purposes, e.g. on the origin of the Greek accusative of scope (1913/14), and on German word order. He strives admirably to get at the basic reason for a given feature; he gives his reader food for thought and ensures that he is not content to rest with traditional accounts. His tireless observation of everyday speech is also praiseworthy, and also encourages his reader. But Blümel’s intentions are not matched by what he delivers. He stimulates thought but does not himself think things through. He means to proceed from a psychological point of view but his approach is often more logical than psychological; his presentation is not very clear and rather formal. This is the judgement of those who know the subject particularly well. The book may still be recommended for the critical and independently minded reader.

‘In English, word-order is utilised to express difference of meaning to a far greater extent than in German, which stands in this, as in many other respects, on a lower plane of development than English’—it is difficult not to think of Twain (1880)! W. may also have known the book on word order in ancient and modern languages by the Hellenist Henri Weil (1844), which contains ideas that go back to 18th-c. French typologies of languages with ref. to supposed correlations between word order and the natural order of ideas; on the latter, see Morpurgo Davies (1998: 53–4 n. 14, 72 & n. 24, 193) with further references.

16 Cauer sees the gnomic aorist as a past narrative tense, and, especially when in alternation with the present in similes, as an expression of vivid (imagined past-time) narrative, of how an experienced event actually was (rather than of how, in general experience, it is). Cauer published, on the one hand, editions of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, *Notes on the Odyssey*, and *The Art of Translation* for schools, and a (more advanced) handbook for the study of Homer (3rd edn 1921–3, repr. 1971); and on the other hand, three books on the value and purpose of a classical education.
reader. Of some use, perhaps, is the final section (pp. 257 ff.), ‘Hints for study and teaching’.

3. W. KROLL, *Die wissenschaftliche Syntax im lateinischen Unterricht* (‘Scientific Syntax in the Teaching of Latin’) (1920; 1st edn 1917): this work, by the well-known classicist Wilhelm KROLL, is an outstanding success. It is the result of a series of lectures that the author gave in March 1917 in the Central Institute for Education and Teaching in Berlin. (A greatly enlarged third edition appeared in 1925.) KROLL’s aim is neither a systematic treatment of Latin syntax, nor the presentation of new findings; he wishes rather to offer some suggestive ideas and to work towards an injection of life into the teaching of grammar in secondary school. The book is well calculated to achieve its goals—and it is far from barren of new things to say about Latin. After an introduction dealing with some fundamental questions, KROLL discusses in turn: problems to do with the cases; simple and complex sentences; and word order. Throughout he brings out important and interesting things. His stance is always based on modern linguistic theory, on both its historical-comparative and its psychological side, so that he is able to turn to good account his comprehensive knowledge of the linguistic facts.

It may be useful to go in a little more detail into some points on which KROLL is convincing, and some others on which I cannot agree with him. This will give us occasion to devote a little attention to some fundamental questions which are important for our purposes and to debate a few interesting Latin idioms which we may not have occasion to discuss in detail later on. KROLL shows very nicely (in part following earlier work) all the different ways in which within Latin, as in other languages, case constructions are transferred from one word to its synonyms (cf. I, 61, above). Take, for instance, (KROLL 1920: 7–8) Plaut. *Amph.* 293 *nullust hoc metuculosus aeque* (‘no one is as timid as him’), where the abl. *hoc* is due to the fact that *metuculosus aeque* is very close in meaning to a comparative (see Ussing’s commentary (1875), *ad loc.*). This closeness in meaning leads to a mixed expression at Plaut. *Merc.* 335 *homo me miserior nullust aeque, opinor* (‘there’s no more miserable man alive than me, I do believe’). Plautus uses this kind of ablative with *aeque* on several other occasions, and from a later period note e.g. Plin. *Nat.* 35. 17 *quibus equidem nullas aeque miror* (‘which to me at least are incomparably remarkable’).

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17 It is unfortunate that W. did not use the 3rd edn in preparing the 2nd edn of the *Vorlesungen*, since Kroll had made some significant changes, in part as a result of reading the 1st edn of the *Vorlesungen*!

18 For a more recent example of the application of linguistic theory to the teaching of languages including Latin, note the use of ‘dependency grammar’, the brainchild of the French linguist Lucien Tesnière (cf. Tesnière 1959), in e.g. Randall (1986) in English, or in German Happ (1977) on the basis of his controversial study Happ (1976) (on which see Pinkster 1990a: ch. 2, esp. 24).

19 W. B. Sidgwick in his commentary (Manchester 1960) on *Amphitruo*, 293, characterizes *Merc.* 335 as ‘a mere confusion’.
Again: the well-known ablative construction with *opus est* meaning ‘it is necessary’ is obviously secondary (KROLL 1920: 28–9). The original meaning of the expression is conveyed by the genitive which occurs in e.g. Lucilius 335 Marx = 360 Warmington *nummi opus* (for classical *nummo*) ‘it’s a matter of money’, 20 or in the famous line of Propertius, 2. 10. 12 *Pierides: magni nunc erit oris opus* (‘Muses, a loftier tone will now be needed’). The construction with the ablative arises in imitation of its use with the semantically related *usus est* ‘one needs’. In particular, both phrases share a fondness for putting the noun in the abl. with a perf. participle: compare Cato, *Agr*. 38. 2 *cum cinere eruto opus erit* ‘when it is necessary to take out the ashes’ with Plaut. *Pseud*. 50 *argentum mi usus inuenio siet* ‘I must find money’. The abl. after *usus est* is based in its turn on the well-known abl. which is taken by the verb *uti* (‘to use’) and which is basically instrumental: compare the dative taken by χρησθαι in Greek, which is also instrumental, as the dative in Greek very often is (cf. I, 19–20 above). Verbal abstracts, especially when combined with the verb ‘to be’, like to take the construction of their underlying verb.

Another obvious case of a construction being transferred from one word to another is seen in the Latin impersonal verbs *refer* and *interest* ‘it is of concern to, it matters to, it affects the interests of’ (KROLL 1920: 29–30). The person whose interests are affected is either in the gen. or, much more commonly, in the abl. fem. of the possessive adj. This construction arose with *refer*. According to Skutsch’s promising suggestion (1908), *mea referit* (e.g.) goes back to an earlier *mea res fert* ‘my concern, my interest, brings (with it)’, showing a use of *fero* which can be paralleled elsewhere. If Skutsch is right, then, *mea* must originally have been nominative (with *res*) and had a short final -a. *res fert* came, through so-called sandhi, to be pronounced *rē fert*; rē was taken to be abl. sg., and so *mea* became *meā*. *interest*, on the other hand, basically meant ‘it makes a difference’; compare, e.g. Horace, *Odes* 2. 3. 21–3 *duesne prisco natus ab Inacho, nil interest, an pauper ... sub dino moreris* ‘it makes no difference, whether you live beneath the sky as a rich man descended from ancient Inachus, or as a poor man’. Here we could also translate, ‘it does not matter’, that is to say, *interest* was almost synonymous with *refer* and so, like *refer*, could take a gen. or a possessive adj. Caesar, for example, uses repeatedly the phrase *interest reipublicae + infin*. ‘it is in the interest of the Republic to ...’ (e.g. BC I. 24. 5).

20 F. Marx cites further parallels in his commentary (1904–5; repr. 1963: *ad loc*).
21 Eduard Hermann (1916: 26), reviewing the first edn of KS II.1 (1912), rejects Skutsch’s account, citing Plaut. *Pers*. 593 *quae ad rem referunt*.
22 The term *sandhi* (Skt *sam· dhı´* ‘combination, junction’) was used originally by Sanskrit grammarians of assimilatory changes affecting sounds coming into contact at word boundaries or between constituent elements of a single word. It has since been adopted as a general linguistic term for juncture phenomena of all sorts in all languages.
Other explanations offered by KROLL can be improved on. Generally speaking, he is well grounded in modern linguistics, but he has in common with his friend, the gifted and prematurely late lamented Franz SKUTSCH (1865–1912),23 the urge to explain everything from within Latin itself and the tendency to underrate the importance of inherited material.

23 Kroll edited Skutsch’s *Kleine Schriften* (1914), prefacing them (vii–xxvi) with an appreciation of Skutsch’s life and work, and a list of his publications, etc. A brief but telling assessment of the importance of Skutsch’s work is Lindsay’s obituary (1912), which ends, ‘What shall we do now that our protagonist is gone?’
I think it is important from a methodological point of view to demonstrate, with a few illuminating examples, that to consider Latin, or any language, in isolation from other languages has detrimental results.

In the first place, KROLL draws too little on the Italic languages, Latin’s closest relatives. In this book, as in an earlier article (1912) on the origin of the relative clause in Latin, he refers to the relative pronouns *quis, quid* common in Old Latin, which survive in the classical language in the combinations *quis lubet, quid lubet, quiduīs*, which have become indefinites (‘whoever, whatever’); quīūīs, too, when it corresponds to the neuter quiduīs, goes back to an earlier *quisuīs* (showing the same sound-change as in *diuēndere* ‘sell piecemeal’ from *disuēndere*, or *diuēllere* ‘tear apart’ from *disuēllere*). Now, KROLL supposes (1920: 4) that *quis* and *qui* were originally used interchangeably. But this fails in the first place to give a sufficiently accurate account of the Latin facts: when *quis* and *quid* occur as relatives, it is always and only as indefinite relatives. Note, e.g., the ‘foedus Latinum’ in Festus (p. 166 Lindsay) *pecuniam quis nancitur habeto* ‘whoever finds some money, shall own it’, or Cato, *Agr. 147 dominus uino quid uolet faciet* ‘the master shall do with the wine whatever he (shall) wish’. We see this function also in the indefinite pronouns in -libet and -uīs mentioned above.—Now, that this is no accident—that we are not deceived by the limited number of examples—is shown by the evidence of Oscan and Umbrian.¹ The normal relative pronoun here is: nom. masc. Umbr. *poi*, fem. Osc. *paī, pae*, neut. Osc. *pūd*, Umbr. *puē*, which correspond exactly to Latin *qui, quae, quod* | The indefinite relative, on the other hand, is: nom. Osc. *pīs, pīd*, Umbr. *pis, piēre*, as, e.g., in the Oscar *Tabula Bantina* (Lu 1 Rix) 19 *pis cens bantins fust* ‘whoever is a citizen of Bantia’, or the *Cippus Abellanus* (Cm 1 Rix) B, 25–6 *pīd e[īse̯] thesavrei pükka-pīd ee[stīt* ‘whatever is in this treasury’, in contrast with B, 22–3 *thesavrūm pūd e(i)se̯ei ņerē īst* ‘the treasury which is on this land’. *pīs, pīd*, however, correspond to Latin *quis, quid*. The recognition of this fact (cf. Buck 1928: 144) is important

¹ In quoting these languages, the current convention (followed here) is to use bold for forms written in the respective national alphabets, *italics* for those in the Latin alphabet. I cite the most recent and now-standard edition, that of Rix (2002); cf. p. 54 n. 11 above. On the relative pronouns in Oscan and Umbrian, see (in addition to Buck, cited by W.) Untermann (2000: s.vv. ‘pis’, ‘poi’).
for the history of the *qu*-forms in Latin and for the explanation of the relative clause in Latin.

Greek, too, needs to be taken more into account than it is by Kroll. Here we have to consider another question concerning the use of cases. You were probably taught in school the rule that adjectives meaning desirous of, experienced in, mindful of, partaking of, in control of, full of, etc., govern a noun in the genitive. Kroll observes correctly (1920: 31–2) that the genitive after *memor* (‘mindful’) and *plenus* (‘full’) is the same as that taken by the corresponding verbs: *memini* governs the genitive in Latin as its synonyms do in Greek and German, and *plenus* fits the pattern seen in Cato, *Agr.* 88. *impleto aquae purae* (‘then fill it with pure water’), taking the same genitive as Greek uses with πίστημι, πλέως, ἔμπλειος, the construction inherited from Indo-European. The other word for ‘full’ in Latin, *referitus* (from *referctus*), takes the abl. because its basic meaning is ‘stuffed with’ (cf. *farcio* ‘I stuff’); in the course of time, the constructions of the two adjectives became confused. On the other hand, Kroll (1920: 32; but see n. 17, p. 90 above) wants to derive the genitive taken by *cupidus* and *peritus* (‘desirous’, ‘experienced’) from that following the related nouns, *cupido* and *periculum* (‘desire’, ‘trial, risk’); in other words he wants to regard it as an adnominal genitive. But, in spite of their etymological connections, the formal distance between these adjectives and their respective nouns is great, and in the case of *peritus* and *periculum* the difference in meaning as well (the real meaning of *periculum* being ‘attempt, venture’, as in the phrase *periculum facere*). It is also wholly improbable that an adjective should have taken over the construction of a noun from which it is not derived and with which it does not make compounds—contrast the situation of e.g. *particeps* and *expers* (‘partaking’, ‘having no part in’) with *pars* (‘part’). In the light of what we have agreed for *memor* and *plenus* (above), we would expect that the genitive after *cupidus* and *peritus* originated in a verbal construction, and this expectation is satisfied in Plautus’ phrase (*Mil.* 964) *quae cupiunt tui* (‘who desire you, are desirous of you (gen.)’). This phrase used to be regarded as a Grecism, but mistakenly so, for Plautus has no syntactic Grecisms. But Kroll (1920: 32–3; but see n. 17, p. 90 above) takes a step in the

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2 Cf. Lindsay (1907: 2): ‘Nor can we suppose that Gracisms were employed by Plautus, as by the Augustan poets . . . , to embellish his style. This is out of keeping with the colloquial tone of Comedy’; Lindsay then refers to further passages later in his book, in all of which he gives alternative accounts of supposed syntactic Grecisms, with the exception of the nom. + infin. after a verb of saying at *Asinaria* 654 (cf. Henderson 2006: 113). On the face of it, W.’s claim is stronger, and harder to sustain, since not all syntactic borrowings are literary in nature, and the avoidance of colloqulal Grecisms would indeed be out of keeping with Comedy (cf. Lindsay, just above). Plautus appears admittedly rarely but nevertheless he is there among the instances of syntactic Grecism adduced by Coleman in his long article (1977: e.g. 125, 137) and in Maurach’s shorter review (1995: 89–92). Plautus uses vocabulary, including Greek words, for sociolinguistic characterization (see Shipp 1953; 1955); Gratwick’s question (1982: 112) ‘whether the greater variety of Plautine syntax relative to the classical language is also to some extent socially determined’ remains to be systematically addressed. W. later (I, 131 below) extends this denial of Greek syntactic influence to cover all of pre-classical Latin; see p. 172 n. 4 below.
wrong direction in deriving this genitive from *cui̇pens* + gen., and this in turn from *cúpidus* + gen., which, as we have seen, is supposed to be in imitation of the noun *cúpido*; each transfer is as unlikely as the next. Plautus’ *cui̇punt tuī* bears the clear imprint of a genuine archaism—and Delbrück’s scepticism (1893–1900: I, 325) is unfounded. Verbs of desiring take the genitive in Indo-European. This is perfectly usual in Greek: recall the construction of ἐραμαί, ἔμαι, μέμονα (all ‘I desire’), and the like. German also shows traces of this, in *begehren* (‘desire, crave’), for instance, which often retains the construction of its etymologically related synonyms Gothic *gairnjan* and OHG *gerēn* with the genitive.—As for *peritus*, we see the source of its genitive in the Homeric phrase ἐπιστάμενοι φόμιγγος ‘skilled with the lyre (gen.)’ and in his frequent use of the genitive with forms of οἶδα, ἔδαιν, γεγυνόσκω (all ‘I know’): the genitive after verbs of knowing is extremely ancient and belongs with the genitive after verbs of hearing and other forms of perceiving. (On the other hand, there are some Latin adjectives, such as *prodigus* (‘wasteful, extravagant’; cf. *prodigo* ‘waste, squander, lavish’), which can take an objective adnominal genitive because of their similarity to agent nouns.)

And finally, Kroll has disdained unduly the help of Sanskrit. Let me once again illustrate this, too, with a couple of case constructions. In Old Latin, a verb such as *fungor* ‘to go through with’ takes the accusative or, more rarely, the ablative, while in the classical language—by the familiar rule taught in school—the ablative is usual (although the accusative comes in again in the 1st-c. BC biographer Cornelius Nepos and in Silver Latin). Kroll seems to assume (1920: 28) that the ablative after *fungor* is in imitation of the ablative after *utor*. It is indeed thinkable that *utor* could have exerted influence in this way—cf. Ter. *Ad*. 666 (*miser* *qui illa consueuit prior* ((‘the poor fellow) who knew her first’))—but the verb must have been inherited with a particular construction, or constructions. Now, the verb that corresponds in Sanskrit, *bhuj-* (sg. 3 present *bhunjīkte*), is also a deponent and means ‘to enjoy’ something; given that the Sanskrit verb from the earliest times takes either accusative or instrumental, we should regard this double construction of *fungor* as inherited and not explain the use of the ablative as the result of a later extension. Some scholars challenge the identity of *fungor*.

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3 Delbrück allows even the possibility that the verbs borrow the construction from the adjectives. Kroll must have changed his mind since the 2nd edn (that used by W.) of the book under review, for his account in the 3rd edn (1925) is very much in line with W.’s in this paragraph.


5 Kroll and W. are following the commentary of K. Dziatko & R. Kauer (Leipzig 1903; repr. 1964), and the same line is taken by R. H. Martin in his edition (Cambridge 1973). Neither abl. *illa* nor acc. *illam* is easy (A. Gratwick obelizes *illa* in his edition, 2nd edn Warminster 1999): we really want *cum illa* ‘with her’. Possibly *cum in* *consueuit* has enough of the force of *cum*; possibly the speaker started to say *consueuit* (‘slept with’) and switched to a euphemism after the first syllable. I am grateful to Peter Brown for helpful discussion of this line.
with bhuj-, but the inflection of each is strikingly similar (deponent endings, nasal infix) and their meanings are very close. One should note in particular that, just as Lat. fungor in Lucretius can mean ‘to submit to, to have to endure’, so Skt bhuj- often means ‘to atone for something, to bear the consequences of’. 6

The next instance is rather more complicated. Lat. potior, as you know, governs either the abl. or the gen., the latter being assured for the classical language in the phrase rerum potı¯tur ‘to be in power’. KROLL is ready with an explanation (1920: 3–4, 27–8) which is purely internal to Latin. In Old Latin, potior has a set of active forms (potio, -ı¯re, also 4th conjugation) meaning ‘to make party to, put under the power of’. Plautus has it, e.g. at Amph. 177–8 cum nunc potiuit pater servitutis ‘his father has now reduced him to slavery’, and hence potitus can also have passive meaning, ‘made party to, fallen into the power of’ (Capt. 92, Epid. 562). In potior KROLL rightly sees a denominative formed to the | inherited noun potis ‘master’, which constitutes part of possum (‘I am able’), as Plautus’ potis est, potis sim, potis sit show (literally ‘I am master’); the same noun is seen in Gk πῶς, which shows a narrowing of meaning, itself ancient, to ‘husband’. Potio, potior is formed like partior and mentior to pars and mens. The construction with the genitive is usual for a denominative of this sort based on potis; that takes care of rerum potıt ur (= rerum potis est). But what about the ablative construction? In spite of KROLL’s efforts, it is difficult to explain within Latin. Perhaps, though, a peculiarity of its inflection may be able to help us. Old Latin has also some 3rd-conjugation forms, such as potıurry, poteremur, poteretur, infin. poti. These cannot possibly belong to a denominative verb but they do correspond to the Sanskrit (Vedic) deponent pa´tyate (from IE *pótyetaiş), which means exactly the same as potior (‘be master of’), and which has for a long time been compared with it—and this pa´tyate governs precisely the instrumental that corresponds to the Latin ablative. But that is not all: in Old Latin, potior sometimes takes the accusative, too, e.g. at Plaut. Asin. 324 fortiter malum qui patitur, idem post potıurry bonum (‘the man who bears ill bravely later wins good’), and just so in Vedic pátyate alternates between governing an accusative and an instrumental. This all means that Latin potior represents a conflation of two verbs, an ancient one (3rd conjugation) which took an instr.-abl. or an acc., and a new one derived within Latin from potis, which took a gen. This is actually not so strange. As we just noted, the forms of the verb ‘to be able’, etymologically related to potior, are based in part on combinations of potis or neut. pote with the verb ‘to be’, and in part on an old verb *potere, which in

6 Indeed, Lucretius uses fungor to translate Gk παθεῖν ‘suffer’: note (+ acc.) 3. 734, 813, s. 358, and (absol.) 3. 441, 443, and see C. Bailey’s edition and commentary (3 vols, Oxford 1947), ad loc. and I, 92. For the sense given by W., note also (e.g.) Plaut. Mos. 47. On the Sanskrit verb, see EWAia, s.v. ‘BHJO’2, with further refs, giving much the same account and starting from IE *bheug˘ ‘enjoy’ (cf. LIV, s.v.).

7 The sg. 3 present middle ending is now reconstructed as *-toi (or *-tor), with -o- as in the past counterpart *-to; see most recently Jasanoff (2003: ch. 2).
Oscan was fully conjugated. It is to *potēre that the perfect potui belongs (this cannot be derived from *potis fui) and also the participle potens. This assumption of two potior s obviates the difficulties posed by the coexistence of 3rd- and 4th-conjugation forms; on this, see most recently Niedermann (1908: 47, 53) (ms. add.2; and Meillet 1927b).8

Of the most recent publications of relevance as introductions to the systematic treatment of language in school, particularly to be recommended is, I think, the book by Friedrich Hoffmann, Der lateinische Unterricht auf sprachwissenschaftlicher Grundlage (‘Latin Teaching on Scientific Linguistic Foundations’) (2nd edn 1921); note Kroll’s review (1917: 307–8).9

First of all, we shall have to say something, as briefly as possible, about the functions of the parts of speech and the functions of the forms in which the parts of speech appear. I described in an earlier lecture (I, 13–16 above) how ancient scholars gradually came to classify the vocabulary and to draw distinctions between the parts of speech, and I indicated that in distinguishing the parts of speech that we are used to, we are under the influence of a tradition that goes back to antiquity. This dividing up of the vocabulary into individual classes of words has been perfectly well justified, but at the same time one must note that its final result is something quite incongruous. You will find an excellent critique of the exercise in Paul’s Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte (‘Principles of Language History’) (219 ff. in the 2nd edn, 1888). Paul shows just how varied is the motivation that has led to the partition of the different classes: sometimes the meaning of the word by itself, sometimes its function in the structure of a sentence, sometimes its behaviour in relation to inflection and word formation.11

It is, for instance, quite illogical to set up Numeral as a part of speech alongside

8 W. means that the existence of *potēre will have reduced the distance between poti and potēre/potērē and made the conflation of the two more likely. Cf., with the same account, Walde & Hofmann, s.v. ‘potis,’ EW'Asia, s.v. ‘PAT-2’, in spite of the objections of Meillet (1927b), who sees no need for two verbs in pre-Latin and makes do with IE *pot-i-/o-’ (and Italian *pot-e-); on the latter, see now Untermann (2000: s.v. ‘puttiad’).

9 Cf. p. 90 n. 18 above.

10 I have changed W.’s reference to ‘229 ff.’ in the belief that he means to refer to ch. 15, on psychological and grammatical categories (263 ff. in the 5th edn (1920), to which he might by now have referred).

11 Exactly the same point is made by Anward in his introduction to the first essay in Vogel & Comrie (2000): ‘one common feature of naturally occurring part-of-speech systems seems to be that they are not “well-designed” . . . Whatever identifying criteria we use for parts of speech—meaning, syntactic function, or inflection—the relationship between particular criteria and particular parts of speech is typically many-to-many’ (Anward 2000: 3). Anward (2000) makes some interesting comparisons between different part-of-speech systems across space and time, from Dionysius Thrax, Varro, and Priscian. Note the modern distinction between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ word classes: ‘open’ classes are those which can acquire new members by means of word formation (essentially, nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs); ‘closed’ classes
Noun, Adjective, and Adverb, since numerals include nouns, adjectives, and adverbs. All the same, a completely logical classification is not really feasible. For my part, I shall begin by excluding so-called Interjections, which are in the grey area between words and non-words (cf. I, 16 above). Under words proper, there are two main classes, namely Nouns (words which have case) and Verbs (words which distinguish the persons of the subject), and a third class, of the words which do not have inflection.

Between Noun and Verb we can draw a pretty sharp boundary line. Fifty years ago one of the masters of comparative linguistics, August Schleicher, discussed ‘The distinction between Noun and Verb’ in the various languages of the world (1865), and tried to show that a clear distinction between noun and verb is unique to the Indo-European family of languages, and absent from all other language families, even Semitic. This thesis is very cleverly applied, but the argumentation is not always convincing, as Schleicher often uses unjustified yardsticks, gearing his decisions about categories in different languages too much to formal and etymological criteria. The fact is, the opposition between noun and verb is there in many languages, including Semitic, and is not only present but essential to the forms of utterances.12

There is, however, a limit to the depth of the gulf between noun and verb, for two reasons. First, forms exist which really are in a sense halfway between noun and verb, belonging half with the one and half with the other. This is true of participles, infinitives, and gerunds. Historically based linguistics puts these with the noun since they all lack the requirement of a personal ending, and instead are either declined with their own set of case forms or, in the case of the infinitive and gerund, can be traced back to case forms. In other words, from the point of view of both formation and origin, these forms belong with the noun. This does not, however, disprove the standpoint of the ancient grammarians, who counted the infinitive with the verb and saw it indeed as the ideal form of the verb. In actual fact, in the course of languages’ development, these forms have constantly moved closer to the class of the verb.

Another relevant point is that transfers have taken place from one class to the other, that is, that verbal forms have come to assume the values of nouns, and vice versa. For a nominal form assuming the value of a verb, I would simply remind have more or less fixed inventories (articles, auxiliaries, clitics, interjections, negations, etc.); note the presence there of some classes which W. has ignored or rejected. For a good introduction to word-class systems, see Schachter (1985).

In different ways, Schachter (1985) and Croft (2000) argue the same case for seeing noun, verb, and adjective as language universals and not as categories of particular languages. On distinguishing nouns and adjectives, cf. II, 51–2 below, and the notes and references there. On August Schleicher (1821–68), professor at Prague and then Jena, one of the pioneers of the reconstruction of Indo-European, the great biologist of language and the first to use a ‘family tree’ to represent linguistic relationships, see Sebeok (1966: I, 374–95), Taub (1993), and Morpurgo Davies (1998: esp. 167–74).
you of Gk χρή (‘it is necessary’): according to its form, it must once have been a noun, but gradually it was extended through all the tenses and moods, receiving the augment and coming to be treated entirely as a verb.

Occasionally, verbal forms arise also out of interjections, or other kinds of uninflected words. To start with, let me give you two examples from Greek and two from Latin. The adverb δέωρο ‘over here, hither’ was used especially in summoning people. For this reason it was easy to see it as an imperative and hence to make a pl. 2 form δέωτε (already in Homer) ‘come here, all of you!’. Or again, Homer and comedy attest an interjection τῇ ‘there you are, look there’ used when handing something to someone. Because it thus had a sort of imperatival function, later on the verbal ending -τε was added to make τῇτε for telling more than one person to take something (at least in Sophron, the 5th-c. BC Syracusan composer of mimes [fr. 154 in PCG I]). In keeping with this view of τῇ, later imitators of Homer let it form a clause of its own with a neuter object, treating it, that is, just like an imperative such as λαβέ or δέξαι (both ‘take!’).

13 It seems that only the 3rd-c. scholar-poet Sim(m)ias of Rhodes makes τῇ govern an object (26. 3 Powell). τῇ is always accompanied by an imperative in Homer (e.g. Il. 23, 618, Od. 9, 347) and comedy (e.g. Cratinus 145 in PCG IV, Eupolis 378 in PCG V), but it is attested without an imperative in Callimachus, Ἐπιγ. 33 and 38, and Sophron, cited by W., τῇτε τοι κορώνα εἶναι (‘there you are, they’re crows?’); Hordern (2004: 113) does not comment on τῇτε, which he translates as ‘go on, you lot’.

14 This was probably a personal communication of Mez to Thurneysen, at least it is acknowledged as such by Thurneysen (1907a: 803) in his review of the 1st edn of Walde’s Latin etymological dictionary (Heidelberg 1906), and Walde & Hofmann, s.v. ‘auoe’, state that Thurneysen in the ThLL is following Mez.

15 This, the only possible instance of είτε amid myriad cases of εία, is amended away by Mohrmann (1932), who also argues that the sermon in question is not after all genuinely Augustinian. On the other hand, in an article published posthumously (1943: 184), W. thought to find another example of this phenomenon in reading Gk ητε as pl. of the exclamation η in a papyrus fragment of Pindar, Παεαν 6.
some parts of Germany . . . ; . . . when more than one person is addressed, dat! is used’. Grimm gives numerous instances of this dat or (Low Hessian) dät (D. Gr. III, 239–40). Another case just like Gk τῷς is the making of a plural form to se or sē, which is used when offering something (in Swiss German, too): whence MHG sēt, sēnt, and Swiss German sēnd (Schweiz. Id. VII, 11, with useful comparisons). Corresponding to δεύτερον beside δεύτερος, on the other hand, is perhaps Gothic birjats (dual) and birjēþ (plur.) to hiri, which Wulfila uses precisely to translate δεύτερος vs δεύτερος; unfortunately, the etymology of hiri is not yet clear, and it is not excluded that it is itself an imperative. Certainly analogous to δεύτερον are Swiss German heied hu¨ned, which are shown to be pluralized forms of the calls of encouragement hei hii (Schweiz. Id. II, 832; VII, 11); more broadly comparable is Swiss German nuset from nuse [= nun so] (Schweiz. Id. VII, 5), and especially the plural of gëlt, or gël (‘isn’t it?’), gëlttet (et sim.), which has spread through much of the German-speaking area: the starting point here was the sg. 3 subjunctive (es gëlte ‘let it be true’, or gëlte es? ‘should it be true?’), which, because it was used as a particle of address, was made to refer to the 2nd person and so became half verbal again (D. Wb., s.v. ‘gelt’ interj. (3), 3058–9; Schweiz. Id. II, 277); our Basel German gëlte Sie for polite address is not unique: Diels draws my attention to Nassau German gëllë së.16 Here I can only allude to the fact that this phenomenon occurs in other languages, too, including Slavic—cf. D. Wb., ibid.; Jagic’ (1900: 13);17 Ernst Fraenkel (1921: 63–4), with further details and references—and Iranian (cf. Bartholomae 1917: 9), and the same sort of thing has been observed outside Indo-European, too: Nöldeke informs me that in Arabic the interjection hā may not only be combined with pronominal suffixes (e.g. hā-ki ‘come here!’) but may even take verbal endings. And beside the adverb halumma ‘over here’ there exists halumnū ‘come here!’ (pl.) showing the ending of the pl. 2 imperative.18 (ms. add.): Note also Old French estes, pl. to es < Lat. ecce ‘behold!’; cf. REW, s.v.)

The converse is found as well, that is, the use as a noun of a finite verbal form. In a curious way, χρῆ, mentioned above, appears to fall back into its original nature, when Euripides uses τὸ χρῆ to mean ‘that which must be’ (Heracles 828; at Hecuba 260 the manuscripts have τὸ χρῆν [and χρῆ is a conjecture of Nauck]). It may be that this is simply on the model | of the nominal τὸ χρῆν, which, without

16 Presumably, the Germanist and Slavist Paul Diels (1886–1963), the youngest son of Hermann, who had recently (June 1922) died in Berlin.

17 Jagic’s point is that a finite verb can be formed by the smallest element in a clause, even an indeclinable. He mentions e.g. Slavic na ‘look, here you are’ with pl. Russian nate, Polish nacie.

18 The Arabic demonstrative particle hā is comparable in meaning with Latin -e; the suffix -ki is sg. 2 fem., for talking to a woman. halumma is one of a group of interjections which have ‘a certain verbal force and are called therefore ismā al-af ‘ali (‘noun of do!’)’ (Wright 1896–8: 295). For the imperative of a normal verb, cf. (of fa’ala ‘to do’) sg. 2 (masc.) if’al, pl. 2 (masc.) if’alu; there are different endings for the fem. I owe the information in this note to Caroline Petit.
the article, was synonymous with χρή,¹⁹ but the modern languages actually show a genuinely nominal use of verbs in this semantic field. Sentences such as Grillparzer’s der Tücht’ge sieht in jedem Soll ein Muss (‘the competent man sees in every Should a Must’)²⁰ are entirely in keeping with our Sprachgefühl; but in jedem Soll really means ‘on every occasion when he says “I should”’, the verb standing for the relationship in question. In the same way we speak of a bitter Muss (‘a must’) and English has as nouns the ought (also oughtness) and the must (all ‘duty, obligation, imperative’). Curious is Old French interest (whence English interest) and Modern French intérêt, since here a noun has developed out of the Latin sg. 3 form with the meaning that the other Romance languages (and from them German) convey with the infinitive of interest, namely Latin interesse > German Interesse ‘interest’. Even more transparent is the substantival use of verbal forms which are common as headings and titles, such as the Soll of accounts-books. Compare the well-known lines of Goethe: Er wird es in sein Schuldbuch schreiben | Und dir nicht lange im Debet bleiben (‘he [a nobleman] will write it in his debt-book, and not long remain in debt to you’), and English an IOU (i.e. I owe you) for a receipt. So, too, placet (lit. ‘it pleases’) ‘an approval’, vidi (lit. ‘I have seen’) ‘a verification’, English affidavit (lit. ‘he has attested’) ‘a statement on oath’; (ms. add.: cf. English debenture ← Lat. debentur ‘are owing’). It is loanwords that are most prone to this category shift.—Here belongs also the use of complete sentences as nouns, as in French vasistas ‘a peep-hole’, va-et-vient ‘coming and going’, and so on.

Quite different, however, is the phenomenon observed in modern languages, especially English, whereby—as a result of the loss of inflectional endings—nouns appear simply to inflect and behave as verbs (cf. Krüger 1910–19: II.4, 1040 ff.).²³

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¹⁹ On the etymology of χρή, see W. (1897: 52–62).
²⁰ From his tragedy about Hero and Leander, Des Meeres und der Liebe Wellen (1833), act 1, 415.
²¹ In Sprichwörtlich, a poem in the collection Parabolisch, v. 288 (vol. 2 (1888) of the Weimar edn, p. 236).
²² Earlier was-ist-das, from German was ist das? (‘what is it?’); cf. TLF, s.v.
²³ On conversion, or zero-derivation, ‘the change in form class of a form without any corresponding change of form’ (Bauer 1983: 32), see Jespersen (1909–49: VI, §6.1), Adams (1973) and Bauer (1983), all of them excellent accounts of English word formation more broadly.
I am saving for a later lecture more detailed discussion of the characteristics of the individual parts of speech, and so turn first to consider a grammatical function which nominal and verbal forms have in common, that of number. In Latin and Greek, number is marked on verbs in the personal endings, and on nouns in their case-endings—though the personal pronouns show also a change of stem, which was originally the only means they had of signalling number.

First, a word about the dual. The name ‘dual’ goes back to antiquity. Latin dualis translates the Greek grammarians’ term διάκος (sc. ἀριθμός). The state of affairs in Greek and Latin prompted the ancient grammarians to set up all sorts of hypotheses on the age and the needfulness of the dual. In Choeroboscus’s commentary on Theodosius, we find the claim (GG IV.1, 134, 7–15) that the dual forms are not original and arose later than the singular and plural forms: this, it is argued, is implied by the fact that many of the Greek dialects, and, in agreement with Acolic, Latin, too, did not know the dual, and that in the ‘common language’, the κοινή διάλεκτος, it was normal to use the plural instead of the dual. The great Friedrich August Wolf pronounced a very similar judgement more than a hundred years ago (1831: 51): The dual is neither

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1 For a concise modern overview of number and of number systems, see Cruse (1999) and, for an excellent recent textbook treatment, Corbett (2000).

2 The theory that Latin was, more or less, a dialect of Greek, and of Acolic in particular, goes back to the work of Greek grammarians teaching in Rome in the 1st century BC (cf. e.g. Varro, Lat. Lang. s. 24–5, 96, 102). This point regarding the dual is ascribed to Philoxenus of Alexandria. The best recent discussion of this and other aspects of the theory is Garcea & Lomanto (2004: 44–7), with further references.

3 The chief surviving work of the 8th/9th-c. Byzantine grammarian Georgius Choeroboscus is a 269-page commentary on the (97-page) Introductory Rules (Canones eisagogici) concerning declension and conjugation by the 4th/5th-c. grammarian Theodosius of Alexandria. The commentary aimed to explain literary Greek, especially for the purpose of Biblical studies, to those who spoke the very different contemporary colloquial language, or another language altogether; it was used by Italian grammarians during the revival of Greek learning in the Renaissance. On Choeroboscus, see Sandys (1906–8: I, 390), Kaster (1988: 394–6), Robins (1993: esp. 112), and Dickey (2007: 80–1); on Theodosius, see Kaster (1988: 366–7), Robins (1993: 111–16), and Dickey (2007: 83–4).

4 This was in one of Wolf’s lectures of 1798/9, edited and published by S. M. Stockmann more than thirty years later, and now available online at <http://www.uni-kiel.de/ub/digiport/abt8000/Virt4.html>. Friedrich August Wolf (1759–1824), pupil of the great C. G. Heyne (see Schindel 1990), was professor in Halle and then Berlin. Wolf was responsible for a new interest in reconstructing the history of classical texts (esp. Homer), and central to the foundation of ‘a new school of classical philology characterized by an extraordinarily high level of linguistic and cultural research which was often devoted to a global concept of
required nor welcome. When the Romans were shaping their language, the Greeks did not yet have a dual. It is a mere refinement, which gradually found its way into the language, like the ablative in Latin. This is the most perverse thing that one could possibly say about the history of the dual.

The correct approach to the dual was discovered by modern linguistic research. Particular fame was accorded to the article ‘On the dual’ by the great linguist Wilhelm von Humboldt (read to the Berlin Academy in 1827, published in its Proceedings (1830) and now reprinted in his Collected Works, 1903–36: VI, 4–30). Here Humboldt demonstrated that the dual is to be found in all parts of the world. He intended in a second article to pursue the history of the dual, language by language, but, alas, was unable to find the time to address this task. Since Humboldt, it has been taken as read that the dual is not a late phenomenon, no ‘refinement’, but that it is, on the contrary, something very old indeed to signal with special markers different from those used for the plural that a verb has two subjects or that a noun denotes two people or things.

Cuny’s Paris dissertation (Le nombre duel en grec, 1906) is instructive in giving an overview of the whole question of the dual. Here again, it is made clear that the dual is really to be found everywhere. There is hardly a well-known language family on earth where it is not to be found; (ms. add.: cf., however, Jacobsohn 1926: 390). At the same time we have the remarkable fact that while the dual is in every instance an ancient category, there is visible nearly everywhere the tendency to put it in the background, that nearly everywhere attempts are made to get rid of the dual, as of a piece of ballast, a form that is essentially superfluous. We can observe this in the Semitic languages, to take for example a language family that stands close to our own. The majority of the Semitic languages have preserved the dual only in individual usages. Only the oldest language, Classical Arabic, has a full-blown dual in regular use; in modern colloquial Arabic, it has largely


\[ 5 \] Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835), the founder of the Humboldt University in Berlin, was not only one of the pre-eminent linguists of his age, but also a philosopher of note and an educationalist, a diplomat, and a statesman. He was friends with Goethe and Schiller; his younger brother was the equally famous natural scientist Alexander. On his place in the history of linguistics, see Sebeok (1966: I, 71–120); the two-volume English biography by Sweet (1980); Morpurgo Davies (1998: ch. 5); and the respective introductions to the two Cambridge editions of Humboldt’s On Language, by H. Aarsleff (1988) and M. Losonsky (1999).

\[ 6 \] Of Humboldt’s famous lecture on the dual, note the English translation listed in the bibliography. For a review, ‘on an empirical basis broader than Humboldt’s [of] all of his descriptive generalizations about the dual’, see Plank (1989: here 294, 296), who approaches it ‘as a fellow comparative grammarian rather than as a historian of linguistic wisdom long obsolete’, in the belief that ‘with Über den Dualis comparative grammar arguably entered, or could have entered, a new era’.

\[ 7 \] In general on the use of the dual and patterns of its elimination, see Corbett (2000: 20 & n. 14, 260 & n. 7, and ch. 7), and note also Diver (1987).
disappeared.\(^8\) Other language families bear even more eloquent testimony. The numerous languages of the Americas, for example, nearly all have the dual.\(^9\) It is missing only in three languages, probably because they lost it. These are the language of Mexico, the kingdom of Montezuma;\(^10\) the old language of Peru, the kingdom of the Incas; and in Central America in the so-called Maya language, in other words precisely in those nations which achieved an independent high level of culture.\(^11\) We can infer that highly developed culture and use of the dual are practically mutually exclusive. Conversely, in the most primitive societies we find the most primitive use of the dual. An extreme example of this is met with in the language of the inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego, which has a singular, a dual, a ‘trial’ and, for any larger number, a plural. Their concept of number stops at three because they cannot count beyond three.\(^12\)

Taking these insights as our starting points, I wish now to turn to the Indo-European languages. Here we can make two general observations: first, in any relatively early stage of a language we will certainly find the dual, and the more ancient the language, the fuller the use of the dual will be; secondly, nearly everywhere, the dual disappears. Nowhere is the use of the dual richer and older than in the \textit{Veda}, but already at a fairly early period the Indic languages

\(^8\) Strictly, W. should have mentioned Akkadian, Eblaite, Old North Arabian, Old South Arabian, Ugaritic, and Hebrew alongside Classical Arabic as old—indeed, older—Semitic languages in which the dual is a living category. In Phoenician and Punic, and the modern Arabic dialects, it is true, the dual survives sporadically, and only in nouns; it is vestigial also in Aramaic and not attested in Ge’ez. For details, see Fontinoy (1969), Lipin’ski (1997: esp. §§31, 40), Kienast (2001: 133–6), and the relevant chapters in Hetzron (1997: Index, s.v. ‘dual markers’), and Woodard (2004), where the ancient Semitic languages are very well represented.

\(^9\) Suárez (1983: 81–2) reports dual pronouns for the Meso-American languages Huave and Mazahua, the latter distinguishing forms for ‘I and you’, ‘I and he/she’, ‘you and he/she’, ‘they two’, but W.’s generalization is probably exaggerated. In the ancient Meso-American language Epi-Olmec, there is no dual and even the marking of plural is optional; see Kaufman & Justeson (2004: 1081–2) and cf. I, 103 and n. 14, p. 139 below. Mithun’s survey of native North American languages (1999: 79, 436) mentions only a limited use of a dual in Maiduan (California) and some Eskimo-Aleut languages. See generally on Meso-American languages, McQuown (1967), vol. 5 of the 16-volume \textit{Handbook of Middle American Indians}.

\(^10\) In Nahua, often called Mexicano in older works, a dual is attested only for nouns denoting animate beings; see Andrews (1975: 16–17).

\(^11\) According to Bricker (2004: 60), even marking of the pl. is not obligatory. Among grammars of Mayan, note Tozzer (1921), contemporary with W., although he does not cite it.

\(^12\) W. refers to the Andean language Yámana (or Yag(h)an, or Tequenica, called by its speakers Hausi Kuta), the language of a people known to Europeans since 1624, but whose language is first recorded only in the 1830s and is now (since 1978) reportedly extinct (see Klose 2001: s.v. ‘Yamana’). Hestermann-Hamburg (1929) prefaces his study of the pronoun in Yámana with a most interesting survey of the study of the people and their language (with bibliography). He illustrates grammatical number very clearly, stressing that, while nouns, pronouns and verbs all distinguish singular, dual, and plural, the ‘trial’ is confined to the verb. A missionary, Revd Thomas Bridges (Bridges 1894), who also compiled a dictionary of the language (Bridges 1933), and Haudricourt (1952: 1106–8) both report a dual but not, as far as I can see, a ‘trial’. W.’s allusion to the speakers’ concept of number suggests to me that he knew Adam (1884–5), who speaks (p. 300) of ‘l’impuissance des Fuegiens à abstraire l’idée du nombre’. Of more recent work, note Golbert de Goodbar (1978), and Mason (1963: 311), the latter towards the end of a comprehensive survey of South American Indian languages including rich bibliography.
occasionally fail to use the dual of verbs and nouns. In so-called Middle Indo-Aryan, so e.g. in Pāli, the holy language of the Buddhists, the dual has disappeared completely.\textsuperscript{13} While \textit{Avestan} and the \textit{Old Persian} cuneiform inscriptions know the dual, no trace of it survives in modern Persian.\textsuperscript{14} Within the circle of Indo-European languages today, the dual is a living category only in \textit{Baltic} and \textit{Slavic} and even here only in individual languages, e.g. in Lithuanian of the Baltic languages, and in Slovene (in Carniola), Sorbian (in Lusatia) and Slovincian (in Pomerania) of the Slavic group (\textit{ms. add.}\textsuperscript{2}: on Slovene, cf. \textsc{Tesnière} 1925).\textsuperscript{15} So, Indo-European shows the same pattern: existence early on, reduction, disappearance.

Now let us turn to the three groups of languages that especially concern us here. Concerning \textit{Germanic} I need only say that not only German but all the modern Germanic languages do without the dual (except that modern Frisian has preserved the dual forms of the personal pronoun with their own endings). Only indirectly is there a formal distinction between ‘two’ and ‘more’, namely when an exhortation which includes both speaker and addressee(s) is introduced by \textit{lass uns} (‘let (sg.) us’, plus infinitive) when there are two of ‘us’, but by \textit{lasst uns} (‘let (pl.) us’) when there are more than two. For the former, note e.g. Luther’s translation of Genesis 33: 12 (Jacob to Esau) \textit{laß uns fortziehen} (‘let us take our journey’), or Schiller’s translation of Euripides’ \textit{Iphigenia at Aulis} (act 4, scene 1, Clytaemnestra to Achilles:) \textit{laß, deine Hand in meine Hand gelegt, das neue Bündnis glücklich uns beginnen} (‘let us gladly begin the new alliance, your hand placed in mine’). The singular \textit{laß} is logical; apart from the speaker, only one addressee is involved. \textsc{Grimm} aptly remarks (\textit{D. Gr.} IV, 95) that this form of expression \textit{|} serves to paraphrase the 1st person dual of Gothic (e.g. Gothic I, 76 \textit{gaggos} \textit{→} \textit{laß uns gehen} ‘let (the two of) us go’).—The distinction is not always

\textsuperscript{13} On Sanskrit and Middle Indo-Aryan, see Jamison (2004\textsubscript{a}, 2004\textsubscript{b}); on the modern Indo-Aryan languages, Masica (1991).

\textsuperscript{14} For a survey of Iranian languages, see Schmitt (1989\textsubscript{a}). In particular, on Avestan, see Hoffmann (1989), Hale (2004), and Hoffmann & Forssman (2004); on old Persian, still Kent (1950) and now Schmitt (2004); on modern Persian, Lazard (1992).

\textsuperscript{15} The dual has since vanished from Baltic: indeed, Delbrück reported (1893–1900: I, 144) that it was already extinct in Latvian and obsolescent in Lithuanian. For Latvian Endzelins (1923: 291) reports only fossilised remains; for details, see Endzelins (1923: 331–9) and on Lithuanian, Senn (1966: §§83, 693). On the history of the dual in the Slavic languages, see the numerous entries in Comrie & Corbett (1993: Index, s.v. ‘dual’). Slovene (or Slovenian) is a South Slavic language spoken also in enclaves in Austria, Italy, and Hungary, and the Duchy of Carniola makes up about half of modern Slovenia. Sorbian (or Wendish, or Lusatian, spoken in two dialects centred on the modern German cities of Cottbus (Lower Sorbian) and Baurzen (Upper Sorbian)) and Slovincian (closely related to Cassubian, spoken to the west of Gdansk in north central Poland, but extinct since the mid-20th c.) are West Slavic. On the dual in these languages, see respectively Priestly (1993: 399, etc.), Herrity (2000: esp. §2.6), Stone (1993\textsubscript{a}: 614, etc.) and Stone (1993\textsubscript{b}: 768, etc.). On the Slavic (or Slavonic) languages, see the brief account of Roman Jakobson (1953), the fuller discussion of contributors to Comrie (1990), chs 2–6, and above all de Bray (1980) and Comrie & Corbett (1993); on the literary languages, see Schenker & Stankiewicz (1980) and Stone & Worth (1985).
observed, however. Quite often, the commoner *last uns* is used when just two people are involved, although it is formally inappropriate in such a case.

But in the earliest stages of the Germanic languages we find traces of the dual. Gothic has lost it in the declension of the noun, but has it still in the first and second persons of the verb and in the personal pronoun. Wulfila attests numerous examples, which is all the more remarkable as the text that he was translating shows no dual forms. The dual evidently survived in the verb because it was supported by the dual forms of the personal pronoun. The latter survived the longest of all. Otfrid still says *unker zveio* ‘of us two’; in Frisian, as we have just noted, these pronouns are still used today; in Bavarian, too, but with plural meaning. In Wulfila, on the other hand, perhaps as a result of recent textual corruption, we sometimes find a plural verb when we expect a dual. On isolated dual forms of the verb in very early documents in other Germanic languages, see Feist (1918).\(^{16}\)

As for Latin, first it is well known that broadly the dual has not survived here, except, of course, in *ambō* and *duō* (‘both’, ‘two’), in which the ending -\(\ddot{o}\), like Greek -\(\omega\), appears also in the accusative, alongside the plural ending -\(\ddot{o}s\), which eventually became the only accusative ending. At various times, however, people have thought to see relics of the dual in certain other forms. First, the scholars of antiquity. The Latin grammarians built up their grammar on the model of the Greeks’, and applied the categories of Greek grammar as far as possible to their own language. They found it irksome and irritating to be unable to speak about dual forms in their accounts of the Latin language, and consequently, so Quintilian reports (1. 5. 42–3), certain scholars regarded -\(\ddot{e}r\), the variant of the pl. 3 perfect ending -\(\ddot{e}runt\), as a dual form. Perhaps they were comparing the final -\(e\) with the Greek dual in -\(\epsilon\). Quintilian easily refutes the theory by adducing places in Vergil and others where such forms in -\(\ddot{e}r\) appear with plural function. Cicero (*Orat.* 157) describes this ending as a simple phonetic variant of -\(\ddot{e}runt\); in reality it is older than -\(\ddot{e}runt\).\(^{17}\) —Secondly, Wiłamowitz (in a contribution to Leo’s *Plautinische Forschungen* ['Plautine Researches'], p. 333 of the 1st edn) believed

\(^{16}\) The best single source on the dual of the pronouns in Germanic is Howe (1996: Index, s.v. ‘Dual’). On Gothic, see Jasanoff (2004), with further refs. Otfrid of Weissenburg (2nd half of 9th c.: his autograph survives) uses the gen. dual *unker* once only, *Book of the Gospels* III, 22. 32; the presence of the numeral suggests that the dual meaning was not otherwise clear. Howe (1996: 193–5) sets out the modern North Frisian pronominal dual forms (clearly related to those of Gothic, Old Swedish, Old English, and Old Saxon), now lost in several North Frisian dialects but documented as current in the 1920s. The old dual forms nom. *o¨s* and gen. *enk* are attested in Bavarian from the Middle High German period, but with pl. meaning; similarly, in modern Icelandic the pronominal forms standardly used for the plural of the 1st and 2nd persons continue the old dual forms: see the grammar by Einarsson (1949) and the monograph by Guðmundsson (1972).

\(^{17}\) In fact, Cicero says something rather different: ‘I feel that *scripserunt* is more correct, but I am glad to follow custom which favours the ear’. But W. is right about the relative age of the two endings: -\(\ddot{e}r\) probably goes back to inherited *-er-i* (that is, the IE pl. 3 pf. ending *-er* + ‘primary’ (present) marker *-i*), while -\(\ddot{e}runt\) is taken to be a remaking of -\(\ddot{e}r\) motivated by the fact that all other active pl. 3 forms end in -\(nt\).
that he could assume the existence of the dual in the very earliest Latin. One finds on early Roman inscriptions name groups such as M. C. Pomplio (CIL I2. 30) or Q. K. Cestio (CIL I2. 61). These were understood as Pomplios and Cestios. But why singular? And why no \( -s \) in Pomplio? Well, Wilamowitz thought that he had found the simplest solution by reading Pomplio and Cestio as old duals, preserved in formal naming formulae. This is an attractive proposal, which met with widespread approval (cf. Leo 1912: 248 n. 2), but we cannot really continue to believe it. In his splendid book on Latin and Greek proper names, Karl Meister (1916: 99–105) has made a good case for thinking that these forms are after all nominative singular.\(^{18}\)

It is not at all surprising that Latin lost the dual. After all, in many other respects, too, Latin is so much further developed than Greek from its linguistic point of origin. The source of Latin’s extraordinarily radical development is another question altogether; the Italic peoples must have undergone profoundly formative experiences (and perhaps a significant admixture of foreign people) prior to their firm settlement in Italy.

Given the experience that we have accumulated among other language families, we are now better equipped to express a judgement concerning the dual in Greek (on which, see Meillet 1921b).\(^{19}\) Obviously, there was a dual in Greek from the beginning, and the dual forms of Greek may be compared with those of the other Indo-European languages. In Greek as well, however, we find the same tendency to do without the dual. Every dialect of Greek has lost the 1st person dual of the verb, which Gothic, for example, has preserved. This loss of a dual form must then have been prehistoric.\(^{20}\) For the remaining forms, the loss of the dual proceeds before our eyes, but not at the same speed in all forms of Greek. Here we can observe very well how use of a grammatical marker correlates with level of intellectual development. Those Greeks among whom intellectual development was most rapid, who were the first to become modern, the Greeks of Quintilian, certainly, takes \(-erunt\) to be from \(-erunt\) in the same way as he assumes (again incorrectly) that the sg. 2 deponent/passive \(-ere\) is from \(-eris\) (rather than the other way round).

\(^{18}\) As W. well knew (he is employing ‘teacher’s irony’ here), word-final \(-s\) is frequently not written in early Latin inscriptions (and does not count for purposes of scansion in early Latin poetry). On these inscriptions (five in all, all 3rd or 2nd c. BC), see, in addition to Meister, Wachter (1987: 232–7, 345) and Vine (1993: 109, 225). Wachter adduces an additional argument in favour of reading Pomplio(s) and Cestio(s) as nom. sg. (of, in effect, an adj., in agreement with just one of its nouns) in the fact that in inscriptions naming slaves as belonging to two brothers the family name of the brothers is in the gen. sg., e.g. CIL XII. 2353c Pilota, Arri Quinti et Cai seruus ‘Pilota, slave of Quintus and Gaius Arrius’. On the genuinely plural type Q. M. Minucieis (CIL I2. 584, 117 BC), M. P. Vertuleieis (CIL I2. 1531, 2nd c. BC), see most recently Vine (1993: chap. 8).

\(^{19}\) For bibliography, see Meier-Brügger (1992: I, 144–5; 2003: 190–2, 274–5) on the use of the dual, and (1992: II, 68–9) on its morphology.

\(^{20}\) Mycenaean dual forms are well attested, and illustrated in Ventris & Chadwick (1973: 83–9), but note that no 1st person verb forms whatsoever are attested in Mycenaean. Jasanoff (2004) characterizes the preservation of the 1st person dual as a significant archaism of Gothic.
Asia Minor, were also the first to give up the dual. It is not possible to get a clear picture of the state of affairs in Aeolic, though, at all events, they lost the dual very early on. Much more significant is the use of the dual in Ionic. We can trace Ionic back into the seventh century BC without being able to find the slightest trace of a dual. (We shall touch later on certain usages of the Hippocratic corpus, I, 79 below.) Well, you are aware how much earlier than all other Greeks the Ionians achieved relative freedom of thought. One need only compare Ionic and Attic religious practice, the national characteristics of the Ionians are evident at every turn.21

This rejection of the dual in Ionic has coloured epic poetry very markedly. The store of words and grammatical forms that we encounter in Homer is inherited from time immemorial. The Homeric bards who used this store were Ionians.22 As a result, the dual, as one of these inherited items, is extraordinarily frequent in Homer, but its use is quite inconsistent. When a pair is being talked of, we often see in one and the same sentence a jumping back and forth between dual and plural. The only possible explanation of this is that the epic language (which had the dual) was being handled by poets who did not possess a dual in their own speech and who were consequently unsure how to use it. And these poets went further still. Since the dual was for them no longer a living category, they occasionally took a fancy to the idea that the dual forms were just variants of the plural forms, and to using them as such. (On what follows, cf. Buttmann, 1830–9: I, 134, 340; pp. 46, 115, 316 in Robinson’s English translation.) This is absolutely certain in the first place for the samples of epic poetry we have which are later than the two great epics. For instance, in the legendary Life of Homer (pseudo-Herodotus, p. 368 West), we have an epigram to the inhabitants of Cyme, where we read with reference to the Muses (vv. 8 ff.) κούραι Δίός... ἡθελέτθην (“the daughters of Zeus... wished”), and then in the next line similarly ἀπαντήσαθην (“refused”) of the Cymaeans, for ἡθελον and ἀπαντήσαντα, respectively. This uncertainty is found very frequently also in other imitators of Homer, such as the Hymn to Apollo (456, 487, 501; Apollo speaking to his future ministers),

W. is presumably thinking of the Ionian scientists, the Pre-Socratics (cf. Guthrie 1950: ch. 5 ‘The contribution of Ionia’) and Huxley (1966: 93), who draws a contrast with Athens: ‘The greatest gift of Ionia to the intellectual tradition of mankind was the creation of a rational view of the world. . . . The Athenians’ persecution of the philosopher Anaxagoras would have been inconceivable in the Miletus of Thales and Anaximander’). What W. had been reading is hard to say, probably Rohde (1921), possibly Bilabel (1920), both of whom stress the contrast between Ionia and mainland Greece. The Ionians are held to be reflected in the Phaeacians of the Odyssey, and their religious frivolity, in the second song of Demodocus. W. probably would have sympathized with Murray (1934: ch. 11) on ‘Ionia and Attica’. On ethnic and other relations between the Athenians and the Ionians, see now Hall (1997: passim, esp. 39–40, 41–6). For help with this note, I am indebted to Robert Parker.

W. (1916: 54) views the duals in Homer as belonging to the Aeolic layer; on the dialectal ‘layers’ of Homer, see Hainsworth in Heubeck, West, and Hainsworth (1988: 24–7 & nn.). On the typology of the dual in Homer, see Hillyard (2006).
Aratus (Phaenomena 968, 1023, both times of crows), and the epic poets of the imperial age. Similarly, Apollonius of Rhodes (e.g. 1. 643, 2. 465) used σφωντερος, properly ‘belonging to the two of you’, in the sense of σφετερος ‘belonging to him’: that is, he no longer had any feeling for the dual meaning of this possessive.—Naturally, ordinary speech has nothing to do with this deviant usage. The plural use of the dual in ordinary prose (such as ξυμφέρεσθον (‘let the two of them be brought together’), which used to be read at Plato, Theaetetus 152e) was abolished long before.

This sort of dual for plural was accepted at several places in the Iliad and Odyssey by a great many of the ancient critics of Homer—not the worst of them either—by critics such as Zenodotus, Eratosthenes, and Crates, head of the school in Pergamum. But the master of Homeric scholarship, Aristarchus, rejected this improper use, and, where other critics accepted dual forms of this type, he resorted to an alternative reading, deletion of the lines, or interpretation. For a long time, on this point, as on others too, modern Homeric studies lay under the spell of the authority of Aristarchus; only Buttmann (1830–9: I, §87.4 n. 1) and Nauck (1848: 35–6) expressed more independent judgements. But now we really do have to acknowledge that already in the old Homeric poems dual forms are used with plural meaning. This is certainly the case at Il. 8. 73–4 (κήρες . . . ξέσθην ‘the fates . . . settled’) and 186, 191 (ἀποτίνετον ‘pay back’, ἐφομαρτεῖτο καὶ σπεύδετον ‘come along and hurry’ in an address to four horses), though I would at the same time remind you that book 8 is probably the most recent book of the Iliad. Then, in book 9, although three ambassadors go to Achilles—Ajax, Odysseus, and Phoenix—the dual is repeatedly used of them at lines 182 ff. (182 βάτην, 183 ενχομένω, 192 τῷ . . . βάτην, 196 τῷ, 197 χαίρετον, ἵκανετον). The fact that the original meaning of the dual forms was no longer evident to this poet should naturally not count at all against our admiration of his colossal poetic power. Boll has shown nicely (1917/18; cf. 1919/20) that he was composing partly under the influence of Il. 1. 327–8, where the dual βάτην is correctly used. Earlier commentators wished to infer from the duals that in the oldest version of Iliad 9 Phoenix was not part of the embassy; but this would be ‘to force the jewel from the crown of this recent poetry of the first rank’ (Wilamowitz 1920: I, 79)

23 D. Kidd, in his commentary (Cambridge 1997) on Phaenomena 968, characterizes this use of the dual for the plural ‘as a kind of archaism, especially in participles’ (already noted by Buttmann). See his references to further ancient instances (incl. Pindar, Ol. 2. 86–7, Apoll. Rhod. 1. 384) and modern discussion, including the remark of Lloyd-Jones (1990: 88) explaining the examples in Aratus on the grounds that ‘crows were often seen in pairs’.

24 Apollonius uses σφωντερος also to refer to sg. 2, pl. 2, and pl. 3!

25 This view is based on the fact that Iliad 8 contains a relatively large number of (i) verses suspected by the Alexandrian critics, and (ii) so-called ‘plus-verses’ (inappropriate insertions of Homeric verses from other books). See the introduction to the book in Kirk (1990: 293–4), with further references. Kirk tends to espouse the view expressed by W., to the effect that the text of book 8 ‘remained fluid later than elsewhere’; S. West (1967: 12–13, 75) is more sceptical.
Further instances of this sort are mentioned, albeit with the wrong judgement of them, in FRIEDLÄNDER’s edition of Aristonicus (1853: 15 n.); ‘incorrect’ duals seem to be secure at Iliad 1. 567, 3. 279 and 3. 459.\textsuperscript{27}

As for the other Greeks, the Greeks of the mainland, it is in keeping with their slower development in other respects that they retained the dual for a much longer time. The DORIANS and the BOEOTIANS used the dual correctly by and large, as long as they continued to use their native dialects. But we know of its use best of all from Athens. There are few linguistic developments of which we can give such a splendidly clear overview as of that of the use of the dual in ATTIC. With regard to earlier work on the subject, I shall content myself with referring to the careful, if superficial, collection of material in HASSE’s book on the dual in Attic (1893). We know Attic in very much greater detail than the other dialects, and from securely dated texts at that, especially from the start of the Peloponnesian war until Alexander the Great—and it was precisely in this hundred-year period that the dual in Attic gradually faded and then disappeared. In the inscriptions, it is possible to see a well-defined series of steps in this development. Until about 409 BC, dual forms of all types are used; then begins some fluctuation in use, and one by one the dual endings are given up, starting with dual forms of the verb about 380, then those of nouns in -\textit{ei} (e.g. \textit{têi} xêi ‘two walls’), then the 1st-declension forms in -\textit{a}. Those which survived longest were the oblique (gen.-dat.) forms in -\textit{ov} and -\textit{auv}. Finally, the dual disappears completely, except for denoting the two goddesses Demeter and Persephone, that is to say in a religious expression: in later Greek they were still called \textit{tê ov teôw}, \textit{tê ov theoîn} (‘the two goddesses’). Attic literature agrees extremely well with the picture presented by the inscriptions. Of the orators, Lysias makes the fullest use of the dual; Demosthenes knows only the dual endings in -\textit{auv}, and makes only restricted use even of these; Dinarchus, the latest of the orators, has no dual any more. In Aristophanes similarly it can be shown that in his latest comedy, the \textit{Plutus}, the use of dual and plural forms is thoroughly confused. In line 509, for instance, in an address to two people, we have \textit{polkeîn} ýmêîs (‘you (pl.) desire’) in the first half of the line but \textit{sfôôn} (‘you (du.)’) in the second.\textsuperscript{28} And we find something very similar in Plato: at Laws 10, 892e, e.g., | we read in the same line \textit{sfôôn} (du.) as

\textsuperscript{26} Boll’s approach is developed by Segal (1968), according to whom (p. 103) W. was alone in approving Boll without reservation. For an excellent survey of this marvellous problem, see Hainsworth (1993) on II. 9. 182 setting out six alternative approaches, of which W. appears to combine (1) (‘an abuse of grammar’) with (6), which Hainsworth also favours, viz. that ‘the duals survive from an archetype in which they were grammatically appropriate’. J. Griffin has a helpful appendix on this problem at the end of the introduction to his edition of II. 9 (Oxford 1995).

\textsuperscript{27} The first and third of these three passages are now generally read without duals; note, however, e.g. II. 5. 487. Still fundamental on the extended use of the dual is Debrunner (1927), cited by W. at II, 112 & 122 below.

\textsuperscript{28} On the ‘newness’ of Aristophanes’ language in the \textit{Plutus}, see now Willi (2003b).
genitive but ἰμιον (pl.) as dative in an address to the same two people. [Add.: It is striking that the poets of the New Comedy, although in general they reflect everyday language more faithfully than those of the Old Comedy, still use the dual. Menander (frs. 200, 411, 491 in PCG VI.2) and Diphilus (fr. 72 in PCG V) attest genitives in -οιον and -αιον, and Bato (fr. 3, 2 in PCG IV) as late as the third century may have the form χυντριδε (we owe this observation to Humpers (1922), whose conclusions, however, I cannot accept).]

The Koine, which grew out of Attic, shows the use of the dual in its latest phase. Earlier prose-writers have only the same old -οιον to offer: Aristotle uses it only in isolated instances, and Polybius is the same, using e.g. ἰμφοιν (‘both’). Otherwise, in the whole of Greek literature until the time of Augustus, the dual is unknown, which means that for Greek speakers it was completely dead. But then we get the remarkable phenomenon of the reanimation of this corpse, the resurrection of the dual from extinction. There is a very good article on this subject by Schmidt (1893); see also H. Diels (1910: 1153–5) on the dual in some of the Hippocratic writings.31

29 That the dual is preserved in the literary language only and hence does not appear in the less cultivated language of the New Testament, the Church Fathers, etc.
30 De Foucault (1972: 69) registers also χεροι ‘hands’, κεφαλοὶ ‘horns’, μεροὶ ‘parts’, μηροι ‘thighs’, each usually accompanied by ἰμφοιν, which also occurs alone.
31 Schmidt catalogues the decline of the dual in prose authors from Aristotle to Dionysius of Halicarnassus and its subsequent revival. Hermann Diels shows that the dual is hardly used in the Hippocratic corpus (there are a few examples in particular texts, including On Regimen, On Diseases III, On Diseases of Women) and that its use in On Glands provides another argument against the authenticity of this text. On Diels’s life and work, see Schüttrumpf (1992).
There appeared that extraordinary movement, well known to any student of the history of Greek literature and style, the Atticist reaction, or whatever we want to call it. Around the middle of the first century BC, a new stylistic ideal was laid down and mimesis, or imitation, of the great old Attic writers was prescribed as essential for anyone aiming at virtue and dignity in his expression. Gradually the requirement became more and more firmly established of adhering to Attic norms not only in style but also in vocabulary and grammar, that is, of using only those words, and only in those meanings, which were attested in Attic authors, and of proceeding in the same way with the formation and use of grammatical forms. This movement reached its high-point roughly towards the end of the second century AD. Our evidence for it are those authors whom we customarily call ‘Atticists’, who established word by word in lexical form what was correct Attic and what should be avoided. I would mention before all others the famous Phrynichus, whose Ekloge (‘Selection’) was edited by Lobek (1820; cf. I, 27 above), and would refer you to various works of Lucian in which he takes issue with Atticism, half in mockery of it, half captivated by it. 1

Now, one of the grammatical features in which the Atticists sought to imitate the old Attic writers was the dual. In the eyes of the learned, it counted as a peculiarly Attic feature. This belief was justified to the extent that Ionic literature, the most important after Attic, knew no dual. Aristarchus immediately used the fact that Homer made such frequent use of the dual as an argument in favour of his view that Homer was in fact an Athenian (see the scholia to Iliad 13. 197). It makes sense that anyone striving for a form of expression as close as possible to Attic should resurrect the dual as well, completely extinct as it was. This is very nicely set out by Schmidt in the article I referred to above (1893).

The revival of the dual began in a few forms of the noun, as for instance in Dionysius of Halicarnassus. I should mention also Dionysius’ older contemporary the poet and scholar Parthenius (1st c. BC): in a little work (Erotica pathemata, I, 81

1 Lucian seems to mock Atticism in e.g. Lexiphanes and The Teacher of Rhetoric but to speak from within it in The Soecist. For an excellent brief view of Atticism, with remarks on Lucian and on lexicography (including the other great lexicon, Moeris’s Attic Lexicon), see Whitmarsh (2006: 41–7), who notes that ‘lexical Atticism’ is already implied by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (late 1st c. BC). For a much fuller account, see Swain (1996); on lexicography in particular, note Alpers (1990).
prose summaries of unhappy love stories) dedicated to the Roman poet Cornelius Gallus, he too revived the use of a few dual forms of the noun. From here on we can watch its further progress step by step. Josephus was the first to reuse the dual in verbal forms as well. But Dio Chrysostom in particular goes much further than Dionysius a century earlier. I hardly need to illustrate this in detail. Let me mention just two points which are particularly characteristic of the development.

First, even inscriptions in the language of officialdom share in this artificiality. In Attica, not only is the sacred formula τῶ θεῶ (‘the two goddesses’) continued, but there is even mention in a temple inventory of χρυσὰ οἰνόνθα ‘two golden vines’. And in a letter of AD 174 from some Tyrian merchants in Puteoli (IG XIV. 830, 19), the dating by the Roman consuls shows the dual form: line 19 Γάλλος καὶ Φλάκκος Κορνηλιανὸς ὑπάτων (‘when Gallus and Flaccus Cornelianus were consuls’) (ms. add.): cf. P. Giessen I, 99, 19 ταῖν στήλαιν. Another interesting example is presented by Athenaeus of Naucratis, who wrote probably in the first half of the third century AD. Among the company at the dinner that he portrays, several individuals distinguish themselves by their extreme Atticism. One of them, for instance, is called Κείτωσεν since of every word that is uttered he always asks the question κείται ἢ οὐ κείται; ‘is it attested, or not (in the old Attic writers)?’ Another is called Ὄνοματοθήρας ‘Word-hunter’ and Athenaeus makes him give the most exquisite taste of his Atticism by using the first person dual of the middle: 3, 98a πρότερον συντριβησόμεθαν, ἐπειτα ... ἀπολούμεθαν (‘first we shall have a rub down, then ... we shall ruin ourselves’).

In this connection there is something else worth highlighting. In the verb in Greek we have dual forms only in the second and third persons; in the first person, when the dual would be appropriate, the ending of the plural is used (active -μεν, middle-passive -μεθα). Originally, as a glance at Gothic shows, there were special dual forms, too, which were lost in Greek. And yet in three places in ancient Greek literature we find dual forms in the middle, first in Homer, Iliad 23. 485 περιδώμεθαν ‘let the two of us wager!’, and then twice in Sophocles (El. 950 λελείμεθαν, Phil. 1079 ὄμμεθαν). Already in the grammar books of antiquity these forms in -μεθα were adopted as an integral part of the system, perfectly parallel to the other middle forms. The Englishman Peter Elmsley (1773–1825), no genius but a careful critic, was the first to see that these forms were mere inventions of the grammarians,

2 W. must have found this in Meisterhans & Schwyzer §§848.17, 83.14. It is now in IG II 2, 4511, 11 (early 2nd c. AD) and is characterized by Threatte (1996: 94) as ‘quite doubtful’.

3 Only the word for ‘consuls’ is in the ((gen.-)dat.) dual; the individual names are in the dat. sg. and illustrate the Latinizing use of the Greek dative in consular dates in imitation of the Latin ablative: see Adams (2005: 304), who quotes an inscr. of 39 BC with ὑπάτος dat. pl. For more examples of the dual from inscriptions, see W. (1883a) and (1943: 188–90).

4 On Athenaeus, see most recently the collection edited by Braund & Wilkins (2000).
obviously a silly idea, and already refuted by G. Hermann and Lobeck.\(^5\) What we have to see in these forms is rather a new, analogical formation. On the model of the du. 2 ending in -αθον, Greek speakers ventured to use in the first person an analogous dual form in -μεθον instead of the plural ending -μεθα. It is an experimental formation, which found acceptance for a time in Attic, but which never appears in Plato or in comedy. And Homer’s περιδώμεθον (du. 1) is doubtless an intruder from Attic; the poet will have said περιδώμεθα.

The colloquial language remained undisturbed by these reactionary strivings to revive the dual, and consequently modern Greek also remains innocent of the dual.

So much for the external circumstances of its use. Now we must pursue its use in greater detail and ask ourselves in which contexts is the dual employed. Here we are concerned especially with the noun, since the situation with the verb and the personal pronoun is, on the whole, self-explanatory: dual forms are used in the verb when the subject comprises two people or things, especially when the subject is a noun in the dual; and in the personal pronouns when two persons are referred to: so e.g. νώ, νών ‘we two, you and I (or s/he and I)’, or σφώ, σφών ‘you two’. That is straightforward and clear. The only thing to observe is that strictly speaking the du. 1 represents not a doubling of the ‘I’ but merely an addition to the ‘I’.

In the noun, on the other hand, things are more complicated and the rules to some extent more subtle. Let me preface my remarks by saying that there were usages of the dual in prehistoric times which appear strange to us and which do not appear in extant Greek. In the earliest form of Indic, a word for something which is often paired with something else can be put in the dual in order to denote the pair as a whole, as if in Greek e.g. πατέρε could be used to mean something like ‘father and mother’. Even stranger is a second form of expression, also from Vedic, which involves putting both words for the members of the pair in the dual, so that the meaning ‘parents’ would be πατέρε μητέρε. I mention this phenomenon because all sorts of unproven conjectures have been put forward about supposed traces of this idiom in Greek, Latin, and Germanic. It has been suggested, for instance, that the Homeric dual Αἴαντε, which ought to mean ‘the two Ajaxes’, originally meant ‘Ajax and Teucer’. On this point I refer you

\(^5\) On Peter Elmsley (1774–1825), one of the most important of English classicists, see Sandy’s (1906–8: III, 494–5) and now Finglass (2007). Elmsley attributed these forms to the grammarians in a note on Ar. Ath. 733 (in his edition of 1809, revised 1830; cf. Elmsley 1826: 294). Hermann refuted Elmsley in a note on Soph. El. 950 reproduced in the edition of Sophocles by Brunck and Schaefer (Leipzig 1827). As for Lobeck, I suspect that W. has misattributed to him as the editor of vol. 2 of the 2nd edn of Buttmann’s Greek grammar the long note in vol. 1 of the 2nd edn (Buttmann 1830–9: I, 341–3 n. **) written by Buttmann himself shortly before his death; at the end of this note, Buttmann draws the quite different inference from Athenaeus that such forms were known only from early literature.
especially to an essay by H. Möller (1903). There may be a trace preserved also in the old religious language of Umbrian.  

When we come to consider what is really regular in Greek, we can and must distinguish two types of use of the dual. In the first place, from Homer down to the Attic orators—and there are examples in the inscriptions, too—the dual is regularly used of a natural pair—I stress a pair, not any set of two objects—in other words, of concepts of which we can say ‘both’, when two things that belong together are referred to together. This is particularly the case with parts of the body. Hence in Homer ὀφθαλμός, ὀσσε, ὄμω, πηχεῖς, χεῖρε, μηρώ, ποδοῖν (‘eyes’, ‘eyes’, ‘shoulders’, ‘forearms’, ‘hands’, ‘thighs’, ‘feet’). Then there are ἵπποι and βόε (‘horses’, ‘oxen’), when a team of animals is intended. Equally, in the context of Homeric armour, δοῦρε ‘the two spears’ denotes a natural pair, since the hero typically carried two spears. Moving on from Homer, we find similarly here and there on inscriptional inventories of Attic temple treasuries the dual ἐνομίω (for ἔνομίω) ‘a pair of earrings’, since these were naturally dedicated in pairs (e.g. IG II² 1370, 14). Similarly the dual is used of people and gods who belong to a well-known pair. We find very frequently τῶ θεῶ of Demeter and Persephone (cf. I, 79 above)—and I remind you in this connection that θεῶs is originally of common gender, i.e. either masculine or feminine, while θέα is Aeolic-Homeric and was borrowed into Attic from that source. This corresponds to τῶ σιῶ, which we know from Xenophon as the Laconian form of this dual. Again, in Attic documents dealing with the administrative body comprising two stewards of the treasury, we find τῶ τὰμία, that is to say, not any two stewards but the pair established as a public institution. In the same way Plato speaks at one point of τῶ νεῖε Περικλέους (‘the two sons of Pericles’), as it was well known that Pericles had two sons. It is only natural that the dual was acceptable with the demonstrative and relative pronouns when they referred back to a pair already mentioned.

6 W. had himself argued for this interpretation of Αἰαττη in an article of 1877, ‘On the Homeric dual’. With this sense of the ‘elliptical dual’ Αἰαττη, compare the Skt dual Mitrā ‘Mitra and Varuna’, or πितरα (dual of ‘father’) and मातरा (dual of ‘mother’) both meaning ‘father and mother’, and—in a language which has lost the dual—Lat. pl. Castores ‘Castor and Pollux’; for further examples from various IE languages, and bibliography, see Schwzyer & Debrunner 50–1, and now Clackson (2007: 100–1). Contrast Ακτρόπιον ‘the twin sons of Aktor’, and see Hainsworth (1993) on II. 11. 750 and Richardson (1993) on II. 23. 638. The allusion to Umbrian is to the formula ueiro pequo ‘men and animals’, which W. (1910: 295–8) suggested might continue an IE dual-dvandva *uitro pekuos (with both elements in the dual) seen also in Avestan pasu-vira. This is unlikely in view of the word-divider and the fact that the outcome of inherited *-ū in Umbrian, not *-a, and the phrase is nowadays regarded as a neut. pl. collective (from IE *uitro pekuos), an idea that goes back to Thurneysen (see Untermann 2000: s.v. ‘uiro’). This would be the only known example of an animate collective; see Clackson (2007: 103).

7 There are at least fifteen examples of this form in the inventories IG II² 1370–1448.

8 In Sparta, τῶ σιῶ ‘the two gods’ were Castor and Pollux (cf. Aristophanes, Lysistrata 81, 174, and frequently; Peace 214, with S. D. Olson’s commentary [Oxford 1998] ad loc.); in Thebes, they were the mythical founders of the city, Amphion and Zethus (cf. Aristophanes, Acharnians 905, with S. D. Olson’s commentary [Oxford 2002] ad loc.).
When we say that a natural pair is marked with the dual, we have to reckon with one striking oddity, namely that the word for ‘parents’, early on τοκεῖς, in Attic γονεῖς, is always plural, and no one knows why. In Homer, τοκής comes thirty-seven times; we have the dual τοκῆ once only, in the tale of Ares and Aphrodite (Od. 8. 312), which is a very late addition to the poem. This exaggerated use of the dual is an indication that it was no longer a living category for that poet. Similarly, we find regularly for the same meaning, ‘parents’, οἱ τεκόντες, οἱ φύσαντες, οἱ φυτεύσαντες, οἱ γεννήσαντες (all, lit. ‘the begetters’, pl.), and never ever τῶ τεκόντε (du.), or the like.

Secondly, the dual is used for any accidental group of two, even if it is not a natural pair, but in this case, from Homer on, there is the firm rule, which you can confidently follow, that the numeral ‘two’, δύο (δύω), must be present. Homer offers an exception to this rule in Od. 11. 578, where, in the depiction of the penitents in Hades, we read, γυπε δὲ μίν . . . ἤπαρ ἐκεῖρον ‘two vultures tore at his liver’. This is no natural pair but an accidental group of two, and the Greek should be δύω γυπε, but again this is a very late addition to the poem, composed by a poet for whom the dual was dead and who has here used the dual in an exaggerated way.

Let us now move on to the other grammatical numbers, singular and plural. Let me say by way of preface that, while many individual points have been established, we do not here have the benefit of such good historical and systematic comparative preliminary studies, as we do for the dual. Moreover, the phenomena which belong under this heading do not so easily allow a comprehensive presentation. These topics are clear for the most part; I shall therefore rather select just a few of the more interesting questions. Cf. L. Tobler (1883), and Delbrück (1893–1900: I, 146–72).

There is a point I wish to emphasize at the outset. We are easily inclined to assume, on the strength of our linguistic intuitions and independent thought, that the normal meaning of a noun, in and of itself, is singular and that the plural use is something secondary. This assumption is suggested to us by the word forms of German and also Romance, in which usually the plural is formally an extension of the singular. But in fact, in and of itself, the meaning of a noun is neutral with respect to the opposition between singular and plural. If we strip away the outer skin and extract the kernel of the stem from the paradigm, we have to allow it the potential of both singular and plural meaning. This emerges clearly from the fact that when the bare stem appears, as in compounds, we can interpret

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9 Cf. Od. 8. 317 ἀφοε (W. 1916: 35). On the dual in Homer, including on this and the next ‘late’ example, see Chantraine (1953: 24–5), Shipp (1972: 128).

the first element of a compound equally well either as singular or as plural. So, in ἰππόδαμος (‘horse-taming, horse-tamer’), to take an example from Homer, the stem ἰππο- belongs no less to the forms of the plural than to those of the singular. Indeed, ἰππόδαμος is precisely not someone who tames just one horse; the meaning of the first element has to be seen as plural. Or in the Homeric epithet of Zeus, νεφεληγερέτα, νεφελ- is again plural, since Zeus gathers the clouds, not a cloud. Or when the Ionians called a storyteller λογογράφος, they meant someone who wrote λόγους, not merely a λόγον; | Latin aucesps denotes someone who catches a number of birds, lumbifragium a rupture of the loins, and so on. The same applies to German words like Eichwald (‘oak wood’), Zahnarzt (‘dentist’, lit. ‘tooth-doctor’), Fischhändler (‘fishmonger’).11

The stem of a noun, then, has no inherent singular meaning. Some linguists even believe that we should regard the plural meaning as basic. An analogy, of which I wish to take advantage at this point, is offered by the verb. There is one form of the verb which from a purely formal point of view consists of nothing but the stem: that is, the sg. 2 imperative. It has no recognizable personal ending. If we take the -μι-verb forms, such as ἵστη (to ἵστημι ‘set up’), δαίνυ (to δαίνυμι ‘to feast’), κρίμη (to κρεμώνα ‘to hang’), all that we have here is a stem with no suffix to indicate a person. The same goes for the imperative in -ε: λέγε (‘speak!’), for example, is simply the present stem which we can extract from (pl.) λέγε-τε, (du.) λέγε-τον. Now, it can be shown that at all periods imperatives were used in the main to give a command to an individual, but that again at all periods they were sometimes addressed to more than one person. I do not necessarily wish to maintain that this is a direct inheritance from the prehistoric state of the language, though that seems to me probable. However that may be, words like ἀγε, εἰπέ, ἐθά, ὁρα, φέρε (‘come on’, ‘speak’, ‘go’, ‘look’, ‘come on’) can be directed at a group of people (on which, see now Wilamowitz on Aesch. Eum. 25513), just like the German imperatives siehe or wart’ einmal (‘look’, ‘just wait’). This has to do with the semi-interj ectional nature of the imperative. We shall see shortly that such imperatives have preserved their neutrality no less with respect to person and to the opposition between active and middle. The situation is very similar with the vocative, which in the singular also consists originally of just the bare stem.

So, that is the first point. A second false claim made of the use of the grammatical numbers is that every noun is expected to attest both numbers. There is no a priori reason for this. You will certainly know from your use of your

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11 For recent bibliography on the syntax and semantics of compound formation, see Bauer (1983: ch. 6) and Matthews (1991: 100–1).
12 See e.g. Jespersen (1924: 188), and in general on semantic distinctions conveyed by grammatical number Corbett (2000: ch. 2).
13 In his edition of Aeschylus (1914a), Wilamowitz compares with Eum. 255 ὁρα...λεύσαετε ‘look (sg.) ...search (pl.)’ Septem 110 ὧν ἵδετε ‘come (sg.) see (pl.)’; cf. (1914b: 220–1).
own language that there are many nouns which occur either just in the singular (*singularia tantum*) or just in the plural (*pluralia tantum*). Let me draw your attention straightaway to the form of this grammatical term. Unlike other terms of grammar, this (*tantum*) is purely Latin, not a Greek word and not a translation of a Greek word. This is because the Roman grammarians took very careful account of this restriction of a noun to a single grammatical number, while the Greek grammarians paid it no attention.14

Now, in this connection we have more reason to consider Latin, in the first place because of what the grammarians tell us. It is commonly said that we do not need the grammarians if we have texts. In general this is wrong, since literary texts do not use all the resources of a language, and because not all our texts are perfectly preserved. On a given point it is extremely difficult to infer from the texts that something was not part of the language. It is always dangerous to conclude from the fact that a form is not attested that it did not exist, since chance may be a factor. So, on this point the testimony of the grammarians is extremely welcome. When they teach that a word was a *plurale tantum* (*plural only*), we can be sure that as far as they were concerned the singular was not usual.

Furthermore, research in Greek is made difficult by the very richness of the language, since we know so many varieties of the Greek language, both chronological and dialectal. There are consequently many fewer words for which we could demonstrate an absolute restriction to one or other grammatical number. Very often, when we are inclined on the basis of one variety of the language to posit such a restriction, evidence appears from a particular period with counter-examples which oblige us to reckon with the possibility that both numbers were quite usual. Just two examples: the word ἐντεσα (‘equipment, armour’) is familiar from Homer, and, other things being equal, we would tend to label it a *plurale tantum*. There is, however, a fragment of Archilochus (§ 2 West),15 in which the singular ἐντος appears, and this form is supported by the fact that Hesychius expressly attests the singular. Similarly, ὑπαί are attested only as a plural in the literature until the second century AD, but a fairly recently discovered inscription from Erythrae of the fourth century BC (Bechtel 1921–4: III, 322 = *IK* II, 206. 3) offers the form τῆς ὑπαί (dat. sg.).16

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14 On this oversight on the part of the Greek grammarians, and for *singularia, dualia, and pluralia tantum* in Greek, see Schwizer & Debrunner §1–2.
15 Now also at fr. 139, 5, on papyrus.
16 See J. L. Lightfoot’s marvellous commentary (Oxford 2003) on Lucian, *On the Syrian Goddess*, 16, and the pertinent remark there, ‘while in the plural the idea of verbal action tends to predominate (< ἑργα), the singular may refer to concrete objects’; she renders the word ‘mystic object’.
Lecture I, 16

At this point, I am acutely aware of the fact that it is not possible in the present context to give a complete account. I must content myself with highlighting a few points. Let us begin with the **pluralia tantum**. The question I wish to address is what sorts of words, and categories of words, show this restriction to the plural—and, as I have said, we will stick mainly with Latin; the richest collection of material is in **Neue & Wagener I, 659–724**. In Latin, **pluralia tantum** denote persons or things which occur only in groups. Let us start with persons, and with the groups of celestial divine beings which were conceived only as a plurality, such as **caelites, lemures, penates** (‘heavenly ones, gods’, ‘shades, ghosts’, ‘household gods’), and we could add the **manes** (‘departed spirits’), probably identical etymologically with the Greek **singulare tantum μῆνες** ‘wrath’.¹ People much preferred to think of frightening beings of this sort as vague pluralities; so, too, with the **inferi** (‘inhabitants of the lower world’). Then, among words denoting human beings belong ethnics (names of peoples), such as **Quirites** (‘the Roman citizen-body’), or the strange names for the oldest Roman tribes, perhaps of Etruscan origin, the **Rames, Tities, and Luceres**. Let me remind you at this point of something roughly comparable in Greek, where, in Homer for instance, the ethnics **Ἀργεῖοι** and **Δαβαῶι** occur only in the plural; with the exception of two places (†. 3. 167, 226), **Ἀχαιῶι**, too, is always plural—though **Ἄχαιός** and **Δαβάος** are subsequently extracted as the names of the heroic founders of these peoples. It is even clearer and easier to understand that **Ἀμφικτῖνοι** (lit. ‘those who dwell round about’) should exist only in the plural, even though later on an **Ἀμφικτῖνος** was worshipped as the heroic champion of the Amphictyony. Then I should mention also expressions such as Latin **primores** (‘chief or leading men’), and, in particular, all the names of colleges of officers, like **tresuiri, septenuiri, decenuiri** (‘commission of 3/7/10 men’). This was a speciality of Latin; Greek has very few names of officials formed with numerals. This relates to an important linguistic peculiarity of the Romans. They also often named their sons and daughters with the ordinal numerals: **Quintus, Sextus, Tertia** (lit. ‘fifth’,

¹ This etymological comparison has long since been abandoned; see Frisk and Chantraine, each s.v. ‘μῆνες’, and Walde & Hofmann, s.v. ‘mānēs’, with references to earlier literature.
‘sixth’, ‘third’). The Romans were good at counting and rather less gifted in imagination.  

Next, the names of constellations are *pluralia tantum*. Here there are nice correspondences in Greek, e.g. in Πλειάδες: Lat. *Vergiliae*, an old Roman name (the Pleiades, or Seven Sisters, in Taurus). Only secondarily was the singular Πλειάς formed by the Greek tragedians (e.g. Eur. *Iph. Aul.* 8). Then there is Gk Ύδες: Lat. *Suculae* (the Hyades, also in Taurus), where again only the whole group comes into question. And lastly *Septentriones* (Ursa major, the Great Bear or the Plough) is also relevant here, on which more anon (I, 90–1 below).

Another striking group are the plural-only names for body parts, of which the singular occasionally appears in later writers. First, the names for those parts which come in pairs, just as in Greek ὀσον, ὀσοις only with dual meaning (first in Hesiod, *Theog.* 826, *Shield* 145). So we have the Latin words *nares*, *palpebrae*, *malae*, *lumbi*, *nates*, *clunes* (‘nostrils, nose’, ‘eyelids’, ‘jaws, cheeks’, ‘loins’, ‘buttocks’, ‘buttocks’); strangely, *ceruices* (‘neck, throat’), too, is used by many authors as a *plurale tantum*. In all these cases we can assume, or at least imagine, that these were originally inflected as duals; *scapulae* ‘shoulder blades’ is another example. Then there are other words of this type, such as *gingiuae* ‘gums’, *tonsillae* ‘tonsils’, *palearia* ‘the dewlap of an ox’. Then there are words for the intestines, like *lactes*, *exta*; in many authors *uiscera*, too, is plural only. And this is understandable, since the intestines and what goes with them—and note that the German word *Eingeweide* (like English *intestines*) is itself *plurale tantum* in normal usage—constitute a single mass within which it is not possible to pick out individual parts. For the same reason, Homer has σπλάγχνα and ἔγκατα (both ‘entrails’). A striking example, still in the same lexical field, is Lat. *artus* ‘limb’, which, except in Lucretius, occurs only as *plurale tantum*. I note also that the Greek word μέλος ‘limb’ is attested until the Augustan period only in the plural. Then there are Lat. *moenia* (‘walls’) and *arma* (‘arms, weapons’).

I wish to mention two further words which are not normally recognized as *pluralia tantum*, but for which we have completely reliable testimonies, namely those of Varro (*Lat.* 8. 7, 9. 68 f.) and Quintilian (*Inst.* 1. 5. 16) for *scalae* ‘stairs’ and *scopae* ‘broom’. The ancient testimony is very important, since with the means at our disposal for these words it would be hard to establish the original absence of the singular.

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2 The Latin ordinal numbers used as male given names (esp. 5th, 6th, 10th) are generally regarded as referring to birth *month* (July, August, December), not birth order (as W. perhaps implies), though those used as female names (esp. 2nd, 3rd, 4th) may refer to the latter; see Salomies (1987: 111–14), Kajava (1995: 122–5).

3 On *ceruices*, and the other *pluralia tantum* names for body parts, see further André (1991: s.vv.).
Alongside all these we have numerous *singularia tantum*; for the Latin material, see *Neue & Wagener I*, 591 ff. On this topic I refer you especially to Varro, *Lat.* 9. 66 ff. and Quintilian, *Inst.* 1. 5. 16. They refer particularly to the many names of materials which occur only in the singular. You will find a choice remark in Othon Riemann’s sensitive monograph on the language and grammar of Livy (1885), one of the best works in existence on the language of a major Latin author; there is a great deal to be learnt from it, especially on syntax. Among many other excellent comments, Riemann refers (p. 48) to the fact that in Diocletian’s ‘Prices Edict’ (*Editium de pretiis rerum uenalium, AD 301*), an official list in Greek and Latin of permissible charges for the essentials of life—such an important document for our knowledge of conditions of life in the ancient world (most recently edited by Mommsen & Blümner 1893)—dried meat and vegetables are given in the singular, while the names of fresh produce, which are counted, are in the plural. In other words, what is only measured and not counted is denoted by means of a singular. Cf. Michels (1891: 127), who makes reference to Humboldt and American Indian languages.

This restriction of a noun to one grammatical number is extremely old. There are *pluralia tantum* which are quite definitely inherited. One example is Latin *tenebrae* (‘darkness’), which survives in the Romance languages as a *plurale tantum* (e.g. Span. *tinieblas*), and of which the Sanskrit cognate *tāmisrāḥ* is also *plurale tantum*. It is at the same time undeniable that in many cases the restriction to singular or plural is secondary. We can illustrate this from German, where the earlier language is quite familiar with the singulars corresponding to the modern *pluralia tantum* die Trümmern (‘rubble’), die Altvorderen (‘ancestors’), die Ränke (‘intrigues’), die Lente (‘people’).5

But there is another sort of noun, apart from those which are straightforward *pluralia tantum* or *singularia tantum*. In many words the meanings of the singular and plural are so far apart that their difference cannot be regarded as merely a matter of grammatical number. Here, it is as if singular and plural have undergone independent semantic development. This is common especially in Latin. In Greek, τεўχος means ‘vessel’ and is attested both in Ionic and in Attic, even if it is not very common. The plural τεўχα, on the other hand, means not ‘vessels’ but ‘armour’. Both meanings are understandable, but plural and singular meanings have developed independently. There are instances of this type also in Gothic: e.g. the plural bokos means ‘book’, the singular boka, ‘letter’. And we find this

4 The 1893 edition (in *CIL III, Suppl. i*) was reprinted as a separate volume (Berlin 1918). The standard editions are now Lauffer (1971) and Giaccherio (1974); note the more recent information in Crawford & Reynolds (1977, 1979); Reynolds in Rouché (1989: 265–94).

5 That is, Trummu (neut.) ‘piece, lump’, Rank (masc.) ‘cunning, guile’; however, *D. Wb.* reports that Lente (neut.) ‘a people’ is not found in the written language since the 13th c., and records only pl. Altvorderen without a sg., even in OHG (altförderen).
frequently in modern German: e.g. *Alpe* (‘nightmare’): *Alpen* (‘Alps’); *Woche* (‘week’): *Wochen* (‘period of confinement’); *Kost* (‘food’): *Kosten* (‘costs’); *Trupp* (‘herd’): *Truppen* (‘troops’). In Latin, you learn it as a special point already in school e.g. that *aedes* means ‘temple’ in the singular but ‘house’ in the plural—plainly because a temple involves a single building, while a house consists of a complex of buildings. Another peculiar case is that of *liberi* ‘children’. How did this expression come to be formed? (Attempts have been made to connect *liberi* etymologically with German *Leute* ‘people’, but this is impossible.\(^6\)) The situation is quite clear: for the *pater familias* there were two classes of dependants, the one free, the other slave. The free dependants are precisely the children. Or take *rostrum* and *rostra* (sg. ‘beak (of a bird), prow (of a ship)’, and pl. ‘a platform for public speaking in the forum’). Here a historical factor is involved. The connection is based on the fact that the platform for public speaking was decorated with the prows of captured warships (Varro, *Lat*. 5. 153; Livy 8. 14. 12). Other examples in Latin include *castrum* : *castra* (‘a fortified place’ : ‘military camp’); *littera* : *litterae* (‘letter of the alphabet’ : ‘letter, epistle’); *comitium* : *comitia* (‘a place of assembly’ : ‘the Roman people in assembly’); *copia* : *copiae* (‘an abundance, a supply’ : ‘military forces’); *auxilium* : *auxilia* (‘help, aid’ : ‘auxiliary troops’); *impedimentum* : *impedimenta* (‘a hindrance’ : ‘baggage’).

Sometimes, as an accompaniment to a slight difference in meaning, singular and plural show different genders. The beginner in Latin learns, for instance, that the plural of *locus* (‘place’) can be either *loci* or *loca*, of *iocus* (‘joke’) either *ioci* or *ioca*. Other instances have been missed, such as that *carrus* (‘a four-wheeled wagon’) had a plural *carra*. Greek offers even more interesting examples than Latin. Let me recall a few examples from Homer: the plural of *κέλευθος* (‘way, road’) is *κέλευθα*, of *δρυμός* (‘copse, thicket’), *δρυμά*, and then, with an interesting shift of accent, *μῆρος* (‘thigh’) has a plural *μήρα*, alongside *μηροί*. This last word shows what these different forms are about. The essential feature of the neuter plural is to denote, not a plurality, but a mass. *μηροί* is used of the thighs of separate persons, while *μήρα* is used in the context of sacrifice to denote the mass of heaped-up thighs of the victims. A similar account is to be supposed for *δρυμά* and *κέλευθα* as well, and Latin *loci* and *loca* also differ in meaning.

This is not the only form of gender-alternation between singular and plural. In Latin it occurs between neuter and feminine in *balneum* : *balneae* (‘bath’), *epulum* : *epulae* (‘banquet’). For the first pair (tackled but not explained by Varro at *Lat*. 8. 48 and 9. 68) we can at least venture the view that, since Gk *βαλνηές* is the source, *balneum* must be original and *balneae* a Latin innovation; Herzog (1864:\(^6\))

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6 ‘Impossible’ is too strong: Ernout & Meillet, s.v. ‘liber’, reserve judgement on this and on the relation between *liber* ‘free’ and *liberi* ‘children’, while Walde & Hofmann, s.v. ‘libert’, favour the connection (and explicitly reject W.’s next sentence here), and Rix (1994a: 114) takes it as given without further comment (all on the IE root *‘h₁leudh-‘climb, grow’; cf. *LIV*, s.v.).
2257; and p.c.) has made the attractive suggestion that the model was the word *aquae*.\(^7\)

Another point worth mentioning occurs in modern German, where the plural of, say, a verbal abstract in | certain meanings is formed to a more elaborate stem, as in *Ruf* (‘nomination, appointment’): pl. *Berufungen*, *Bezug* (‘connection’): pl. *Beziehungen*. The formal difference is still more marked in *Landmann* (‘country-man, rustic’): pl. *Landleute*.

I have already hinted more than once at the fact that in many cases the same word from being restricted to a single number comes to be used in both numbers. It is by no means uncommon for a word to begin as a *plurale tantum* and to have a singular made alongside it as the language develops. On this point the dictionaries are very superficial. We have to ask ourselves, what is original and what is a secondary development? A very interesting example is the well-known use, common in Latin, of a numeral to denote colleges of officials (cf. I, 87 above). Here, the need could easily arise to denote just a single member. Roughly speaking from the Augustan period on, a singular is simply formed to the *plurale tantum*. So, in inscriptions we find e.g. *sexprimus* ‘a member of a board of six’, or in the Greek version of a Latin title *δέκαπρωτός* ‘a member of a board of ten’, which strictly are monstrous word forms. Already in Horace, *Satires* 2. 5. 56 we find *quinqueuir*, and in Pliny, *Nat.* 33. 31, *nongentus*, with reference to a voting class (‘one of 900 inspectors of ballot boxes’). I quote the whole passage because it is typical of the growth of the singular out of the plural: *praeter hos* (scil. *tribunos aeris*, etc.) *etiamnum ‘nongenti’ vocabantur ex omnibus electi . . . et divius hic quoque ordo erat superba usurpatione nominum, *cum alius se ‘nongentum’* (acc.), *alis ‘selectum*, *alius ‘tribunum* appellet* (‘in addition to whom, there were the persons styled the “nine hundred”, chosen from all [the decuries] . . . From the ambitious adoption, however, of some one of these names, great divisions ensued in this order, one person styling himself “a member of the nine hundred”, another “one of the *selecti*, and a third “a tribune of the treasury’’’); on this

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\(^7\) The ‘neuter plural’ forms of non-neuter nouns (such as Lat. *locā* to masc. *locus*, beside the regular plural *loci*) are widely taken to continue a separate category in Indo-European, the ‘collective’. This category, which, as W. remarks, can be interpreted as a sort of ‘mass’ singular, has been used to explain the construction of neuter plural subject + singular verb in some old Indo-European languages (cf. I, 101–2 below); it has even been regarded as the source of the feminine gender, which is conspicuously absent from Anatolian, the earliest-attested group of Indo-European languages. For a good recent survey of these extremely vexed issues concerning both number and gender, see Clackson (2007: 100–13) with further references. The development of new feminine singulars from old neuter plurals (or ‘collectives’), postulated by some for Indo-European, is well attested in Latin, both in Romance reflexes of Latin, where it is one of the ways in which the neuter is abolished (e.g. French *joie* ‘joy’ fem. sg. — Lat. *gaudia* neut. pl.) and within Latin itself (e.g. already in Ennius fem. sg. *caementa* ‘a small stone, piece of rubble’ beside regular neut. *caementum*, pl. *caementa*). This development could account for W.’s forms *epulae* and *balnea*. On the Latin and Romance aspects of the story, see e.g. Harris (1978: 52–3), Väänänen (1981: §§213–25), Herman (2000: 65–6).
passage, cf. Mommsen (1887–8: III, 533 n. 3). This is, however, not the original way of saying that one is a member of a group of officials. From Cato (Orat. 113) is quoted the clause *si triumuirum sim* (‘were I to be one of the triumviri (gen. pl.)’; Festus p. 466 Lindsay), with a partitive genitive. This is the original form. Later it became *si triumuir sim* (‘were I to be a triumvir (nom. sg.)’), the expression being singularized. Probably it happened in this way: if you said e.g. *Marcum Antonium triumuirum, triumuirum* was actually a genitive plural, ‘Marc Antony was (one) of the triumviri’. Then the genitive came to be regarded as an accusative and finally a nominative was made to it, *Marcus Antonius triumuir*. This is how *trium*– (‘three–’) arose, looking at first sight so odd, as the first element of a compound. 9

In the above cases, the point at issue concerned the wish to denote an individual out of a crowd, when only the crowd had a ready-made name. But it also happens that a plural notion denoted by a *plurale tantum* came to be regarded as a single thing and hence gradually lost its plural ending. A case in point is the appearance of *quadriga* instead of *quadrigae* (‘a team of four’), which is from *quadriiugae equae* ‘mares yoked four together’; similarly *bigae* is replaced by *biga* (a pair of horses or the chariot they draw). Even more remarkable is the story behind *septentriones*, mentioned earlier (I, 87 above; and cf. II, 171 below). This is the | constellation that received the largest number of different names. Homer calls it ἄρκτος and ἄγαξ (‘the Bear’ and ‘the Wain’; II. 18. 487, Od. 5. 273). The Romans, and incidentally some Greeks as well, liked to name the constellations from the point of view of the farmer and the frame of reference proper to him. Hence our *septentriones*, which Roman scholars themselves explain for us as meaning ‘the seven oxen for threshing’. They used the word not only for the constellation, which lies in the northern sky, but also for the northern sky itself, so that in Cicero (Nat. 2. 49) we find *septentriones* as the counterpart of *meridies* (‘the south’). Cicero is the first to use, very occasionally, the singular as well as the plural, although Caesar has only the plural. In the Augustan poets, the singular is absolutely normal and a further striking development is to be seen in their work. *Septentrio* is one of those words which unfortunately do not fit the hexameter, because of the short syllable -tri- between two long syllables. So how did the poets manage? In Vergil’s *Georgics*, we read 3. 381 *septem subiecta trioni* (‘beneath the seven-starred Bear’), and something similar at Ovid, *Met* 1. 64 *Scythiam septemque triones* (‘Scythia and the north’). Tmesis, legitimate in compound

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8 Mommsen adduces another example of the singular, in *CIL XIV*. 2630 *nungentus*.

9 Odd indeed, since *trium* is the (perfectly regular) gen. of *três* ‘three’; normally the bare stem, *tri*-, is used as the first element of a compound. The gen. pl. ending *-um* (inherited in all declensions) was by the classical period generally replaced in the 1st and 2nd declensions with *-orum* (on the analogy of fem. *-arum*, inherited in the pronouns). The ending *-um* is seen in 1st- and 2nd-decl. gen. pl. forms in literary archaisms such as Lucretius’ *agricolum* ‘of farmers’, Vergil’s *deum, uirum* ‘of gods’, ‘of men’; see further e.g. Sihler (1995: 264–5), Meiser (1998: §§92.6, 94.9).
words and also in the plural *septem triones* (Cic. *Nature of the Gods* 2. 105), has been here extended to a complex word whose singular ending was possible only on condition of complete univerbation. Nobody could ever have said in natural speech, *septem trio*. This then is a case of an incorrect expression being occasioned by metrical necessity.\(^{10}\)

Let me just add that this restriction of a word to one grammatical number manifests itself also in the numerals, where it is self-explanatory. Conversely, certain verbs occur only in the singular: think of the impersonals (cf. I, 114 below).\(^ {11}\)

\(^{10}\) Cicero uses the singular of the north wind at *Att*. 9.9.2 (no. 176 Shackleton Bailey), and of one of the two constellations at *Nat*. 2.111. On both plural and singular forms, see Mynors (1990) on *Geo*. 3.381, with further references, esp. to Housman on Manilius 1. 555.

\(^{11}\) Such as Latin *pudet* ‘it shames’, *decet* ‘it is fitting’, etc., and the weather-verbs, e.g. *pluit* ‘it is raining’, which normally occur only in the sg. 3: on the various types of Latin ‘impersonal’ expressions, which differ e.g. as to whether they may take a ‘subject’ and/or one or more complements, see Pinkster (1990a: 23–4 & nn.); on impersonal constructions more generally, see Seefranz-Montag (1984), Lambert (1998), Bauer (2000).
Lecture I, 17

What, though, is the meaning of singular and plural? How do they compare with each other? The standard view is that the plural form expresses a multiple of what is expressed by the singular form. But even this is by no means always the case. Even in the personal pronoun this is not true. Gk ἡμεῖς means not ‘I and I’ but ‘I and you’, ‘I and those who belong to me’; similarly, ύμεῖς is not always an agglomeration of several singular yous. With personal names, too, a genuine multiplication in the plural is quite unthinkable: the plural of a personal name denotes a plurality of individuals who either have the same name, or are in some essential way comparable with the bearer of the name, in which case the proper name has really become a common noun, e.g. at Martial 8. 56. sōn Maccenas (pl.), non derunt, Flacce, Marones (pl.) ‘granted people like Maccenas, Flaccus, then there will be people like Vergil’. This form of expression is thoroughly familiar to us and was very common in later Greek and in Latin. But even if we confine ourselves to common nouns, we cannot say simply that the plural serves to denote a multiplication of the singular. It is better to put it like this: in the singular the meaning of the noun is viewed as a single unity, in the plural, as a multiple entity. This does not admit an a priori material difference of meaning.

Very often the singular is distributive, while the plural is used for counting. In other words, for denoting a plurality the singular is used when each individual member is held in view, the plural when the picture is of a number: this is how quisque (‘each’) and omnes (‘all’) are used in Latin; either can be used of equally large numbers. Or there may be any number of objects of which only one belongs to one person, the plurality being divided between different individuals. When, for instance, at Eur. Med. 1069 the mother addresses her children: δότ' ὃ θέκνα, δότ' ἀσπάσασθαι μητρὶ δεξιὰν χέρα (‘children, let your mother kiss your right hands!’), and then, kissing them, continues in the singular: ὁ φιλτάτη χείρ, φίλτατον δὲ μοι κάρα καὶ σχήμα καὶ πρόσωπον (‘O dearest hands, my dearest heads, and bodies and faces’), she is addressing in each case a plurality of right hands, heads, and faces but she uses the singular because each child has only one of each. The same applies in other languages, too, and it applies in Greek not only to body-parts but sometimes to things that are carried on the person. Thucydides, for example, has at 6. 58. 2 μετὰ γὰρ ἄσπίδας καὶ δόρατος εἰσώθεαν τὰς πομπὰς ποιεῖν ‘it was their custom to take part in the procession with shield and spear’. In
reality, this involved a number of shields and spears, but the singular is used because each man had just one shield and one spear.

Or take a second group of cases. It happens very frequently that we find the names of concrete objects in the singular when the idea is of a mass, in the plural when it is of the plurality of the individual pieces. So, κέραμος denotes the mass of tiles or clay wares, κέραμοι the individual pots; ἄμπελος the vines taken together, the vine as a whole, ἄμπελοι the individual vine trees; or, in Latin, caro the meat, carnis the pieces of meat. There are countless similar instances, especially in words for natural objects and the like, such as lapis (‘stone’), saxum (‘rock’), unda (‘water, wave’); often, the only difference between silua and siluae is that the singular silua denotes the wood as a whole, while the plural siluae implies the idea of the many trees in it.

A third case, which I should like particularly to emphasize, is to be seen in collectives. Let us take, by way of example, the word for ‘people, a people’ in various languages. In Homer, λαός is extremely common in both singular and plural without any material difference in meaning. We can, however, make something of a distinction by translating λαός as ‘people, host’ and λαοί as ‘the various people, retainers’. When the \( \text{plural} \) is used, the idea is more of the plurality of the crowd that constitutes the people; with λαός, the idea is more of the unity. In Attic, too, an appeal, say, to a mass of people can take a singular form. So, in Aeschylus’ *Eumenides* (997) we have \( χαλιβετ’, \) ἄστικος λεώς (‘greetings, people of this city!’). In an address, however, it is more usual to use the plural, e.g. in the old herald’s call \( ἄκοντες, λεώ ‘hearken, ye people!’\). Now, what is striking is that this pattern more or less repeats itself with synonymous words in other languages. In Latin we find, for instance, at Plin. Nat. 28. 4 intuentibus populis ‘as the people looked on’. The plural here is better than the singular because in the matter of looking on it is not the mass that is involved but rather each individual is an intuens (an onlooker). In some languages, this has even caused a partial shift in the grammatical number of the word. Latin gens survives in the French plural gens. In Old French the word is still a singular, although it takes a plural predicate. The modern form has the plural marked in its article (*les gens*). Similarly, English folks and German Leute have developed out of originally singular words. The same phenomenon is demonstrable in other collective

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1 On λαός see M. Schmidt’s article in *LfgrE*, s.v., with bibliography.

2 The context is of epileptics drinking the (still-warm) blood of gladiators killed in the arena. Most of the manuscripts have \( \text{ut bibentibus populis} \), but recent editors print \( \text{ut uiuentibus poculis} \) ‘as if with living cups (i.e., a draught of life?)’; poculis for populis goes back to the 1554 edition of Gelenius. W. quotes the conjecture of J. Sillig in the app. ad loc. in vol. 4 (1855) of his 8-vol. edn of the *Natural History* (2nd edn Hamburg & Gotha 1851–8).

3 Cf. *DALF*, s.v. ‘1. gent’. From plural λαοί ‘people’ was derived, albeit rarely, sg. λαός ‘person, individual’. On a similar development yielding Lat. gens ‘a pagan’ (cf. Hebrew goy ‘a gentile’), see Adams (1992: 10–12).
nouns, as for example in modern Greek πλήθος and ὀχλοῦ (in ancient terms, lit. ‘masses’, ‘crowds’) in the sense of ‘people’.

Fourthly, when the idea is not so much of a plural number as of the type or class—of an abstract plurality, as it were—then either singular or plural may be used. In that case the singular has much more abstract meaning. I am thinking of expressions of the type es irrt der Mensch, so lang er strebt (‘to err is human, let him only aspire’, lit. ‘the human being errs, as long as he aspires’). Exactly this kind of expression was possible in both Greek and Latin from the earliest times, although earlier on the plural is more common. In the last example from German, Homer would have said ἄνδρες (‘men’, pl.).

There are two interesting idioms of relevance here. First, the much-discussed phenomenon of the reference to peoples with singular forms. In colloquial German this is very common, as in e.g. der Russe wird den Krieg erklären (‘the Russian will declare war’). Hence, in imitation of colloquial speech, Schiller writes in Wallenstein’s Death (act 3, scene 15, Corporal to Wallenstein:) So treibst Du’s mit dem Schweden nur zum Schein? (‘Are you only pretending to carry on with the Swede?’). What is ancient usage in this situation? Homer doesn’t know this idiom at all. We saw earlier (I, 87 above) that he even, conversely, treats certain ethnics as pluralia tantum. It is almost unknown in tragedy, too, but it is frequent in the historians. We can distinguish some different types, and this makes the idiom easier to understand. A singular of this type is used, in the first place, of barbarians when viewed as an ethnic unity. This is the sense of Herodotus’ use of ὁ Πέρσης and ὁ Ἑλλην (‘the Persian’, ‘the Mede’) when he is speaking of the Persians and the Medes as peoples. Thucydides uses ὁ Μῆδος, ὁ βαρβάρος (‘the Mede’, ‘the barbarian’) in exactly the same way, and so too does Theognis. Here we can recognize—or at least imagine—the origin of the idiom. In Greek it is quite normal to denote the king of a barbarian people simply by means of the ethnic: e.g. in Herodotus ὁ Κῦμεις means simply ‘the king of the Cilices’. In the same way, in Πέρσης strictly the Great King himself was understood, as standing for the power of the barbarian state. There may possibly have been some influence at work here from oriental speech habits, since in the Old Persian cuneiform inscriptions the singular Ma¯da occurs denoting the Median people and their land (and there are many similar examples). We find corresponding terms used, much more rarely and more hesitantly, to refer to Greek peoples and states, ὁ Ἑλλην once or twice in Herodotus (e.g. 1. 69. 6), ὁ Συριακόσιος in Thucydides (e.g. 6. 78. 1). The rarity of this usage will incline us

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4 Goethe, Faust, Part 1, prologue in heaven (the Lord to Mephistopheles).
5 D. J. Butterworth has suggested to me that W. had in mind Theognis 829 Σύνῳν voc. sg.; note also ὁ Μῆδος in the 6th/5th-c. philosopher-poet Xenophanes of Colophon (no. 21 Diels & Kranz) B22, 5. For numerous further examples, with references, see Schwyzer & Debrunner 41–2.
6 On province names and ethnics in Old Persian, see Kent (1930: §§166–7).
to see it as something relatively recent. Certainly recent, in fact not attested before Imperial times, is this kind of singular in Greek when the subject is not a political and military power but a people in the ethnographic sense, as when, e.g., the grammarians use ὁ Δωρικός to mean speakers of Doric (e.g. Apollonius Dyscolus, *On Conjunctions*, **GG** II.1, 245).

In Latin we may in general assume that Greek usage has served as the model. When, for instance, Poenus is so frequently used to denote the Carthaginians, this is in close agreement with the practice of the Greek historians, and this usage is not common in Latin before Livy and his successors (cf. **RIEMANN** 1885: 42 ff.). Even so, I do not wish to be categorical on this point, as already in Naevius and Ennius, *Romanus, Poenus* and *Opscus* are used in a political / military sense, and noteworthy is the old proverb quoted by Varro at *Rust.* 1. 2. 2 *Romanus sedendo vincit* ‘the Roman conquers by sitting still’. The original thought here is probably of the power of the state, but Varro uses it of the Romans as individuals and, in any case, as a popular saying, it is not really likely to have been formed on a Greek model. Do note Ennius, *Annals* 60 Skutsch *Romanus homo*, which Cicero discusses at *De oratore* 3. 168 precisely because of the singular. Johannes **Geffcken** draws my attention to *Pomai* in the oracles in Phlegon of Tralles (2nd c. AD), *Marvels* 3. 67 and *Long-lived Persons* 4 (pp. 68, 92 Keller). (*ms. add.* 2: Excellent on the sg. of ethnonyms is LÖFSTEDT (1942: 12–24.).)

Next, a sort of odd counterpart to the use of the singular to denote a group: a plural can be used in a sort of generic sense, when just a single person is intended. This is found first in tragedy, especially in Euripides. Euripides, as you know, stands at the heart of the intellectual endeavours of his age and loves to take issue with developing views of the world. Occasionally, then, he will cite the representatives of a particular contemporary view. But when he makes them express themselves, he cannot refer to them | by name, as this would spoil the dramatic illusion. So what he usually does is to use a plural expression like *ὁ λέγων* even when he has in mind a single particular individual; others, too, such as Isocrates, used the plural in latent polemic of this sort. Instead of mentioning the individual, you name the group of people who represent the same attitude. Look, too, at **Welcker** (1839–41: I, 107) on Sophocles, fr. 305 Lloyd-Jones, and especially the remarks of Ferdinand Dümmel (1892: 269–73), repr. in his *Kleine Schriften*, II, 426–30.

There is another kind of plural reference to individuals to be seen in Latin. On this point we have a couple of testimonies from ancient scholars, first from Gellius (2. 13). He notes that the old orators and historians, and the poets too, like to use the plural *liberi* even when referring to individual sons or daughters.

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7 Of the *Book of Marvels* notice the useful recent edition, with introduction and (German) translation, by K. Brodersen (Darmstadt 2002).
He adduces by way of example a passage from the historian P. Sempronius Asellio (d. 99 BC), an account of a speech by Tiberius Gracchus: 2. 13. 5 _orare coepit id guidem, ut se defendent liberosque suas_ ‘he began to beg them to defend himself and his children’; Sempronius continues, ‘with these words Tiberius Gracchus presented to the people the one son that he had and, weeping, commended him to them’. Here the historian made Gracchus speak of _liberi_, although he had just one son. This use of _liberi_ was very widespread; I refer you to Köhm’s valuable book on Old Latin (1905: 117–19) and then to Landgraf’s commentary on Cic. Sex. Rosc. 96 (1914: 191–2). Now, _liberi_ is a _plurale tantum_; there was basically no singular word for ‘child’; _infans_ means just ‘under age’, ‘a minor’. This fact is relevant to the use of _liberi_, which we should translate in cases like the above with something like ‘offspring’.8 Exactly parallel is the use of _parentes_ of the mother of the Gracchi, adduced by Charisius (pp. 130–1 Barwick=GL I, 102, 27), so, too, the use of _mei, tui, nostri, uestri_ (‘my’, ‘your’ [sg.], ‘our’, ‘your’ [pl.], all nom. pl.) when just one family member is intended, and equally Cicero’s reference to his sister-in-law with _a domesticis_ (‘Quintus’s domestic circle’, Att. 1. 17. 3, no. 17 Shackleton Bailey). All these are really instances of _pluralia tantum_ and they depend not on the number of people referred to but on their relation to the speaker. We can say in German, _seine eigenen Leute haben ihn verraten_ (‘his own people betrayed him’), even if there was just one traitor in the family. Generic reference of this kind to a single individual is found also in Greek tragedy: Euripides, for example, uses τέκνα (‘children’) of Iphigenia (_Iph. Aul._ 1015) and _πατέρας_ (‘parents’) of Hecuba (_Hec._ 403).

A _fifth_ point: we can say—although it is difficult to get the feel of this—that the plural likes to be used when the idea is of something relatively extended in a spatial sense, while the singular is used when the relevant object is regarded as a unitary mass. A very interesting illustration of this is offered by the word _frumentum_ ‘corn’, as used by that supremely precise author, Julius Caesar. The idea of ‘corn’ is rendered both in the singular, with _frumentum_, and in the plural, with _frumenta_. The distinction between the two emerges particularly well from Gallic War 1. 40. 11 _frumentum Sequanos, Leucos, Lingones subministrare, iamque esse in agris frumenta matura_. We translate both _frumentum_ and _frumenta_ as ‘corn’: _corn_ (sg.) was being supplied by the Sequani, Leuci and Lingones, and the _corn_ (pl.) was already ripe in the fields. But the singular _frumentum_ denotes corn as a transportable foodstuff, the plural _frumenta_ the corn standing in the fields. Exactly this distinction occurs, within a single sentence, in another passage of Caesar (_Civil War_ 3. 49. 5). We cannot reproduce the distinction in German (or English), though we can still feel it to some extent.

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8 Michael Weiss reminds me of the indefinite use of English _children_: to the question ‘Do you have children?’ it would be odd to reply, ‘No, I have a child’, but quite normal to say, ‘Yes, I have one’. Cf. Corbett (2000: 9–19) on ‘general number’.
Sixthly, and differently again, the plural tends to be used of words for materials, and the like, for distinguishing different types. Just as we nowadays speak of ‘fats’, so uina are different ‘kinds of wine’, unguenta different ‘sorts of perfume’. Various manifestations of a single concrete object can also be expressed with this kind of plural: e.g. soles to sol (‘sun’). And we should recall also the possibility, especially characteristic of the classical languages, of putting abstract nouns in the plural. Take, for instance, Demosthenes, On the Crown 246: ἐκαστοχοῦ βραδυτῆτας ὁποιοις ἄγνοιας φιλονείας ‘the delay (pl.), hesitation (pl.), ignorance (pl.), jealousy (pl.) at every turn’, where the ἐκαστοχοῦ in particular (lit. ‘in each place’) serves to explain the use of the plural, or Plato, Laws 1, 625b κυπαρίσττων...ἄηθη καὶ κάλλη (‘tall and graceful cypress trees’, lit. ‘heights and beauties of cypress trees’). Homer often uses the plural of abstracts for no obvious reason, e.g. in the phrase ἀδρέισι νῶσο ‘out of ignorance’ (cf. I, 97 below). This is rare in German, though WUNDERLICH (1924–5: II, 90) adduces the title of a farce by Hans Sachs (1494–1576), Die drei fröhlichen döt (‘The Three Happy Deaths’)—compare Herodotus 6. 58. 2 κατὰ τῶν βασιλέων τῶν θανάτου (‘at the deaths of their [the Spartans’] kings’)—and this, from a letter of Levin Schücking (1814–83): sie hat alle drei Arten Hochmütte (‘she has all three kinds of arrogances’); GILDERSLEEVE & MILLER I, 21 §42 compare early modern English let us two prove our strengths.

Now, to two further points. So far, I have treated the referent more with regard to its meaning, but it is important to remember that the use of grammatical number is not always determined by purely semantic factors, but that analogy can play an important role, and that there are very many instances in which analogical extension has occurred or at least played a part. Let us take an example. | The Latin for ‘letter, epistle’ is litterae, the plural of littera ‘letter of the alphabet’. Modern French uses the same word but in the singular, and, within Latin, Ovid (Heroides 6. 9, Met. 9. 516) attests the earliest instance of the singular littera ‘letter, epistle’. We could explain this in terms of meaning, and say that the singular takes over because of the simple idea of the singularity of the meaning ‘epistle’ and the desire to express this in linguistic form. This semantic factor may have been relevant, but it was certainly important also that there existed a synonym epistula which offered an obvious singular form to imitate. Conversely, we often find the plural epistulae used with singular meaning (e.g. Plin. Epist. 10. 5. 1, Tac. Ann. 1. 30), undoubtedly because of the influence of the plural litterae.

I must speak at greater length about something that has yet to be clarified in the literature, namely the poetic plural. It was observed already by the ancient

9 Of parhelia and the like; cf. OLD, s.v., citing Livy 28. 11. 3, 29. 14. 3, and Sen. Nat. 1. 11. 2; 13. 3.
theorists that certain uses of the plural are confined to the poets. The great Aristotle himself discusses this at *Rhetoric* 3. 6, 1407b, where he enumerates everything that contributes to ὀγκός λέξεως, ‘loftiness of speech’, and includes τὸ ἐν πολλὰ ποιεῖν, ὅπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ ποιοῦσιν (‘making a single thing many things, as the poets do’). He illustrates this by saying that a tragic poet would use λυμένας εἰς Ἀχαικοῦς (‘into the Achaean harbours’), even if in context just one harbour were intended. This use of λυμένας is far from rare. Already in Homer, in book 13 of the *Odyssey*, the harbour of Ithaca is referred to sometimes in the singular (13. 96) and sometimes in the plural (13. 195). Even in later prose, in Polybius, this plural is used of a single harbour (e.g. 1. 42. 7). But to Aristotle’s linguistic intuitions the plural seemed strange, a poetic aberration. Well, if you are at all familiar with Homer, you will know how often a plural occurs where we expect a singular, what chaotic alternation there is in many words between singular and plural. On this subject there is a clever but rather ill-considered book by Kurt Witte, *Singular und Plural* (1907, with addenda 1913). Witte attempts to show that in Homer plural is used for singular and vice versa mainly in the interests of the aesthetics of the line, and invariably when a more or less remote synonym shows the other grammatical number. He assumes, for example, that the word φρήν ‘understanding’ was originally a plurale tantum and that it acquired the singular forms which are used by the poet only on the analogy of θυμός (‘mind, spirit’) and the like. In this particular case, he may be right, though his reader has to supply the proof. Outside Homer, you see, φρήν is indeed used predominantly in the plural and, given its primary meaning ‘diaphragm’, it is easy to suppose that it was originally used only in the plural. But this is the fundamental flaw in Witte’s book: he fails to ask in the first place what the ordinary usage of the word was, or what original meaning can be inferred from related languages. It is against these yardsticks that Homer and poetic language have to be measured; only then can we speak of a poetic modification of grammatical number, and Witte has failed to do this essential preliminary work. With regard to φρήν, φρένες, for example, he should give some account of how the isolated cases of singular and plural are to be explained in Herodotus and elsewhere. Even so, his book is highly stimulating and, given the freshness and power of its ideas, may be read with profit. 11 Before Witte, Maas (1902) and Bednara (1906) worked along similar lines on the Latin side. Both start from the assumption that these things are to be seen as artful or metrically conditioned innovations on the part of the poets. Here, too, a re-examination of the evidence is called for, and much remains far from clearly established. Let one instance serve as illustration. Bednara

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11 Indeed, Witte’s book contains a great deal of valuable material drawn from Greek poetry from Homer to Euripides and Aristophanes, and with appendices on Apollonius and prose-writers.
(1906: 533, 544) and MAAS (1902: 496–8) regard it as self-evident that when gaudia occurs instead of gaudium it is simply a poetic variant motivated by the fact that it fits the verse better. But this will not do, since French la joie continues the Latin neuter plural gaudia, which became feminine singular:12 we are surely not going to say that the French form was determined by metrical considerations!

12 Cf. French la feuille, Ital. foglia, Span. hoja, all ‘leaf’ fem. sg. ← Lat. folia neut. pl.; on this development, see p. 123 n. 7 above.
I must devote a few more paragraphs to grammatical number, starting with an idiom which involves personal pronouns and, relatedly, the persons of the verb. There is an extremely strong tendency in a range of languages, partly as a result of fundamental relatedness, partly through imitation, to use in numerous different connections a plural form for a single person. Very old—dating from as far back as we can trace the languages of Europe—is the idiom whereby an individual uses the 1st person plural when speaking of himself, even if he is talking of his own action which is proper to himself personally. In Homer there is a whole series of incontestable examples. An absolutely certain instance is at Iliad 22. 393, where Achilles, after killing Hector, says, Ἕκτωρ διῶν (‘we have won great glory, we have killed brilliant Hector’). Now, in the first part, about winning glory, Achilles could at a pinch be understood to be saying, ‘Through the glory that I have won, the Achaeans have attained glory.’ The killing of Hector, however, he accomplished alone, and not in company with the Achaeans, so that it is indisputable that ἐπέφυγεν stands for the singular ἐπέφυν. Corresponding to this use of the plural, Homer employs also the possessive pronoun ᾿ημέτερος (‘our’) in the sense of ῖμός (‘my’); let me give you two unquestionable instances. At Iliad 16. 244, Achilles speaks of Patroclus as ᾿ημέτερος θεράπων (‘our attendant’). The pronoun here can refer only to Achilles, as Patroclus was his attendant and his alone. Clearer still is Iliad 9. 108, where Nestor says to Agamemnon, ‘You took Briseis from Achilles’ and adds, οὐ τι καθ’ ᾿ημέτερον γε νόον ‘not at all in accord with my (lit. our) opinion’. The γε already makes this practically inapplicable to anyone but Nestor, and any doubts are removed by the very next words, μάλα γάρ τοι ἐγὼνε πόλλ’ ἀπεμυθήμην (‘for I tried very hard to dissuade you’). This use of the plural possessive by a single first person is particularly marked with the archaic form ᾿αμός (more correctly ᾿αμος). One can almost say that the use of this word with singular reference so dominates that there are places where the manuscript tradition has substituted ῖμός for ᾿αμός (e.g. Iliad 6. 414).

1 From *新浪财经 come by regular sound change Aeolic ᾿αμος, Doric ῖμος ‘our’. On these forms, cf. Schwyzer 608, Chantraine (1968: 187, 272), Rix (1976: 181), and on the singular uses of ᾿ημέτερος and ῖμείς (‘our’, ‘we’) in Homer, see Schwyzer & Debrunner 203, 243 and now Floyd (1969).
I confess that I cannot give a complete answer to the question how this idiom, so common already in Homer, came into being. Nevertheless, some thoughts suggest themselves. Often what you say about yourself is true also of your friends and relations: ἡμιέτερον δῶμα means originally what it says, ‘the house which belongs to me and mine’, though the dominant thought is that it is the personal property of the speaker. Similarly, there are activities, especially for warrior chieftains, which are shared with comrades to whom one can sometimes kindly refer with an inclusive plural. An example of this sort of intermediate case occurs in Ajax’ words at Iliad 7. 196 οὐ τῶν δεῖδαμεν ἐμῇς ‘we are afraid of no one at all’; he has just been speaking of the Greeks and he goes on to talk about himself alone.

It is of the poetic language in Greek that this idiom remains characteristic; there are examples in Pindar, but it occurs especially in tragedy. Since classical scholars have devoted such detailed research to the tragedians, a great deal has been written on this point. At Soph. Ant. 926 Antigone says: παθόντες (masc. nom. pl.) ἀν ἐγγυνοίμεν (pl. 1) ἡμαρτήκωτες (masc. nom. pl.) ‘when I have suffered, I could become conscious that I have done wrong’. Here we are struck not only by the plural but also by the fact that the participles are masculine, although a woman is speaking; there is a whole range of examples of this. Obviously, the masculine gender of this type of plural arose in cases where a speaker referred to himself as a member of a group. The form then stuck and was used in utterances which were interpretable only with reference to the individual speaker. In the line just quoted, both the becoming conscious and the wrongdoing are matters purely personal to Antigone herself. The feminine singular is, however, also found, e.g. in Lyssa’s words at Eur. Her. 858 ἢλιον μαρτυράμεισθα (pl. 1) δροῦσ’ (fem. nom. sg.) ἁ δραν οὐ βούλομαι ‘I call the sun to witness that I do what I do not wish to do’.

There is a close parallel in Latin, particularly in colloquial language. Cicero in his letters (e.g. To his Friends 2. 11. 1, 11. 29. 3) and Catullus in his less serious poems often use this kind of plural. Catullus sometimes mixes sg. 1 and pl. 1 forms in a single poem, e.g. at 107. 3–6 quare hoc est gratum nobis quoque, carius auro, | quod te restituis, Lesbia, mi cupidio, | restituis cupidio atque insperantī, ipsa referat te | nobis (‘and so to me, too, this is a pleasure more precious than gold, that you, Lesbia, restore yourself to me who longed for you, to me who longed but never hoped, yes, you yourself give yourself back to me’), or 68. 17 multa satis lusi: non est dea nescia nostri (‘I wrote playful poems enough: the goddess is not unaware of me’), etc. Here, too, I can really only report the phenomenon rather than explain it in any full sense.

2 e.g. Olymp. 11. 8, Pyth. 3. 2, 41; cf. Hummel (1993: 173).
3 See KG §371.2.
4 For further examples from these and other authors, see KS I, 88–9.
On, now, to two special cases of this idiom! First, the authorial plural. The *Odyssey* begins with the words, ἀνδρά μου ἐννεπε, Μοῦσα (‘Tell me, Muse, of the man’). The bard wishes to hear from the Muse what he is to tell his audience; at the end of the proem to the *Odyssey*, however, we have the words, εἰπέ καὶ ἡμῖν (‘starting from any point of this story of Odysseus,) tell the story to us, too’ (i.e. as you have told it to others). The least forced explanation of the ἡμῖν is to equate it with the earlier μοι. In this type of plural, in fact, the singer and the audience are taken together, and in the very earliest instance of a poet giving prominence to his own person, Hesiod in the proem to the *Theogony*, the word is ἀρχίωμεθα (‘let us begin’). The poet uses the word of himself, but he presents himself together with his audience.

This authorial plural is not found in every author. It would be interesting to investigate which authors speak of themselves in the sg. 1 and which in the pl. 1. Polybius, for example, is very fond of referring to himself in the plural. The same can be said of Tacitus. It is on exactly this point that Cicero (*De orat.* 3. 168) cites the well-known line of Ennius (*Ann.* 525 Skutsch) *nos sumus Romani qui fuitimus ante Rudini* (‘we, who once were Rudian, are (now) Roman’). The same thing is found in other literatures as well. GRIMM mentions (*D. Gr.* IV, 357) that the Nordic scalds use ‘we’ when they are speaking as poets, and this plural is not out of place in the language of modern scholarship and scholarly reviews.

A second special type of this ‘we’ for ‘I’ is the so-called *pluralis maiestatis*, used by persons of high rank who imagine that they represent a plurality compared with an ordinary human being. Xerxes already, in his letter to Pausanias in Thucydides (1. 129. 3), is made to refer to ἡμέτερος οἶκος (‘our house’), and this plural is usual among the Seleucids (SCHMID 1923). From the time of the Roman Emperors down to the present day, it has remained part of the style of princes and royalty, and related to it is the fact that periphrastic honorific designations of persons sometimes take the plural form, e.g. German *Ihro* for *clementia uestra* (‘your Grace’).

This brings us to the next point, that there is a plural of this type to be found also in second-person verb forms. This does not, however, include the use of the plural imperative of the verb with the vocative singular of a collective, as in

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5 Cf. de Foucault (1972: 84–5), noting the apparent sg./pl. alternation at e.g. s. 105. 9 σαφῶς, ὠμαώ, δεδέχαμεν ‘we have shown, I think, clearly’.

6 For example, at *Histories* 4.5.1, *Annals* 3.11.3, 4.32.1; for details and further references on Tacitus and other Latin authors, see Slotty (1927; 1927b; 1928) and Hofmann & Szantyr 19–20; on Greek and other languages, cf. Slotty (1927c).

7 That is, the (Greek-speaking) descendants of Seleucus, one of Alexander the Great’s generals and successors, who ruled the eastern part of Alexander’s empire, at its greatest extent from central Asia Minor to India, from 312/11 to the Roman settlement of the East under Pompey the Great in 63 BC.

8 *Ihro* for *Ihre* reportedly spreads from the start of the 18th c., and in his later years even Goethe uses it in formal expressions incl. titles; cf. D. *Wb.*, s.v. ‘ihro’, (3).
χαίρετε, λεώς (I, 93 above). Nor does it concern passages such as *Odyssey* 12. 81–2 ὑμεῖς νήα ... ἱθώνετε, φαιδμῦ ὘θυσεω 'steer (pl. 2) the ship, glorious Odysseus!', spoken by Circe, who has in mind also his companions, who steer the ship with him. What I have in mind rather is first and foremost the idiom whereby a plural form of address really is directed to a single individual (cf. I, 42 above). By and large, this is not a classical idiom—although examples can be found in Isocrates’ letters to persons of high rank (e.g. 2. 24, 4. 10), and in Callimachus (*Hymn* 4. 204, 227) and Nonnus: see Schmid (1923); it is, however, thoroughly modern. We may take it that a pl. 2 address to a single person is basically a transposed version of the *pluralis maiestatis*. The usage becomes established in the Roman Empire and is never lost. This type of address was used first of all to those of higher status, then to those one wished to honour, and eventually to anyone and everyone. It is found throughout Europe, not only in German but in French and in English (where it has ousted all other forms), and also e.g. in modern Greek and Slavic. It is a habit which has come in the end to affect the whole of the modern world: it is found even in modern Persian.

In German the use of the second person singular has become quite impossible outside family circles, and in rural dialects. (There is a splendid collection of evidence in *D. Gr.* IV, 356–76, and, on German in particular, in Ehrißmann (1901–4). On the alternation between sg. 2 and pl. 2 in Lithuanian, see Niedermann in *Antidoron* (1924: 165.)

A word now on the interesting position between singular and plural occupied by the so-called *neuter plural*. Anyone beginning Greek is surprised by the rule, illustrated by an example such as τὰ ζῷα τρέχει (‘the animals are running’), that, if the subject is neuter plural, the verb goes in the singular. The rule holds absolutely, however, only for Attic; it is a case in which something which used to be normal only under certain circumstances was applied consistently and made into a law. Thucydides offers an exception at 4. 88. 1 τὰ τέλη τῶν Λακεδαίμονίων ... Βραδίδων ἐξέσημων ‘the Spartan authorities (neut. pl.) sent out (pl. 3) Brasidas’. This belongs basically | with the type ὁς φᾶσαι ἡ πληθῦσ (‘this is what the crowd said’), in which a plural verb is used with a collective subject since the idea has to be of a number of different people (see I, 103–5 below). Thucydides does the same at 4. 15. 1 ἔδοξεν ... τὰ τέλη καταβάντας ... βουλεύειν ‘the authorities (neut. pl.) decided to go down (masc. acc. pl.) ... and deliberate’), while at 1. 58. 1 he has τὰ τέλη ... ὑπέσχετο ‘the authorities (neut. pl.) ... undertook (sg. 3)’. The other dialects are less consistent: on Herodotus’ usage, see Stein (1877–89) on

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9 The modern Greek pattern of usage arose in the 19th century, in imitation of the French polite use of vous. See further, on the forms and use of modern Greek ὑμεῖς (‘you’, pl., the form replacing ancient ὑμεῖς from the 4th c. AD), Horrocks (1997a: 126–7), Holton et al. (1997: 95, 197–8), and on Slavic, Corbett (1993: Index, s.v. ‘pronoun, of non-familiar address and personal’).

10 The situation in modern Persian is complex, and status-differentiation affects also 1st- and 3rd-person pronouns; for a detailed but lucid account, see Beeman (1986: ch. 6 ‘Persian socio-morphology’).
3. 88. 14; in Doric, the tablets of Heraclea seem to prefer the plural.\textsuperscript{11} This makes us perhaps anxious to know Homer’s position on this point. There is a particularly fine treatment of this by Delbrück in his ‘Foundations of Greek Syntax’ (1879: 20–6). Homer does both. Now, admittedly this is based in part on purely poetic licence: at \textit{Iliad} 2. 135 δοῖρα (‘spears’) has a singular verb (σέσηπε (‘are rotten’), sg. 3) but σπάρτα (‘ropes, cables’), although very similar semantically, has a plural (λέλυνται (‘are loosed’), pl. 3). This is poetic exploitation of two alternative constructions which were available in the living language and which were based on a semantic opposition. In general, however, what Delbrück establishes holds good, namely that, where the idea is predominantly of a unitary mass, the verb is in the singular, so with words such as οἰκία ‘house’, δοστέα ‘skeleton’, χρήματα ‘property’, μῆρα ‘heap of thighs’, ὀρέα ‘mountain range’; we can show this by translating them with singular nouns. When, however, a numeral is present, the verb goes in the plural. There is an interesting alternation in the constructions taken by δοῖρα: the verb is singular when it means ‘beams, timber-work’ or when a ‘pile of spears’ is understood; but when individual spears are intended, when they do not constitute a mass, then the verb is in the plural, as e.g. at \textit{II.} 5. 656–7. Analogously, the neuter dual ὀσεῖ ‘eyes’ takes usually a dual or plural verb, but on three occasions a singular (\textit{II.} 12. 466 δεῦτε ‘blazed’, 23. 477 δέρκεται ‘looks’, \textit{Od.} 6. 132 δαιέται ‘blazes’).

It is easy to show that this usage is not a Greek innovation, as it is found also in the \textit{Rigveda} and in the Avestan hymns of Zoroaster.\textsuperscript{12} In other words, it is inherited, and it reflects the fact that the plural of the neuter does not have the same meaning as the plural of masculine and feminine. The notions ‘one’ and ‘more than one’ are not so sharply distinguished in the neuter as in the other genders. Compare the fact that in Homer ἡμιρ (‘day’, sg.) is used in parallel with νύκτες (‘nights’, pl.)—cf. \textit{II.} 5. 490 (= 22. 432, 24. 73), \textit{Od.} 24. 63, etc., and also Pindar, \textit{Pythian} 4. 256\textsuperscript{13}—thus being at the same time both singular and plural, even though the plural form ἡματα exists. Especially important, however, is what Johannes Schmidt demonstrated in his learned book (1889) on the plural forms of neuters in Indo-European, regarding the primary relatedness of the neuter plural with certain singular collectives of feminine gender. In a sense, the Romance languages regressed to an ancient state of affairs when feminine singulars evolved out of Latin neuter plurals, as in \textit{la voile} (‘sail’) from Lat. \textit{uela}, or \textit{la joie} (‘joy’) from Lat. \textit{gaudia}. Further, one can compare the fact that in languages

\textsuperscript{11} Collitz & Bechtel no. 4629, Buck no. 79 (Table I only), e.g. I, 112 πάντα τὰς πόλεις ἔσωσται ‘all will belong (pl.) to the city’.

\textsuperscript{12} And, we can now add, in Hittite; cf. Friedrich (1960: §196), Watkins (2004: 572). In Vedic, there are a few examples of the construction in the \textit{Rigveda}; see Macdonell (1916: 289). In Young Avestan, the construction is rare, but in Gāthic Avestan it is the norm; see Reichelt (1909: §619).

\textsuperscript{13} See Braswell’s fine note on the Pindar passage (1988: \textit{ad loc.}).
which make a formal distinction between words for animate and inanimate objects (in Mexicano, for example), only the animate nouns have a plural (Misteli 1893: 124–6).  

So, considered from the point of view of its prehistoric origin, this construction of the neuter plural seems perfectly reasonable. It must, nevertheless, have been felt to be an oddity, since the function of the neuter plural was similar to that of the masculine and feminine plural and, except in the nominative-accusative, had the same sets of endings. Consequently, the construction was lost in prehistoric times in most of the Indo-European languages, including Latin and Germanic, and Indic and Iranian gave it up very early in the historical period. It is preserved most faithfully in Attic Greek, though in the Koine, which is based on Attic, it begins to decline, with the result that in, for example, the New Testament and early Christian literature there is considerable variation in its use; cf. Blass & Debrunner (1913 [= 1961]: §133). There is no trace of the construction in modern Greek.

Let us follow this discussion straightaway by recalling the tendency to treat singular nouns with plural meaning as plurals, despite their form, and when, e.g., they are in subject position, to put their verb in the plural (even though this topic really belongs under grammatical agreement). In the Slavic languages, this is practically a rule with collectives denoting a number of persons,  

and the situation is similar in the Indo-European languages of Asia.  

In Greek there are examples already in Homer. The little phrase (II. 2. 278) ὁσις φάσαν ἦ πιλθος (‘so said (pl.) the crowd (sg.)’) was already in antiquity the stock example of the ‘constructio kata σύνεσιν’ (‘construction according to sense’). But it is not only the poetic language (cf. e.g. Bacchylides 17 Snell & Maehler, 92–3 τρέσσαν ... γένος ‘the group trembled’) that shows this freedom: some of the dialects attest in ordinary speech a regular preference for the usage. In Cretan, πόλεις, στρατός (‘city’, ‘army’) and similar nouns regularly take a plural verb. It is found elsewhere in Greek, too, without being exactly a norm.

We find the same phenomenon in Italic territory. It can be shown in Oscan,  

and, more commonly than in Greek, in Latin, where it permeates practically the whole of the literature. It is there already in Plautus in sentences such as Trin. 35
faciunt pars hominum (‘some people (lit. a part (sg.) ) do (pl.)’) and with the singular of the indefinite pronoun at e.g. Capt. 500 ubi quisque uident (‘where they each (sg.) see (pl.)’). Elsewhere in pre-classical Latin, uolgus (‘the crowd, the common people’) takes the same construction, and there are examples also in the inscriptive evidence for archaic Latin. That the best classical authors shrink from this usage is only natural. | Cicero uses this plural only if the collective to which the verb refers is in an earlier clause. Caesar, too, shows restraint, though we do find even so e.g. Gallic War 2. 6. 3 nam cum tanta multitudo lapides ac tela coicerent (‘since such a large crowd (sg.) were throwing (pl.) stones and missiles’). In Livy, by contrast, the construction is very common, so e.g. at 35. 26. 9 cetera classis . . . fiquerunt (‘the rest of the fleet (sg.) . . . fled (pl.)’), although here the determiners which come between subject and verb make the use of the plural easier; cf. Riemann (1885: 256).

Then there is a group of instances common to Greek and Latin. In the Attic Nights 1. 16, in one of the four chapters devoted to linguistic archaisms and curiosities, Aulus Gellius discusses the pre-classical use of mille ‘a thousand’ and alludes to the fact that in early writers it could take the genitive of the thing counted, e.g. mille nummum (‘a thousand (of ) coins (gen. pl.)’)—and also a singular adjective (milli uno ‘one thousand’ in Lucilius, 365 Warminster)—and that then, in subject position, it took a singular verb: so Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 1. 16. 1, quotes from the annalist Claudius Quadrigarius, ibi occiditur mille hominum (lit. ‘in that place is killed (sg.) a thousand of men’, FRH fr. 44). Isolated instances of this occur still in Classical Latin; Gellius adduces two examples from speeches of Cicero (Mil. 53 hominum mille ‘a thousand [of] men’, and Phil. 6. 15 mille nummum ‘a thousand [of] sesterces’), and we can add e.g. Letters to Atticus 4. 16. 8 (no. 80 Shackleton Bailey) ut mille passuum conficiatur (‘that [the colonnade] be made a thousand [of] steps [a mile]’). Gellius’ judgement of the phenomenon is correct: mille is originally a neuter noun and corresponds to Greek χιλιάδες. From a formal grammatical point of view, then, this construction with the singular is correct. It is, however, very natural that early on with mille used as a noun in this way plural verbs turn up, so at Plautus, Trin. 425–6 mille drachumarum . . . reeditae (‘the thousand (sg.) drachmas (gen. pl.) . . . are repaid (pl.)’), although here admittedly the plural reeditae was made easier by the intervening clause quas . . . adhibuisti (‘which . . . you provided’). Moreover, mille began early on to degenerate into an adjective and to serve as an attribute of plural nouns.

For centum and ἕκατών (‘one hundred’), which appear only with this plural-adjectival value, we must suppose an analogical prehistoric development. Originally, the word for ‘100’ was a neuter collective noun, and in subject position took its verb in the singular. There is, however, no trace of this in the record; the meaning won out over the form, so to speak. The same is true of the ‘tens’,
‘twenty’, ‘thirty’, etc., which will have been influenced by the adjectival character of the single-figure numerals.

This kind of formal lack of agreement with the verb is so natural that there is hardly a language where it is not found. In Germanic, it is observed from the Gothic Bible on, although here, faced with a subject of this type, the translator often replaces the singular of the Greek original with a plural noun. So, for instance, at Mark 3: 32 setun managei (‘there sat many’) for ἐκάθητο... ὁ χλός (‘there sat a crowd’), and Luke 1: 21 was managei béiandans (‘there were (lit. was) many waiting’) for ἦν ὁ λαός προανάκκων (‘the people was awaiting’ [Zacharias]). In Modern | High German, recall the plural construction with eine Menge (‘a crowd’) when the word for the components of the mass or crowd immediately follows, as e.g. in eine Menge Leute kamen (‘a crowd (sg.) of people came (pl.)’).

Even the attribute of a collective may appear in the plural. Richard Meister (of Greek dialects fame) believed, perhaps rightly, that he had an example of this in an Arcadian inscription, the so-called ‘ordeal of Mantinea’ (IG V.2, 262, 16), in the phrase πε' τοῖς Ποικιλάται, which must mean ‘with the slaves’ as a group (Meister 1911: 203–4). Here the meaning ‘group of slaves’ would be in the singular, its article, however, in the plural.18 This phenomenon is certainly attested in Gothic, where the neuter collective fadrein ‘family, parents’ is combined with the plural of the article, e.g. þai fadrein, and the verb is also in the plural (John 9: 20, 22, of the parents of the blind man healed by Jesus). In the letters of St Paul, fadrein itself even acquires plural endings (e.g. 2 Corinthians 12: 14, 1 Timothy 5: 4). Something very similar is attested in Slavic (see Delbrück 1893–1900: III, 234–6).19

18 More recent editors suppose that the final -ς of Ποικιλάται was omitted in error; cf. e.g. Buck no. 17, followed by Thür & Taeuber (1994: no. 8).
19 Cf. Comrie & Corbett (1993: Index, s.v. ‘noun, collective’).
Lecture I, 19

When we speak of ‘personal’ forms of the verb, we are following ancient usage. In the little grammar book of Dionysius Thrax, the word πρόσωπον is used in this connection, and this was rendered in Latin with persona (first in Varro, Lat. Lang. 8. 20, Cic. Part. Orat. 18). When we follow this by speaking of ‘persons’ of the verb, we are admittedly using the term not quite in the sense actually intended to begin with. What we mean by ‘person’ was not denoted at all by πρόσωπον at the time when Greek grammatical terminology was being coined. πρόσωπον means originally ‘face, countenance’. Then, in the language of the theatre, it is the word for the actor’s mask, the artificial face which the ὑποκρέτης puts on, and from this it denotes also the role, the character which the actor has to play. This is how the word is used in Attic, and it is not used beyond these contexts. It was only gradually that the habit developed, from this starting point, of using πρόσωπον also for the role that one plays in life, for one’s personal position. Latin-speakers used persona to translate πρόσωπον not in the meaning ‘face’ but in all its secondary meanings. The original meaning of persona was ‘mask’ and is probably Etruscan in origin, which is explained by the fact that the Romans learned the dramatic arts from the Etruscans. Then the word for ‘mask’ acquired also the extra, more recent meanings of the corresponding Greek word. Persona ‘theatrical role’ and ‘role in life’ is a semantic borrowing. The same applies to persona as a grammatical term. When the grammarians speak of three πρόσωπα, three persona, they are thinking of the three roles in which a speaker can appear. We are used to speaking of ‘1st’, ‘2nd’, and ‘3rd’ person and to putting the forms of the verb in this order, which seems obvious to us but is not necessarily so. We find

1 For a good recent introduction to the grammatical category of person in languages of all sorts, see Siewierska (2004). The word persona is indeed generally regarded as a borrowing by Latin from Etruscan, which had borrowed the word in turn from Greek. On Etruscan loanwords in Latin, see the classic article by Ernout (1929) and the recent study by Watmough (1997); on Greek loanwords in Etruscan, see De Simone (1968–70).

2 It is worthwhile to distinguish purely semantic borrowings (sometimes called semantic calques) of the persona-type, where the word already exists in the borrowing language and it is only its meaning that is extended to match that of the foreign model, from morphological loan-translations (or calques), in which a new form enters the borrowing language (e.g. Cicero’s qualitas ‘quality’ for Gk ποιότης). On these two types in Latin (here termed loan-shifts and calques, respectively), see most recently Adams (2003: 459–68) with numerous further references.
the reverse order in the Indian grammarians, who put the 3rd person first because it is semantically the most general.³

Let us go a little more closely into the substance of the matter! When we define the verb in terms of its formal properties, we must say first of all that a word may be called a verb when it has a personal ending. But there are verbal forms which have no proper personal endings. This is true, strictly speaking, of the singular forms of the imperative, which consist only of the bare temporal stem (cf. I, 85 above): λέγε (‘speak!’), sg. 2 impv., e.g., is identical with the stem of λέγετε (pl. 2). From a formal point of view, then, these forms are neutral with respect to person. This fact may lie behind a phenomenon that is seen particularly in the Greek dramatists and which has been frequently commented on. In these authors, the 2nd singular of the imperative can be used also in commands to unspecified third persons. This happens especially when we have the subject determined by a singular such as πᾶς (‘everyone’), as, for instance, in the Ὀδυσσεῖς of the comic playwright Cratinus, fr. 151 (PCG IV) αἰγαν νυν πᾶς ἔχε, σίγα ‘everyone keep quiet now!’; where ἔχε (sg. 2) stands for ἔχετω (sg. 3). There are numerous parallels in Aristophanes. Euripides does something similar with τίς at Bacchae 173 ἵτω τίς, εἰσόγγελλε (‘let someone go (sg. 3) and announce (sg. 2) it in the palace’). In Aeschylus, this sort of imperative is sometimes found spoken into the air, when the speaker has no one particular in mind; cf. BLASS (1907: 265–6) on Agamemnon 1125 (Cassandra) ἀπεχε τῆς βοῶς τὸν ταύρον (‘keep the bull from the cow!’).

Furthermore, not all verbs and not all verb stems have all three persons attested. For obvious reasons, the imperative does without sg. 1; to what extent we may speak of a pl. 1 imperative is a question we shall consider later. Conversely, some forms occur only in the 1st person, such as Latin quaeso, quaesumus, interjections meaning ‘please’ (lit. ‘I ask’, ‘we ask’). We can well understand why a verb of asking is confined to the first person. Sometimes a verb is defective for purely formal reasons: for example, the fact that in Latin no sg. 1 was made to fatur is due to a general aversion to monosyllabic verbal forms, so that *for ‘I say’ would have stuck out as an oddity.

But in verbs which do distinguish three persons, what is the pattern of their use? We shall confine ourselves in the first instance to the classical languages. Given that the subject is now specified in the personal ending of these verbal forms, to what extent can they have with them in the same clause a subject separately expressed? This is straightforwardly clear in the so-called 3rd person, where, if the subject does not emerge clearly from the context, it is absolutely normal for a pronoun or noun in the nominative to stand alongside the verb to specify more closely the third person of which the meaning of the verb is

³ Apparently, with the sole exception of the Jain grammarian Devanandin (3rd–8th c. AD), who uses the order 1st, 2nd, 3rd; cf. Scharfe (1977: 168 n. 4).
predicated. In this connection let me highlight the fact that Attic has even a nominative of the indirect reflexive. This is very rare in the singular, ἐ (fem.!), commoner in the plural, ὑφείς; forms of αὐτός are used in the same sense, as are forms of ipse in Latin.

On the first person, singular and plural, two remarks need to be made. First, in early Greek it is not unheard of for a separate subject form to appear even in the first person, as regularly in the third person. A subject, whether noun or pronoun, can be added to a verb in the first person. I should like to give a pair of examples of the noun type. In Thucydides, at the beginning of the letter that Themistocles sends to the Great King, we read, at 1. 137. 4 θεμιστοκλῆς ἦκω παρὰ σέ Ἰ, Themistocles, have come to you’. Analogously, Tacitus puts the following words in the mouth of Mithridates, at Annals 12. 18. 2 Mithridates sponte adsum Ἰ, Mithridates, have come of my own free will’. It is, however, particularly the nominatives of the pronouns, masculine and feminine, which appear in this way (from Homer on) as subjects of first- and second-person verbs. So if, for instance, a relative pronoun refers to a first-person subject, and this relative pronoun is itself a subject, its verb will also be in the first (or, mutatis mutandis, second) person, as, e.g., at Odyssey 9. 466–7 φάνημεν οἵ φύγομεν θάνατον (‘we who had escaped death appeared’), or at Iliad 23. 707 (= 753) ὁρνυθ’ οἱ καὶ τοῦτον ἀέθλου πειρῆςεσθ’ (753 πειρῆςεσθ’ ὁρνυθ’ οἱ καὶ τοῦτον ἀέθλου) (‘get up, you (two) who will make trial of this contest, too’). This is not confined to relative clauses. The phrase οἱ ἄλλοι (‘the others’), for example, occurs variously with pl. 1 or 2 verbs. Notice also Odyssey 7. 307 δύσζηλοι γὰρ ἐμὲν ἐπί χθονί φῶλ’ ἀνθρώπων (‘we are jealous we tribes of men upon the earth’), and there are similar instances in Attic Greek. Notice, too, passages such as Iliad 10. 82, where one person says to the other, τίς δ’ οὖν... ἐρχεῖς; ‘who are you who comes here?’ Compare Plautus, Menæchmi 779 uter mereustis culpam ‘which of you two is deserving of culpa’. It should really be meruit but, since it is an address, the second person is used and, since the address is to two people, the plural; cf. Men. 785 neuter ad me iretis (‘that neither of you should come to me’). Broadly speaking, this belongs to the instances of the plural discussed earlier (I, 103 above).

The other question we must consider is this: under what circumstances is the so-called personal pronoun used with the verb in the first and second person? It goes without saying that the pronoun is used to express special emphasis on a person, e.g. in Lysias 1. 26 οὐκ ἐγὼ σε ἀποκτενώ, ἀλλ’ ὁ τῆς πόλεως νόμος ‘it is not I who will put you to death but the law of the city’. Related to this, to some extent, is the frequency with which Gk σο/ Lat. tu is added to the imperative, especially in Latin, when the speaker wishes to draw the addressee’s attention to the fact that he is being addressed.

But this is not the only use of the pronoun in the nominative in ancient Greek and Latin. I begin with an isolated instance. In Ionic prose, as we know it from
Herodotus, the result clause answering to a conditional clause likes to have a δέ, and this δέ likes to have the support of a pronoun. If the verb is in the third person, we find something like ἐλ μὴ οὔτῃ ἑλεύθουν... γνωσκεις, σὺ δὲ παρὰ Ἀτόσσης πυθεῖ ‘if you do not recognize Smerdis yourself, then ask Atossa’. Apart from this, however, it is very common in ordinary speech in both Greek and Latin for the pronoun to be added pleonastically, and also to be appended in a semi-enclitic fashion. The latter phenomenon looks very striking, but, to judge from Indic parallels (cf. Ai. Gr. III, §224d), may be inherited. MEYER-LÜBKE (1897: 331–3) shows very nicely from Petronius how colloquial Latin behaves in this respect in the early Empire. Here, an unemphatic ego or nos appears more frequently at the head of the clause, or after a sentence-opening particle, than immediately after the verb. Obviously, the need was felt for the person of the subject to be announced as early as possible. From an Ego... volui (‘I wished’) of this type, with weakly accented ego in first position, there developed e.g. French je voulu with proclitic connection of the pronoun on the verb. 4

This brings us to the usage of modern times. Still today in Greek, the nominative of the personal pronoun is used with the verb only when it would have been usual in ancient Greek. While no further development has taken place here, there have been changes in the Romance languages, though to different degrees. Italian and Romanian behave like colloquial Latin. Spanish and Portuguese have gone further, while in Modern French the use of the pronoun is obligatory. It is essentially the same in Modern High German, although here the pronoun may be omitted in particular cases. 5

We turn now to consider the actual functions of the personal forms. We shall always relate our view of them closely to their semantic context, and on this I recall my earlier remarks I, 41–2 above, in connection with GRIMM 1866: on changes of person in speech. Related to the polite use discussed there of pl. 1 for sg. 2 is the use of pl. 1 for a general human activity, in passages such as Od. 7. 307 (quoted on I, 107 above), Ovid, Amores 3. 4. 17 nitimur in uetitum semper cupimusque negata (‘we always strive after what is forbidden and desire what is refused’; cf. also line 25), or Caesar, Civil War 2. 27. 2 quae uolumus, et credimus libenter (‘we readily believe what we want to believe’); cf. Gallic War 3. 18. 6 fere libenter homines id quod uolunt credunt (‘people generally like to believe what they wish’). ZUBÁTÝ (1907: 483) compares Lithuanian mātem ‘one sees’ (pl. 1 of mąšti

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4 On the placement of nominative personal pronouns in Latin, see now Adams (1999), and on the placement of unstressed pronouns in general, Adams (1994a), both with further references. On the development of the syntax of the personal pronouns from Latin to Romance, see Harris (1978: 111–14).

5 On the use of the subject pronouns, see further, on modern Greek, Holton et al. (1997: 108), on Romance, Harris (1978: 111–20) and Harris & Vincent (1982: Index, s.v. ‘pronouns, subject’), on German, Hammer & Durrell (1991: §3.1.1).
‘to see’).—Let us not forget the soliloquy, attested in literature from Homer on. Self-address is done in the first person from an early date; it is always so in Homer except at Od. 20. 18 τέπλαθη δή, κραδίη (‘endure, my heart!’). This alternative approach, of addressing one’s heart and soul in the second person is followed by Archilochus, elegy and lyric, but is not found in tragedy before Euripides, who is also the first (with the possible exception of Sappho, in fr. 133 Lobel & Page) to attest formal soliloquy, again with the verb in the second person, e.g. at Med. 401–2 φείδου μοθέν ἄν ἐπίστασαι, Μήδεα (‘spare none of your skills, Medea!’). Very good on this, and on the later developments in Greek and Latin, is Leo’s study of the monologue in drama (1908: 94–113), with reference to Grimm’s discussion mentioned above, where (1866a: 281 ff.) this whole form of expression is traced through the Germanic languages as well. Grimm (1866a: 293 ff.) refers to the use of first- and second-person forms as ‘I-’ and ‘You-’ monologue respectively, ‘which could also be distinguished as monologues of first and second degree’; ‘a monologue of the second degree will be stronger inasmuch as “you” is stronger than “I”’.

As for the second person, it is well known that in Greek and Latin an activity which ought to be predicated of someone unspecified is often attributed to the person addressed and accordingly the verb is in the second person, as at Il. 4. 223 ἐνθ’ οὐκ ἂν βρίζωντα ἵως Ἀγαμέμνονα δίον ‘then you would not have seen brilliant Agamemnon asleep’. In effect, an ideal person is addressed, something like, ‘if you, hearer of the poet, had been there, you would not have seen him asleep’. This idiom is common in Homer particularly in expressions of the type οὐκ ἂν φαῖν (‘you would not say’). Homer uses in this way the 2nd person of the optative (with ἂν) and of the future. Later writers do the same, only they admit also imperfect and aorist with ἂν. On the other hand, Greek idiom does not allow a present or perfect indicative in this function: since the person addressed is not really carrying out the action of the verb, but is merely a hypothetical addition, a hypothetical form of the verb is called for. Correspondingly, in Latin we find the subjunctive, e.g. crederes, diceres ‘one could believe’, ‘one could say’. The brilliant author of the work Περὶ ὑψος (‘On the Sublime’)7 has a splendid appreciation of this idiom in chap. 26. I would also refer you to an observation of the Dutch scholar Cobet (cf. I, 30, 41 above), a particularly sensitive Hellenist: it bears on Demosthenes’ speech Against Meidias, 21. 33 τὸν ἀρχοντα... ἐὰν μὲν... πατάξῃς (sg. 2) ἕ... κακός εἰπης ‘if you (indef.) assault or insult an official’. This is the reading of the best manuscript (Parisinus, graecus 2934, 9th c.), which however contains the variant reading, in common with the other manuscripts, πατάξῃ τις (‘if’)

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7 This immensely subtle and influential work of ancient literary criticism, probably of the 1st c. AD, is attributed in the manuscripts to both ‘Dionysius Longinus’ and ‘Dionysius or Longinus’; see D. A. Russell’s article “‘Longinus’” in the OCD.
anyone assaults’ sg. 3). Cobet (1876: 505) remarks quite rightly that it runs completely against Attic usage to speak of ignominious actions in the second person in this way and so to impute them hypothetically to the addressee. This would be crude and hence Cobet is of the view that here the reading of the inferior manuscripts is to be preferred. I might add that this form of expression has developed independently in many different languages; its use in the Baltic languages and in Russian, where it is particularly frequent, is discussed by Zubaty (1907: 480–2).

While this is an instance of a form of address in which an unspecified person is imagined as the agent, the converse is also found, where the indefinite pronoun is made to do service for a definite form. In the modern languages this is nowhere commoner than in French, where on is often used to refer not only to the speaker but also to the person addressed, i.e. instead of je, tu, vous. Littré treats this extremely well in his famous big Dictionnaire de la langue française (1859–72: s.v. ‘on’, §3). The starting point for this phenomenon is the speaker’s desire to put his own person into the background, and doing the same with an addressee also reflects a sort of reserve. This is, as I say, very common in French, but it is not confined to French. Wunderlich adduces a lovely instance from Gottfried Keller’s Sinngedicht (Gesammelte Werke VII, 15): ‘Weil ich ihn nicht leiden kann.’—‘Ei, und warum kann man ihn nicht leiden?’ (‘Because I can’t bear him.’—‘Ah, and why can’t one bear him?’) Obviously, it should be: ‘Warum könnt Ihr ihn nicht leiden?’ (‘Why can you not bear him?’), but the speaker pretends, out of kindness, that this aversion is a general one, common to all mankind. (Grimm’s view of this idiom is somewhat different: cf. D. Gr. IV, 256).—Very similar in Greek are τις- clauses with sg. 3 verb referring either to the speaker or to the addressee. The former is common in tragedy and comedy, as at Sophocles, Ajax 403 ποί τίς οὖν φύγῃ; (‘whither then can one flee?’), followed immediately by ποί μολὼν μένων; (‘where can I go and find refuge?’) (see the commentaries on this passage for collections of parallels). Particularly in questions of this kind, uttered in difficulty or desperation, the speaker shrinks from talking expressly of his own personal fate and action, and behaves as if the issue concerned all humanity. | We should bear in mind other situations which occasion this form of expression: e.g. in Epictetus an ignominious wish is expressed in this form, at 2. 18. 15 σήμερον καλὸν ἵδιον ἢ καλὴν οὖκ εἶπον αὐτὸς

8 See the edition of this speech by D. M. MacDowell (Oxford 1990).
9 The great Parisian philologist and philosopher Émile Littré (1801–81) is probably better known to classicists for his editions of Hippocrates (1839–61) and of Pliny the Elder (1848–50), but his greatest work is this dictionary, known as ‘the Littré’, which may still be consulted with immense profit.
10 The Zurich-born Swiss writer Gottfried Keller (1819–90) is best known for his novel Green Henry (Der grüne Heinrich, 1855; rev. 1880); cf. I, 292 and II, 14 below. Remarkably, vol. 7, p. 15 remains the correct reference to the passage here cited in the most recent edition of Keller’s works (Sämtliche Werke: Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe, ed. W. Morgenthaler, 32 vols, Basel, Frankfurt, and Zurich 1996–)!
έμαντω ὅτι ἀφιέρων τίς μετὰ ταύτης ἐκομιμήθη’ (‘today, on catching sight of a handsome boy or pretty girl, I did not say to myself, “If only one might sleep with her”’). Similarly, τίς is to be found when the actual reference is to a second person, especially in sentences which contain a threat or warning (cf. BRUHN 1899: 54).

In the third person, it is normal (apparently so, at least) for the subject to be given either by the context or by a noun or pronoun in the nominative which goes with the verb. It also happens, however, that no specific or known subject is given. We can distinguish three types of case.

(1) The use of the pl. 3 in the sense of ‘one’ of an action performed by people unspecified. In Greek and Latin, this usage is really common only with verbs of saying, as in Gk λέγουσιν, Lat. dicunt for ‘one says, it is said’. The unspecified group of speakers is conceived as subject; with a verb of saying this form of expression is particularly likely, and seems still to be the prevailing form in modern Greek (cf. TTHUMB 1910: §254.3). In New Testament Greek, however, we repeatedly find pl. 3 forms of this type with quite different verbs, e.g. at Luke 6: 44–5 συλλέγουσι σύκα . . . σταφυλήν τρυγᾶσι (‘they collect figs . . . they eat grapes’). The reason here is clear: the use of the pl. 3 active to denote the action of an indeterminate group of people is Semitic, and characteristic in particular of Hebrew and Aramaic. Here, then, we have another Semitic feature in the language of the New Testament (cf. I, 8 above).11 An interesting feature of Wulfila’s Gothic translation is that Greek pl. 3 forms of this kind are occasionally put into the passive, e.g. in the passage just quoted, Luke 6: 44–5 lisanda smakkans . . . trudanda weinabasja (lit., ‘are gathered figs (acc. pl.) . . . are trodden grapes (nom.-acc. pl.’)).12 In cases of this sort, Luther uses man with the sg. 3, e.g. in the above passage he has twice man lieset (‘one collects’). This illustrates what clear evidence translations may give us as to what is a living idiom in a language, and what is less common. (In general on the use of the pl. 3 in the sense of ‘one’, see ZUBATÝ 1907: 497–501.)

12 Cf. Streitberg (2000: ad loc.).
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(2) A second important usage is the **indefinite sg.** 3, and the prime examples of this come in early Latin and Greek legal phraseology. The ‘Laws of the Twelve Tables’ are among our oldest evidence for the Latin language, and it is study of their language that can show, contrary to the doubts of one or two historians, the genuinely archaic character of the text of these laws: they present Latin as we must suppose it to have been in the fifth century BC.1 Well, here we find sentences such as 1.1 *si in ius uocat, ni it, antestamino* ‘if (one man) calls (another) to a pre-trial, and he (the latter) does not go, let there be an *antestatio* (summoning of witnesses)’, or 8.12 (1.17 Crawford) *si nox* (obsolete genitive!) *furtum faxit* ‘if someone has committed a theft at night’. In the first sentence both subject and object, in the second the subject at any rate, are left unspecified, to be thought of as anyone at all. This seems very strange. The Romans were themselves aware of this usage and went on to imitate it in later laws. Now, exactly the same occurs in the language of early Greek laws, and can be illustrated from various parts of the Greek-speaking world. I shall content myself with a reference to the numerous examples from the well-known Law-code of Gortyn (Collitz & Bechtel no. 4991; cf. I, 36 and n. 6 on pp. 52–3 above), e.g. at 6.1 *θυγατρὶ ἦν διδὼ* ‘if (someone) gives (a dowry) to his daughter’: nowhere is the giver specified. The discerning Franz Skutsch once thought (1912b: 533–4) that this similarity of style between the Twelve Tables and ancient Greek laws revealed the dependency of Roman law-making on the Greek. A syntactic form of this kind, however, is not easily borrowed; the agreement must be based on common inheritance, and this linguistic feature must be something very ancient. This is beautifully confirmed by the fact that the style of ancient Greek poetry shows the same sort of thing, as in Homer at *Il.* 13.287 *οὐδὲ κεν ἑνθα τεόν γε μένος καὶ χεῖρας ὄνοιτο* ‘and no one would find fault with your strength and your hands’. The scholiast Aristonicus comments, from a factual point of view quite correctly,

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1 Here and there, it is true, we glimpse in the Twelve Tables—according to tradition, the first written collection of Roman statutes—forms and features of mid-5th c. BC Latin. However, it is important to remember that their language is very largely modernized, since ‘[t]wo long processes of transmission lie between the Twelve Tables and ourselves: from the text promulgated in 451 and 450 BC to our sources . . . ; and from those sources to our manuscript witnesses’ (Crawford 1996: II, 356). The best introduction to the Twelve Tables is now Crawford (1996: no. 40), with full bibliography, and on Cicero’s use of them, note Powell (2005: esp. 123–6).
λείπει τὸ τίς 'he omits the word for “anyone”’ (cf. ERBSE 1969–88: III, 453, 55), but we have to say that the sg. 3 δούλος by itself can denote the action of any subject at all (cf. II. 22. 199). And we find exactly the same in Hesiod, e.g. at Works and Days 291 ἐπὶ τὴν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἔφηται ‘when one reaches the top’, and also in Pindar, e.g. at Isthmian 5. 22. Further, at Olympian 6. 11 πολλοὶ δὲ μέμνησαι καλῶν εἰ τι ποιήθη, ποιήθη is probably better understood as active, ‘if someone has done something fine’, than as passive; cf. ποιήθη used transitively in Archilochus and on an inscription from Corcyra (for details, see I, 139 below). There are even some examples in Herodotus.

In two situations this idiom occurs also outside the archaic language. First, when the finite verb is supported by a participle, e.g. in pseudo-Xenophon, Athenian Constitution 1. 10 πολλάκις ἄν οἰδήθεις εἶναι τὸν Ἀθηναίον δούλον ἐπάταξεν ἃν ‘it can often happen that someone beats an Athenian, thinking him to be a slave’. An influence similar to that of | the participle can be exerted by the Latin gerund, e.g. in Caccilius 169 Warmington diu uiuendo multa quae non vult uidet ‘when one lives for a long time, one sees much that one does not wish for’, where Aldus Manutius wanted to supply quis (‘one, a man’) and read diu <quis> uiuendo.

It is also very common—and normal in both Greek and Latin prose as well—to make a finite verb dependent on an infinitival clause with indefinite subject without adding a τίς or (ali)quis as pronominal subject. Note e.g. Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus 1225–8 τὸ δ', ἐπεὶ φανῇ, βήναι κείθεν δὲν περ ἦκει πολὺ δεύτερον ὡς τάχιστα ‘and once one has appeared, to go back to where one came from as soon as possible is the next best thing’, where φανῇ and ἦκει do without an explicit subject, their indefinite subject being supplied from the verb βήναι. This is common in Latin, too; the best discussion of this is that of SEYFFERT & MÜLLER (1876: 386–7) on Cicero, On Friendship 59. So we read at Tac. Dial. 5. 5 quid est tutius quam cæm exercere artem, qua...praesidium amicis, opem alienis...ferat? ‘what is safer than to practise that art with which one can bring protection to friends and help to strangers? This ferat has been variously emended but its correctness is proved by dozens of parallels.3

If we do not wish to be governed by our own speech habits, we have to infer from this usage that it is not the function—or not the exclusive function—of the sg. 3 to refer to a specific named person, but that it is the least personal form of expression. We could in fact say that the sg. 3 is used where the first or second

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2 This short, anti-democratic pamphlet about the political workings of 5th-century Athens, transmitted among the works of Xenophon, is nowadays generally known as ‘the Old Oligarch’; neither its date of composition nor its dramatic date is secure. For an excellent introduction with bibliography, see Simon Hornblower’s article (‘Old Oligarch’) in the OCD.

3 Lipsius emended ferat to feras, which was printed by H. Furneaux in his Oxford Classical Text (1900), but (e.g.) H. Heubner retains ferat, in his Teubner edition (Leipzig 1983).
person is out of place. In connection with this point, let me remind you of the well-known phenomenon of the subject remaining unexpressed when it is anyway clear who is performing the action of the verb, e.g. in ἄλπος ἦλθεν ἐπ’ ἐνοπίᾳ ‘(someone) sounds the trumpet; the trumpet sounds’, or in the use of inquit in Cicero, and φησιν in later Greek, to introduce an opposing view. See Schweighäuser (1799–1800) on Epictetus I. 4. 9; Bentley (1869) on Horace, Satires I. 4. 79; Kieckers (1921). On Old Icelandic segir ‘there is someone who says’, and the like, see Grimm, D. Gr. IV, 311.—This whole phenomenon is discussed by Pedersen (1907: 138–49, 171–3), with reference also to Slavic, Finnish, etc., and with greater accuracy and richer material by Zubaty (1907). 4

(3) Then we come to the notorious question of the impersonal verbs, that is the impersonal use of the sg. 3. The term impersonale comes from the Latin grammarians; a similar term for the same thing is impersonatiuus, though some applied this also to the infinitive. 5 In recent scholarly literature, there has been an extraordinary amount of discussion of clauses with impersonal verbs. On German and the Germanic languages, I refer you in particular to Grimm, D. Gr. IV, 262–93 and to Delbrück (1893–1900: III, 23–37). The best special treatments of the subject are the book on subjectless sentences (1883) by the Slavist Miklosich mentioned earlier (I, 2 above) and an article by the Germanist Siebs (1910).

It seems best to begin with a particular class of impersonal verbs and to test against them the theories that have been advanced. I am going to take those verbs which serve to denote natural phenomena. Subjectless clauses of this type are to be found in practically every part of the world; at any rate they appear in a whole range of mutually independent languages. 6 So, for example, just as in Latin you say pluit ‘it rains’, so in Greek you say δελ and later βρέχεται, and the word for ‘to rain’ stands in the sg. 3 in Sanskrit and German, and also in the Semitic languages. Other examples include Lat. ning(u)it : Gk νεφελ : NHG es schneit (‘it snows’); Lat. fulgurat, fulget, fulminat : NHG es blitzt (‘there is lightning’); Lat. tonat : Gk βροντά : NHG es donnert (‘there is thunder’). Moreover, Varro has at Rust. 1. 13. 5 si nubilare coepit ‘if it begins to cloud over’, for which Cato has a passive form, Agr. 88. 2 nubilabitur; corresponding to these in Greek is ξυννέφος (Aristophan...
nes, fr. 46, PCG III.2). Latin has also lúcescit ‘it is dawn, it is getting light’, to which corresponds e.g. διαφανοῦσκει in Polybius (31. 14. 13), and uesperascit, aduesperascit, with Gk συνίκαζει, ‘evening draws in, it grows dark’. Similarly there is also e.g. calét ‘it is hot’ (Petronius; cf. caléter in Plautus, Capt. 80, Truc. 65), and further post-classical gelat ‘it is freezing’, vorat ‘dew is falling’, or in Gk ἐσείεσθε ‘there was an earthquake’ (e.g. Thuc. 4. 52. 1).

We have, then, a large number of expressions for frequent natural phenomena which consist only of a verb. Now, it is well known that even in the case of those words used exclusively of particular natural phenomena we also find them frequently combined with a subject. The type that has excited greatest interest is the mention of a god as the agent behind weather verbs. In particular, Greek has not only the impersonal ἄστραπτει ‘there is lightning’, βροντά ‘there is thunder’, but also already in Homer Ζεῦς ἔβροντησε, ἄστραπτει, ὃς (‘Zeus thundered, flashes lightning, rained’). These are in keeping with the Homeric phrases Ζηνὸς βροντή (‘the thunder of Zeus’) and Δῶς μεγάλου κεραυνός (‘the lightning-bolt of mighty Zeus’), where the poet depicts thunder and lightning as possessions of the chief god. Note also Od. 20. 105–19, where the maid hears a clap of thunder, and immediately regards it as an utterance of Zeus, and is thus moved to make her prayer to Zeus. In the same way Latin can say Iupiter fulgurat, Ioue fulgente (‘Jupiter flashes lightning’). In the Augustan period there was a cult of Iupiter tonans (‘Jupiter the Thunderer’), and in the graves of the lightning-bolts, which were originally Etruscan but customary also among the Romans, the lightning is denoted as fulgur diuum (‘lightning of the gods’). Furthermore, Wissowa (1912: 120–2) refers to the cult of Iupiter fulgur, which implies the complete identification of Jupiter and the lightning. So, too, we read on a fifth-century inscription from Mantinea (IG V.2. 288) the phrase Δῶς κεραυνῷ ‘of Zeus the Thunderbolt’; on its implications for the history of religion, see Usener (1905). Rain is also ascribed directly to action by the supreme god. Marcus Aurelius in his work Communings with Himself (Τὰ εἰς ἑαυτόν) 5. 7 mentions an old prayer common in Athens ‘Rain, rain, dear Zeus!’ (ὦ σοῦ, ὦ σοῦ, ὦ φίλε Ζεῦ), and Herodotus (2. 13) attests a similar expression. There is a nice parallel in Aristophanes, Birds 1501–2 where Prometheus asks, ‘What is Zeus doing?’ and continues, ‘Is he clearing away the clouds to make it bright or is he making it cloudy?’ (ἀπαιθριάζει τὰς νεφέλας ἡ συννέφει); For a final instance, note the familiar expression θεὸς ἐσείεσθε (‘the god shook (the earth)’), where the agent referred to is probably Poseidon; particularly good examples of this are at Ar. Ach. 510–11, Lys. 1142.

7 Augustus dedicated a temple to Jupiter Tonans in 22 BC, vowed four years earlier when he survived a violent storm; for bibliography, see LIMC VIII.1, s.v. ‘Zeus/Juppiter’, p. 425. The purported remains of lightning-bolts received special attention from Etruscan experts and their students, and were given appropriate burial by the official fulgerator; see Palmer (1976: 47–8). For references to fulgur diu(u)m, see ThLL, s.vv. ‘dı¯us’, 1632, 31, and ‘fulgur et fulgus’, 1519, 18. On the archaeology and history of the cult of Jupiter Fulgur, whose temple is dated to 252/1 BC, see Palmer (1976).
But it is not only the gods who serve as subjects to ‘weather’ verbs. Other possibilities include the part of the natural world or the period of time related to the phenomenon: so, e.g. *fulgente caelo*, *uesperascente caelo*, *caelum pluit*, *dies illucescit* (‘with the sky flashing’, ‘with the sky drawing towards evening’, ‘the sky rains’, ‘the day grows light’). Or the verb may be accompanied by a noun denoting the material contents or the process itself, as in German *der Wind weht*, *der Regen regnet*, English *the wind blows*, *the rain rains*. (ms. add.:) WILAMOWITZ (1931–2: I, 21 n.) argues against understanding ‘god’ with weather verbs, and quotes Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night*, act 5, scene 1, ‘for the rain, it raineth every day’! Aristophanes rather nicely makes the clouds say, *Clouds* 579–80 ‘If any project seems ill-concocted then *we* thunder, then *we* drizzle’ (*γαρ ἰδίως ἐξοδος, τὸτ’ ὑ βροντῶμεν ὑ ψακάζομεν*).—It goes without saying that many of these verbs occur with a transferred meaning, as in the *pocula rorantia*, small cups sprinkling wine in drops, at Cicero, *On Old Age* 46, etc.

With all these verbs, then, we have both impersonal use and construction with various types of real subject. Now, since a logical proposition has to have a subject and a predicate, logicians have regarded the type without a subject as something fundamentally unthinkable, and, in line with this philosophical view, PAUL in his ‘Principles of Language History’ (1920: §91) stipulates that one has to supply a subject to all these impersonal verbs. But this introduces a foreign motive to the assessment of linguistic forms: we have to confine ourselves to what is there in the language, and the question arises whether there is anything in the linguistic expression that indicates the presence of a subject, when we have nothing but a verb form. Three answers have been proposed to this line of inquiry. First, it has been suggested that the impersonal use is based on a sort of ellipse, either the name of the active god or the space or content of the weather phenomenon being understood: ἐσελεσεν, then, for instance, would be short for ἐσελεσεν ὁ θεός. This account is to be found already in Priscian (17. 60 = GL III, 144): *fulminat et tonat de Ioue solo intellegimus* (‘we understand the verbs flashes lightning and thunders to be predicated only of Jupiter’), but it cannot be proved. We may suppose ellipse only in cases where the fuller expression is attested earlier on, and in these verbs the impersonal use is as old as the use of a god’s name as subject. Admittedly, for lightning, thunder, and rain (*ἀστράπτειν*, *βροντάν*, *φειν*) Homer uses only the latter, personal construction, but this is the language of a poet and is in keeping with, say, his personification of the Dawn. We are not entitled to assume that the religious conception of the weather is older than a view whereby speakers were content to express just the phenomenon by itself without inquiring after the agent. This is not to deny that in individual instances the impersonal expression has replaced one constructed with the name of a god, as, for example, at Luke

8 See J. G. F. Powell’s commentary (Cambridge 1988) *ad loc.*
"it rained fire and brimstone" ($\varepsilon \beta \rho \varepsilon \varepsilon \nu \pi \upsilon \rho \kappa \alpha i \theta \varepsilon \iota \omega$ (acc.)), which reproduces Genesis 19: 24 ‘the Lord rained fire and brimstone from the Lord out of heaven’ ($\kappa \varpi \rho \upsilon \omega \varepsilon \beta \rho \varepsilon \nu \theta \varepsilon \iota \omega \kappa \alpha i \pi \upsilon \rho \varphi \lambda \alpha \rho \zeta \mu \nu \upsilon \alpha \nu \eta \nu$), a word-for-word translation from the Hebrew. (ms. add.2: On $\beta \rho \varepsilon \chi e\nu$ of God in the Septuagint and the New Testament, see JOHANNESSOHN (1925: 317 & n. 3).)

Secondly, appeal has been made to the fact that German, French, and English use not completely subjectless verbs but expressions of the type NHG es regnet, Fr. il pleut, Eng. it rains, with a supporting pronoun; on this pronoun see BRUGMANN (1917). It is, however, quite certain that this neuter pronoun is something secondary; it is not found in Gothic or Old Norse any more than in Latin.

And thirdly, attempts have been made to exploit a formal analysis of the verbal ending in the framework of comparative grammar. BOPP and others claimed that the ending -$\tau i$ of Greek $\varepsilon \sigma \tau i$ (‘is’)—which yields -$\alpha i$ in $\phi \eta \varsigma i$ (‘says’) by regular sound change,9 and which is cognate with Latin and German -$t$ and English -$th$—is the original ending of sg. 3 and is related to the Greek article $\tau \circ$ (‘the’, neut. nom.-acc. sg.) so that the sg. 3 form contains within itself the marker of the subject.10 This also turns out to be untenable. For one thing, the ending -$\tau i$ / -$t$ is found only in some sg. 3 forms; it is out of the question that $\nu \epsilon \phi e i$ (‘it snows’) ever contained a -$\tau i$.11 Moreover, the comparison of -$\tau i$ in $\varepsilon \sigma \tau i$ with the pronoun $\tau \circ$ is an arbitrary assumption. It is perfectly possible and much more probable that it belongs rather with the suffix -$\tau i\varsigma$ which we find in verbal abstracts such as Greek $\pi \iota \varsigma i\varsigma$, $\phi \alpha \tau i\varsigma$ (‘trust, faith’, ‘speech, talk’), Latin $s i t i s$ (‘thirst’), $f a t i s$ in $a d$ $f a t i m$, $a f f a t i m$ (‘amply’, lit. ‘to the point of exhaustion’). If we approach this question without any preconceived theory, we will be reminded that the process could be represented in this simple form without any thought of a subject. This agrees extremely well with what emerged earlier (I, 113 above) concerning the use of the sg. 3.

The weather verbs are not the only impersonal verbs. In Latin, there are also especially those learned early on, $p i g e t$, $p u d e t$, $p a e n i t e t$, $m i s e r e t$ (‘it regrets’, ‘it shames’, ‘it repents’, ‘it pits’), and other verbs | expressing a feeling or pressing

9 The regular sound change of *$t > s$ immediately before $i$ occurred only in the ‘East’ Greek dialects, Attic-Ionic, Arcado-Cyprian, Aeolic, and Mycenaean; in Doric and North-West Greek, inherited $t$ remains before $i$ (cf. Dor. $\delta \iota \delta o \iota$ ‘gives’ vs Attic $\delta \iota \delta o \iota$); see further Lejeune (1972: §51), Rix (1976: §101), Sihler (1995: 149–50).

10 Cf. already Bopp (1816: 147–51).

11 Indo-Europeans divide on this issue. For recent statements of W.’s view that the difference between the endings of $\varepsilon \sigma \tau i$ and $\phi \phi e i$ is old, see e.g. Watkins (1969: passim), Jasanoff (1978: §4.4), Sihler (1995: §4.26), and for a succinct survey with bibliography Jasanoff (2003: §21), who nevertheless believes ($§4.0$) that *$b h e r e t i$ is too widely and securely attested not to be reconstructed for Indo-European. Others believe that the thematic endings differed from the athematic only in the sg. 1 (*$\alpha$ vs *$\alpha$-$m i$), and have to explain $\phi \phi e i$ as the result of analogical change within Greek, starting from expected IE*$b h e r e t i$, or even as arising by regular sound change (metathesis of *$b h e r e t i$ to $\phi \phi e i(\tau)$); cf. e.g. Rix (1976: 251), Szemerényi (1996: 236–7), Meier-Brügger (2003: 178–9).
thought. Let me say straightaway that these, too, show personal as well as impersonal constructions, although differently from the weather verbs. Already in Old Latin, the person experiencing the emotion can appear as subject of *pudet*, *paenitet*, *miseret*. And in the cases of *libet* and *taedet* (‘it pleases’ and ‘it wearies’), think of *libens* (‘with pleasure, feeling pleasure’), which retains its true participial force in the ablative absolute, and *pertaesus* (‘thoroughly wearied’), forms which presuppose the personal use of the verb. Alternatively, these verbs can take as their subject the cause of the emotion. Here, too, however, we have no reason to regard the impersonal use as secondary; rather we must say that with verbs expressing any kind of thought or feeling all languages tend to have both types of expression. Depending on which conception predominates we find either the personal or the impersonal use, the latter arising from the awareness that feelings overwhelm us and thoughts occur to us without the involvement of our will and without our participation as movers or creators of these thoughts. To mention only the most superficial feelings, we say in German both *ich friere* and *es friert mich*, *mich friert* (‘I am freezing’), both *ich dürste* and *mich dürstet* (‘I am thirsty’), both *ich schaudere* and *mich schaudert* (‘I shudder’), both *ich verlange* and *es verlangt mich* (‘I desire’), both *es ahnt mir* (es schwant mir) and *ich ahne* (‘I have the presentiment’), both *ich denke* and *es dünkt mich* (‘I think’)—cf. Nietzsche’s *es denkt in mir* (lit. ‘it thinks in me’). And we can observe in Latin quite generally that verbs of this kind show personal and impersonal use side by side. For example, *uereri* ‘to fear’ is usually personal, but Accius and Pacuvius use it impersonally, as does Cicero at Fin. 2. 39 *quos non est ueritum in voluptate summum bonum ponere* ‘those who **have not been afraid** (impers.) to see the greatest good in pleasure’. Similarly, a very late author, the sixth-century poet and hymn-writer Venantius Fortunatus, uses impersonal *horret* (‘it shudders’) beside personal *horreo*. With *dolere* (‘to pain, feel pain’) both uses are attested from Plautus on. The Greek verb *oιμαί* (‘I think’) is construed impersonally at one point in the *Odyssey*, 19. 312 (Penelope to the beggar) *μοι...dioetai* (‘I have the presentiment’). To some extent we see a tendency in the modern period to favour the personal construction. This is clear in the case of English, where e.g. *I think* corresponds to German *es dünkt mich* (lit. ‘it thinks me’), and *if you please* to Latin *si tibi placet* (lit. ‘if it pleases you’); and you can see numerous similar developments in the family of Germanic words including German *verlangen* and English *to long*. But neither of the constructions can claim absolute priority; it is rather a matter of constant to and fro. An instructive point of ‘ethnic psychology’ (*Völkerpsychologie*; cf. I, 48 and n. 8, p. 69 above) in this regard is Bally’s demonstration (1920: 271) that Russian has more of these impersonals | than German, German more than French, and English has lost them all.

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12 And compare now Hitt. *mu-mu ištarke*i ‘I am ill’, lit. ‘it sickens me’.
It is noteworthy that so-called primitive languages tend to treat as impersonal processes what we generally regard as personal activities. For instance, where we say I hear, the Greenlander says literally (to/for) my sounding (mein(em) Ertönen)—and really, he’s right to do so;¹³ cf. FINCK (1910: 35–6; also p. 14 on Chinese).

A third category of impersonals comprises verbs denoting a **necessity**, a duty, an ability, or happening or being in general, and this includes compounds and phrases involving the verb ‘to be’, such as Greek εξεστή (‘it is possible’), Latin opus est (‘there is a need’), nescere est (‘it is necessary’). As examples of verbs of necessity, duty, and need, let us take Greek χρη and δεῖ, two verbs which well illustrate what very different sources such impersonal expressions have. χρη is originally a noun, surviving as such only in this one form (cf. I, 71 above). As for δεῖ, its evolution all the way to an impersonal unfolds before our eyes. It occurs just once in the whole of Homer (Il. 9. 337) and incidentally, once only in Pindar, too (Olymp. 6. 28): the uniqueness of the occurrence has led to attempts at emendation, but without good cause. From the fifth century on, δεῖ becomes steadily more frequent and almost completely ousts χρη. This form δεῖ is the sg. 3 of a verb δέω (Aeolic δεόω), which really means ‘to be far from, deficient in, something’. In Attic, the personal use is still found alongside the impersonal: you can say, for example πολλοῖ δέω with the personal construction, ‘I stand far short of’ (such and such), as well as impersonal πολλοῖ με δεῖ. It is noteworthy that δέομαι ‘wish, need, ask’ also occurs and is also used impersonally in isolated instances, first in Soph. Oed. Col. 570 δεῖσθαι, and Plato, Meno 79c δεῖται, 79d δεῖσθαι, and later on there is a further example in Herondas, Iambi 6. 41; compare the analogous double construction of German bedürfen (‘require, need’).

Latin offers a nice parallel to something we established in the last lecture (I, 117–18 above), namely that the personal use can easily shift to the impersonal. Old verbs of duty, such as oportet, decet, dedecet (‘it behoves’, ‘it befits’, ‘it is a disgrace’), are joined in Late Latin by the verb debere, which was earlier always personal meaning ‘to be obliged’ but which is attested as the impersonal debet ‘there is duty’ (see Löfstedt 1911: 45). Compare the impersonal use of must and ought in Middle English.

Next, verbs of possibility. The etymology of Latin licet (‘it is permitted’) is uncertain, though it is attested also in Oscan. This group also shows clear

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1 German bedürfen may still be used personally or impersonally (+ usu. partitive genitive, or, rarely, accusative, of the person or thing needed); on the usage of the earlier modern language, see D. Wb., s.v.
2 Oscan has most probably borrowed the verb from Latin, at least in the juristic use in which it is attested. The only possible comparandum outside Italic is Latvian likt ‘come to terms with’, which is generally explained otherwise; see further LIV, s.v. ‘*leik-’, Untermann (2000: s.v. ‘likitud’).
examples of an impersonal use developing in originally personal verbs. From posse, properly ‘to be master of’ (cf. I, 68–9 above), we have already in Old Latin potis est, potest ‘it is possible’; and ualet ‘the possibility exists’ has been documented in later writers.3

Let me mention a few more cases from later Greek and Latin. The Greek verb ἀπέχει means, among other things, ‘to have, to receive in full’ and hence ‘to have enough’; here belongs the well-known phrase from the Gospel τὸν μεσθὸν ἀπέχει ‘he has received payment in full’. But it is remarkable that at Mark 14: 41 an impersonal ἀπέχει also occurs meaning ‘it is enough’. And one more example from the New Testament: in Attic you say ἁγεῖν τὴν ἐορτὴν and ἁγεῖν τὴν ἡμέραν ‘to celebrate the festival’ or ‘to spend the day’; but at Luke 24: 21 we find τρίτην ταύτην ἡμέραν ἁγεῖ ‘today is the third day’ (lit. ‘it spends this third day’), with ἁγεῖ used impersonally.

An example from Late Latin claims our attention because of its effects on the Romance languages. In the life of the Emperor M. Claudius Tacitus (late 3rd c.) in the Scriptores Historiae Augustae (8. 1) we find: habet in bibliotheca Ulpia . . . librum elephantinum, lit. ‘it has in the Ulpian Library a book of ivory’, with habet used impersonally, exactly like French il y a (‘there is’). Similarly we find in the Peregrinatio Aetheriae, c.g. at 23. 2, in a sentence full of Romance features, inde ad sanctam Teclam habebat de ciuitate forsitan mille quingentos passus ‘from there to the church of St. Thecla was (lit. it had) from the city about one and a half miles’; see Löfstedt (1911: 43), and cf. Grimm, D. Gr. IV, 266–7 (on German es gibt and es hat ‘there is’), Pedersen (1907: 137).

The personal endings of the Greek and Latin verb mark not only person and number but also what the Greek grammarians call ‘diathesis’ and the Romans ‘genus uerbi’, namely grammatical voice,4 a category which the modern languages also try to express, though through means other than personal endings.

I must speak first of the distinction between active and passive, which is common to all our languages. For our usage and hence our linguistic intuitions, only active and passive come into question as grammatical voices, and we regard the active as the normal, simple form of the verb, with the passive to some extent a secondary transformation of a corresponding active expression, as an addition, a complement to the active, albeit a welcome one. This is the situation in most modern languages, | except that different languages use different formal means to

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3 On this use of potest, see also Norberg (1941: 106) in his study of the collectio Avellana (a collection of Imperial and Papal rescripts, AD 367–553); on impersonal ualet, see Löfstedt (1959: 63), who starts from Gregory the Great, Dialogues 3. 7.

4 Eng. voice (first attested in 1382, in Wycliffe’s prologue to his Bible translation) and Fr. voix are loan translations of Lat. uox, of which the early grammatical sense is quite generally ‘word, sound, form’ as opposed to ‘meaning’, and which is used in Charisius and (esp.) Priscian with special reference to active vs passive verbal forms; see the material assembled by Schad (2007: s.v. ‘vox’), who quotes eight such examples from Priscian.
make the passive. Most often you find a periphrasis with an auxiliary verb, usually one meaning ‘be’ or ‘become’, though in Danish, for example, ‘to stay’ is used. But if we take a broader view and go back further in time, the relationship between active and passive takes on a different appearance. Even in the Scandinavian languages it is different from what we are used to, in that some passives are formed by adding -s or -z to the active form (this -s, -z deriving from sik ‘self’). But if we go all the way back to our oldest texts in a Germanic language, that is to Gothic, while in the past tense we find a familiar periphrastic form, other tenses have special passive forms with their own personal endings. So, for example, Greek ἡγάζεται ‘is blessed’ is translated by gaweihada (sg. 3 pass. of gaweihan, 1 Timothy 4: 5), and analogous forms occur in the present optative. In the passive here, then, we find not some addition or complement to the active, but a set of parallel endings alongside the active ones.

The same is true in Latin. But here there is the additional notable feature that alongside the regular actives and passives there are numerous verbs with passive endings but without passive meaning, and these include not only intransitives like morior, orior (‘die’, ‘arise’), which are not so far removed from passives in meaning, but also out-and-out transitive verbs in all four conjugations. This category exercised the scholars of antiquity: it did not fit the pattern. They called these verbs deponentia (‘deponents’), which the Greeks subsequently rendered with ἀποθετικά, i.e. ‘verbs which have put off [viz. their passive meaning]’. This seems absurd. How is it to be explained?

Let us go a step further back in time, to Greek: the forms become yet more various but we are getting closer to the root of the matter. On this subject, we shall have to treat Greek as basic, even more than usual, and take it as our starting point, as this will throw light on the meaning of the voices outside Greek, too. Having already cited their term διάθεσις, I want to begin with the theory of the Greeks themselves. In the grammar of Dionysius Thrax is the doctrine, §13 ‘There are three διάθεσις: 1. ἐνέργεια ‘activity’, 2. πάθος ‘experiencing’, 3. μεσότης (lit. ‘middleness’).’ To μεσότης is ascribed the property of expressing sometimes an activity and sometimes an experience. The examples given for ἐνέργεια and πάθος are τύπτω ‘I hit’ and τύπτομαι ‘I am hit’, respectively; for μεσότης ‘the middle’ are given on the one hand πέπηγα (‘I am fixed fast’) and διέφθορα (‘I am undone, have lost my wits’) and on the other ἐποιησάμην (‘I made (for myself)’) and ἐγραφάμην (‘I wrote (for myself)’). First of all, it is clear that the linguists whose views are here quoted are already taking the same view of the voices as we do. | For them as for us, the main distinction is in the opposition between active and passive. Verbs that do not fit this scheme are lazily swept into the category ‘that lies in the middle’, μεσότης. On this point, note that we depart slightly from the usage of the ancient grammarians in that they include under μεσότης not only the aorist middle but also those perfects which we call second perfects, which are intransitive
although the verb itself is transitive (e.g. \(\pi\varepsilon\pi\gamma\alpha\) ‘I am fixed fast’, already in Homer). The Alexandrian scholars excluded \(\pi\varepsilon\pi\gamma\alpha\) from the active proper probably because the Hellenistic language had made a new perfect \(\pi\varepsilon\pi\gamma\chi\alpha\), which was transitive (‘I have fixed fast’) and corresponded to the meaning of the present \(\pi\gamma\gamma\nu\mu\mu\). As for \(\delta\iota\varepsilon\phi\vartheta\omega\rho\alpha\), the other perfect ascribed by Dionysius to the middle, it was transitive in Attic but intransitive in Ionic and post-classical Greek, where a transitive perfect was supplied by \(\delta\iota\varepsilon\phi\vartheta\rho\alpha\kappa\alpha\) (‘I have destroyed, corrupted’), which arose in the fifth century; the same is true of some other verbs, too. Well, if we stick to this account, it is clear that at least in the aorist (active: \(\varepsilon\gamma\rho\alpha\iota\varsigma\epsilon\nu\), middle: \(\varepsilon\gamma\rho\alpha\iota\varsigma\alpha\tau\), passive: \(\varepsilon\gamma\rho\alpha\iota\eta\)) and future, we have three separate sets of forms—although in the other tenses there is just a single set of forms for middle and passive.

Now, what are we to make of this three-way contrast? If we go even further back and examine the oldest stages of the Indo-European languages, it emerges that really the main opposition is between active and middle and that the passive voice is something additional that grew up and developed later. In Greek this can still be seen especially in the fact that there are basically no specifically passive forms at all: passive functions are served partly by the same forms as the middle and partly by specially deployed active forms, the former in the present and perfect, the latter in the aorist. Now, as soon as we regard active and middle as fundamental and primary, the so-called deponents become clear, of which Greek has a great number, as well as Latin. Our account will now be as follows: there are (1) verbs with both active and middle endings, whose middle forms can sometimes have passive meaning, e.g. \(\phi\varepsilon\rho\omega\) (‘I carry’), \(\phi\varepsilon\rho\omega\mu\iota\) (‘I carry for myself’ or ‘I win’ (middle), or (passive) ‘I am carried’); (2) verbs which occur only in active forms, such as \(\kappa\lambda\iota\omega\), \(\sigma\tau\epsilon\iota\gamma\omega\), \(\sigma\tau\iota\lambda\beta\omega\), \(\phi\varepsilon\iota\gamma\omega\) (‘hear’, ‘go’, ‘gleam’, ‘flee’); and (3) verbs which occur only in middle forms, such as \(\eta\mu\iota\iota\), \(\kappa\epsilon\iota\mu\iota\), \(\nu\epsilon\omicron\mu\iota\) (‘I sit’, ‘I lie’, ‘I go, come’), and there are more of type 3 than of type 2 (active only). In other words, deponents are simply middle verbs which have no active forms and our task becomes to discover the middle meaning in the deponents.

Having thus laid the foundations for a proper scholarly approach to the matter, we must first, starting with Greek, define the use of the active and middle forms and determine more precisely the meaning of the endings that mark voice. First, some necessary preliminaries.\(^5\)

It is noteworthy that the personal endings signal not only the person of the subject, including the number of the persons, but also the voice of the verb. It

\(^5\) A useful and approachable collection of papers giving an idea of relatively recent cross-linguistic work on grammatical voice, with special reference to the middle and passive, is Fox & Hopper (1994), in which note especially Bakker (1994) on middle and passive in ancient Greek, Kemmer (1994) on the middle, and Arce-Arenales, Axelrod, & Fox (1994) on ‘active voice’ and ‘middle diathesis’ across languages. On the middle in general, note also Barber (1975), and on the Greek middle in particular, Allan (2003).
would seem to follow that verbal forms without proper personal endings cannot mark voice either, and this leads me to comment for the third time (cf. I, 85 and 106 above) on the imperative in -έ, which consists just of the bare present stem and which, although generally used in the singular and the 2nd person, is relatively indifferent in use with regard to number and person. Although it is generally used actively, this imperative form shows a trace of analogous indifference as to grammatical voice, too. A secure first example of this is παίσε ‘stop!’ (in later comedy, e.g. Menander, Samia 311, also παύσ). As the active forms of this verb are otherwise all transitive-causative (‘make to stop’) and it means ‘come to a stop’ only in the middle. The same is true of ἐγείρε ἑαυτόν ‘wake up!’ at Eur. Iph. Anl. 624 (and, according to Von der Mühll, also the first ἐγείρε at Aesch. Eum. 140) and later, in the New Testament, also ‘get up!’; see Blass & Debrunner (1913 [=1961]: §§310, 461), Reitzenstein (1921: 167).—The same account must be allowed for a second group of imperative forms, common to Greek and Latin, which we shall consider more closely later on (I, 217–20 below): I mean those in -τορ, which were originally quite unmarked for number and voice. This indifference has vanished in Greek, but note that in Old Latin, deponents can form this imperative not only in -τορ but also in -το.

On the other hand, it should be remembered that marking for voice is not confined to the finite, personal, forms of the verb, but from the beginning involves the participles, too. In Greek this feature is faithfully preserved, while in Latin middle participles have nearly all been lost. Still, I draw your attention to a fossilized medio-passive participle in Latin alumnus, which belongs with aleré (‘to nourish’) as Greek τρεφόμενος does to τρέφειν, and means ‘he who is nourished’. Similarly, the god’s name Vertumnus is interpreted—probably wrongly!—as meaning ‘he who turns’ or ‘is turned’. Otherwise, the active participle is frequently used in place of the middle, or, alternatively, the verbal adjective in -tus shifts from the meaning which it shares with its Greek cognate in -τό, in order to serve the function of medio-passive participle. In the following lines of Propertius, uersus ‘turned’ and uertens ‘turning’ are the replacements available in the later language for the form of the participle apparently preserved in the name of the god: Propertius 4. 2. 10–12 Vertumnus uerso dicor ab amne deus, / seu quia uertentis fructum praecerpimus I, 123 anni / Vertumno uulgus credidit esse sacrum (‘I am called the god Vertumnus from the turning of the river, or it is because I reap first the turning year’s produce that this produce is sacred to Vertumnus: so the people believe’). (Cf. also the passive gerundive ending -ndus alongside

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6 An alternative view is that Vertumnus, Picumnus, autumnus, etc. are Etruscan in origin; see Ernout (1929), Leumann (1977: 322, 583). The other textbook example of an old middle participle in Latin is fēmina ‘female, woman’ ← ‘suckling’ (on the IE root *dhei-*).

7 On this passage, see Gregory Hutchinson’s introduction to the poem and his commentary (Cambridge 2006) on lines 11–12.
secundus (‘following, second’) to sequor (‘follow’), moribundus (‘dying’), etc. to morior (‘die’), etc.—As for the infinitive, it was originally unmarked for voice, but the oldest forms of Greek and Latin have already introduced the formal marking of voice on the infinitive. 8

Although we are taking Greek as fundamental for our account here, it is necessary to emphasize that it is no more homogeneous in the use of the voices than it is in other grammatical features: not only do the dialects differ sharply among themselves but considerable changes occurred over the course of time. For example, Ionic often has the middle where Attic uses an active form (BECHTEL 1921–4: III, 246–50), and sometimes it is the Ionic usage that is inherited by the so-called Koine: so, for instance, ‘to occupy’ is καταλαμβάνει (act.) in Attic but καταλαμβάνεσθαι (mid.) in Ionic, and Polybius (e.g. 8. 2. 6) also uses the middle form. In general, the boundaries between active and middle break down in post-classical Greek, which shows striking departures from the earlier period. Often the sharpness and refinement of Attic usage is lost, though more in the middle and lower echelons of the linguistic community. Attic made a sharp distinction between the active μοιχεύειν and the middle μοιχεύεσθαι of the verb meaning ‘to commit adultery’, corresponding almost exactly to the difference between active γαμεῖν and middle γαμεῖσθαι (‘to marry’). γαμεῖν means ‘to take a wife’ and is used of the man marrying, while the middle γαμεῖσθαι is used of the woman. So, μοιχεύειν denotes adultery by the man, μοιχεύεσθαι that of the wife. In Biblical Greek, the active and middle of this verb are correctly contrasted at Levit. 20: 10, but elsewhere in both the Old and the New Testament, active and middle forms are totally confused. So, too, in Doric the active, μοιχάω, is used of the man (cf. Xen. Hell. 1. 6. 15), but in the New Testament μοιχάσθαι is used indiscriminately of both sexes (e.g. Matt. 5: 32, Mark 10: 12).

All this may have something to do with the inability of non-Greek speakers to distinguish active and middle. We can demonstrate this inability in passages in the Greek poets where a barbarian is made to speak. The Phrygian who appears in the newly discovered ‘nome’ of Timotheus (published by Wilamowitz in 1903), 10 speaks, as the poet himself testifies, semi-barbarian Greek—frag. 791,

8 That is, in Latin, active -re vs deponent-passive -ı¯ / -ier; in Greek, active -ev vs middle-passive -oī (note that Sanskrit infinitives in -dhyai, corresponding to -oī, are active). Sanskrit and Germanic, for example, do not mark voice on their infinitives. On the other hand, it is doubtful, and certainly controversial, whether Indo-European had more than the germ of the infinitive (viz. in the use of various case-forms of verbal nouns), as opposed to a full-fledged morphosyntactic category infinitive as such; see further Rix (1976: §§206, 210, 261–3), Sihler (1995: §§351–3), Szemerényi (1996: 324–6).

9 Bechtel’s examples include: ἀπείσασθαι ‘to prohibit’, ἰδεῖσθαι ‘to see’, φάσθαι ‘to say’, πειθαρχεῖσθαι ‘to obey one in authority’, σαπγνωσκεῖσθαι ‘to forgive’.

10 The extensive, 4th-c. B.C papyrus fragment (P. Berol. 9875) of this nome, The Persians, by the 5th–4th-c. citharode and dithyrambic poet Timotheus of Miletus, was discovered in 1902. On the Phrygian’s (Celaenae’s) speech (lines 150–61), see Friedrich (1918: 301–3) and the commentaries by Janssen (1984), based on Wilamowitz’s text, and Horden (2002), based on a new edition of all the fragments of
Page 146–7 Page 'Ελλάδ’ ἐμπλέκων Ἀσιάδι φωνάι (‘intertwining Greek with Asian speech’; cf. Wilamowitz 1903: 42–3)—and comes out with the forms κάθω ‘I shall sit’ and ἐρχω ‘I shall go’, using present subjunctive for future indicative (cf. I, 234 below), and active endings for middle. The converse occurs in Aristophanes, at Peace 291 ὁς ἡδομεῖ καὶ χαίρομαι κείφραίνομαι (‘what pleasure and cheer and joy I feel!’). This form χαίρομαι is not at all Greek; it is cited from the melic poetry of one Datis and labelled a ‘Datism’.\textsuperscript{11} There must have been some cantilena sung by a barbarian, which contained this form χαίρομαι; Wilamowitz (1903: 43 n.) suggests one of the characters from Asia Minor who appear in the comedy. In this connection I draw your attention to two interesting points: first, in the Aristophanes passage, χαίρομαι has obviously been attracted into the middle by the surrounding middle forms; secondly, in modern Greek χαίρομαι is the standard form. We saw earlier (I, 49–55 above) how neighbouring forms can easily influence one another and cause certain changes of form. There is another such instance involving voice in Aristophanes, Knights 1057, where to achieve a rhyme with μαχέσαιτο (‘would fight’), an aorist middle form χέσαιτο is made, instead of the usual χέσει (‘would shit’).

\textsuperscript{11} See the scholiast on the Aristophanes passage. LSJ cite also the 3rd-c. AD philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias, Problemata 1. 20, and there are at least two inscriptive examples (IGUR I. 148, 5 [IG XIV. 966], Rome, early 3rd c. AD; SEG 43, 911, Caesarea Hadrianopolis, undated).
The distinction between active and middle is observed best not in those verbs which have only one form or the other—though Delbrück (1893–1900: IV, 415) believes these have to be the starting point—but in those which show active and middle forms side by side in the same period of time and in the same dialect.

For my first group of verbs I take those in which the middle forms, in contrast with the active, denote an action carried out by the subject for himself, in his own province and interests. One may compare here the terms coined by the Indian grammarians for active and middle. They call the active forms ‘parasmaipadam’, lit. ‘word for another’, and the middle ‘atmanepadam’, ‘word for oneself’. In other words, they use the atmanepada forms for marking a use of a verb in which the action benefits the agent. So, the middle is used when the action of the verb affects something that belongs to the subject-agent. For example, πλήσαειν in Homer means in general ‘to strike’, but when it is a case of someone striking his breast or thighs, then the middle is used (στήθεια or μηροῦ πλήσαειαι) since the striking is performed not on a foreign object but precisely on a part of the subject; or again, ‘to draw, pull’ is ἐρύειν, but when Homer wants to say that someone draws his own sword from his own side, he uses the verb in the middle ἄρο δ妪τ ἐρυσάμενος παρὰ μηροῦ (‘drawing (mid.) his sharp sword from by his thigh’, e.g. Il. 21.173); and at Il. 9.137 we find (Agamemnon of Achilles) ‘let him load (mid.) his ship with gold and bronze’ (νῦν ἄλις χρυσόν καὶ χαλκοῦ νησᾶσθω). The opposition is also well illustrated in Homer’s use of ἀναβάλλειν (‘to put off, postpone’: at Od. 19.584, the disguised Odysseus says to Penelope, ‘Do not postpone (act.) any longer this contest in your halls’ (μηκέτι νῦν ἀναβάλλε δόμοις ἐν τοῦτον ἀεθλον), referring to the competition that Penelope means to set up between the suitors; that is, the postponement of an activity that involves someone else. At Il. 2.435–6, on the other hand, we have the words, ‘let us no more assemble here nor postpone (mid.) any longer our work!’ (μηκέτι νῦν δῆθι αὕθι λεγόμεθα μηρ’ ἐτὶ δηρόν ἀμβαλλόμεθα ἔργον).

A second difference of meaning between active and middle: the active expresses the performance of the action for someone else, the middle, when the subject will possess the fruit of the action. In this case, we can paraphrase the meaning of the middle with something like ‘for oneself’. Let us take a passage from Xenophon’s Memorabilia, 4.4.14, where we have side by side the phrases
vómuς τιθέναι (act.) and νόμους τίθεσθαι (mid.) (both ‘to make laws’). What is the difference between them? Well, when the active is used, the subject are the gods, who make laws for others, while the middle τίθεσθαι is used of men, who make laws which will apply to themselves. Or again, ἀγεῖν means generally ‘to lead’, but ἀγεῖσθαι (mid.) means, among other things, ‘to marry’, i.e. to lead a woman into the possession of the one leading. The active εὑρίσκειν is ‘to find’, the middle εὑρίσκεσθαι ‘to acquire’. Or take a passage like (pseudo-) Demosthenes 7 (On Halonnesus). 16 [ὁ Φίλιππος] τρήρεις κατασκευάζεται καὶ νεωσόκους οικοδομεῖται (‘he [Philip] is fitting out triremes and building docks’): here a Byzantine scholar, Thomas Magister, 1 drawing on ancient sources remarked (Selection of Attic Verbs and Nouns, p. 508 Ritschl) that if the shipwright, the μαθητής, were the subject, the verb would have to be active (κατασκευάζει); the middle, κατασκευάζεται, was used of the one who furnished the means for the building of the ships, and, we may add, who will use the ships for his own purposes. (ms. add. 2: Add the examples of λύω act. ‘set free’ vs λύόμαι mid. ‘get free’, already at II. 1. 29 [Agamemnon] vs 1. 13 [Chryses]; cf. γῆμα-, μνα- ‘marry’, act. of the father of the bride vs mid. of the bridegroom.)

Related to the second is the third difference in meaning, whereby the active denotes a giving from one’s own resources, the middle, the action of taking possession. This is very clear with one group of verbs in particular: in Greek μισθοῖν (act.) is ‘to let, hire out’, while μισθοῦσθαι (mid.) is ‘to hire, take for rent’; or, with the two verbs of lending/borrowing, the active forms κιχρήμι and δανείζω are used of the lender, the middles κιχραμαι and δανείζομαι of the borrower, i.e. of the person who gets something for himself out of the loan transaction. The Greek verb ‘to buy’, ὀνείσθαι (already in Homer), is cognate with Latin uendere (earlier uenum dare) ‘to sell’. That the Greek verb originally began with ž- (digamma, w-) is seen in the way it forms its past tenses with a syllabic augment. 2 Both Latin and Greek verbs relate to the same commercial transaction but each from a different point of view. The Latin word takes the side of the vendor who is giving something away (act.), the Greek, that of the purchaser, who gets something (mid.). As with the Attic-Ionic verbs of lending and borrowing (above), Doric has an active form ὀνεῖν, attested in the inscriptions of the Cretan city Gortyn 3 and in Hesychius’ gloss ὀνεῖν· τολεῖν, ἀπολαύειν

1 Thomas Magister, who flourished at the end of the 13th and in the first half of the 14th century, wrote important commentaries on Homer and classical Greek authors in addition to the Attic lexicon here referred to; for bibliographical orientation, see Dickey (2007: Index, s.v.).

2 That is, in λοῦ-, without contraction (e.g. impf. λοῦόμην, cf. δοῦόμην ‘urinated’, ἔδωκαν ‘pushed’), as the hiatus supposedly arose relatively recently; the implied contrast is with those (very few!) verbs with older initial ι- or ι- (ὁφέλους ‘helped’, ἄδωσον ‘suffered pangs’). It is odd that there is no trace of the digamma in ὀνείμας in Homer or Cretan. See further KB II, 14–15 & n. 1, and on the IE root *yet-, which makes a primary verb only in Hittite and perhaps Tocharian B, LIV, s.v. ‘2. ὕπη’.

3 Cf. e.g. Gortyn Lawcode (Buck no. 177), V. 47; SIG 525, 8 (3rd c. BC).
(‘sell, profit from’). The opposition between ὀνεῖν ‘to give (in a commercial transaction)’ and ὀνείσθαι ‘to take (in a commercial transaction)’ exactly matches the contrast between δανείζειν and δανείζεσθαι (above).—The Greek verb ἀποδίδωμι ‘give away, give back’ also has middle forms and they serve as suppletive forms of πωλεῖν ‘to sell’ in the future and the aorist. 4 Why middle forms here? Well, because from this action of giving away the giver gains something for himself.

I come to a fourth difference of meaning. Verbs denoting official, especially legal or religious, actions are used in the active when the subject is an official who simply carries out the action without having a personal interest in it, but in the middle when it is someone who is personally involved in the action. For example, the verb ‘to perform a sacrifice’ is ἱεροποιεῖν when carried out by priests, but we also have the middle form used when the subject is a πόλις (‘city’) performing a sacrifice in its own interests, e.g. in a Lesbian dialect on a late fourth-century inscription from Hecatonnesus, a small island near Lesbos: IG XII. 2. 645, 33 ὅτα κε ἀ πόλις ἱεροποίηται (‘whenever the city performs a sacrifice’; Buck no. 27). Allow me to adduce a parallel case from distant Asia: in Sanskrit texts, where sacrifice plays a very important role, the verb of sacrificing is used in the active when the priest is subject, but in the middle when the subject is the person for whose sake the sacrifice is performed, 5 and in exactly the same way Greek says θὸν ὁ ἱερέας (‘the priest sacrifices (act.)’) but θὸς εἶ ὁ στρατηγὸς (‘the general sacrifices (mid.)’). Similarly, ‘to conduct a suit at law’ is δικάζειν (act.) of the judge, but δικάζεσθαι (mid.) of one of the parties. Ammonius, On the Difference of Meaning between Related Words, rightly teaches (p. 120 Valckenaer; cf. §410 Nickau) that πρεσβεύειν denotes in the active the business of the ambassador, while πρεσβεύσθαι (mid.) is used of the state negotiating through embassies. 6 Or again, νέμειν in the sense ‘to distribute, divide’, e.g. τὴν οὐσίαν (‘property’), is used in the active of the father or guardian but in the middle (νέμεσθαι) of the heir. The same account will explain also the curious meanings of τιμωρεῖν and τιμωρείσθαι, which in pure Attic mean, respectively, ‘help’ (act.) and ‘perish’ (mid.). How is this to be understood? The verb is derived from τιμωρός (cf.

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4 On suppletion in the Greek verb, see now Kolligan (2007).
5 Skt yajati (act.) ‘sacrifices’ (e.g. as a priest) vs yajate (mid.) ‘sacrifices for one’s own benefit’, e.g. as the patron of a sacrifice. The example is implicit in Pāṇini, and explicit in Pañjali’s Mahābhāṣya (2nd c. BC), and in the Kasikavrtti (?7th c. AD). We know nothing of the Ammonius to whom this De differentia is ascribed: its authorship is pointedly denied by J. F. Lockwood and N. G. Wilson (in OCD, ‘Ammonius [1]’) to the 2nd-c. BC pupil and successor of Aristarchus, and by Kaster (1988: 241) to the late 4th-c. AD grammarian. Its most recent editor, K. Nickau, in the introduction to his Teubner edn (Leipzig 1966: lxi-lxvii) suggests that what we have is a fairly full summary, made by a Byzantine grammatical Ammonios, of an original work compiled around AD 100 by Herennius Philo of Byblos. See now Dickey (2007: 94–5).

6 It is not clear to me that Nickau’s text says what W. understands here. W. refers to the fundamental edition of 1739 by the great Dutch classicist Lodewijk Caspar Valckenaer (1715–85), on whom see Sandys (1906–8: II, 456). We know nothing of the Ammonius to whom this De differentia is ascribed: its authorship is pointedly denied by J. F. Lockwood and N. G. Wilson (in OCD, ‘Ammonius [1]’) to the 2nd-c. BC pupil and successor of Aristarchus, and by Kaster (1988: 241) to the late 4th-c. AD grammarian. Its most recent editor, K. Nickau, in the introduction to his Teubner edn (Leipzig 1966: lxi-lxvii) suggests that what we have is a fairly full summary, made by a Byzantine grammatical Ammonios, of an original work compiled around AD 100 by Herennius Philo of Byblos. See now Dickey (2007: 94–5).
τιμά-ορος in choral lyric, τιμή-ορος in Herodotus and later epic) and really means ‘preserve the value or worth (τιμή) of’—with the second element (ὁρος) compare Gk ὁρᾶν ‘to watch’, German wahren (‘to watch over, protect’). Therefore, τιμωρεῖν τιν really means ‘preserve someone’s worth, safeguard them’ and hence ‘help protect’ and also ‘avenge’, while τιμωρεῖσθαι (mid.) means ‘preserve oneself, one’s own worth, one’s principles against someone else’, and this amounts to punishing someone. (However, the two voices of this verb are confused in Sophocles, through poetic licence, and in Polybius, in keeping with the loss of the distinction in Hellenistic Greek (cf. I, 123 above).)\(^7\)

We see a fifth difference of meaning in the uses of the voices of ἀρχεῖν ‘to begin’ and of ποιεῖν ‘to make’. For the former, a passage of Thucydides is instructive:

1. 14.2 πολέμον δὲ οὐκ ἀρξομεν, ἀρχομένους δὲ ἁμινούμεθα (‘we shall not start (act.) a war but, if others begin one (mid.), we shall defend ourselves against them’). That is, πολέμον ἀρχω (act.) means ‘provoke war, be the aggressor’ (as an external agent, as it were), while πολέμον ἀρχομαι (mid.) means rather ‘undertake a war’. This fits the use of the active ἀρχεῖν with a subject denoting a period of time, as at Thuc. 2. 12. \(\hat{\text{η}}\)δὲ η ἡμέρα τοῖς Ἑλλησι μεγάλων κακών ἀρξεί (‘this day will be the start (act.) of great troubles for the Greeks’) (cf. the parallels adduced in the commentaries on this passage), or in the Elean inscription, DITTEMERGER & PURGOLD (1896) no. 9 (= COLLITZ & BECHTEL no. 1149), 2 ἀρχοί δὲ κα τοὶ (Ρέτος) (‘let the present year mark the start (act.) of the treaty’; BUCK no. 62). Similarly, with ποιεῖν (active) and ποιεῖσθαι (mid.), πολέμον ποιεῖν means ‘to cause a war (as an external agent)’, so that the conduct of the war does not involve the party who caused it, while πολέμον ποιεῖσθαι is ‘to prosecute a war’, and for the latter meaning the middle is always used because it involves the activity of the subject. Even discerning scholars such as KRÜGER (1873–91: §52.8; cf. COOPER 1998–2002) speak perversely here of a ‘dynamic’ middle, an expression which is much imitated, but which I fail to understand.\(^8\)

Without making any claim to completeness on this subject, I mention one more kind of difference between active and middle. STAHL, in his careful but slightly misguided account of the matter in his Syntax (1907: 55–6), is of the view that there is also a middle ‘of spatial relationship’ (‘der lokalen Beziehung’). That is a rather misleading expression, and we should say rather that some verbs of motion are used in the middle when the result of the action involves movement

\(^7\) W. was not satisfied with his account of τιμωρεῖν and τιμωρεῖσθαι: in ms. add.\(^2\), he crossed out from ‘The same account will explain . . . ’ to the end of the paragraph, and wrote ‘ungenau’ (‘imprecise’) against it. On τιμωρεῖν, see Frisk and Chantraine, each s.v., but note that Chantraine parts company with W., foreshadowing the fact that Gk ὅροι (cf. Homerīc ὅρωται, Mycenaean a-ro-me-no) and German wahren are now generally regarded as having quite separate origins, from roots *ser- and *u-er- (cf. Gk ἑρμα ‘ward off’), respectively; see further LIV, s.v.v. ‘1. *ser-’, ‘1. *u-er-’, and on ὅροι and cognates, Rix (1994a: 77–80).

\(^8\) On the criteria determining the choice between act. ποιεῖν and mid. ποιεῖσθαι, see now the long article by Cock (1981).
towards the subject; we could then render the middle forms, but not the active, with ‘to him/her/itself’. Let me give you a classic example from Homer, namely *Od. 16. 294* (= 19. 13) αὐτὸς γὰρ ἑφέλκεται ἄνδρα σίδηρος ‘iron itself draws a man to itself’. The basic proverbial expression was probably just ἑφέλκεται ἄνδρα σίδηρος—proverbs are usually in verse—and the poet has strengthened the force of the middle by the addition of αὐτός. There is a similar case at *Il. 13. 597* τὸ δ’ ἑφέλκετο μελίνων ἕγχος ‘and he dragged it behind him (mid.), the ashen spear (stuck in his hand)’. | Similarly the peculiar verb εἰσφρέω (of as yet unexplained origin) means in the active ‘let in, admit’ and in the middle ‘let in to oneself’ (note εἰσφρῆσεται ‘admit within their walls’ at Dem. 8. 15).9 The use of πέμπειν ‘to send’ is interesting in this connection. In archaic and classical Greek, it is normally used only in the active, but in Sophocles (*Oed. Col. 602*) and Euripides (*Hec. 977*) it appears in the middle (πεμπέσθαι), and for good reason, since it means ‘to send for, to summon (to one’s presence)’, and this is the principal meaning of the compound μεταπέμπεσθαι: this is not just an action of sending but of causing to come to the subject. (*Soph. Oed. Tyr. 556* πέμψεσθαι is more difficult.10) The verb ἀποπέμπεσθαι (‘to send away’) (mid.) is used of the man who divorces his wife, who sends her away from himself.

I turn now to a related group of verbs in which the subject is at the same time the object of the verbal action. Here belong first of all straightforward reflexives such as ‘to hang oneself’ (ἀπάγχεσθαι), ‘to wash oneself, to bathe oneself’ (λούσθαι, λοῦσθαι, λούσθαι), ‘to anoint oneself’ (χρίεσθαι). Here the verbal action is performed not merely to the advantage of the subject but actually on the subject as direct object. A related type comprises verbs in which the middle denotes an action which the subject makes another subject (unspecified) perform on him/her/itself (the subject). In Aristophanes, *Frogs 857*, for example, the god Dionysus tells the greatly agitated poet Aeschylus ‘gently criticize (act.) and let yourself be criticized (mid.)’ (προφόνως ἐλέγχῃ ἐλέγχου). Here, as with ἀπάγχεσθαι, etc., the subject is at the same time the object of the action of the verb but, differently from the reflexive use, the performance of the verbal action falls to another agent or agents. Compare Homer *Od. 3. 214* (Nestor to Telemachus) ‘do you let yourself be overpowered (mid.) willingly?’ (ἔκὼν ὑποδάμασαι;) or Attic ἀπογράψθαι ‘to have oneself registered’. Here belong also the familiar oppositions between γαμεῖν and ὁπνεῖν ‘to marry’ (of the man) and γαμεῖσθαι and ὁπνεῖσθαι ‘to marry’ (of the woman); cf. I, 123 above on μοιχεύειν ~ μοιχεύεσθαι

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9 On this obscure Greek verb, see Frisk and Chantraine, each s.v. ‘πίφρημι’, and cf. II, 238 & n. 14, p. 698 below!

10 The middle here is less expected because the ‘someone’ sent is expressed: Oedipus asks Creon, ‘But didn’t you persuade me that I ought to send someone/have someone sent (πέμψασθαι των) for the much-revered prophet (Τειρεσίας)?’ Neither Jebb nor Dawe comment on the middle infinitive; J. C. Kamerbeek in his commentary (Leiden 1967) remarks rather oddly, ‘The middle is often a means of intensification’, but quotes no parallels. Perhaps we have a blend of πέμψασθαι ‘to send for’ and πέμψαι των ‘to send someone’.
(‘to commit adultery’). And note also πείθειν ‘to induce someone, to persuade’ vs πείθεσθαι ‘to let oneself be induced by someone else, to obey’; διδάσκειν ‘to teach’ vs διδάσκεσθαι ‘to let oneself be taught, to learn’. I remind you also of a witticism that Diogenes Laertius reports (6. 54) of Diogenes the Cynic: when someone said to him, ‘many people make fun of you’ (πολλοί σου καταγγέλωσιν), Diogenes replied with the middle ἄλλ’ ἐγώ οὖν καταγγέλωμαι, which we might translate as, ‘But I do not let myself be made fun of.’

The deponent verbs also show that the middle could have a reciprocal meaning. Remember that in Greek and German the reflexive pronoun can have a reciprocal meaning, since this, too, involves a reflection of the action back onto the subject; | note the nice Latin expression inter se ‘one another’. This explains why this function was proper to the middle from very early on. There is a trace of it in the Greek verb διαλέγεσθαι ‘to converse’ in which the middle form reflects the reciprocity of the acts of speaking/addressing (λέγειν). In the Homeric phrase ἄλλα τις μοι ταῦτα φιλος διελέξατο θυμός (II. 11. 407, Odysseus to himself), the middle either is reflexive or denotes an internal reciprocal conversation. (ms. add.2: On the reciprocal middle in modern Greek, see THUMB (1910: 109); for another ancient example, note ὀμολογεῖσθαι ‘to grant assent to each other.’)

We have still not dealt with all of the uses of the middle. In many cases we cannot be so clear and definite as to the distinction between active and middle forms, and it sometimes seems as if both are used side by side indiscriminately.

We have already observed repeatedly that beside the verbs which are used in both active and middle are others which are restricted to a single voice. Those which count as active only include some which display a straightforward passive use but not a middle. Many verbs are inherited with active forms only and can be identified as such by comparison with Sanskrit (see DELBRÜCK 1893–1900: II, 416). Thus the Greek verbs (e.g.) εἰμί (‘I am’), εἰμι (‘I (shall) go’), ἐμώ and ἔρω (‘I vomit’ and ‘I flow’) continue an inherited feature in showing only active forms, as the corresponding verbs in Sanskrit are also active only. Conversely, there are verbs which were evidently inherited with only middle forms. Two especially old and frequent examples are κεῖμαι ‘I lie’ and ἰμαί ‘I sit’, and they have exact correspondences in Sanskrit (Vedic s´a´ye, áste).12 Now, we would certainly like to be able to discover in these middle-only or deponent verbs those same shades of meaning that we established above, but in these instances we are often unable to recognize the true meaning of the middle inflection or the reason for its use. With the deponents in particular we have to reckon with the possibility that large-scale transfers have taken place: that originally middle-only status

11 Or reflexive: ‘but I don’t make fun of myself’? The Loeb edition takes καταγγέλωμαι as passive, ‘but I am not laughed down’.

12 Compare now in Anatolian, Cuneiform Luwian zıyar(i) ‘lies’ and Hittite ęa(ri) ‘sits’; see further EWAia, s.vv. ‘S´AY I’, ‘AS’, and LIV, s.vv. ‘*kej-’, ‘*h₁e,ˇs-‘.
was confined to those verbs that denoted an action in the interests of the subject, and that deponent inflection was then extended analogically to other verbs which were somehow semantically or morphologically similar. Even so, in the case of middle-only verbs, \textit{κειμαι} and \textit{ημαι}, for example, we can recognize the meaning of the middle endings: the states of lying and sitting have no effect on any other person and the meaning of the verb in both cases benefits only the subject.

An extraordinary number of verbs which show at first only middle endings later acquire active forms. This leads to a reduction in the number of deponent verbs and to the introduction of double inflection. On this topic, see Delbrück (1893–1900: II, 36, 188, 417) and Wackernagel (1916: 123 ff., 130 ff.). Let me give just one example. There are several Greek verbs in -\textit{ονοςθαι} which are derived from comparative adjectives and which are exclusively middle, e.g. \textit{λαττοοςθαι} (‘to worst, defeat’); similarly Ionic has formed to \textit{σαων} (‘weaker, inferior’; Attic \textit{τασθαι}) the verb \textit{σαοςθαι} meaning ‘to suffer a defeat’ (cf. Attic \textit{τασθαι}, with a slightly different formation) and beside the latter we then find in the Koine (e.g. in Polybius) an active verb \textit{ταν} ‘to defeat’.
Lecture I, 23

But our next question is how far Latin has preserved what we have seen (and recognized as ancient) in Greek, given that in Latin as a rule one speaks only of active and passive. Well, the so-called ‘passive’ in Latin shows a number of uses which are decidedly ‘middle’ in nature.¹ To begin with, that first group of middle uses which we identified in Greek (I, 124–5 above)—where the middle forms denote an activity that proceeds for the subject—finds correspondences also in Latin, especially early Latin. Plautus has *Aulularia* 116 *copulantur dexteras* ‘they join hands’, with *copulant* for *copulant* because the hands (*dexterae*) belong to the subject, and because at the same time it is a reciprocal action. Also the shades of meaning reflected in the active and middle forms of Greek verbs of buying/selling and lending/borrowing (I, 125–6 above) are matched by the Latin use of *pignerare* and *oppignerare*, which mean in the active ‘to give as a pledge’ but in the ‘passive’ (*pignerari*) ‘to receive as a pledge’, and then in general ‘to acquire, appropriate’. For example, at *Met.* 7. 621 Ovid is recounting how Aeacus appeals in his need to Zeus and receives from him a flash of lightning as a sign of goodwill, and then says *quod das mihi pigneror omen* ‘the omen that you give me I take as a pledge (of your goodwill)’. You could not wish for a better match with the Greek usage.

The second main type of middle function in Greek, where the subject is also the object of the action of the verb—i.e., especially the direct reflexive use (I, 124–5 above)—is even better represented in Latin. This type is very common in Plautus (cf. *Blase* 1903: 299–302; *Ernout* 1908/9: 322–5), especially with verbs denoting care of the body. There is a great string of examples at *Poenulus* 219–21, where Adelphasium says of herself and her sister: *ambae numquam concessamus* ‘we’re both incessantly kept at it’—then follows a long list of ‘passive’ (really, middle!) infinitives: *lauari aut fricari aut tergeri aut ornari, poliri, expoliri, pingi, fingi* ‘washing or rubbing or drying or bedecking, prinking and pranking, painting ourselves and doing ourselves up’ (and cf. 229 *ornantur, lauantur, tergentur, *

¹ Baldi (1976) goes so far as to claim that synchronically Classical Latin had a middle voice, ‘a large set of non-deponent R-form verbs’ which ‘assume the R-form without permitting for outside agency or instrumentation’ (1976: 232). Among other relatively recent work on voice in Latin, note Comrie (1977), Perlmutter (1978), Lehmann (1985), and Plank (1985). Orbán (1974) is of interest in relating the development of the middle from Latin to Romance to the theories of the Latin grammarians.
poliuntur ‘they are bedecking, washing, drying, and prinking themselves’). All of these verbs are to be taken as reflexive: they are not things done to the girls but things that they do to themselves. The only doubtful one is lauari, given that in Plautus the active lauare already has reflexive meaning.\(^2\) The regular lauare (cf. Var. Lat. Lang. 9. 105; Langen 1880: 297) has probably been assimilated to the adjacent middle infinitives, either by the poet himself or in the process of transmission.—Other examples include ungi ‘to anoint oneself’, amiciri ‘to dress oneself’, cingi, accingi ‘to gird oneself’.

The construction with the accusative in Vergil’s phrase ferrum cingitur ‘he girds his sword on’ (Aen. 2. 510–11) could be in imitation of the Homeric χαλκόν ζώννυσθαι (‘to gird on bronze (armour)’), ζωννύσκετο μύτην (‘he used to gird on his waist-guard’). But in the case of Vergil, Aen. 7. 640 loricam induitur ‘he puts his breastplate on’, there are additional considerations to note, namely that the Umbrian inscriptions use the middle of the corresponding verb anou- with an accusative object,\(^3\) and that pre-classical Latin, unaffected by influence of Greek syntax,\(^4\) uses at least the participle indutus with accusatives such as aliquid or pallam. In other words, Vergil’s use of the accusative may be an archaism connected with the ‘middle’ functions of cingi and indui. For a different—and mistaken—view, cf. Kroll (1920: 32–3).\(^5\)

This use is not confined to verbs of dressing and caring for the body. Plautus uses also simulor and adsimulor reflexively, to mean ‘I make myself like something/someone, I pretend to be’. And to the same type belong expressions (some of which survive into Classical Latin) such as Plaut. Cas. 239 uix teneor quin dicam ‘I can hardly restrain myself from saying’, Ter. Phorm. 206 non possum immutarier ‘I cannot change myself’, or the frequent use of convuertor ‘I turn (myself) to’ (e.g. Plaut. Persián 608).

Here is a nice example of a verb confined to deponent use in the classical language: in contrast with the simplex plecto (‘weave’, cognate with German flechten), the compounds amplector, complector mean literally ‘weave oneself around another’ and hence ‘embrace’. Then, with a slightly different shade of meaning, there are uehi ‘to have oneself driven’, pasci ‘to have one’s animals pastured’ and, more intransitive, rumpi ‘to burst’, minui ‘to shrink’. Notice that, even with verbs that are not deponent, you cannot get away with treating them as straightforward passives. | In the end, the frequent cases of alternation between

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\(^2\) See Feltenius (1977).

\(^3\) In the Iguvine Tables (Um I Rix), V1b49, the sg. 3 fut. impv. (middle-)pass. anouilimus (‘let him put on for himself?’) governs the words for the insignia of the sacrificing priest in the accusative; cf. Untermann (2000: s.v.), with bibliography.

\(^4\) This is of a piece with W.’s earlier denial of syntactic Grecisms in Plautus (I, 67 above), but this is altogether too sweeping: there are certainly examples of such influence in Ennius; see most recently Adams (2003: 422–3 & nn. 24, 28), and the references in n. 2, p. 94 above.

\(^5\) Again, Kroll had changed his mind before the 3rd edn of his book (cf. n. 17, p. 90 above).
active and middle inflection, even in Old Latin, are presumably due to the fact that many verbs had both active and middle forms for different functions, and when the semantic opposition was given up, one or the other set of forms was lost. So, for example, *pacisco*, attested with active endings in Naevius (e.g. *Punic War* 41, 43 Warington) and Plautus (e.g. *Bacchides* 866, 870–1) may have meant originally ‘establish’, ‘impose conditions’, as opposed to the regular classical form *paciscor* ‘agree terms’, with the middle of a reciprocal action.

In this light, the Latin deponents are suddenly easy to understand. For the Latin material, I would refer you to the incredibly rich collection of evidence—admittedly without any scholarly assessment—in *Neue & Wagener* III, 11 ff. But even the ancient grammarians and lexicographers assembled a great deal: see e.g. Nonius Marcellus, pp. 748 ff. Lindsay. Just like the Greek middle-only verbs, they are simply verbs which take only middle endings in accordance with their meaning. Now, admittedly, the Latin passive endings cannot be compared straightforwardly with the Greek middle endings but they do originate ultimately in middle forms (although it would go beyond our brief to discuss this in detail here).\(^6\) In fact, some verbs do allow us to see that there really is a deep-seated connection between the Latin deponent and the old middle. A particularly well-known Latin deponent is *sequor*: the Sanskrit cognate *sácate* (‘accompanies’) also has middle endings, and the corresponding Greek verb *(I)σπομαι* is also a deponent—note that the active *(I)πελευ* ‘to busy oneself with’ has no connection at all with *(I)σπομαι!*\(^7\) Or again, Latin *metior* ‘to measure’ is exactly comparable with Homeric μητιέσθαι ‘to devise, contrive’ (lit. ‘to reckon, estimate, measure’). Other deponents have cognates in languages other than Greek: e.g. *nasci* (‘be born’), and compounds such as *reminiscor* (‘remember’) have correspondences in Celtic.\(^8\) A particularly interesting case is that of *morior* (‘die’): Sanskrit and Avestan have each a corresponding verb also with middle endings (Vedic *(I)riyáte*, Young Avestan miriiéte, both ‘dies’), which presents us with the striking inference that, since the verb is decidedly passive in form, the action of dying was viewed as something that happens to one.\(^9\)

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\(^6\) The common origin of the Latin deponent-passive and the Greek middle-passive endings is superficially obvious only in the 3rd person, where the -(n)to- of early Latin sg. 3 -to-r, pl. 3 -nto-r may be compared directly with Gk -(v)to in the past endings sg. 3 -το, pl. 3 -ντο; less obviously, Gk sg. 2 -οο is exactly comparable with Lat. sg. 2 -re, which comes by regular sound change from *(v)ω. On the Indo-European middle endings and their treatment in Latin, Greek and other branches of the family, see further Sihler (1995: 470–80), Szemerényi (1996: 238–43), Jasanoff (2003: §§31–7), the last two with extensive further references.

\(^7\) Note, however, that these two, originally quite separate verbs are occasionally confused in Homer; see Frisk and Chantraine, each s.v. *(I)πελευ*, and *LIV*, s.vv. *'it, *sek*',' *sep*’.

\(^8\) Hence the r-endings in, for example, Old Irish *gainethar* ‘is born’, -mainethar ‘thinks, believes’ (on which, see Jasanoff 1978: §68) and *sechithir* ‘follows’, cognate with Lat. *sequor*, etc. adduced by W. a few lines above; on these Indo-European verbs, cf. *LIV*, s.vv. *'genh*P, *men-'P, and *sek*'P.

\(^9\) See further on the attested forms of this verb *EWAia*, s.v. *MAR*, *LIV*, s.v. *'mer*P.
Apart from being inherited as a middle-only form, a verb without active endings could arise in other ways. It could, for instance, start life with both active and middle inflection and then lose the active: this is the case with (e.g.) Latin *laetari* ‘to be glad’, for the oldest of all Roman poets, Livius Andronicus, has the active form *laetauisti* ‘you made me glad’ (*Trag. 14. Warmington*). The active fell into disuse, just the medio-passive remained, and the verb now counts as a deponent. Comparison with Greek shows that this was the way in which the deponent verb *fari* ‘to speak’ arose, which corresponds with the Greek middle forms ἔφαμην, φάμεως (‘I spoke’, ‘speaking’), etc. In Greek, active inflection is more usual (φημί, etc.) but Latin has only *in-fans* (lit. ‘not-speaking’) and the isolated participle *fans*. The absence of other active forms in Latin may be due in part to the tendency to avoid monosyllabic verb forms, which also explains the use of *effor* instead of the non-occurring sg. 1 *for* (‘I speak’). As a result of this tendency (which we shall see again in connection with the imperative, I, 219 below), *fatur* and *fantur* were preferred on formal grounds to *fat*, *fant*. This explains also the rarity of the nom. sg. *fans*, which occurs only in Plautus, *Persa 174 fans atque infans*, where it is clearly supported by the contrasting *infans*. This shows, incidentally, how the choice of voice can be determined by purely external formal factors.

Conversely, as in Greek (I, 129–30 above), active forms may be made secondarily to an erstwhile deponent, and assume the meaning to be expected if the deponent had been passive, so that the new active functions as a sort of causative to the old deponent. For example, *conflictari* was an old deponent meaning ‘to enter into a contest, contend, struggle’: now, on the one hand, in colloquial language (see below) this verb is used in the same meaning with active endings; on the other hand, we find in Pliny and Tacitus a causative *conflictare* meaning ‘to throw into confusion’, or again, the deponent *plector* ‘suffer damage, punishment’ is ancient, but Late Latin writers (e.g. Ausonius and Prudentius) make a new active *plectare* ‘to punish’. In making an etymology of the verb, it would be foolish to start from this active form.

Furthermore, from early on in the course of the development of Latin, by analogy with old deponents, originally active verbs acquire passive, or better: middle, endings. In later Latin, there is an immense number of secure examples: e.g. instead of *delectare* ‘to delight’, both Petronius and the Latin Bible translations have *delectari* with the same meaning, perhaps on the model of *adulari, blandiri* (both, ‘to flatter’); there is also *lacrimari* (‘to weep’) on the model of *lamentari* (‘to lament’), and so on. This formation of new deponents is probably due to the fact that the use of deponents in the living language was becoming increasingly rare and it was therefore regarded as a mark of educated speech to use verbs with deponent endings—which is what was attempted, especially when a semantic analogy with an old deponent suggested itself.
In many cases, then, in consequence of a genuinely colloquial tendency, deponent endings were lost. We see the end-point of this development in the Romance languages. When it started—whether already in the classical or archaic period the man in the street felt it natural to give old deponents active endings—we cannot say. (ms. add. 2: On deponents in Late Latin, see Löfstedt 1936: 128ff.)

To conclude our consideration of the middle and the deponents, let us recall one further feature common to Greek and Latin: namely, that it is not always the case that all tenses of a verb show the same voice-endings. In Greek, there are many verbs which are middle in the present but have an active aorist, e.g. ἔδρακον: ἔδρακος; πέρδομαι: πέρδον; πτάρνυμαι: ἐπταρν. (‘look’; ‘fart’; ‘sneeze’). But what is especially common and much discussed, is the concurrence of active perfect and middle present (cf. I, 121 above): the present may be middle-only—e.g. ἔδορκα: ἔδροκοι; πέσπορα: πέσπορα; γέγονα: γέγονα; βέβουλα: βεβούλα (‘look’; ‘fart’; ‘be, become’; ‘wish’)—or it may be middle in the function corresponding to the active perfect: so, for example, the perfect ἔστηκα belongs semantically with ἐπταρν ‘I hope, wish’, and not to the rare active present ἔστηκε ‘causes to hope’, and ἐστηκα ‘stand’ belongs with ἵσταμαι (‘I set myself up’). 10 On πέτηγα (‘I am fixed’), etc. in the ancient grammarians, cf. I, 121 above. We find exactly the same thing in Sanskrit, namely active forms in the perfect beside a middle present, with the aorist agreeing sometimes with the present, sometimes with the perfect. We even have a few traces of this pattern in Latin: the best-known example is reuertor (‘turn back, return’) : perfect reuerti; from Cicero on, assenzir (‘assent to, approve’) has the alternative perfect assensi; and compare Quintilian’s interesting discussion (1. 6. 10) of the relationship between present paciscor (‘make an agreement’) and perfect pepigi (of pango ‘fix, stipulate’). 11 Celtic, too, the group of languages most closely related to Latin, has this kind of alternation as well. We have here something very old, which still awaits explanation. 12

10 Rather than with the active ἵστηκα ‘I set (something else) up’.
11 W. is probably supposing that paciscor is formed on the root of pactus, ptc. of pango, -ere, pepigi; cf. Sommer (1914: §319.4) and Haverling (2000: 400) with further references. A more recent reconstruction sets up two related but separate roots, *pēh₂j- intr. ‘become fixed’ vs *pēh₂k- tr. ‘to fasten’ (cf. LIV, s.vv.; Meiser 2003: §170); much depends on one’s account of paeit, -unt ‘make an agreement’ in the Twelve Tables, 1. 6. 7. 13 Crawford. However, W.’s main point about the coexistence side by side of deponent presents and intransitive perfects still stands; see the next n.
12 The view that one takes of the historical relationship between the perfect, the middle, the thematic conjugation, and the so-called bi-conjugation (parallel to the more familiar-looking mi-conjugation) of Anatolian is central to one’s view of the verbal system of Indo-European, and still today as controversial as ever. For introductory surveys, see Sihler (1995: esp. §§413, 509–10) and Szemerényi (1996: ch. 9), the latter with bibliography, and now the important monograph of Jasanoff (2003) (on the perfect and the middle, esp. ch. 2).
Another related though not inherited peculiarity of Greek, which also remains to be adequately explained, is the fact that so many active verbs have **middle inflection in the future**. There is nothing to compare with this outside Greek, and any attempts to explain it can only be tentative. Not all of the examples are necessarily equally old: forms may have been extended and analogically remodelled in the course of time. For example, the futures of τρέχω ‘run’ in (respectively) Attic and Hellenistic Greek, δραμοίμαι and θρέξομαι, may have been modelled on the Homeric future θένωσομαι ‘I shall run’, though admittedly the latter requires explanation, given the active present θέω (‘I run’). Or again, ἀκοῦσομαι ‘I shall hear’, future of ἀκοῦω, may have been in imitation of ὁφομαι ‘I shall see’. And ὁφομαι we can explain, as it belongs etymologically with the Homeric present ὁσομαι ‘look’, which has an active perfect ὁπωτα (cf. the pattern above). Possibly, therefore, ἀκοῦσομαι was made to ἀκοῦω on the analogy of ὁφομαι to ὁρω. Similarly, there is reason to think that the Homeric future ἔδομαι ‘I shall eat’ is ancient, while πίομαι and later Greek φάγομαι are later analogical formations. For the rest, I refer you to DELBRÜCK (1879: 74–5); he is right on a number of new points, although he cannot give a complete account of this phenomenon.

This group of verbs also shows the effects of a tendency to analogical levelling: e.g. alongside γέγονα, appears γεγένημαι attested as early as the fifth century. Conversely, the middle forms in the future are sometimes given up, so that in the later language we find θρέξω for θρέξομαι (‘I shall run’), or πλέωσω for πλέομαι (‘I shall sail’).

Note also that different compound forms of the same verb can disagree in respect of voice: e.g. Latin experior vs comperio (‘make trial of’ vs ‘find out’); cf. pre- and post-class. deponent comperior. This may be connected with cases such as Greek ἀποδόθαι: δοῦναι or διαλέγεσθαι: λέγειν (‘sell’ : ‘give’, ‘converse’ : ‘say, speak’), where the middle inflection of the compound is determined by its different function vis-à-vis the simplex; cf. also μεταπέμπεσθαι vs πέμπειν (‘send for’ vs ‘send’; cf. I, 128 above).

Instead of regarding the **passive** as the natural counterpart to the active, we should really be amazed at the very existence of a passive. The passive has rightly been called a luxury for a language to have, since a passive clause presents nothing more than a transformation of the normal active clause.13 If we look beyond our narrow linguistic horizons, we can see that many languages have no passive at all, and furthermore that in nearly all those that do have a passive, the passive forms originally had some other function. These general considerations are very well

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13 This sentence is quoted and challenged by Pinkster (1984: 422), in the first of a series of works arguing that active and passive transforms are not synonymous, but reflect each a quite different ‘perspective’ on the action of the verb.
treated by the excellent linguist von der Gabelentz (who also co-authored with Loebe (1843–6) an outstanding grammar of Gothic) in his article ‘On the passive’ of 1861.14

The first question that we must ask is, how, in the languages that concern us, did the passive forms arise in the first place? What sort of formal markers provided the necessary resources? We should note first that Indo-European, the so-called ‘protolanguage’, already possessed the beginnings of a passive, namely outside the finite verb in the verbal adjective marked by the suffix continued by Greek -τός, Latin -tus and German -t. Gabelentz (1861: 493–502) points out that many languages which otherwise have no passive have some sort of passive participle, for of course it could often happen that a noun had to be described in terms of an action of which it was the object, and this called for a type of adjective which contained the idea of being acted upon. Words such as Greek τυκτός or ὄνομαστός (‘made’, ‘named’) are really the oldest passive expressions in the Indo-European family. But even these forms are not really passive in the strictest sense, since they denote not the state of being acted on but the attachment of the verbal action to something and consequently do not always have passive meaning as we understand it. In Latin, from the earliest period, we have forms such as iuratus, pransus, cenatus, potus (‘having sworn’, ‘having lunched’, ‘having dined’, ‘having drunk’), and verbal adjectives of this type can be used whenever the verbal action attaches to the subject: e.g. Greek στατός ‘one characterized by standing’, ἄπαστός ‘one who has not eaten’, Latin nupta ‘a woman who has married’, and—an especially famous and interesting word, which you will know particularly from Homer—ματί ‘(a) mortal, one to whom dying attaches’, not in the present but in the nature of things (cf. I, 288 and II, 285–7 below & nn.): in these cases we cannot talk strictly of a passive meaning, but notice the passive form of Lat. morior (‘die’) (cf. I, 132 above).

In the finite verb, too, however, the Indo-European protolanguage took some first steps toward the creation of a passive by using the original middle forms sometimes also as passives, especially in the perfect. (ms. add.2: The mid./pass. of ‘make, do’ ποιεῖσθαι in Homer is passive only at II. 6. 56, Od. 7. 342, both times in the perfect, πεπολύτατοι.) And there is nothing unnatural in this. The straightforward reflexive middles and those meaning ‘cause an action to be performed (by another) on oneself’ (such as γαμεῖσθαι, διδάσκεσθαι: cf. I, 128 above) can equally well be regarded as denoting an undergoing, or experiencing, of the verbal action (‘being married’, ‘being taught’). In many languages, including Scandinavian and Slavic, Latvian, and Romance, the combination of verb and reflexive pronoun

also has passive meaning (cf. especially Pedersen 1907: 160 ff.). Compare also German expressions such as das lernt sich leicht (‘that is easily learned’, lit. ‘that learns itself easily’). This construction must have been familiar already in the colloquial Latin of the Empire, whence, e.g. Plin. Nat. 5. 121 Myrina, quae Sebastopolim se uocat (lit. ‘M., which calls itself S.’), where se uocat translates Greek καλεῖται (Klotz 1908: 416), and facere se for fieri in late authors (see Löfstedt 1911: 167–8, 358). The shift to true passive meaning is brought about by excluding the action of the subject from the content of the middle or reflexive expression. So we can understand how Greek and Latin middle forms came to be used quite regularly in the passive, once the wish and the need for passive forms had arisen.

Now I must remind you of something that has been in every Greek grammar since Dionysius Thrax (§13), namely that Greek uses in the aorist and future separate forms for middle and passive, so that beside middle ἔγραψάμεν (‘I wrote’) and γράφομαι (‘I shall write’) (mid.) we find passive ἔγραψαν (‘I was written’) and γραφήσωμαι (‘I shall be written’) (pass.). In these cases, one could say, the distinction between middle and passive has prevailed and a special passive form, independent of the middle, has been achieved. But this is true only in a very qualified sense, even from the point of view of one particular period of the language, namely classical Attic, and it becomes even less true when we review the whole history of Greek from the beginning.

It is usual to say that in the aorist you use ἔποιησάμην for the middle, ἔποιήθην for the passive, and it is certainly true that this distinction applies to this and many other verbs in Attic (and to some extent outside Attic, too). In Attic at any rate, the forms of the weak aorist always count as middle, never as passive, and conversely an Attic aorist passive is always in -θην or -ην. But it would be wrong to suppose that this opposition had always existed in Greek, or that the forms in -θην and -ην were at some point restricted to passive function. In the first place, it is clear that in the archaic and poetic language, aorist middle forms could also have passive meaning. In Homer, middle forms of certain strong aorists in particular occur as passives, e.g. βλήτω from βάλλω ‘throw, strike’ and ἐκτάτο from κτείνω ‘kill’ meant simply ‘was killed’, ‘was struck’. Then there are the (middle) participles with passive meaning, κτάμενος (‘killed’), βλήμενος (‘struck’), κτίμενος ‘established, built’, or expressions such as λύτο γούνατα ‘his knees were loosed’ or ἔπράβετο ‘was sacked’. The passive meaning of the strong aorist ἐσχέτο ‘was taken, held’ was still normal in Attic, as, for example, in Plato’s ἀπορία σχόμενος (‘held in desperation’). Compare also ἀπ-έφατο (glossed by Hesychius with ἀπέθανεν (‘died’)) as the passive of ἔπεφυ (‘killed’).

Even some weak aorists are found with passive meaning, admittedly only rarely in Homer, and practically never in Attic. I think first of the form ἔστεφανοσάτο in Pindar (Olymp. 7. 81), which, however you look at it, means simply ‘he was crowned’. Another interesting instance is Simonides, fr. 507, 1 Page, a passage much discussed in antiquity because of its content. The poet is celebrating the victor of a wrestling match, and says: ἔπεξαθ’ ὁ κριός ὁ γὰρ ὁ ἀπεκέως. The victory was over someone by the name of Κριός (lit. ‘Ram’). Simonides was taken to task by his contemporaries for here disregarding the rules of proper behaviour by not only glorifying the victor but also deriding the loser because of his name. The words mean simply ‘the ram was quite properly shorn’, that is, ἔπεξαθο is a true passive. The evidence of Aristophanes is valuable on this point, since at Clouds 1356 he quotes this line of Simonides but replaces ἔπεξαθο with the unambiguously passive form ἔπεξθη. There are also isolated instances in Homer, and later certain Alexandrian poets, passionately fond of archaisms, revived this usage. Even δαμασαμένη and βιησαμένη (‘overcome’, ‘overpowered’) are used with passive meaning by Euphorion of Chalcis (cf. Meineke 1843: 88, no. 49, and
In other words, to begin with, the passive use of the aorist middle was not impossible, and it was gradually given up only because other forms were available with unequivocally passive sense. Now to the so-called passive forms of the aorist! There is no doubt that the forms in -\( \eta \nu \), were originally active. They take active endings (-\( \gamma \), -\( \varsigma \), -\( \mu \nu \), -\( \tau \), -\( \epsilon \nu \)), and several aorists in -\( \eta \nu \) belong straightforwardly to active verbs, such as Homeric and Attic \( \epsilon \chi \rho \rho \nu \tau \) to \( \chi \alpha \rho \omega \nu \) (‘rejoice’). Pindar makes passive-looking participles to the strong aorist active \( \eta \rho \iota \nu \tau \nu \) ‘I fell down’ (\( \epsilon \rho \iota \nu \epsilon \tau \nu \tau \iota \), *Olymp. 2. 43*) and to \( \tilde{e} \rho \delta \rho \kappa \nu \) ‘I looked’ (\( \delta \rho \kappa \epsilon \iota \varsigma \), \( \delta \rho \kappa \epsilon \iota \varsigma \tau \), \( \delta \kappa \epsilon \iota \varsigma \sigma \), e.g. *Pyth. 2. 20*, *Nem. 7. 3*.

A second group comprises those instances where the aorist in -\( \eta \nu \) stands beside a weak aorist, from which it differs not only in voice but also by being intransitive while the weak aorist active is transitive. Many verbs have a transitive weak aorist and an intransitive strong aorist in -\( \eta \nu \). In Homer, \( \delta \gamma \nu \mu \mu \iota \) (‘break’) has, on the one hand, \( \epsilon \rho \rho \xi \zeta \varphi \) vs \( \kappa \iota \zeta \omega \nu \iota \) ‘broke, caused to break’, on the other, \( \kappa \iota \zeta \omega \nu \iota \) ‘broke, was broken’. Likewise, note \( \epsilon \rho \rho \eta \xi \varphi \) vs \( \epsilon \rho \rho \gamma \nu \) ‘split’, \( \epsilon \eta \xi \xi \alpha \) ‘I made fast’ vs \( \epsilon \pi \gamma \nu \) ‘I stuck fast’; and compare the intransitive perfects \( \epsilon \gamma \alpha \varsigma \), \( \epsilon \rho \rho \omega \alpha \), \( \pi \eta \gamma \alpha \) (‘I am broken’, ‘I am broken, have broken out’, ‘I am stuck fast’).

From this opposition between transitive and intransitive there occurred already in Homeric Greek the development whereby a passive meaning came to attach to the originally intransitive aorist in -\( \eta \nu \). Completely unequivocal passive use remains rare in Homer, but there is e.g., \( \epsilon \pi \lambda \iota \gamma \gamma \) ‘he was struck’ vs \( \epsilon \pi \lambda \iota \xi \alpha \) (act., ‘struck’), \( \tau \upsilon \iota \epsilon \varsigma \) (II. 11. 191, aor. pass. participle) vs \( \epsilon \tau \iota \omega \iota \) (act., ‘hit’) and frequently \( \epsilon \delta \alpha \mu \nu \iota \) (aor. pass.) vs \( \epsilon \delta \alpha \mu \alpha \sigma \iota \) (act., ‘subdued’). For the development of passive meaning in intransitive verb forms with active endings, we have a nice parallel in Gothic, where present stems formed with the suffix -\( \eta \alpha \) are used with fully passive function. For example, at Luke 1: 41 Wulfila translates Greek \( \epsilon \pi \lambda \iota \alpha \sigma \theta \gamma \) (‘was filled’) with *gafullnoda*, which is simply an active preterite. In the same way in Attic, -\( \eta \nu \) came to mark a genuine passive of the aorist of many verbs.

The other form of the aorist ‘passive’, however, the form in -\( \theta \eta \nu \), has its origins in the middle. Indeed, in our earliest evidence, we find it used with unequivocally middle meaning, e.g. in an early inscription from Corcyra (*IG IX. 1*, 867, 6; late 7th c. BC) \( \tau \omicron \delta \omicron \sigma \alpha \mu \) \( \pi \omicron \nu \epsilon \iota \theta \epsilon \) ‘made this monument’, with thoroughly unpassive \( \epsilon \pi \nu \theta \nu \theta \eta \) (‘made’) to a verb \( \pi \nu \epsilon \iota \sigma \theta \omicron \alpha \) ‘to tire oneself’; we find the same transitive use of aorist \( \dot{a} \mu \phi \pi \nu \theta \nu \theta \) still in Archilochus (fr. 9. 10–11 West), and the form

1 Nos 96 and 90, respectively, in Powell (1925), where both forms have masculine endings and are hence middle; the latter is masc. and middle even in Meineke.

2 Of \( \eta \eta \)-aorist middles with passive meaning in Homer the handbooks give only *Od. 8*. 36 (Alcinous to his people) \( \kappa \rho \nu \alpha \theta \omicron \alpha \omicron \) ‘let them be chosen’ (or ‘let them choose for themselves?’); see further Schwyzzer & Debrunner 236–41, and Chantraine (1953: 181–2).

3 Cf. Slater (1969: s.vv. ‘\( \delta \epsilon \rho \iota \kappa \omega \)’, ‘\( \epsilon \rho \iota \iota \iota \iota \)’).

4 On the aorists in -\( \eta \nu \) and (cf. the next paragraph) -\( \theta \eta \) in Homer, see further Chantraine (1958: 399–407).
The aorist passive in Pindar (Olymp. 6. 11) may belong here, too (cf. I, 112 above). This serves to illustrate that the passive meaning of forms in -θην was not so far developed, and in Homer -θην is still predominantly middle, especially in middle-only verbs, such as ἀδικήθης, ἐδοξάσθης, αἰσθήθης, αἰσθήθης (‘was infatuated’, ‘was able’, ‘felt shame’, ‘thought’) — so, too, e.g. Pindar, Pyth. 1. 51 ἐστρατευθής (‘campaigned’), and Herodotus, 7. 44 ἵπτερθη (‘desired’). In Attic, too, many deponent verbs have an aorist in -θην, e.g. ἐβουλήθης το βούλομαι (‘I wish’), and indeed with each successive generation the use of -θην in the middle and with deponents grows steadily, so that (e.g.) διελέξατο (‘conversed’) is replaced by διελέξθης, ἀπεκρίνατο (‘replied’) by ἀπεκρίθης, and the use of -θην is extended still further in the Koine. This development became so firmly established that in modern Greek no aorist middles survive and the aorist of deponents and middles is always in -θην. So, the passive function of -θην represents only a part of its use. Incidentally, even the so-called strong aorist passive is occasionally found in place of the aorist middle: so, e.g., the Atticists have to warn against using ἐκάρπην in place of ἐκειράμην (‘I shaved (myself)’), and for Homer διελέξατο (‘conversed’), Attic has διελέξθης and Aristotle διελέγη as well.

It is, then, only in a very incomplete fashion that Greek has developed a special form for the passive of the aorist, and the forms of the so-called aorist passive were never completely passive. The idea that -θην was any more passive than the old middle forms was suggested by the fact that it rhymes with -ην, which had nothing to do with the middle.

The situation in the future is different again. Originally, the future middle served also as passive, as in the present and perfect, though there was also a future passive in -ήσομαι modelled on the aorist in -ην. The future passive in -θήσομαι, on the other hand, is not found at all in Homer and is very rare in Herodotus (Wackernagel 1916: 214–15). It is an innovation modelled on the aorist passive of -θην, and is practically confined to Attic. In the fourth century the passive of the future is still very often in -σομαι (the middle form), and conversely Attic uses forms in -θήσομαι also for deponents. Only gradually does -θήσομαι become obligatory for the future passive.

Latin, too, by the way, has other ways of marking passive apart from the old middle forms (cf. I, 135 above). The grammarians teach quite correctly, that ueneo (‘be sold’) is the passive of uendo ‘sell’ (cf. Diomedes, GL I, 368, 24; Priscian 8. 12 = GL II, 377, 15); consequently, although uenditus (‘sold’) is usual, uendor is not, and in pre- and post-classical Latin ueno sometimes has passive endings.  

5 Note also a second inscriptional example, IG IX.1².1. 197 (Aetolia, 5th c. BC).
6 On the intransitive and passive futures in -θήσομαι, see further Schwytzer 763, and Chantraine (1958: 447).
7 This applies in particular to the infinitive, uenditūs, which is found both early (e.g. Plaut. Pers. 577) and late (e.g. in the Old Latin Bible, Mark 14: 5); see further Flobert (1975: 199).
On the other hand, the construction *uenire ab aliquo* ‘to be sold by someone’ seems not to occur before the Empire (e.g. at Quint. *Inst.* 12. 1. 43, in parallel with *spoliari* ‘strip, rob, despoil’). This usage is explained by the fact that *ueneo* really means ‘go/come for sale’, just as *ueno* (earlier *uenumdo*) is ‘give or put up for sale’. The same relation holds between *pereo* and *perdo*—cf. Catullus 8. 2 *et quod uides perisse, perditum ducas* (‘and what you see to have perished you should regard as lost’)—and between *pessum eo* (‘be ruined’, lit. ‘go to the bottom’) and *pessumdo* (‘ruin’), except that here the phrase with *eo* (‘go’) is not felt to be so decisively passive as in *ueneo*. The rarity of the passives *uendor* and *perdor* in Old Latin is discussed by Lachmann (1882) on Lucretius, 2. 831 *disperditur*. In contrast, *fio* ‘become, be made’ (with the future infinit. *fore*) both on the same root as *fui* and *futurus* (‘was’ and ‘about to be’) serves as the plain passive of *facio* (even in compounds of the type *calefio* ‘am made, become, warm’), and as in the present of *factus sum* (‘was made, became’). As a result, *facitur* is practically unheard of, and *fio* occasionally has passive endings (e.g. *fitur* in Cato, *Orat.* 68 [p. 42, 5 Jordan]). The infinitive *fieri* (which is attested already in Old Latin and is the usual form in Classical Latin) is based on a remodelling of regular *fiere* (still in Ennius, *Annals* 352 Skutsch, and Laevius, in Gell. 19. 7. 10) after the passive infinitives in -ı̆.

8 Other verbs, such as *napulare* ‘to be beaten’ are labelled as passives by the grammarians; cf. also Greek *πίπτειν* and *ἀποθανεῖν* *ὑπὸ τῶν* (‘to be killed (lit. to fall, die) by someone’), Latin *cadere* and *mori ab aliquo* (ditto), and also the use of *κεῖσθαι* (‘to lie’) as the perfect passive of *τιθέναι* (‘to put’), ‘to have been put’.

The usual Latin way of paraphrasing the perfect passive with *esse* and participle in -*tus* (which is used also for the perfect of deponents) finds a correspondence in Gothic, which translates Greek passive past forms with *ist or warþ* (‘is’, ‘was’) and perfect passive participle, while in the present the old middle forms are used, as in Latin and Greek. German uses only the verb *werden* (‘become’) in this perfect passive periphrasis and following loss of the old middle forms has extended its use to the present.10 (On the Gothic passive in -*nan*, see I, 139 above.) What kind of verbs are *used in the passive*, anyway? On the whole, we can say that the transformation into the passive can occur with verbs which in the active take a direct object, the object then being presented as the subject. That is true as a rule

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8 Note that the present of *fiere* (class. *fieri*) has active endings, *fio, fis, fit*; see Skutsch (1985: 161) on Enn. *Ann.* 11.

9 But this presupposes the grammaticalization of *ὑπὸ τῶν* as the marker of the agent after a passive verb. If we translate ‘at someone’s hand’, the use of the phrase with ‘fall’ or ‘die’ seems perfectly natural. See the illuminating discussion of the early history of *ὑπὸ* with passive verb forms in George (2005: 61–7) with further references.

10 It is perhaps surprising to find that in a random sample of 80 languages, only 31 languages form between them 39 passive constructions, of which only three are formed periphrastically, and all three are in Indo-European languages; see Haspelmath (1990).
in the three languages that concern us here. Note that intransitive verbs can also go into the passive, the impersonal passive, that is: but more of that anon. We do, however, find the passive use of verbs which, by the rule just stated, should not have a passive.

In the first place, in Greek and Latin you can form a passive to verbs with middle inflection, whether or not they have an active alongside the middle. With deponent verbs this is easy to understand when they have transitive meaning, and in fact we find this already in Homer: e.g. at II. 11. 589 in the phrase δὲ βελέσσεται βιάζεται ‘who is forced back by the missiles (of the enemy)’, used of Ajax son of Telamon. The verb βιάζομαι (‘I force my way’) is always deponent in Homer, but even so people ventured to use one of its forms in a passive sense, and this happens throughout the history of Greek: e.g. κεκτημένος is not only ‘having occupied’ but also ‘having been occupied’, ἔοικε ‘was bought’ (Ar. Peace 1182), ἔσκεπται ‘has been considered’ (Plato, Rep. 369b). What is more remarkable is that the same thing happens with non-deponent middles: αἱρεῖν means in the active ‘take’, in the middle, ‘choose’, but there are passive forms such as ἃρέθην which occur meaning not only ‘was taken’ (passive to ἔλην ‘took’) but also ‘was chosen’ (passive to ἐλόμην ‘chose’). Similarly to γράφεω ‘write’ there is γράφεσθαι (middle) ‘accuse’ but also γράφεσθαι (passive) ‘be accused’; μεταπέμπεσθαι can mean ‘be summoned’ as well as ‘summon’ (middle). The same thing occurs frequently with Latin deponents, although in Latin things are complicated by the fact that so many verbs alternate between active and deponent endings (I, 133 above). Priscian already has long lists of examples (8. 15, 11. 29 = GL II, 379, 567): e.g. Plaut. Pseud. 687 satis philosophatum est ‘that’s enough philosophizing’ (lit. ‘it has been philosophized enough’), Lucilius 085 Warmington a me auxiliatus siet ‘be helped by me’, to deponent philosophari and auxiliari (‘to philosophize’, ‘to help’). Numerous examples are found until Late Latin.

Another point to note is that especially in Greek, intransitive verbs can also be used as passives if they require a complement, albeit not an accusative direct object. So, for example, ἐπιτάσσεσθαι ‘to be commanded’ (Thuc., e.g. I. 140. 5), from ἐπιτάσσειν τωι (‘to impose on someone as a duty’). On this point, | Gothic is about as free as Greek, and modern English is much freer: expressions such as she was given a watch are criticized by some purists, but are absolutely normal, especially in Ireland (G. Krüger 1910–19: II.1, 71 ff.).11 On the whole, however, it is not permitted in Latin or German. On Latin, note an interesting passage in Quintilian: after reviewing the distinction between the impersonal passive and the normal passive (1. 4. 28), he comments, ‘Yet a third type of passive (quidam tertius modus) is found in urbs habitatur (‘the city is inhabited’), whence we get

11 On the origins and development of this construction in late Middle English and early modern English, see I, 48 and n. 7, p. 69 above, and note also Denison (1993: 103–62) and (1998: 214).
phrases such as *campus curritur* (lit. ‘the field is run’) and *mare navigatur* (‘the sea is sailed’).’ Obviously, Quintilian means that such passive transforms of intransitive verbs are different from the normal transitive type: in other words, he does not regard his examples as transitive verbs. In the case of *habitare* (‘to inhabit’), this is striking, but in fact in Old Latin and still in Cicero it means ‘to live’, and combines with locatival expressions (like *habere* in the same sense), developing only gradually as a transitive verb (probably on the model of *colere*, which in the sense ‘to live’ took early on besides a locative complement also an accusative object, though it originally suited only the sense ‘to care for, to devote oneself to’). The passive construction commented on by Quintilian fits in here, and it is common from the Augustan poets and Livy on; it is already attested in Cicero, e.g. *Verr.* 4. 119 *coliturque ea pars et habitatur* (‘this part is cultivated and inhabited’), although here the passive of *colere* may have caused the passive use of *habitare*.—As for the two other verbs mentioned by Quintilian, *navigare* appears not to be attested with the accusative before the Empire. The manuscripts of Cicero have at *Fin.* 2. 112 *Xerxes cum . . . maria ambulauisset, terram nauigauisset* (‘when Xerxes had walked the seas and sailed the land’), but BAITER and MADVIG quite rightly read ablatives (*maria . . . terra ‘by sea . . . by land’) for the accusatives;\(^{12}\) in spite of Ovid, *Fasti* 1. 122 *libera perpetuas ambulat illa uias* (‘she [Peace] freely walks the ways unhindered’), *ambulare + acc.* in particular is hardly imaginable in Cicero, and still in Quintilian (1. 5. 38) *ambulo uiam* is designated as a solecism. The passive *nauigari ‘to be navigated’ is not uncommon in the Empire.—And finally *campus curritur*, which becomes comprehensible especially when compared with *currimus aequor, currere uias*, and the like in Vergil, Propertius, and others (less so beside *cursus cucurrerunt, stadium currit* in Cicero); cf. C. F. W. MÜLLER (1908: 22). It emerges from all this that the passives quoted above from Quintilian are not of quite the same type as Greek ἐπιτάσσομαι and the like.

On the other hand, not all transitive verbs have a passive transform. Let me pick out just two points here. A Germanist has drawn attention to the fact that even such a thoroughly transitive verb as *besitzen* (‘to occupy’) does without the passive in actual German usage;\(^{13}\) the old participial adjective *besessen* (‘occupied’) proves nothing about the finite verb. In other words, there are | transitive verbs which speakers do not like to use in the passive because of their meaning, because they cannot think of the agent of these verbs other than as their subject, and because there is no need to promote the object to be the grammatical subject (see

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\(^{12}\) In fact, J. G. Baiter printed the ablatives only in the editio minor of the complete works of Cicero that he edited jointly with C. L. Kayser (in vol. 1 of the philosophical and political works, Leipzig 1863). J. N. Madvig, in his edition of the *De finibus* (3rd edn, 1876), expresses approval of Baiter’s view, but follows the manuscripts.

\(^{13}\) It is clear from *ms. add.*\(^2\) that the Germanist referred to was W.’s friend Behaghel, who (1923–32: II, §654) lists *besitzen* in his section on verbs which form no passive among ‘verbs denoting a state’.
below). Of course, each language behaves differently in this respect: the Latin and Greek words for ‘possess’, such as *possidere* and *κτάσθαι*, do have a passive. On the other hand, the Greek verb *φεύγω* (‘flee’), for example, although capable of transitive use, hardly ever appears in the passive before the first century AD. Homeric *πεθυμένοι* (‘having fled’) is purely middle (cf. fut. *φεύξεσαι*); the Homeric phrase *φυκτὰ πέλοντα* ‘it is possible to flee’ has an adjective in -τος without passive meaning, although *ἀφυκτὸς* (‘inescapable’, Pindar +) and *φευκτός* (‘escapable’, Sophocles +) are passive. Diels refers me to an example of *φευγόμενος* (passive) in the Epicurean Demetrius of Laconia (end 2nd c. BC; Hercul. vol. ed. ox. I, 124), but the next examples do not appear until Josephus (1st c. AD). There are certainly many verbs of this type, but it is much harder to notice something missing from the use of a verb than positive facts about it.

Furthermore, it is not really possible to imagine the strictly passive use of a second-person imperative. *στάθητι*, for example, in Plato, *Phaedrus* 236b, really means ‘get yourself set up!’, i.e. it still contains an element of middle meaning. An instructive passage on this point is Luke 17:6 ἐκριζώθητι καὶ φυτεύθητι ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ (‘be uprooted and be planted in the sea!’): the Latin translation has *eradicare* and *transplantare* for the imperatives, i.e. still passive; but Wulfila and Luther use reflexives: *uslausei þuk us waurtim jah ussatei þuk in marein* (Wulfila) and *reiss dich aus und versetze dich ins Meer* (Luther), respectively.

Let us move on to the question what the passive is used for, what job it does: there are two points of view to mention. Paul (1920: 232) states that its main task is to promote to subject position the noun that is normally the object when it is the main idea on which the thought is focused. Quite different is the second view (that of, e.g., Wellhausen 1911: 18–19), that the passive likes to be used when the speaker does not wish to, or cannot, name the agent, who is consequently not a suitable subject; for a recent account along these lines, see Meyer-Lübke (1925). This is consistent with the fact that in Arabic, for example, the agent is rarely named in passive sentences as he is in Greek with ṣή, in Latin with *ab*, in German with *von*. This has been known for a long time in other Indo-European languages, such as Latvian (Bielenstein 1863–4: II, 212–13). A French Latinist, Alfred Ernout, has shown (1908/9: 329–30) that in Old | Latin it is quite exceptional to express the agent of a passive verb. He analysed between 6000 and 7000 lines of Plautus and discovered only two examples of an overt agent with *ab*. It is slightly commoner in Terence, whose language is more developed than that of Plautus, but it is still the exception. There are intermediate cases with

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14 On Demetrius Lacon in the Herculaneum papyri, see Crönert (1906: 100–25) and Gigante (1988); on the Herculaneum papyri, note the impressive online resource at <http://www.herculaneum.ox.ac.uk/index.html>.

15 Ernout (1908/9: 330) collects the examples under the heading ‘*a or ab denoting the origin*’ (of the action).
per, such as *Phormio* 27–8 *quia primas partis qui aget is erit Phormio . . . per quem res geretur maxime* (‘since the man who plays the leading part will be Phormio, through whom most of the action will be carried out’). Unfortunately, no comparable study has been done for Greek.\(^{16}\)

There is, of course, the ancient option of including the agent in a (passive) verbal adjective in Greek -τος or Latin -tus, whether just the stem as the first element of a compound (e.g. πατροσπαράδωτος ‘handed down by one’s forefathers’), or a case-form, the oldest being the genitive (e.g. Διόσδωτος ‘given by Zeus’).

In general we can say that the tendency to use passive expressions increases in languages in parallel with an increase in the prominence of abstract expression and so-called educated speech. Natural, colloquial speech will nearly always avoid the passive—although we cannot be too categorical about this. It is very striking that Latin as reflected by Plautus in particular has a very curious attachment to the passive. There are countless instances like *Pseudolus* 1077–8, where Simo asks the pimp, *uiginti minas dabin?* (‘will you pay twenty minas?’), and he replies, not *dabo* (‘I will (give)’), as we expect, but *dabuntur* (‘they will be given’), making the minas the subject. Very often a passive of this kind alternates with a first-person active, e.g. *Stichus* 550–1 *duas dabo . . . addentur duae* (‘I’ll give two . . . and two will be added’), or *Poenulus* 1082–3 *restituunt omnia, | suam sibi rem saluam sistam* (‘it shall all be restored to him. I’ll put him in possession of his patrimony complete’). In many passages like these, we see a clear tendency to avoid naming the agent. This is of a piece—if I understand the French usage correctly—with what used to be characteristic in French, namely, in an effort to conceal the first person, to replace it with the impersonal *on* (‘one’).\(^{17}\) In the same way, the passive may be used in place of a second-person active: think of the expression, beloved of comedy, *quid agitur?* (lit. ‘what is being done?’) for *quid agis?* (‘what are you doing?’). We shall find comparable things to all that we have just seen when we turn in the next lecture to the impersonal passive.

\(^{16}\) We are now fortunate to have George (2005) for Greek, and on Latin see now Pinkster (1985b) and (1990a: 9–10).

\(^{17}\) On the French usage, see further Grevisse §724b, with the remark that in the 17th century it belonged to the ‘style noble’.
We have still to deal with a particularly interesting phenomenon: the impersonal use of the passive. Of the two factors mentioned in the last lecture (I, 143 above) as favouring a passive form of expression, only the second is relevant here, that is, the wish to refer to the verbal action itself without giving prominence to the agent.1 This form of expression is domiciled in Latin in particular, and again we find the usage above all in the colloquial language of early Rome as it is presented to us in the comedies of the third and second centuries BC—this fact assures us that it was a real feature of the living language. Already in Plautus, there is a mass of very striking examples of the passive being used where we would expect first or second person active: e.g. *Pseud.* 273: QUESTION: *quid agitur?* ('how are you?', lit. 'what is being done?') ANSWER: *amatur atque egetur* (lit. 'it is loved and it is lacked'), instead of *amo atque ego* (I love and I lack). At *Truculentus* 369, the Palatine manuscripts have the reading *benene ambulasti?* ('have you walked well?'), which is obviously an attempt to make sense of the genuine reading, in the Ambrosianum (p. 309 n. 18 below), *benene ambulatumst?* ('has it been walked well?'). There is even *ut ualetur?* ('how are you?'), but we cannot translate it literally at all: *ualetur* is for sg. 2 *uales*. (*ms. add.*: Pasquali [p.c.] compares Italian *come si sta?*, lit. 'how is one?' for 'how are you?'.) Perhaps even stranger is *caletur* 'it is warm' (which the archaizing Apuleius imitates in an exaggerated way with *qua pluitur et ningitur* 'as it’s raining and snowing'); *calet* in Plautus means 'be warm' (of a person) and always has a definite subject; see Lindsay (1900) on *Captivi* 80 (comparing *Truc.* 65). Mainly, this is another case of the tendency to put the agent into the background, which we saw in Plautus’ use of the normal passive. Consider Terence, *Andria* 129, concerning a burial: *in ignem inpositast* 'she was laid on the pyre' and then simply *fletur* ('it was [lit., is] lamented'). The ancient commentator on Terence, Donatus, has a nice remark on this word: ‘bene hic impersonaliter *fletur*: ab omnibus; extrema enim quaque mortuorum omnes commouent ad lacrimas’ ('the impersonal use of *fletur* is appropriate here: [it implies] “by everyone”; for it is generally the case that the last rites for the dead move everyone to tears’). In other words, according to Donatus, the impersonal

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1 Among more recent work on the impersonal passive, notice especially, in addition to Pinkster (1985b) and esp. (1992), Comrie (1977), and Perlmutter (1978), all with further references.
passive suggests general lamentation—and this gets the nuance of this example very well. At another point in the same play, someone asked to take care of something says, *Andria* 403 *curabitur* (lit. ‘taking-care will be done’). Here, Donatus comments that we have the impersonal form rather than sg. 1 act. *curabo* (‘I will take care’) because it is a difficult matter and the speaker does not want to commit himself personally to the whole responsibility for it. We could translate, ‘it will be taken care of, somehow or other’.

It is also striking that the Augustan writers show a remarkable fondness for this use of the passive, especially Vergil. This was noticed already by ancient scholars: see e.g. Quintilian 1. 4. 28; Priscian 17. 68; 18. 55 = GL III, 148, 9–12; 231, 10–16. At *Aeneid* 6. 177–82, for instance, after the words (omnes) *festinant, flentes . . . certant*, we have (179) *itur in antiquam siluam* (lit.) ‘then there was a general going into the ancient wood’. So, too, *Aen.* 1. 700 *discumbitur* ‘there is a general lying down to rest’; 7. 553 *pugnatur* (‘there is fighting’); 10. 355 *certatur* (‘there is competition’), and—an especially instructive passage—*Ecl.* 1. 11–12 *undique toitis | usque adeo turbatur agris* ‘on all sides constantly throughout the countryside confusion arises’. The indefiniteness of *turbatur* | heightens the impression of confusion: you don’t know who is the source of the turbare, you just see the process of turbare everywhere. The old variant reading *turbamur* ‘we are disturbed’ arose from an inability to understand the impersonal properly. Servius (III, 6 Thilo) has the nice comment, ‘sane uera lectio est *turbatur*, ut sit impersonale, quod ad omnes pertinet generaliter: nam Mantuorum fuerat communis expulsio; si enim *turbamur* legeris, uidetur ad paucos referri’ (‘the reading turbatur is correct, so that what applies generally to everyone is expressed impersonally: the expulsion of the Mantuans was common to all, and if you read turbamur, it seems to refer to only a few people’). The ubiquity of the activity denoted by the impersonal passive, as here, is expressly emphasized by Vergil at *Aen.* 4. 416 (Dido to Anna) *uides toto properari litore circum* (‘you see haste being made all round all over the shore’), and by Livy at 2. 45. 11 *totis castris undique ad consules curritur* (‘from all over the camp, men ran to the consuls’); recall Donatus’ comment on *fletur* in Terence, *Andria* 129 (cf. I, 145 above), and note Aristophanes, *Birds* 1160 ἐφοδεύεται κωδωνοφορεῖται πανταχῆ (‘on all sides the rounds are made, the sentinels inspected’), which anticipates the next point. You might have thought that there was something prosaic in the impersonal passive, given that it is common in very sober texts, such as Caesar and laws. But in Vergil it has more of an archaic flavour, and indeed Norden in his commentary on *Aeneid* 6 has shown that Vergil is archaizing in the whole of the passage containing *itur* (*Aen.* 6. 179–82). And as we saw, the impersonal passive is particularly common in Old Latin.

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Now, it is a very curious thing that with this passive in early Latin the object of the action can be mentioned, but if so, in the accusative (see Ernout 1908/9: 290–1). That is to say, we find not the normal inversion, but rather a retention of the active construction, only with mention of the subject being suppressed. So, e.g. Miles 254 quae mentititur ‘what lies people will tell’: here quae can only be accusative, and emendations are quite wrong. Or Ennius, Trag. 202 Jocelyn praeter propter utitam uituitur (‘life is lived, more or less’), where the accusative, which has good manuscript support, cannot be made to depend on praeter propter.3

Heinrich Zimmer, a brilliant linguist who has rendered excellent service in the field of Celtic studies, has attempted to explain the appearance and prominence of the impersonal passive in Latin in terms of the peculiar nature of the Latin -r- endings. He claims (1890: 286 n.) that they are not true passive forms, but modifications of an old pl. 3 active form. A judgement on this view is going to depend partly on how other languages use the impersonal passive.

Well, the renowned classicist J. N. Madvig (cf. I, 33 above) maintains that Greek is in general averse to the impersonal passive. In his view, it is limited (apart from the perfect passive) to a few verbs of saying, such as λέγεται, where strictly we have not impersonal use but the suggestion that the content of what is said is the subject. Now, it is beyond question that the use of the impersonal passive in Greek is much less common than in Vergil or Plautus, and Madvig’s definition may indeed be true for many Greek authors. But Attic prose makes wider use of the construction (cf. Riemann 1882), and it is especially striking that there are some peculiar uses of the impersonal passive outside literary prose. I do not mean in Homer: indeed, there are various usages to do with the verb which are conspicuously absent from Homer, such as the historic present or the impersonal use of weather verbs (cf. I, 116 above). But I can cite from among writers of iambi Herondas (early 3rd c. BC), who attests (4. 54) κτήμι μέξουν φθείρεται ‘there is more pushing’, ‘the crush is getting worse’, but what is particularly striking, and not sufficiently commented on before now, is the fact that religious language has a fondness for the impersonal passive. For example, on an early inscription from the island of Thasos (IG XII. 3; 490–480 BC), in the terse prescriptions for the performance of a rite, we find the phrase οὔ παῖον γίγνεται ‘there is no chanting of the paean’—and that this is no accident emerges from the fact that the same impersonal passive occurs in Aeschylus (fr. 161.3 Nauk = Radt, TrGF III), and equally in the inscription of the so-called guild of singers of Miletus (Collitz & Bechtel no. 5495 = SEG 36, 1050, 28), here in alternation with παῖον γίγνεται (ibid., 5495, 12). Compare, in this and other religious inscriptions, ἔρθεται (‘sacrifice is made’), σπένδεται,

3 Cf. Jocelyn (1967: ad loc.).
κατασπένδεται (both, ‘libations are poured’), θύεται (‘sacrifice is made’), etc.; and note also on a recently discovered religious inscription from Thasos, c.500 BC (Picard 1923: 243; cf. IG XII Suppl. 414) ἑνατεύεται, ἀθρείται. Now, linguistic features that are proper to religious language tend to be old, and we may accordingly be entitled to say that the impersonal passive was something ancient and inherited in Greek, too. It need not be accidental, and may reflect something deep-rooted, that, unlike Latin, Greek in general especially Homer on the one hand and Attic on the other avoided this vague form of expression that leaves the agent unexpressed.

As for German, you know that the modern language has this form and uses it in a relatively unconstrained way: note e.g. in the writer and critic Otto Ludwig (1813–65) nun wird sich wo anders geärgert (‘now annoyance is being expressed somewhere else’, the words of a simple-minded husband; Collected Works, II. 418). In earlier German, it is not so unconstrained: Tatian’s Old High German Bible translation has at Matthew 7: 7 in gibt man (‘to you one gives’) for dabitur nobis (‘it will be given to you’) and in intuot man (‘to you one opens’) for aperietur nobis (‘it will be opened unto you’), showing that this kind of impersonal expression was not so normal for Tatian. Luther on the other hand has in this passage wird euch gegeben and wird euch aufgethan, respectively (see Wilmanns III.1, 302–5).

In view of the nature of the impersonal, we must expect an even more marked aversion to mentioning the agent here than with ordinary passives (cf. I, 143–4 above). In Greek, sometimes a dative occurs in such cases, and of course the dative can be used to denote the agent. It is not however a form which serves straightforwardly | to denote the agent as such, but rather it indicates that the action of the verb is performed in someone’s interests, as e.g. in the common phrase in Thucydides (e.g. 4. 67. 1) ἐπεί (or ἐπειδή) παρεκκένασο αὐτοὶς (or ἀμφοτέροις, or the like): admittedly, we translate as ‘when preparations had been made by them/by both sides’, but the meaning is really ‘when preparations had been made for them’.

In Old Latin, mention of the agent is completely unheard of. There is supposedly an example in a line of Pacuvius (182 Warmington a te ueretur ‘awe is shown by you’), but the passage is certainly corrupt. In Cicero and Caesar, however, it does occur once or twice: e.g. Gallic War 3. 25. 1 cum ab hostibus pugnaretur (lit. ‘when it was fought by the enemy’); 5. 30. 1 cum a Cotta resisteretur (lit. ‘when it was resisted by Cotta’)—cf. Ernout 1908/9: 292, with a good explanation of this abnormality—as also in Livy (e.g. 35. 42. 1) and Tacitus

4 Picard translates (both verbs are negated), ‘pas d’offrande de la neuvième part’ and ‘on ne regarde pas (le sacrifice)’. For the latter in IG XII Suppl. 414, one reads ὀδὴ ἀθρείται, presumably, ‘nor are games held’.

5 Again (cf. I, 143–4 above), in terms of a/ab marking the source or origin of the action.
There is a particularly strong example at Tacitus, *Annals* 1. 21. 3 *accurritur ab uniuersis* (lit. ‘there is running up by all’), where it is used to denote a general, unspecified subject; Plautus and Terence would have said simply *accurritur*, but the precise prose-stylist adds the explicit *ab uniuersis*. On the well-known passage of Horace, *Odes* 2. 16. 13–14 *uiuitur paruo bene, cui paternum splendet in mensa tenui salinum* (‘a man lives (lit., it is lived) well on little if his father’s salt-cellar shines on his modest table’), KESSLING (1917: *ad loc.*) comments fittingly, ‘Since the impersonal passive causes the relation of the action to a subject to fade into the background (hence also *paruo* cannot be dative), the general validity of the statement receives greater emphasis’; the subject is only very loosely denoted, in the relative clause, with *cui* for *si cui*. In German, the agent can be mentioned if it is human, as in *von der Jugend wurde getanzt* (lit., ‘by the young people (it) was danced’); cf. WILMANNS III. 1, 303.

The impersonal passive is found in nearly all branches of Indo-European. Given the closeness of the relationship between Celtic and Latin, let me mention Old Irish, where ‘an intransitive verb may be used in the passive in impersonal construction, e.g. *tiágar* “let people, someone go”, lit. “let it be gone”’ (THURNEYSEN 1946: 328); and in view of its antiquity, let me mention also Sanskrit, where it occurs with increasing frequency from the Vedas on—the details of the Sanskrit use of the construction have unfortunately still to be properly investigated. Concerning Egyptian—to bring in an unrelated language—the nice observation has been made that actions of the Pharaoh are particularly prone to appear in the impersonal passive (see ERMAN 1911: 151); it is an expression of reverence towards the Pharaoh to forbear to mention him explicitly. You see that we do not really need ZIMMER’S hypothesis at all (cf. I, 146 above).

A complication arises for the expression of the passive in general when a collocation of *infinitive and auxiliary* can or ought needs to be turned into the passive. Three alternative approaches are found. In German, the auxiliary stays in the active and only the infinitive is marked for passive; *wird gekonnt* (as it were, ‘is could-ed’) is used only on its own, not with an infinitive. Greek and Classical Latin do the same, while pre- and post-classical Latin have the third solution, which I shall come to in a moment. In Sanskrit, which has no passive infinitive, the auxiliary verb ‘to be able’ goes into the passive. The third method is to put both infinitive and auxiliary into the passive. This is commonly attested in Old Latin: for examples of *potestur, possitur, poteratur, possetur, quitur, quitus sum, nequitur*, etc. (all passive forms of ‘be possible, be able’), see NEUE & WAGENER III, 613 f., 626 f. Similar sorts of forms are found occasionally in late writers. There is
also custodiri debetur (‘must be preserved’) in one of the Roman land-surveyors, Hyginus, on types of dispute (p. 92, 27 Campbell = p. 127, 9 Lachmann; cf. Thulin 1913: 45).

Not one of these three forms of expression stands up to the test of logic. Strictly speaking, the object of the infinitive of the verbal action can be made the subject neither of an active nor of a passive auxiliary. These are all just attempts to transform as well as possible an essentially active expression into the passive. With the verb ‘to begin’, things are not quite the same. Here, even in Classical Latin, the double passive (of both infinitive and auxiliary) is not only permitted but actually preferred: Caesar, for example, knows only expressions of the type Gallic War 4. 18. 4 pons institui coeptus est lit. ‘a bridge was begun (pass.) to be built’, as opposed to Horace, Ars 21–2 amphora coepit institui lit. ‘an amphora began (act.) to be made’. The verb coepi (‘begin’), you see, can also be transitive and govern an object, and then in the passive have a subject.

Related, albeit indirectly, to this is the treatment of the combination of Lat. eo (‘go’) with the supine. Originally, no doubt, only the impersonal passive of eo was used and any object of the supine appeared in the accusative: so, originally you would say e.g. contumeliam factum itur ‘there is a move towards offering an insult’. But already at an early period the accusative object of the supine (factum) was made into the subject of the verb ‘to go’. Aulus Gellius 10. 14. 4 quotes the following from Cato (p. 63, 6 Jordan): contumelia mihi factum itur (lit., ‘an injury is gone to inflict on me’). Similarly, the accusative subject of the future passive infinitive in -tum iri was certainly understood originally as the object of the supine, with iri impersonal. But the word order in passages such as Terence, Adelphoe 694 (credebas) illam in cubiculum iri deductum (‘(you thought that) she would be brought to your bedroom as a bride’) shows that already before the classical period the accusative in such cases was taken to be the subject of the whole infinitive clause (parallel to illam deduci). We even find nominative and infinitive in -tum iri already in Old Latin, as at Plautus, Rudens 1242 mibi istaece uidetur praedatum irier (‘it seems to me that this booty is about to be plundered’).

The tenses of the verb. As early as in Aristotle (De interpret. 16b6, Poetics 1457a14), the distinguishing characteristic of the verb was regarded as being τὸ προσημαίνειν τῶν χρόνων (‘the indicating of the time’), and this is the basis of the term Zeitwort (‘verb’, lit. ‘timeword’), standard in German grammar from the seventeenth century (though not of ancient origin). 9 We can say, however, that it is thanks to the ‘timeword’ that the action or process | denoted by the verb is

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8 Thulin defends debetur, against Lachmann’s debet, with ref. to Stolz & Schmalz (1910: 492).

9 According to the D. Wb., s.v., col. 580, the term Zeitwort was used in the 18th century by (among others) Gottsched, Herder, and Goethe, and in the 19th century quite generally, although by then it was again overtaken in technical contexts by Verbum.
located in a specific time. But it is important to realize that it is not immediately obvious what ‘time’ is supposed to mean here, and to understand this we need to go in some detail into the early theories regarding the meaning of the tenses. I briefly recall the fine Stoic theory of the tenses (cf. I, 15 above), still of use today, which found a place in the standard grammar of Dionysius Thrax. The influence of this theory, although slightly distorted, is still seen today in the names of the individual tenses. But I would like particularly to emphasize some very fine observations in the books of Apollonius Dyscolus Περὶ συνταξέως (cf. I, 1–2 above). In the first place, while Dionysius Thrax reckons the so-called perfect (παρακείμενος) among the past forms of the verb (§13, end, p. 53 Uhlig), Apollonius comments that the perfect, although referring to past time, really denotes a συντέλειαν ἐνεστώσαν, a present state of completion (3. 21, p. 288 Uhlig). 10 Especially valuable is another set of remarks: at 3. 140 (p. 389 Uhlig), he observes acutely that the present optative expresses a wish for the duration of something that is real, while the aorist optative conveys a wish for something unreal to be realized. As for the subjunctive, ἐὰν τρέχω (pres.) on his account means ‘if I should be in an ongoing action of running’, as opposed to ἐὰν δράμω (aor.) ‘if I should bring my running to a conclusion’. Similarly he teaches that the imperative γράφε (pres.) refers to ongoing writing, γράψων (aor.) to a complete action of writing (3. 103, p. 358). Obviously, all speakers of Greek observed this distinction, but Apollonius is the first in surviving works on grammar to treat this fact as a theoretical axiom.

As for modern work on syntax, there is a remark in BUTTMANN (1830–9: II, 88) which is of interest to us even though the book does not deal with syntax: he comments that any perfect is in itself ‘a true present, to the extent that it denotes the state resulting from the action in the past’. As I noted earlier (I, 29 above), Gottfried HERMANN has dealt in detail with the use of the tenses, exclusively from the point of view of Latin.

When we speak of the temporal reference of the verb, it is most natural for us starting from German and Latin to think first in terms of relative points of time. The notion ‘Zeitstufe’, to be precise about it, has two meanings (on the term, see I, 152–3 below & n.). First, it means the temporal relation between an action or process and the speaker. In this sense, we distinguish present, past, and future, and the size of the difference in time generally does not matter: at any rate, it is usually expressed by means of adverbs or other adjuncts. In addition to this ‘absolute’ time-reference, as it were, there is also a relative time-reference, that is the difference in time between one action and another that is referred to elsewhere. It is a speciality of Latin, a feature particularly well developed in that

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10 Excellent on the terminology used by Greek philosophers and grammarians for referring to the tenses of the Greek verb is Lallot (1989: 169–77).
language, to denote separately not only the past but what preceded the past and what will in the future be past. Gottfried Hermann believed that he could demonstrate that Greek also had these forms for relative time-difference—but I have already mentioned the distortion to which he subjected Greek on this point (cf. I, 27–9 above). 11

11 For a good general overview of tense and aspect in Greek and Indo-European, and a critical review of their study, see Giannakis (1993) and (1997: ch. 2); Bybee & Dahl (1989) offer a good cross-linguistic typological survey of tense and aspect systems, in which that generally recognized in ancient Greek (and Indo-European, as traditionally reconstructed) emerges as the commonest in the languages of the world. On later developments in Greek, esp. in the New Testament, note Porter (1989) and Fanning (1990). On Latin, see Pinkster (1990: ch. 11); on Latin and Romance, Harris (1971) and (1978: 132–59).
Lecture I, 26

In the first place, if we want to talk about the temporal use of the verb, especially in the earlier period, it is quite wrong to concentrate on time-reference and in particular on the way in which Latin marks it. Just think how often the use of the tenses is actually wrong if we relate it all to time-reference and to the distinction between past, present, and future. There is plenty that is aberrant even in the indicative forms of the tenses. For instance, the historic present is a present form used to express a past action. And we find similar things in Greek and German, too: in German the future use of the present, in Greek the gnomonic aorist, or the ‘modus irreals’, the ‘unreal’ use of a past tense with the particle ἄν in which (e.g.) ἐλέγεν ἄν ‘he would (now) be saying’ makes no reference at all to past time.¹ One thing in particular must be noted. The meanings expressed by the Latin future perfect and pluperfect are foreign to Greek, and the meaning of the Latin future perfect is really not found in German either. The Greek future perfect is something completely different from the Latin. Formed from the perfect stem, it expresses not an event or process preceded by a future event, but a future state of completion: ἔστηξει means ‘he will be standing’ and τεθήξει ‘he will be dead (in the future)’. The same is true of the passive of the future perfect.

Nor does Greek feel the need to refer to what we call ‘Vorvergangenheit’, the time before a point in the past. The Greek pluperfect can often be translated in this way but it is wrong to see this as its intrinsic use in the manner of the Latin pluperfect. Already in Homer, but in many other texts as well, an event which precedes another and is given as such in the context of the sentence can be rendered with the imperfect or aorist, whether it is in a main or a dependent clause. For an example of a dependent clause, note Οδ. 11. 523–7 αὐτὰρ ὅτε ἔλθεν καταβαίνομεν, δὲν καὶ Ἡπείος, . . . δάκρυα τ’ ὄμοργυνοντο ‘but when we had climbed into the horse which Epeios had fashioned, . . . tears had to be wiped away’. The climbing (καταβαίνειν) preceded the wiping (ὄμοργυνον), and the fashioning (κἀμνειν) preceded the climbing. (Note, however, that others translate, perhaps rightly: ‘As we were (in the process of) climbing into the horse’; (ms. add.²; this is thanks to Danielsson [p.c.], who draws attention to the lines that follow).

¹ In this construction, in classical (post-Homeric) Greek the imperfect is used to refer to present time, and the aorist to past time; cf. I, 225–6 below, with nn.
In a main clause, notice Ἡ Ἠμήν ὑπεράνθεν καταβάσα, προῆκε γὰρ εὐρόστα Ζεῦς. Here we cannot translate (after ‘and Athene stirred up the fighting [over Patroclus’ body] having come down from heaven’) ‘for Zeus sent her’, but only ‘for Zeus had sent her’. The aorist is used for an event preceding that referred to in the first clause. Greek speakers were originally not concerned to distinguish between different stages of past time. The extent to which they later on used their pluperfect like the Latin pluperfect is something I cannot go into here. —The same applies to the old Germanic languages. On this matter in Gothic, it is again useful to compare original and translation. At Mark 14:44, the Greek δεδώκεις σύσσημον αὐτοῖς (Lat. dederat signum eis ‘he had given them a sign’) is rendered by Wulfila simply as at-gaf... im bandwon; Mark 15:7 οἶτινες... φόνον πετοῦκελαν (Lat. qui... fecerant homicidium ‘who... had committed murder’) becomes paici... mauþr gatawidedun, and so on. In Gothic, there was simply no way of distinguishing different stages of the past, but in Old Icelandic, which does have periphrastic formations, we can see a similar failure to express the time before a point in the past (cf. HEUSLER 1921: 132 §415). The work of Georg Curtius has marked a great step forward in the understanding of the use of the tenses in Greek in particular (as represented in his book on the tenses and the moods (1846: esp. 144 ff.), and then in the Elucidations (Erläuterungen, 3rd edn 1878; English edn 1875b), with which he followed up the publication of his once widely used school grammar, 1875a). In an elaboration of earlier observations he points out that the moods other than the indicative, even if they are associated with a past indicative, need not—or even may not—have a past meaning. Now, thanks to the genetic study of languages, it has become possible to distinguish in the verb, as in the noun, between the inflected forms and the stems to which personal endings and sometimes endings marking the mood are attached. We are able to recognize for example an aorist stem which forms the basis for the forms of the subjunctive, optative, infinitive, and participles as well as for those of the indicative. But while the indicative of the aorist generally has past meaning, its other forms do not, and it follows from this that the temporal reference does not attach to the aorist stem as such, and that the reference to past time in the indicative was given only by the augment, | probably spreading from the augmented forms of the indicative to the unaugmented. This is a cardinal point, which for us goes without saying, but which earlier was not recognized at all. Well, Curtius’ theory, in his own new terminology, is that the different temporal stems of the verb express not the ‘Zeitstufe’ (stage in

2 On the use of the Greek pluperfect, see Goodwin §§42–52, Cooper (1998: §§53.4–0–3), also Kuryłowicz (1964: ch. 3, esp. 9c–1), who contrasts the Greek and Latin systems. Scholars differ on the question whether a pluperfect may be reconstructed for Indo-European: contrast e.g. Berg (1977) and Sihler (1995: §§69, 520, 531), who recognizes only a ‘tenseless stative’ (= the perfect), with Jasanoff (2003: §§25–6) on the pluperfect in IE and Anatolian (esp. p. 36 on Greek).
time, or tense) but rather the ‘Zeitart’ (the kind of time), and that the distinction between the different stages in time is conveyed by and large only in the indicative. This distinction between ‘stage’ and ‘kind’ of time was to be a very fruitful one.3

To understand this distinction better, we shall do well to go beyond the languages that immediately concern us and survey for a moment a broader horizon, where we meet verbal forms of expression quite different from those we are used to. If you know Biblical Hebrew and its grammar, then you know that in the Hebrew verb two groups of tenses are distinguished by names which are common in German grammar, too, ‘perfect’ and ‘imperfect’; but you also know that these terms mean something completely different from their normal use in German and that these two temporal terms do not directly refer to tenses at all. The so-called ‘perfect’ and ‘imperfect’ of Hebrew can be used of past, present, and future. The essential point is rather that the forms called ‘perfect’ denote a completed action (or process), one that has in some sense become definite, while forms in the so-called ‘imperfect’ are characterized by a meaning of incompleteness. Essentially the same is true of Arabic, and indeed this system of temporal forms goes back to Common Semitic.4 The Danish linguist Chr. Sarauw has some acute observations on this (1912: 59 ff.), including comparison also with non-Semitic languages; see now Cohen (1924), with Meillet’s review (1925).5

Especially important for the evaluation of the meaning of verbs in general, and indirectly for the understanding of the meaning of temporal stems, was above all what was to be seen in the Slavic languages. In no other languages is more refined

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3 Curtius introduced the terms in his school-grammar (11th edn 1875a: 268–9); cf. his Elucidations on this work (Curtius 1875b: 207–16, in Abbott’s English version), and the helpful remarks in Szemerényi (1987b: 2–3 & nn.). Under ‘Zeitstufe’ are distinguished present, past, and future; under ‘Zeitart’, ‘dauernd’ (rendered by Abbott as ‘continuous’, signalled by the present stem), ‘vollendet’ (‘completed’, perfect stem), and ‘eintretend’ (aorist stem), of which Abbott notes (Curtius 1875b: 209) that it ‘cannot be represented in all its bearings by any single English word. It is “initial” as opposed to “continued”, “culminating” as opposed to “preparatory”, “instantaneous” as opposed to “durative”’. The three ‘kinds of time’ are seen in the three-way opposition between impf. εγίνετο—plupf. εγέρθηκεν—aor. εγέρθη, all of them denoting the past ‘stage of time’. Contrast (and beware!) the terminology of Smyth (1956: §§1851–2), in which ‘kind of time’ surely corresponds to Curtius’ ‘Zeitstufe’, and ‘stage of action’ to Curtius’ ‘Zeitart’. For his view of the moods vs the tenses in general, cf. Curtius (1846: 233–44); cf. Brugmann (1883: 173–81) on ‘relative Zeitstufe’. On the life and work of the immensely influential classicist and linguist Georg Curtius (1820–85), professor in Prague, Kiel and Leipzig, see Sebeok (1966: I, 311–73) and Morpurgo Davies (1998: esp. 154 & 186–7 n. 40).

4 The traditional view, alluded to here by W., that the West Semitic (incl. Hebrew and Arabic) opposition of ‘perfect(ive)’ and ‘imperfect(ive)’ was inherited from Common Semitic has yielded, thanks to more detailed study of Semitic and related languages, to vigorous controversy. While the debate about Common Semitic continues, there seems to be agreement that the West Semitic system is not original but the result of a long and complex process of evolution; see, for useful brief overviews, Moscati et al. (1964: 31–4) and Stempel (1999: 124–30), and, for more detail on the several branches of the family, Lipinski (1997: 335–46) and the contributors to Hetzron (1997).

5 On the work of the great linguist, Armenologist, Latinist, and Indo-Europeanist Antoine Meillet (1866–1936), whose pupils numbered not only Émile Benveniste, Georges Dumézil, and André Martinet but also the American Homerist Milman Parry, see Sebeok (1966: II, 201–49).
attention paid to what Slavic grammarians call 'vid' (in French 'aspect verbal'). The modern grammatical term for this is 'Aktionsart'—but note that the Slavist Sigurd Agrell (1908) wishes to draw a distinction between Aktionsart and aspect. The first detailed treatment of the aspects | or Aktionsarts of the Slavic verb, and the forms available for expressing them, was a study published by the Slavist J. Navratil in 1856, which became famous. Now, of course, every handbook of a Slavic language deals with these aspects. You see, in Slavic very strict attention is paid in the living languages to something that we saw observed in its essentials in the partition of temporal forms of the verb in Semitic, namely whether and to what degree the action of the verb is regarded as complete. In Slavic three ‘vidy’ are distinguished. First, there is the ‘imperfective’—an unfortunate term in that it resembles so closely our ‘imperfect’. An action is said to be imperfective if the speaker conceives of it as ongoing and does not think of its completion and result. The essential thing is not the factual nature of the process but the speaker’s view of it. The best definitions of this and other aspects are those given by the distinguished linguist August Leskien (who died in 1916), in his grammar of the so-called Old Bulgarian language (2nd/3rd edn 1919: 215–31), the language of the Slavs’ old translation of the Bible and of their oldest liturgical works, which has its geographical starting point in Thessaloniki (and is usually called ‘Old Church Slavonic’). Leskien here adduces (1919: 217) as an example of the imperfective the sentence They were hunting the stag the whole day. Here, there is no thought given to whether the hunting is complete or not, but it is simply stated that the action is regarded as ongoing. But let me point out that the phrase the whole day is not there by accident. The admissibility of an expression of time how long is a reliable criterion for judging aspect. If we can add such a phrase, we have an imperfective verbal form—and this determinant of aspect is not confined to Slavic.—The second aspect, or Aktionsart, distinguished by Slavic grammar, is the ‘perfective’. This, too, is an unhappy term in that it is reminiscent
of ‘perfect’. A verb is said to be perfective when it conveys that the speaker has in mind an end or result of the activity or process that the verb denotes. So, to stay with our earlier example, take *They wanted to hunt down the white stag:* *hunt down* is the perfective verb corresponding to *hunt*, as here the interest is not in presenting the action as in train, in its duration, but merely in its end point, its result. Our touchstone still works, since we cannot add an expression of time how long to a verb such as *hunt down.* | You cannot say, ‘They hunted down the stag for two days’.—And finally, the third aspect distinguished by Slavic grammarians is the ‘iterative’. This involves the repetition of the process or event, whether complete or incomplete.

For the Slavic *Sprachgefuhl*, then, these are three discrete types of verbal expression, and the Slavic speaker is able to make fine distinctions which we must often leave unexpressed. If we turn to inquire about the linguistic means which serve in Slavic to express these oppositions, we note that some verbs, in fact the majority, are by themselves imperfective. Isolated examples are basically perfective, but mostly a perfective meaning is expressed by making the verb into a compound. As a rule, the simplex is imperfective, the compound perfective, and in the latter case the specific meaning of the preposition is also accorded due weight. There are some prepositions, however, which are bleached of specific meaning and which serve almost exclusively to make a given verb perfective. Let me give you some examples of this from Old Church Slavonic, in the infinitive: *biti* means ‘to strike’ and is naturally an imperfective verb, as you can add to it a phrase of time how long. But the compound verb *u-bitit*, with the preverb *u*-(= *Lat.* *au*), means ‘to fell’ and is perfective; *bı ratified* ‘to gather’ (related to German *gebären*, Gk *φέρων*, *Lat.* *ferre*, all ‘to bear, carry’) is imperfective: *sü-bı ratified* ‘to bring together’ is perfective, as is *iz-bı ratified* ‘to pick out’; *tresti* means ‘to shake’: *po-tresti* ‘to shake up, rouse from rest’. This last preverb *po-*(which is compared with the *po-* in Latin *po-situs*) is used in Slavic only for making perfectives.

Ever since scholars began to study Slavic more seriously, linguists have been aware of the phenomenon of verbal aspect, and the hunt has been on to demonstrate corresponding phenomena and distinctions in other languages, too.10 I refer you in particular to DELBRÜCK’s extensive account (1893–1900: II, 7–15), to HERBIG’s article (1896) on Aktionsart and tense (‘Zeitstufe’), and to what BRUGMANN has to offer in his Short Comparative Grammar (1902–4: 493–509).11 There is no doubt that similar things exist to a certain degree in all related languages, only without such strict systematicity.—Attempts have been made to draw even finer distinctions. DELBRÜCK for instance divides ‘perfective’ into

10 This is what Szemeréni (1987b: 3) is at pains to deny: ‘this was evidently a quite unjustifiable extension of the Slavic situation to other IE languages’ (emphasis original); cf. Lloyd’s response (1990), and Haverling (2000: 16).
11 Herbig (1896) is still useful for the older bibliography.
‘punctual’ and ‘terminative’. On his account, an aspect is ‘punctual’ if the verb form makes clear that the action or process is complete as soon as it is begun. Here belong verbs like *die* and *kill*. On the other hand, his ‘terminative’, or ‘linear-perfective’, aspect expresses the fact that the end point or starting point of an action is in view. This involves verbs such as *bring* and *fetch*. Here we have an activity which occupies a stretch of time but in which, in contrast with, say, *carry*, the end point is in view. Another useful new term of Delbrück’s is ‘cursive’, of actions which proceed in such a way that one conceives neither of individual acts within the action (as with iterative aspect) nor of a start or end point to the action. So, for example, *er schreitet über die Brücke* (‘he strides or is striding across the bridge’) is cursive, while *er überschreitet die Brücke* (‘he crosses or is crossing the bridge’) is terminative.

Delbrück’s proposals have been criticized by the Danish scholar Sarauw (1905) and by Streitberg (1900). I cannot go into the detailed arguments here. Recently, the outstanding Danish linguist Jespersen published a paper on this whole question (in the Proceedings of the Copenhagen Academy for 1914; note also Norén’s introduction to the scientific study of language (1923: 415 ff.)). I wish only to observe that some verbs are neither perfective nor imperfective; secondly, that originally the means of formation of the present stem is related to the Aktionsart of the verb; and finally, that that particular feature of the Slavic languages, of making perfectives by the prefixation of preverbs, is found also in other languages (cf. II, 181 below). This has been shown most securely for Germanic, where there is no doubt that perfective aspect is occasionally expressed by a verbal prefix. I remind you of the opposition in *schlagen : er-schlagen* (‘strike’ : ‘fell’), *reisen : ver-reisen* (‘travel’ : ‘make a journey’), etc. On Gothic in particular, see the important evidence assembled by Streitberg (1891), the Czech Mourek (1890), and, with reference to the latter, Delbrück (1893–1900: II, esp. 158–61).

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13 This tantalizingly elliptical sentence allows two interpretations, both of them true and important: either (a) that the present stem can be enlarged with one or more affixes to indicate that the sense of the verb is (e.g.) causative or iterative or inchoative; or (b) that the meaning of the verb (specifically, whether it is ‘telic’ or ‘atelic’, that is, whether it implies its own completion or not: compare e.g. English *deliver, arrive* (telic) vs (atelic) *carry, travel* predisposes it to form a basic perfective stem, say a root aorist (with, where appropriate, a derived imperfective, say a reduplicated present) or a basic imperfective, a root present (with a derived perfective, e.g. an s-aorist). The latter idea, (b), was fundamental to significant proposals concerning the history of the Indo-European verbal system; see especially Cowgill (1975). This point also serves to introduce the important distinction (which I attempt to maintain throughout this book) between ‘lexical aspect’ (or Aktionsart, inherent in the meaning of the verb) and ‘grammatical aspect’ (or aspect, inherent in grammatical categories and conveyed in the morphology of a verb-form): all too often, a single term ‘aspect’ (or ‘Aktionsart’) is used indiscriminately. See the useful discussion by Pinkster (1990a: 216, 223), but be aware that for Aktionsart he uses the more developed notion of ‘state of affairs’ in the (correct) belief that the lexical meaning of the verb is all too often ambiguous.

14 This book is in Czech. Mourek published his views also in German, e.g. in a book review of 1895.
In Gothic, it is the prefix *ga-* (corresponding to German *ge-* ) which most frequently has this function of making perfectives. Similar attempts have been made for Latin and Greek, too. While there are clear hints of such a use of preverbs, no clear-cut results have yet been obtained, and misgivings are voiced by Meltzer (1919: 76–7).15

I propose now to begin with the present, as it will allow us to take our three languages all together. Then we will move to the various ways of expressing past time, where I shall have to take Latin, Greek, and Germanic separately—you will see why. Thirdly, we will deal with our languages’ efforts to make their verbs express future time.

15 And, more trenchantly, by Szemerényi (1987b: 5–6 & nn.). Among more recent work on Gothic, note especially Lloyd (1979) and (1990), the latter in response to Szemerényi (1987b: esp. 3–4), and the remarks of Haverling (2000: 16).
Lecture I, 27

Present indicative (*praesens indicativi*). At first sight, it seems simple and straightforward to speak about the present. Latin *praesens* means ‘present’, so that one might think that the present forms Greek λέγω, Latin *dico*, German *ich sage* (all ‘I say’) serve to locate the verbal idea of saying in the speaker’s present time. That would seem to conclude the matter. But it is not so simple. First, we should note that expression in the present may be held to be impossible. The ancient commentators on Dionysius Thrax point out that, according to the teaching of the ‘philosophers’, there is strictly speaking no present time (*GG* I.3, 248. 16–20). On this account, the ‘present’ is just an infinitesimal point in time; what we call ‘the present’ belongs partly to the past and partly to the future. Well, this concern bothers us less because our natural instincts say that there is a present, and linguistic expression follows not philosophical thinking but common sense. Obviously, we use the present to render actions and processes which we situate in the so-called present. But this is nothing like an exhaustive account of the use of present forms. Take, for instance, a proverb like ἄχειρ τὰν χείρα νι’ζει: manus manum lauat: *eine Hand wascht die andere* (all, ‘one hand washes the other’). Here the present forms—νι’ζει, wascht—do not signify that this washing is proceeding now, in the present moment, as I speak, but that it proceeds in general, that it was so in the past and that it will be so in the future, too: it is something of general validity, which happens, or may happen, at any and every time. Here we have not a properly present-time use of the present form but, let us readily admit it, a timeless use. For at least some present forms, this is reflected already in their formation. In a form such as Greek φημί, we have in φη- the so-called verbal root, which contains no meaning other than that of saying, and in -μι the marker of sg. 1. So the verbal meaning and the agent are denoted, but nothing else at all; when we analyse the form in simple terms, the meaning ‘present’ is not there. With regard to temporal reference, then, the present is an unmarked form, present only in so far as it contains no element which through its meaning would refer to the past (such as the augment) or to the future (such

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1 In English, You scratch my back, and I’ll scratch yours, or One good turn deserves another. The Greek is attributed by pseudo-Plato, *Axiōmata* 366c to the 5th-c. Sicilian poet Epicharmus (fr. 211, *PCG* 1); the Latin is in Seneca (*Epistulae* 9. 6) and Petronius (*Satyricon* 45. 13).
as | the element -s-). Because there is no relationship to past or future time, this form remains available for the present, but the natural meaning of such a present form in and of itself is a timeless one, without temporal reference.

Obviously, related to this use in general instructions and proverbs is the use that we see for example in comparisons—and let me point out straightforwardly that in clauses of this kind in Greek the general, timeless present alternates sometimes with the subjunctive and sometimes with that strange creature, the gnomic aorist (I, 178–81 below).

A clear product, or a special kind of the timeless present, which we must recognize as something particularly ancient, is the usage (mentioned earlier in passing, I, 47 above), shared by the language of Homer (e.g. II. 18. 386) and the oldest form of Indic, in which you express a past action—one that you want to mark as past—by putting the verb itself in the present and then adding an adverb that refers to past time, such as Gk παύος (‘before’). (ms. add.2: Cf. in Latin e.g. Plin. Epist. 1. 11. 1 olim . . . mittis ‘for some time . . . you have been sending’). It may be legitimate to suppose that Attic, too, uses words such as πάλαι, ἄρτι or πρόσθεν (‘long ago’, ‘recently’, ‘before’) with a present verb when reference is to the past. Wilamowitz (1895: 231) has a fine comment on this apropos of Eur. Her. 967 ἄρτι καίνεις (‘you have just been killing’). Compare also the participial expression at II. 1.70 τὰ τ’ ἔσσομενα πρό τ’ ἔκτα ‘both the things which are/were about to be and those which were/had been (lit., are) formerly’.2 It is perfectly natural that in all these cases the time frame is expressed by a special word rather than by the form of the verb. The augment is also a little word of this kind, which has the task of denoting the past in the verb—although this is not its only task.3

In this connection, let me mention the two related facts that in the Indo-European languages—in Germanic in particular—the present is used either with direct future reference (of an action which belongs firmly in the future) or as a preterite. I should like to begin with the easier case, the use of present for future. Here we should note first of all that in Germanic it was originally quite

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2 The point is that the participle taken to refer to the past (ἔκτα) is a present one. The use of πρό ‘in front of’ to refer to the past would suggest the image of the human figure moving backwards through time.

3 The syllabic verbal augment (*-e-) is found in the poorly attested Old Phrygian, vestigially in Armenian, and systematically in Greek and Indo-Iranian, where it is prefixed to the indicative (only) of the past tenses (aorist, imperfect, and pluperfect). It remains controversial whether, and if so in what function(s), to reconstruct it for IE. W. himself on the one hand pointed out (1906: 147–50) that Homer never omits the augment if the resulting form would be a monosyllable with a short vowel; on the other hand, he advanced the view (1932b: 187–9), which was for long influential, that the otherwise optional omission of the augment was a feature of IE poetic language. This is made difficult by the fact that the Linear B tablets employ, with one possible exception, only unaugmented forms, and because the ‘temporal’ augment (the lengthened-vowel type found only in Indo-Iranian and Greek, in e.g. ἰδοῦ ‘we were’ < *-e-h₂-s-me-) must have been inherited as a bound (grammatical) form in pre-dialectal Greek, i.e. before Mycenaean. See Schwzyger 650–6, Morpurgo Davies (1988: 78 and n. 9), Meier-Brügger (1992: II, 50–2), Szemerényi (1996: 296–9), Bakker (1999), Meier-Brügger (2003: 182), all with rich bibliography.
normal and regular to denote a future action with a simple present. In the oldest stages of the Germanic languages, the present is the normal form for denoting the future. This is clear in Wulfila’s translation of the Bible, where a future in the original is quite regularly rendered with a present. And this has remained characteristic of German right down to the present day. The reference to the future is made clear either by adding an adverb or, usually, simply from the context. In German, morgen | verreise ich (‘tomorrow I’m going abroad’) is absolutely standard. We shall consider later (below, I, 193–9) to what extent and in what way periphrastic expressions grew up in German alongside this use of the present.

By and large, this thoroughly acceptable and regular future use of the present is foreign to Greek and Latin, and that is true of the modern as well as the ancient languages—though for some exceptions see Vendryes (1921: 119). Modern Greek, however, has made a completely new future, as have the Romance languages, too, and thanks to the new formations statements about future time may be made quite distinct from the present. I noted above (I, 9) that in English the usual strictness of the distinction between present and future is perhaps to be traced to the influence of French. Still, in ancient Greek there are some peculiar instances of the future use of the present that need to be mentioned.

We have to distinguish several different types. First, in Homer, at II. 11. 454 and elsewhere, the pl. 3 form ἐρύωσαι occurs with unmistakable future meaning, ‘they will drag’, although it, and its paradigm, functions normally as a present. This was a problem already for ancient critics of the text of Homer, leading one scholar, Alexio (second half 1st c. AD), to propose a reaccentuation of the form to ἐρυωσαι so that we would have a so-called second future. This is out of the question, as the accent is securely transmitted. Rather, ἐρύωσαι is a genuine old future. An original *ἐρύσωσαι became through the familiar loss of intervocalic s by regular sound-change homonymous with the present, while in λύσω and similar forms the s was restored by analogy with λείψω and the like. The occasional future

Hittite, like Germanic, lacks special future forms and uses the present to refer to future time (Friedrich 1960: 136); on the old present form Gk εἰμι, the ‘future’ of ἐρχόμαι ‘go’, see I, 160 below. Whether—and if so in what form—to reconstruct a future tense proper for the Indo-European verb remains an open question. Some future formations (such as the Latin [and Faliscan] future in -bo [-fo]) are clearly recent; others, notably a whole array of similar formations involving *s-, attested in a wide range of languages from Celtic to Indo-Iranian including Greek, require the assumption of inheritance from IE, but were probably originally desideratives (forms expressing a wish of the subject) rather than simple futures. See Sihler (1995: 45–2, 556); Szemerényi (1996: 285–8); Fortson (2004: 91). Other future forms in the daughter-languages continue old subjunctives (see I, 193 and n. 18, p. 248 below).


Vendryes cites Plautus, Captivi 749, and examples from modern French, German, etc.

On Greek, see I, 195–6 below and n. The Romance languages (with the exception of Romanian) use a structure of the form I have to + infin. (e.g. Fr. (je) chanterai continuing Lat. cantare habeo; cf. NE I shall . . . ); see further I, 196–7 below and nn.
meaning of (e.g.) τανύσασιν or ἔντανυεν (‘stretch, string (a bow)’) in Homer,\(^8\) or of τελῶ (‘fulfil’) in Attic is to be understood in the same way.\(^9\)

A further instance of the same sort: Homer uses as futures ἔδομαι ‘I shall eat’ and πίεμαι ‘I shall drink’ (the latter still in Attic), and later Greek adds φάγομαι ‘I shall eat’, all of these being middle forms which look thoroughly present in form but are no less surely future in meaning. Here we have to venture into morphology again. The starting point of this curious use is to be found in the old verb ‘to eat’. From Greek ἔθμεναι, on the one hand, with the supporting evidence of Latin ἔσ, ἔστ, ἔσσε (sg. 2, sg. 3 and pres. infin. of ‘eat’) and corresponding forms in other languages, on the other, it can be shown that Greek used to have a present *ἔδμι, which conjugated like the verbs in -μι. When we put this *ἔδμι beside ἔδομαι, the meaning of the latter becomes clear. ἔδομαι is the old short-vowel subjunctive of *ἔδμι, representing an old type of formation that is well attested in Homer (in e.g. ἵμεν ‘let us go’, or ἕτην παραμείφεται ὄρη ‘when the season (of youth) has passed’ Mimnermus, fr. 3 West), with a curious change of grammatical voice, for which we have parallels in Sanskrit.\(^10\) Now, the subjunctive often (especially in Homer) has a simple future meaning—in Delbrück’s terms (1871: 23–5, 122–8), the ‘subjunctive of expectation’;\(^11\) and most future formations in Latin are in fact old subjunctives.\(^12\) So, when ἔδομαι is taken to pieces, its meaning becomes quite clear and we are on firm ground. We can then simply say that πίεμαι was formed on the model of its semantic relative ἔδομαι—as conversely in Homer ἔδηδοται (sg. 3 pf. pass. ‘has been eaten’, Od. 22. 56) was to ἐκπέποται (‘has been drunk’)—whence Attic ἔδηδοκα (‘have eaten’, sg. 1 pf. act.).\(^13\) And later,\(^14\) on the model of the relation between ἐπιον and πίομαι, speakers ventured

\(^{8}\) Above all in Odyssey 21, the book of the bow (92, 97, 127, 132, 174).

\(^{9}\) On ἐφίσσα, cf. Janko (1994) on II. 15. 351, and in general Monro (1891: 37): ‘other verbs which have an aorist in -σασα (–σα)–the verb-stem ending in a short vowel—usually form the future without a’. On Alexio’s ἐφίσσα see Erbse’s edn of the scholia (1969–88) on II. 11. 454 (also on 20. 452 ἄνωσας), and Monro (1891: 59).

\(^{10}\) W. must have in mind the few roots which, while taking both active and middle endings in the present, are required to take the middle in the desiderative (with which W. regards the future as closely related). Whitney overgeneralizes when he states (1889: §328) that ‘there is no active personal form which does not have its corresponding middle, and vice versa’; compare Renou’s general statements in his introduction to voice (1930: esp. §276) to the effect that oppositions of voice are fully worked out only in the present, and that ‘the future tends towards the middle’.

\(^{11}\) Monro (1891: 251) characterizes the subjunctive in main clauses in Homer as ‘intermediate in meaning between an imperative and a future’; cf. Chantraine (1935: 209–10).

\(^{12}\) So, e.g. Lat. fut. eris and Skt subjv. asaes(i) both continue directly IE subjv. *ēs-e-s(i). With Gk *ἔδμι compare Skt admi and Hitt. ēdmi, and on IE *hêd- ‘(bite —) eat’, see LIV, 230 (and Chantraine 1938: 292). The short-vowel subjunctive is particularly well attested in the s-aorist (as in W.’s second example, παραμείφεται), where the form is identical with the fut. indic.; cf. Monro (1891: 68–9), Chantraine (1938: 454–7).

\(^{13}\) W. means that the -ο of ἔδηδοται is analogical on that of (ἐκ)πέποται (in which the -ο belongs to the root); on ἔδηδοται, see Chantraine (1938: 432).

\(^{14}\) LSJ cite examples of φάγομαι (condemned as ‘barbarous’ by Phrynichus 300 Fischer) only from the Septuagint and the Greek New Testament; cf. Blass & Debrunner (1913 [= 1961]: §§74, 77).
to make to the aorist ἐθάγανον a corresponding future φάγομαι.—Probably, an analogous account is right for several similarly puzzling futures. For instance, Homeric δήω ‘I shall find’ seems to be an old subjunctive of a lost verb.\(^{15}\) Attic χέω ‘I shall pour’ remains obscure, or rather, explicable in various ways.\(^{16}\)

So far we have been discussing what appear to be present forms with future meaning. We come now to a second type, which takes us more into semantic and there in Attic, it seems that above.)

To denote the action of going in present time with a present form you must use ἐρχομαι, which in Attic has neither the other moods in the present nor an imperfect, since the forms of ἐλῷ are available for these. In Attic this is an absolute rule. In Homer it is not quite so clear-cut, but in individual passages it is beyond doubt.\(^{18}\) Right at the beginning of the Iliad (1. 169), when the row erupts between Achilles and Agamemnon, Achilles announces, νῦν ὤλμε Φθόρνε, which can mean only ‘now I shall go (fut.) to Phthia’. So, too, at II. 20. 362, where ἐλῷ stands in parallel with the future infinitives μεθησάμεν (‘be slack’) and χαίροσέν (‘be glad’). At II. 18. 333, Achilles says to the dead Patroclus, σεῦ ὀστέροι ἐλ᾽ ὑπὸ γαίαν ‘I shall go after you beneath the earth’.—A couple of synonyms of ἐλهواتف also show this future use of the present. In Homer νόμαι ‘go back, return home’ is so used, e.g. at Od. 20. 105–6 οὐ γὰρ δὴν μησήτερες ἀπέσασθαι μεγάροι, ἀλλὰ μᾶλθ᾽ ἐρῶ νέοτα the suitors will not be away from the house for long, but will be back very early in the morning’. So, too, νίσσομαι at II. 23. 76, where the shade of Patroclus says to Achilles, οὐ γὰρ ἐρ᾽ αὕτις νίσσομαι ἔξ Ἀἴδαν, ἐπὶν μὲ πυρὸς λελάχητε (‘no more shall I come back again from Hades, when you give me the rite of burning’).\(^{19}\) Here and there in Attic, it seems that πορεύομαι must be understood as a future.\(^{20}\) And even in the New Testament the same phenomenon is found, especially with ἐρχομαι, e.g. at John 14: 3 πάλιν ἐρχομαι καὶ παραλήψωμαι υἱὰς (‘I shall come back and take you to be with me’). It is a feature of the Apostles’ Creed, in ὅθεν ἐρχεται

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\(^{15}\) Or a present used as a future (Chantraine 1958: 452); cf. LIV, 103 (s.v. ‘?2. "deh,"’) adverting also the gloss in Hesychius ἑδην: ἑδρευν (‘found’).

\(^{16}\) Cf. Homeric χέω; LIV, 179 simply supposes loss of intervocalic s (as did W. for ἐρώσεω, etc. above).

\(^{17}\) In indirect discourse, the optative and infinitive (and participle) may have future meaning (cf. Goodwin §30).

\(^{18}\) Cf. Chantraine (1953: 191); it has present meaning at e.g. Il. 2. 87, Od. 6. 131.

\(^{19}\) Cf. the imperfect νίσσοντο (Il. 12. 119, 18. 566). Chantraine (1958: 440) takes it as an old desiderative of νόμαι (cf. Meillet 1927d); Monro (1891: 39), Giannakis (1997: 207–12), and LIV, 454–5 relate it to the same root (‘nes- ‘return safe home’) but as a reduplicated present of the type seen in γίγαμαι (‘become’), standing to νόμαι as ἄγαμος to ἄμεω (‘have, hold’) or μέμνομα to μένω (‘await, remain’) (and perhaps as Skt nātate to nātate). (On the treatment of *ni-ni* in Greek, see Wackernagel (1888a: 136), and Giannakis and LIV, as above.)

\(^{20}\) This is repeated by KG §382. 6 and Smyth (1936: §1879), but without illustration; Jannaris (1897: Appx IV, 2–4) gives one example, from the New Testament (Romans 15: 25); Cooper (1998: §53.1.8) cites the pres. infin. πορεύομαι at Xen. Anab. 1. 3. 7.
κρίναι ζώντας καὶ νεκρούς (Latin unde uenturus est indicare uiuos et mortuos; German von dannen er wieder kommen wird zu richten die Lebendigen und die Todten ‘from thence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead’).

Where does this curious usage come from? Well, here our knowledge of the Slavic verb comes to our aid. Slavic has the rule that the present of perfective verbs has future meaning. Because they denote a complete action or process, with the end point in view, their present forms can express only something in the future, just as in German e.g. ich verreise (‘I am going away’) can only denote something that is not in progress for the speaker. Now, the verb ‘to go’ in Homer means not ‘to stroll’ or ‘to go for a walk’ but ‘to go to a particular point, to reach a particular point’. Either meaning can be conveyed by English go and German gehen—gehen, that is, at least in written (High) German: Swiss German i gang (‘I am going’) is semantically very close to Attic εἰμι, and when gehen corresponds to French marcher (‘to walk’), we use laufen. It is this that explains the meaning of εἰμι, and it is entirely in keeping with this that we do not find the future meaning with the other moods. As Sărău points out (1905: 159–61), there is a very strong tendency in other languages besides Greek to use the present of verbs of going with future meaning. In Latin we see this with eo, e.g. at Plaut. Bach. 592 (Pistoclerus:) non it, negat se ituram ‘she (Bacchis) won’t go, she refuses to go’. And the same has been demonstrated for Old Irish.

Let me also draw your attention to an observation made by the sensitive Hellenist Kaibel. In an epigram in the Palatine Anthology (§ 46 [Philodemus], line 7), we find the question ποῦ γίνεται νη; which is normally translated ‘where do you live?’. Kaibel, however, purely on the basis of his knowledge of Greek and working quite independently of general linguistic considerations, teaches (1885: 7) that γίνεται νη here has to mean ‘(where) will you be’. You see, γίγνεσθαι, in

21 Vaillant (1948: §244) gives a slightly different account, stressing, on the one hand, that the present perfective is not in and of itself a future—‘il indique seulement l’action qui n’est pas en train de s’accomplir’—and may be used e.g. of habitual actions or proverbs; on the other hand, that the present imperfective may also be used with (durative) future reference; compare Lunt (2001: §21.1), ‘the present perfective forms cannot denote action in progress. They signify rather action as completed in the future or at any other moment defined by the context’. In the introduction to their edited collection, Comrie & Corbett speak (1993: 10–12) rather of ‘bounded’ (perfective) and ‘unbounded’ (imperfective) situations, and observe (1993: 11) that ‘the present/future opposition is typically neutralized in the perfective’.

22 This is still true today of Swiss German gä(n) ‘go’: in e.g. i gang gänes ‘I’m going on foot’ there is a clearly implied goal to the action of going, and gang schnöll! can mean either ‘leave quickly!’ or ‘try to be there quickly!’ but never ‘walk fast!’ (with no implied goal); I am most grateful to Ruedi Wachter for these examples; cf. Schweiz. Id. II, 1 ff., s.v. ‘gä(n)’.

23 Sărău gives examples from Serbian and English. Cf. Lindsay (1907: 58) on this use of the present in early Latin (‘less in evidence than in modern languages and . . . mostly confined to some verbs of motion, especially eo and its compounds’). As for Old Irish, reuse of the present for the future is not mentioned in Thurneysen (1946: §19.1), but W. may have known Thurneysen (1928), and cf. Thurneysen (1944).

24 Both translations may be possible, according to context: in his excellent note ad loc., Sider (1997: poem 20) argues for taking the phrase here, with Kaibel and W., as ‘where will you be?’ but the same phrase in the next poem (21. 3) as ‘where do you live?’.
contrast with εἶναι, is a perfective verb.²⁵ Compare the fact that Wulfila very often translates Greek ἐσομαι (‘shall be’) with Gothic wairþa (literally ‘become’).²⁶

Thirdly, we may speak of a prophetic, visionary use of the present for the future. Oracular language in particular is fond of referring to the future with expressions of present time. Hence the declaration at Aesch. Agam. 126 ἀγρεὶ Πριάμου πόλιν δὴ κέλευθος ‘this road will take (pres.) the city of Priam’. The statement concerns the future but the seer or seeress sees the event as it happens and | the expression reflects this point of view. Compare the oracles in Herodotus, 7. 140. 2–3 (lines 3–5), and Aristophanes, Knights 179–80 (γενήσομαι ~ γίγνει) with Kock’s note (1882: ad loc.).

A fourth type may be mentioned, which is normally not recognized. Mahlow has some good things to say about it in an acute article on the use of the tenses in Greek (1883), which otherwise contains much that is peculiar and much that is wrong.²⁷ He shows here that it is far from rare in Greek for the verb to be in the present in order to indicate that its action is contemporaneous with a future action mentioned close by. Two examples are particularly striking: first, Thuc. 6. 91. 3 καὶ εἷς αὐτὴ ἡ πόλις λαθήσεται, ἔχεται καὶ ἡ πάσα Σικελία ‘and if this city (Syracuse) is captured (fut.), the whole of Sicily is in our hands’. This is the normal way of saying it in English or German, but the holding is in the future. The historian uses ἔχεται because he wishes to emphasize that the taking of the whole of Sicily happens at the same time as the capture of Syracuse. There is a similar case at Herodotus 1. 109. 4, where the conditional clause has a future, the main clause a present: εἷς ἐθελήσει... ἐστὶ τὴν θυγατέρα... ἀναβήσει ἡ τυραννίς,... λείπεται τὸ ἐνθεύτεν ἐμοὶ κυνόνων ὁ μέγιστος (‘if the crown will (lit. wishes to [fut.]) devolve onto Astyages’ daughter,... then the greatest of dangers remains for me’). I believe that we may assume this usage for Latin, too, although it is not recognized. In Caesar, Civil War 3. 94. 5, Pompey says to the centurions: tuemini castra et defendite diligenter, si quid durius acciderit (‘watch the camp and defend it strenuously if there is any reverse’), and then, ego reliquas portas circumeo et castrorum praesidia confirmo ‘I shall go (lit., am going) round to the other gates and shall inspire (lit., am inspiring) confidence in the defenders of the camp’. We really expect circumibo and confirmabo but we find the present used just as in the Greek passages above. We can take account of it if we translate, ‘at the same time (or meanwhile) I’ll go round and encourage them’. The present form indicates that the two actions happen at the same time. This usage is certainly to be connected with the timeless use of the present that we saw earlier (I, 157).—On

²⁵ That is, it denotes in its basic form an intrinsically complete action (cf. English ‘bring’ vs ‘carry’). Today in this context we would say ‘telic’ rather than ‘perfective’.
²⁶ For example, at Matthew 11: 24, Luke 1: 14, 2: 10, Romans 12: 18; cf. Balg (1887–9) and Streitberg (2000: II), each s.v. ‘wairþan’.
²⁷ This article is critically reviewed by Delbrück (1893–1900: II, 11–13).
present for future in announcements of utterances, note e.g. Cic. *Att.* 13. 23. 1 (no. 331 SB) *nunc respondeo uespertinis* (‘now I shall reply (lit., am replying) to your letter of (yesterday) evening’), and Arnobius (3rd–4th c.), *Against the Heathen* 3. 26. 1 *praeterimus* (‘I shall omit’); see now Löfstedt (1918: 64–5), with reference to Blase (1903: 286).28

Lecture I, 28

The historic present (*praesens historicum*). A very great deal has been written about the historic present. For general discussion, I refer you to e.g. BRUGMANN (1883: 169–73); on Latin, see EMERY (1897) and the fine, if unconvincing article by HEINZE (1924); on Greek, see BRUHN (1899: 58); on German, see BEHAGHEL (1923–32: II, 266–70).1 Dealing with the historic present is very difficult for two reasons. For one thing, its distribution in our three languages is very uneven; for another, its meaning, and the colour which it brings to its context, is not in every instance the same.

Given that in fact all the languages of the Indo-European family know the use of the present for reporting the past, it would be easy to believe that this was an original feature of the parent language. But when we look more closely, things are not so simple. The historic present is found in Latin of all periods and, we may add, in all registers. Caesar, a writer of thoroughly correct prose, uses it very frequently, but it is no less at home in the old language of conversation as we know it from Plautus, and again, far from being avoided, it is used quite happily by poets of the highest style; in Vergil, for example, it is common.2 In Greek the situation is quite different. Here it took scholars a very long time to realize that particular phenomena are confined to particular varieties of the language. For the most part Greek was treated as a single massive entity and it was only recently recognized that various things which were taken to be Greek *tout court* do not occur in certain types of Greek. On the other hand, it was recognized a long time ago that the historic present does not occur at all in Homer, for all the stories that he has to tell. And great aesthetic critics, like A. W. VON SCHLEGEL, were at pains to explain this absence by referring it to the stylistic conventions of the Homeric register, a view made difficult straightaway by the fact that Vergil has the historic

1 Among more recent bibliography, note: on Indo-European and early IE languages, Kiparsky’s classic account (1968)—with Levin’s modifications (1969)—of the historic present in terms of ‘conjunction reduction’ (that is, the dropping of past-tense morphology from the later members of a series of past-tense verb-forms); on Latin, Pinkster (1983: 310–14), (1990a: 224–5, 239–41) and above all (1998: esp. 71–80); on Greek, McKay (1974), and Sicking & Stork (1997), with special ref. to Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Lysias, Plato, and Sophocles’ messenger-speeches.

2 Pinkster (1999) offers a detailed critical study of the use of the present as ‘the main narrative tense for past events’ in the *Aeneid*. 
present. Homer apart, it is absent also from Pindar, which in his case may be connected with his relatively early date or his elevated stylistic level. Genuine use of the historic present is, however, there from the outset in the language of Greek literary prose. There are countless examples in Herodotus, and Herzog refers me to instances in the predecessors of Herodotus (e.g. in Pherecydes of Syros, mid-6th c., Diels & Kranz no. 7, B2). From then on, the historic present is common in Greek generally.

In German, the distribution is similar to that found in Greek. Although Wulfila uses present for future as often as he likes, he is generally much less inclined to use it for telling of the past. As a rule an historic present in the text of the Greek Bible is rendered by Wulfila with a preterite. But in German in particular we must draw a sharp distinction (following Behaghel 1923–32: II, 266–8; 1928: xxiii) between the present of an ongoing action and the uses of the present to denote a state of affairs which still holds in the present or a point of rest in an action in the past. While the latter uses appear early, the former is found neither in early Germanic nor in the oldest Slavic and is not in fact attested until the twelfth century. Another remarkable thing worth mentioning is that, at a time when the historic present was generally common, a great poet avoided it when writing epic. In the epic Hermann und Dorothea (1797) and in his other tales in hexameters, Goethe has not a single example of the historic present (Behaghel 1923–32: II, 270). Was his practice on this point determined by theoretical considerations, or by his poet’s stylistic instinct? In the Ballads he admits the usage, as does Schiller (cf. Wunderlich 1924–5: I, 150–62).

What is the real purpose of the historic present? The most prominent view is that it conveys a particularly vivid form of representation, a strongly present depiction of an event. A common view is that something is told in the historic

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3 W.’s reference is to Schlegel’s essay of 1798 on Goethe’s Hermann und Dorothea (vol. 1, pp. 42–66 in E. Lohrner’s 7-vol. edn of Schlegel’s critical writings and letters [Stuttgart 1962–74], here at p. 50); Schlegel goes on to remark that Vergil’s style is altogether different.

August Wilhelm von Schlegel (1767–1845, often referred to by his second Christian name) and his brother Friedrich, the philosopher and linguist (1772–1829), are famous together in two connections, in leading the intellectual and literary movement of German Romanticism, and in fostering the new discipline of Indo-European linguistics through focusing scholars’ attention on the newly discovered Sanskrit language. (Wilhelm is known also as one of the great translators of Shakespeare and Dante into German, and as the consort of Madame de Staël.) Although one thinks first in the Sanskrit context of Friedrich’s book On the Language and Wisdom of the Indians (1808), Wilhelm ‘became a much better Sanskritist than Friedrich and founded an important school of Sanskrit studies’ (Morpurgo Davies 1998: 75). Wilhelm played an important part also in the beginnings of Romance philology. For an excellent assessment of the contributions of both brothers to the history of linguistics (and other areas besides), see Morpurgo Davies (1998: passim, esp. ch. 3).

4 Hummel (1993: 235–7) characterizes it as ‘conjectural’ in Pindar, but agrees that it is not really there.

5 = fr. 68–9 Schibli; cf. At, Bt Diels & Kranz I, 43, 47 = fr. 14 Schibli. Pherecydes is a predecessor of Herodotus as a writer of prose rather than as a historian; see Schibli (1990: ch. 1).

present if it is to be practically performed with dramatic vividness for the audience, so that they themselves witness the event and actually experience it with the narrator. Now, there is certainly no denying that the historic present is used very often in this way. There would be no point in giving heaps of examples: none are finer than those in Goethe’s *Iphigenia in Tauris*, act 1, scene 3 (and 3, 1), where Iphigenia relates to Thoas (and then Orestes to Iphigenia) the dreadful history of the house of the Atreids. Nor do I mean to deny that the historic present is used in lively everyday speech, particularly when the speaker wants to make his story as vivid as possible, but it is impossible to claim that the historic present always and intrinsically serves this purpose. Against this, there is straightaway the fact that few Roman authors use it as often as Caesar: Caesar uses it more than Tacitus, for example, although he writes much more drily and less emotively than the latter.—I remind you also of the first sentence of Xenophon’s *Anabasis*: Δαρείον καὶ Παρυσάτιδος γίγνονται παῖδες δύο ‘Darius and Parysatis had (pres.) two sons’, and then ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστανε Δαρείος, ἐξούλετο ‘(but when Darius was growing feeble (imperf.), . . . he wanted’), and so on. Apart from the first sentence, then, the narrative is in the preterite, as usual. Now, nobody would wish to maintain that this is a case of dramatically vivid representation. It is simply an important piece of factual information, necessary for an understanding of what follows, and placed first. Or take another example. On the so-called Parian Marble (*IG XII.5. 444*), a chronicle immortalized on stone in the third century BC, the events recorded for the individual years are mostly in the preterite but often also in the present (e.g. τελευτά (pres.) for ‘so and so died’). Exactly the same happens in the much later chronicle of Eusebius of Caesarea (c. AD 311), according to the Latin translation. Here we find entries such as *Pericles moritur* (lit. ‘Pericles dies (pres.)’), p. 115 Helm), although the death of Pericles is something firmly in the past. We, too, are fond of recording events in chronological tables with the verb in the present. Some scholars take a similar view of the

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8 The Parian Marble (or the Parian Chronicle or the *Marmor Parium*) is the oldest surviving example of a Greek chronological table. It originally covered the period from 1381/0 (the alleged date of the accession of King Cecrops in Athens) to 264/3 BC, the date of composition of the chronicle. The top half was lost and is known only from a copy. A fragment covering the years 895–355 BC was part of the Arundel Collection presented to the University of Oxford in 1667, and, although now worn to the point of illegibility, remains one of the great treasures of the Ashmolean Museum there. A smaller fragment, covering the years 336–299, was found in Paros in 1897 and is in the local museum. The standard editions are still those of Jacoby (1904) and (1923–58: vol. B2, no. 239) (the text of the latter is available online at <http://www.ashmolean.museum/ash/faqs/2004/> with a translation by Gillian Newing), but a new edition is being prepared by Jim Sickinger for Brill’s New Jacoby. See Mosshammer (1979: passim), Connor (1989: esp. 26–7), Scullion (2002: 81 n. 4) (cf. SEG 52 [2002], no. 796).

9 Made (and expanded) by St Jerome c. AD 380 (see Mosshammer (1979), incl. pp. 37–8 on Jerome’s work). The most recent edn is by R. Helm (2nd edn Berlin 1956, repr. 1984), and note the online text and translation by Roger Pearse at <http://tertullian.org/fathers/>, with a most informative preface.
examples in the old Scipio epitaph (CIL I² 7), subigit omne Loucanam ‘he subdues all Lucania’, opsidesque abducit ‘and takes hostages away’. ¹⁰

This last-mentioned use of the present has sometimes been called the praeens tabulare. ¹¹ At all events it can be said that in notice-like announcements, where it is simply a matter of communicating an unadorned fact, and where the time is either immaterial or to be inferred from the context, the present is used. Here there is no question of dramatic effect, rather we should say very carefully that there was a type of statement about the past in which the distance in time from the present could remain unexpressed if the only requirement was to express the meaning of the verb. This is an instance of the timeless present. It emerges, moreover, especially from the material collected by Bruhn (1899: 58)—and this can be exemplified even more richly from Latin and Greek authors—that the historic present is often used also of actions which are directly connected. This would also be related to the timeless function of the present and would agree with the use of present for future reported by Mahlow (1883; cf. I, 162 above).

Naturally, the meaning of the present indicative is often determined by the meaning that attaches to the present stem itself, and in this respect the imperfect, optative, subjunctive, imperative, infinitive, and participle all belong with the present indicative. I am thinking here of two phenomena in particular, which have been sometimes misunderstood. In the first place, the present stem often has an inchoative or conative meaning, denoting then not the performance of the action of the verb but the preparation for its performance. For example, Gk διδόναι means not only ‘give’ but also ‘offer’, πείθεν not just ‘persuade’ but also ‘urge’, ὄνειοθαι in Herodotus not only ‘buy’ but also ‘offer to buy, bargain’. ¹² It is just the same in Latin. At Plautus, Captivi 233 impetrant means ‘are trying to obtain’; in Horace, Epistles 1. 18. 7 and 2. 1. 161 se commendat is ‘tries to commend himself’, and so on. This is the basis of the conative imperfect. ¹³

Furthermore, in Greek and Latin the present stem is often synonymous with the perfect stem, in that it expresses the persisting of a state resulting from the performance of the action of the verb, so that (e.g.) ἀκοίνων can mean from Homer on | not only ‘to be engaged in listening’ but also ‘to know as a result

¹⁰ This 3rd-c. text, the epitaph of L. Cornelius Scipio Barbatus (cos. 298 BC), is in the Old Latin verse form called ‘Saturnian’, and the first historic present (subigit) may be for metrical reasons; on the other hand, Kiparsky (1968: 32) points out that the first verb in the series is perfect (cepit) and sees in the following presents conjunction reduction (cf. n. 1 in this lecture). On the diverse and extensive discussions prompted by the inscription, see Gordon (1983: 80–2), Wachter (1987: 301–42) and Flower (2006: 56).

¹¹ Gildersleeve & Miller I, §201 call it the ‘annalistic or note-book present, or present of registration’; cf. Schlicher (1931: 51).

¹² Cf. KG §382.7, Cooper (1998: §53.1.7), and esp. the extensive recent discussion by Ruigijh (1985). Note e.g. (διδόναι ‘offer’) II. 9. 261, Xen. Cyrop. 1. 3. 14; (πείθεν ‘urge’) Isoc. 6. 12; (ὄνειοθαι ‘offer to buy’) Hdt 1. 1. 69, Isaeus 2. 28; this use of the pres. and imperf. of ὄνειοθαι is indeed frequent in Herodotus, but is common elsewhere, too (see LSJ, s.v.).

¹³ Cf. Goodwin §84, Gildersleeve & Lodge §227 n. 2.
of having heard’ (e.g. *II. 24. 543, Xen. *Mem.* 3. 5. 26). Similarly, at *II.* 14. 248 ὀὐκ ἀδέις is ‘have you not heard?’; κλοῦες in tragedy is ‘you have heard’ (e.g. Soph. *Phil.* 261); μανθάνω in Aristophanes is ‘I have learnt’ (e.g. *Frogs* 194); νικᾶν and ἱππάθης can mean ‘be victor’ and ‘be vanquished’ (e.g. *Thuc.* 1. 54. 2, 3. 57. 3); φεύγειν not only ‘be in flight’ but ‘be in exile’ (e.g. *Thuc.* 5. 26. 5). Some verbs are used exclusively (or nearly) in this way: for a Greek-speaker, ἐμαί (‘be sitting’) and κείμαι (‘be lying’) are practically perfects, and the latter replaces the perfect passive of τίθημι (‘put, place’). There is a curious form in ἔφευγεν ‘to have arrived, to be there’ (etymology still unclear); that it was perceived as a perfect is clear from forms such as ἔκαστ (with pl. 3 perfect ending) in the Septuagint and elsewhere in later Greek.

**THE PRETERITE**

I have already indicated that it is impossible to give a single general account of the preterites of the languages that concern us, because their respective treatments are so divergent and show striking innovations. The oldest state of affairs is preserved for us in Greek, where we find more or less the uses that we must suppose for Indo-European. Latin shows a radical redeployment of the temporal forms, and Germanic shows even more thoroughgoing changes from the beginning of our written record. I will begin with a sketch of the Greek system, and then try to make clear as briefly as possible the changes which the original system has undergone first in Latin and then in Germanic, down to Modern High German.

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14 Cf. KG §382.4, Goodwin §27, Cooper (1998: §53.1.3).

15 The relevant entry in *LIV* (s.v. ‘*seh,k*) compares only the Armenian aorist hasi ‘arrived’, and is (still) beset with question marks. For a radically new approach, taking ἔφευγε back to *Hjih,k-, the root of Gk Ἐμμι ‘send’ (aor. ἔκαστ, Lat. idēt), see Willi (2002).

16 e.g. in 4 *Kings* 20: 14; cf. Ἐφεουά (with pf. infin. ending) in a 2nd-c. bc papyrus (see LSJ, s.v.).
The perfect stem. The first thing to emphasize in this connection is that in Homeric Greek, but also frequently in Attic, a perfect can have a present meaning. The best general account of the evidence is to be found in Curtius’ presentation of the Greek verb (1877–80: II, 152–60). On how to explain it, see especially Meltzer (1909). Certain semantic groups can be identified. Here belong, first of all, verbs of making various sorts of noise. Beside βρυχάσθαι (‘to roar, bellow’), Homer has (e.g. Od. 5. 412) βέβρυχε ‘roars’ (not ‘has roared’), of a roaring occurring in the speaker’s present moment. The participle βέβρυχως means ‘roaring’ (pres.), and similarly λεληκώς means ‘crying aloud’, although there is a present λάσκω (admittedly not in Homer). In Attic this type is frequent and familiar, in e.g. κέκλαγγα from κλάζω, in Aristophanes, κεκραγότες ‘screeching, shrieking’ (to κριζω, Birds 1521), and particularly common, again in Attic, is κέκραγα from κράζω ‘to scream’ of an ongoing scream (along with the imperative κέκραγθι ‘scream!’). With this verb, the reduplicated form was so prominent in speakers’ consciousness that it even served as the stem of nominal formations, such as κεκραγμός (‘scream, cry’). In comedy there is a character Κεκραξίδάμας, and there are other formations of this type in Hellenistic Greek.

A second group of perfects with present meaning comprises verbs of perception and related activities, e.g. ὁπωτα ‘I see’, ὁδοδε ‘it smells’, and in Euripides, beside pres. λάμπει, perf. λελαμπε ‘it shines’ (Andr. 1026).

Thirdly, verbs expressing an emotion often have a perfect with a present meaning. In Homer alongside γηθείν is γέγηθε (sg. 3 pf. ‘rejoices’, e.g. Il. 8. 559),
and κεχαρηγότα (acc. sg. masc. pf. ptc. ‘rejoicing’, e.g. II. 7. 312) beside χαίρεων. This group is still productive later on, new formations appearing such as λελιμμένος ‘desirous’ (to λίπτομαι ‘be eager’) in Aeschylus (Septem 355, 380), or ἐσπούδακα ‘I am keen and eager’ (first in Ar. Wasps 694, to σπούδαζω). We could include here verbs relating to the intellect, such as Attic ἔγνωκα ‘I know’, ἐντεθύμησαι ‘I am considering’, νεώμικα ‘I believe’.

A fourth group distinguished by Curtius comprises verbs relating to facial expression, e.g. πεθρεκώς ‘staring’, κέχυπε ‘gapes’, σέσηρε ‘grins’.

In addition, both in Homer and in later writers, there are further instances which belong in none of these four groups, such as τέθηλώς ‘blooming’ beside θάλλω, or ἀδάλληται ‘wanders around’. In these, however, we can still demonstrate something characteristic of the meaning of the perfect. Beside βαίνειν we find βεβήκει ‘strides’ and βεβηκώς ‘striding’. Clearly, the perfect is expressing an iterative meaning of the series of striding movements. Similarly κεκοπόσως and πεπληγύως mean something like ‘lash out at’, and πεποτήσατε ‘they flap about’.

Behind this present use of the perfect lies a view of the action as being frequently repeated or performed with a special intensity. This is in keeping with the meaning which reduplicated forms generally tend to have; on this I refer you to an old, but still valuable book by Pott (1862),4 entitled ‘Doubling (Gemination, Reduplication) as one of the most important means of creating forms in language, illustrated from languages from all parts of the world’. It can be shown by comparison with other Indo-European languages that this category of perfect forms in particular is old, and that this is an inherited use.5 On the other hand, from the fact that in certain semantic categories quite a few new forms can be identified in Attic, it follows that this function remained productive. | I, 168

A second inherited feature is the use of the perfect to denote the state resulting from the performance of the action of the verb, a state in which the effect of the performance of the action applies to the subject. A perfect of this sort may be translated in German or English sometimes with a present and sometimes with a perfect. Take Gk pf. τέθηκε ‘is dead’ (in German, ‘ist tot’) beside pres. ἀποθνήσκει ‘is dying’ (in German, ‘ist im Sterben’). The German and

4 On the life and work of August Pott, see Sebeok (1966: I, 231–61), and on his pioneering role in Romance linguistics, Malkiel (1980).

5 Cf. e.g. Ved. āta ‘says’, nōniwā ‘roars’, lēliya ‘trembles’; see Jasanoff (2003: 30 and n. 2) with further references. The question whether the ‘intensive’ perfect (as it is commonly called in the grammars) is related to other uses of the perfect, and if so how, remains controversial: both to deny it as a separate type (as does Chantraine 1927: 17) and to derive it from an earlier present with intensive reduplication raise difficult questions; for a brief review of the issue see Sicking & Stork (1996b: 125–7), and on IE reduplication in general and intensive perfects, cf. Szemerényi (1996: 268–9 with nn. 1, 2, and 293 with nn. 32, 34). Schwyzer & Debrunner 263 n. 1 observe that some intensive perfects are attested mainly or only in the participle (cf. W.’s examples above examples above), Jasanoff (2003: 88 n. 73) that they ‘show a marked affinity for thematic pluperfects in -o-ι, -o-s, -e, etc. alongside or instead of pluperfects of the normal type in -e-oa, -e-as, -e-i’. 
English translations show at once what a strong element of presentness is there in the meaning. But this use is subtly different from that addressed above, in that the respective perfects and presents refer to different times. Compare e.g. λαγχάω ‘I obtain by lot’ vs λέλογχα ‘I have obtained by lot, I am in possession of’, or λείπει ‘leaves, is leaving’ vs λέλοιπε ‘has left, is gone’. Here belong also some instances which occur only in Homer, such as ἐδηδῶς ‘who has gorged himself’ (nom. sg. masc. pf. act. ptc., e.g. II. 17. 542). There is an interesting perfect belonging here which is attested only after Homer. While τίκτω ‘beget’ refers to procreation generally, and the aorist participle is used of both male and female parents (ὁ τέκων ‘the father’, ἡ τεκόσσα ‘the mother’, οἱ τέκοντες ‘the parents’), the perfect τέτοκα until a late date is used only with a female subject, since the old perfect has always to do only with a state which applies to the subject her/himself. So, τετοκυία is either someone who has just given birth or someone who is a mother and therefore no longer a virgin, in other words in either case someone affected by the after-effects of τίκτειν. The masculine τετοκῶς is not attested before the Septuagint (Job 38: 28).6

In both types of perfect so far discussed, it is extremely common to find an active perfect corresponding in meaning to a middle present. Instances of this from the group of perfects with straightforwardly present meaning include δέδορκα ‘I see’ beside δέρκομαι, ἑολπα ‘I hope’ beside ἐλπομαι, προβεβοῦλα ‘I prefer’ beside βούλομαι. From the second group of perfects (i.e. those denoting the state resulting from the action of the verb), note e.g. ἔστηκα ‘I am standing’ beside ἔσταιμαι ‘I stand up’, πέποιθα ‘I trust’ beside πείθομαι ‘I obey’, ἐγρήγορα ‘I am awake’ beside ἐγείρομαι ‘I wake up’. Cases of this sort are attested from the later period, too, as in μέμην ‘I am raging’ vs μαίνομαι. This was particularly prominent in the Ionic dialect, which then influenced the Hellenistic language (e.g. Ionic and Hellenistic διέφθορα ‘I am ruined’7 beside φθείρομαι).

Another sort of case is where we have an active perfect but no corresponding present at all. The most interesting of these is οἶδα ‘I know’. We have to call this form a perfect, since both in the indicative and in all other relevant categories it shows perfect endings. The only thing missing is the reduplication, but its absence, as the other Indo-European languages show, is an old inherited feature. This present | perfect is exactly what we find in German ich weiss (‘I know’). I, 169

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6 Note McKay’s pertinent observation (1965: 7) that ‘this is less significant grammatically [emph. orig.] if it is noted that the state of motherhood has commonly been regarded as a more significant fact of life for women than the state of fatherhood for men, and that in the Job passage the masculine is general (τὸς ἄτατος ὁ τέτοκας) in a passage denying that the Creator has any equal, at a point where the fatherhood metaphor changes to one of motherhood’. Note that discussion of τέτοκα has centred on Herodotus ἑ. 112 τέτοκα δὲ τεθείναι ‘I am mother of a still-born child’ (see McKay 1965: 7 and nn.).

7 This intransitive use of διέφθορα, ‘I am ruined’, is attested in Homer, Hippocrates, and frequently in later prose, but in (Attic) tragedy and comedy it is always transitive (‘I have ruined’); see LSJ, s.v. ‘διαφθείρω’, III.
This perfect expresses some sort of state, but it belongs not to the first but to the second category, in that the state it denotes has arisen from the performance of the verb at another time. Φόιδα is the Greek form corresponding to Latin uītī ‘I saw, I have seen’. Really Φόιδα means ‘through seeing I have reached the state of knowing’ and is thus the perfect of aorist eīdōn. Knowing is regarded simply as the result of seeing. An interesting piece of evidence of the thinking about the ancient Indo-Europeans!—Another perfect that belongs here is Homeric δείδω ‘I am in fear’. It is contracted from *δείδοια, the sg. 1 form beside pl. 1 δείδιμεν, and it is the older variant of δείδα, Attic δείδα, and of δειδικα, Ionic δειδικα all meaning ‘I am in fear’, while the corresponding aorist ἔδεσσα means ‘I was scared, became afraid’. There is no true present to this verb. Other defective verbs of this kind, ἔσαν, μέμνυ σα ‘I strive’, τετῆμαι ‘I am downcast’, λελήμαι ‘I strive’.—Another use of the perfect is something very natural. It is predicated of the nominal element which is brought into the state effected by the state denoted by the verb. So, e.g., II. 2. 135 σπάρτα λέλυνται ‘the ropes are undone’. Often the relationship with the present form is very apparent, e.g. at Plato, Charmides 174c ἦ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ὑγιαίνειν ποιήσει, ἦ δὲ σκυτικὴ ὑποδέδεσθαι, ἦ δὲ ὕβατικη ἡμφύεσθαι (‘the art of the doctor will produce the state of being healthy (pres.), that of the cobbler that of being shod (pf.), that of the weaver that of being clad’ (pf.)).—Another use of the perfect is to denote a continuous series of actions, the end of which has occurred in the present; we express the meaning of this type by adding ‘until now’, or something similar. Here belongs e.g. ἔσωργα, which goes back to earlier Ἐς ἐσωργα and is cognate with English work and German wirken (‘work, have an effect’). It comes e.g. at II. 2. 272 ἦ δὴ μυρί’ Ὁδύνοσσε ἐσθλά ἔςωργεν ‘countless good

8 On the (controversial) question whether the lack of reduplication in *wūid- is an innovation or an archaism within the parent language itself, see Szemerényi (1996: 290)—who supposes *wōida < *wewōida < *wevōida, by assimilation and simplification—with notes and further references; for a radically new version of the view that *wūid- is secondary within IE (‘a back-formation from its own middle, which in origin was not a perfect at all but a root stative-intransitive present’), see Jasanoff (2003: Appendix 2, here at 232). Lat. uīdi—which does not mean ‘I know’!—is now generally regarded as continuing an IE aorist (see LIV, s.v. *‘aor-*), in other words closer to Gk ἔδων than to oίδα, but Jasanoff (2003: 230, 232) takes it from what he reconstructs as the original IE perfect of *wūid- ‘see’, namely *wewōid- ‘is visible/recognizable, is found (as)’. With modern German ich weiss, compare Gothic sg. i wait ‘I know’.

9 *δείδοια is by regular sound-change from *de-di-wωi-a, the simplification of *ḍw being accompanied by lengthening of the preceding short e to ε (written e) in Ionic (δείδ-) but not in Attic (δείδ-). The stem of the plural (δεῖδ-) is extended to the singular yielding δείδα/δείδα. The e-aorist δεῖδα/είδα (the first syllable is long) replaces an old root aorist seen in Homeric περί . . . δεί ‘became (very) afraid’ (the aorist of stative verbs denoting the entering into the state). See LIV, s.v. *‘aor-*.

10 Note, however, that Homer has only the participle of the aorist ἔσαν (ταφῶν), τετῆμαι (save only II. 8. 447) and λελήμαι. Gk μέμνον, also used in the weaker sense ‘I am minded’, is the Greek counterpart to Lat. menenti ‘remember, mention’; cf. LIV, s.v. ‘i. *men*’. 
things has Odysseus accomplished (down to the present time), and then follows
νῦν δὲ τὸδε μέγ’ ἄριστον ἐν Ἀργείωσιν ἔρεξεν (‘and now he has accomplished this by
far the best thing among the Argives’), with the aorist appropriately of a recently
accomplished action (I, 176 below).

Such, in broad outline, is the Homeric use of the perfect. At every point we can
see its close relation to the present in meaning, but at every point also a certain
nuance which sets it apart from the present proper. In post-Homeric Greek,
innovations occurred. After Homer, the perfect begins to be used even when
the action has an effect in present time not on the subject but on the object.
(This becomes very common in Attic and is consequently adopted by many
grammars as part of the definition of the perfect.11) | Take, for example, διδόναι
‘to give’. According to Homeric usage, a perfect active could not be formed to
this verb, neither one of the first category—since it is not a verb of perception or
similar—nor one of the second category—since, when someone has given, the
effect of the giving does not apply to the giver himself. Consequently, in all of
Homer there is not a single example of an active perfect of διδόναι, although there
is a passive example, at Il. 5. 428 δέδοται (‘is given, has been assigned’). What is
given still exists or can still exist at the moment of speaking, so that the perfect is
entirely appropriate. Now, in post-Homeric Greek a modification of the passive
took place as well so that it became permissible, if the object of the verbal action
still existed at the moment of speaking, to put the active verb into the perfect. So
it is that we find first in Pindar δέδωκε ‘he has given’, and also first in Pindar
τετίμακεν ‘he has honoured’, while Homer himself has only the corresponding
passive, τετίμηται (‘is honoured’, e.g. Il. 12. 310, Sarpedon to Glaucus). You see,
someone who has performed an action of honouring does not himself carry the
effect of the action, rather the one honoured does so, so that in Homeric Greek
the perfect of this verb is possible only in the passive. How this led in individ-
ual cases to new formations is a matter of morphology, which does not concern
us here. For further details, see my ‘Studies on the Greek perfect’ (1904);
on possible isolated Homeric antecedents of later usage, see K. MEISTER
(1921: 122–6).

The last stage of the development was finally reached in the third century BC.
At this point the perfect came at last to be used in purely narrative function, even
if there was no question at all of any effect in the present. This narrative perfect is
found first on inscriptions and papyri but later it appears in literature, too.
Examples are πέφευγε ‘he fled’ (on an inscription from Nisa of 88 BC) or
γέγοναν ‘they were’ (on an inscription from Rome of AD 160–177, IGUR II,

11 This is, however, questioned by Sicking & Stork (1996b: 146–50) and by McKay (1965: esp. 9–17),
who calls (1965: 9) for a re-examination of ‘the whole concept of the resultative perfect’ and questions ‘the
assumption that so many transitive perfects are resultative’, and sees more generally (1980: 23) ‘no
substantial change in the aspectual system for well over a millennium from the time of Homer’.
340; DIETERICH 1898: 235). (ms. add.²: On the perfect in Hellenistic Greek, note also CHANTRAINE (1927: ch. 9), esp. p. 239 on the narrative perfect.)¹² In the 5th-c. AD epic poet Nonnus, for instance, it is quite normal (BRUHN, p.c.). It is important to note this development, as it can help us to understand the usages that we shall encounter in Latin and Germanic (I, 188, 190 below).

Commentators on the Attic authors often speak of an ‘emphatic’ or ‘rhetorical’ perfect.¹³ This involves cases where for example an orator concluding his speech says not παῦσαι but πέσαι, or the instance at Aristophanes, Lysistrata 839 εἰρηκε εὑθέως ‘she (Myrrhine) immediately says’,¹⁴ or the giving of commands in the perfect imperative instead of the present or aorist imperative. This has nothing to do with the present use of perfect forms discussed above. This involves rather an anticipatory use of the perfect, whereby the speaker reports straightaway the completion of the action that is being performed: εἰρηκε ‘the word is already spoken’, ‘the speech is already complete’. This is really more a stylized mode of expression than the introduction of a new meaning of the perfect.

¹² For further references, see Blass & Debrunner (1913 [=1961]: §343.3).
¹³ Also called ‘future’; Schwyzer & Debrunner 287 n. 1 suggest the term ‘anticipatory’.
¹⁴ Cf. Wilamowitz, in his edn (Berlin 1927: ad loc.), ‘ist ihre Antwort’ (‘is her reply’).
Aorist and imperfect. Let me say straightaway that for all the acute and careful attention that has been paid to the use of the aorist and imperfect, we have yet to achieve a full understanding of them. (See the recent detailed study of the distinction between the two tenses by Hartmann (1918–20).)

In the aorist Greek has preserved something ancient and original. This applies both to its morphology and in general to the functions that these forms have in Greek. With regard to the morphology, it is bewildering to find when you study the forms more closely that in the active and middle the aorist meaning can be expressed through two completely different formations. On the one hand, we have the ‘second’ (strong) aorist, which so resembles the imperfect of some present stems that there are a good many past forms over which one hesitates whether to call them aorist or imperfect. Beside that there is the ‘first’ (sigmatic) aorist, which has its own characteristic formation. It is probable that these two formations were not originally synonymous, but even in the earliest Greek it is impossible to demonstrate a semantic distinction between the two. The same is true of the few other Indo-European languages which have preserved both formations. It follows that the presumed difference in meaning between the two types had already disappeared in prehistoric times, and that we must treat the aorist as a single entity.

1 For more recent bibliography, see Meier-Brügger (1992: 123–7, 132–4; 2003: 232–5), and for a critical review of some of the main approaches to the tense–aspect system of Indo-European and Greek, Giannakis (1997: ch. 2). The scope of Rijksbaron (1988) is much broader than its title would suggest: he examines all the Greek tenses in the indicative, he concludes that the imperfect is ‘the past tense par excellence’ and that the aorist is ‘not inherently a past tense’; he includes a substantial section on the use of the imperfect as a narrative tense in Herodotus. On (esp.) aor. and impf. in Thucydides, with reference to narratology (techniques of narrative presentation), see Bakker (1997a) and his bibliography.

2 So, e.g., the Greek aorists ἐκεῖνος ‘gave birth to’ and ἔφη ‘went, took a step’ are formed in exactly the same way as the imperfects ἔφηβος ‘was carrying’ and ἔφη ‘said’ (but see W.’s comments below on ἔφη); again, ἔξετο ‘took a seat’ is formally ambiguous between impf. and aor. The s-aorist is an athematic formation in which originally the past endings were added directly to a stem comprising augment + root (with ε or perhaps η); so e.g. *ε-δείκ-η-m > ἔδειξα ‘I showed’.

3 This remains the standard view. Thematic root aorists of the type Gk ἔθρακαν ‘looked’ are now regarded as arising from a reanalysis of the root athematic type sg. 3 ἤγνω : pl. 3 ἤγνων ‘recognized, knew’; a form like ἤμολον ‘they went’ comprised originally root -μολον- and ending -ν and was reanalysed as root -μολ- and ending -ν. The thematic type is securely reconstructable for IE (e.g. in the forms directly ancestral to Gk ἤδει ‘saw’ and ἤλθε ‘went’), although there are signs that it arose late in the ‘common period’, i.e. before the split. Similarly, the s-aorist must be reconstructed for IE but may again be a late
While the other tenses have Latin names in the grammar books, the aorist is a tense with a Greek name (on its meaning, see I, 15 above). The reason why there is no Latin term for it is clear. Latin-speakers had no cause to coin a name for it, since in their language the aorist had disappeared. So, in this instance, the Greek name has—unusually—persisted untranslated. This is also very appropriate in that this category is a particularly prominent hallmark of Greek. Certainly, we have evidence for the use of the aorist in many related languages, especially in the oldest texts in Indic and Iranian, but today the aorist is productive only in modern Greek—apart, that is, from a few Slavic languages, in which incidentally it is showing a sharp decline.4 | In Greek it still shows enormous vigour, while everywhere else it has been lost. It is striking how Greek has here preserved something ancient for so long, and has even managed in its more recent development, on the basis of the opposition between present and aorist subjunctive, to introduce a corresponding distinction for referring to actions in the future (see I, 200 below).5

One further preliminary. We are absolutely not entitled to expect that every Greek verb is, in schoolbook terms, fully conjugated.6 We have already seen (I, 170 above) that many Greek verbs in the early period had no perfect, since the meaning of the verb did not lend itself to the type of action for which the perfect is appropriate. Similarly, although the aorist is much more generally used than the perfect, there are still verbs which have no aorist. In the first place, there is keîmai ‘I lie’ and ōmai ‘I sit’. These verbs have only a present stem, (though keîmai forms a future as well). The reason for their lack of a perfect is that they are themselves semantically very close to the perfect, keîmai and ōmai being parallel to ἔστηκα (‘I am standing’). They denote a motionless state which presupposes an earlier action of lying down or sitting down (I, 166 above). On the other hand, it formation (it occurs only in Indo-Iranian, Greek, Italic, Tocharian, Celtic, and Slavic [not, NB, Baltic]). Note that the Anatolian languages show only a simple present vs past opposition, i.e. they make no distinction between imperfect and aorist, and seem to have nothing corresponding to the s-aorist. For useful surveys of the evidence and the problems, see Strunk (1994), Sihler (1995: 441–8), Szemerényi (1996: 302–13) with strikingly extensive bibliography, and Jasanoff (2003: ch. 1).

4 The aorist was lost early in East Slavic (Russian, etc.) and West Slavic (Czech, Polish, etc.) and retained only in South Slavic (Bulgarian, Macedonian, and Serbo-Croat); see Entwistle and Morison (1949: 203, 220, 322, 379) and various contributors to Comrie & Corbett (1993: Index, s.v. ‘aorist tense’), esp. Schenker (1993: 94–103) on Proto-Slavonic, and Huntley (1993: 151–3) on Old Church Slavonic.

5 The ‘simple past’ of modern Greek continues, broadly speaking, in the active the ancient s-aorist (e.g. ἔγραψα ‘I wrote’, πληρώσα ‘I paid’—the augment survives only when accented), and in the passive a combination of the ancient θ-σubjunctive passive and the ancient κ-perfect active (e.g. πληρόθηκα ‘I was paid’); see Holton et al. (1997: pt II, ch. 7), and, for the historical developments, Browning (1983: passim) and esp. Horrocks (1997a: Index, s.vv. ‘aorist’, ‘past tense paradigms’).

6 One of the most important developments in the history of the verbal system in Greek (and Latin, Sanskrit, and other ancient IE languages) is the establishment of a standard, predictable conjugation, that is, one in which every verb makes forms to fill every available paradigm in the system, and both the form and the meaning of each paradigm are predictable. For an excellent study of the emergence (between Homer and Attic) of the standard conjugation of verbs with stems ending in a vowel, see Tucker (1990).
follows from this that the characteristic meaning of the aorist—that of effecting something—cannot be expressed at all with these verbs. To denote the transition to the state of lying or sitting, other verbs are called upon, such as ἐκομισθήσαμην, or ἐκομισθήσαμην (‘went to bed, lay down’), for κεῖμαι, ἐξόμην (‘took a seat’) for Ἰημαι. In the latter, BUTTMANN (1866: 164–6 in the Engl. tr.) recognized an old aorist, which only rarely allowed a present to be formed to it. Moreover, εἰμί ‘I am’, like κεῖμαι, has apart from the present stem only one for the future. The verb ‘to be’ has neither an aorist nor a perfect, and this state of affairs is probably inherited, despite the appearance of perfect forms in Indic and Iranian. In Latin, as in Sanskrit, the stem fit- is used to complement esse. In Greek, φύω (‘produce; come into being’) has completely lost this function, but γενόμην and γέγονα can to some extent be regarded as aorist and perfect of εἰμί.

The situation with ἐπη ‘I say’ is different. The earliest Greek—indeed, by and large still the classical language, too—knows only forms of the present stem of this verb; a future appears by the fifth century (e.g. Ar. Ach. 739). Aorist forms occur only very sporadically. The aorist is very doubtful in one corrupt passage of Pindar (Nem. 1. 66 φάσει in the manuscripts), more secure in Aeschylus (Prometheus 503 φήσει, sg. 3 aor. opt.), and somewhat more frequent in Herodotus and Attic prose. Here the reason for the non-appearance of the aorist is exactly the converse of the case of κεῖμαι. No special aorist was made, not because the meaning of the verb is at odds with that of the aorist, but because the past of ἐπη is already in itself aoristic. Like English say and German sagen, as opposed to sprechen, φημί is perfective, or telic, in meaning, and formally ἐπη (‘said’) is identical with aorists like ἔστη (‘took a stand, stood’).

It can be definitely shown that Greek-speakers really felt ἐπη to have aorist meaning. BRUGMANN has drawn attention (BRUGMANN & THUMB 1913: §552) to II. 22. 280, where ἐπη is embedded in a speech entirely in the aorist: ἢ τοι ἐπῆς γε ‘you said it (though it is not true)’. I would remind you also of the famous phrase of the Pythagoreans: αὐτός ἐπά ‘he himself (the master, Pythagoras) said it’ (e.g. Diogenes Laertius 8. 44, 46). When the statement is supposed to be that the Master said something, an imperfect would be quite

7 Gk ἐσώμαι ‘I shall be’, with middle endings (cf. I, 134 above).
8 In Latin, fit- is the stem of the perfectum (the perfect system), es- (s-, er-) is that of the infectum (the present system). In Sanskrit, the root as ‘be’ makes a pres., impf., and pf. but relies for its fut. and aor. on bhu-; cf. Macdonell (1916: §212.1).
9 Kirkwood (1982: ad loc.) accepts and defends the conjecture of Theiler (and Snell, based on Wilamowitz 1922: 496) φά ‘said that he’. Braswell (1992: ad loc.), on the other hand, argues strongly for the transmitted form φάσε, buttressing the security of the s-aorist with reference to Lautensch (1911: 125–6) and KB II, 211 §289; Carey (1981: 127) also defends the tradition. On the criticism of this passage, see also Hummel (1993: 95, 197).
10 Or: ‘yet you thought you did’ (Richardson 1993: ad loc.), in which case the meaning of ἐπης is not punctual (aoristic). And note that the previous verb is no aorist, but a pluperfect used as an imperfect (οὐδ’ ἀρα . . . ἤειδος ’you do not after all have knowledge’).
unthinkable. Only the aorist is suitable. Nevertheless, there are other opinions about these imperfects.\(^\text{11}\)

Similarly, and for the same reason as φησιν, νέομαι ‘I return’ has no aorist, and is indeed confined entirely to the present stem. We saw earlier (I, 161 above) that, in virtue of its telic/perfective Aktionsart, its present indicative is used with reference to the future. This is entirely in keeping with the fact that what is formally an imperfect has aorist meaning, e.g. at Od. 4. 585 ταῦτα τελευτήσας νεόμην, ἐδοσαν δὲ μοι αὐτὸν ἀδύνατοι ‘I have now returned’\(^\text{12}\) (I, 176 below).

Turning now to the meaning of the aorist stem (i.e. not only the aorist indicative), I can refer you to some outstandingly good studies, first to that of the perceptive French scholar Riemann (1884), also to Jacobsthal’s remarks (1907: 15–21, 22–35). The character of the aorist has its clearest expression in the ‘ingressive’ aorist and in the ‘effective’ aorist, which denote respectively the entry into a state and the completion, the putting into effect, of an action. So, an example of the former is νεόμαι ‘to fall ill’ vs νοσεῖ ‘to be ill’; of the latter, ἀποθανεῖν ‘to die’ vs (ἀπο)θνήσκειν ‘to lie dying’. The strictly ingressive meaning may be a Greek innovation.\(^\text{13}\)—Naturally, this opposition between aorist and present stems holds also in cases where the lexical bases differ: compare e.g. the opposition of ἀναύτευκτος (‘the purchaser’, pres. ptc.) and πρινται (‘when he secures a deal’, aor. subjv.) at Dem. 18. 247.

Secondly, connected with this quintessence of the aorist is the fact that a one-off event is rendered in the aorist, while the present is used for one that is lasting or habitual. The most instructive instances are those where we find side by side a present-stem and an aorist-stem form of the same verb. Following Riemann (1884: 598), I refer you to Plato, Gorgias 462d βούλῃ οὖν, ἐπειδὴ τιμῶς τὸ χαρίζεσθαι, συμφρῶν τί μοι χαρίζασθαι ‘Do you wish therefore, since you value the doing of favours (pres.), to do me a small favour (aor.)?’. The first infinitive is present and refers generally to the performance of a good turn on any number of occasions. The second one (χαρίζασθαι), on the other hand, refers to one particular instance of the doing of a good turn. Or let us take a passage from Jacobsthal’s article (1907: 31, 34). In an inscription from Magnesia (Kern 1900: no. 98; early 2nd c. BC),\(^\text{14}\) in a ὅπως-clause giving the content of a provision, we read (lines 10–12): ὅπως ὅλοι ὰνομοῦσι ὅλοι ἑνεστηκότες ἀγοράζωσι ταῦρον ‘that the administrators of the current year should buy (aor.) a bull (for sacrifice)’, καὶ ὅλοι ἀδεὶ καθιστάμενοι ἀγοράζωσι ταῦρον ‘and that the administrators in any given year should buy

\(^{11}\) See Brugmann & Thumb (1913: §§541–5) with further references; for more recent discussion, see the references in n. 1 in this lecture.

\(^{12}\) Cf. West (1988: ad loc.); an alternative is to take νεόμην as a conative imperfect, as in the Rieu’s Penguin translation: ‘When all this was done, I set out for home, and the immortals sent me a favourable wind’.

\(^{13}\) At any rate, it is not proper to the aorist in Vedic Sanskrit.

\(^{14}\) On the inscriptions from Magnesia on the Meander, cf. Nachmanson (1903), here 163 & n. 3.
(pres.) a bull’. So, the one-off purchase that is to be performed now is rendered with the aorist ἀγοράσωσι, while the annually repeated purchase is in the present ἀγοράζωσι. Jacobsthal does well (1907: 28–31) to draw attention in particular to the alternation between aorist and present in hypothetical sentences. For instance, on an inscription from Rhodes of c. 200 BC (Collitz & Bechtel no. 3749, 85–6), the verb of deciding alternates between the present and aorist subjunctive, the present (δοκή) being used of a condition that may apply at any given moment, the aorist (δόξη) of a condition that applies in the particular concrete case at that moment. And in manumission documents from Delphi (e.g. FD III.1. 138, 7; 217, 11, et saepissime), when chance meetings are mentioned, ὁ παρατυχάω is used in the singular but οἱ παρατυχαόντες in the plural. If just one person is involved, it is just a single case of παρατυχάων; if there are several people, there is a series of cases and so the present is used.—In the imperative in particular it is hard for us to feel the distinction between present and aorist Aktionsart. But on this point the living language can help us. In present-day modern Greek, the aorist γράψε ‘write to me once!’; the present γράφε ‘write to me regularly!’.

There is a nice connection between what we have seen so far and the third use of the aorist. The aorist stem expresses the bare fact plain and simple, while the present stem is used to depict the process. On the Cretan inscriptions, we have side by side (e.g.) the present infinitive δικάδεν (Attic δικαζειν) and the aorist infinitive δικάζαι (Attic δίκασαι). We translate both with ‘judge, decide by judgement’. The aorist is constructed with an accusative + infinitive: ‘The judge is to decide that such-and-such is to happen.’ In contrast, in the present infinitive we have instead an indication of the way in which the trial is to be conducted. In the present, the process is taken to pieces, while if we say δικάζαι we are concerned not with the How but with the Fact That (cf. Jacobsthal 1907: 38–43). Related to this is what Meisterhans & Schwyzer adduce in their grammar of the Attic inscriptions (1900: 244, §88.16, from an inscription of 363 BC). Here it is stated first in the aorist that so-and-so are to exact fines (ἐἰσπρακτόντων pl. 3 aor. impv.), but then it continues with the present συνεισπραττόντων ‘so-and-so are to assist in the exacting’ (pl. 3 pres. impv.). The main action, then, is in the aorist, the accompanying action in the present. The fact that we often fail to recognize a distinction of this sort results from a certain insensitivity in our own linguistic instincts.

A quite different question is whether, beside these distinctions, which fall under the heading of aspect, reference to the past could attach to forms of the


The aorist other than the indicative. Here it has to be stated that there are numerous places where we have good reason to understand an aorist infinitive, for example, as a preterite, when we consider the context. So, at (e.g.) II. 18. 499–500 ὁ μὲν ἑγχετο πάντ’ ἀποδοῦναι ‘the one (the defendant) maintained that he had returned everything’, and then ὀ δ’ ἀνάινετο μηδὲν ἐλέάθαι ‘but the other (the plaintiff) denied that he had received anything’, the two aorist infinitives denote past actions, and we are justified in using past forms in English or German. But that does not mean that a past meaning was inherent in the forms, any more than if we were to translate ‘the one asserted the complete return, the other denied receipt’, where both ‘return’ and ‘receipt’ denote past actions but neither form contains any element of past meaning. In both cases in the Greek, the essential point is that the aorist stem is used to express what is complete, over and done with, and not in fact to express what is past. Consistent with this point is the fact that the present infinitive can also often be translated as a preterite, and the same is true in the optative. Or take the sentence ὡς ἄρα φωνήσας ἀπέβη ‘having spoken thus, he went away’. Here φωνήσας has to be translated as a preterite, but the same form can occur also in clauses such as καὶ μὲν φωνήσας ἔσεα περιβέντα προσηύδα ‘and addressing him he spoke winged words to him’, where the action of the participle φωνήσας happens at the same time as that of the main verb προσηύδα. In sum, we must resist the idea that reference to the past attaches to the aorist stem as such. Well, now that these foundations have been laid and we know how aorist forms function in general, let us turn to the indicative of the aorist, and first to a couple of uses where competition with the imperfect does not arise. Some come very close to the use of the present. An ancient topic, even in school grammars, is the aorist of verbs which express a personal utterance in the 1st person, especially through word or gesture, as when someone laughing says ἔγελασα ‘I have to laugh’, or ἔκλαυσα, ἔδακρυσα, κατώπτιρα (‘I lament’, ‘I weep’, ‘I pity’), but also those more to do with the intellect, such as ἔννικα ‘I understand’. There is also κατώμοσα ‘I can swear to it’ and isolated cases in the 2nd person, such as Sophocles, Ajax 270 πῶς τούτ’ ἔλεξας; οὐ κάτοιδ’ ὅπως λέγεις ‘How do you mean (aor.) that? I don’t know what you mean (pres.).’ This usage, which is very

17 This is the scholiasts’ view of this passage from the Shield of Achilles; W. repeats this interpretation at II., 282 below in defending this unusual use of μηδὲν (rather than οὐδὲν), and is followed by Fraenkel (1950: III, on Agam. 1633). In a magisterial note, Edwards (1991: ad loc.) argues on linguistic, legal, and thematic grounds for the following alternative interpretation: ‘The one man was claiming <to be able, to have a right> to pay everything (i.e. to be free of other penalties), the other refused to accept anything (i.e. any pecuniary recompense in place of the exile or death of the offender)’—note that the defendant has killed a kinsman of the plaintiff. W.’s point about the use of the aor. infin. to refer to a past action remains true (Edwards adduces II. 8. 254, 21. 501, Od. 11. 261), but this is not the best passage with which to illustrate it.

18 For recent developments of this view, cf. e.g. McKay (1988), Rijksbaron (1988).

19 Gildersleeve & Miller §262 call this the ‘dramatic aorist’, as it is rare outside tragedy and comedy (cf. Cooper 1998: §33.6.3).
common in Attic (only the orators, the most particular stylists, avoid it) is connected, in my opinion, with another use, which is attested from Homer on and which is particularly well represented in the Sanskrit aorist. The aorist often does the job of denoting an action which has just been effected, or a process which has just begun. Particularly clear examples of this in Greek are a couple of colloquial idioms. In Athens, for example, it was customary on a wedding day for a boy to call out (perhaps in the name of the bridegroom), ἔφυγον κακῶν, ἡδρῶν ἅμεων ‘now I have escaped the bad and have found better’; he thereby took his leave of the past. In a mystical context these words were spoken when someone was rejoicing over a newly bestowed blessing; cf. LOBECK (1829: 648). We see the same thing in the Rhodian call at the return of the swallow (Athenaeus 8, 36οc) ηλθ’ ηλθε χελιδὼν ‘now the swallow has come’, which was sung on the first day on which swallows were seen again and the return of spring was assured. There are further examples in early poetry. I referred earlier (I, 169 above) to Il. 2. 272 ff., where the perfect ἔφρην refers to a series of actions. Then come the words νῦν δὲ τόδε μέγ’ ἄριστον ἔρεξεν ‘but now (i.e. at this moment) he has done this, the best thing of all by far’. This, too, is a passage which illustrates beautifully the characteristic meaning of both perfect and aorist, since the same verb is used in both forms. Similarly, note Il. 3. 439 νῦν μὲν γὰρ Μενέλαος ἐνίκησεν σῶν Αθήνην (‘this time Menelaus has beaten me with Athene’s help’), where the meaning of the aorist is clear even without the addition of νῦν. The aorist, then, is used for something immediately preceding, and precisely that has given rise to expressions like ἔφανηκα ‘I have just now understood it, I understand it’, ἔδακρυσα ‘I have just broken into tears’.

20 On Vedic, see Macdonell (1916: 343–6); on Sanskrit overall, Whitney (1889: §930). In spite of the distinctions drawn by Pāṇini between aorist (most immediate), imperfect (less immediate), and perfect (most remote) (cf. Renou 1966: 202), in classical Sanskrit, the difference between aorist and imperfect ‘becomes of little importance’ (Coulson 2006: 207).
The aorist can also sometimes be used of a future action. If we are to be absolutely precise, we can distinguish two shades of meaning here. At Herodotus 8. 102. 2 we read ἢν καταστρέφεται...σὸν τὸ ἔργον, ὃ δέσποτα, γίνεται ‘if he (Mardonius) subdues (all that he says he will), then the achievement will be ascribed to you, Sire’ (with γίνεται = ἐσται; cf. I, 161 above). | Then the speaker continues: οἱ γὰρ σοὶ δοῦλοι κατεργάσαντο ‘for your slaves will have accomplished (aor.) it’ (‘it will be your slaves who have wrought it’). For κατεργάσαντο a Latin-speaker would have used the future perfect, perfeecerint. In other words, it is something regarded at a future moment as being in the past and therefore denoted in the aorist. The same account is to be given of Euripides, Iph. Aul. 1017 ἢν ἐπίθετε (Achilles to Clytaemnestra: ‘if you persuade him (Agamemnon)’; = Lat. persuaseritis ‘you will have persuaded’).

Slightly different are a couple of Homeric passages (to which we can add some from other literature). At Il. 9. 412–15, Achilles considers the two options, of fighting around Troy and going back home, and says: εἰ μὲν κ’ αὐθὶ μένων Τρώων πόλιν ἀμφιμάχωμαι, | ὀλετο μὲν μοι νόστος, ἀτάρ κλέος ἄφθιτον ἐσται ‘if I stay here and fight around the city of the Trojans, then lost for me is my return home but immortal fame will be mine’, εἰ δὲ κεν οἰκαδ’ ἵκωμαι ἐμὴν ἐς πατρίδα γαίαν, | ὀλετό μοι κλέος ἐσθλὸν, ἐπὶ δηρὸν δὲ μοι αἰῶν | ἐσσεται ‘while if I go home, lost for me is noble fame but my life will be long’. Both times, ὀλετο (aor., ‘is lost’) is quite clearly used of something in the future. If the time were expressed more precisely, we ought to have ὀλεῖται (fut., ‘will be lost’), parallel to ἐσται and ἐσσεται (fut., ‘will be’). 1 A second example is at Il. 4. 160–1 (Agamemnon to Menelaus) εἴ περ γάρ τε καὶ αὐτίκ’ Ὀλύμπιος οὐκ ἐτέλεσκεν, | ἐκ τε καὶ ὅφε τελεῖ, σὺν τε μεγάλῳ ἀπέτεισαν ‘for even if indeed the Olympian has not accomplished it straightway, he will accomplish it completely even late on, and then they will pay together with a heavy price’. 2 Parallel to the future τελεῖ (‘will accomplish’) stands the aorist ἀπέτεισαν of an action of paying being performed in the distant future. Some scholars3 assign this and similar instances to the first type of aorist for

1 See Hainsworth (1993: ad loc.), on κλέος ἄφθιτον (a fragment of Indo-European poetry?: cf. II, 286 & n. 6, p. 757 below), and the unmetrical ἵκωμαι.
2 See Kirk (1985: ad loc.).
3 Including Krüger (1873–91: §53.6.3) (cf. Cooper 1998), Kühner & Gerth (KG §386.11), Gildersleeve & Miller §263, Brugmann & Thumb (1913: §554.3a); indeed, I have been unable to find W.’s distinction anywhere else.
future, which, as we have just seen, is based on the fact that the speaker adopts a point of view in remote future time. It seems to me that the function of the aorist here is rather to denote a factual, absolutely certain occurrence. No other form of the verb could express the reality of the occurrence more definitely, so that regard is had only to the meaning inherent in the Aktionsart and the time is set completely aside. (By contrast, for ongoing existence in the future, ἐσται / ἐσσεται was the available form.) We occasionally have something similar in Euripides’ use of ἀπωλόμην (‘I am lost, undone’, e.g. Alc. 386, Med. 78). Another aorist to be taken in this way is found on one of the most famous documents in the Doric dialect, the Tables of Heraclea (Tab. I, 122 and 143), κατεικάσθην ‘they are (hereby) condemned in advance’. Here, too, the reference is to something that is certain to occur.—It is noteworthy that aorists of this kind always occur in the main clause of a conditional sentence. This applies also to the ‘future aorist’ in modern Greek (discussed by Thumb 1910: §189.2, n. 2).

These instances in which the time-stage is ignored in the indicative of the aorist provide a convenient link to that well-known phenomenon, more discussed than all the other uses of the aorist put together, what has been called since Döderlein (1843–7: II, 316) the gnomic aorist. First, the facts about its use. Three types are to be distinguished.

The first involves the use of the aorist for something that a reflective observer recognizes as occurring at any time, i.e. in statements such as that (by Hector) of the war-god at II. 18. 309 καὶ τε κτανέοντα κατέκτα ‘(impartial Ares) kills (aor.) the one about to kill, too’, i.e., there is slaughter on both sides. This is a general perception abstracted from many single occurrences. Or that saying which Homer has in slightly modified form but which occurs in an older version in Hesiod, Works and Days 218 παθὼν δὲ τε νῖπτοις ἔγνω ‘the fool achieves understanding (aor.) only when he has suffered’. This use is continued in fourth-century prose, and later; it is attested in the Septuagint and the New Testament.

4 Both times with the particle ἄρα (‘then’), and followed by a future conditional; cf. Thuc. 6. 80. 2, a rare instance in prose, in an impassioned speech, again as the main clause of a future conditional.

5 IG XIV. 645 (Collitz & Bechtel no. 4629, Buck no. 79, Tab. I only), most recently ed. and comm. by Uguzzoni & Ghinatti (1968). This Heraclea (near Siris in Lucania, southern Italy) was a 5th-c. colony of (the 8th-c. Spartan colony) Tarentum. The two bronze tablets, containing reports of commissions on the redefinition, division and letting of land belonging to two temples, date from the late 4th c. BC and constitute the only substantial early Doric inscription from Italy.

6 Also termed ‘aorist subjunctive’ or ‘dependent’; on its use, cf. Holton et al. (1997: 220–2), where the term ‘dependent’ is used.

7 Ludwig Döderlein (1791–1863) was professor first at Bern and then, from 1819, Erlangen, where he was also headmaster of the local school. His numerous publications include editions of Greek and Latin authors and works on Latin synonyms, etymologies and word formation. See Sandys (1906–8: III, 113).

8 Cf. II. 17. 32 (Menelaus to Euphorbus) ἐὰν δὲ τε νῖπτοις ἔγνω ‘only when he (Epimetheus) had the problem did he notice it’), here with historic aorists.
From the latter, note James 1: 24 κατενόησεν γὰρ ἕαυτὸν καὶ ἀπεκλήθηκεν καὶ εὐθέως ἐπελάθητο ὅποιος ἦν ‘he recognizes himself and goes away and immediately forgets what sort of man he was’. The recognizing (κατενόησεν) and the forgetting (ἐπελάθητο) can occur at any time.

Secondly, from Homer on there is an aorist of this type in similes, in competition with the present, also with the subjunctive. So, e.g., in the exordium of Pindar’s seventh Olympian, 1–6: ‘As when a man from his rich hand gives (δωρήσαται, aor. subj.) a young son-in-law a bowl . . . and so makes (θηκε, aor.) him an object of envy among his friends’. What is here rendered with θηκε can occur at any time in life.

Thirdly, a use that is not found in all types of Greek. I can document it for sure only in Herodotus and then the Hellenistic Koine. The aorist can be used of a verb denoting a fixed custom, as at Herodotus 1. 194. 4 (of the Armenians) ‘When they have offered their wares for sale’, ἀπ’ ὅν ἐκήρυξαν.10 This is not something generally true that a reflective observer has inferred from experience, but rather a consciously practised custom, something quite different. As I said, this use occurs also in Hellenistic authors, such as Polybius, who at 6. 19, in the extraordinarily learned passage where he tells us about the institutions current at Rome in his day, describes military conscription in Rome in a mixture of presents and aorists.11

The standard explanation of the gnomic aorist is argued for at length by Franke, a pupil of Gottfried Hermann, in an article which is valuable also for its generous number of examples (Franke 1854); of more recent discussions I mention here Cauer (1903: 100–6) (cf. I, 63–4 above), and Sarauw (1905: 153–5).12 But more anon! On this account, the aorist is used because the thought is that what sometimes happens can or must always happen, the example of the past serving to indicate that something happens habitually. You can find all sorts of evidence to support this view, including in German proverbs such as Vorgetan und nachgedacht hat manchem schon schwer Leid gebracht, which means simply that, in general, thinking after doing tends to be regretted, or Mit Harren und Hoffen hat’s mancher getroffen (lit., ‘with waiting and hoping many have reached their goal’; cf. English All good things come to him who waits). Similar passages can be quoted from Roman literature, e.g. Sallust, Catilina 51. 11 multi eas (iniiorias) grauius aequo habuere ‘many men have taken insults more seriously than was...
reasonable’; here, too, a general truth is expressed with a past form of the verb. But I draw your attention to the fact that the content of the utterance is generalized by the addition of *multi* (German *mancher, manchem* ‘many a (person)’). This kind of aorist is common also in negations, e.g. *nemo pecuniam sapiens concupiuit* ‘never has a wise man desired money’. Naturally, when something is denied absolutely for past time, it can be a way of expressing the impossibility of the event. We have similar instances in Greek, too, as at Hesiod, *Works and Days* 240 πολλάκι καὶ ξύμπασα πόλεις κακοῦ ἄνδρος ἀπηύρα ‘often a whole city has carried the can for the actions of one wicked man’. 13

But the gnomic aorist is essentially different from this kind of use. With the gnomic aorist we have neither negation (by which the action would be excluded from the past) nor an expression of many agents or repeated action (which would make it easy to take the utterance quite generally). Rather we have simply a past form of the verb. This will make it harder to adduce analogous instances from other languages. It is true that Horace and Vergil use the perfect in this way, but this, like many of the peculiarities of the Augustan poets, is probably better regarded as a Grecism, 14 just as in that well-known line of Ludwig Höltz (1748–76), ‘Wunderseliger Mann, welcher der Stadt entfloh!’ (‘wondrously blessed man who escaped from the city’), 15 which is followed by a depiction of blessed rustic existence with lots of present forms. Here we have a poem in ancient metrical garb, whose author has obviously read Homer. WILMANNS (III, §95; cf. §99) does adduce one or two proverbial expressions from early German literature but most of them are either negative or contain the word *je* (‘ever’). Moreover, this explanation anyway fits at most the gnomic examples; it does not work at all for the similes or for the third use of the aorist (of customs and institutions). It also leaves unexplained why particularly the aorist was so used and not the imperfect or the perfect.

A second explanation is the one used by DELBRÜCK (1893–1900: II, 286–302), and among the classicists by BLASS. 16 On this view, the aorist is there because the

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13 But West rightly resists W.’s separation of this example from the gnomic aorist, observing (1978a: ad loc.) that ‘the syntax of 241 . . . shows that Hesiod’s mind is not on past examples but on the universal principle’.


15 The first line of both the first and the last stanza of his poem *Das Landleben* (‘Country Life’). Note that the last stanza is in the past tense, which suggests a past-tense interpretation of the second occurrence of the line.

16 I have been unable to find where Friedrich Blass espouses this view, unless W. has in mind Blass (1889: 424–3), on aorist and imperfect in Demosthenes, where Blass argues (against Riemann 1884) that the aor. marks an implied end-point or goal of the action—this need not, however, belong to the past. Delbrück
speaker regards the action as belonging to the past. DELBRÜCK makes appeal to (e.g.) the Homeric simile at II. 4. 141–5, about the woman staining ivory with purple. Here we have first the aorist subjunctive μῆνη (‘stains’), and then it goes on: κεῖται δ' ἐν θαλάμῳ, πολλές τε μν ἵρήσαντο | ἵππης φορέειν βασιλῆι δὲ κεῖται ἄγαλμα ἵτ (the piece of ivory) lies in an inner room, and many horsemen long to own it, but it lies as an adornment for the king’. According to DELBRÜCK, this means that the horsemen wanted it before it lay in the king’s house.

On this account, the gnomic aorist in a simile renders something that precedes what is depicted in the simile. But this explanation, too, suits at most the similes (and perhaps Hölty’s entfloh ‘escaped’, above). How can it be applied to independent gnomic utterances like παθῶν δὲ τε νῆπιος ἐγώ?

A third explanation is advanced by MUSIĆ, who tries to show that there is something analogous to the Greek gnomic aorist in Serbian (in the Proceedings of the Yugoslav Academy (1892), and then the Archive for Slavic Philology, 1902).17 If I understand him correctly, he regards the aorist here as originally timeless.18 But in fact, if we go through the examples in similes in particular, where aorist and present alternate, or if we compare gnomic utterances in the aorist with those in the present, we see that the aorist is always used when the meaning is ‘effective’ or ingressive, while a state is rendered in the present (or perfect). So, e.g., at II. 3. 23–6 Ὅς τε λέων ἐχάρη μεγάλῳ ἐπὶ σώματι κύρας ... πεινῶν μάλα γὰρ τε κατεσθίει, εἰ περ ἂν αὐτὸν σεῦνωτα παχέες τε κύνες βαλεροὶ τ' αἴζησοι ‘as a lion is seized with joy (aor.) when he comes on a large carcass ... when he is hungry; he devours it eagerly, although against him are rushing swift hounds and strong young men’, or II. 7. 4–6 Ὅς δὲ θεός ναῦτησι ἐελδομένουσιν ἐδωκεν | οὐδὲν ... καμάτῳ δ' ὑπὸ γυιᾶ λένω τα ‘as a god gives (aor.) a favourable wind to sailors who wish for one ... and by weariness their limbs are loosened beneath them’. Just so the aorist in gnomic utterances always refers to a completed action. Compare, for example, II. 1. 218 Ὅς κέ θεός ἐπισπεάθησα, μάλα τ' ἐκλὼν αὐτὸν ἢ ἢ if a man obeys the gods, they readily listen to (aor.) him’, or | II. 9. 320 (Achilles to the Embassy) κάθησαν ὁμώς ὃ τ' ἄεργος ἀνηρ ὅ τε πολλὰ ἐσταράωσ (‘both die (aor.) alike, the man who has accomplished nothing and the man who has accomplished many things’), with the proverbs ἔλεφας μνὸς οὐκ ἀλεγίζει (‘ivory does not think (pres.) of the mouse’)

does not refer to Blass, and his account is not, as far as I can see, in KB. An alternative possibility is that W. has in mind Blass & Debrunner (1913 = 1961): §333 ‘an action valid for all times can be expressed in the aorist ... because (at least originally) the prevalent thought is of an individual instance in which the action was realised’.

17 There is a German summary in MUSIĆ (1895).

18 This view is adopted by Humbert (1945: 145–6) and forms part of McKay’s general view that ‘aspect is an essential feature of the Greek verb in all its inflexions’, and that ‘timeless contexts may be appreciated as containing essentially the same aspectual patterns as temporally-based contexts’ (McKay 1988: 193, 208). The passages considered by McKay include (1988: 196, 200) II. 3. 23–6 and 9. 320, which are used by W. immediately below.
or ἐπικυρώσει οὐρον ἵσαι (‘locals know (pres.) the fair wind’). Here we have to understand that the aorist is used without any temporal reference in order to express the essential meaning of the aorist aspect. Admittedly, we must then assume that the augment here marks not past time but actual occurrence; noteworthy in this connection is the fact demonstrated by Platt (1891: 217–21) that in Homer, in contrast with the aorist when it has past meaning, and unlike the imperfect and pluperfect, the gnomic aorist has the augment almost without exception.19

Let us turn now to the normal use of the indicative of the aorist, namely to denote past time, which we render in German with the imperfect.20 First, we should note that it alternates with the imperfect in free-standing utterances. Pliny the Elder in the preface to his Natural history (pr. 26) mentions that artists signing their own works prefer faciebat (impf.) to fecit (pf.). But in Latin itself this use of faciebat would be impossible, and in Latin inscriptions by artists only fecit and related forms occur. Pliny, in his mention of faciebat and fecit, is simply translating Greek preterite forms. And indeed, it has been observed ever since Greek art-history has been studied that artists’ inscriptions have sometimes ἐποίησεν, sometimes ἐποίει. If my overall impression of the usage is correct, the aorist generally predominates, but ἐποίει is common alongside it both in the early period and in the archaizing later period. Analogously, inscriptions on paintings and drawings have both ἔγραψε and ἔγραψε.21 How are we to understand this variation? Pliny (or his source?) attributes the imperfect to modesty on the artist’s part, the idea being to suggest that he had not really finished the work.22 Pliny, then, views the imperfect as conative: ‘so-and-so was trying to make’, but it would be more accurate to say that with ἐποίει the artist is telling of the process of his work, with ἐποίησεν, he is reporting it as an accomplished fact. In other words, ἐποίει means ‘so-and-so did work on this piece’, while the aorist ἐποίησεν means ‘so-and-so is the creator’.

That this is the correct view is made clear by the following. Alongside artists’ inscriptions, the commonest type of writing on monuments are the dedicatory inscriptions indicating the god for whom the piece is intended. On these only the aorist is found—ἀνέθηκε, occasionally ἐθηκε, καθηκε, ἐστάσαντο, etc. (all, ‘[so and

19 The best survey of the problem is by Bottin (1969), who sees unaugmented forms in Homer as linguistic relics associated with traditional paratactic 3rd-person narrative (hence there are more augmented forms in e.g. direct speech and similes).
20 W. means the simple past or preterite.
21 Cf. Threatte (1996: 511–12). On the other hand, Wachter (2001: 209, 143) records among non-Attic vase-inscriptions down to c.400 BC only a single example of the imperfect ἐποίει (from Thera: he cites other uses of the present rather than the aorist stem from other inscriptions of Thera and Melos), and one possible example of impf. ἔγραψε (from Corinth).
22 ‘As though’, Pliny comments of the imperfect, ‘art was always a thing in process and not completed’; the perfect, on the other hand, ‘made the artist appear to have assumed a supreme confidence in his art, and consequently all these works were very unpopular.’
so] dedicated or set up)—never the imperfect. The difference between these and the words for making is easy to see. A dedication does not describe a process, the course of which we need to know about, but involves rather just the bare fact of the offering up, while the activity of an artist can be regarded from the point of view of its performance as well as its result.

The distinction between aorist and imperfect may be illustrated by two further passages in which both forms of the same verb occur in succession with reference to the same action. At Herodotus 2. 175. 3 we have first ὀὐκήμα μοινόλεθον ἐκόμισε ἔξ Ἑλεφαντίνης πόλιος ‘he (Amasis) transported (aor.) from Elephantine a house made of a single stone’, and then καὶ τοῦτο ἐκόμιζον μὲν ἔπ’ ἔτεα τρία ‘and they transported it (impf.) for three years’, i.e. they were occupied with its transport for three years. Both clauses refer to the same act of transporting, but the aorist ἐκόμισε straightforwardly reports the fact while in ἐκόμιζον we have the depiction of the process itself and its three-year duration.

Similarly instructive is the use of the tenses of τικάν on the fifth-century victory column of the Spartan Damonon (IG V.1. 213), which gives a list of his successes in various contests. In the title, where Damonon summarizes the content of the record, he says (line 6) τάδε ἐνίκας (in Attic that would be ἐνίκησε) ‘Damonon won (aor.) the following victories’. But later, when he is recounting the individual circumstances of each victory—where the victory occurred, in what manner he won the victory and with what kind of chariot—he always says ἐνίκη (Attic ἐνίκα, impf.). Both relate to exactly the same victories. Those reported in the imperfect are simply seen from a different perspective from that of the aorist in the title, the idea being of the process and not just the bare fact of victory.—With these last examples compare my earlier remarks on the aorist stem (I, 174–5 above).

23 = Buck no. 71. This is still one of the oldest inscriptions of any length in the Laconian dialect, although the earlier dating of c. 450–431 BC (cf. still Jeffery 1990: 196, 201 no. 52) has been revised to the period shortly after 403 (Jeffery 1988; Johnston in Jeffery 1990: 448). For translation and historical discussion, see Hodkinson (2000: 303–7).
Lecture I, 32

The basic difference between aorist indicative and imperfect emerges well enough from the foregoing, but we deceive ourselves if we regard this as the end of the story. Often, particularly in early Greek and later in the most polished prose, to our way of thinking imperfect and aorist are used completely interchangeably in reports about the past. Take an example from Homer. In the account in the *Iliad* about the kingship in Argos, how the sceptre was passed from one generation to the next, we read at II. 2. 106 Ἀτρεὸς δὲ θυήσκων ἔλειπεν πολιάρμη Θυέστης ‘Atreus as he died left it to Thyestes rich in flocks’, and then immediately | αὐτὰρ ὁ ἄδει Θύεστ’ Ἀγαμέμνονοι λεὶπε φορήναι ‘but Thyestes left it in turn to Agamemnon for him to bear’. Here is the same fact in sentences of the same structure expressed once with ἔλειπεν and once with λεὶπε. ¹ Similarly, I remind you of the numerous places in Homer where ἔλειπεν means not merely ‘he urged him’ but, like ἔπεισε, ‘he persuaded him to do such-and-such’ (cf., however, Ed. HERMANN 1920: 130–6²). Homer has in fact many imperfects which serve as straightforward narrative forms, without depicting the action or the process any more than the corresponding aorist. We simply have to recognize, especially in view of comparison with related languages, above all Sanskrit, that the imperfect was often the narrative tense, just as later Herodotus and Thucydides generally use the imperfect in plain narrative.³ The most that we can say, if we wish to draw a distinction between the two, is that occasionally the aorist denotes more the culmination of a series of actions or processes, while their actual performance is expressed in the imperfect. It is striking that with some verbs Attic shows a curious preference for the imperfect, the reason for which

¹ For Kiparsky (1968: 39–41), this is another example of conjunction reduction (see n. 1, p. 210 above): in his view, past tense is marked only on the first verb form (aor. ἔλειπεν) and λεὶπε is not impt. but an injunctive (that is a member of the most primitive verbal category in Indo-European, normally recognized only in Vedic among the attested languages, and comprising just stem and personal ending and unmarked for tense). When Greek lost the injunctive, Kiparsky continues, forms like λείπε were replaced either by historical presents (λείπε) or by historical imperfects (ἐλείπε), which brings us back to W.’s topic.

² Hermann explains this as arising from negated sentences with an imperfect in the standard function of denoting repeated action in the past (e.g. neg. ὦκ ἔπεισε ‘she failed to persuade him’ (in spite of repeated efforts) → positive ἔπεισε ‘she succeeded in persuading him, she persuaded him’).

³ In McKay’s view (1988: 254), on the basis of a close analysis of Herodotus 4. 1–5. 23, ‘[the imperfect] serves as the time-anchor for other states of affairs; on the level of large-scale narrative units it establishes cohesion between different and, more specifically, distant parts of a given narrative’; note also Lang (1984).
remains unclear. In particular, ἐκέλευε (‘ordered’, impf.) is infinitely more common than ἐκέλευσε (aor.), as is the imperfect of παρακελεύεσθαι (‘encourage, recommend’) and ἐρωτάω (‘ask’), the latter often almost exclusively in the imperfect. For details, see Bläss (1889: 406–30), and Bläss & Debrunner in their grammar of the New Testament (1913 [=1961]: §328). It is instructive how Hartmann (1920: 8–29) sets alongside their French and Russian translations narrative excerpts from Thucydides in which aorist and imperfect alternate.

The imperfect speaks for itself, in that the present stem, on which it is based, can serve as we saw (cf. I, 165–6 above) to express either an ongoing state of completeness or an incomplete action: ᾐκονοῦ ‘by hearing I came to know’, ἐφευροῦ ‘I was on the run’, ὄνειτο ‘he bargained’. Related to these are those cases in which the imperfect denotes a situation in the past on which a particular event impinges. The imperfect alone is common in this sort of context. This use of the imperfect, and the contrast between it and the factual aorist, is very nicely presented in the so-called prescripts to Athenian public decrees. For example, in the one regarding Chalcis of 446/5 BC (SIG 64), we have first ἔδοξεν τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ ‘it was decided (aor.) by the Council and the people’. This is a fact which had to be stated straightaway, and hence in the aorist. Then follow notes such as Ἀντιοχίς ἐπρυτάνευε (‘the Antiochis tribe was presiding’), where the imperfect of the verb πρυτανιέω is used to indicate which part of the Council was taking its turn at presiding. That is not a fact determined by decree but rather one of the circumstances that obtained when the decree was passed. The Antiochis tribe was presiding already on the day before and again on the day after. Then comes Δρακοντίδης ἐπεστάτηκε ‘Dracontides was in the chair’. This, too, is something that obtained throughout the Assembly, in the course of whose business the decree, which follows, was just a single item in the day’s agenda. The chairmanship (ἐπιστάτειν) started before and went on after the formulation of the decree. (On other inscriptions, the scribe and the archon who were in office when the decree was passed are also mentioned in the imperfect, ‘so-and-so ἐγραμμάτευε / ἐρημεῖ (was secretary / was archon)’. Then, right at the end of the prescript it says, Διόγνητος ἔησε ‘Diognetos made the proposal’, in the aorist again because it involves the single action on which, with ἔδοξεν, the decree depended. This is not peculiar to Attic. In the public decrees of Argos, e.g., beside aorist ἔδοξε stands imperfect ἀρρήτευε ‘so-and-so was spokesman, presided’. 5

4 IG I3. 40, Meiggs & Lewis no. 52, now generally dated to the 420s. I have retained W.’s standardized spelling of the words quoted.

5 So, e.g. in Buck no. 85 (Argos, c. 450 BC; = SIG 56), line 43 (immediately after ἔδοξε), IG IV. 497 (197–5 BC). For ἀρρητεύε (also abbrev. ἀρ, ἄρ), cf. also Buck no. 82 (Argive Heraeum, early 5th c.), and no. 86 (Cimolos, 4th c.; = SIG 261–impf. ἀρρητεύη following aor. ἐκρινεῖ). The form more probably reflects a compound *ἀνα-(e)ρητεύε (with syncope of the short vowel in the second syllable and assimilation of ν to (f) to (f)) than a lowering of the augment έ to ά.
Let me touch very quickly on two further points, where in strict logic the imperfect expresses something that belongs purely to the present. For the first, which relates very closely to the last use of the imperfect, I begin with a passage of Homer, on the text of which already his ancient critics disagreed. The depiction of the aegis of Athene at Il. 2. 448 has the words τής ἐκατὸν θύσανοι παγχρύσεωι ἡρέθονται ‘from it a hundred tassels all-golden dangle’. One group of ancient editors, including Aristarchus, read here the present ἡρέθονται, while others read the imperfect, ἡρέθοντο. Those who preferred the present thought that, when an object belonging to a god was described, only the present could be used, since what a god possesses is possessed for eternity and the imperfect would imply that the dangling occurred only at a particular time. But in spite of this apparently enlightening defence of the present, the group who read the imperfect were probably right. For we can see already in Homer that when a state is described which was true at the time of a past action, the state is reported in the imperfect even if it still holds in present time for the speaker. Compare Od. 3. 291–2 (τὰς μὲν Κρήτην ἑπέλασσαν, ἧχει Κύδωνες ἑναυον ‘(some of the ships Zeus drove towards Crete,) where the Cydones lived’. Now, it is quite certain that from the standpoint of Homeric geography the Cydones were still actually living there at the time of the telling of the tale, so that strictly it should have been ναίοναι. But because the speaker is thinking only of the time of the events in the narrative, and is unconcerned whether what he says is still true in the present, he uses the imperfect. This carelessness, so easy to understand, is to be seen even in such a careful writer as the historian Thucydides, e.g. at 2. 13. 7 τοῦ τε γὰρ Φαληρικοῦ τεῖχος στάδιοι ἡγὼν πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα πρὸς τὸν κύκλον τοῦ ἀστέως (‘the wall of Phalerum ran for thirty-five stades to the circuit of the city’). And there are certainly similar things to be found in other languages (so, in Latin, e.g. Cic. Or. 161; cf. also van Ginneken’s report (1917: 53) of Feldkeller 1917).

Of interest is a completely unrelated use of the imperfect in place of the present. We find in Hesiod, Works 11, οὐκ ἄρα μοῦνον ἔην (impf.) Ἐριδών γένος, which has to be translated as, ‘there is then after all not merely one type of Eris’. This is a general truth, valid at all times, and yet the poet uses the impf. ἔην ‘was’. But it involves a realization that the poet has recently achieved, in contrast with an earlier misunderstanding on his part and on the part of others. ‘I now recognize, as I did not earlier, that there is not only one type of Eris.’ Now this type of utterance, with οὐκ ἄρα and the imperfect of ἔην, is attested frequently from Homer to Demosthenes, in statements of a newly won realization. Only rarely is a sentence of this type with ἄρα positive, and only exceptionally is the imperfect other than that of ἔην. The imperfect is, of course, illogical, but it may still be explained: οὐκ ἄρα μοῦνον ἔην stands for οὐχ ὥσπερ πρότερον φόμην . . . ‘so it is not as I thought (impf.) earlier’. Because the speaker is thinking of his earlier, wrong opinion, the imperfect slips off his tongue. Already in Homeric Greek,
statements of this type are felt to relate to present time, whence we find at II. 15. 274 and 21. 495 oιδ’ ἄρα . . . αἰσιμον ἦν in similes, where otherwise, apart from the subjunctive and the aorist, only the present is admitted. The reading of fr. 3 of Timoacreon of Ialysus (6th / 5th c. BC) is uncertain.\(^6\)

Whether there was a past of the perfect stem already in pre-Greek, or in the parent language, we do not know.\(^7\) Nevertheless, Greek itself possessed such a past tense fully developed since the earliest period—and the Greek pluperfect is to be regarded only as the past of the perfect, and not as denoting ‘past in the past’. So the pluperfect stands alongside the perfect with present meaning (I, 167–8 above): e.g. to ἐσποῦδακα ‘I am eager’, ἐσποῦδάκειν ‘I was eager’. We have seen (I, 168–9 above) that the perfect is used when the effect of an earlier action is still felt on the subject himself, as e.g. in πέπτωκα ‘I am fallen’, compared with ἐπεσον ‘I fell’. Well, corresponding to this is ἐπεπτάκεν ‘I was fallen’. Similarly ἦδεν (‘I knew’) beside οἴδα, ἐπεθύμηκεν (‘I was dead’) beside τέθυμηκα, ἐπεθήκεν (‘I was standing’) beside ἐστήκα. We have also | seen that in post-Homeric Greek this perfect was used also when the result of the action was available in the present to the object: δέδωκα ‘my gift is there’, and so δεδώκειν ‘my gift was there’.—From here it is an easy step for the pluperfect to become the apparent or actual marker of ‘past in the past’.

Two usages of the pluperfect, however, one pre-classical and one post-classical, call for explanation. A number of shrewd scholars have believed that Homer attests a completely deviant use of the pluperfect. It appears to function as an aorist in e.g. the formula ὁρώμει 8’ οὐρανόθεν νῦς ‘and night emerged from heaven’ (e.g. Od. 5. 294), or in πάλην οἰκόνδε βεβήκε ‘she set out to go back home’, beside βεβήκε ‘he walked’; so, too, βεβλήκει or πεπλήγει, both ‘struck’. The best discussion of these, correcting earlier misunderstandings, is in MELTZER’s article (1909, already quoted more than once). This use belongs straightforwardly with the use of the perfect as a present: ὁρώμεν ὦρα e.g. can mean ‘is aroused’, βεβήκε ‘he strides’. Now, just as any imperfect can shift an action into the past as a simple narrative tense and regardless of the Aktionsart of the given verb, so this apparently aoristic use of the pluperfect is to be seen simply as the past of the perfect with present meaning. It is therefore striking that this usage is no longer attested in Attic, which has also restricted the use of perfects as presents and no longer attests perfects such as βεβήκα or ὁρώμα with present meaning.

\(6\) On this use of the imperfect with ἄρα, see Denniston (1954: 36–7) and West (1978a: 143). Timoacreon 729 Page (= fr. 3 Bergk) is variously printed, with ἄρα or ἄρα and an imperfect or present form of the verb: οὐκ ἄρα/ἐστὶν Τιμοκρέων μόνο/μόνος Μήδιοιν ἄρκεστιέμε/ἀρκεστιέμε (‘T. then is not the only one who swears a solemn oath with the Medes’).

\(7\) A pluperfect is now generally, though not universally, reconstructed for Indo-European (formed of augment + pf. stem + past endings). Jasanoff (2003: 34–43), the most recent and best account, is in favour, as is Szemerényi (1996: 298); Sihler (1995: 578–9) regards the Greek plupf. as ‘a wholly Greek innovation’; the issue is sidestepped by Fortson (2004: 81).
The second usage, usually not to be found in the grammar books, is the Hellenistic use of the pluperfect simply as an indeterminate past tense, in contexts where we would expect an aorist. For example, in a letter of c. 210 BC from King Philip V to the city of Larisa (SIG 543), we read (vv 27–8) εἰπερ ἐγεγόνει τούτο ‘if this really has happened’, where we have to take ἐγεγόνει in the sense of ἐγένετο (aor.). That this is not accidental is clear from similar use of the pluperfect as a simple past tense by writers of the imperial period (cf. Schmid 1887–97: III, 75).

MARKERS OF PAST TIME IN LATIN

Latin shows a radical rearrangement of the original state of affairs, the essential feature being that, while Greek has preserved the aorist until the present day, the Italic languages, like Germanic and Celtic, have lost it, and so have dispensed with a very particular nuance among expressions of past time—although we shall have to amend and amplify this observation slightly, when we turn to the Latin perfect. The Latin perfect has a twofold meaning. On this point I have no need to refer to modern accounts, but can appeal to the linguistic intuitions of the ancient grammarians. In the most extensive and comprehensive grammar that we have of Latin, that of Priscian, we read the following: 8. 97 = GL II, 445, 22–3 ‘practeritum perfectum... pro παρακειμένου... et pro δορίστου... habemus’ (‘(in Latin) we use the perfect preterite sometimes in the sense of the Greek perfect and sometimes in that of the Greek aorist’). Priscian refers on this point to the judgement of Probus, and exemplifies his doctrine with Lat. amauit, which he says can equate not only to Gk πεφίληκα (pf., ‘I have loved’) but also to ἐφίλησα (aor., ‘I loved’). Similarly, he continues, feci (‘have made, have done’ / ‘made,
did’) means not only ἐποίηκα but also ἐποίησα, ὤδι (‘have seen’ / ‘saw’) not only ἔφορακα but also ἐδόθων, ‘et sic omnia cetera’. This is absolutely right: we can with certainty divide the uses of the so-called perfect forms in Latin into two groups. One group consists of cases which match exactly the Greek perfect: e.g. ὄdì ‘I am in the state of hating, I hate’ can be set in parallel with Greek οἶδα (‘I know’), meminì (‘I am mindful, remember’) corresponds exactly to Greek μέμνημαι. In Classical Latin, odi has no present forms and no simple forms with past meaning. Marc Antony was the first to form odiui ‘I have hated’, and from Tertullian on we find odio ‘I hate’. The simplex memini also lacks present forms, although to it belong the compounds in -miniscor (which correspond to Gk μεμνησκομαι). In other cases, however, the present is in common use, as e.g. in nosō (‘get to know’) beside noi (‘know, be aware of, apprised of’); cf. Gk ἐγνώκα ‘know’, pf. of γινώσκω ‘come to know, perceive’, and in the presents (pereo ‘perish’, occido ‘fall’, intereo ‘die’) to the perfects perii, occidi, interii (used as presents, ‘am lost’, ‘am fallen’, ‘am dead’; cf. Gk θλωλα, τέθνηκα, etc.). This perfect is sometimes called the ‘logical perfect’ (‘perfectum logicum’).14

A derivative of this use of the perfect (i.e. to denote either something in the present or a present state arising from a completed action) is perhaps to be seen in that famous phrase in Vergil, Aeneid 2. 325–6 fuimus Troes, fuit Ilium et ingens | gloria Teucrorum ‘until now we have been Trojans, until now Ilium has stood and the great glory of the Teucrians, (but all that is now over)’. This usage is attested already in Plautus, e.g. at Pseud. 311 ilico uixit amator, ubi . . . supplicat ‘the life of the lover is over when he has to beg’; uixit here is a good example of a logical perfect, its completion occurring in the | present moment.15—We shall see later how the perfect acquires a genuinely perfect use also in subordinate clauses.

Alongside all this, of course, the perfect very frequently serves to establish or simply narrate past actions and events which have no immediate connection with the present. The perfect is the real narrative tense in Latin, and so corresponds not only, as Priscian represents it, to the Greek aorist but also to the Greek imperfect in its narrative function (I, 183 above).17 If you ask how the perfect

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13 The form odiuit is app. attributed to Marc Antony by Cicero, Phil. 13. 42. Forms of a 4th-conjugation verb odio, odire are attested also in an inscription (CIL i. 2541) and several times in the Old Latin Bible, which may antedate Tertullian (AD c.160–c.240), although in both the manuscripts often disagree over the form in a given passage (cf. ThLL, s.v. ‘odī’, 454, 62 ff.); note e.g. that odies ‘thou shalt hate’ in Against Marcion 4. 35. 2 is in a quotation from the Old Testament.

14 So, e.g., by Draeger (1878–81: c.g. I, 253, 257).

15 ‘This pf. of ‘live’ (in the pl., uixerunt) is what Cicero must have used in reporting the execution of the Catilinarian conspirators (though Plutarch, Cic. 22. 4 Flacelière & Chambry, renders it with an aorist, ἐξετασάτω). An even better Vergilian example is Aen. 7. 412–13 et nunc magnum manet Ardea nomen, sed fortuna fuit ‘the name of Ardea still remains great, though its fortune is no more / belongs to the past’.

16 Another reference to unrealized plans for the third series of lectures.

17 Schlicher (1931: 56–9) contrasts the narrative perfect with the historical present. Pinkster (1993a: 237–9) distinguishes the narrative imperfect and the narrative perfect in terms of their functions as ‘background’ and ‘foreground’ tenses, respectively (cf. Pinkster 1983: 300–8).
comes to have, alongside its first function (corresponding to the Greek perfect), this second, narrative, function (which is especially striking in perfect passive forms in -

\textit{tus est}\textsuperscript{18}), there are two things to say. In the first place, a tendency to develop a narrative function is intrinsic to the nature of the original perfect (on this development in Greek, see I, 170 above). In Modern French, the periphrastic perfect (\textit{j'ai fait}, etc., the \textit{passé composé}) functions also as a narrative tense. The same goes, so PASQUALI tells me, for north Italian, and similarly in some dialects of German you say \textit{ich habe getan} for \textit{ich tat}; and this \textit{tat} is itself an original perfect form that has become a preterite (see I, 190 below).\textsuperscript{19} The speaker is always inclined to relate something that belongs to the past to his own present time, and so to use a form that presupposes this relation. In the Latin perfect there is the additional factor that some perfect forms really originated in the aorist, perfect endings having been added to an aorist stem. So, for example, Latin \textit{dixi} (\textit{said, have said}) is the same as Greek \textit{édeixα} (\textit{showed}) with a perfect ending, and Latin \textit{clepsι} (\textit{stole, have stolen}) is the same as Greek \textit{éklefpsια}. The same holds essentially for Lat. \textit{fecti} and Gk \textit{édhikα}.\textsuperscript{20} We can say that, once the original perfect forms had assumed aorist meaning, in the manner described, the surviving aorist forms were assimilated to the other perfect forms and used not only in their original sense but also with purely perfect meaning.\textsuperscript{21}

In the most recent phase of the history of Latin, as represented in the modern Romance languages, only the more recent use of the perfect survives, the Latin perfect active forms having become semantically pure aorists. The French \textit{passé défini} (preterite, or past historic), for instance, simply continues this Latin perfect.\textsuperscript{22} To express a true perfect meaning, however, the familiar periphrastic

\textsuperscript{18} W. means because the auxiliary verb (\textit{est}) makes these look like present forms.

\textsuperscript{19} The original reduplication in the preterite stem of \textit{tun} (OHG \textit{tuon}) is seen clearly in the Runic pl. 3 \textit{dedun} ‘they did or made’ (from about AD 600) and OHG sg. 1 and 3 \textit{tēta}; cf. Braune & Reiffenstein §385, Paul et al. (1998: §279 & n. 2). The German perfect (\textit{ich habe getan, etc.}) is favoured over the preterite (\textit{ich tat, etc.}) esp. in southern Germany (as far north as Frankfurt am Main, according to Hammer & Durrell 1991: 283). On Italian, see Renzi & Salvi II, §1.2.3; on French, Benveniste (1966: 244), for whom the \textit{passe composé} is the tense of autobiography (cf. Fleischman 1989: 23), and Grevisse §852.

\textsuperscript{20} Note also, of course, that the Latin ‘aorist’ stem lacks the augment. The original endings in question are pf. sg. 1 *-a(i) (giving Lat. -\textit{i}, Gk -\textit{a} in e.g. \textit{oída}) and aor. sg. 1 *-\textit{m} (giving Gk -\textit{a} in \textit{édeixα}, Lat. -\textit{m} in impf. -\textit{bam}, plupf. -\textit{ram}, etc.). For ‘show’ and ‘steal’ we reconstruct IE *-deïks-\textit{m} and *-kleïps-\textit{m}, and for ‘do, make’, a root aorist *-dêh-\textit{m} (of which the \textit{k}-extension in Greek and Italic remains unexplained); see LIV, s.vv. ‘*dheh-\textit{h-}, ‘*dheh-\textit{k-}’.

\textsuperscript{21} On the detailed (pre-)history of the Italic and Latin perfect, the standard point of departure is now Meiser (2003), on which see the review article (in English) by Schrijver (2006). The essence of Meiser’s thesis concerning the Latin and Italian perfect is that the merger of the IE perfect and aorist occurred \textit{after} the Proto-Italic period—\textit{in} Proto-Italic they were still distinct categories—it was a gradual merger and consequently individual Italic languages made different choices between the available inherited perfect and aorist forms for the new single category ‘perfect’.

\textsuperscript{22} Furthermore, the \textit{passé défini} (or \textit{passé simple}) as a narrative past tense is now practically confined to the written language, and even there it is being increasingly replaced by the periphrastic perfect (cf. above), although Grevisse §852 notes that the preterite survives in some southern French dialects.
combinations are formed with the verb *habere* (‘to have’) and its reflexes—although these, too, | as we have just seen, are liable to develop narrative function. It is very striking that the same periphrasis with ‘to have’ is found also both in Germanic and in modern Greek, where the ancient Greek perfect has been lost and replaced exclusively with periphrastic ἔχω + participle.23

23 So, e.g. the ancient pf. act. γέγραψε (‘has written’) has been replaced by ἔχει γράψει (or ἔχει γράμμένο), the ancient pf. (mid./)pass. γέγραπται (‘has been/is written’) by εἶναι γραμμένο (or ἔχει γραφεῖ); see Holton et al. (1997: 229–30, 233–4, 236–7). On the Germanic periphrastic perfect, see I, 190–1 below. On the ‘past simple’ and the ‘present perfect’ in Romance, see Harris (1982), and on the development of the auxiliaries *habere* and *esse* in Romance, Vincent (1982). Note the important article by Allen (1964), with references to articles by Benveniste and Vendryes, illustrating the general observation (1964: 337) that ‘the similarity between perfect and “possessive” expressions is not confined to cases involving an auxiliary *to have*.'
Lecture I, 33

The Latin imperfect.¹ The usual equation of the so-called imperfect of Latin with the so-called Greek imperfect goes back to the ancient grammarians, who use the same name for both forms (cf. I, 183 above, on Pliny’s rendering of Gk ἠπολέων with Lat. faciebat). In reality the two are similar at most, and the understanding and proper evaluation of the Greek imperfect have been greatly hindered by its assessment in Latin terms. Some uses of the Greek imperfect correspond to the general use of the Latin imperfect, but the converse does not hold. The use of the Latin imperfect is palpably more constrained. Like the Greek, it denotes an incomplete action, one denoted more with regard to its duration, but unlike the Greek it is not generally used for true narrative. In contrast with an event or action in the past, which is expressed with the perfect, the imperfect represents a state, a preparation, an attempt (inchoative), sometimes also repeated action. It should be noted, however, that in Old Latin (see Bennett 1910: 32–5) there are isolated imperfects which are reminiscent of the Greek imperfect: aiebam or negabam, for example, are often used of a single past act of saying.² And Nepos sometimes still says proueniebant where Cicero would have said prouenerunt.³

If we ask why the imperfects of Latin and Greek differ in the ways described, we must remember that formally they do not correspond at all. As the element -bam shows, there is something else lurking in the Latin forms, apparently some sort of auxiliary verb, so that the Latin imperfect is in effect a periphrastic formation. Most scholars see in -bam a form of the same verb that we have in fui, and that subtle Latinist Franz Skutsch (1901; cf. 1903, 1912a) derives the part before the -bam from a nominative participle, with loss of its final element, e.g. ferē- in ferē-bam from ferēns, so that ferēbam was originally in full ferēns eram (-bam being a synonym of eram, with b for f in the verbal stem fu-). This explanation is

¹ On the imperfect in Latin, see Pinkster (1983: 300–8) and (1990a: 227–9, 237–9), Mellet (1988), and the earlier studies of Wheeler (1903) and (1906). On its development into Romance, see Posner (1961).
² On imperfects of the type aiebam, etc. in particular, see Mellet (1987).
³ I am so far unable to document this; there is no such remark in Lupus’s useful little book on the language of Nepos (1876: 133), nor in KS or Hofmann & Szantyr, and moreover so many of the imperfects in Nepos are truly of repeated, habitual action in the past; W. may have intended the Elder Seneca or Suetonius (cf. Hofmann & Szantyr 317).
wrong, although quite appealing semantically. Incidentally, the imperfect in *-bam is an innovation not of Latin, but of Italic; we find similar forms in Oscan.\textsuperscript{4}—The only imperfect without *-bam is that of esse ‘to be’; but eram, too, has an additional element (-ā-) compared with the corresponding forms in Greek.

The pluperfect represents the preterite of the perfect stem,\textsuperscript{5} and accordingly has two main functions, in the first place that of an imperfect to the ‘logical perfect’ (e.g. in ōderam, memineram, nōueram, pertinueram or incēnus eram). It is also, however, a simple preterite to the perfect used to denote past time—a ‘plu-aorist’ (‘Plusquamaorist’), as it has been called!\textsuperscript{6} In this way Latin satisfied a need that Greek did not feel so keenly, namely to express clearly the relation between different stages of time.

In addition, later Latin shows traces of an odd shift of meaning, whereby the pluperfect turns into a simple past tense. This is foreshadowed in isolated instances in early Latin, but it is chiefly in the continuators of Caesar (e.g. Bell. Afr. 88. 3) and in other ‘semi-classical’ authors of the classical period that we find fueram for eram (‘was’) and habueram for habebam (‘had’)—very good on this is BLASEʼs history of the pluperfect in Latin (1894: ch. 1, summarized at 108–9),\textsuperscript{7} cf. I, 186 above on an analogous development in Greek.

\textsuperscript{4} In fact, only one such form, namely Osc. fufans ‘they were’, an impf. or a plupf., on the Cippus Abellanus (A, 10) = Cm i in Rix (2002); see Buck (1928: 169 §220); Untermann (2000: s.v. ‘ezum’). It is quite right that the same Indo-European sound, *bh, here in the root *bhū ‘be’, regularly shows up in Oscan as *f in all positions, but in Latin as *f at the start of a word, as b in the middle of a word. All the other issues touched on here are still uncertain and contentious, but the standard view remains in outline if not in detail essentially that sketched by W. here: namely, that we have in Italic a past-tense marker -ā- (in er-ā-s, -b-ā-s, plupf. -er-ā-s, etc.), and that the Latin imperfect is in origin a periphrastic formation comprising a nominal form + the -ā- past-tense form of the verb ‘to be’. Meiser (1998: 197–9 §129) and (2003: 42, 59, 201) makes Osc. fufans the starting point for the Latin and Italic imperfect, which is still seen as periphrastic in origin; cf. Schrijver (2006). In the stem of the Latin imperfect, in place of Skutsch’s participle, Jasanoff sees (1978: 123–4)—as did Brugmann, Grdr. II.2 §§886, 899, and presumably W. here—the development of an instrumental singular case-form (so that *fērē bās meant lit. ‘you were with carrying’). An important element in the debate (touched on by W. below, I, 244) is the question whether the Italic past-tense marker -ā- (with which we may wish to compare the past-tense markers -ā- in Balto-Slavic and Tocharian) is in origin the same as the modal markers -ā- in Celtic and Tocharian and in Lat. subjunctives such as ng-ā-s, etc.—and, if so, how. Szemerényi gives (1996: 261–3) an excellent outline history of the question; cf. Sihler (1995: 354–5, 596).

\textsuperscript{5} In Pinkster’s terms (1990a: 232–3), the pluperfect expresses anteriority (the meaning of the perfect stem) with respect to a moment in the past (the preterite).

\textsuperscript{6} W. himself uses the term, without inverted commas, in an early review (1883b). I have sought it in vain in Osthoff (1884).

\textsuperscript{7} Cf. Blase (1903), frequently referred to by W. and justly endorsed by Pinkster (1990a: 242) as still the best survey of the uses of the tenses in Latin (here, pp. 210 ff.). On the use of the plupf. for the pf., cf. Hofmann & Szantyr 320–3 §179, with details and bibliography, mentioning esp. Vitruvius (certainly one of W.ʼs “semi-classical” authors). On Löflstedtʼs account (1911: 153–6), however, the use is neither isolated in early Latin (19 examples in Plautus, e.g. Capt. 17; see Lindsay 1907: 62–3; Bennett 1910: 50–2) nor confined to writers of sub-literary Latin (note e.g. Cic. Verr. 4. 48, Or. 101, Lentulus in Cic. Fam. 12. 15. *habueramus ‘we had’, Caes. Gal. 2. 6. 4.), but characterized most interestingly by occurring in relative clauses and other sorts of parenthetical remarks and by therefore affecting a restricted range of verbs, notably dicēram ‘said’, and synonyms, and fueram ‘was’. The synthetic pluperfect indicative hardly survives in Romance.
THE GERMANIC PRETERITE

In its oldest known form, viz. Gothic, Germanic has just one preterite, which Wulfila uses to translate the Greek imperfect, aorist, and perfect alike (and the pluperfect, too: I, 152 above). In the so-called ‘strong’ verbs, this preterite continues the old perfect, so that the perfect in Proto-Germanic has undergone an extension of meaning similar to that of its Latin counterpart, with the notable difference that in Germanic it encroached on the imperfect as well as the aorist. It is not yet clear whether the preterite of the so-called ‘weak’ verbs also originates entirely in the Indo-European perfect, or whether it is based on old true preterites (or at least contains isolated examples of such). In any case, it is fully synonymous with the preterite of the strong verbs, and serves to express any kind of past action. If, therefore, it was in origin wholly or partly a preterite, it has extended its properly preterital meaning to include that of the perfect.8

Soon, however, the need was felt for a proper perfect. All living Germanic languages have a periphrastic perfect analogous to that of the Romance languages and modern Greek mentioned above, formed in part with sein (‘to be’), in part with haben (‘to have’); I, 191 on the history and meaning of these periphrastic forms, and the functional distinction between periphrasis with sein and that with haben, especially important is Paul (1905). I draw attention to English in particular, as here the boundaries between the simple preterite and the periphrastic formation are not drawn quite as they are in German. In English the original meaning of the periphrastic forms has been strictly preserved, their use being restricted to past actions whose completion or effect belongs in the past.9 In German, on the other hand, the periphrastic form can be used more widely, in particular if a past action is simply to be presented as important and significant. Not only is this common in conversation, it occurs also in the most perfect literary writers. Wilmanns (III, 189) adduces a particularly nice example, in the last two sentences of Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werther (1774): Handwerker trugen ihn. Kein Geistlicher hat ihn begleitet (‘Workmen carried him. No priest accompanied him.’). Here are two actions, one (positive) of carrying, one (negative) of accompanying, which are entirely parallel and belong to the same past time, but are in different tense forms. The fact that he was not accompanied is emphasized, although rhythmical factors, too, certainly played a part.

It was noted above (I, 188) that in some German dialects these periphrastic formations eventually replaced the preterite and now serve as general-purpose

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8 On the Germanic and Gothic preterite, cf. Jasanoﬀ (2004: 901–3), who notes (903) that the origin of the weak preterite remains ‘the most widely discussed morphological problem in Germanic’.
9 For an excellent account of the origins and development of the construction in English, see Denison (1993: ch. 12); cf. Traugott (1992: 180–3).
preterite. Furthermore, these periphrastic formations in Germanic, as in the Romance languages, also have their own preterital forms corresponding in part to the Latin pluperfect.\footnote{That is, with the past forms of the auxiliary ‘have’ or ‘be’.
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Nevertheless, one fragment of the old perfect proper survives to the present day in the Germanic languages: the so-called ‘praeterito-present’ verbs.\footnote{That is, verbs which are strong preterites in form but present in meaning. For the most part, they form new, weak preterites. There are thirteen of them in Gothic, incl. \textit{wait} ‘I know’ and \textit{skal} ‘I ought’.}

The best-known and clearest example is \textit{ich weiss} (‘I know’), which corresponds exactly to Gk \textit{οἰδα} (earlier \textit{φοίδα}) (‘I know’), and, like the Greek, really means ‘I have attained to a state of knowing through a past action of seeing’ (Gk \textit{εἰδεῖν}, Lat. \textit{niderē}; cf. I, 169 above). Exactly the same applies to NHG \textit{soll}, \textit{mag}, \textit{kann}, \textit{darf}, and \textit{muss} (‘ought’, ‘do gladly’, ‘can’, ‘be allowed’ and ‘must’). Not all of their etymologies are clear, but they certainly belong with \textit{weiss}: \textit{ich soll}, for example, really means ‘I have done wrong, I owe’, and from here arises the notion of ‘ought’ proper to the verb. Here, then, we find genuinely perfect meaning, in that a state is denoted that has arisen through an action expressed by means of the same verbal root. | 

\textbf{I, 192 THE FUTURE}

(On the future, see especially, on Greek, Magnien (1912); on Latin, Sjögren (1906); on German, Wunderlich (1924–5: I, 169–86).\footnote{For a recent cross-linguistic study of future tenses, see Ultan (1978), and with special reference to Latin and Romance, Fleischman (1982).}) We have to consider two questions here. First, what sorts of verb forms are available for reference to the future? Secondly, what is the meaning of the future forms?

On the first question, I would first recall what I observed with reference to the present (I, 158–9 above), that many speech communities evidently feel no need to distinguish future and present actions. This is true especially of the Germanic languages, where from the beginning of our record to the present day any present form can be used with future reference, because the context always gives sufficient clue to the reference to the future. Already in the Gothic Bible translation, presents are very frequently used to render futures in the Greek original. For instance, at Romans 14: 4 we have in the Greek first \textit{στηθεῖεν} ‘he stands’ (pres.\footnote{This is the late pres. \textit{στηθεῖεν}, attested first in the Septuagint, formed to the classical pf. \textit{ἐστήκα}} and then \textit{σταθήσεται} ‘he will be stood up, be holden up’ (fut. pass.), but the Gothic text has both times \textit{standiþ}, the present of ‘to stand’, notwithstanding the difference of tense in the original.

\textit{10} That is, with the past forms of the auxiliary ‘have’ or ‘be’.

\textit{11} That is, verbs which are strong preterites in form but present in meaning. For the most part, they form new, weak preterites. There are thirteen of them in Gothic, incl. \textit{wait} ‘I know’ and \textit{skal} ‘I ought’.

\textit{12} For a recent cross-linguistic study of future tenses, see Ultan (1978), and with special reference to Latin and Romance, Fleischman (1982).
In Greek, however, this use of the present with future reference is not common (except under very specific conditions, mentioned earlier, I, 159–62 above). In general, it is not common in Classical Latin either, although Stögren (1906: 5–71) adduces quite a few instances from pre-classical Latin. But otherwise, the languages that concern us here, far from offering a uniform set of forms for referring to the future, present us with a great diversity. Greek is the most archaic, in that it alone among our three groups has preserved the old (originally Indo-European) future stem, formed with -s(y)-, and preserved also in Indic, Iranian, and Lithuanian. This stem made originally an indicative and a participle, and Greek added an infinitive and an optative. Two facts about this future optative have become only gradually apparent. First, the English critic Richard Dawes (referred to earlier, I, 25–6 above) showed in his Miscellanea critica (1745: v, 103), so rich in acute observations, that the future optative lacks both the function of ‘wishing’ and the ability to combine with the particle ἃν and express possibility. Secondly, it was observed that the | future optative is not to be found in the earliest Greek. Neither Homer nor Hesiod attests a secure example. Its oldest witnesses are Pindar (Pyth. 9. 116 σχύσω) and Aeschylus (Pers. 369 φευγόλατρο), so that it is not attested until the fifth century, and then, as later, (as Dawes observed) only as a substitute for the indicative in dependent clauses. The optatives of the present and the aorist provided the model for the new form.

Latin and Germanic have not preserved this old future stem. That it was lost is remarkable in itself. Plainly, the need for a specific future form cannot have been felt at certain periods in the lives of the respective languages, and the old formation consequently fell into obsolescence. But the life of a language is a struggle, a constant interplay, between conflicting tendencies, and the wish for a form to express the future made itself felt again. We can distinguish several main types of attempt to achieve new ways of expressing the future.

First, we should mention the present again, in that (as we saw earlier, I, 158 ff.) the present of certain verbs in virtue of their meaning was liable to be used as a

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14 Strictly, W.’s ‘-sy-’ (I have added the parentheses) conflates the s(τι)-future of Greek, Latin and Celtic with the sy(τι)-future of Indo-Iranian and Baltic; on the much-debated direct comparison of Baltic (Lithuanian diu-si-u, etc.) with Indo-Iranian (Skt dā-syāmi, etc.), see Szemerényi (1996: 286) with further references. The reconstruction of a future as such for Indo-European is controversial. Compare the accounts of e.g. Rix (1976: §§204–5) and Sihler (1995: §§417, 499), who suppose that future meaning was conveyed by the use of other forms (notably present, desiderative, subjunctive), some of which were later and independently grammaticized as future markers in many of the daughter languages, with that of Szemerényi (1996: 285–8), who is prepared to recognize an IE future form proper. Cf. n. 18 in this lecture.

15 Note that Keith (1912) urges a reconsideration of the age and status of the fut. opt., adducing passages (e.g. Thuc. 5. 94, Plato, Rep. 613d3, Arist. Poet. 1456b7–8 [19. 3]) where it occurs as the sole or a variant reading outside indirect speech or the like (and cf. Schwyzer & Debrunner 337).
future, and so there are forms which are morphologically present but exclusively future from a semantic point of view.

Secondly, certain **modal forms** are used in the role of futures. Wulfila often uses an optative to render a future in the Greek original; this is comparable with the Greek use, especially in archaic Greek, of the optative with ἔχω as an important means of referring to the future. But the forms of the Indo-European subjunctive were especially suited to this function, because they conveyed expectation. Homer often uses the subjunctive as a future, and from this use, which was originally available for any verb, certain forms emerged which were then felt to be true futures. (See I, 159–60 above, on Gk ἔδομαι (‘I shall eat’), etc.; ἐσται (‘will be’), too, has probably been remade from an old subjunctive *ἐσται.16) Latin achieved in this way a replacement for the old lost future: ερῶ (‘I shall be’: < *esô), for example, is formally identical with Gk sg. 3 subjv. ἐω, with contraction ὄ, and is simply an old subjunctive.17 To this are added the futures in -αθο-, -εθο-, -ιθο-. Moreover, forms such as faxo-, which occur especially in Old Latin, probably correspond to a Greek aorist subjunctive, and the futures of the third and fourth conjugations (type audiēs, ueniēs, except in sg. 1 audiam, ueniam) to a Greek present subjunctive, the long ἐ of Lat. legētis being the same as that of Gk λέγητε (cf. I, 198–9 below).18

Semantically related to the use of modal forms for future actions is the third type, the ubiquitous | periphrastic formations. What is striking about these is, first, the great variety of forms, and, secondly, the frequent agreements between separate languages. (For material from Late Latin, see THIELMANN 1885.19)

Let me begin with an example from Gothic. Luke 6: 25 πενθήσετε καὶ κλαύσετε ‘you shall mourn and weep’ is translated by Wulfila as gaunon jah gretan duginniþ (lit.) ‘you begin to mourn and weep’, with the future reference being conveyed by the verb ‘to begin’. You can regard something in the future as having its beginnings in the present. What we find here and elsewhere in Gothic occurs

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16 Orig. sg. 3 subjv. (with middle endings, NB) *es-e-tai > (with Greek loss of *s between vowels) *e-etai > (by contraction of vowels in hiatus) *e-tai (*e-tai).
17 Identical also with the first element of the Vedic sg. 1 subjv. asta-ni.
18 The Latin 3rd- and 4th-conj. futures of the type legētis, audiētis certainly continue the IE thematic subjunctive, the long ἐ in Greek, ἐθο arising from contraction of the short-vowel subjunctive marker ἐθ with the short thematic vowel ἐθ (in Latin, long ἐ is generalized through the paradigm, even, in Old Latin, to the sg. 1, where in the classical language sg. 1 subjv. -am replaces earlier -e(m); cf. p. 255 n. 13 below). The Latin future in -bo (which is found also in Faliscan carefo ‘I shall lack’) is generally explained as a periphrastic formation similar to the imperfect in -bam, the -bo, -bis element continuing a short-vowel subjunctive of (the aorist of) *-bhū- ‘be’ (*-bhū-e-su > -bis). The origin of the faxo type is less clear, but, whether one calls the stem ‘aorist’ or ‘desiderative’ or whatever, again it is natural and easy to see in a Latin future form the reflex of an old subjunctive in *e-si, *e-ti (> -si, -ti). Similarly, the Latin future perfect (the future of the perfectum) is an old subjunctive.
19 On the development of all the principal future-tense auxiliaries in Latin (‘wish’, ‘must’, ‘can’, ‘have’, ‘go’), see now Pinkster (1985a).
occasionally in the Slavic languages, and Late Latin writers sometimes use *incipere* (‘begin’) in the same way.

A second type of periphrasis is firmly established in Latin in the future infinitive passive in -*tum iri* (‘to be about to be . . . ed’). Its origin has to be imagined more or less as follows. The combination of *eo* (‘I go’) with the supine is common throughout Latin, e.g. in *hoc castellum captum eunt* ‘they are going with the purpose of capturing this fort’, and in the passive (impersonal, cf. I, 149 above) this becomes *hoc castellum captum itur* ‘it is gone/one goes with the purpose of capturing this fort’. Just like the periphrases with ‘to begin’, this could be understood as a future: ‘it is foreseen that this fort will be captured’, and this construction was then used for the infinitive, which had no other way of marking the future in the passive.

French and Italian also use the verb ‘to go’ in certain forms related to the future, and in some Romance dialects, such as Swiss Rhaeto-Romance and Piedmontese, periphrases with verbs of coming and going have become the normal forms of the future. (On a somewhat related phenomenon in modern Greek, see *Thumb* (1910: §193.2 n.).

Then there is the verb ‘to become’ (the German future auxiliary *werden*), on which we should note that Gothic *wairþan* (cognate with *werden*) functions as the future of *wisan* ‘to be’ (I, 161 above). In German, the verb ‘to become’ has been dominant in the formation of the future since the end of the Middle High German period; Gothic shows a hint of the same in the combination of *wairþan*

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20 Vaillant (1948: §245) and Huntley (1993: 154) note the rare use of the verbs ‘begin’, ‘have’, and ‘wish’ as auxiliaries in the formation of periphrastic futures in Old Church Slavonic. Cf. Entwistle and Morison (1949: 206) ‘with imperfective verbs Common Slavonic allowed a considerable range of auxiliaries expressing willing, necessity, motion, beginning, etc.’.

21 For *incipio + infin. = fut.*, cf. perhaps already Propertius 3. 4. 15 *spectare . . . incipiam* ‘I shall watch’. For further examples and bibliography, see Thielmann (1885: 85–7), Löfstedt (1911: 210–11) and, on *possum, uolo, debeo* and *habeo* as well as *incipio*, Hofmann & Szantyr 313–15.

22 Debate has continued on the origin of the future infinitive passive. A recent alternative account is that of Coleman (1989), who supposes simply the formal passive-marking of ambiguous complements of the type *seruum redditum i¯re* ‘that the slave is on the way to returning it /C24 to being returned’ in order to convey unambiguously the second meaning (the supine *redditum* being neutral as to voice).

23 With ‘Swiss Rhaeto-Romance’ I have rendered W.’s ‘Churwälisch’, that is the Romance dialect(s) spoken around Chur in the canton Graubünden/Grisons. I am aware that my term is broader than W.’s (which probably refers to the dialects today called Sutselvan and Surmeiran), but his point about the formation of the future is more generally applicable. On Rhaeto-Romance dialects, see Haiman (1988) with bibliography, and note his observation (p. 363) that ‘an analytic future in (a reflex of) *venire AD + infinitive* is found throughout Rhaeto-Romance’. On Romance futures based on ‘to go’ + infin. and the differences between them and the simple future, see Fleischman (1982: 78–102); note also Champion (1978) and, for a cross-linguistic study of verbs of coming and going (‘ventive’ and ‘itive’, or ‘andative’!) in the formation of futures, see Ricca (1993: esp. 34–7), and cf. Fleishman (1993). In Piedmontese, on the other hand, (that is, the language of Piedmont in NW Italy (capital Turin), one of the Gallo-Italian dialects, and lying both geographically and linguistically between Italian and French), the simple future is based on infinitive + *habere* and is synthetic, while the alternative, periphrastic type uses the auxiliary ‘must’ or ‘have to’; see e.g. Brero & Bertodatti (1988: 90–5), Parry (1997: 242).

24 This concerns the optional use of *πά* (fossilized sg. 3 form of *πάω* ‘I go’) in the construction *πά + subjunctive* for expressing a wish in the 1st person.
with the participle, e.g. at John 16: 20 saurgandans wairþiþ for Gk λυπηθεσσεθε ‘you (pl.) shall be sorrowful’.—The same is to be found in many Slavic languages and in Old Prussian.  

A fourth and a fifth type of periphrasis imply a stronger emotional involvement by combining the verbs ‘ought’ and ‘wish’ plus the infinitive in a future sense. The idea here is that what you ought to do, or what you wish for, is realized in the future. The development was favoured by the tendency in modern languages, in German at least, more than in the classical languages, to give linguistic expression to the will of the speaker or the agent, if it plays a part in a future action. Typical is a passage such as Matthew 12: 18–19 θῆσω τὸ πνεύμα μον ἐπ’ αὐτῶν καὶ κρίσαν τοῖς ἐθνεάν ἀπαγγελεί. οὐκ ἔρισεν οὐδὲ κρανγάσει οὐδὲ ἀκούσει τις ἐν ταῖς πλατείαις τῆν φωνήν αὑτοῦ (‘I will put my spirit upon him, and he shall shew [lit. announce] judgement to the Gentiles. He shall not strive nor cry; neither shall any man hear his voice in the streets’). Here Latin retains all the futures of the original: ponam (‘put’), nuntiabit (‘announce’), contendet (‘strive’), clamabit (‘cry’), audiet (‘hear’). Luther, however, translates the first two with the verbs ‘wish’ and ‘ought’, because they involve things which properly belong to the plan of God: ich will meinen Geist auf ihn legen, und er soll den Heiden das Gericht verkünden; only the last two does he translate with the normal tense form: er wird nicht zanken noch schreien, und seine Stimme wird man nicht hören auf den Gassen: the absence of strife, etc. is not wished for, merely expected.

We find this use of ‘wish’ sporadically in Greek. WILAMOWITZ (1908: 343 n. 1–1970: 146 n. 28) showed that Pindar is probably using ἔθελεν with the infinitive in a simple future sense at Nemean 7. 90–1 κ’ ἔθελοι ναίεν, and VON DER MüHL gives the same account of Hesiod, Works 38–9 βασιλῆς δωροφάγους, οἱ τήνδε δίκαιον ἔθελον δικάσαι (‘rulers living on gifts, who will (?) make this their judgement’). Since this meaning was not understood, the text was usually emended at this point.  

On the same phenomenon in colloquial French, see LE FOYER (1894–6). There are remarkable instances already in later Latin. The African poet Flavius Cresconius Corippus (6th c. ad) has the expression

\[25\] In Slavic and Baltic, the common auxiliary that W. refers to is the verb ‘to be’ (rather than ‘become’), which is standard in the formation of at least the imperfective future in South (c.g. Slovene), West (c.g. Slovak, Polish), and East (c.g. Belorussian, Ukrainian) Slavic; see Comrie & Corbett (1993: Index, s.v. ‘future tense’), and on Slovene Herrity (2000: §6.25). On the same phenomenon in Lithuanian, see Senn (1966: §781).

\[26\] In fact, well before Wilamowitz, Fennell (1883: ad loc.) had suggested that ἔθελοι here was equivalent to μελλοι; cf. Carey (1981: 174); Slater (1969: s.v. ‘ἔθελοι’) registers this use for Olympian 7. 20, but not for Nemean 7. 90.

\[27\] West (1978a: ad loc.) rejects this interpretation of ἔθελοι, defends the text, and translates ‘who see fit to make . . . ’.

\[28\] Le Foyer reports futures such as il ne veut pas pleuvoir ‘it will not rain’ for the French départements of Doubs and Jura and the Swiss canton of Vaud; Grevisse 1238 §791(o) ascribes the future use of the ‘semi-auxiliaire’ vouloir to the colloquial language of many regions, notably the north-east and French-speaking Belgium.
Johannis' \(^{29}\) 6. 88–9 (Maurae) matribus Afris servire vult 'Moorish women' will serve African mothers', where the basic meaning of wishing has clearly been eliminated. There are examples in German, too, e.g. in was . . . wil aus dem Kindlin werden, Luther's translation of Luke \(1: 66\) τι ἄρα τὸ παιδίον τοῦτο ἐσται (Latin quis . . . puer iste erit 'what manner of child shall this be!'), or in Schiller, Kabale und Liebe (composed 1783), act 5, scene 5 das arme Ding . . . will sich zu Tode weinen ('the poor thing . . . will cry herself to death'). In other languages this usage has become established, as in English and in several Slavic languages. \(^{30}\) (Compare also the periphrasis with mono, properly 'have in mind, mean, intend', in Old Icelandic. \(^{31}\) ) But I would particularly draw your attention to modern Greek, which has lost the old future and uses instead new formations such as θὰ δένω 'I shall bind'. It can be shown, partly thanks to the dialects and partly through the earliest stages of modern Greek, that this combination of θὰ with the subjunctive goes back to θέλω ἵνα, and this combination, for its part, is explained by the fact that in later Greek the infinitive is by and large replaced with subjunctive clauses introduced by ἵνα. The use of the verb 'to wish' in the formation of the future is further advanced here \(\text{I. 196}\) than in English, in that modern Greek θὰ is confined to this future function. On the future formed with expressions for 'wish' in the languages of the Balkans, see LAMBERTZ (1914/15: 70–2 & n. 2). \(^{32}\)

English is not alone in using 'I shall' (properly 'I ought, I am in debt') as a means of expressing the future. We may compare in Gothic for example the passage quoted above for the future use of 'will' in the German Bible, Luke 1: 66 hwā skuli þata barn wisan (τι ἄρα τὸ παιδίον τοῦτο ἐσται). Most other Germanic languages also have parallels. \(^{33}\) From later Latin THIELMANN (1885: 64–71) adduces debeo facere for faciam. \(^{34}\) In an Old High German translation of the Psalms, habebitis is translated with muozzint habin. WUNDERLICH assumes (1924–5: I, 180 in the 2nd cdn) that this usage is based on a fatalistic belief in predetermination.

\(^{29}\) An historical epic poem in eight books, also known as On the Libyan Wars, about the conquest of the Mauri (AD 546–8) by Justinian’s general Johannes; note the cdn by J. Diggle and F. R. Goodyear (Cambridge 1970).

\(^{30}\) Especially in South Slavic (Bulgarian, Macedonian, Serbo-Croat) but also in the West Slavic language Polabian: see Comrie & Corbett (1993: 211, 288, 330–1, 815 and Index, s.v. 'future tense').

\(^{31}\) Cf. Heusler (1921: §413), noting that in the 1st person skolo 'shall' is also used; cf I, 198 below.

\(^{32}\) On the complex and fascinating developments in Greek, see Horrocks (1997a: passim, esp. 76–7, 166–8, 229–32), and Holton (1993). The modern colloquial Greek future, e.g. θὰ γράφω 'I shall write' (like that of Albanian, Bulgarian, Macedonian, Serbian and Romanian—the other members of the Balkan Sprachbund to which W. here alludes; cf. I. 275–6 below) represents the grammaticization of a new, periphrastic desiderative structure of the form I want to . . . (cf. NE I will . . . ; NGk θὰ is from δέλω ἵνα lit. 'I want, that . . .').

\(^{33}\) So, e.g., zullen in Dutch or skola in Swedish; see König & van der Auwera (1994: Index, s.v. 'future').

\(^{34}\) The reflex of debo + infin. survives (alongside babeo + infin.) as a regular exponent of futurity in Sardinian (cf. Jones 1988: 334).
Lecture I, 34

Much more frequent is the periphrasis involving the verb ‘to have’. Already in the very earliest days of modern linguistics, in the year 1492, a Spanish scholar, Elio Antonio de Nebrija, in his Lexicon latino-hispanicum put forward the view that the Spanish future is based on a combination of the infinitive with the verb habere. 1 Eighty years later the Italian scholar Ludovico Castelvetro (c. 1505–71) taught the same for the Italian future, 2 and it was gradually recognized that this explanation is true for the Romance future in general, so that e.g. French ferai derives from Latin facere habeo. And now careful study of the later development of Latin has shown that the roots of this Romance formation are to be found in the colloquial language of the imperial period. Striking instances are to be found there already in large numbers, especially in the Latin of Christian writers, who indeed in general give excellent illustration of a language different from Classical Latin. In the Old Latin translation of Hermas’ Shepherd, we read, for example, 3.9.5 uelle habetis benefacere (‘you will wish to do good’) as a translation of θελήσετε ἀγαθοποιεῖν. Particularly numerous and striking instances are offered by the first great Christian writer, Tertullian. So, for example, Against Marcion 4.40.5ouis ad uictimam adduci habens ‘a sheep which will be led to be sacrificed’. For testimony that this form of expression was available also to pagan authors of colloquial speech habits, we may use the note of Porphyry of Tyre, the third-century commentator on Horace, on Epist. 2.1.17, where he translates the poet’s oriturum (esse) (‘to be about to be born’) with nasci habere. Foreshadowings of this usage are to be found even in Classical Latin, thanks to the use of habere in a potential sense. Common already in Cicero are expressions such as habeo dicere

1 I could not find this in the Lexicon, but it is in the Grammatica de la lengua Castellana (ed. González-Llubera, Oxford 1926), p. 100, the first grammar of a national language. Nebrija (or Lebrixa, or Nebris-sensis, 1444–1522) also published the Introductiones Latinae (Salamanca 1481, repr. 1981), the first Latin grammar of note in Spain; see Kukenheim (1932: esp. 191–2), Tavoni (1998: 29, 31, al.).

2 In his Giunta fatta al Ragionamento degli articoli et de’ verbi de messer Pietro Bembo, written between 1549 and 1563; see Kukenheim (1932: 191 and n. 4) and Tavoni (1998: 47–9, al.).

3 This ?early-2nd-c. Greek compilation of apocalyptic pronouncements (conveyed by an angel in the form of a shepherd to the author ‘Hermas’) was regarded as canonical by some early Church Fathers incl. Irenaeus and Tertullian. The two surviving Latin translations, which being complete supplement the Greek original, are dated to the late 2nd and 4th/5th cc. respectively; for bibliography see HLL IV, §471.7.
'I have the potential | of saying'. The welcome testimony of Gothic, too, is again relevant, as at e.g. 2 Corinth. 11: 12, where Wulfila translates δέποιω, καὶποιήσω (‘what I do and shall do’) with ἐπεὶταυτα ἄνταυτα ἕβα (lit., ‘what I do and have to do’). This periphrasis is known among the Slavic languages, too, for example in Ukrainian, and, lastly, it occurs also in Albanian. As Latin shows, the verb ‘to have’ is suited to expressing the future in virtue of the potential meaning attaching to it. But you would be wrong to expect in consequence that the true verbs of ‘being able’ like to be used in the same way. There appear to be only isolated instances of this sort. You could take in this way, e.g., Caesar, Gallic War 1. 3. 8 totius Galliae sese potiri posse sperant (‘they hope that they will (?) acquire control of the whole of Gaul’). Compare in Old High German Otfrid, Book of the Gospels 3. 6. 17 war mu`gun wir...bróıt giwinnan? for John 6: 5 unde ememus panes? (‘whence shall we buy bread?’). There are yet other means of expressing the future. We should not forget the use of the future participle in -tur us in Latin. The origin of this formation is not clear. It used to be compared, incorrectly, with the striking Sanskrit use of the agent noun as a form of future (i.e. as if you said in Greek e.g. δοτηρε εἰμι (lit. ‘I am a giver’) for δῶσω (‘I shall give’)).—On Late Latin amandus est for amabitur, see below, where a parallel is adduced from a quite different linguistic domain; semantically this expression is reminiscent of the periphrases with Lat. debere or OHG muozzint (‘must’; I, 196 above). And lastly, recall Greek μέλλειν. The original meaning of this verb emerges from its etymology. Festus cites (pp. 300–1 Lindsay), obviously from legal language, Lat. promellere as meaning ‘postpone a trial, delay’, and so the sense ‘delay, hesitate’, which is preserved into Attic, represents the basic meaning of

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4 It is now clear that the new future evolved not from the potential use of habeo + infin. (roughly, ‘I can’, e.g. at Cic. Rosc. 100 habeo etiam dicere ‘I can even say’), but rather from a ‘deontic’ use, i.e. in expressions of obligation or necessity (cf. English have to meaning ‘must’), a use moreover in which the normal Latin sequence auxiliary + infin. was reversed so that habere followed the infin. (as it manifestly does in all its Romance reflexes), presumably for emphasis. This was decisively demonstrated by Adams (1991), principally on the strength of new evidence from the 5th/6th-c. ad grammarian Pompeius (33 instances of habeo + infin.); see Adams (1991) for a critical discussion of alternative views, and further bibliography.

5 On Ukrainian (also known as Ruthenian or Small Russian), see Entwistle and Morison (1949: 282–8, here 286) and Shevelov (1993: 971). On Albanian, W. probably used Meyer (1888: 44 §120); cf. Pipa (1982: 204) (the most recent historical grammar of Albanian, Orel (2000), is devoted to phonology and morphology). Note that it is only the northern (Geg) and central dialects that use kam ‘I have’ + infin.; in the south, a form of the ‘Balkan’ future periphrasis is used, do te‘I wish that’ + subjunctive (cf. n. 32, p. 231 above).

μέλλειν, from which the senses ‘be about to’, ‘intend’ (which we meet from Homer on) have developed, and with them a sense very close to that of the future. Note incidentally that thanks to this word it really was possible to express a future meaning even on a noun stem: recall Sophocles’ μελλόγαμος (Antigone 628), of one about to marry. 7

Summing up on these various paraphrases for the future, one should add that they may be divided also according to whether they represent isolated and occasional efforts or whether they have become fixed and conventional. 8 There is a considerable difference between the manner of, say, Gothic, where (alongside the use of the present indicative and the optative as a future) paraphrases with wairþan, duginnan, haban, and skulan (‘become’, ‘begin’, ‘have’, and ‘owe’) occur side by side, and, on the other hand, of the Romance languages and modern Greek, where out of periphrastic expressions fully fledged new forms have emerged, in which | the original meaning of the auxiliary verb is totally eliminated and the future meaning quite pure. To what extent this is true of the freer periphrases, it is not always easy to say.

What we see unfolding before our eyes in the historical period allows us perhaps to draw inferences about the prehistory of the old future formations. The early Indo-European future preserved in Greek shows an unmistakeable formal kinship with certain desiderative formations, such as Lat. uisere (properly, ‘to wish to see’). 9

Contemporary English and Latin share superficially a striking phenomenon. As you know, English uses in the 1st person a different auxiliary from the 2nd and 3rd persons (I shall, we shall, but you will, he/she/it will, they will). The basis of this seems clear. Formerly, in English, too, usage varied, but in each person the expression which came to dominate for marking the future was that which excludes the free will of the speaker. It is I shall because the idea is to depict a future action which the speaker does not wish to make to appear dependent on his will; conversely, in the same way shall is inappropriate for the 2nd and 3rd

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7 The reading of Antigone 628 is disputed, but cf. 653 μελλονυμφων with the same meaning, and note also Theocritus, 22. 140 μελλογάμος, and Euphorion, 7 Powell (acc. to the scholiast on Apoll. Rhod. Arg. 1. 1063). On the Greek periphrastic futures composed of μέλλω + infin., see Basset (1979) and (also on βούλομαι, (ἐ)θλον, ἐρομαῖ) Schwzyer & Debrunner pp. 291, 293–4. In place of the basic meaning ‘delay, hesitate’ (challenged already well before W.), Szemérenyi proposed (1951) the meaning ‘go’ based on an etymology linking Gk μέλλω with βλάσκω, ἔμιλον ‘I go, I went’; for a critical survey of attempts at an etymology of μέλλω, which is more safely regarded as obscure, see Basset (1979: 13–23). Neither Gk μέλλω nor Lat. promellō is in LIV.

8 In modern linguistic terminology, ‘grammaticized’ or ‘grammaticalized’.

9 This remains the modern view of Lat. uìsē, e.g. in LIV, s.v. ‘χείδ.’. A desiderative formation comprising root + *-*s is widely reconstructed for Indo-European and held to be reflected in a variety of s-desiderative and future formations in the daughter languages. It is certainly the case that a number of Greek futures are formally distinct from s-aorist subjunctives, e.g. Gk τέτεναι < *ten-est-o ‘I shall stretch’ vs ἔτεσαν < *ten-s-πο ‘I stretched’, and contrast fut. πείσομαι ‘I shall suffer’, ἔλλειπομαι ‘I shall go’ with thematic aorists ἐπάθομ, ἔλθομ ‘I suffered’, ‘I went’. See further the literature cited in n. 14, p. 247 above.
person because it would express the will of the speaker. Incidentally, in Old Icelandic the periphrasis of the future with the verb *skal* (corresponding to English *shall*) is similarly restricted to the 1st person.

We appear to have a similar phenomenon in Latin, too. The future of the 3rd and 4th conjugations is formed differently in the sg. 1 from the other forms. *legam, audiam* (‘I shall gather, collect’, ‘I shall hear’) are in origin merely forms of the regular present subjunctive used also as futures. Here, too, then we have a special treatment of the 1st person. But the similarity with English is a very remote one. In the first place, Latin *-am*, in stark contrast with English *I shall*, has originally a voluntative-optative function. And then its use as a future rests on more external factors. We saw that the long *ē* of the Latin future corresponds to the η of the Greek subjunctive, e.g. Lat. *legētis* belonging with Gk λέγητε. As in Gk λέγω : λέγητε, Lat. *legētis* ought strictly to have sg. 1 *legŏ*, a form that shows no obvious future marking, which was identical with the sg. 1 of the present indicative. This led people to cast about for an alternative expression, and they chose the semantically most closely related form, that of the present subjunctive, although it does not exactly match the future meaning. Another attempt to avoid ambiguity was, on the model of the replacement of pl. 1 *legŏmus, | pl. 3 *legont* with *legēmus, legent*, to introduce the long *ē* also in the sg. 1 and to say *legē* (instead of *legam*), but this form, apart from sporadic attempts in Old Latin, did not become established; cf. I, 193 [& n. 18, p. 248] above and SOMMER (1914: §342 with n. 1).

We find this variation in future forms according to the grammatical person again in a completely different language area, in modern Indo-Aryan. This case is of interest in general terms also for dialectology, in that the two-way relationships of an intermediate dialect become apparent. Western Hindi preserves the old Sanskrit future, while in Bengali this has disappeared and an old gerundive is used in its stead, and in eastern Hindi (spoken between western Hindi and Bengali) the two forms are combined, the old future surviving (as in W. Hindi) in the 1st and 2nd persons, the gerundive coming into play (in Bengali fashion) in the 3rd person. What could lie behind this special treatment of the 3rd person?

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10 This pattern is taught by English grammars from the 1620s, and may be traced in texts already in the 16th c.; see Rissanen (1999: 210–1) and on the various stages in the history of the construction the relevant pages in the other volumes of CHEL (Traugott 1992: 195–8, Fischer 1992: 262–5, Denison 1998: 167–8; cf. also Denison 1993: ch. 11, esp. 304).

11 Cf. Heusler (1921: §413).

12 The inherited subjunctive form may survive in deliberative questions of the type *co-ne? ‘am I to go?*, *quid ego? ‘what am I to do?’.

13 Sg. 1 future forms such as *dice ‘I shall say*, facie ‘I shall do* are reported (e.g. by Quintilian, 1. 7. 23) as having been used by early writers, esp. Cato. On the ‘exceeding doubtful’ sg. 1 future forms in *-em* in the manuscripts of Plautus, see Hodgman (1907: 48).

14 The Bengali future is made with the inflecting suffix -iba (e.g. kariba ‘I shall do’), which continues the Sanskrit gerundive in *-tana*. On the mixed future in the eastern dialects of Hindi, see Kellogg (1893: §§339, 541.3), although without explicit reference to the special treatment of the 3rd person.
I now turn to discuss in greater detail the use of the various future formations.

First of all, in the old future stem preserved in Greek, it is striking that, while the other tense-stems—in Greek, too, NB!—say nothing in themselves about the time of the action, but rather serve to distinguish between Aktionsarten, the future makes reference to a specific time directly by the stem itself, and not just by the indicative endings used. This raises two questions. First, is there only a single stage of time for action in the future? Apart from the future perfect and related matters, we might here refer to the fact that in Sanskrit two distinct future formations are available, which differ also in that one, the inherited one, is used for the immediate future, e.g. for what will happen today, while the other, formed with the agent noun (I, 197 above), is used of a remote future, for a statement about e.g. tomorrow or next year.\(^{15}\) It is conceivable that something similar was available also in the languages that concern us, so that people were not dependent just on adverbial phrases in order to express particular time differences. There is, however, no trace of any such thing, for when occasionally there is an accumulation of future markers, as in e.g. Gk μελλέσω (fut., lit. ‘I shall be about to’) for μέλλω (pres., ‘I am about to’) + inf., or Lat. mutare habebunt for mutare habent (lit., ‘they will have to change’ for ‘they have to change’. i.e. ‘they will change’), this reflects merely the blend of two forms of expression, there is no change of meaning.

Much more pressing is the second question, whether the future forms express the distinctions of Aktionsart so prominent in recent work on tenses. This distinction is certainly there in a language, which, while strictly not in the frame of our study, is of close relevance to us, namely modern Greek. Here we find two futures with different meanings according as the θά, etc. (arising from θέλω ἵνα: see I, 195–6 above), is followed by a present or an aorist subjunctive.\(^{16}\) To the verb ‘to go’, for example, from ancient Greek θά πηγαίνω (‘go away; go forwards’ → ‘go’) are formed the two futures θά πήγαινω (with present subjunctive) and θά πάω (with aorist subjunctive). In German and English we translate both with ‘ich werde gehen’, ‘I shall go’; Latin would say for both ‘ibo’, and French ‘j’irai’. But modern Greek uses them each differently. You use θά πηγαίνω when you announce something you mean to do regularly, e.g. ‘Next winter I shall go to the theatre regularly’ (τὸ χειμώνα θά πηγαίνω ταχτικά στὸ θέατρο). But if you want to say, ‘Tomorrow I shall go to the theatre’, you use θά πάω (αὐτῷ θά πάω στὸ θέατρο). Thanks to its retention of the aorist in its original meaning,

\(^{15}\) The Sanskrit grammarians characterize the periphrastic future as referring to a definite point in the future. Early on, it is used especially with ῥήτως ‘tomorrow’ (cf. Whitney 1889: §§942–9; Coulson 2006: 140–1).

\(^{16}\) These are respectively the ‘imperfective future’ (θά + the present) and the ‘perfective future’ (θά + the dependent), in the terminology of Holton et al. (1997: 110–11, al.).
modern Greek is able through its periphrastic future formation even in the future to make the distinction between the incomplete/ongoing and the one-off (cf. I, 172 above). Given that the modern Greek Sprachgefühl is receptive of this distinction, the question arises whether ancient Greek Sprachgefühl, too, was already sensitive to this distinction in the future. Untenable is Delbrück’s claim, based on comparative-linguistic arguments, that the Greek future in -σω must originally have been aoristic and used of punctual actions. This view is founded only on theory, and completely contradicts even the early evidence of Homer, where futures with durative meaning, such as κείσομαι (‘I shall lie’), ἔσομαι (‘I shall be’), and θεύσομαι (‘I shall run’), are perfectly normal.

An alternative theory enjoys great popularity. Already in the eighteenth century, an Englishman, James Harris (1751: 119–25), postulated a future very close in meaning to the aorist, and then Gottfried Hermann, in his book De emendanda ratione grammaticae graecae (‘On the need for a new theory of Greek grammar’) (1801: 186 ff.), claimed to be able to show a genuinely formal distinction between two futures, one corresponding more closely to the present, the other to the aorist. Of the two forms of the future passive, he thought that the shorter, originally middle, in -σομαι belonged more to the present, that in -θήσομαι to the aorist. Various scholars, and today practically everyone writing about Greek grammar, have agreed with Hermann, although Buttmann has expressed some doubts (1830–9: II, 87). Prominent adherents of this theory who particularly deserve mention are the Platonist Stallbaum, and Blass (1892), who is famous for his work on the Attic orators (esp. Blass 1887–98). Stallbaum (1841: 401–3) found support in a passage of Plato’s Parmenides 141d8–c2 (gratefully used as a basis by Blass (1892: 273), too), where, according to the manuscripts, the future forms γενήσεται and γενηθήσεται occur in close succession in such a way that a distinction in meaning has to be supposed for the passage to be intelligible. Stallbaum, and others following him, explained the

17 This is puzzling, as Delbrück’s discussion of the future in his comparative syntax (1893–1900: II, 242–55)—W. refers only to ‘II 232 ff.’—makes no such claim, adduces futures with durative meaning, and tends if anything against any strong connection between aorist and future (for an even clearer denial, cf. Delbrück 1879: 98). I wonder whether W. meant Brugmann (cf. Brugmann & Thumb 1913: 369, 552–3). As for aspectual distinctions in future time in classical Greek, it is interesting to note the perfective future sense conveyed by ἐσομαι + aor. ptc., e.g. at Soph. Ant. 1067, Herodorus 7. 194; see Schwzyzer & Debrunner 266 (3).

18 On the Aristotelian James Harris’s Hermes of 1751, in which the forms and use of individual languages are derived from the modes of the thought and the character of the nations of their respective speakers, see Roy Harris’s introduction to his recent edition (London 1993) and Law (2003: 265).

19 Buttmann accepts only that the middle form has a preference for denoting a state of enduring, but adds that in turn is subject to euphonic and rhythmical factors, and that anyway the fact is that most verbs make only a passive form, even when a durative sense is clear.

20 Note that in Stallbaum’s edition the Stephanus page number 141 is misprinted as 135!

21 The passage is as follows: τὸ ἐσται καὶ τὸ γενήσεται καὶ τὸ γενηθήσεται οὐ τὸ ἔσται (scil. χρόνον μέθεν δοκεῖ σημαίνειν); ‘And do not “will be”, “will become”, “will have become” signify a participation of future time?’
passage by supposing that the two forms each expressed a different aspect, \( \gamma \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \sigma \varepsilon \tau \alpha \) marking more of a durative meaning, \( \gamma \varepsilon \nu \nu \theta \varepsilon \sigma \varepsilon \tau \alpha \) more the momentary aoristic. The tradition, however, cannot be right, because the form \( \gamma \varepsilon \nu \nu \theta \varepsilon \sigma \varepsilon \tau \alpha \) cannot be allowed as a future of \( \gamma \iota \gamma \nu \omicron \omicron \alpha \) in Plato; it would be the only attestation of this future form before the end of the fourth century. There is also the following consideration: a formation like \( \gamma \varepsilon \nu \nu \theta \sigma \omicron \omicron \omicron \alpha \) presupposes the coexistence of an aorist \( \dot{\varepsilon} \gamma \varepsilon \nu \nu \theta \eta \nu \), which we do not find in Attic before the comic poet Philemo at the end of the fourth century (95. 2, 167 Kock). 22 Plato, on the countless occasions when he has to form an aorist to \( \gamma \iota \gamma \nu \omicron \omicron \alpha \), uses always and only the old form \( \dot{\varepsilon} \gamma \nu \omicron \omicron \eta \nu \). Long ago, Schleiermacher (1818: 415) and Sauppe (1886: 11) showed that the correct construction of the passage and agreement with normal Greek usage are achieved only by reading, not \( \gamma \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \sigma \varepsilon \tau \alpha \) and \( \gamma \varepsilon \nu \nu \theta \varepsilon \sigma \varepsilon \tau \alpha \), but the juxtaposition by Plato of the normal future \( \gamma \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \sigma \varepsilon \tau \alpha \) with the third future \( \gamma \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \sigma \varepsilon \tau \alpha \); for the two futures are matched in a parallel sentence a few lines later by the present forms \( \gamma \iota \gamma \nu \varepsilon \tau \tau \) and \( \gamma \varepsilon \gamma \omicron \nu \varepsilon \). 23 This Plato passage, then, must be completely eliminated. Recently, Meillet (1924) has defended the manuscripts’ version of the passage on the assumption that \( \gamma \varepsilon \nu \varepsilon \sigma \varepsilon \tau \alpha \) had for Plato a meaning close to the future perfect and that he was then obliged to create \( \gamma \varepsilon \nu \nu \theta \varepsilon \sigma \varepsilon \tau \alpha \) anew as a match for \( \gamma \iota \gamma \nu \varepsilon \tau \tau \); he rejects, however, the inferences drawn from the passage by Stallbaum and Blass (above).

22 These fragments are among a large group no longer attributed to Philemo (see PCG VII, 317). In Doric, cf. already Epicharmus fr. 210 PCG I, Archytas Bi Diels & Kranz no. 6, and, in Ionic, Hippocrates, Epidemics 6. 8. 32, 7. 3.

23 The translation of most of the works of Plato (5 vols, Berlin 1805–9, 2nd, improved edn in 6 vols, 1817–26) by the German philosopher, theologian and classicist Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) are still re-edited and reprinted (most recently Darmstadt 2003); on Schleiermacher’s life and works, see Forster (2002), with full bibliography. Note that the ancient commentator on Plato Proclus (cols 1233–9 Cousin) read \( \gamma \varepsilon \nu \nu \theta \varepsilon \sigma \varepsilon \tau \alpha \) in this passage, and found no difficulty with it; cf. Stallbaums (ad loc.).
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The question then arises whether a distinction between two sorts of future is borne out by the actual usage. Blass (1892) proceeds from the future of φαίνομαι, where, from the fifth century on, we have side by side the two formations φανείται and φανήσεται. It is quite probably, although not necessarily, the case that, if we have two distinct formations side by side, the difference of formation is matched by a difference of meaning. And indeed, Blass has shown (1892: 269–73) from the usage of Plato and especially Demosthenes that such is in fact the case here, viz. that φανείται means ‘will be apparent’, with durative meaning, in contrast with φανήσεται ‘will appear, will become visible’, with ingressive-aoristic meaning. So, for example, Demosthenes in the speech against Leptines says, 20. 37 (et al.) συνθήκας, αἷς ὁ μὲν Λεύκων ἐμμένων φανείται ‘the agreements to which it will be clear that Leuco always remains true’, in contrast in the same speech with 20. 30 δὲ σκοπήτε, φανήσεται συνεχῶς ἡμᾶς ἐὰν ποιῶν ‘if you look closely, it will become evident that he is our constant benefactor’, where the aoristic meaning is quite clear. Other passages show this opposition, which is easy to understand, in that φανήσεται shows an unmistakeable similarity to the aorist ἔφάνη ‘became visible’.

If we look more closely, however, Blass’s theory, while not wrong in this particular case, turns out to be inadequate. It does not even quite cover the fourth century, in that here the same authors use φανείται, durative on Blass’s account, also with ingressive-aoristic meaning. So, Plato, for example, at Apology 33a uses φανοῦμαι meaning ‘I shall turn out to be’. And conversely, not in Plato but here and there in Demosthenes, φανήσεται is found with durative meaning: e.g. in the speech quoted above (20. 164), it is used in parallel with and with the same meaning as δόξει (‘will seem, will have a reputation’).¹

We shall be helped out of this difficulty by something that Blass neglected to use, namely a genetic view of the phenomenon. If we consider the use of the futures of φαίνομαι diachronically from the beginning, things look very different. A future of φαίνομαι occurs already in Homer, at Od. 12. 230. The talk is of safety measures against the dangers posed by Scylla, and Odysseus explains why he

¹ It is not clear to me that the futures at Demosthenes 20. 164 are necessarily durative.
wants to keep his ship away from the white cliff where she dwells: ἐρεθὲν γάρ μν ἐδέγμην πρώτα φανεῖσθαι ‘for it was from there that I expected her first to appear’.\(^2\) This is the oldest, and the only Homeric, instance of the future of φανεῖσθαι, and you see straightaway that it is not a stative appearance but a momentary coming into view that is expressed. That is, in the earliest attestation of its use, the form has aoristic meaning, and moreover, to judge from our available sources, φανεῖται remains for a long time, into the fifth century, the only future form of the verb \((\text{ms. add.}^2):\) cf. Soph. Phil. 82 ἐκφανούμεθα ‘we shall show ourselves to be’). The alternative form φανήσεται occurs first in a fragment of Aeschylus (329 \textit{TrGF}, from Eustathius on \textit{Od.} 4. 84) and very rarely | in the other tragedians, here, however, in connection with the aorist ἐφάνη, i.e. only in the meaning ‘will appear, will be made manifest’.\(^3\) But alongside it φανεῖται remains usual, and in both functions at that, not only durative but also aoristic-ingressive. In the fourth century, φανήσεται gradually gains ground, but, the more ground it gains, the more it assumes durative meaning and becomes the basic future form of φανεῖσθαι. So, only for φανήσεται and only very fleetingly in those authors who first use this form, can a special meaning be demonstrated: in this case, this is what BLASS’s theory is reduced to.

But BLASS believed he had further support in another, rather similar future. The verb ἔχω, from Homer on, shows two future forms, ἔξω and σχῆσω. Since σχῆσω appears to belong with the aorist ἐσχὼν, BLASS (1892: 285–7) felt entitled to regard it as the aoristic future. This, however, flies directly in the face of actual usage: both in Homer (\textit{Il.} 24. 670\(^4\)) and in Herodotus and Demosthenes it occurs with durative meaning.

The main emphasis in BLASS’s whole article is laid on the distinction between the two future passive forms, in -σομαι and -θήσομαι. Here again, he has not investigated the genetic relationships at all, but he has simply depended on the fact that in Attic both types are available to form the passive, and tried to demonstrate a semantic distinction similarly as in the case of φανεῖσθαι. Like HERMANN, he thinks that the shorter form, in -σομαι, has a meaning corresponding to the present stem, while the longer, in -θήσομαι, which belongs together with the aorist in -θηρν, has a specifically aoristic sense. Certainly, isolated passages can be adduced where a form in -σομαι has durative meaning, and others where a-θήσομαι form has ingressive meaning, but the converse is no less frequent. In Plato, \textit{Republic} 2, 376c, we have θρέψονται...καὶ παιδευθήσονται ‘they will be reared

\(^2\) In fact, ἐρεθὲν must refer to the prow of the ship, where Odysseus has taken his stand. See Heubeck in Heubeck & Hoekstra (1989; \textit{ad loc.}). This does not affect the interpretation of φανεῖσθαι, which Heubeck glosses ‘come face to face with’.

\(^3\) Only twice in Sophocles (\textit{Trach.} 666, \textit{OC} 662), but eleven times in Euripides.

\(^4\) Achilles to Priam: σχῆσω γάρ πάλευον τόσον χρόνον δόσον ἤνωγας ‘I will hold off our attack for as much time as you bid me’ (tr. Lattimore).
and educated—nearly synonymous verbs, τρέφειν and παιδεύειν, with different future formations!—while in Crito 54a θρέφονται καὶ παιδεύονται we have the future of παιδεύειν in -σονται in exactly the same collocation as that in -θέσονται in the Republic passage. And how is one justified in seeing an ingressive-aoristic meaning in a verb like παιδεύω?

The existence of twin future passive forms is very easy to explain. Look in an index of Homer, and you will find not a single future form in -θέσομαι; as far as the poet is concerned, this form simply does not exist. No matter which verb you take, the middle future is always used for the passive meaning, so e.g. at Il. 24. 728–9 | πόλις...πέρσεται ‘the city will be destroyed’, or Il. 14. 481 κατακτανέεσθε ‘you will be killed’, and so on. For a long time, the future middle remains the only form available for the passive also. Herodotus probably has no alternative form of expression at his disposal. Not until Aeschylus, and not in all of his plays, does the longer future form occur, obviously formed to the aorist in -θην, on the model of -ην : -ήσομαι. Then it gradually establishes itself. Plainly, the decisive factor in the emergence of -θήσομαι was the wish to have a specifically passive form, distinct from the middle, and at the same time to make the future agree with the aorist, with the result that -θήσομαι appears early on in deponents, too. Rhythmical considerations also played a determining role. It has been observed that longer verbs prefer the shorter ending, -σομαι, over the longer, -θήσομαι; excessively heavy forms were, if possible, avoided. In post-classical Greek, the formation in -θήσεται is the only one available for the future passive.—You see how little remains of Blass’s theory.

Let us turn to a second question. We have so far presupposed (cf. I, 193 above) that the future serves simply to make statements about something to come. Is this right? Well, this a priori plausible-seeming view needs supplementing and correcting in three particulars. First, it is a curious counterbalance to what was argued above (I, 195 ff.), about the emergence of future markers from more modal expressions (such as ‘wish’, ‘ought’, ‘may’, ‘must’), that conversely the forms inherited with future meaning easily reacquire a modal colour. In the first place, they serve to express a wish. In Greek and Latin this is perfectly normal, in

5 Quoted by Buttmann (1830–9: II, 87).
6 It is avoided by later imitators of Homer. The two examples of fut. -ήσομαι in Homer (beside aor. in -ηπ: II. io. 365, Od. 2. 187) are both intransitive. See Schwyzer 763 & n. 1.
7 The sole example of the long form in Herodotus is αλλατισθήσονος (6. 39. 2), with middle meaning.
8 It seems not to occur in Supplices, Persae or Choephoroe.
9 Such as ἐρωθήσομαι ‘I shall fall in love with’, Aesch. Eum. 852.
10 Blass defends the theory in KB II, §229.2 and pp. 585–6. Other sympathizers included Gerth (in KG), Delbrück, Meltzer, and Brugmann & Thumb (1913), and with qualifications Gildersleeve & Miller §168; among other opponents were Curtius (1877–80: II, 325–39 = 1880 [Eng. trans.]: 491–500), Stahl, Magnien, Chantraine, Mayser, and Schwyzer & Debrunner, q. v. (265–6) for an overview and further references.
all contexts and in all persons. It is quite normal in the first person, especially in Latin: so, e.g. *faciam* ‘I wish to do such and such’. Indeed, we can even say that in more elevated Latin this is the normal way of expressing a wish. The Latin for ‘I want to go’ is *ibo*. It expresses not only the prediction of a future act of going, but also the wish for a future going. The phrase corresponding to the German or English for ‘I want to go’, *uolo ire*, is not unheard of but belongs more to the relaxed, less careful manner of speech. In Cicero, for example, it is confined to the letters. In the second person, German, too, uses the future for the wish of the speaker, e.g. in Schiller’s *William Tell* (act 3, scene 3), *du wirst den Apfel schiessen von dem Kopf des Knaben* (‘you will shoot the apple from the boy’s head’), which is not a prediction of a future event, rather the | future form is chosen to express a very decisive command, the observance of which is not in doubt. We find commands in this form also in Greek and in Latin. Sometimes future and imperative are juxtaposed, e.g. at Plato, *Protagoras* 338a7 *οὐν ποιήσετε καὶ πελεσαθέ μοι* ‘so then you should do and obey me’, ‘should do’ being expressed with a future, ‘obey’ with an imperative. The semantic closeness to imperative clauses is reflected in the use of *οὐ* for negation, when something is forbidden by means of a verb in the future. A special instance of this, which we have in German, too, and which is very common in Attic, is the question, with the 2nd person of the future and negative *οὐ* having the force of a command, as e.g. at Ar. *Lyk. 459 οὐχ ἐλέετ’ οὐ πανήγετ’ οὐκ ἀρήετε; ‘won’t you pull, won’t you strike, won’t you help?’ You hear in the words the impatience of the speaker.

The 3rd person is rarer in this function, but not unheard of. (On Latin, I refer you to Blase (1903: 118).) Especially interesting is a group of expressions in Plautus, the oaths *ita me amabit Jupiter, di me amabunt*, etc., i.e. roughly ‘so truly do I wish that Jupiter / the gods be gracious to me’.12

Related to this voluntative meaning of the future, is its frequent use, in both Latin and Greek, in doubtful and deliberative questions, where the speaker debates with himself or another what should happen; here it is not infrequently in parallel with a subjunctive, e.g. at Eur. *Ion* 78 *εἰπωμεν ἢ σιγώμεν ἢ τί δράσομεν;* (‘should we speak or keep silent or what are we to do?’), or Ov. *Met.* 3. 465 *quid faciam? roger anne rogem? quid deinde rogabo?* (‘what should I do? Should I ask or be asked? What then should I ask?’).

Here belongs also the future participle. Classen, in his little book of observations on the language of Homer (rich indeed in fine observations), has drawn attention (1879: 78–80) to the fact that in Homer the future participle, while common, is hardly ever used purely temporally, but nearly always has a voluntative

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nuance attaching to it. Either in the nominative to verbs of going and the like, or in the accusative to verbs of sending and the like, the action which the subject wishes to have performed is given in the future participle, e.g. βῆ ἀγγελέωνα ‘she went meaning to announce’ (Od. 18. 186, 22. 434, 496), ἐπαλεξήσουσαν ... προϊάλλεν ‘he sent (me) with the intention of helping’ (I. 8. 365). Exceptions are ἔσομενος ‘being about to be’, and two isolated passages, namely II. 18. 309 ξυνός Ἐνυάλοις καὶ τε κτανέωνα κατέκτα ‘the impartial War-god kills even the one about to kill’, and Od. 11. 608 αἰεὶ βαλέοντι | ἐοικός ‘looking like one who is always about to shoot’.13—Only later was it possible to use the participle purely with reference to time, and so it came about that from Herodotus on a passive future participle could also be formed.14 It simply could not be formed in the earlier language, because a passive meaning was not compatible with the voluntative meaning of the future participle.

We come to our second point. When a nuance of will or obligation is introduced, the performance of the verbal action still lies in the future; but in many cases, where we have a future expression, even this is not true. For one thing, I remind you that in German we can use a future to express a likelihood, e.g. in das wird wohl so sein (‘that is (lit. will be) probably so’). This does not say that ‘that’ will occur in the future, but that the possibility exists. While we could observe above (I, 197) that hardly any future expressions arose from expressions of possibility (i.e., with the auxiliary ‘can’ or the like), conversely the prediction of a future occurrence entails the statement of its possibility, so that the expression of future can serve also to express possibility. This is familiar in the ancient languages, too. So, in early Latin the future can express a supposition, e.g. at Plautus, Persa 645 haec erit bono genere nata, nil scit, nisi uerum loqui ‘she is (lit. will be) probably of a good family, she cannot but speak the truth’.15 In Greek a similar use is found, at any rate in Ionic and in the Hellenistic Koine, which is based in part on Ionic. In the ‘lame iambics’ (choliambics—χωλός ‘lame’16) of Herondas, ἐρείς ‘you will say’ occurs frequently in the sense of ‘one could say’ (e.g. 4. 57, 6. 59, 7. 116), and there are very similar instances in his older contemporary Theocritus.17 Indeed, in a medical papyrus (ed. Kalbfleisch 1901: 206,...

13 Both κτανέωνα and βαλέοντι can surely very well convey will or intention; on the former passage, cf. Chantraine (1953: 201) and Edwards (1991: ad loc.). Classen reckons a total of four purely temporal examples out of a total of 120 future participles in Homer (57 II., 63 Od.). He regards as purely temporal also ἐπιβοηθόμενος (II. 5. 46, 16. 344, 23. 379), which is surely better taken as ‘trying to mount’.
14 I have yet to find this statement in a handbook. I have found one fut. pass. ptc. in Herodotus, πολιορκηθόμενος ‘about to be besieged’, used three time (5. 34. 1, 9. 88. 3, 9. 97). There seem to be three examples in the Hippocractic corpus, αοπηρόμενος (Pragnostic 1. 21), γραθηθόμενος (Diet in Acute Diseases 8. 3), τὸ ποιηθόμενον (On Proper Behaviour II. 2).
15 Cf. Lindsay (1907: 60), Bennett (1910: 44–5) ‘the potential future’.
16 Also known as scasonis (σκαζόν ‘limping’), these lines have a long penultimate syllable, which is normally short (West 1987: 30).
17 What does W. have in mind in Theocritus? Neither Idyll 22. 64, nor Epigr. 15. 3 or 17. 6 seems comparable.
We read ἵσως τινὸς ἐροῦντος ‘at which perhaps someone might say’, with the future participle.

Even more remarkable is what Herodotus offers in this direction. You see, he uses a future in describing customs and habits. So, e.g. at 1. 173. 5, in his report of the much-discussed custom of the Lycians of determining descent solely with reference to the mother: εἰρομένου δὲ ἐτέρου τὸν πλησίον τίς ἐη, καταλέξει ἐωτὸν μητρόθεν καὶ τῆς μητρὸς ἀνανεμέσσαι τὰς μητέρας ‘if one man asks another who he is, he will give his descent on his mother’s side, and he will recount his mother’s maternal ancestors’. (Or is the future used because καταλέγειν and ἀνανεμέσσαι follow εἰρέσθαι, and from the point of view of the one asking lie in the future?) Related to this is the usage, common in Greek and Latin, of a gnomic future, relating something as a fact of general experience, something that can be observed immediately as soon as it is considered, e.g. Plautus, Mustellaria 1041 | qui homo timidus erit in rebus dubiis, nauci non erit (‘a man who is (fut.) timid in a crisis is (fut.) not worth a fig’). Cf. Blase (1903: 120–3). Pohlenz refers me to Arist. Eth. Nic. 4, 112324–31 ποιήσει, ἐλλείψει, ἀπολεί.

A third point: the future can convey not only something timeless, but even something belonging decidedly to the past. In other words, there is also a historic future; cf. on Latin, Samuelsson (1905–6); on German, Wegener in Paul (1901–9: 1480); on Old Persian and numerous other languages, Wackernagel (1912b). The following are the main types. First, when reference is made in narrative to a later event in someone’s life, this can be done with a future form, as e.g. at Val. Flacc. Argon. 1. 451–2 Canthus, in Aeaean uoluet quem barbarà cuspis puluere ‘Canthus, whom a barbarian spear was to (lit., will) roll in the Aeaean dust’. Now, this ‘rolling in the dust’ is narrated of Canthus in the next book of the poem. The future is used because from the standpoint of the narrative of the first book, the event still lies in the future. Futures of this kind are not uncommon also in the modern languages; especially popular in French, they are coming to be usual in German, too, probably as a Gallicism. Comparable with this (I owe this reference, too, to Pohlenz) is the fact that Dionysius of Halicarnassus and other Greek prose writers, when giving two successive quotations from another author, often introduce the second with ὅτε (lit., ‘a little later he will say’) or ἐποίσει (‘will cite’).

18 P. Strasb. inv. gr. 1r (Mertens-Packe 1993: 498 no. 64), a treatise on fevers, of the 2nd c. AD.
19 Pinkster (1999: 707) presents this as a consequence of the historic present, and cites Verg. Aen. 10. 502 Turno tempus erit (‘the time would (lit., will) come for Turnus’) as a good example.
20 On this usage (and on those of the next three paragraphs) in French, cf. Grevisse 1298 §857.4 and 1299 §88b (on the ‘futur antérieur’), and Fleischman (1990: 33, 40–1) on the ‘after-past’ and the ‘historical future’. In current German, it seems to be the fut. pf. rather than the plain fut. that can refer to the past: Hammer & Durrell 287 §14.4.2 give the example sie wird den Zug verpaßt haben ‘she will have missed the train’.

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Related, although not quite the same, are the instances in Livy where, as at the very beginning of book 7, after naming the consuls, he begins his account of the new year with the words *annus hic erit insignis* (lit. ‘this will be an outstanding year’), taking his viewpoint from the first day of that year.\(^{21}\)

Thirdly, it is commonly seen, especially in French, that in the description of a relatively long development the results, which may actually belong to the remote past, are rendered in the future. This is in order to express their posteriority with respect to the earlier developments.\(^{22}\)

Fourthly and finally, in some languages the future occurs in the normal course of the narrative, if the progress in the action is to receive strong emphasis. Here we can say that the future serves simply to express something posterior, and the future meaning has completely vanished. This usage has been observed in Latvian and in colloquial German. So, in a novel Friedrich Spielhagen (1829–1911) has a servant say, *ich also hin nach Tannenburg gemacht und werde dann gleich auf sein Zimmer gehen* ‘so I made off to Tannenburg and go (lit. will go) straight to his room’. The ‘going to his room’ is in the future in order to express the fact that it happens after another action.\(^{23}\) On the peculiar usage of Old French epic, see Vossler (1921: 60–1), who sees there a ‘futurum oratorium’.

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\(^{21}\) S. P. Oakley, in his commentary (Oxford 1998), *ad loc.*, compares 24. 43. 8, which is more probably expressing a likelihood (cf. W. above); a better parallel is 21. 46. 8.

\(^{22}\) Cf. Gamillscheg (1957: 388–9), although this usage is not clearly registered by Grevisse §857.

\(^{23}\) This is quoted by Schiepek (1899: 143–4), by Wegener in Paul’s *Grundriss* (1901–9: 1480), and by W. (1912b: 137) in an article on the same phenomenon in Old Persian, where he refers on Latvian to Bielenstein (1863: 332–3) and provides numerous further references.
Finally, we must speak of the future formed on the perfect stem. We appear to have here an agreement between Greek and Latin, but the similarity is little but superficial.

First, a word about the formation in Greek (on which see the good Breslau dissertation of Cakot (1911) on the so-called 'third' future). The usual label 'futurum III' is rather superficial, because, while the distinction between the first and second future is purely formal, that between the third and the first/second is semantic as well. But we want to keep this term for Greek, in order to avoid the need to speak of a Greek future perfect.1 In Attic, first of all, we have only three active forms, of which ἐστήξει ‘will stand’ and τεθνήξει ‘will be dead’ are clear. The origin of these forms, which are not very old—they are not attested in Homer—is self-evident. Greek had in ἔστηκα and τέθνηκα (I stand', 'I am dead') verb-forms that functioned reasonably enough as presents (I, 168 above). It was natural that the regular futures ἔστήκω (‘I shall stand up’) and ἀποθανόμαι (‘I shall die’) did not express the stative meaning inherent in ἔστηκα and τέθνηκα. As, then, subjunctive and optative ἔστήκη and ἔστήκοι were made on the analogy of τήκη and τήκοι (subjv. and opt. of τήκω ‘melt’), so, on the model of the future τήξω, ἔστήξω, etc. were formed. In later Greek, under the influence of the semantically corresponding middle forms of the present and future, middle ἔστήξομαι, τεθνήξομαι were then formed. Less clearly recognizable, but quite secure, is a third form, known to us from Aristophanes, Clouds, 1001 (Unjust Argument:) τοῖς Ἰπποκράτοις... εἴξεις ‘you will resemble the sons of Hippocrates’. This εἴξεις belongs with the perfect ἐόικα ‘I seem, resemble’, which we translate with a present, and which in Greek does without its own present. In order to understand the formation, we must remember that this verb has, alongside the forms based on ἐόικ-, also forms showing the perfect stem in the form εἰκ-, εἰκ- (from ἕ-ὔκ-, ἕ-ἕικ-). Familiar are the participle εἰκώς ‘resembling’, and also in Homer the dual forms εἰκτον and (plupf.) εἰκτην ‘the two of them resemble(d)’; in Attic we have pl. 3 pf. εἰξασί and the sg. 3 plupf. ἢκεων. It is on this stem εἰκ- that the

1 This legitimate terminological point was not generally appreciated: KB II, §229.1, and KG I, §388, use not ‘Futurum III’ but ‘Futurum exactum’; Goodwin, §§77–84, and Gildersleeve & Miller, §§279–284, ‘future perfect’. ‘First future’ and ‘second future’ are the old names for, respectively, the regular sigmatic type in ἀσω and the ε-contract type made to verbs with stems in μ, ν, λ, or ρ.
third future is built, which must be old, precisely because it is associated with this stem without -οι-. It emerged probably on the model of an old subjunctive *εἰκω from *ἐξεῖκω. In Homer there is also κεχαρήσεμεν (Il. 15. 98), which belongs with κεχαρηστά (Il. 7. 312).

The grammarians (Macrobius, GL V, 610, 38) adduce yet a fifth future of this type: δεδοκήσω I shall fear, and it is specified as being Syracusan, which means that they read it in one of the Syracusan | poets, Epicharmus or Sophron. This is based on the quasi-present δέοικα (‘I fear’; I, 169 above). Of relevance to the formation of a future to this verb is the fact that the Syracusans were wont to inflect perfects of this sort as presents.—These five are the only secure examples of an active third future. Attestation of κεκλάγω (‘I shall scream’) is inadequate, and the Homeric futures κεκαθήσω and τετορήσω (‘I shall proclaim shrilly (lit., pierce’), Ar. Peace 381) have nothing to do with the perfect, but are based on the reduplicated aorist.

Very frequent, however, from Homer to late Greek, is the third future in -σεται. It occurs with middle sense, and to deponents, e.g. Homeric μεμνήσομαι to μέμνημαι (‘remember’). It is particularly common, however, in the passive, as in λέλεξεται (‘will be said’) or πεπράξεται (‘will be done’). Its meaning is quite clear: it denotes a future state arising from a completed action. So, λέλεκται means ‘it has been said and exists as something said’, and λέλεξεται ‘it will be in the state of having been said, it will exist as something said’. It is only this, the original, meaning of the perfect that is reflected in the future formation. The later developments in the use of the perfect (I, 170 above) do not affect the future, and it is clear how close semantically these middle and especially passive third futures are to the active forms discussed above which are based on present perfects. The middle and passive are more numerous than the active because in general the passive of the perfect remained closer than the active to the original meaning.

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2 On the various forms of ἐικω, see Buttmann (1866: s.v. ‘εἰκω’), KB II, 410–11, and Willi (2003: 249), with references to Lautensach (1911).
3 Cf. κεχαρήσουμι (Od. 23. 266), and, on the same stem, pf. act. κεχάρηκα, mid. κεχάρησα, κεχαριστέες, plupf. κεχάρητος on the forms of χαίρω, see Buttmann (1866: s.v.), KB II, 368–9.
4 Note e.g. δεδοίκα ‘I fear’ at Theocr. 15. 58; on the forms of this verb, see Buttmann (1866: s.v. ‘δείσαι’).
5 The literary dialectology of the ancients, see Hainsworth (1967: esp. 72–6).
6 Only the middle (κεκλάγωμα) is secure, at Ar. Ἀριστ 930, though both act. and mid. forms are quoted in the Byzantine lexicon Suda (cf. Buttmann 1866: s.v. ‘κλάζω’). A redupl. aor. to τείρω, τορέω ‘pierce’ is attested only in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes, 119 (τετορήσας) and in the late lexicographer Hesychius (τέτορων), and is not included in LIV, s.vv. ‘τερή’, ‘τερῆ’, (cf. Buttmann 1866: s.v. ‘τορεῖ’). A redupl. aor. stem κεκαθ- is seen in Homeric κεκαθῶν ‘fell back’ (traditionally related to χάζωμαι, although this is phonologically difficult; cf. LIV, s.v. ‘καθ’), of which aor. ptc. κεκαθῶν (Il. 11. 334), and fut. κεκαθήσω (Od. 21. 153, 170) are regarded as the active factitive, ‘cause to retire from’—‘deprive of’; κεκαθησήθαι, on the other hand, at II. 8. 353, is generally connected to κέδομαι ‘feel concern for’; on these forms, see Buttmann (1866: s.v. ‘χάζωμαι’). On the reduplicated futures in Homer, see Monro (1891: §66), who adds πεσείται ‘will spare’ (cf. aor. infin. πεσεῖται), and, on the reduplicated aorist in the Indo-European languages, Bendahan (1993).
Let us now turn to Latin, where for the future formed on the perfect stem we use the term ‘futurum exactum’ (i.e. completed, perfected future, ‘future perfect’), although this term arose only in relatively recent times.\(^7\) In part this formation is parallel to the Greek third future, namely where it belongs to present perfects such as ὧδι, meminin, ὥδερο, meminero mean simply ‘I shall hate’, ‘I shall be mindful’. So, too, certain medio-passive instances, such as factum erit ‘it will be done’, may be set alongside the Greek use. For the rest, however, Latin goes far beyond Greek. This finds formal expression in the fact that, in contrast with the few active third futures of Greek, Latin has a limitless number of active future perfects; indeed, every verb can make a future on the perfect stem. (On the use of the forms, I refer you to Blase (1903: 112–23) and Sjögren (1906).) First of all, we can establish a very widespread use of these forms simply as futures; often fecero cannot be distinguished in meaning from faciam. But in addition, and this applies especially to subordinate clauses, and then also to main clauses, the future perfect is used to express the completion in the future of an action presupposed by \(\text{I}\), another future action.\(^8\) Often, if we wished to translate a Latin future perfect into Greek, we could use an aorist subjunctive; but in keeping with the tendency of Latin to distinguish relative points in time as sharply as possible, this formation, too, has been developed to express the past in the future. This is entirely a specific characteristic of Latin and alien to the Greek third future. The correct evaluation of the Latin formation is made somewhat more difficult by the need to include consideration of the short forms of the type capso, fazo, the use of which is very similar to that of the future perfect.\(^9\)

In German the future perfect is as good as obsolete, and, unless artificially formed in imitation of the Latin formation, practically confined to expressions of probability, such as er wird das getan haben (‘he will have done it’), and the like.\(^10\) On Old Icelandic, see Heusler (1921: §414).\(^11\)

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\(^7\) The term ‘futurum exactum’ may go back to the humanist Pomponius Laetus (1425–97), the first editor of Varro, although it may not have been until the work of the Dutch-German classicist G. J. Voss (Vossius, 1577–1649) that the term was introduced to school grammar (see Jellinek 1913–14: II, 327–9).

\(^8\) These two points match very closely the accounts of Bennett (1910: 54–9) and, in the end, of Pinkster (199o: 226–7 with n. 20). Both note the metrical observation that in comedy the fut. pf. occurs esp. at line-end (trimeter or septenarius).

\(^9\) Sometimes, in subordinate clauses, fazo=fecero (e.g. Plautus, frag. 62 peribo, si non fecero; si fazo, uapulabo ‘I’m done for, if I don’t do it; if I do do it, I’ll be beaten’), but often it, no less than the fut. pf. (see W. above) is indistinguishable in meaning from the simple fut. On the Latin type fazo, see most recently de Melo (2002a; 2002b; 2007), who argues that the formation is based on old s-aorist subjunctives and arose within Latin, and Weiss (forthc.: ch. 32, ILA.2), who derives the type from the subjunctive of the s-desiderative, both with rich bibliography.

\(^10\) In German, the perfect is preferred to the fut. pf., provided that the context makes clear the time reference, as e.g. in Bald habe ich den Brief geschrieben ‘soon I shall have written (lit., I have written) the letter’ (Hammer & Durrell §§14.3.4).

\(^11\) In Old Icelandic are formed (with mono and the verb ‘to have’) a fut. pf., a conditional and a conditional perfect.
THE MOODS

The term *modus* (‘mood’) is found already in ancient Latin. Quintilian uses the term (*Inst.* 1. 5. 41) in his overview of the science of language, which I have already quoted more than once; he also mentions *status* and *terminus* as possible alternatives. In Quintilian, however, *modus* is not otherwise confined to what we call ‘mood’. The commonest term in Greek is *ἐγκλίοις* ‘leaning, turning’, probably originally in the sense of the ‘turning’ of the present indicative, so that the indicative was no more an *ἐγκλίοις* than the nominative was a *πτῶοις*. Indeed, in the elementary grammar of Dionysius Thrax, five *ἐγκλίοις* are distinguished, the infinitive (ἀναρέμφατος) also being regarded as an *ἐγκλίοις* of the verb (cf. Steinhall 1890–1: II, 272–6).

The distinction between modal forms has to do with the relationship between the action of the verb and reality. A greater or lesser degree of actuality is expressed, which really implies that one could conceivably have an infinite number of moods. The restriction to the three or four moods that we encounter is, if you like, accidental and arbitrary.

Study of the moods is not among the easiest sections of syntax, perhaps precisely because in recent decades so much has been written about them, with almost excessive sophistication. We want to smooth our way in to this part of our project by beginning with the easiest bit, and in this sense the ideal starting point is the

IMPERATIVE

as here the usage is clearest and the differences between the languages that concern us slightest. The Latin term *imperativus* (‘imperative’) is simply the

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12 The word *ἐγκλίοις* could be used of any formal modification of a word, noun or verb. The comparison between the nominative and the present indicative is made by Varro, *Latin Language* 9. 102, and cf. the remark of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On the Arrangement of Words* 6, that some call the moods ‘the cases of the verb’ (*πτῶοις ῥηματικάς*); cf. Matthews (1994: 89, 103).

13 A good general textbook on mood and modality is Palmer (1986). On the imperative in particular, Krakovskij (2001) contains contributions on English, German, French, and Armenian as well as numerous non-IE languages. Note the mammoth critical surveys of research on the moods in Greek and Latin in the period 1903–83 by Calboli (1966–8) and (1983: 80–109), and for more recent surveys of the bibliography, which has continued to grow, see, on Indo-European, Meier-Brügger (2003: 252–9); on Greek, Meier-Brügger (1992: I, 128–38); Latin, Pinkster (1999a: 213), and on Indo-European and all the relevant daughter languages, Szemerényi (1996: 257–66, and 247–9 on the imperative). On Indo-European and Greek, important are Kuryłowicz (1964), Rix (1986), and Strunk (1988) [with a long summary in English]; still worth consulting are Hahn (1952), Gonda (1965), and Lightfoot (1975). On Latin, Pinkster (1999a: ch. 10) gives an illuminating survey with reference to ‘sentence type, illocutionary force and mood’; note the recent monograph by Sabanéeva (1996), and the still-valuable books by Thomas (1938) and Handford (1946). For a critical review roughly contemporary with W. of the earlier scholarship, see Bennett (1910: 145–61). W. gives some bibliography on I, 240 below.
translation of the Greek προστάκτική (scil. ἐγκλείσις), from προστάττειν ‘command, enjoin’; the Latin is masculine because modus is understood. So, there is a special form for commands directed at one or more people.

In virtue of their meaning, the imperative forms come into contact with certain indeclinable words. We saw earlier (I, 71–2 above) that isolated adverbs and interjections, since they serve to give orders, are used alongside imperatives and the like, and consequently acquire verbal endings. Conversely, imperatives can shed their verbal nature and join the class of interjections. So, e.g. Gk ἀγε and Lat. age are certainly imperatives in origin, but it is clear that they were not regarded as straightforward imperatives, partly in that they are used without regard to grammatical number (I, 85 above), but more importantly in that in context they give up the usual transitive meaning of the verb. The grammarians regard them as particles.—In addition, the Aeolic and poetic ἄγρει, properly ‘seize! catch!’, is also an imperative on the way to becoming a particle. The original verbal meaning has receded, and it remains simply as a word of encouragement placed before another imperative. It is clear that ἄγρει was no longer felt to be an imperative from the fact that in addressing more than one person the form used was the proparoxytone ἄγρειτε (with -τε simply added as a plural marker to ἄγρει, as in the cases discussed earlier, I, 71 above); the proper verbal form would have to be ἄγρειτε.—BENFEY once derived Lat. heus from an old imperative meaning ‘hear’.

Furthermore, it is natural that certain verbs are confined to imperatival use, since the activities they denote were mentioned only or mainly as the object of an order. Here belongs first and foremost Lat. cedo, pl. cedt ‘give here!’, -do being the old imperative form of dāre (‘to give’), with the of Lat. dōnum (‘gift’), Gk δίδωμι (‘I give’). The ce- is probably the same as the -ce that we find at the end of demonstrative pronouns, such as huiusce, hisce. So cedo is literally ‘here’ + ‘give’.

Among the forms which make up the paradigms of the imperative in Greek and Latin, we must distinguish three groups, each of different origin and formal character, each showing differences also of imperatival function. First, there are the true imperative forms, used exclusively as such from the beginning. Here belong only the sg. 2 active of the various tenses in Greek (including the sg. 2 aorist passive, and perhaps excluding the sg. 2 weak aorist active), and the sg. 2 present active in Latin and Germanic, i.e. forms such as Gk pres. λέγε, δάμνα,
δέκκω, ἵθ (‘say!’, ‘tame!’, ‘show!’, ‘go!’), aor. ἵδε, στῇθ, θέṣ.\(^16\) (‘look!’, ‘take a stand!’, ‘put!’), pf. κέκραχθι (‘shriek!’), aor. mid./pass. φάνηθ (‘appear!’), Lat. læge, dūc, ἵ (‘read!’, ‘lead!’, ‘go!’), German nimmt, is (‘take!’, ‘eat!’). These are all old, inherited imperative forms, which were never anything else. These are the imperative forms par excellence, the truest expressions to use for giving a command. (On the Gk sg. 2 weak aorist in -σον, see I, 215 below.)

Then there is a second group, forms which belonged with these true imperatives not only in the grammarians but for native speakers themselves, but still with a slight semantic difference apparent in the earliest Greek (I, 215 below). These are: in Greek the du. 2 and pl. 2 in the active and the 2nd person of all numbers in the middle, with the exception of the sg. 2 weak aorist middle imperative in -σας, whose origin remains obscure.\(^17\) If we compare forms of this group, such as Gk λέγετε (‘say!’ pres.) or πράξατε (‘do!’ aor.), with other verbal forms, we find that they are in fact identical with the unaugmented forms of the imperfect or aorist, and in Homer a form such as λόγατε can as well be taken as a preterite as an imperative. Exactly the same applies to the middle forms in -αο, -αθων, and -αθέ. These forms of the imperative, then, are really unaugmented preterites. Historical study shows that this is original. In the earliest phases of the Indo-European languages, the unaugmented forms of the preterite could have the meaning of inter alia imperatives. For a long time the current term for this group of forms has been the happy invention of Brugmann, ‘injunctive’ (from Lat. iniungere ‘impose, enjoin’).\(^18\) The Latin pl. 2 active imperative in -te, although without parallel in the endings of the preterite in Latin, has the same origin; so, too, does the Latin sg. 2 deponent-passive,\(^19\) while the forms in -mini are old infinitives, which were used first as imperatives and then also as indicatives.\(^20\) The same is true of modern German nelmt, esst (‘take’, ‘eat’, pl. 2 pres. indic. or impv.). Moreover, because in Germanic the forms of the

\(^{16}\) W.’s Greek examples show either the bare stem (thematic or athematic), or athematic stem + particle -θι (＜IE *-dhθi: cf. Skt -dhī, -hī), except θές, which (in common only with δός ‘give!’, ἐς ‘send!’, αὐχ ‘hold!’ and ἐνίσσες ‘tell!’) shows what is generally taken to be the sg. 2 ending *-ς, and continues an old injunctive form (cf. W. (1906: 175) and below); for details, cf. Rix (1976: §288d) and Strunk (1987: 327–33).

\(^{17}\) This is still the case: Rix (1976: §289) derives the weak aor. impv. middle from the aor. infin. act.; Meier-Brügger (1992: II, 52) seems to see in the ending an ‘additional particle’; Sihler (1995: §350) and Szemerényi (1996: 247–9), as far as I can see, ignore it.

\(^{18}\) Brugmann (1880: 2). See Bloomfield (1884), Delbrück (1893–1900: II, 352–7).

\(^{19}\) That is, Lat. -re, e.g. in sequere ‘follow!’ which comes by regular sound change from *-so, the sg. 2 past middle ending in Indo-European (cf. Gk -σο, after a vowel -α, as in ἐπασο ‘follow!’ and (influenced by pl. 2 middle -dlve, -dlvam) Vedic -sva, e.g. in sacsva ‘follow!’).

\(^{20}\) On this view (advanced by W. in 1888b), Lat. (medio-passive) -mini is compared with the Homeric (and Lesbian) (active) infin. in -μενοι (cf. Vedic -mane). The earlier view (already in Bopp 1816: 105–6) regarded -mini as participial in origin (cf. Gk -μενοι, the relic of an earlier periphrasis (imagine e.g. anāmin estis ‘you are loved!’). Recently, attempts have been made to derive Lat. -mini from something like *-dlwe-ne-I, a form that at least contains the IE pl. 2 middle ending *-dlwe or *-dlwe (see in Gk -oβe, Skt -dlve, -dlvam). Problems remain. See Leumann 517–18, Sihler (1995: 479), Szemerényi (1996: 241–2), Meiser (1998: $142.2$).
pl. 2 imperative were always identical with those of the present indicative, the Gothic dual form in -ts, which originally belonged only to the present indicative, acquired also imperative meaning. 21 (On the so-called ‘adhortative’ in Germanic, see the remarks below, I, 221.) | A third group comprises those forms which end in -ō (and those semantically related to the latter), namely the 3rd person imperative of all numbers in Greek and the so-called future imperative in Latin. (The Gothic 3rd-person imperative forms in sg. -adau, pl. -andau are unrelated. 22)

The forms in the first two groups are normally used for giving positive orders. They very often have particles attached to them, especially interjections (ā, for instance, in Greek), to strengthen the force of the command. Especially the conversational Latin of Plautus shows a great many such supporting elements, including the suffix -dum (properly ‘now?’), as in dicit dum and the like. 23 One way of reinforcing the imperative—namely with quīn—deserves special mention, as it involves an interesting shift. We find it already in one of the earliest speeches 24 of Cicero, For Q. Roscius the Actor, 25 quīn tu hoc crimen aut obice . . . aut iacere noli (‘then either launch this charge . . . or do not launch it’), and so, too, in Vergil, Aen. 5. 635 (Iris, in disguise, to the Trojan women) quīn agite et mecum infaustas exurite puppes ‘come on! Burn with me the accursed ships!’ and frequently elsewhere. (Cf. Ussing (1875–92: I, 374) and Leo (1895–6: I) on Plautus, Asinaria 254.) It arose as follows. In Old Latin, quīn (composed of quī ‘how’ + the negative particle nē), except when functioning as a subordinating conjunction, meant ‘why not?’. From this emerged the expression quīn etiam (‘yes, and . . . ; and furthermore’), strictly with quīn confirming what had been said (‘why not?’) and etiam strengthening it some more. Now, it is very common to combine quīn in this sense with the 2nd person of the indicative, as in—to modify the above sentence from Cicero as an example—quīn tu hoc crimen obicis? ‘why do you not launch this charge?’ Now, because such sentences (like their counterparts in German and English) had the force of a command, and e.g. quīn facis? (‘why do you not do (it)?’) was synonymous with fac! (‘do (it)!’), it gradually came about that the verb

21 So, e.g. Gothic bairiþ and OHG beret (‘carry’; cf. Gk ἔψειε, Skt bharata) can be either impv. or (pres.) indic. On the history and prehistory of the Gothic forms, see Krahe & Seebold §§87, 97.

22 They are also without cognates in Germanic (Krahe & Seebold §87); for references to more recent discussion, see Szemerényi (1996: 249 n. 11).

23 Cf. agēdum ‘come now!’ (pl. agīdēdum at Livy 5. 52. 9), but dum as an intensifier of imperatives is now normally printed as a separate word (e.g. mane dum ‘just wait!’ at Plin. Letters 8. 6. 13), and is sometimes separated from the impv., e.g. Plaut. Men. 378 sine me dum hanc compellare ‘just let me speak to her’. Other particles attached to imperatives in Plautus (and in colloquial Latin generally) include modo ‘just’, proin, proinde, sane and words for ‘(if you) please’, amabo, obseso, queso, sīs, sode (cf. Bennett 1910: 349–50, 357–8; Hofmann & Szantyr 339).

24 The date of this private speech has been long disputed, opinions ranging from 82 to 66 BC. The older preferred date of 76 BC (favoured on stylistic grounds and because of Cicero’s reference in it to ‘my youth’, 44 mea adulescentia), has been thrown into doubt by Stroh (1975: esp. 149–56) and Axer (1980: esp. 54–66); cf. Vasaly (2002: 86 and n. 28).
was put into the imperative, contrary to the original meaning of *quin*, the general sense of the clause giving rise to the modification of an inherited form of expression.

It is easy to understand that an imperative expression can be employed more to give permission, or to concede or admit something; such divergence of meaning occurs in all languages.25

25 In modern terms (cf. e.g. Pinkster 1990a: ch. 10, with refs), the single sentence type (imperative) can convey various illocutionary forces. In the case of *quin obiec*! the illocutionary force (command) has influenced the formal sentence type (interrogative → imperative). On the use of the impv. and other directive expressions in Latin, see Risselada (1993). For critical discussion of relevant concepts and terms, with reference to various types of languages, see Palmer (1986: ch. 1).
Not so simple, less simple than our modern usage would imply, is the question to what extent the imperative can stand also in prohibitions, i.e. be combined with a negation.

With reference to *Aeneid* 6. 544 (the shade of Deiphobus to the Sibyll) *ne saeui, magna sacerdos* ‘do not rage, great priestess’, Servius remarks in his learned commentary that this same phrase *ne saeui* occurs in Terence (*Andria* 868; cf. Donatus *ad loc.*), and that it was | *antique dictum, nam nunc ‘ne saeuias’ dicimus, nec imperatiuum adiungimus* (‘an archaic expression, for now we say *ne saeuias* and we do not use the imperative’). In other words, a Latin grammarian of the imperial period felt the combination of *ne* with the imperative, which he met in Terence and Vergil, as something abnormal in his own language, as something which had to be excused with the plea of archaism. If we review the actual usage of classical prose, it emerges that *ne*+ imperative is, indeed, completely avoided. In prohibitions and warnings, we find either *ne*+ subjunctive (present or another tense) or the periphrasis *nols+ infinitive*. Practically the only exception to this is that after a positive imperative a negative one may be joined with *neque/nec*.1 Independent *ne*+ imperative is attested just three times in all of ‘good’ Latin prose, one in Livy, one in the Elder Seneca, and one in the Younger Seneca. There are several examples in poetry. Vergil has this construction also at e.g. *Aen.* 6. 74 and 698. It is supposed that he intended it to have an archaizing effect, as *ne*+ imperative appears in an unconstrained fashion in old comedy.2

From this odd state of affairs, it seems legitimate to infer that the imperative form was for positive commands only, and entered prohibitions only by analogical extension. Now, let us recall the rule in Attic about prohibitions with *μή*, formulated already in antiquity by an unknown scholar (Koch 1830–1: 437).3 By this rule, a prohibition can be conveyed either by *μή+ present imperative or

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1 This is common in verse and with the fut. impv., but in prose one finds normally *nec* + pf. subjv. (KS I, §11.2b).

2 Bennett (1910: 362) reports 66 instances in Plautus, 14 in Terence. The three prose examples are: Livy 3. 3. 9 *ne timete ‘do not fear’; Sen. Contr. 1. 2. 5 (Arelius Fuscus) *ne metue, puella ‘do not fear, girl’; Sen. Dial. 2. 19. 4 *ne repugnate ‘do not reject*: the first two are in direct speech, the third in virtual direct speech. Norden (1957: on *Aen.* 6. 544) observes that often a linguistic feature is at the same time archaic and colloquial.

3 The Greek is quoted by Stephens (1983: 69).
by $\mu \dot{\eta} +$ aorist subjunctive, while it is unheard of to express a prohibition with $\mu \dot{\eta} +$ present subjunctive or aorist imperative. This rule has been much discussed, ever since Gottfried Hermann\(^4\) and the emergence of the systematic scholarly study of syntax. As far as the present is concerned, the rule is without exception. The few apparent counterexamples of $\mu \dot{\eta} +$ present subjunctive are either based on mistakes or are not prohibitions.\(^5\) So, when Plato says, \textit{Laws} 9. 861e $\mu \dot{\eta} \tau \iota \varsigma \omicron \iota \eta \tau \iota \mu$, he is expressing a fear, ‘I fear that someone may think’. The rule against the combination of $\mu \dot{\eta}$ with the aorist imperative is also practically exceptionless, although in Homer we have (\textit{Il.} 4. 410, \textit{Od.} 24. 248) $\mu \dot{\eta} \varepsilon \nu \theta e o$ ‘do not place’ and (\textit{Il.} 18. 134) $\mu \dot{\eta} \kappa a \tau a d \dot{\delta} \sigma e o$ ‘do not go down into’. But I remind you of what was said earlier (I, 212 above), that the middle imperative forms are not true imperative forms at all, but unaugmented forms of the preterite serving to supplement the paradigms of the imperative. | In essence, then, $\varepsilon \nu \theta e o$ and $\kappa a \tau a d \dot{\delta} \sigma e o$ do not break the rule.\(^6\) A $\mu \dot{\eta}$ with a genuine strong aorist imperative, such as $^{*} \mu \dot{\eta} \delta \dot{\delta} \sigma$, $^{*} \mu \dot{\eta} \sigma \tau \dot{\eta} \dot{\theta} \iota$, would be completely anomalous in Homer and is never found. However, two passages of Attic poetry have been adduced where $\mu \dot{\eta}$ is combined with the sg. 2 imperative of the weak aorist. Most frequently cited by the grammarians is a fragment of Sophocles’ \textit{Pelæus} (\textit{TrGF IV}, fr. 493) $\mu \dot{\eta} \phi \varepsilon \vartheta \sigma o n o v$, $\delta \ Z e ù$ ‘do not deceive me, Zeus’ (reproduced in a parody by Aristophanes, \textit{Thesmo. 870}). There is a second example in the comic poet Thugenides, fr. 4 (\textit{PCG VII} $\mu \dot{\eta} \nu \omicron \mu \xi \sigma o n o v$ ‘do not think’. Two quite isolated examples, then!\(^7\) It should also be noted that the origin of the ending -$\sigma o n$ is as yet not quite clear. I see in it an old infinitive, to be compared with the Vedic infinitive in -\textit{sani}; Kretschmer (1920: 118–20) compares it with the Sanskrit gerundive in -\textit{tvi}.\(^8\)

\(^4\) In his edn of Viger (1672), pp. 458–9 of the 3rd German edn, pp. 166–7 of Seager’s English tr.

\(^5\) The first example of $\mu \dot{\eta} +$ pres. subjv. appears to be in the Septuagint, Tobias 3: 3 (Schwyzer & Debrunner 315).

\(^6\) These forms and their construction have been much discussed!—on $\kappa a \tau a d \dot{\delta} \sigma e o$, in particular, one of six ‘mixed aorists’, with -$\sigma$ and thematic vowel, see now Stephens (1983: 76–8), who follows Chantraine (1958: 416–18; cf. 1953: 230–1) and Risch (1974: 250) in deriving the type from the desiderative / future (W. himself (1897: 47) saw them as imperfects to $s$-presents). Stephens (1983) supposes that they are the only three of as many as thirteen aorist subjunctives in the text of Homer which could not be replaced with subjunctives without violation of the metre: in his view, the other ten (7 II., 3 Od.) were replaced, relatively recently, with aorist subjunctives of the same metrical pattern (e.g. $\lambda \iota \pi e \theta \omega o n o v$ with $\lambda \iota \pi e \theta \omega o n o v$ at II. 23. 407). Compare Smith (1979: 45–50), followed by Edwards (1991: on II. 18. 134), who attributes the presence of the three Homeric examples to ‘the pressure of familiar phrasing or the transfer of phrases to new positions in the hexameter’ (p. 50). Note also the two Homeric examples of $\mu \dot{\eta} \tau \iota \varsigma +$ sg. 3 aor. impv. (II. 16. 200; Od. 16. 301), which W. subsumes under the future imperative below.

\(^7\) The parody, however, guarantees the reality and the oddity of the tragic use, which may be in deliberate imitation of epic. There are now two more examples, which W. could not have known: Aeschylus, \textit{Theoi}, fr. 78c, line 54 (\textit{TrGF III} $\mu \dot{\eta} \alpha \pi a i \pi e$ ‘don’t refuse!’, Callimachus, \textit{Heale}, fr. 233 Pfeiffer = 7 Holllis $\mu \dot{\eta} \pi \iota \dot{\mu} \dot{\iota} \dot{\iota}$ ‘don’t drink!’). For good discussion of all these examples, see Smith (1979: 48–50).

\(^8\) Where, if anywhere, W. published his comparison of Gk -$\sigma o n$ with Ved. -\textit{sâni}, I do not know—there is no ref. to it in \textit{Ai. Gr.} II.2, §751. Cf. Schwyzer 803, Rix (1976: §288c), Meier-Brügger (1992: II, 52), all favouring in one way or another a nominal / infinitival origin for Gk -$\sigma o n$. Ved. -\textit{sâni} (attested in seven or eight roots in the \textit{Ṛgveda} only) has more recently been compared with the Gk infin. in -\textit{e} -, -\textit{e}v (< *-\textit{s}e\textit{n}, *-\textit{e}se\textit{n}); see Jeffers (1975: 134), Szemerényi (1996: 325 and n. 9).
Plainly, there is a parallel with Latin here. Not, admittedly, for the present but for aorist utterances, the Latin rule for a prohibition is to use not the imperative but a subjunctive form. This similarity is not accidental. The situation becomes clear if we venture a step back in time, to Sanskrit. Here, in the oldest form of the language, the true imperative, i.e. the sg. 2 (cf. I, 212 above), is confined exclusively to positive commands, and its combination with the prohibitive particle ma¯´ (corresponding to Gk μη) is not allowed. The same restriction is true also of the oldest part of the Avesta, the songs composed by Zoroaster himself, while Young Avestan, like later Sanskrit, combines μη also with the imperative. This sort of formal contrast between command and prohibition is found also in non-Indo-European languages: MISTELI points out (1893: 22, 485 f.) that in Arabic and Hebrew the imperative does not tolerate any negative with it, and that these languages use another form in prohibitions. This is broadly true of the other Semitic languages, too. In Modern High German, as in French, the formal distinction between command and prohibition has been given up, although traces of it have been observed in the old Germanic languages by JACOBSOHN (1913), and in Italian you say mangia (impv.) for ‘eat!’ but non mangiare (infin.) for ‘don’t eat!’.

Latin prose usage is, then, more ancient than that of Plautus’ comedy, and continues an old Indo-European regularity. It is striking that such refinements are preserved over millennia. And when we find in Greek that it is only the aorist imperative that is excluded from prohibitions, we can make sense of this, too, with reference to Sanskrit, in that in prohibitions in that language as a rule only aorist forms of the injunctive are used. Consequently, the prohibitive injunctive was established only in the aorist, and in Greek the imperative with μη remained excluded specifically from the aorist. Conversely, it was originally not normal to express prohibitions in the present, and as this innovation began to appear in Greek, there was no traditional combination of μη with a non-imperative form to stand in the way of this very plausible use of the imperative. Consequently, μη + the sg. 2 present imperative is common already in Homer. In this way, Lat. nē saeuı̇, etc. is easier to understand. 12

9 It is true also of Hittite, where, with very few exceptions, the prohibitive particle lē (< IE *mē) combines with the indicative, not the imperative; see Friedrich (1960: 159) and Stephens (1983: 69–71).

10 The Semitic imperative makes only 2nd-person forms, and in prohibitions (and other persons) another mood, the ‘jussive’, is used, ‘the simplest form of which would be identical with the preterite if there were no differences in the stress’, and which is closely related to the apocopated imperfect of Classical Arabic and Hebrew (Lipiński 1997: 336, 351). See McCarter (2004: 148–9) on Hebrew and the relevant sections in the other Semitic chapters (chs 8–16) of Woodard (2004), and, for a comparative survey of the forms and uses of the imperative and jussive in the Semitic languages, Moscati (1969: 134–6, 145–6) and Lipiński (1997: 356–8, 366–8).

11 For example, the Gothic sg. 2 impv. āgis ‘fear’, which is used esp. in prohibitions, continues an old pf. short-vowel subjv., and the OHG equivalents of Lat. nōtī, nōlite (ni curī, ni curet) contain past optatives (old aorist injunctives) (Braune and Reiffenstein §322 n. 2).

12 The hypothesis (of Helmut Rix) that Proto-Italic had a separate modal category (the ̀a-‘preventive’) for prohibitions and negative purpose clauses is illuminatingly discussed (and rejected) by de Melo (2004).
At this point in the discussion, it might seem odd that旅游度假 is so rarely used with original injunctive forms such as ἔνθεο (I, 215 above), when in Vedic the combination of मां with the injunctive is regular. But it was precisely the injunctives which came at an early date under the influence of the imperative and were made subject to the same rules. The same holds for Latin, where only the original (quasi-injunctive) pl. 2 in -te retained formally, too, the character of an imperative (cf. I, 212 above).

It is in the nature of the imperative that it favours independent expressions, and consequently you hardly ever find it, either in Latin or in German, as the verb of a subordinate clause. It should be noted, however, that in Old Saxon, Old High German, and Middle High German, the imperative is found in that-clauses after verbs of saying: this is just the form of command normal in direct speech carried over into the dependent clause (cf. Kretschmer 1920: 115–18).

The imperative of the dependent clause is frequently attested in Greek (KG I, 238–9), as in the common phrase οἶδα ὅδε δράσαν, οἶδα ὅ δει γενέσθων ‘you know what you must do’ (or as a question, ‘do you know what you must do?’), and the like. It is common in Attic poetry, once in Sophocles, frequent in Euripides and the comic poets. The explanation of the usage may lie in the non-imperatival—infinival—origin of the formation in -σον (I, 215 above), although we find also (Eur. Iph. Taur. 1203) οἶδα νων ἃ μοι γεγένεσθω (‘you know then what must happen (lit., let it happen, sg. 3 impv.) for me’).

Another case, not so easily explicable, occurs in Latin. The imperative puta ‘think!, reckon!’ came early to be used like a particle, with the meaning ‘for instance’ (e.g. Horace, Satires, 2. 5. 32 ‘Quinte’, puta, aut ‘Publi’ ‘say, “Quintus”, for example, or “Publius”’). Now, instead of puta in this sense, you could say ut puta. Here, however, we have an imperative form in a subordinate clause, but only because the original meaning had been lost and there was no longer any sense of a command. The first occurrence of ut puta is in the Priapea, 37. 6 ut Phoebu φοβέρα φιλίος | Phoebi (‘such as Phoebus or Phoebus’ son’). The separation of this puta from the imperative finds expression also in its preservation of the phonologically regular short final -ā, in contrast with, say, amā (‘love!’), which has taken by analogy the long -ā that predominates in 1st-conjugation imperatives.

The sophist Protagoras is supposed to have criticized Homer for using the imperative in the first line of both his epics: μὴν ἄειδε, θεά (‘sing, goddess, the wrath’) and ἄνδρα μοι ἔννεπε, Μοῦσα (‘tell me, Muse, of the man’), on the grounds that ἄειδε and ἔννεπε are commands, and that it was not seemly to command a

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13 Kretschmer adduces, with reference to an article by J. Grimm, German examples of the type MHG ich sage dir, was du tu (lit. ‘I tell you what you Do! [imperative’]).
14 That is, *puþa* was subject to iambic shortening; cf. n. 15, p. 270 above.
15 Cf. Aristotle, Poetics 19, 1456b15, and the scholiast on II, 1. 1.
divinity. Protagoras was the first grammarian, and in particular the first syntactician. When a theory appears for the first time, it is an easy tendency to go overboard and to overconstrain the facts. But there must be something behind Protagoras’s reported remark. We may infer from it that the imperative really was felt to have a certain abruptness and determination. Related to this is the fact that we find extremely often, from the earliest Greek on, not the imperative but, say, the 2nd person optative (i.e. the expression of a wish), and that this happens above all when the command is to a superior or a divinity: ‘I wish you to do such and such’, ‘would that you might do it’.16 Now, this tendency to be polite by using optative for imperative was not confined to Greek. In each of the languages that concern us, the optative is used as a milder form of command. Here and there, this has led to genuine changes of usage, to the extent that the optative has frequently replaced the old imperative. Sometimes this is a general replacement, as in Slavic, where only the optative form of command has survived, the imperative having disappeared altogether;17 sometimes it affects just particular verbs. In Gothic the verb ‘to be’ and the so-called preterito-presents have only the optative command. Just so, modern German sei (‘be!’) is actually an old optative form, while in earlier German the true imperative vis was still used, which survives as bis in modern Swiss German dialects.18 It may be that the -i of the imperative δίδοι ‘give!’ (in Pindar and early Corinthian inscriptions) comes from the optative. This is certainly the case for the -i of Lat. noli, nolite, nolito.19

Now to the imperatives in -to, and their accessories! Here Latin must lead the way. For ages, Latin grammars have taught that in the 2nd-person imperative, singular and plural, active and passive, the normal forms in -e, -te, -re, -mini had present meaning, while the parallel forms in -tō, -tōte, -tor, -minō(r) had future meaning. There have been times when this doctrine has been doubted, but it is amply confirmed by the usage of especially Old Latin.20 In a way, of course, any

16 Examples are collected by W. (1895: 26–30); cf. Goodwin §725.
17 Cf. for the forms and a brief history, Lunt (2001: 98–9, 246): the impv. markers -e and -i must go back to a diphthong *-ai, which appears to continue the IE (thematic) optative suffix */-ai/. For more detail, see Entwistle & Morison (1949: esp. 113–16), Arumaa (1985: 309–11) with further references, and Schenker (1993: 94); on this phenomenon in Baltic, see Ernst Fraenkel (1950: 33).
18 On Gothic, cf. Krahe & Seebold §§100, 101; on OHG, Braune & Reiffenstein §378 w. n. 3, noting that pl. 2 opt. sit occasionally does service for pl. 2 impv. wēset as early as the 9th c. The sg. 2 impv. bis (once in OHG, common in MHG) is analogical on bim, bist ‘I am, you are’. 19 In δίδοι (four or five times in Pindar, in two Bocotian inscriptions, and in a restoration in one Corinthian inscription), W. (1895: 25–35) sees an imperative modified on the analogy of optatives used in prayers; Strunk (1962) explains it rather as a literary Aeolic form analogical on indicative δίδοις. Cf. the commentators, including Gerber (1982: on Ol. 1. 85) and Verdenius (1987: on Ol. 7. 89), and, for an overview of the whole question, Hummel (1993: 262–4). In Lat. nolē, what looks like a 4th-conjugation impv. must be a new form based on a reinterpretation of nolite as an impv. rather than what in fact it was, namely the old optative (Lat. subjunctive) *neud-i-tē, the long -i- being the so-called ‘zero-grade’ (weak, or unaccented) form of the IE ablauting athematic optative suffix */-tē/ (cf. /-is-tē/). See Meiser (1998: 224), Weiss (forthc.: ch. 33, §I.D.6).
20 Cf. Lindsay (1907: 72), Bennett (1910: 354–61).
imperative has future reference; something ordered belongs always to future time. But there is the near future and the more remote future, and the reference of the forms in -to is, for the most part, to the remote, in contrast to the normal imperative. This can be demonstrated from many passages, such as Plautus, Pseudolus 647 tu epistulam hanc a me accipe atque illi dato ‘take (pres. impv.) this letter from me and (then) give (fut. impv.) it to him’. The taking (accipe) is something that has to be performed immediately after the utterance, the giving (dato) is something for later performance, after the taking. Compare Pseudolus 20 cape has tabellas, tute binc narrato tibi ‘take this letter and (then) discover the truth for yourself from it’. The collocation of a normal imperative with one in -to giving a command to be carried out later is attested very frequently in comedy, but it is not confined to early colloquial Latin. Cicero also attests examples, and there is a very nice instance in Vergil, in his well-known early work, Catalepton 5.21

He addresses the Camenae at line 11 ite binc, Camenae ‘go now hence, Camenae’, and then at 13–14 et tamen meas chartas | reuisitote ‘but still do come back later to my pages’. It could not be clearer that ite gives something to be carried out immediately, reuisitote a wish for the more remote future. A nice observation was added by Havet (1808): in Plautus the greetings salue and salueto differ in that salueto is always in reply to an earlier greeting, obviously meaning ‘then greetings to you, too!’.

No less instructive on this imperative in -to are the numerous places where it is attached to a clause with future reference, as e.g. Plautus, Pseudolus 257 ducito, quando habebis ‘when you have the money, then you can take the goods’, i.e. the taking is to take place not immediately but in the future when the having begins. Very similar is the -to imperative belonging to a subordinate clause with future perfect, e.g. Plautus, Asinaria 228 remeato audacter, mercedem si cris nactus; nunc abi ‘if you get the payment, come boldly back; now go’, where the following nunc abi makes the future character of remeato particularly clear. Here, too, we are not dependent on Plautus alone: note Horace, Satires 2. 5. 74–5 scribet mala carmina necors, laudato ‘if the idiot writes bad poems, then praise them!’. |

Admittedly, the -to forms are occasionally used also in a weakened sense, where a normal imperative is expected, and the -to form can even be the regular substitute for the normal form. So, the only imperatives attested for the present perfect memini (‘I remember’) are memento, mementote, obviously because the normal imperative forms of the perfect (e.g. pl. 2 *memento) were too

21 Scholars are now more sceptical about Vergil’s authorship of any of the fourteen or fifteen epigrams in the collection entitled Catalepton; for bibliography, see A. Schiesaro’s article ‘Appendix Vergiliana’ in OCD. The sequence pres. impv.—fut. impv. is very rare in Cicero (e.g. For Cluentius 124, Against Verres 3. 41), and probably serves a rhythmical rather than a semantic purpose, since the regular thing (common already in Plautus) is simply to use sequences of pres. impvs. W.’s next observation, however, does apply to Cicero (and other classical authors), e.g. Tusculan Disputations 1. 103 (quoting Socrates) si me assequi potieris ... sepelito ‘if you can catch me... then bury me’.
odd-looking, and in the whole of Latin the command ‘know!’ in the singular is always scito, never once *seī. Here we should not agonize with misguided sophistication over a special meaning. This is based simply on a rhythmical tendency, found in various languages, to avoid monosyllables in emphatic words. It is for this reason alone that scito completely ousted the bare *seī. In later Latin this phenomenon recurs. In the Latin Bible the command ‘be!’ is always esto, never es, while ī ‘go!’ is replaced with uade (cf. French and Italian va), this in connection with the emergence of uadis for īs, etc. 22

It is easy to understand why the -to imperatives are usual also in very general instructions and prescriptions, as e.g. in Cato, On Agriculture 141. 2 Iamnum Iouemque uino praefamino; sic dico ‘then address a preliminary prayer with wine to Janus and Jupiter; use the following words’. Such instructions belong not merely to the present but to all future time. 23

This special meaning of the -to forms is old and inherited. It is found just so in the Sanskrit imperative forms in -tād, the ending of which corresponds exactly to Lat. -tō, from earlier -tād. The Germanic languages and literary Greek have given up the ability to express this fine distinction through verbal endings. In Greek in particular, -tω, etc. has survived as an imperative ending but only in the 3rd person (on which more in a moment). Even so, the dialects preserve traces of an earlier state of affairs. In the abundant lexicon of Hesychius (?5th c. AD), the form ἐλθὲῖν ‘come!’ is adduced from the language of Salamis on Cyprus with the meaning ἐλθὲ ‘come!’! Curtius (1859: 297) recognized that the -tωs is to be compared with the Latin -tō, the final -s being a later addition, 24 and he later (1870: 187–8) followed this up with reference to a second Hesychius gloss, which we might also attribute to the dialect of Cyprus. It is transmitted nonsensically as φατώσαν γνώθι and Curtius proposed to read φατώσαν ἀνάγνωθι. Now, ἀνάγνωθι means ‘read!’ and perhaps we may make sense of this by supposing that in the official language of a Greek community an old form ἐλθέ ‘speak!’ formed just like ἐλθὲῖν ‘come!’ was preserved for commanding someone to read something aloud, a frequent occurrence in the adducing of documents in public business. Admittedly, the lexicographer glosses these Greek forms corresponding to the Latin 2nd-person -tō with normal imperatives, but the existence of the forms allows us to suppose that future meaning was once available in Greek, too.

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22 On Lat. *seī, ī, etc., cf. W. (1906: 180–3) in his famous article on the size and the shape of words, corrected and supplemented by Strunk (1987), who points out (336–7) that ī is well attested until Late Latin and that monosyllabic stā ‘stand!’ is never replaced.

23 Note, however, that the first impv. in this chapter, on purifying ploughland, is pres., impera ‘command’!

24 In Old Latin, these imperatives are in -tād, just like Skt -tāt or -tād. Curtius supposed that the development in Greek was *-tād > -tō > -tōs; he compared the addition of the -s to the development seen in Greek adverbs in -tōs supposedly from -o < the IE abl. sg. ending *-ōd.
The -tō forms of the imperative were originally not marked for number and voice; only later, although still in prehistoric times, were special forms made for plural and middle. Forms such as persequito (‘pursue’, Cato, Agr. 49. 2) in Old Latin preserve a trace of the old situation, but I cannot go into this in detail here. To start with, the -tō forms were unmarked even for person, so that -tō in Latin is used also for the 3rd person, and it is this part of the old use of the formation that Greek has preserved. Both languages show innovations in the dual, plural, and middle of the 3rd person, too. This use in the 3rd person suits well what we established for the meaning of the 2nd person in -to, in that an instruction to a third party cannot be carried out immediately, but must first be conveyed, involving a necessary element of futurity in the 3rd-person imperative.—Germanic has not inherited this 3rd-person use of the -tō forms any more than their use in the 2nd person. In general, the subjunctive (optative) is used instead, except that Gothic experiments with a peculiar new form for sg. and pl. 3.

It is striking that both Latin and Greek from the earliest times attest the -tō forms also in prohibitions. The Twelve Tables (451/0 BC) have with indefinite subject 10. 1 hominem mortuom in urbe ne sepelito neu urito (‘one is not to bury or burn a dead body in the city’); an old Saturnian line (DIEHL 1959) reads, ne tangito, o mortalis (‘do not touch (this grave), mortal’). Similarly, in Homer, e.g. Od. 16. 301 μήτις ἐπειτ’ Ὀδυσσῆος ἀκουσάτω ἐνδον ἔντως, | μήτ’ οὖν Λαέρτης ἵστω τό γε μήτε συβίωτης (‘then let not anyone hear that Odysseus is in the palace, let neither Laertes know this nor the swineherd!’), and so quite frequently.—Third-person imperative forms are found also in dependent clauses, e.g. in Eur. Iph. Taur. 1203 (quoted earlier, I, 216 above), Herodotus i. 89. 11, Thuc. 4. 92. 7, and in Plato even in a question, e.g. Republic 8. 562a τί οὖν; τετάχθω

25 Active -n)tu for passive-deponent -n)tor is found esp. in early laws, so e.g. CIL I 2. 589, 8 utunto ‘let them use!’ (71 bc; Crawford 1996: no. 19), patiueto ‘let them allow’ in Cicero, Laws, 3. 4. 11, even CIL I 2. 183, 77 censento ‘let them be registered’ (123/2 bc; Crawford 1996: no. 1). Cato attests also utito ‘(then) use!’ (Agr. 96. 2), obsequito ‘(then) indulge!’ (s. 6), praefito ‘(then) address a preliminary prayer!’ (134. 1). Neue & Wagener, III, 212–13 collect the examples. On passive imperatives in Latin, see Bergh (1978).

26 Hittite and Sanskrit show that Indo-European had 3rd-person imperatives in sg. *-ntu, pl. *-ntu. In Greek and Latin, it is as if these were replaced with *-n)tod. Compare sg. 3 Greek ἐγγοῦ ‘let him be’, ἀγγεῖο ‘let him lead, drive’, Lat. estō, agitō; Latin inscriptions down to the 2nd c. bc attest the original final consonant, in e.g. estōd, licētōd, vio latōd, dataōd. To judge from its use in Vedic, the fut. impv. in *-tōd was originally unmarked for either person or voice: the ending *-tōd is generally regarded as the abl. sg. of the demonstrative pronoun that was to give the definite article in Greek, meaning ‘from this’, added to the basic impv. On these endings in Indo-European, and their analogical extension in the daughter languages, see Leumann 229, 571–3, Szemerényi (1996: 247–9), Weiss (forthc.: ch. 32, §§ III.AI.c, 3), all with further refs.


28 See now Crawford’s edition of the Twelve Tables (1996: II, 704–5). An even older example of nē + tō(d) is in the last fifteen letters of the so-called ‘Duens’ inscription, one of our very oldest texts in Latin, nē med malos tātōd famously divided and translated by Rix (1985) as ‘let not a bad man steal me!’ (cf. Gordon 1983: 77–8; Vine 1993: 373–4).
ημίν κατὰ δημοκρατίαν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνήρ, . . . ; (‘well, then, is this the sort of man that we should regard (lit., let him be in a state of having been assigned by us) as corresponding to democracy?’). Answer: τετάχθω (lit., ‘let him have been assigned!’), sg. 3 pf. pass. impv.).

The Indian grammatical tradition gives forms in the paradigms of the imperative also for the 1st person, in both voices and all three numbers. It was long ago recognized that these forms represent simply relics of the old subjunctive, otherwise lost in classical Sanskrit. Anyway, it is obvious that an imperative expression is not thinkable in sg. 1, although possibly in du. and pl. 1, as the speaker can tell one or more others to do something with him. Latin and Greek | both use for the latter function simply the pl. 1 of the ‘subjunctive’, while the Germanic languages have special forms. Modern German makes use of expressions with lass uns (‘let us’, with sg. impv., for the dual), last uns (with pl. impv., for the plural) (cf. I, 75 above), and also the type, current since the end of the eighteenth century, gehen wir (Lat. eamus ‘let us go’), which is probably formed on analogy with the pl. 2 imperative with postposed vocative personal pronoun, geht ihr! (lit., ‘go, ye!’). The older Germanic languages use, for the most part, the pl. 1 of the so-called subjunctive (properly, the IE optative), that is, they behave like Latin and Greek. But in the earliest period, since the pl. 2 indicative was always formally identical with the pl. 2 imperative, the pl. 1 indicative was used also as an imperative. Gothic uses this so-called ‘adhortative’ in -am, when the meaning of the verb or the context ensures that it cannot be misinterpreted as an indicative. Traces of this use are found also in the very earliest documents in Old High German; see Behaghel (1918a) and Braune (1918).

Apart from the imperative, Greek has three moods, Latin and Germanic only two. The greater variety in Greek is explained by the fact that Greek has more faithfully preserved the old state of affairs. As the oldest stages of the related languages show, the Indo-European parent language had alongside the indicative two different modal forms for non-indicative utterances, i.e. what we call subjunctive and optative. What we find in Latin and Germanic arises from impoverishment or simplification of use. This simplification must, however, have been

29 The old subjunctive is reflected in the absence of accent and in the long -ā- in the Sanskrit imperatives given by the grammarians for sg. du. pl. 1 active -āni, -āva, -āma, and middle -āi, -āvalai, -āmahai. Note, however, that in a sentence such as ‘let’s go!’ (dual) it is normal to use the indicative, gacchāvah, rather than the impv. gacchāvha (Coulson 2006: 128–30).

30 In NHG, the addition of the pronoun in pl. 2 geht ihr! and sg. 2 geh du! is optional and emphatic, in pl. 1 gehen wir! and the polite pl. 2, gehen Sie!, it is obligatory (Hammer & Durrell 1991: §12.2.1).

31 So, e.g. Gothic pl. 1 indic. and adhortative nimam (‘take’) vs optative nimaima; OHG pl. 1 indic. and adhort. nėmamēs vs opt. nēmēn. Otfrid retains adhort. forms in -mēs, but generally in OHG from the 9th c. the optative form ousted not only the adhortative but also the indicative (Braune & Reiffenstein §312 w. nn., Wilmanns III, §110.4). In Indo-European terms, one should perhaps speak of injunctive rather than indicative (cf. Krahe & Seebold §87).
very plausible, as it occurs in other Indo-European languages, too. In the European languages of the family, a levelling has occurred everywhere except in Greek. Even in Sanskrit, the subjunctive, which stands beside the optative in the oldest texts, disappeared early on.32

Especially noteworthy, however, is the fact that even Greek did not maintain both moods. We can show that already in the Hellenistic period the optative had been practically eliminated from the living language. In the New Testament, apart from the phrase common especially in Paul, μη γένοιτο ‘let it not happen’, it is very rare, and in some texts, e.g. the first and fourth Gospels, never found. In keeping with this development, the optative is completely unknown in modern Greek, with the exception, again, of μη γένοιτο (cf. I, 238–9 below).33

For obvious reasons, we shall begin by considering the meaning of the two forms in Greek, and then turn to the simplified states of affairs that we encounter in German and Latin.

32 In Vedic, the subjunctive is commoner than the optative, but only vestiges of it remain in Classical Sanskrit (Whitney 1880: §§557–63; Macdonell 1916: §215c; it is not even indexed in Coulson 2006).

33 On the replacement of the ancient optative, see Schwizer & Debrunner 337–8 and Turner (1963: 118), with older bibliography, Browning (1983: 30 and n. 11), with references to the controversy over the place of the optative in literary Greek of the Hellenistic and Roman periods, Horrocks (1997a: 35, 33–4, 76), and Evans (2001: 175–80), a wide-ranging recent survey with rich bibliography. On modern Greek, it is worth adding that, while in W.’s day the indicative and subjunctive (although pronounced identically) were distinguished in spelling (cf. Thumb 1910: §179), nowadays they differ only in the particles, including the negative, which accompany the finite verb-form (Holton et al. 1997: 204–5). Of some 39 examples of the optative of wish in the New Testament, 28 are in St Paul and 13 of these 28 are μη γένοιτο (Turner 1963: 120–2); cf. Blass & Debrunner (1913 [= 1961]: §§3 n. 4, 128–5, 384, 440). In the modern language, beside μη γένοιτο note also φαιλαξοί, as in θεός φαιλαξοί ‘God forbid!’, a hybrid, non-ancient form, in which the opt. ending -οι is added to the σ-аor. stem (Evans 2001: 177 n. 7).
In Greek, the verb in all three moods can be accompanied by a modal particle that specifies the modal meaning more closely. This particle differs from words like German *wohl*, English *well*, in that it has a significant effect on the meaning of the modal form of the verb, and its use is subject to strict rules. The Danish classicist Madvig compares the modal particle of Greek with those of Chinese, where mood is expressed exclusively by means of particles.¹ In Greek the form in question is the familiar particle ἀν, and its cognates in the dialects. Much has already been written on the subject, and Gottfried Hermann devotes to it almost an entire volume of his *Opuscula* (1827–39: IV, 1–204, *Quattuor libri de particula ἀν*—first published 1826–7). As for its etymology, it is tempting to identify it with the homonymous particles of Latin and Gothic. Latin an introduces direct and indirect questions, especially the second part of a double question, so that we often have to translate it with ‘or’ or ‘or whether’. Gothic an, too, serves exclusively to introduce questions, in particular urgent questions picking up something said by someone else. So, for instance, at Luke 10: 29, where Jesus says to the scholar, ‘Love your neighbour as yourself’, and he replies, καὶ τίς ἔστιν μοι πλησίον; ‘and who is then my neighbour?’, the Gothic version has an hwas ist mis nehvundja?

An equation of Gothic an with Greek ἀν is possible phonologically and favoured by semantic considerations, since both lend their respective clauses a shade of uncertainty, and both often refer to a situation that is already given. The restriction of the particle in Greek to questions, and its exclusion from clause-initial position in Greek (for more on this, see the section on word order²), will derive from later developments.—Latin an, by contrast, is problematic. Attention was drawn long ago by Ebel (1857: 208), and later emphatically by Skutsch (1892: 59–60; 1902b: 105–10), to the fact that in Old Latin an alternates in most of

¹ The comparison is made by Madvig in a lecture of 1881 entitled ‘What is linguistics?’ (a version of which is printed in Madvig 1971: 345–57, here at 352). Some of these ‘particles’ of Mandarin Chinese would now be described rather as auxiliary verbs. Palmer (1986: 38–9, 88–9) lists and illustrates both these and sentence-final particles with references to Li & Thompson’s grammar of Mandarin (1981: 173 ff., 238 ff.). On approaches to discourse particles in general, see Fischer (2006), especially the papers therein by Fraser, Waltereit, and Weydt. On modal particles in particular, with special reference to French, see Mosegaard Hansen (1998: esp. 41–6). On discourse markers (rather different from ἀν) in Latin, note Kroon (1998).

² A forlorn hope, alas, on W.’s part!
its functions with the synonymous \textit{anne}, which must go back to \textit{*at-ne}. And in keeping with the syncope of word-final vowels in Old Latin, brilliantly demonstrated by Skutsch, \textit{an} can be simply the shorter by-form of \textit{anne}, as \textit{ne}c and \textit{seu} are of \textit{neque} and \textit{sine}. Perhaps Lat. \textit{an} represents the merger of the old particle of indeterminacy attested in Greek and Gothic with \textit{am}(e) that marks a contrast with what precedes. The latter suits Latin \textit{an} meaning ‘or . . . ?’, while \textit{an} in e.g. \textit{nescio an}, \textit{dubito an} (‘I do not know/I doubt whether’) is hard to relate to \textit{*at-ne} (\textit{baud scio an} at Terence, \textit{Self-Tormentor} 999 occurs only in the later manuscripts), although easy to connect with Gothic \textit{an}.—This, then, sheds some light on the prehistoric starting point of the use of Greek \textit{āv}.

However, it is well known that this \textit{āv} is not common to all forms of Greek, but confined to Attic, Ionic, and Arcadian. All the other Greek dialects have, not \textit{āv}, but a particle beginning with \textit{k}- used in precisely the same way as \textit{āv}: \textit{κ(e)(v)} in Lesbian, Thessalian, and Cyprian (known from inscriptions in a non-Greek script\textsuperscript{4}), and \textit{κα} (scanned long in verse, e.g. at Ar. \textit{Adh.} 799, Theocr. 1. 4) in Doric, Elean, and Boeotian. It used to be thought necessary to suppose a third \textit{k}-particle, \textit{καν}, for Arcadian, where conditional clauses requiring the hypothetical particle are introduced by \textit{eikāv}. But Schulze (1890: 1502–3 = 1966: 672) showed that, whenever \textit{δe} is used, we revert to \textit{āv} (i.e. \textit{eI δe (āv)}), and he rightly inferred that \textit{eikāv} is to be segmented not as \textit{eI + καν} but as \textit{eik + αv}, and that \textit{eik} stands to \textit{eI} (‘if’) as \textit{οvκ} (‘not’) to \textit{ov}, viz. as the form used before a vowel. In Homer, \textit{κe} and \textit{āv} are used side by side and interchangeably, a peculiarity shared by those forms of poetry which imitate Homeric language. This simply reflects the fact that Homer’s language is a colourful mixture, \textit{κe} belonging to the Acolic, \textit{āv} to the Ionic component of the epic idiom. The forms \textit{κe} and \textit{κα} have been compared with particles in several related languages which begin with \textit{k}- and express a modal relationship (see especially Solmsen (1899: 463–72), on Slavic \textit{ka}, \textit{ko}). It is, however, extremely striking that they are absolutely synonymous with \textit{āv}.

\textsuperscript{3} In a note in \textit{ms. add.}, dated to 1932, W. remarks that Skutsch is wrong, and that the disjunctive meaning of Lat. \textit{an} is secondary. For further references to early discussion of the etymology and basic meaning of these three particles \textit{an}, see Schwyzer & Debrunner 588, and Hofmann & Szantyr 466–7; on Gk \textit{āv} in particular, see Monroe (1891: §364), Schwyzer & Debrunner 305–6 (368 on \textit{κe(v) and κα}), LfgR, s.vv. \textit{‘av} and \textit{‘ke}, Meier-Brügger (1992: I, 108).

\textsuperscript{4} That is, the Cypriot syllabary, the syllabic script used on Cyprus \textit{c.800–c.200 bc} (one inscr. may be from the 11th c. BC), which turned out to be closely related to the Linear B script, in which Mycenaean Greek was written, and which is used to write both Cypriot Greek and an otherwise obscure language conventionally labelled ‘Eteocypriot’. The decipherment of Cypriot syllabics was begun by the brilliant young Assyriologist George Smith (1871), largely accomplished by Moritz Schmidt (1874), the editor of Hesychius, and completed in an article by Heinrich Ahrens (1876). For a detailed account of the decipherment, with illustrations, see Pope (1975: ch. 6); briefer accounts are in Gordon (1968: 126–9), Chadwick (1987: 17–18, 50–6) and Bennett (1996: 130–2). The standard edn of the syllabic inscriptions is \textit{ICS} by Masson (1961, 1983); there are lexica by Egetmeyer (1992) and Hintze (1993); for further bibliography, see Meier-Brügger (1992: I, 52–3), and now, on the script and on ‘Eteocypriot’, M. Karali and O. Masson in Christidis (2007: 239–42 and 243–6).
As noted, the hypothetical particle is found in combination with all three moods, but it is completely excluded from the so-called ‘principal tenses’ of the indicative (‘Haupttempora’, i.e. present, perfect, future), except that in Homer we can perhaps occasionally recognize κε with the future, a result of the close relationship between the future and the subjunctive; ἂν sometimes occurs with the future in later Greek, too. But the particle is quite unknown with the present and perfect indicative; Apollonius Dyscolus, On Syntax 3. 21 (pp. 287–8 UHlig [= Householder 1981: 161]), explains the inadmissibility of ἂν with the perfect in terms of the present character of the latter.

In origin, ἂν and κε serve to specify the mood of the finite verb; by easy analogical extension, their use gradually expands beyond this. It extends first to clauses without a verb, where the verb is supplied by the context. At Eur. Ion 1253, e.g., Creusa asks, ποί φῦγω; (‘whither am I to flee?’, aor. subjv., deliberative), to which the chorus replies, 1255 ποί δ’ ἂν ἄλλως ἦ’ πι βομμόν; ‘where else but to the altar?’, with φῦγως (aor. opt., potential) understood from the φῦγω | of the previous sentence.—Furthermore, the particle is found already in Homer in clauses with a purely nominal predicate, as e.g. at Il. 5. 481 ὁς κ’ ἐπιδευῆς, ‘whoever is in need’ (where the copula, were it there, would be in the subjunctive: ἦ).—Secondly, however, ἂν and κε are used also with the nominal forms of the verb, the infinitive and the participle, if a finite verb phrase with ἂν or κε underlies them. [Add.: The infinitive and participle are used with ἂν only if the verb in a corresponding main clause would have ἂν, i.e. only when standing for an optative with ἂν or an unreal preterite (see esp. Krüger 1873–91: §§54.4.4; 54.12.6). Hence, it is rather hazardous to take the words τὰς ΑΝΟΔΕΑΣΑΣ (IG V.2. 262, 17, 5th c. BC, Mantinea) with Hiller von Gaertringen as τὰς ἂν ὀδὸς ἔσασε (= αἱ ἂν ὀδὸς ἔσα, ‘whichever are so’). In any case, such an abstract phrase in a fifth-century dialect inscription would be astonishing.] With the participle this usage is attested only after Homer, but there are instances with the infinitive already in Homer. A particularly clear example is at Il. 9. 684–5, in the report back to the Achaeans by the ambassadors to Achilles: καὶ δ’ ἂν τοῖς ἄλλοισαν

5 Cf. e.g. Il. 3. 138 κε…κεκλήσῃ ‘you will be called’; more often in Homer the ‘future’ may be orig. a short-vowel aor. subjv., e.g. Il. 9. 262 κε…καταλέξω ‘I shall list’. Since before W., it has been controversial whether to allow fut. indic. + ἂν / κε or to emend the text, even against all the manuscripts. See Goodwin §197, and, with further references, Moorhouse (1946), KG I, §392.1, Schwyzzer & Debrunner 351–2.

6 Friedrich Hiller von Gaertringen was the editor of several volumes of IG, and bibliographer (with Klaftenbach) of Wilamowitz. On this inscription, the so-called ‘judgement of Mantinea’, see Buck no. 17, Schmitt (1977: 83–4), and above all the full recent editions and commentaries of Dubois (1986: II, 94–111, esp. 103–4) and Thür & Tauber (1994: 75–98, esp. 83–4). Dubois following an old view, which W. implicitly supports here, takes ἂνῳδ(a) as ‘above’ (= Attic ἂνῳθεν), and translates ‘the houses which are higher up [i.e., on the mountain].’ Thür & Tauber follow Strunk (1978) in the interpretation (much closer to Hiller von Gaertringen’s) ‘whichever really belong to him (lit., are of him indeed)’, reading the Greek as τὰς ἂν σ’ ὄ(δ) (= αὐτῶι) δι(ε) (= δῇ) ἔσασε, the article + ptc. with ἂν functioning as an indefinite relative clause (cf. KG I, §398.2).
εφ’ παραμυθήσασθαι οίκα’ ἀποπλείειν, ‘he (Achilles) said that he would persuade
the others as well to sail back home again’. This is simply reproducing in indirect
speech what Achilles himself said at 9. 417, καὶ δ’ ἄν τοῖς ἄλλοισιν ἐγὼ
παραμυθησαίμην οίκα’ ἀποπλείειν.—Finally, in a yet further development, ἂν can
accompany purely nominal elements. As a consequence of its combination with
the participle, it occasionally occurs with a verbal adjective, as e.g. at Plato,
Republic 9, 577b6–7 τῶν δυνατῶν ἂν (= τῶν δυναμένων ἂν) κρίναι, ‘of those who
would be able to judge’. Euripides goes even further at Alcestis 181–2 θνήσκω. σε δ’ ἄλλη τις γνώη κεκτήσειν, σώφρων μὲν οὐκ ἄν μάλλον, εὐτυχῆς δ’ ἵσως, ‘I am dying.
You (my marriage bed) another wife will possess, certainly not better than I, but
perhaps more fortunate’, where the ἂν pushes σώφρων into the realm of hypoth-
esis, as if it had ὅσα (‘being’) with it. I note in passing that in certain combin-
ations, such as ὡσπερεινέ (‘just as if’), ἂν lost its modal meaning; the development
here is easy to trace. 7

For all the languages that concern us here, we can say that the position of the
indicative among the modal forms of the verb is similar to that of the present
among the tense forms. On the one hand, it has a well-defined specific meaning,
in that it expresses reality as opposed to what is merely wished for or possible.
But at the same time it can express, let us say, a neutrality of mood, that is, it can
be used where the intention is to express neither reality nor unreality but a
statement that does completely without modal colour. This is particularly clear
in hypothetical sentences. A much-quoted example is Euripides, fr. 286b, 7
(TrGF V.1) εἰ θεοὶ τι δρῶσι φαίλον, οὐκ εἶσαι θεοί, ‘if the gods do something
base, they are not gods’. This claims neither that they do something shameful,
nor the opposite. It is an entirely neutral form of utterance. This is true of Latin
and German, just as of Greek. It is in keeping with the form of the indicative,
which is characterized by the absence of a mood-marker. 7

However, the past forms of the indicative are used not only for what is real or
modally neutral, but also for what is straightforwardly unreal. In Greek in
particular, past indicative forms are standardly used to express an unreal state of
affairs, one which is known to be merely supposed and not actual. This occurs in
the first place in conditional sentences.

I wish here to begin with a comparison that one might make (following
Wilmanns, III, 265) with modern classical German, and with Goethe, Tasso
act 2, scene 4, und tratst du (past indic.) Herr nicht zwischen uns hinein, so stünde
(past subjv.) jetzt auch ich als pflichtvergessen . . . vor deinem Blick (‘and had you,
Lord, not stepped between us, I, too, would now be standing guilty of neglect of
duty . . . before your gaze’). Here, in the main clause, the subjunctive stünde sets

7 On ἂν with the participle, the infinitive and other nominal forms, see Goodwin §§192–229; KG I,
240–6; Schwyzer & Debrunner 407.
the statement in the sphere of the unreal, but its dependent clause also contains
an unreal event in negative form, and it has the preterite of the indicative—the
indicative used as in the hypothetical sentences mentioned above with indicative
in both parts, the preterite because it involves a past event. There are some related
passages in the plays of Schiller, e.g. William Tell, act 3, scene 3 (2060 ff.) mit
diesen zweiten Pfeil durchschoss (past indic.) ich—Euch, wenn ich mein liebes Kind
getroffen hätte (past subjv.), und Eurer—wahrlich! hätte ich nicht gefehlt (past subjv.)
(‘with this second arrow I would have shot you through, if I had hit my dear
child, and you, in truth, I would not have missed’). Here it is just the other way
round, with the past indicative in the main clause, and the subjunctive in the
subordinate clause, and the second main clause also. A final example, again from
Schiller (Wallensteins Tod, act 2, end of scene 2), with the indicative in both
clauses: warf er (past indic.) das Schwert von sich, er war verloren (past indic.)
(‘had he thrown his sword away, he would have been lost’). Note here that the
whole sentence involves past time. The indicative forms serve to express only the
strictly logical connection between the two clauses, the linking of the one to
the other. That it does not involve real events in the past is to be inferred from the
hypothetical form of the speech.

In German, then, we cannot speak of a genuine use of preterites with unreal
meaning. In Greek, on the other hand, unreality is quite consciously so expressed,
with the main clause of conditional sentences normally containing the modal
particle, which has the express effect of shifting the whole utterance, including the
dependent clause, into the realm of the hypothetical. There is an oddity here: in
Attic, the rule is normally that the imperfect is used in this sort of conditional
sentence when it refers to present time, the aorist, when it involves something
in the past. For example, at Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus 1511, with reference to
their present state of mind, and his present behaviour, Oedipus says to his two
daughters, ei μὲν εἰχέτην (du. impf.) ἡδη φρένας, πόλι' ἢ παρῆγατο (sg. 1 impf.),
‘if you two had already understanding, I would be giving you much advice’. Occasionally, however, the imperfect is used of past time, even alongside the
aorist. For instance, at Gorgias 516c2–3, Plato makes Socrates say of the long-dead
statesmen Cimon, Themistocles, and Miltiades, καὶ τοιο oὐτοι, εἰ ἡσαν ἄνδρει ἀγαθοὶ,
ὦς σὺ φῆς, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ταύτα ἐπασχοῦν (impf.), ‘and yet, had they been good men, as
you say, they would never have suffered this’. This preterital use of the unreal
imperfect never completely died out (cf. LAMBERTZ 1914/15: 75–8), but as a rule
the aorist is used of the past, the imperfect of the present. The question arises,
how does the imperfect come to make a statement about the present? We are so

8 On εἰχέτην (app. du. 3) for expected du. 2 εἰχέτον, see Jebb’s commentary, ad loc., and Curtius
9 Cf. Goodwin §410.
used to this construction that we feel no surprise. Here it is worth paying a little attention to the chronology. It emerges that this Attic rule does not yet apply in Homer, where, if we find an imperfect + ἄν and ἔλ + the imperfect in a conditional sentence, the reference is regularly to the past. The contrast with the aorist involves only the Aktionsart, as e.g. in the opposition between the imperfect of ‘to be’ in the common phrase (e.g. II. 5. 201, 22. 103) ἦ ὁ πολὺ κέρδιον ἠ, ‘indeed, it would have been much better’ (durative), and the aorist at II. 13. 676 τάχα ὁ ἄν καὶ κόδος Ἀχαιῶν ἐπλεῖστο ‘even glorious victory for the Achaens would soon have come about’ (punctual). Homer has no secure counterexamples, where the imperfect with ἄν would refer to present time. At Od. 2. 184 οὐκ ἄν τόσσα θεοπροτέων ἀγόρευες, since the ἀγορεύειν (uttering) has after all just preceded, we have no reason to translate otherwise than, ‘you would not have uttered so many prophecies’. Again, at Od. 19. 282–3 καὶ κεν πάλαι ἐνθάδ ’Οδυσσεὺς ἤν, lit. ‘Odysseus would be here for a long time already’, the πάλαι situates the content of the utterance in the past (i.e. ‘would have been here a long time ago’). The possibility of using the imperfect with reference to the present arose only after Homer, the earliest examples being in Xenophanes of Colophon (6th / 5th c. BC, Diels & KRANZ no. 21, e.g. B15. 1, 4). This shift of meaning is nothing so extraordinary. In the Romance languages, too, many forms which were originally and early on used of unreal events in present time, came eventually to be used also of unreal events in past time (cf. MEYER-LÜBKE 1890–1902: III, 738). It is probably legitimate to say that in such cases the speaker’s attention was directed not so much at the point of time as at the unreal nature of what the form expressed, and hence applied a form for unreal statements in the past to unreal statements generally. The Greek shift can also be understood in this way. On the same phenomenon in English, cf. DEUTSCHBEIN (1926: 92 [= 1931: 103]).

Different from the above are Latin idioms like that in Tacitus, Annals i. 63. 6 trudebantur in paludem ...ni Caesar productas legiones instruxisset, ‘they would have been driven (lit., were being driven) into the swamp, had not Caesar drawn up the legions’. Expressions of this sort are elliptical: ‘they were being driven into the swamp, (and it would have come to that), had not . . . ’. Compare the use of Latin -turus eram (lit. ‘was about to . . .’) in an unreal sense.

10 Cf. Goodwin §435, Monro (1891: §244), Chantraine (1953: 226–7). Note, however, that in Homer the optative is normal in both present and past unreal conditions (e.g. II. 23. 274–5, s. 311–12; cf. Chantraine 1953: 276–9).

11 This is the famous fragment about human anthropomorphic representations of the gods: if animals had hands (ei χεῖρας ἔχων, unaugmented impf.) and could paint, they too would make images (ἰδέας ἔργαθορ, impf.) of the gods like themselves. Goodwin §436 cites Theognis 905 (but only with the verb ‘to be’) and Pindar, Nem. 4. 13.

12 Cf. e.g. Ovid, Tristia 1. 7. 40 emendaturus, si licuisset, eram ‘if I had been allowed to do so, I would have removed the faults’; see KS §215.4, Gildersleeve & Lodge §897 nn. 2–3.
I now come to a second, and rather different, type of unreal use of the preterite, namely that found in expressions of moral obligation, necessity, ability, possibility, or probability. In German we illogically use the subjunctive in such expressions, if what is possible or required is not, or was not, realized (e.g. in ich sollte das tun (‘I should do that’), ich hätte das tun sollen (‘I should have done that’)), even though the obligation applies regardless. Latin is on the whole stricter in this regard, saying possum or debeo hoc facere where in German we say ich könnte or ich müsste das tun (‘I would be able’ or ‘I would have to do this’). So, too, Latin debbam, debui ‘I ought to have’, and Greek ἔξην ‘it would have been possible’, and so on. Note, however, that these expressions can be used in their preterital forms of a possibility or duty in present time which has not been realized. This is frequently observed in Attic, and in Latin, too, from Varro, Cicero, and Lucretius on (cf. Blase 1903: 149–52). So, to take a Latin example, we find in Cicero, Att. 13. 26. 2 etsi poteram remanere, tamen . . . proficiscar, which we have to translate with ‘although I could stay here, I am nevertheless . . . going to depart’. Why poteram and not possum? Obviously, it is related to the fact that it is unreal. How are we to explain it? Here we have a shift similar to that discussed above. To begin with, these forms were used with past reference, if there was an unrealized obligation or possibility. Since the thought then suggested itself, ‘but no use was made of the possibility, the duty was not fulfilled’, these expressions acquired a value of unreality in past time. Then the nuance of unreality came to acquire more weight than that of temporal reference, and so the forms came to be used even when the desire was to express something unrealized in present time. In this way, we can make sense of the use of these preterites in Latin and Greek.\footnote{On Latin, cf. KS §§44.2a with n. 1, 213.4b; Gildersleeve & Lodge §254 nn. 1–3 (incl. ref. to the impf. as the ‘tense of disappointment’). On Greek, see KG §§391.5, 393 (with misleading ref. to ‘omission of ἂν’), Schwýzer & Debrunner 308, 352–3, and esp. Goodwin §§435–23 and Appendix V.}

Thirdly and fourthly, connected to the above, is a further case, confined to Greek. You know the common use of the inflected forms (except pl. 1 and 2) | of the preterite ὁφελοῦ with the infinitive (in Homer including forms with double -λ-; cf. nn. 14, p. 201, and 20, p. 202 below). This ὁφελοῦ, which serves to express an unrealized wish, belongs of course with the family of words including ὁφείλω, ὁφλεσάω (both ‘owe’), etc., expressing a debt, as e.g. at Il. 19. 59 (Achilles to Agamemnon) τὴν ὁφέλ’ ἐν νήσοις κατακτάμεν Ἄρτεμις ἵω, lit., ‘her (Briseís) Artemis should have killed with an arrow among the ships’, although Achilles means, ‘if only Artemis had killed her . . . !’. Already by Homer’s time, the true meaning of the verb has faded in this construction, and we are left simply with the expression of an unfulfilled wish. This is reflected in the accompanying particles. For one thing, in Homer as in Attic, if a clause of this type is negated, the negative particle used is the prohibitive μή. Given the etymological meaning of the expression, we
ought to expect the factual negative odi, but because the ὠφελον clause, when negative, involves a rejection, μὴ is selected, e.g. at Hesiod, Works 174–5 μηκέτ’ ἐπεί τ’ ὠφελον ἐγὼ πέμπτοισι μετείναι ἀνδράσι, ‘if only henceforth I did not belong to the fifth generation of men’. The same factor accounts for the preposing from Homer on of words like αἰθέ, εἰθέ, ὡς before such an ὠφελον clause. These particles are otherwise particularly frequent with the optative—including in unfulfillable wishes, as e.g. at Il. 16. 722 (the disguised Apollo, ironically, to Hector) αἴθ’, ὡςον ἦσαν εἰμὶ, τόσον σέ φέρτερος εἶνυ (‘would that I were so much your superior as I am your inferior’). They are, then, not suited to the etymological sense of ὠφελον, but very much so to that of the clause as a whole, and to the speaker’s intention.

This ὠφελον of Homeric and Attic survived into Hellenistic and Imperial Greek, although with two occasional modifications, to which I must draw your attention, especially as they are scarcely mentioned in the grammars. In Callimachus, the classical poet of the Hellenistic age, we read, Επιγραμματικ 17 Pfeiffer (45 Gow & Page) ὠφλε μηθ’ ἐγένοντο θεαὶ νέες, ‘would that swift ships had never even been made’! In keeping with its true meaning denoting an action called for, ὠφελε originally takes the infinitive, and agrees in its ending with the subject of the clause; it is always so in Homer and Attic. Here, in contrast, first we have the sg. 3 form in spite of the plural subject νέες (‘ships’), and secondly the verb giving the content of the unfulfilled wish is in the indicative instead of the infinitive. Here, then, ὠφελε is treated simply as a ‘wish’-particle. The model for this development was provided by clauses with εἰθέ + past indicative (on which, see below).

The counterpart to the above is the use of the indicative after αἰ γὰρ and εἰθέ (the model for which was ὠφελον + infin.), as e.g. at Od. 7. 311 (Alcinous to Odysseus) αἰ γὰρ...παῖδα τ’ ἐμὴν ἐχέμεν καὶ ἐμὸς γαμβρὸς καλέσθαι (‘I wish that [a man like you] . . . could have my daughter and be called my son-in-law’), with 2nd-person force; so, too, Crinagoras, Επιγραμματικ 37. 3–4 Gow & Page ἐργὴ ἕτερῃ, Κόρυθε, κείσθαι, ‘would that you lay, Corinth, more prostrate than < >!’. For an example with 1st-person force, note Od. 24. 376–81, another of these passages illustrating how completely, already in Homer, the etymological meaning of ὠφελον had been forgotten.

14 See West (1978a: ad loc.), also on the form ὠφελον.
15 On ὠφελον, etc., see KG §391.6 n. 3, Schwzyer & Debrunner 308, 345–6, 353–4, and Goodwin §§424, 744–8.
16 On this poem, see the commentary of Gow & Page (1965–8: II, 198).
17 Hainsworth (Heubeck, West, & Hainsworth 1988: on Od. 7. 311) calls the construction ‘a blend of the wish (αἰ γὰρ + optative) and the prayer (apostrophe of the god + infinitive)’, and he also compares Od. 24. 376–81 (Laertes’ prayer to the gods before the final battle): Chantraine (1953: 229, 318) sees it as analogical on ὠφελον + infin. On Crinagoras of Mytilene (1st c. BC/AD), who moved in the highest circles of Roman society in the age of Julius Caesar, Augustus, and Tiberius, see Gow & Page (1965–8: II, 210–13). It deserves to be stressed (as it is by Gow & Page (1965–8: II, 247–8) on Crinagoras 37) that εἰθέ + infin. is really very rare.
Secondly, from the time of Callimachus on, in texts with a colloquial colouring or written in a popular idiom, ὀφελὼν is used in just the same way as ὀφελεῖ in Callimachus above. Indeed, ὀφελὼν is found even in the high poetry of the later Empire, such as the Orphica18 and the epic, Pothomerica (e.g. 1. 729), of Quintus of Smyrna (?3rd c. AD). Strictly, this ὀφελὼν is the neuter participle (functioning as a clause, lit. "it is owing") of ὀφελὼν (as προσήκον can stand for προσῆκει 'it is fitting'). Originally, it, too, took the infinitive, but, like ὀφελεῖ in Callimachus, ὀφελὼν is combined, by St Paul for instance, with the finite verb, with the pl. 2 imperfect at 2 Corinth. 11: 1 ὀφελὼν ἀνείχεσθε, 'would that you could endure', aorist at 1 Corinth. 4: 8 καὶ ὀφελὼν γε ἐβασιλεύσατε, 'and would that you were kings', and even with a subjunctive, or with a future, e.g. at Gal. 5: 12 ὀφελὼν καὶ ἀποκόψωνται, 'I wish that they would be cut off'.19

A fourth group of unreal preterites comprises those with εἰθῆ, αἰθῆ. They are confined to poetry, as e.g. at Soph. Oed. Tyr. 1217 (Chorus to Oedipus) εἰθῆ σε μήπορ' εἴδόμαν (aor. indic.), 'would that I had never set eyes on you!', and there are examples also in Euripides and Theocritus. The genesis of this usage is clear. Given the ancient construction εἰθ’ ὀφελεῖ + infinitive, speakers ventured to replace the combination ὀφελεῖ + infinitive with a simple indicative verb. Conversely, this εἰθ’ + indicative construction served as the model for the Callimachean ὀφελεί and colloquial ὀφελὼν + indic. (see above).20

Of great interest is a fifth type of unreal preterite, attested three times in Homer. This is its use in relative clauses (including temporal clauses) which are subordinated to an unreal main clause, as e.g. at II. 6. 350, where Helen laments to Hector the uselessness of her husband Paris with the words ἄνδρος ἐπειτ’ ὀφελὼν ἄμεινον εἶναι ἄκοιτος, | ὑς ἔδη (impf.) νέμεσιν 'would then that I were wife to a better man, one who knows (lit. knew) right and duty'. Because the content of the subordinate clause belongs in the realm of the unfulfilled wish expressed in the main clause, its verb is attracted to that of the main clause (cf. II. 6. 348, Od. 1. 218). Later this use was extended, and from Aeschylus on we find it also in final and consecutive clauses, e.g. at Choephoroi 195 εἰθ’ εἰχε φωνῆν ἐμφρον’ ἀγγέλου δύκην, ὡπως δέφροντις οὗδα μὴ κυνοσόμην (impf.), | ἀλλ’ εὖ σάφ’ ἤν, 'would that it (the lock of hair) had an intelligent voice as of a messenger, so that I would not be (lit. was not) tossed to and fro between two thoughts, but it would be (lit. was) quite clear . . .'.

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18 It is e.g. in the 1400-line Argonautica of Orpheus (line 1159 in the edn of F. Vian, Paris 1987) of the 4th c. AD (or later?). For an excellent introduction to the ‘Orphic poems’ (famously edited by Gottfried Hermann in 1803), see West (1983: ch. 1).
19 On the later history of ὀφελὼν and ὀφελῶν, see W. (1916: 199–200), and Schwyzer & Debrunner 346 (quoting examples of ὀφελῶν + infin. from as early as the 2nd c. BC).
20 On εἰθ’, etc. + past indic. (not securely attested in Homer, who uses instead εἰθ’, etc. + optative, or ὀφελ(λ)ον + infin.), see Goodwin §§732–3, KG §391.6 with n. 3, and Schwyzer & Debrunner 345–6.
THE SUBJUNCTIVE AND OPTATIVE IN GREEK

Still fundamental on these concepts is Delbrück’s book of 1871 on the subjunctive and optative in Sanskrit and Greek, which gives the first truly complete picture of the use of the moods in Homer, and presents and illustrates the various terms and ideas which are of general philological and linguistic interest. It should also be noted here that Stahl’s Syntax of the Greek Verb (1907), a book that I have rarely if ever had cause to cite elsewhere, has a very precise treatment of the subjunctive and optative and an unusually generous presentation of material (pp. 220–596, although I cannot say that the discussion is either comprehensive or accurate in its evaluation of the data). A few years ago, there appeared a work by the linguist Friedrich Slotty, who now teaches in Prague, on the use of the subjunctive and optative in the Greek dialects (1915), which offers much that is new and original on this subject. The advantage of this book, suggested already in the title, lies in its painstaking use of texts in the dialects. Most of those who have written on Greek syntax, Stahl among them, pay almost exclusive attention to Attic, Ionic, and Homer, and Delbrück confines himself to Homer alone. In Slotty’s book, however, the evidence of the dialects is acutely and precisely evaluated, and special reference is made also to the use of the moods in Hellenistic Greek, with emphasis on the usages of the later period. Slotty does, however, make some very bold assumptions, which I cannot always accept, in particular that many usages of late Greek should be regarded as inherited, having been transmitted solely in the colloquial language. Moreover, Slotty is constantly inclined, in line with a strong tendency in modern classical scholarship, to accept in his quotations from texts simply what is transmitted in the manuscripts. As a result, he often believes that he has found evidence of usages which are not recognized at all in other grammars. Now, it goes without saying that the grammarian is duty-bound always to go back to the manuscript tradition, but this has to entail, even for the grammarian, familiarity with the factors that really affect the tradition, and Slotty’s failing here leads demonstrably to some serious errors. Since this is of fundamental importance for the study of grammar, I should like to take some examples from his book. He is, for instance, of the opinion (1915: 63, 69) that the combination of ἅν with a subjunctive in the main
clause (which we know from Homer) was in later Greek not only usual in the lowest registers of the language but was admitted even by Polybius. From the whole of Polybius’ work, which, for all the extensive missing parts, is still of very considerable size, he is able to adduce only two complete examples (11. 5. 6 and 18. 35. 2), but thinks that these entitle him to attribute this usage to Polybius. A priori, this cannot be right, as Polybius is an extraordinarily consistent—indeed, monotonous—writer, and, given this, it is unthinkable that he would have used a construction that he would have had occasion to use a thousand times only twice in his whole work. In both passages, however, there are special reasons for suspecting the tradition. First, they do not occur in books 1–5, which are transmitted directly and very reliably, but in two of the later books, of which we have only excerpts. Obviously, extracts chosen for their subject matter cannot be fully reliable witnesses on questions of form, because the excerptors were concerned only with the content. In the second passage (18. 35. 2), where the manuscripts of the excerpts have ὑπογρήγαμον ἄν (‘I would be confident’), there is another convincing argument against the correctness of the tradition. Few prose writers are as strict in their avoidance of hiatus as Polybius: are we really to suppose that he here departed from his stylistic principles in favour of a construction which is unclassical and otherwise quite alien to him?1

SloTty errs also in that, if he finds a modal form with a special function in isolated passages, rather than asking whether the special meaning is not perhaps determined by the whole tone of the context, he immediately constructs a general use from that single passage. For example, since at Soph. El. 1491 (Orestes to Aegisthus) χαραίνεις ἄν εἰσώ ἄν τάχει has the sense of a command, SloTty (1915: 96–7) immediately thinks that the optative with ἄν can generally be used as an imperative. Obviously, since the optative with ἄν has potential sense many thousands of times, we must take this as our starting point in individual cases, even if the context seems to point in another direction. Here it should be translated, not ‘you must go in’, but rather ‘you may go in (if you like), and quickly’. The real beauty of the line is that Orestes, instead of using a form of command, with feigned politeness suggests the possibility that Aegisthus might go into the house. So, in other places, too, where this sort of optative with ἄν occurs apparently as a command, we may see it as an expression of Attic politeness (cf. I, 237–8 below). In spite of these failings, of which I thought I should give you explicit warning, the book is very useful and helpful. (ms. add.2: On the Greek moods, see also Sommer (1927).)

1 On Polybius’ avoidance of hiatus (the placing of a word beginning with a vowel immediately after one ending with a vowel), see Foucault (1972: 277–86), although he makes no mention of ἄν + finite verb in this connection. Both of the forms referred to by W. have been amended to optatives, ὑπομείνασα (at 11. 5. 6, already by Immanuel Bekker in his edn of 1844) and ὑπογρήγαμον ἄν (at 18. 35. 2, by Büttner-Wobst). In fairness to SloTty, one should note that he does cite examples from Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Plutarch in addition to Polybius, and that he refers for further material to Jannaris (1897: §1922 and App. IV, 12).
In dividing up the various functions of the Greek subjunctive and optative, we have very welcome criteria (pace Slotty 1915: 63–4) in the presence or absence of the hypothetical particle ἄν (or κε) and in the form of the negative (οὐ vs μη').

I should like to start with a passage that is quoted in every school grammar for illustrating the twofold use of the optative: Soph. Ajax 550–1 (Ajax to Euryaces) ὁ παῖ, γένοιο πατρὸς εὐνυχέστερος, | σὰ δ' ἅλλ' ὅμοιοι· καὶ γένοι: ἄν οὐ κακός ('boy, may you be luckier than your father, but in all other ways resemble him! Then you will be no coward'). Clearly, γένοιο here without ἄν expresses a wish, γένοιο with ἄν, a possibility. And from this two things may be inferred: first, that the optative has two meanings—true optative and potential; secondly, that the potential optative takes ἄν, while the optative of wish stands without it.—In addition, the potential optative is negated with οὐ, while the negative wish, of course, takes μη'.

Delbrück (1871) was probably the first to draw a comparison between the optative and the subjunctive and to show that in the latter, too, we can distinguish two main nuances. To the optative of wish corresponds the subjunctive of will, likewise without ἄν or κε. The difference between the two moods, then, consists only in the fact that the subjunctive expresses something willed, the optative something wished for. Both involve a desire. If you will something, you think you can bring it about yourself; if you wish for it, you refer it to the decision of other powers. We could, then, define the difference between the two moods also as follows, that the subjunctive approximates more closely to reality. Equally, the potential optative can also be matched with a corresponding subjunctive, which Delbrück calls (1871: 17, 23–5) the subjunctive of ‘expectation’ (nowadays also called the ‘prospective’ subjunctive). Like the corresponding optative, this normally takes the hypothetical particle and the negative οὐ.

The optative of wish can stand in all persons. It is often accompanied by a particle of wishing. In the 2nd and 3rd persons, it appears also (already in Homer) in prescriptive function, i.e. wishing the performance of an action by another person; it is then a more polite form of command. So, at Od. 4. 193 (Pisistratus to Menelaus) πίθοι οἱ γείτοναι ('please be persuaded by me') is a shade politer, more restrained, than if | it were πιθεόi οἱ ('obey me!'). Or compare Ili. 11. 791 (Nestor to Patroclus) ταῦτα εἰποίει Χιληί δαίφρων, 'would you, please, say this to wise Achilles'. Similarly ancient is the concessive use, that is involving in Delbrück’s words (1871: 27) ‘a wish made under duress (‘abgerungen’), as e.g. at Od. 7. 224–5 (Odysseus to Alcinous) ἰὸντά μὲ καὶ λίποι αἰῶν κτῆσιν ἐμὴν, ‘if I can only see my possessions, then let my life leave me’.

The use of the corresponding, voluntative subjunctive is found from Homer until late Greek, but at first with increasingly restricted use. It occurs nearly always in sg. and pl. 1, e.g. in Homeric ἵομεν ‘let us go’, or Od. 20. 383 (the suitors to Telemachus) τοὺς ἐχοῦς...πέμψωμεν, ‘let us send... these guest-friends of yours’. And in the sg. 1 from Homer on, it must be preceded by a word of
encouragement, as e.g. at II. 22. 450 (Andromache to her maids) δείτε, δῶν μοι ἑπεσθον ἵδωμι ὅτιν ἔργα τέτυκτα, 'come here, two of you come with me! Let me see what has happened', or Euripides, Heracles 1060 αἶγα, πνεύμα μάθω, 'hush! Let me check his breathing'. Usually, what precedes is a true imperative particle, such as ἀγε or φέρε. Indeed, the Euripides passage continues with the words φέρε, πρὸς ὁδὸς βάλω 'come! Let me put my ear close to him'.

One imperative of this type that frequently precedes the subjunctive, ἀφες, 'let!', let go!, allow!', is particularly common in this combination in later Greek and is eventually fossilized as a supporting particle. (It is strikingly reminiscent of English let us!, German laß uns!, used of an action that must be performed by a group to which the speaker belongs.) This ἀφες is attested in the New Testament, e.g. at Luke 6: 42 (cf. Matt. 7: 4) ἀδελφε, ἀφες, ἐκβάλω τὸ κάρφος ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀφθαλμοῦ σου, 'brother, let me cast out the mote from your eye!' (cf. the Latin sine, eiciam festucam de oculo tuo, and the Gothic let ik uswairþa...), where ἀφες retains its true meaning, in that the brother is asked to allow what the speaker wills. But this other meaning is absent, and the form fixed in the singular, in the explanation addressed to the crowd at Matt. 27: 49 ἀφες, ἵδωμεν ('come, let us see') (cf. Mark 15: 36 with the plural ἀφετε, ἵδωμεν), and in Epictetus e.g. in 2. 18. 24 ἀφες ἵδω, 'come, let me see', 1. 9. 15 ἀφες δεἰξωμεν, 'come, let us demonstrate...' (although elsewhere in Epictetus with clear retention of the true meaning of ἀφες, and with sg. 3 subj., 1. 15. 7 ἀφες ἀνθήσῃ πρῶτον, ἐέτα προβάλη τῶν καρπῶν, ἐτα πεπανθή, 'let (the fig) first flower, then put forth fruit, then ripen'). In the reduced form ἀς, this imperative survives in modern Greek as an auxiliary of the subjunctive, and indeed is found in this form and function already in a sixth-century AD papyrus.2

2 On ἀφες in Hellenistic and New Testament Greek, see Blass, Debrunner, & Funk §644; on modern Greek ἀς (also used in concessive clauses), Thumb (1910: §§193, 194, and 278) and Holton et al (1997: 205, 208). The papyrus W. refers to is (so ms. add.2) P. Amh. II, no. 153, 7 (6th / 7th c.) ἀς λάβων 'let them take' (though Grenfell & Hunt (1901) print ἀς, the relative pronoun); note also P. Ross.-Georg. III, no. 22, 9 (Zereteli et al. 1925–35: 87–90 = Debrunner 1933, no. 18, there dated to the 7th c.) ἀς ἔδωκα 'let me go'. An alternative derivation of ἀς, ἀς, from ἐὰς ἀς allow!' (with contraction and apocope), is vigorously defended by Jannaris (1897: §§1915–16θ), but effectively demolished (in favour of ἀφες) by Psaltes (1912). Note that ἀς 'let...!' is found even in literature as early as Leontios of Naples (6th/7th c.). On the history of the construction, see now K. Nikiforidou in Christidis (2007: 1443–7).
'I will never again come here to fight, but sit quiet'. In his transcription into Attic, Wilamowitz (1903) is right to replace these subjunctives with οὐ μή ἐλθω and the futures ἔξω and καθεδῶμαι, respectively. In English or German, we would most probably use futures. Perhaps, then, Slotty is right here to assume that the colloquial language preserved the use of this subjunctive without auxiliary imperative, while the literary language gave it up.

Even the above-mentioned restriction to the first person is not invariable. A much-discussed case is Soph. Phil. 300 (Philoctetes to Neoptolemus) φέρ', ὥ τέκνων, νῦν καὶ τὸ τῆς νήσου μάθης ('come, my son, now you should learn about the island'). Since this is the only example in the whole of classical literature of the use of the sg. 2 subjunctive to express something willed by the speaker, several editors have replaced this μάθης with the imperative μάθε, 'learn!'. But it is better to proceed as others do, and say that the poet here is taking a liberty, one based on the phrase φέρε μάθω and reflecting a contamination of φέρε μάθω with synonymous φέρε εἶπω. Slotty, characteristically, sees here not poetic licence but the reflection of something current in the colloquial language and deliberately echoed by the poet.

It may seem strange that two examples of the voluntative subjunctive in the sg. 3 should occur in a document in the dialect of Elis, on the so-called Damocrates bronze (dated by R. Herzog (Klee 1918: 73 and n. 1), to between 212 and 200 BC): vv. 30–2 τὸ ψάφισμα ... ἀναστῆθαί, 'the decree ... should be put up', and 36–7 ἐπιμέλειαν ποιήσαται. Νικόδρομορ, 'Nikodromos should undertake charge'. In themselves both examples are indisputable; we may, however, wonder whether the usage was long established in Elean. Elean texts from before the third century contain not a single example, although their contents offer numerous occasions on which the construction might have been used. The Damocrates bronze itself shows clear traces of the Hellenistic Koine, and, for all their Elean vocalism, ἀναστῆθαί and ποιήσαται are certainly from the Koine. Moreover, neither form can be explained as genuinely Elean. The | aorist passive of τίθημι is hardly ancient—it is not in Homer—and a pure Elean aorist subjunctive middle would have to have a short modal vowel, not the long vowel presupposed by the α of ποιήσαται. Obviously, the Koine forms ἀναστῆσῃ and ποιήσῃται have been artifically

3 Cf. Friedrich (1918: 301–2) and Janssen (1984: ad loc.), who translates with future forms (and moreover sees an aspectual distinction between ἐλθω and ἔρχω). Hordern (2002: ad loc.) is doubtful about the future meaning. On the history of the Palatine Anthology (a large collection of epigrams in a remarkable 10th-c. manuscript), and the place of Palladas within it, see Cameron (1993).

4 Moorhouse (1946: 9–10) compares II. 9. 121 ἱσομήνω 'let me name, I will name', without preceding impv., and sets this construction alongside ἂν + fut. indic. as examples of retention or revival in colloquial registers of features earlier attested also or only in literature.

5 A proxeny decree, from Olympia, for Damocrates of Tenedos; Buck no. 66 = Dittenberger & Purgold (1806), no. 39 = Collitz & Bechtel I, no. 1172.
‘Eleanized’ to ἀνατέθαι and ποιήσαται (cf. Bechtle 1921–4: II, 833, 838). However, these examples are valuable as evidence of the Hellenistic Koine. They agree with what we find in the imperial period (including the examples from Epictetus: cf. I, 233 above) and in modern Greek; and already from the Septuagint we can quote e.g. Gen. 34: 24 ἀφέθη αὐτοῖς ἡ ἁμαρτία, ‘let their sin be forgiven them’. In the singular, this voluntative subjunctive is nearly always in the aorist, whether or not an imperatival word precedes. The addition of ἄν or κε is due probably in every case to textual corruption.7

Secondly, the subjunctive and optative occur in respectively voluntative and optative function in negative sentences, the subjunctive expressing a prohibition (only in the aorist in this sense: I, 214–15 above) or a fear, the optative conveying a negative wish. The negative particle is μή. These also furnish the basis of the dependent clause after verbs of fearing, and of the negative purpose clause with μή.

We should note certain extensions and modifications of this construction. For example, οὐ μή + subjunctive serves to express a very decisive negative, in which it is in effect denied that there is anything to fear, while μή οὐ + subjunctive expresses a fear that something will not happen. Indeed, if the fear increases to a presumption, the subjunctive can even be replaced with the indicative. There are isolated examples of this already in Homer, e.g. at Od. 5. 300 (Odysseus to himself) δείδω μή δή πάντα θεὰ νημερτέα εἰπεν, ‘(I fear that) perhaps the goddess (Calypso) indeed spoke everything in truth’. This kind of clause is the source of μήποτε meaning ‘perhaps’.8

Thirdly, and finally, there are questions, that is deliberative questions of the type ποί φύγω; ‘where am I to flee?’ By and large (in the earliest stages of the other Indo-European languages, too), this kind of ‘ought’-question is found only in the 1st person, or in expressions which obviously refer to the 1st person, as at Soph. Ajax 403 (cf. I, 110 above) ποί τις οὖν φύγη, ‘where then is one to flee?’, where the speaker (Ajax) plainly means himself.

6 In Elean, it is true, as W. implies, that η regularly becomes ἀ (cf. e.g. μά for μῆ; Buck §15), and this must account for ἀνατέθαι; ποιήσαται, however, which shows the regular Elean secondary loss of intervocalic ο (Buck §39.3), may possibly be from *ποιήσαται with the analogical long-vowel ο-aor. subjv. marker -οα- (found also in Arcadian and Cretan; Buck §51.1). On Elean, note also Schmitt (1977: 62–6), with further references, and now see Minon (2007).

7 For further, earlier and later, examples, see Mayser II.1, 229–30, and Turner (1963: 94 n. 1), who cites two possible cases of positive 3rd- and 2nd-person jussive subjunctives, both of them aorist, as W. notes, from St Paul (1 Cor. 7: 39 sg. μανηθῇ, 11: 33 pl. 2 ἐκδέχῃσθε).

8 Cf. already Aristotle, Nic. Eth. 10. 1, 1172a33 μή ποτε δὲ οὐ καλὸς τούτο λέγεται ‘perhaps this is not sound reasoning’; see Blass, Debrunner, & Funk §§370, 386.2.
A second main group comprises those uses in which the will or wish of the speaker is muted, and which involve rather expressions of expectation (the prospective subjunctive) or possibility (the potential optative).

As a rule, the **prospective subjunctive** is rare in a main clause. In Attic it is confined to isolated phrases and idioms, and it is properly part of the living language only in Homer and earlier Greek generally. The modal particle áv or κε does occur with this subjunctive, but it can be omitted—and this is probably the older state of affairs—as in the phrase καὶ ποτὲ τις εἶπησε, ‘and one day someone **will say**’, or οὐδὲ γένηται, ‘and there will not be one’, or II. 1. 262 (Nestor to Agamemnon and Achilles) οὐ γὰρ πῶς τοῖνος ἰδὼν ἀνέρας οὐδὲ ἰδωμαι, ‘such men have I never yet seen, and do not **expect to see**’. In one phrase, this subjunctive of expectation without áv remained current through the whole of Greek, from II. 11. 404 to post-classical times: this is the common τί πάθω; ‘what may I **expect to suffer**? what may **become of me**?’. Variations on this include Herodotus 4. 118. 3 (Scythian envoys to their neighbours) τί γὰρ πάθωμεν μὴ βουλομένων ὑμέων τιμωρεῖν; ‘What **will become of us**, if you are not willing to help?’; Homer?, Od. 5. 465 (Odysseus to himself) ὥ μοι ἐγώ, τί πάθω; τί νῦ μοι μήκειστα γένηται; ‘what **will finally happen** to me?’; Theocritus 15. 51 (Praxinoa to Gorgo) τί γενώμεθα; (‘what **will become of us**?’).

Apart from this τί πάθω; and its variants, post-Homeric Greek has completely lost these independent, main-clause subjunctives of expectation. The **potential optative**, however, remains as common as the latter is rare. The familiar rule that the optative with potential meaning must have the modal particle holds by and large from Homer onwards. The predominance of examples with áv is so great that the absence of áv in any context is striking. This raises the two key questions: first, where the tradition has the optative without áv, may we trust the tradition? And secondly, where we allow that the tradition is right, how can this departure be explained? On the first question, textual critics remain strongly divided down to the present day. In Attic prose, it is probably legitimate to apply the rule strictly, but it is indisputable that in the language of earlier poetry, and also in some dialect inscriptions, the optative without áv can have potential force. In the question that occurs several times in Homer (e.g. II. 4. 93), ἦ ρά νῦ μοι τι πίθοιο; ‘**would you** perhaps **hearken** to me on one point?’, there is no doubting the
potential meaning of the clause, even though there is no possibility of adding ἄν or κε to the text. And the inscriptive evidence is especially beyond any doubt. I refer, for example, to the small tablets on which visitors to the oracle of Dodona wrote their questions, which include πράσσοι and εἴη (Collitz & Bechtel II, 1564, 9 and 1587, 10), potential optatives without hypothetical particle. This is easy to explain. If we compare the other languages, we see that the addition of the modal particle | reflects a Greek innovation. In its absence, then, we have simply a relic of earlier usage, just as with the corresponding subjunctive. It was only gradually that it became a rule.

With regard to the time reference of the potential optative, various shades of meaning may be distinguished. It usually expresses a general possibility, not tied to any particular time, but it is also found, especially in Homer, with future reference (like the prospective subjunctive), so e.g. at Il. 13. 377 (Idomeneus over the fallen Othryoneus) καὶ κέ τοι ἡμεῖς ταύτα γ’ ὑποσχόμενοι τελέσαιμεν, ‘we too shall probably be able to accomplish these things, in accordance with our promise’. And this optative can also be used with reference to the past, although this is not normal in Attic. In Homer this applies when it is used to express unreal events, e.g. at Il. 5. 85 (the poet in his own person) Τυδείδην δ’ οὐκ ἄν γνοιής ποτέροις μετεί, ‘and you could not have known which side the son of Tydeus was on’, and even more clearly at 5. 311 καὶ νῦ κεν ἐνθ’ ἀπόλοιπο ἀναξ ἀνδρῶν, ‘and then the lord of men (Aeneas) might have been killed’. Attic, apart from a few doubtful places, has not retained this use, as the aorist indicative was available for it. To be distinguished from this is the use attested in Herodotus of rendering suppositions about the past with the optative, e.g. at 1. 2. 1, with reference to pirates in the remote past, εἴσαν δ’ ἄν οὔτοι Κρήτες, ‘they were probably Cretans’, or 9. 71. 4 (the Spartans of the bravest fighters at Thermopylae) ταύτα μὲν καὶ φθόνῳ ἄν εἰποιε, ‘they probably said this out of envy as well’.

I mentioned earlier (I, 231–2 above), in connection with Słoty (1915), that the sg. 2 optative with ἄν can be used to express a command. Aristophanes has a nice example at Wasps 725–6. There was an old saying, attributed to Hesiod (fr. 338 Merkelbach & West), μήτε δίκην δικάσῃς (aor. subjv.), πρὶν ἄμφων μῦθον ἀκούσῃς, ‘and do not pronounce judgement before you have heard the speech of both sides’. The Attic poet quotes it expressly (with the words ἦ ποιον σοφὸς ἦν, ὃς τις ἐφασκέν ‘how wise he was, whoever it was who said’), but changes it slightly: πρὶν ἄν ἄμφων μῦθον ἀκούσῃς (with ἄν introduced in the Attic manner), οὔκ ἄν δικάσαις (aor. opt. + ἄν), and several critics have been foolish enough to change the optative. But all that this and similar passages imply is that Attic could frame a command or prohibition more politely or more carefully by expressing it as a potential clause. It is, however, clear also that this potential formulation

1 Note that the last four letters of this form are restored!
of a command, originally used on special occasions, could become regular, and
the optative + āv thereby eventually acquire straightforwardly imperatival mean-
ing. | This really happened in early Arcadian and in the dialect of Elis, e.g. in an
old Elean treaty (Collitz & Bechtel I, no. 1149, 2)\textsuperscript{2}συμμαχία κ’ ἑα (= āv ἑιη),
‘let there be an alliance’ (cf. Slotty 1915: 97, 124, 127–8).

We shall discuss the use of the \textbf{subjunctive and optative in subordinate}
clauses when we deal with sentence structure.\textsuperscript{3} For now, let me just emphasize
that in subordinate clauses also we have to suppose both functions, namely
willing/wishing and expectation/possibility. Of the formal criteria for distin-
guishing the two types (I, 232 above), one abandons us almost completely in
dependent clauses, as μή is the standard negative particle in subjunctive and
optative subordinate clauses generally. As for the use of the modal particle,
however, the situation is the same as we saw earlier in main clauses, namely that,
in Attic, clauses of fearing, purpose clauses, and deliberative questions are all
without āv, as they all involve something willed or refused. Conversely, āv is
regularly used with the subjunctive in relative, temporal, or conditional clauses,
i.e. with the subjunctive expressing expectation or presupposition.\textsuperscript{4} In earlier
Greek this rule does not always apply. In Homer, these types of clause have not
infrequently the subjunctive without āv. In similes, āv is regularly omitted from
subjunctive clauses. Here, too, as before (I, 236–7 above), we must regard
the absence of the particle as an archaism.—It is striking that with an optative
in a subordinate clause, no matter what its function, the modal particle is by
and large not usual, at least not in Attic; things are slightly different in earlier
Greek.\textsuperscript{5}

As for the other question—of the rules governing the alternation between
subjunctive and optative in subordinate clauses, I recall by way of preliminary
what was observed in the Introduction (I, 26 above) about Dawes’s Canon. The
canon does not apply quite as absolutely as its original proponent and many early
textual critics thought, but it is a significant factor in the use of the moods already

\textsuperscript{2} On this treaty (of c.500 BC, from Olympia) between Elis and Heraea in western Arcadia, cf. Buck
no. 62, Meiggs & Lewis no. 17, and I, 127 above. On Elean long ā from η, see n. 6, p. 298 above.
\textsuperscript{3} Another forlorn cross-reference to a lecture that was never published.
\textsuperscript{4} Cf. Goodwin §192.2.
\textsuperscript{5} W. covers a huge amount of ground rather sweepingly in these last few sentences. For details of
Homer usage, see Monro (1891: §§280–322), and on both Homer and later usage, Goodwin ch. 4, \textit{passim},
esp.: §68 on clauses of fearing (which can include a potential opt. with āv); §§125–30 on purpose clauses
(note not only Homeric ās/δήποι āv (or κε) but also Attic ἀπὸς āv); §522 on relative, temporal and
conditional clauses with āv in general, §§538–41 on cases of the omission of āv in these clauses in Homer,
§§543–9 on the omission of āv in similes in particular, and §542 on the optative with āv in subordinate clauses
in Homer. Monro (1891: §322) gives a useful summary of the differences between the uses of the moods
(incl. āv/κε) in Homer and later Greek, stressing the simplification of usage that we observe (in both main
and subordinate clauses) and the effective tying of āv to the subjv. through the virtual elimination in
subordinate clauses of the subjv. without āv and of the opt. with āv.
in Homer. What is not yet clear is how it was possible for the special relations to develop between the subjunctive and the so-called primary tenses, and the optative and the past tenses.—Moreover, it should be remembered that in reported speech the optative stands in place of the indicative; remember, too, the iterative optative—both these latter usages are already in Homer.

In the later development of Greek, the use of the optative declines markedly. This is happening already in educated Hellenistic Greek, as you see if you compare Polybius and Diodorus with the Attic prose writers. This is treated very well by Karl Reik in his book (1907) on the optative in Polybius and Philo of Alexandria. The optative is much rarer still in texts of lower registers, especially in the Greek Bible. Eighty years ago already, in his magisterial book on the Septuagint, Heinrich Thiersch, a theologian with a fine classical training, showed that the optative is completely absent from large sections of the Septuagint, except in the phrase μὴ γένοιτο (‘let it not happen!’). Similarly in the New Testament, only in Luke and Paul is it slightly more common, and nearly everywhere else it is more or less confined to this μὴ γένοιτο. In all forms of Hellenistic Greek, the subjunctive achieves, if not sole supremacy, at least pre-eminence, and this is inherited by modern Greek, where the optative has been completely lost. This development is puzzling, for in the earliest period it was the optative that gained ground at the expense of the subjunctive—or so it seems from a comparison of the uses of the moods in Homer and Attic. In the other Indo-European languages, too, as we have to some extent already seen, the optative forms were the more vigorous, since in virtue of its endings in all these languages the optative was in clearer contrast with the indicative than were the forms of the subjunctive.

6 Contrast Chantraine’s conclusion (1953: §368) that ‘the optative is freely used after a main verb in the present, and the role of [the opt.] as a substitute for the subjunctive when the main verb is in the past is observed only in an irregular fashion’.

7 On the emergence of both constructions in Homer, see Chantraine (1953: §§330–1), with further refs. Certainly, Homer attests opt. for indic. after a secondary main verb in indirect questions (e.g. Od. 13. 415, 17. 368), but not in indirect statements: at Od. 24. 237, ὃς is more ‘how’ than ‘that’, and the same is probably true of the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite, 212–14 εἶπεν τῇ ἐκαστᾷ . . . ὃς ἐστὶν ἥ (Hermes) explained everything, how he (Ganymede) was’ (tr. West). Cf. Goodwin §§352, 671, and n. 1; Monro (1891: §§306.2, 308.1d); KG §399.44–5, 5.

8 This is true of Germanic and Sanskrit (cf. 220–1 & nn. 31–2, pp. 282–3 above). On the decline of the optative in Greek, cf. I, 221 above and n. 33, p. 283 above.
Lecture I, 41

The Latin subjunctive is not easily dealt with in a short lecture, because there is such an immense amount of collected material. Of all the chapters of ancient syntax, it is probably the most intensively studied. The practical requirements of teaching alone led to numerous observations and made possible some sharp definitions. And ever since scholars first applied themselves to linguistic research without immediately practical considerations, and especially since the establishment of the historical study of the development of language, the use of the moods in Latin has attracted an especially large amount of attention. Apart from the comprehensive accounts of Latin syntax which I mentioned in the introduction (I, 31–3 above), the following works are of particular relevance here: first, the grammatical studies of LÜBBERT, which appeared some fifty years ago (1870), and which represent really the first study of this subject with a view to chronology. Then several American contributions on the moods deserve special mention. In linguistic work, American scholars show two particular merits: in the first place, they are excellent with statistics, assembling impressively complete collections of material and knowing how to organize them sensibly; secondly, most of them have a thorough grounding in psychology (although this sometimes leads them astray into oversharp definitions and excessively pedantic distinctions).1 The most recent treatment of the moods is by BENNETT, in the first volume of his Syntax of Early Latin (1910), whose merits and failings I outlined in the introduction (I, 36–7 above), which includes surveys of the work of his predecessors (on the moods, 145–61). As for German scholarship, I should mention also A. DITTMAR’s studies on the Latin moods (1897), a conscientious work, not lacking in acuteness, although it is impossible to subscribe to its approach.2

First, a word on the name of the mood. The term ‘subjunctive’ (or, as the Germans prefer to say, ‘Konjunktiv’) is misleading in two ways. First, consider

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1 On ‘Sprachpsychologie’ in late-19th- and early-20th-c. American linguistics, with special reference to the young Leonard Bloomfield, see Andresen (1990: 220–6, et passim) and Morpurgo Davies (1998: 206 & nn.). On relations between German and American linguistic scholarship more generally, with special reference to W. D. Whitney, see Andresen (1990: esp. 130–5, 180–3) and Morpurgo Davies (1998: 21 n. 6, 207 ff. & nn.). Andresen comments (1990: 180) that ‘within a generation or two after Whitney [1827–1894], the German approach to linguistics was fully integrated into American linguistic theory’.

2 On the Latin subjunctive, see the references in n. 13, p. 269 above.
the literal meaning of the term: subjoining or conjoining of clauses is certainly not the unique, or even the main, use of the Latin subjunctive. Secondly, the term suggests the fundamental misconception that the use of the Latin so-called subjunctive is especially close to that of the Greek subjunctive.

The root of the trouble lies in the fact that we have followed the Latin grammarians, and they, the Greeks. ‘Coniunctivus’ and ‘subiunctivus’ are both translations of Gk ὑποτακτική, ‘subordinating’. The Greek grammarians seized on this label because in the classical form of their language the subjunctive tended to occur in subordinate clauses, and relatively rarely in main clauses (cf. I, 236 above). Indeed, because of this, in the paradigms of the grammarians (e.g. in an old supplement to Dionysius Thrax, GG I.1, 128–31), while the optative was exemplified by τῦπτομαι, the model for the subjunctive was the subordinate clause ἐὰν τῦπτω, ‘if I strike’. The later Latin grammarians (the earliest theory is unknown because our oldest witnesses on Latin linguistics, Varro and Quintilian, say nothing on the subject) then built on this Greek conception by calling non-indicative modal forms ‘coniunctivus’ or ‘subiunctivus’ when used in a subordinate clause, ‘optativus’ when in a main clause (cf. e.g. Priscian 8.68 = GL II, 424).3 Because the same sets of forms served both functions, they were eventually (by whom first, I do not know) brought together under the single label ‘coniunctivus’ or ‘subiunctivus’.

In order to evaluate properly the so-called subjunctive of Latin, we need to make a small excursus in the area of morphology and establish which forms in other languages correspond to the Latin subjunctive forms. It emerges that what we call ‘subjunctive’ actually represents a very colourful mixture of forms. |  

1, 241

First, we find old optatives. Here belong all forms containing an i-element, such as some present subjunctives, above all those of esse (‘to be’: in Old Latin, siem, siēs, siet, sient, corresponding to Gk εἰν, εἰς, εἶ, εἶν), and also uestim (‘wish’) and its compounds, uestim (‘wish more, prefer’) and uestim (‘wish not’). In addition, the old subjunctive of edere, ‘to eat’ is not edam but edim, which is still attested in Vergil and Horace, and even still in Pliny the Elder, and belongs with the old short form of the present indicative esti, ‘s/he eats’.4 There is also duim, a pre-classical subjunctive of dare (‘give’), attested in Classical Latin only in phrases such as Cicero, In Defence of King Deiotarus 21 di te perduint (‘may the gods destroy you’).5—With these present subjunctives, here belong also the forms in -sim (also -āssim, -ēssim), common in Old Latin, and still seen in classical

3 Note Priscian’s statement here, vv. 17–18, that ‘the subjunctive took its name from its [subordinate] construction’ (‘[subiunctius] a constructione nomen accepit’).
4 For subjv. edim, etc., cf. e.g. Verg. Aen. 12.801, Hor. Sat. 2.8.90, Plin. Nat. 25.46 (perh. 30.66). For the attested instances of the athematic forms generally (in which the endings are added directly to the root ed-, as in est < *ed-ti, later replaced by the new thematic form edīt), see Sommer (1914: §31); KH §166.2b.
5 Cf. KH §166.2, Sommer (1914: §350).
Latin in ausim, fàxim. With these belongs pl. 3 sirint, etc., from *sí-s-int, ‘may they allow’. And finally, all subjunctive forms built on the perfect stem are in origin optatives.7

Fully synonymous with these formations, at least those that belong with the present, is a group of forms of a quite different sort: these are characterized by a long ā vowel, and have absolutely no correspondence in Greek. In Latin, this type gives the present subjunctive in the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th conjugations. In addition, there are a few obsolete forms, which do not belong to the present stem, such as tulās, tulat (to ferre ‘carry’), fiam (to esse ‘be’); ecuat, aduecanat, forms ofuenīre (‘come’), attigat to attingere, all of these attested in pre-classical texts. Osco-Umbrian and Celtic also have ą-subjunctives of this sort, but their origin and basic meaning are obscure. One striking thing is that the same ā occurs in the imperfect in -bam, -bās and eram, ērās (‘I was’, ‘you were’), an agreement reminiscent of the so-called injunctive (I, 212 above).8

Completely obscure are the forms containing a long -ē-, namely the present subjunctive of the 1st conjugation (type am-ē-s) and the imperfect and pluperfect subjunctive (ama-rē-s, amauis-se-ē-s). All that we can say for certain—and this is important for establishing their meaning—is that, in spite of the long ē, these forms have nothing to do with the Greek subjunctive. I have to give this special mention because it is still maintained to an extent by SOMMER in the revised edition of his excellent Latin phonology and morphology (1914: §340). What Latin inherited of the old subjunctive (preserved as such in Greek) was confined to prospective use and used as a straightforward future (I, 193–4 above). We have here a puzzle.9

6 That is, the pf. subjv. of sino ‘allow’ (also attested are strēs, strīt, strĪtis, mainly in Plautus, e.g. Bæcch. 468, and cf. Livy 1. 32. 7 archaizing). For the view expressed here by W. (opt. of old s-á-or.), cf. Sommer (1914: §364.1), LIV, s.vv. ‘sch(i)-’ and ‘tkei-’ and Meiser (2003: 40); for the alternative view, that they are short forms of the regular pf. subjv. struēs, etc., see Leumann 600–1.
7 Apart from Old Latin siem, sēs, sēt, with -iē- from e-grade *-iēdā (and cf. n. 9 in this lecture on the 1st-conjugation type amā), all of these i-subjv. forms continue the zero grade of the IE optative marker (*-ē- < *-ēdā); the regular shortening of inherited long -ē- in closed final syllables except before -s (hence classical sg. 3 uelit vs sg. 2 uelis) occurred around the time of Plautus, in whose plays we sometimes have to scan e.g. sg. 1 edim, sg. 2 edit. From a historical point of view, if we allow only for regular sound-change, in sg. 2, pl. 1 and 2, the pf. subjv. (with -u)er-ī-s, -u)er-ī-mus, -u)er-ī-tīs) ‘should’ be formally distinct from the fut. pf. (the inherited subjunctive of the pf., with -u)er-ī-s, -u)er-ī-mus, -u)er-ī-tīs, in which the short -i- continues the IE subjv. marker *-ē-). While the distinction is observed fairly strictly in Old Latin (Skutsch 1988: on Enn. Ann. 183 and n. 1), in classical poetry both sets of forms are found for both fut. pf. and pf. subjv.: Horace uses both sets of forms in either function; Ovid uses both for fut. pf. (though -i only for pf. subjv.); Vergil uses only the -i forms for both fut. pf. and pf. subjv. (see Wallace 1989; Weiss forthc.: ch. 32, II.A.2.c).
8 An agreement, that is, between a modal form (subjunctive / injunctive) and a preterital form (imperfect / unaugmented past indicative). On the subjunctives and the past forms in -ā-, cf. I, 189–90 and n. 4, p. 244 above.
9 The pres. subjv. of the 1st conjugation is now generally regarded as continuing the inherited (e-grade) optative to athematic stems in -ā- (e.g. *nēā-ē-s ‘would that you would renew’ > *nēuās > *nēuās > nouēs); the uncontracted stage is apparently preserved in Sabellic, in Oscan deinuim ‘let him swear’ on the Tabula Bantina (Lu 1. 11 Rix), phonemically /dēi-w-ā-ē-d/. As for the imperf. and plupf. subjv.—the former
As for the use of these various forms, two points are particularly noteworthy. First, the promotion of the subjunctive, evident whether we compare Latin with related languages, or follow its development within Latin. Its prominence compared with related languages is seen in the fact that the unreal use of the past tenses of the indicative in Greek, with or without ἄν, (e.g. ἐλευθέρω ἄν) corresponds in Latin, of course, to the subjunctive, especially imperfect or pluperfect. This may have to do with the strange origin of these particular forms of the subjunctive, but it is normal already in the earliest Latin, and was probably a feature of Proto-Italic. Even more striking from a Greek point of view is the constant regular use of a subjunctive, again already in the earliest Latin, in an ut-clause giving a consequence of an action in the main clause, even if the consequence involves something that actually happened or was done, i.e. where the indicative would be appropriate. In this case, to begin with, the subjunctive was probably usual only where the consequence was predicted or wished for (as in such clauses in Osco-Umbrian after puz or puze, the counterpart of Lat. ut\textsuperscript{10}), and was then extended to other result clauses. But this development lies in the darkness of prehistory. Particularly noteworthy, though, are the great boundary-shifts in favour of the subjunctive within Latin itself. For the thinking syntactician, these have to be of special interest, because they offer us the best opportunity to work out what was meant to be expressed by the Latin subjunctive.

We first see the promotion of the subjunctive in indirect questions. In a question depending on a main clause containing a verb of asking or an invitation to speak, there must originally have been a choice between subjunctive and indicative depending on whether it was an ‘ought’ question (subjunctive) or a question of fact (indicative). This is what we would expect, given the distribution of indicatives and subjunctives in main clauses, but by the rules of Classical Latin as taught in school, any dependent question has its verb in the subjunctive, even if it involves something entirely factual. Now, on this point it is nice to observe that in pre-classical Latin the subjunctive was not yet so consistently established in this role, so that we have e.g. Plautus, \textit{Rudens} 852–3 opta ocius, rapi te . . . maūs (indic.) an trahi, ‘choose quickly whether you prefer to be torn or dragged’. Cicero here would have had to write mālis (subjv.), but Plautus is content with the indicative. Or, again, with a verb of asking in the main clause, Plaut. \textit{Trinummus} 173–4 sed

well attested in Sabellic, e.g. in Oscan fusid (\(=\) Lat. \textit{foret}, both from *\textit{bhu}-sē-t, ‘impf. subjv.’ to the verb ‘to be’), this formation remains at any rate controversial. Among important recent approaches to the problem are Jasanoff (1991), who starts from the opt. in *\textit{fē}- of aorist-cum-perfects in –s, and Meiser (1993), who sees the –sē suffix instead as a (new,Italic) long-ē subjv. to the inherited future/desiderative in –s (cf. Meiser 2003: 39–40).

\textsuperscript{10} Oscan puz, p(o)us, Umbrian puze, puse, etc. < *\textit{kʷu}t-i-s (very like Lat. \textit{ut}} < *\textit{kʷu}t-; see Untermann 2000: s.v. ‘puz’). With the subjv., e.g., in Oscan, in the \textit{Cippus Abellanus} (Cm i Rix), A, 17–19 puz . . . fusid ‘that it should be’, in Umbrian, in the \textit{Iguvine Tables} (Um i Rix) 1b, 34 puze . . . ūe ‘that . . . he should give’.
nunc rogare uicissim te uolo, quid fuit (indic.) officium meum me facere, ‘but now I in turn wish to ask you, what was it my duty to do’. Admittedly, the subjunctive is occasionally found already in Plautus. A detailed study was conducted by Becker (1873), a pupil of Wilhelm Studemund, in an effort to determine the spheres of use of the two moods (in the studies in archaic Latin ed. by Studemund 1873–91: I, 113–314), and this is the source of the summary in Delbrück’s comparative syntax (1893–1900: III, 275–7). As noted above, the use of the subjunctive needs no comment when it is an ‘ought’ question, as e.g. at Plaut. Bacchides 745 logure quid scribam, ‘tell me what I am to write’, or Pseudolus 779 nunc nescio hercle rebus quid faciam meis, ‘now I really don’t know what I am to do with my things’. These questions, even as direct questions, would have had the subjunctive. The subjunctive is natural also when the clause governing the question is itself in the subjunctive, as e.g. Plaut. Mercator 170 ut istuc quid sit (subjv.) actutum indices (subjv.), ‘that you quickly indicate what that is’. For the rest, we can say generally that an indirect question is most likely to retain an indicative verb if it resembles an independent question, while the clearer the relation of dependence, the more probable is the use of the subjunctive: hence, for example, with the subject of the question anticipated (Becker 1873: 167 ff.), Plaut. Bacch. 555 dic modo hominem, qui sit, ‘just tell me what sort of person he is’, or when the question is not supposed to be answered immediately, e.g. Plaut. Rudens 1149 dicito quid insit, ‘then say what is inside’, or Amphitruo 1128 Tiresiam consulam, quid faciandum censeat, ‘I’ll ask Tiresias what he thinks should be done’, all with subjunctive verbs. In Greek and Germanic, too, the optative is found in indirect factual questions. Obviously, in explicit subordination, the need was often felt to give clear expression to the sense of uncertainty that attaches to the content of an interrogative clause (on this see esp. Delbrück 1893–1900: III, 286–8 comparing Greek, Latin, and Gothic). In accordance with these tendencies, and depending on the various sets of functions, sometimes the indicative predominates and sometimes the subjunctive. The details are well discussed by Becker in the study referred to above (1873), except that his distinctions are often too pedantic and his explanations artificial.

It is not surprising that usage was gradually standardized, to begin with in favour of the subjunctive. As early as Terence, whose linguistic distance from

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11 Both of these examples—and many others besides—may be taken as two paratactic sentences, the second in each case a direct question (to be printed with a question mark). On the indicative and the subjunctive in indirect questions in early Latin, see Lindsay (1907: 66), who rightly stresses the frequency of parataxis (even when the verb is subjunctive), and Bennett (1910: 120–3), who is more confident of telling direct and indirect questions apart.

12 Studemund is known also for his transcription (1889) of the Ambrosian palimpsest of Plautus (n. 18 in this lecture), a labour which tragically cost him his sight; cf. Tarrant (1983: 303).

Plautus is of course very great, we find the sort of subjunctive clauses that would be impossible in Plautus, e.g. at *Hecyra* 78 *audin quid dicam?*, ‘do you hear what I say?’, or *Haut.* 820 *scis ubi sit nunc tibi tua Bacchis?* (‘do you know where your Bacchis is now?’). Plautus, as Becker’s examples clearly show, would here have had the indicative, *dico* and *est*.—By the classical period, the subjunctive has gained yet more ground, although even then the old indicative is sometimes found in such clauses, especially in more familiar registers—as in, say, Cicero’s letters to Atticus (e.g. 8. 13. 2; 13. 18. 2), and even more so in Petronius, e.g. 58. 9, 76. 11—and also in the poets (cf. Leo 1878: 92–4); Norden (1957: on *Aen.* 6. 615) is wrong to see in this a Grecism. The indicative is particularly common in sentences with *uiden ut*, as e.g. at | Catullus 61. 77 *uiden ut faces splendidas quatiunt comas?*, ‘do you see how the torches shake their flaming hair?’ (referred to by Bentley (1869) on Horace, *Epistles* 1. 1. 91). Then, in Late Latin (cf. the 4th-/5th-c. grammarian Diomedes,14 *GL* I, 305, 15) and subsequently in Romance, continuing the habits of popular speech, and under the constant influence of direct questions, the indicative becomes dominant again and the classical development is reversed.15

In clauses of this type, things are fairly clear and straightforward. Much harder is the second type, the change of mood in clauses with *cum* (Old Latin *quom*). The grammar of the classical language has very clear and precise rules about temporal clauses with *cum*, as to when the indicative must be used, and when the subjunctive. In general we can say that the subjunctive is used when *cum* is not purely of time but has a certain causal nuance, when the *cum*-clause gives the background to something contained in the main clause. Again it is clear that in these clauses, too, from the point of view of logic, and from comparison with Greek, we should always expect the indicative. Now, light has been thrown on this point by our emancipation from school grammar books and by the objective study of early Latin. In the first place, in 1835, in a note on Plautus, *Epidicus* 111, the subtle Friedrich Jacob (whom Lachmann called ‘unicus linguae Latinae particularum investigator’16), declared that Plautus departs totally from classical usage in this area and uses the indicative just where our linguistic intuition leads us to expect it. Since then, this divergence between classical and early Latin has been studied especially by Lübbert (1870, on the syntax of *quom*), Hale (1887–9, on the *cum*-constructions), and Dittmar (1897), who have tried to explain the development of the later usage from the earlier.

In Plautus the indicative is well established. The subjunctive is admitted only where its use goes without saying (in a main clause with subjunctive verb; in

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14 No. 47 in the prosopography of Kaster (1988).
15 For a good historical survey, with numerous further references, see Hofmann & Szantyr §294; for further illustration, see KS §227.
16 This is in Lachmann’s edn of Tibullus (Berlin 1829), in the first lengthy note on poem 3. 1.
reported speech; in the generalizing 2nd person sg. meaning ‘one’ (I, 109 above), and so on). It is true that the most recent account of Old Latin syntax, that of Bennett (1910: 302–3), gives a few counterexamples with subjunctive verb in the classical manner, but in none of these passages is the subjunctive sufficiently secure. It was easy for the subjunctive to intrude in early texts, because it was the regular construction later on with cum in temporal-causal clauses. Occasionally, we can use the tradition itself to show this happening. For example, at Plautus, Truculentus 380–1 it used to be normal to read tempestas quondam . . . fuit, cum inter nos sorderemus | alter alteri (‘a time once . . . there was when between ourselves we used to defile each other’), because this was what was offered by what was then the only known group of manuscripts, the so-called Palatines; thanks to the Ambrosian palimpsest, the reading sordebamus, normal by Plautine usage, came to light. Similarly, Cicero’s quotations from Plautus often have the subjunctive where the manuscripts of Plautus have the indicative. The only genuine cases, then, are those passages for which the whole tradition is available and unanimously attests the subjunctive.

The question arises, when and why was this naturally occurring indicative replaced by the subjunctive? An instance that is hard to explain away occurs as early as Ennius, Annals 485 Skutsch (of a trumpeter dealt a deadly wound in the throat) quomque caput caderet, carmen tuba sola peregit, ‘and as his head fell, the trumpet of its own accord played the music to its end’. Did Ennius perhaps wish to express a concessive nuance (‘and though the head fell’)? In such a case Plautus too uses the subjunctive. After Ennius, the subjunctive is found very occasionally in Terence, Gracchus, Lucilius, and Afranius. In the end it becomes as widespread as we know it in Classical Latin. Unfortunately, we do not know the factors responsible for setting the change underway. The most brilliant scholars have strained their astuteness in vain to offer explanations: none is convincing. Most attention has been paid to the carefully elaborated theory of the American

17 On this, see Hale (1906).

18 On this passage see Adams (1982: 199), and cf. II, 101 below. The Ambrosian palimpsest was discovered in Milan in 1815: in a manuscript now in the Biblioteca Ambrosiana in Milan (G. 82 sup.) over an erased copy (made in Italy in the 5th c. AD) of all 21 of the plays of Plautus identified by Varro as authentic, the Book of Kings in the Vulgate version had been written by a (?Irish) hand in the later 6th c. Attempts by means of chemicals to make clearer the older text under the later unfortunately rendered much of the manuscript entirely unreadable. On the Ambrosian palimpsest, the Palatine (orig. Heidelberg) manuscripts, and the rest of the tradition of the text of Plautus, see Tarrant (1983).

19 Cf. KS §205. Skutsch (1985: ad loc.) disagrees that there is a concessive nuance in Enn. Ann. 485 (‘although’ would be correct logic but poor poetry). He dates the construction of temporal cum with subj. earlier than W. does, comparing Enn. Anns. 33 quom . . . teneret and Euhemerus [a prose work by Ennius] 110 Winarczyk, and adding Cato (Orations, pp. 33, 8; 64, 1 Jordan) to the 2nd-c. BC authors mentioned by W. (Terence, e.g. Eunuch 22; the orator C. Sempronius Gracchus, fr. 27 Malcovati; the satirist C. Lucilius, fr. 73, 1137 Warmington; and the author of fabulae tugatae L. Afranius, fr. 106, 152, 233 Ribbeck). At the opposite extreme to Skutsch, Hofmann & Szantyr 622 are suspicious of all pre-classical examples.
scholar HALE, who compares the use of the subjunctive after *cum* with that in qualifying descriptive relative clauses, which were always subjunctive in virtue of their closeness to result clauses (1887–9: II, chs. 3–5). In my view, a key point against this is the fact that these relative clauses always follow the clause or constituent with which they belong, while the subjunctive is used in a *quom*-clause precisely when this precedes its main clause. Barely comprehensible is the thesis advanced by DITTMAR (1897: 79–81, 139–46, etc.) that this subjunctive is of a ‘polemical’ nature and has to some extent the force of an exclamation mark! It is not at all easy to see why Cicero and Caesar would have wished to introduce a polemical nuance to their *cum*-clauses. We must be content to acknowledge our ignorance.

Later on, the frequent use of *cum* clauses led to a general introduction of the subjunctive into temporal clauses (with *postquam, posteaquam* (‘after’), *ubi* (‘when’), *ut* (‘when, as’), *simulac* (‘as soon as’), *dum* (‘while’)). What was normal after one conjunction was extended to others introducing the same sort of clause—so already at Ter. *Hec. 378 ut limen exirem, ad genua accidit ‘as I was leaving the door, he fell at my knees’ (cf. LÖFSTEDT 1911: 97–102). In the same way, in very late Latin, even clauses with *quia* (‘because’) acquire the subjunctive.21 |

20 It is noteworthy that Hale’s book was published in a German translation, with a preface by Delbrück, in 1891.
21 Cf. Hofmann & Szantyr 586 citing Sulpicius Severus (4th/5th c.) and Sidonius Apollinaris (5th c.).
Another very interesting development is to be seen with *priusquam, antequam*. First, let us note in passing that it is no accident that Plautus does not have *antequam* and Caesar, so strict in his choice of words, avoids it. Originally, *ante* did not indicate chronological priority at all: to begin with, it meant ‘opposite’—cf. its cognate in Gk ἀντί ‘opposite, over against’—and from there ‘in front of’, as e.g. at Verg. *Aen*. 1. 95 *ante ora patrum* (= *coram patribus* ‘in the presence (lit., before the faces) of the elders’). From here, the meaning ‘before’ emerged, first in a spatial sense, then with reference to time. The word has this meaning already in Plautus, also in derivatives such as *antiquus* (‘ancient, former, old’), but the meaning ‘before’ (of time) was not well enough established for *ante* to be able to govern a *quam*-clause, like *prius*. This point was reached only in the course of the 2nd century BC.

The variable use of the moods in clauses introduced by *priusquam* and *antequam* has from the very beginning been something scholars have racked their brains over (Charisius, pp. 295–6 Barwick = *GL* I, 228, 26–9; Hand 1829–45: I, 397–402; IV, 568–71). The problem is solved if we follow the development of the usage and attend to the real intentions of the speaker. On this I have benefited from valuable information from Rudolf Thurneysen.

In purely factual reports that one action or process preceded another, we find both indicative and subjunctive, which seems to confirm the view of those superficial scholars who maintained that there was no difference at all between the two. To take examples of each in similar spheres, we have, on the one hand, Plautus, *Miles* 709 *priu' quam lucet* (indic.), *adsunt*, ‘before it gets light, they are there’, and Varro, *Latin Language* 7. 58 *ante rorat, quam pluit* (indic.), ‘there is

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1 For details and bibliography, see Hofmann & Szantyr §323.

2 Cf. Skt ἀντί ‘opposite, facing’. In this preposition we can see clearly the fossilized case-form of a noun, namely the loc. sg. of a word for ‘face’, *ant-i* (< *h-ent-i*); cf. the acc. sg. in the Gk advb/prep. ἀντί ‘over against’, and the verbs ἀντίδου, ἀντικαί ‘meet, approach’. On Lat. *ante* and *antiquus* (probably a compound rather than a derivative), see Ernout & Meillet, s.v. ‘ante’.

3 Classicist, linguist, and Celticist, Eduard Rudolf Thurneysen (1857–1940) was another son of Basel. He taught briefly at Jena before succeeding Karl Brugmann to become the second professor of Indo-European at Freiburg im Breisgau (1887–1913), where he published his famous *Handbuch* of Old Irish (1909; rev. edn in English 1946); he moved to Bonn for the last ten years of his career (1913–23), which he devoted first and foremost to Celtic studies. For an obituary in English, see Ryan (1940).
dewfall before it rains’, on the other hand, Seneca, *Epistles* 103. 2 *tempestas minatur, antequam surgat* (subjv.); *crepant aedificia, antequam corruant* (subjv.), ‘the storm threatens before it gets up; buildings crack before they collapse’. But we can safely say that Seneca’s construction would have been impossible in Old Latin, and even still in Classical Latin.

Apart from the self-evident cases, where the main clause has the subjunctive or contains a command, Plautus uses the subjunctive when the realization of the content of the subordinate clause is prevented by the content of the main clause: then the subordinate clause has as a rule the mood of unreality. So, e.g., at *Amphitruo* 240 *animam omittunt prius quam loco demigrent* (subjv.), ‘they lose their life before they leave their post’—although, because *prius* here is not purely of time (‘sooner than leave’), this point is clearer in instances in thoroughly classical writers, e.g. Cicero, *Against Verres* 4. 147 *ante quam uerba facerem* (subjv.), *de sella surrexit atque abit*, ‘before I could have words, he (the praetor) rose from his chair and left’. Because of the praetor’s departure, Cicero’s speaking did not take place. Similar is e.g. *Republic* 2. 3. 6 *naualis hostis ante adesse potest quam quisquam uenturum esse suspicari queat* (subjv.) (‘a naval foe is able to be present before anyone can suspect that he will come’), and more similar still Varro, *Eumenides* fr. 145 *praequum responderem* (subjv.), *foris nescio quis occupat res indicare* (‘before I could reply, someone outside began to explain matters’; cf. also Caesar, *Civil War* 2. 34. 7, Livy 22. 4. 7.) However, the unreality does not have to be explicitly marked by the mood: cf. Cic. *De inv.* 2. 62 (indic.), Hor. *Odes* 3. 27. 9 (subjv.), Verg. *Aen.* 4. 27 (indic.).—In the classical period, the subjunctive comes to be used, quite frequently in fact, even when the content of the subordinate clause is not straightforwardly unreal but the speaker wants to stress the fact that it was unreal at the time of the action of the main clause (so that we can translate the conjunction with ‘while yet’ or ‘without at first’). So e.g. Cic. *On the Agrarian Law* 2. 71 * bac lege ante omnia uenient ... quam gleba una ematur* (subjv.) (‘by this law everything is being sold... before a single sod can be bought’); Caes. *Civ.* 3. 101. 1 * prius Cassius ad Messanam nauibus aduolauit, quam Pomponius de eius aduentu cognosceret* (subjv.) (‘Cassius dashed to Messana with the fleet before Pomponius could learn of his arrival’), and so on.

The extreme case in Livy—that is, a subjunctive in a statement purely of time—is at 5. 33. 5 *ducentisquippe annis ante quam Clusium oppugnaverant* (subjv.) *urbeque Romam caperent* (subjv.), *in Italiam Galli transcendere*, ‘two hundred years before the attack on Clusium and the capture of Rome, the Gauls crossed the mountains into Italy’. We get the force of the subjunctive if we have in the background a thought such as, ‘but at that time the storming of Clusium 200 years later would not have been conceived’. The whole context shows that Livy’s main concern is to refute the assumption of a causal nexus between the crossing of the Alps and the enterprises against Clusium and Rome.
From here, it is only a small step to the completely unmotivated subjunctive in the sentence from Seneca’s letters quoted above. Many later Latin writers only ever use the subjunctive in this type of clause. This is true of Q. Curtius Rufus (1st [perh. early 2nd.?] c. AD), and then again of Jerome’s Latin Bible, e.g. at John 8: 58 antequam Abraham fieret (subjv), ego sum (πρὶν Ἀβραὰμ γενέσθαι, ἐγώ εἰμι) ‘before Abraham was, I am’. As a result, the ancient grammarians prescribe simply the subjunctive with antequam when the two parts are adjacent, as opposed to ante . . . quam + indic. (e.g. Verg. Aen. 4. 27). Compare the fact that in Gothic only the subjunctive is used with the conjunction faurþizei ‘before’, e.g. in the Bible passage just quoted, faurþizei Abraham waurþi (sg. 3 pret. opt.), im ik.

French avant que shows a development very much like that of Latin antequam. In Old French, in a subordinate clause, avant que (like its synonyms ains que, devant que, etc.) could take the indicative, if there was no intention to express the unreality of the clause; in Modern French, formal levelling has led to the sole dominance of the subjunctive. Indeed, because of the parallelism between avant que and après que, the subjunctive is occasionally used with the latter, although a clause introduced with ‘after’ can hardly involve the notion of an unrealized action (cf. Haas 1916: §461).4

The Latin subjunctive gains ground also in concessive clauses. Under the influence of quamuis and licet, with which the subjunctive was always used, it is found with quamquam from Cicero and Vergil on, even when no nuance of uncertainty is to be expressed.5

Moreover, the use of the subjunctive at Hor. Sat. 1. 9. 62–3 Fuscus Aristius occurrit mihi carus et illum qui pulchre nosset (subjv.) (‘who should appear but my friend Fuscus Aristius, who knew him (the bore) all too well’) is to be explained simply by the fact that, on the basis of complex sentences expressing a wish (such as Plaut. Cas. 255 (ut detur nuptum nostro uilico, seruo frugi atque ubi illi bene sit ligno . . . , ‘(let her be given in marriage to our steward,) a good slave, with whom she will be well supplied with wood . . . ’)), it became regular to use a subjunctive verb in any relative clause coordinated with an attributive adjective. KROLL has some (mainly correct) observations on this point (1920: 14 ff.), but note that the subjunctive at Caes. Gallic War 2. 5. 5 quae res . . . post cum quae essent tuta reddébat is not meaningless, as KROLL thinks: the thought is, ‘he wished thereby to secure his rear’.7

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4 Grevisse §1082 reports a marked increase in the use of the subjunctive after après que since the second third of the 20th c., and conversely, in the colloquial language of certain regions, the use of the indicative after avant que.

5 For details and bibliography on quamquam, quamuis and licet, see Hofmann & Szantyr §§325–6, who, however, refuse to recognize subjv. for indic. after quamquam before Cornelius Nepos, Life of Atticus 13. 6.

6 Cf. the commentary of W. T. MacCary and M. M. Willcock (Cambridge 1976: ad loc.).

7 Again (cf. n. 17, p. 94 above), Kroll has changed his account in the 3rd edn of this book (1925).
A second key question for Latin is how the functions of the subjunctive are divided between the present, imperfect, perfect, and pluperfect subjunctives? First, it must be stressed that it is really rather arbitrary to call forms such as facerem ‘imperfect’ subjunctives, as they have absolutely no formal relationship with the imperfect indicative faciebam, etc. We can say only that the so-called imperfect subjunctive belongs more than does the present subjunctive to the realm of the past.—We should also note straightaway that, as Latin has developed over time, massive shifts have occurred in the use of the so-called tenses of the subjunctive.

The present subjunctive in an independent main clause is used first and foremost to express a wish, especially when utinam is added (in Old Latin and in poetry, also ut or qui). Here we come upon a remarkable difference between early and later Latin (with which we shall see very shortly analogies in other types of clause). A sentence such as Plaut. Haunted House 233 (Philolaches:) utinam nunc meus emortuos pater ad me nuntietur, ‘if only the demise of my father were to be announced to me now’, expresses a wish which the speaker believes to be unfulfillable, and later for such wishes the imperfect subjunctive is used. 8

Closely connected with the optative use (as also in the case of the Greek optative), is the jussive use. Generally, this is in the 3rd person, where the subjunctive alternates with the imperative from the earliest times (although in laws the imperative is preferred). In the most refined Classical Latin, a 2nd-person present subjunctive is not allowed as the expression of a command. Outside his letters, Cicero has the imperative in positive commands, the perfect subjunctive in prohibitions, but with caue (‘don’t!’) he has the present subjunctive through a sort of attraction (of tense) to this present imperative (but note Letters to his Brother Quintus 3. 7 (9). 4 caue...cogitaris ‘do not...concern yourself’, with Stjögren 1916: 9). In early Latin, and generally in non-classical Latin, this rule does not apply, and even the well-known rule of Madvig (1842: 105), that ne facias expresses a general prohibition, ne feceris one for a specific case, cannot be shown to hold for Old Latin. As for the 1st-person forms, finally, apart from the familiar use of the pl. 1 for exhortations, we need to note the Old Latin use of the sg. 1 to mean ‘I wish’, as e.g. at Plaut. Trin. 749 edoceam ut res se habet, ‘I wish to explain what the situation is’, or 1136 sed maneam etiam opinor, ‘but I want to stay, I think’, where Cicero would have used (fut.) edocebo and manebo. This is reminiscent of the identity of the sg. 1 future and present subjunctive endings -am in the 3rd and 4th conjugations (I, 198–9 above).—Note also the ‘ought’ (deliberative) questions. 9

8 Cf. Bennett (1910: 193–4), although he does not take this example as equivalent to the impf.
A potential use of the present subjunctive has recently been denied as far as possible by Kroll (1916; 1920: 49 ff.). In many places he is right, as most of the passages adduced by grammarians under this heading are straightforward examples of the unreal use, to which we shall come in a moment. But *aliquis dicat* (‘someone may say’) and *roget quis* (‘someone may ask’) in Terence cannot be explained in the same way, and *forsitan* (‘perhaps’, lit., ‘the chance may be’), the classical replacement for *fors fuit an*, conceals a use of *sit* synonymous with Gk *εἰναι* ἄν (sg. 3 opt., ‘it may be’).

The use of the present subjunctive to express something unreal in present time is much more widespread than is generally supposed. In Old Latin, it is very common, the nicest example being in Ennius, *Tragedies* (Telamo) 265 Jocelyn (‘I do not believe that the gods care what humankind does,’) *nam si curent*, *bene bonis sit*, *male malis*, *quod nunc abest*, ‘for, if they did care, things would be* well for the good and ill for the bad, which, as things are, is not the case’. Here, from what precedes and follows the conditional sentence, it is as clear as it could possibly be that the content of the conditional is unreal. Although by the classical period the imperfect subjunctive was usual in this kind of clause, this use of the present subjunctive survived until then: even Cicero has it, especially in clauses with *quasi* ‘as if’ (cf. also Catullus, 6. 2 and 13 f.). We can compare what we observed earlier (I, 237 above) on the analogous use of the Greek optative. 11

Of the *perfect subjunctive* three sets of uses can be distinguished, according to its temporal reference. **First**, those cases where it is used like the Greek aorist optative, without reference to the tense of the perfect indicative, as for instance in prohibitions with the 2nd- (more rarely, 3rd-) person perfect subjunctive, e.g. *Enn. Ann. 183* Skutsch *nec mi aurum posco nec mi pretium dederit* (the long *i* is ancient; cf. n. 7, p. 305 above), ‘I ask for myself no gold, and don’t give me a reward!’ (On positive wishes with this form of the subjunctive, see Sjögren (1916: 48.) A potential use is seen esp. in *dixerim = Gk εἰπομαι ἄν*, *dixerit = Gk εἶπεν ἄν* (‘I/he might say’). Here belong in particular those forms, like *ausim* and *faxim*, which are not formed on the perfect stem, including also Catullus 66. 18 *ita me diui...iussuerint* (with short *u*) ‘may the gods so help me’ (and Prop. 2. 23. 22).— **Secondly**, these perfect subjunctives can belong to the so-called ‘logical’ perfect (I, 187 above). This goes without saying for defective verbs with only a perfect stem, as in the well-known *oderint, dum metuant*, ‘let them hate me,

10 Cf. pp. 67–8 of the 3rd edn (1925), conceding W.’s view (cf. n. 17, p. 94 above).
11 W. must mean the unreal use of the opt. in Homer. The tense of the subjunctive after *quasi* is more generally regarded as following the sequence of tenses (see e.g. Bennett 1910: 287; KS §224.6 n. 4; contrast Hale 1892). On Catullus 6 (and 66. 18 below), see K. Quinn’s commentary (London 1970), *ad locc.*
12 On these forms, see Sommer (1914: §364), and n. 9, p. 268 and n. 7 p. 305 above.
provided that they fear me’. But there are other examples, too. With *peri* ‘I am lost’, so common in Plautus, belongs *perierint*, optative (‘may they be lost’) at e.g. *Stichus* 385, conditional (‘they would be lost’) at *Rud.* 987.—The third type, however, is remarkable and not at all self-evident: this is the use of the perfect subjunctive with reference to the past, plainly under the influence of the preterital perfect indicative, expressing either a wish/demand or a possibility. The ‘wishing’ function is classical, e.g. at Cic. *Rep.* 4. 8. 8 *cui quidem utinam uere augurauerim*, ‘would that I have prophesied truly to him!’, and already in Old Latin, e.g. Plaut. *Poenulus* 799 *abscessit :: utinam hinc abierit malam crucem* ‘he’s gone :: I hope he’s gone to perdition’. We find the same in certain questions, e.g. *Amphitruo* 817, where Alcumena, disappointed by Jupiter, says to her husband Amphitryo, *quid ego tibi deliqui si quoi nupta sum tecum fui?* ‘What offence have I done you if I spent the night with you, the man I’m married to?’, to which Amphitryo replies, *tun mecum fueris? Do you wish to have been with me?* (note the dependence of *fueris* on *fui*). Similarly in indirect questions, e.g. at *Miles* 345 *uolo scire, utrum egon id quod uiderim . . .* (‘I wish to know whether I saw what I saw’), where *uiderim* is clearly subjunctive to the preterite *uidi*. Conversely, perfect subjunctives are not attested purely of possibility with reference to the past before one or two controversial passages in Catullus and Cicero; a secure example of this is Petronius 52. 10 *credo, dixerit* ‘I think she may have told him’. Of similar origin, incidentally, is the perfect subjunctive in result clauses, in that this is based on an imitation of the narrative perfect.—With all this, compare Gellius, *Attic Nights* 18. 2. 14, where he is speaking of the problems addressed within a circle of friends: *postrema quaestionum omnium haec fuit: scripserim, legerim, uenerim cuius temporis uerba sint, praeteriti an futuri an utriusque*, ‘the last question of all was this: what is the tense of *scripserim, legerim, uenerim*, preterite, future, or both?’. You see how the general manner of use of the Latin perfect subjunctive (no less than its formation: I, 241 above) is analogous to that of the Greek optative.

We now come to an especially interesting topic, the use of the imperfect subjunctive. Here I must mention straightaway a Latin phenomenon that runs counter to the Latin familiar to us. In Old Latin, the imperfect subjunctive can be used of a wish for the past; Cicero still has a few examples of this, and it is retained

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13 Originally from the tragedy *Atreus* of the 2nd-/1st-c. BC playwright L. Accius, fr. 168 Warmington, quoted three times each by Cicero and Seneca, and said (Suetonius, *Caligula* 30. 1) to be a favourite saying of the Emperor Caligula.

14 Bennett (1910: 195) comments that nearly all of the examples of this use in early Latin involve the forms in *-s(-)*, above all *faxit, faxint*. KS §47.4 add that *faxint* after Terence is practically the only form found in this function, but rightly observe that the *-s(-)* forms are not used of past time.

15 Better is probably, ‘Spent the night with me?’; cf. Bennett (1910: 186–91), who treats this more convincingly under the ‘subjunctive in repudiating questions and exclamations’.

also in more elevated classical poetry. So, e.g. Plaut. *Trinummus* 133–4 *non redderes neque de illo quicquam neque emeres neque uenderes*, ‘you should not have given it back, and you should not have bought anything from him or sold anything to him’. Similarly, in the same passage (*Trin.* 133), in a question about what should have happened in the past, *non ego illi argentum redderem?*, ‘Should I not have given him back the money?’ The imperfect subjunctive is used as a preterite also in conditional sentences. A particularly good example is that quoted by Delbrück (1893–1900: II, 402): *Aulularia* 741 (*factum est illud; fieri infectum non potest. deos credo uoluisse, nam ni uellent, non fieret*, (‘it’s done; it cannot be undone. I believe the gods wished it,) for if they hadn’t wished it, it would not have happened’. This use is attested still in Cicero, Vergil (e.g. *Aen.* 6. 537), and later poets. Note e.g. Cic. *Pro Sestio* 64 *quis audiaret, si maxime quererentur de Cyprio rege quuerentur…?*, ‘Who would have listened to them, no matter how much they wished to complain? Should they have complained of the king of Cyprus…?’ (cf. *Sest.* 54). A fairly common instance is *diceres* ‘one could have said’, but for the rest a shift works its way through, starting already in Old Latin and involving the use of the imperfect subjunctive of unreal events in present time, so that we have wishes and conditional sentences such as at Plaut. *Rudens* 533 *utinam fortuna nunc anetina uterer*, ‘I wish I had now the fate of a duck’, or *Trinummus* 115 *haec, si mi inimicus esset, credo haec crederet*, ‘if he were my enemy, I think he would not believe me’. Since, however, the imperfect subjunctive in Classical Latin denotes unreal events in the present, it gradually loses the ability to serve as the unreal form for past time.

In its place the pluperfect subjunctive appears in this function in Classical Latin, although this, too, starts to occur here and there even earlier. It is common both in ‘ought’-statements and in conditional sentences, in the former e.g. at Cic. *Sest.* 45 *restitisses, repugnasses, mortem pugnans oppetisses*, ‘you should have resisted, defended yourself’, | gone to your death fighting’. In Old Latin, the pluperfect would have been possible here, but the imperfect (*resisteres, repugnares, oppeteres*) would have been normal. 18

The shift, then, involves the replacement of the present subjunctive with the ‘imperfect’, and the substitution of the pluperfect for the imperfect. This corresponds exactly to the change in meaning of the Greek ‘unreal’ imperfect, discussed above (I, 226), but the development in Latin goes further, as even this use of the imperfect in Classical Latin is occasionally replaced by the pluperfect in post-classical times. There are curious examples in later writers, including Apuleius, *Apology* 76 *nisi… incidisset, fortasse an adhuc… domi sedisset*, ‘had she not come

17 The negative *non*, natural in the (deliberative) question, presumably accounts for the unexpected *non* (for *ne*) in the answer (Bennett 1910: 177).
18 Cf. Bennett (1910: 177), who reports (under the ‘subjunctive of unfulfilled past obligation’) that we find only the impf. in early Latin.
across . . ., perhaps she would still be sitting at home’, where you should note especially the *adhuc* (‘still now’), which clearly refers to present time. The imperfect and pluperfect subjunctives are then often confused, or even, because the feeling of opposition between them is weakened, the imperfect subjunctive is used again as in Old Latin, where in Classical Latin the pluperfect would be expected. The most recent treatment of this—and very good it is—is Löfstedt (1918: 96–9).19 This coming to prominence of the pluperfect subjunctive is reflected in the Romance languages: in French, for example, the so-called imperfect subjunctive, which is used like the Latin imperfect subjunctive, formally continues the Latin pluperfect subjunctive. So, for instance, *uellem ires* in Plautus would be in French *je voudrais que tu allasses*, the ending of *allasses* corresponding to the Latin pluperfect *-a(u)sses*. So, too, *plût* in *plût à Dieu* ‘may it please God’, although corresponding in meaning to Lat. (*utinam*) *placeret* (imperf. subjv.), formally continues *placuisset* (plupf.).

A prominent item at a fairly elementary stage of a Latin course, is the doctrine of the *consecutio temporum*, ‘sequence of tenses (of the subjunctive)’.20 Already in antiquity grammarians made an attempt to formulate it. Charisius (pp. 347–9 Barwick=GL I, 263, 8–264, 16) and more briefly Diomedes (GL I, 391, 20–9) teach that a present indicative in the main clause takes a present or perfect subjunctive in the subordinate clause, while an imperfect, perfect, or pluperfect indicative takes an imperfect or pluperfect subjunctive. Since then, this rule is to be found in all manuals of the language. Who invented the term *consecutio temporum*, I do not know. It is not ancient, but it agrees well with the ancient use of ‘consecutio’. Standing for Gk *ἀκολουθία*, the Latin word denotes agreement between constituent words of a group. The locus classicus is Cicero, *The Parts of the Art of Oratory* 18 *numeri quidam sunt in coniunctione seruandi consecutioque verborum . . . ; consecutio . . . ne generibus numeris temporibus personis | casibus perturbetur oratio* (‘in joining words together, certain rhythms have to be preserved, and also the agreement (lit., sequence) of words . . . ; agreement . . . is to prevent the oration being disrupted in respect of gender, number, tense, person or case’). Compare the use of the related term *consequens* (‘consistent, corresponding’).

The rule itself is based on the fact that the imperfect and pluperfect subjunctives generally express something stated or demanded for the closer and the more remote past, respectively, and are therefore well suited to utterances whose

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19 Hofmann & Szantyr 321–2 (with bibliog.; see also 661–3) cite as the first example of plupf. for impf. Cic. *Laws* 2. 58 *cum . . . fuisse* (allegedly for *essent*, ‘since . . . there were’); they mention as possible explanations of impf. for plupf. (a) Greek influence and (b) prose rhythm.

20 Cf. Hofmann & Szantyr 550–4 (with further bibliog.). The doctrine was controversial for at least fifty years from about 1870. Note Hale’s vigorous and well-illustrated attempt (1886–8) to disprove the whole notion of a mechanical sequence, including (72–7) an excellent survey of earlier challenges to the doctrine; compare Gildersleeve’s review (1887a) of Hale, and Fowler’s review (1919) of Heffner (1917).
content is shifted by the main clause into the realm of the past. We are about to see something very similar in Germanic, and I remind you also of Dawes’s Canon in Greek (I, 26 and 238 above).

This internal motivation does not, however, imply that the speaker would always have conceived the content of the subordinate clause with imperfect or pluperfect subjunctive as something belonging to the past. It was just a matter of habit to prefer an agreement of this kind. How superficially this habit was followed is seen in a sentence such as that cited by Kroll (1920: 48\(^{21}\)) from Cicero, Rep. 3. 4 discipula popolorum, quae perfectit in bonis ingenii, id quod iam saepu perfectit, ut incredibilis quaedam et divina virtus existet (‘the training of peoples, which brings it about in men of ability and good character, as it has often brought it about in the past, that an almost incredible and divine virtue arises’). The ut-clause belongs logically with the main clause with perfectit (pres. indic.), and ought therefore to have the present subjunctive, but it has come under the influence of the perfect perfectit in the clause inserted immediately before, and therefore has the imperfect subjunctive existet.

The rule holds in general through the whole history of Latin. It is of no significance that occasionally, almost by accident, once or twice in pre-classical or classical authors, a subordinate clause has a present subjunctive, in spite of a historic main clause.\(^{22}\) On the other hand, there are one or two things to say about the sequence of tenses in sentences with a present (incl. logical perfect) or future in the main clause. The school-grammar rule in such cases is that the subordinate clause has the present subjunctive if it is contemporaneous with the main clause, the perfect subjunctive if its content precedes that of the main clause. But sometimes, even in Classical Latin, the imperfect or pluperfect subjunctive is found. Let me mention some important instances. Take Cicero, Against Vatinius 5 quaero a te cur C. Cornelium non defenderem ‘I ask you why I should not have defended C. Cornelius’. Here, in spite of the preceding quaero, defenderem keeps the form that it would have had in the ‘why’ clause, had this been independent: the question is about a previous ‘ought’ statement.—Another instance is illustrated by a passage such as Cic. Against Piso 26 numerandum est ille annus . . . cum obmutuisset senatus ‘we must include the year . . . when the senate was muted’. Here ille annus refers the content of the subordinate clause to the past; had this clause been independent, it would have been illo anno obmutuerat senatus. Just as here (and cf. Cic. Att. 4. 16. 1 [no. 89 Shackleton Bailey] fuisse for esset) | the pluperfect subjunctive is used because of the suggestion of the pluperfect indicative, so Cicero quite often has, against the sequence of tenses, the imperfect

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\(^{21}\) Pp. 66–7 of the 3rd edn (1923).

\(^{22}\) The first examples given by Hofmann & Szantyr 552 for the breaking-down of the rule are, in the colloquial language, a 3rd-c. inscription, and in the literary language, from the 4th c. (although the jurists, incl. Gaius in the 2nd c., receive special mention in this connection).
subjunctive where in a main clause the imperfect indicative would have stood. So, e.g., at Academica 2. 88 tum cum uidebantur, quo modo uiderentur, id agitur (‘what we are asking is how these things appeared at the time when they were seen’); see Sjögren [quoting Plasberg ] (1916: 12–15). Equally, it is important to consider the underlying thought in a passage such as Cic. Att. 11. 16. 3 (no. 227 Shackleton Bailey) idem a te nunc peto, quod superioribus litteris, ut . . . me moneres (‘I make the same request of you now as in my previous letter . . . that you should advise me’), with moneres for moneas because the quod clause refers to the past (‘my previous letter’).

Scholars have been much exercised also by the question of the sequence of tenses after the historic present (cf. already Charisius, pp. 348–9 Barwick = GL I, 264, 3–8). The rule that is taught—which is probably right—is that, in general, subordinate clauses which precede a main clause with an historic present have the form of the subjunctive that would be usual after an historic main clause (i.e. imperfect or pluperfect); if, on the other hand, the subordinate clause follows, the historic present is treated as a present. 23 This makes sense, as before the main clause is uttered it has a preterital feel to it, while once an historic present has been uttered, a present form is there and it determines the form of the verb in the following subordinate clause (cf. esp. Hug 1885).

Just a brief word, finally, on the subjunctive in the Germanic languages. Like the Latin subjunctive, the Germanic subjunctive does not originally belong with the Greek subjunctive. All forms of the Germanic subjunctive, like some of the Latin forms, began life as optatives: German sei ‘be!’ is cognate with Gk εἰη and Lat. sit. 24 This is why comparative linguists speak also of the Germanic ‘optative’ (cf. I, 60 & n. 2, p. 84 above). (The key work here is Delbrück (1904) on the constructions of the Germanic optative.)

The subjunctive of the preterite in Germanic is, in Indo-European terms, the optative of the perfect. In Greek (and in Sanskrit, too) these forms are rare; in Germanic (like the Latin perfect subjunctives, also derived from the optative), they are not merely frequent but formed regularly to every verb, since the old perfect forms acquired, as in Latin, preterital meaning. In other ways, too, the Germanic use of the so-called subjunctive resembles that of Latin: for example, in

23 Charisius quotes Cic. Sex. Rosc. 21 as an authoritative example, but states no rule. The rule given by W. goes back to an earlier study by Hug (see Hug 1885, with earlier references)—but note that Hug allowed either tense of the subjv. after a preceding historic present (cf. Riemann 1925: 465–6). The rule has always been controversial, and even its proponents acknowledge how frequently it is broken and how important it is to be aware of the clear preferences of individual authors: so, for example, pres. subjv. is preferred by Plautus, Cicero, Caesar, Ovid, and other poets, the impf. by Terence, Ennius, and historians including Livy, Nepos, and Tacitus. See KS §180.2, and Hofmann & Szantyr 551, who (following Hug) allow the rule for Caesar, and quote as an instance of the impf. preceding and the pres. following a single main verb Cic. Verr. II. 5. 116 mirips ne caederetur (impf.) monet (main verb) ut caueat (pres.) ‘he advised him to take care lest he be flogged’. For a survey of earlier discussions, see Lebreton (1901: 239–53).

24 All these forms (cf. OHG si, MHG si, and Old Latin siēt) go back to IE *hs-īdhs-t (sg. 3 opt.).
its use for denoting unreal events, which in Greek are rendered as a rule with the past tenses of the indicative; also in the sequence of tenses, which we will come to in a moment. It should also be noted that in indirect questions asking after a fact, while in Greek and modern German the indicative is normal, in some old Germanic dialects, just as in Classical Latin (I, 242–4 above), the subjunctive can be used. So, e.g. in Otfrid, Book of the Gospels III. 20, 85 ságet uns . . ., wer . . . thīz dati (‘tell us . . . who did this’), this OHG dati is formally identical with modern German täte (sg. 3 past subjv.), but in modern German you would have to say wer dies getan hat, with the indicative.

In independent clauses, Gothic retains uses of the subjunctive which are reminiscent of Greek and Latin, but which are lost in modern German. The present optative can have potential force, as in Greek, e.g. at John 3: 4 δώναται . . . γεννηθήναι; (‘can he be born?’) is rendered in the so-called Skeireins (2, p. 458, 16 Streitberg) with gabairaidan (sg. 3 medio-passive opt. of gabairan ‘give birth to’); again as in Greek, it can also serve as a future. Similarly, the preterite optative serves as a sort of potential in the past. So, e.g., Mark 14: 5 ηδόνατο τούτο τό μόρυν πραβήναι ‘this ointment could have been sold’ becomes maht wesi [sg. 3 pret. opt. of wisan ‘to be’; lit., ‘perhaps it was possible’] auk þata balsan frabugjan. Similarly, the question at Matt. 25: 44 πότε σε εἶδομεν πεινώντα . . . καὶ οὐ διηκονήσαμεν σοι; ‘when did we see you hungry . . . and not minister to you?’ becomes hwan þuk sehwum (pret. indic.) gredagana . . . jan-ni andbahtidedeima (pret. opt.) þus?, with a subtle change of mood from the Greek original. In the second example, modern German would have to use the pluperfect subjunctive ( . . . und hätten dir nicht gedient ‘and would not have served you’) to match the sense of the Gothic translator.

In the expression of unreal events, too, the Germanic optative offers striking parallels with Greek and Latin. In Latin, for unreal events in present time, the present subjunctive was gradually replaced by the imperfect, while for past time, the imperfect yielded to the pluperfect (I, 249, 251–2 above); compare here the increased use of preterites for unreal events in Greek (I, 237 above). For unreal events in the present, already in Gothic, as in Classical Latin, the preterite optative has achieved sole dominance, so, e.g., John 5: 46 εἰ γὰρ ἐπιστεύετε Μωσεί, ἐπιστεύετε ἂν ἐμοί (‘if you believed Moses, you would believe me’) becomes zabai allis Mose galaubidedeiþ, ga-fau-laubidedeiþ mis; but in past time, Gothic differs from modern German much as Old Latin does from Classical Latin.  

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25 That is, ‘Elucidation’, fragments found (by the discoverer of the Ambrosian palimpsest of Plautus, n. 18, p. 309 above) in another Milan manuscript of a Gothic commentary on the Gospel of John breaking off at 7: 52, of disputed date and authorship (cf. Streitberg 2000: xxxii–xxiv; Krahe & Seebold 22).

26 W. is comparing the development from impf. subjv. in Gothic (pret. opt.) and early Lat. to plupf. subjv. in modern German and Classical Latin.
in the Gothic version of Matt. 11: 23 ei ἐν Σωδόμηις ἐγένοντο αἱ δυνάμεις, jabai in Saudaumjam waurþeina (pl. 3 pret. opt.) mahteis (‘if the mighty works had been done in Sodom’), as compared with Luther’s so zu Sodom die Thaten geschehen wären (plupf. subjv.). Delbrück (1904: 264) attempts to explain the former—the use of the preterite optative for present unreality—as follows: ‘It is common to regard something which is possible in itself as for the moment excluded. In this situation, a new verb-form comes to the fore which adds the notion of past time to that of possibility, and thus suggests that the possibility is no longer there.’

The line dividing the two so-called ‘subjunctives’ of Germanic has been debated at particular length with reference to reported speech. Already in the first grammars of Modern High German, parallels were drawn between this and the Latin sequence of tenses (II, 252–4 above); cf. Jellinek (1913–14: II, 402, 410–11). More recent accounts (among which I would highlight in particular Behaghel (1899) on the tenses of the subjunctive in subordinate clauses in German, and Wilmanns’s circumspect treatment (III, 205–10) come to the following conclusion. In early Germanic, the distinction between the two subjunctives agrees more or less exactly with the rule in Latin, although the Germanic preterite optative corresponds in use to the perfect as well as the imperfect subjunctive in Latin. So, for instance, in subordinate clauses relating to past time, depending on a present main clause, we have e.g. at John 18: 21 in Gothic fraih . . . hwa rodidedjau (‘ask . . . what I said’) and in the Vulgate interroga . . . quid locutus sim, or at I Corinth. 4: 7 hwa hwopis, swa ni nemeis? (‘why do you glory as if you had not received it?’) and in the Vulgate quid gloriaris, quasi non acceperis?.

If there is no intended temporal contrast, then a present in the main clause is followed by a present ‘subjunctive’, a preterite in the main clause by a preterite ‘subjunctive’ in the subordinate clause, e.g. in Gothic at Luke 20: 7 andhofun, ei ni wissedeina hwaþro (‘they replied that they knew not from where (was the baptism of John)’).—Modern German usage is fundamentally different in two ways. First, since the Old High German period, periphrases with the auxiliaries sein, haben, werden (‘be’, ‘have’, ‘become’) have expanded considerably, so that there are now specific forms available for marking past and future. Secondly, the two synthetic subjunctives have become confused, because, when it was important to express the subjunctive clearly, the preferred forms were those which were not identical with the indicative, whether they belonged to the present or the preterite subjunctive. The imperfect subjunctive was also commonly avoided where it would have been appropriate by the rules of early Germanic, because through its use in other constructions it was associated with unreal events. So, in the southern German dialects the present subjunctive has encroached markedly on the

27 Jellinek’s references begin with Johannes Clay (Clay) (1535–92).
imperfect, and this has coloured also the use of the written language by authors of southern German origin.\textsuperscript{28}

Unlike in Latin, where we were able to observe an increase in the use of the subjunctive in various types of clause (at least until the period when the influence of popular speech becomes more noticeable in literature), in the Germanic languages the opposite development is clearly to be seen, involving not only the frequent use of periphrases in place of synthetic subjunctive forms, but in particular the promotion of the indicative at the expense of the subjunctive. So, while the comparison of Germanic with the Latin use of the subjunctive after \textit{priusquam} (I, 247–8 above) hold good for Gothic and Old High German, it does not apply to the modern language. (On the complete set of clauses of this type, cf. \textsc{Delbrück} (1904).) The same can be observed in other types of clause, as in clauses introduced by \textit{bis} (‘until’), or in clauses dependent on a command, such as at Luke 15: 12, where πάτερ, δός μοι τὸ ἐπίβάλλον μέρος τῆς οἰκίας is rendered by Luther with \textit{Vater, gib mir das Teil der Güter, das mir gehört} (indic.) (‘father, give me the part of the estate that belongs to me’), whereas for \textit{gehört} Wulfila uses the subjunctive undrinnai (sg. 3 pres. subjv. of und-rinnan ‘fall to, accrue to’).

\textsuperscript{28} According to Behaghel (1899; cf. 1923–32: III, 675–94, esp. §§1322–7), the pres. subjv. was generalized in subordinate clauses in Swabian, Alsatian, and Swiss German (Alemannic), the pret. subjv. in south Franconian and in the central and north German dialects, while Bavarian was split between the two. Behaghel is followed also by Wilmanns III, 207 and by Paul (1916–20: IV, §§489–90). Behaghel gives numerous examples of variation in the written language; to the pull of the spoken dialects Paul adds literary tradition and Latin grammar as factors that may have influenced written usage. On the very different formations of the present and past subjunctives in the various German dialects, see the relevant page in each chapter of Keller (1961); on Bavarian, note esp. Merkle (1975: 69–73).
Lecture I, 43

The term infinitive, which has come down to us from antiquity, is not a happy one. Here, too, the Latin grammarians have discharged their task rather inadequately, in that modus infinitius (‘indefinite mood’) is an inexact translation of Greek ἀπαρέμφατος (scil. ἔγκλισις). This Greek word comes from the verb παρεμφαίνω, which is found already in Plato (Timaeus 50ε3) in the sense ‘indicate alongside, display along with’. Accordingly, Dionysius of Halicarnassus (On the Arrangement of Words, 5 p. 26, 15 Radermacher1) opposes the παρεμφατικά (the verb-forms ‘which denote something else besides’, i.e. what we call the finite verb) to the ἀπαρέμφατα. In this way the infinitive is labelled with the salient feature of having no additional meaning, of being the purest expression of the meaning of the verb. From the point of view of the classical languages, that is not a false definition, although it does not say everything about the function of the infinitive.

The infinitive belongs to those forms our understanding of which has been most dramatically changed by the introduction of the historical way of looking at language. The infinitive as we find it is something that has evolved, not something that has always been. First, we should notice a formal point. In the forms of the finite verb and the participle, Greek and Latin show unmistakeable similarities. In the infinitives, however, they are completely different. No ending of a Latin infinitive can be compared with any ending of a Greek infinitive, and here Latin does not agree even with the other Italic languages: to Latin dicere (‘to say’) corresponds Oscan deikum, deicum, to Latin esse (‘to be’), Oscan ezum, Umbrian eru, erom.—The same is true even within Greek. There are few morphological categories in which the Greek dialects diverge so markedly from one another as in the formation of the infinitive; indeed, the infinitive is one of the main criteria for dividing and grouping the dialects. In the verbs in -μέναι, the infinitive in Ionic and Attic is in -ναι and -έναι, in Aeolic (in part, at least) in -μέναι, in Doric and Boeotian in -μεν: so, ‘to be’ is είναι in Attic, ἔναι in Arcadian, ἤμεναι in Lesbian, ἤμεν in Doric. This is why in Homer, whose language is based on a mixture of various dialects, we find a whole series of infinitive formations, even very

different formations side by side on the same stem. So, in Proto-Greek and Proto-Latin the infinitive was not yet something as fixed and established as the chief formations of the finite verb.

Now, Bopp taught—and with some qualifications his teaching still stands—that the infinitive is in origin not a verbal form but a case-form of a verbal abstract noun, a so-called nomen actionis (action noun). This insight became crystal clear when scholars became aware of the use of the infinitive in the Veda, which, compared with the later Indic language, is at a stage of development similar to that of Greek and Latin. In the Veda we find case-forms (acc., gen., dat., abl.) of various stems that serve as verbal abstract nouns used alongside one another as infinitives, and moreover in such a way that the particular case-meaning is not ignored but determines the use in each instance. We can construct from Latin an approximate impression of the original state of affairs, if we consider not the actual infinitive but the supine and the gerund: no distinction of voice or tense, but different endings according to the relationship between the abstract denoting of the verbal action and the rest of the clause. From the start, like the supine and gerund, the proto-infinitives differed from regular verbal abstracts, first, in respect of the case that they govern; secondly, in that they did not belong to a complete paradigm, being confined to certain cases in the singular only, and lacking a nominative in particular; and finally, in that they were usual only after certain specific verbs and nouns (apart from their use as imperatives: I, 266–7 below). The development that led to the Greek and Latin infinitive consisted first and foremost in that those old case forms that we see were retained but gave up their specific case functions. In individual instances we can probably still see traces of their use as case-forms (I, 261–5 below), but this is no longer reflected in formal variation. The relation of the infinitive form to the clause or word to which it belongs becomes less well determined, and precisely as a result of this, the infinitive becomes a more convenient form of expression.3

To this extent, the European languages agree, but in Greek and Latin already in prehistoric times a further development begins which is broadly speaking foreign to early Germanic and the Slavic languages. This is the effort to make the infinitive more like the finite verb and so to achieve the possibility of an infinitival expression corresponding to any utterance based on a finite verb.

In the first place, the distinction of voice was introduced, so that different infinitive forms were used according as the verb required an active or middle

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2 Bopp (1816: 38–9, 42–3), (1833–52: §849). This is still very much the standard view.
3 The Latin supine appears in two forms, ‘accusative’ or ‘dative’, each with its own set of proper contexts; the gerund in effect supplies regular genitive, dative, ablative, and (after a preposition) accusative forms to the infinitive. W. means that an important aspect of the creation of the infinitive was the giving up of the criteria which earlier led one to choose a ‘proto-infinitive’ with, say, an accusative ending over one with a locative ending, although these criteria continued to operate in the choice of the correct form of supine or gerund. On the supines and gerund, see I, 276–81 below.
ending, and the next step was that the infinitive became capable of straightforwardly passive meaning. The relatively recent date of this refinement is seen in the fact that it appears still to be unknown to Latin’s closest relatives, the other Italic languages: Oscan fatium corresponds to the Latin deponent fatēri (‘to profess, declare’), and perhaps Oscan censam to Latin censorī (‘to be registered at the census’),4 with the same ending as in Oscan deikum beside Latin dicere (‘to say’, with active ending). And yet in the very earliest Greek and Latin this distinction is already in place. Admittedly, it is not strictly enforced in Greek. In many combinations the active infinitive is allowed where in strictly logical terms only the passive would be justified, as e.g. in ἀξιὸς θαυμάζει lit. ‘worthy to wonder at’, ἀξιός συμβάλλει lit. ‘worthy to compare’. The Germanic languages are instructive on this point (cf. Grimm, D. Gr. IV, 60–7; Wilmanns III, 165–7). In modern German it is possible to express the passive by means of a periphrasis with werden (lit. ‘become’), as in er muss gestraft werden (‘he must be punished’). Often, however, the active infinitive is used where really the passive belongs. The idiom wir hören sprechen (lit. ‘we hear speak’) means ‘we hear that it is spoken’; and in von wem hast du das tun lassen (‘who did you get to do that?’), the von wem (‘by whom?’) suggests a passive form of expression, although the infinitive is tun (‘do’, active) and not getan werden (‘be done’, passive). If we go further back, we find this preference for the active infinitive much more marked, and here, too, we must note especially the usage of the Gothic Bible. Gothic already has an infinitive corresponding to the modern German passive infinitive (cf. getan werden above), in e.g. Luke 9: 22 uskusans . . . wairþan for Gk ἀποδοκιμασθῆναι ‘to be rejected’, and in other periphrases. But it is not uncommon to find the active infinitive used in the Gothic for a passive in the Greek, often in such a way that you almost wonder how it remained intelligible at all, e.g. at Galatians 2: 3 for oððe . . . περιτμηθῆναι ἤναγκάσθη (Lat. neque . . . | compulsi est circumcidi ‘nor was he (Titus) compelled to be circumcised’; Luther es ward . . . nicht gezwungen, sich beschneiden zu lassen), the Gothic translator has nih . . . baidifs was bimaitan (lit. ‘was not forced to cut’, active infin.).5 On this point, Meillet has drawn attention (1919a) to the peculiar translation of Mark 10: 45 oðk ἦλθε διακονῃθῆναι, ἀλλὰ διακονήσασαι (Lat. non uenit ut ministretur ei, sed ut ministret; Luther ist nicht kommen, dass er ihm dienen lasse, sondern dass er diene ‘he (the Son of Man) came not to be ministered unto but to minister’), with ni qam at andbahtjam (lit. ‘for services’, dat. pl. of andbahti-), ak andbahtjan (act. infin.). We can say that in German the opposition of voice has been extended only gradually and

4 It is more likely, though not certain, that Oscan censaum, at Tabula Bantina 20 (Lu. 1 Rix), is active in meaning; cf. Untermann (2000: s.v. ‘censaum’).

5 Other versions of Luther’s Bible at this point have sich zu beschneiden, app. active, just like the Gothic. The version quoted by W., with sich beschneiden zu lassen, means lit. ‘to let cut himself’, i.e. ‘to have himself cut’.
incompletely to the infinitive. (On the marking of the passive, in all three languages, by means of a combination of the infinitive with auxiliary verbs, see I, 148–9 above.)

Greek and Latin have also carried over temporal distinctions to the infinitive, and made special infinitive forms for the present, perfect, aorist, and future. For the last, Old Latin has alongside -turum also the forms in -assere (e.g. Plaut. Aul. 687 impetrassere ‘to be about to achieve’). To begin with, however, the temporal meaning of the infinitive follows not that of the associated indicative but that of the temporal stem, so that in Greek the aorist infinitive, e.g., is opposed at first to the present infinitive in respect not of its tense but of its Aktionsart (cf. I, 175 above).—In this connection, we should recall a well-known and much-discussed feature of Latin. The elegant Roman poets, from Lucretius and Catullus on, often use the perfect infinitive with present meaning, frequently even in parallel with a present infinitive, as e.g. at Verg. Aen. 10. 14 (Jupiter to the council of the gods:) tum certare (pres.) odiois, tum res rapuisset (pf.) licebit ‘then will be the time to compete in hatred and to pillage’ (lit. ‘to have pillaged’). The ancient commentators on Vergil see in this usage a Grecism, but its roots are in any case genuinely Latin. This perfect infinitive is already there in Old Latin, in prohibitions with negated uolo, or nolo, e.g. in a whole sequence at Cato, Agr. 5. 4 ne quid emisse uelit insciente domino, neu quid dominum celauisset uelit . . . haruspicem . . . ne quem consuluisse uelit ‘he (the ideal farm-manager) must not want to buy (pf.) anything without the knowledge of the master, nor want to conceal (pf.) anything from the master . . . nor want to consult (pf.) any fortune-teller’). This probably has to do with the ancient preference for the aorist in prohibitions (discussed above, I, 216), and is therefore to be related with the aorist meaning of the Latin perfect (I, 188 above), although we also find infinitives of the type habuisset (lit. ‘to have had’), which have nothing aoristic about them. The classical poets then extended this use of the perfect to the infinitive in simple negative (not prohibitive) contexts, and to clauses with positive uolo (e.g. Lucr. 3. 69 effugisset volunt longe longeque remosse ‘they long to escape (pf.) and go (pf.) far, far away’), and generally to infinitives after any verb of wishing or possibility (of which the first beginning is found in Plaut. Aul. 828 non potes probasse nugas ‘you cannot approve [lit. have approved] trifles’). It is possible that this extension of the Old Latin usage was prompted not only by metrical requirements but also by a desire to imitate the Greek aorist infinitive. From the poets it spread to Livy (who uses it with uelle) and to the imperial prose-writers after him. Fundamental on this

6 On the fut. infin. act. in -turum and in -assere, see Hofmann & Szantyr 342–3, and on -assere see the references in n. 9, p. 268 above.

7 For habuisset in a prohibition, note already the Senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus (186 bc) 3 nequius eorum Bacanal habuisse uelit ‘let none of them wish to keep (pf.) a place of Bacchic worship’, and notice that in the non-prohibitive reference to the same context in the next sentence the present infin. habere is used; on this inscription, see e.g. Gordon (1983: 83–5).
matter is MADVIG (1842: 119–29); note also the works listed by NORDEN (1957) on *Aen.* 6. 78–9.8

Unlike Greek and Latin, the old Germanic languages have no infinitive of the true preterite (Old Icelandic alone making a feeble gesture in this direction9), and it is only with the periphrastic tenses that we find infinitive formations of this kind.

Attempts have been made, finally, to identify in the infinitive the distinctions of mood of the finite verb. Relevant here is the use of ἢν (or κε) with the infinitive in Greek (cf. I, 224 above), and in Latin the use of the forms in -turus to yield something corresponding to the unreal imperfect/pluperfect subjunctive. This correspondence is based not on some theory of school grammar books, but on numerous passages where we can demonstrate such a meaning for the periphrastic construction, as e.g. at Cicero, *De finibus* 1. 39, where we have first, *si noluptas esset bonum, desideraret (manus)* ‘if pleasure were a good, it (the hand) would desire it’, and then, *conessum est, . . . si noluptas esset bonum, fuisset desideraturum (manum) ‘it was allowed that, . . . if pleasure were a good, the hand would have desired it’. For a good, recent discussion of this, see TERRELL (1904).

So, gradually the infinitive was brought ever closer to the verb. It had yielded a means of expressing the pure meaning of the verb, along with all the semantic nuances of the finite verb except person and number, while retaining the construction of the verb. The infinitive was favoured as a form also because its meaning is not as sharply defined as those of the case-forms of the normal verbal abstracts.

Of the *infinitive constructions*, we may regard as the oldest those which can be connected with a definite prehistoric case-form. Many infinitives are in formal terms old datives, and this is reflected in the fact that the infinitive often gives the goal or result of the activity expressed in the whole clause or part of it. This final or consecutive infinitive is found especially in combination with verbs of going, sending, and giving, as we find in our earliest texts in both Latin and Greek, e.g. in Homer *βῆ iέναι* (’set off for’, lit., ’took a step to go’), ἀρτό . . . ὁδεῖς ἀήμεναι (lit., ’there arose a breeze to blow’, *Od.* 3. 176), λέιτε φορῆναι (’he (Thyestes) left (it, the sceptre, for him, Agamemnon) to bear’, *II.* 2. 107), ὁινον ἐγκεράσσα πιεῖν (’mixing in wine to drink’, *II.* 8. 18910), or in Plautus *dat bibere* (’gives to drink’, e.g. *Persa* 821), *uenio uisere* (’I come to visit’, e.g. *Rudens* 94), *Pseudolus* 642 *reddere hoc non perdere erus me misit* (’my master sent me to pay it back, not to lose it’). If we

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8 For a survey of more recent work, see Hofmann & Szantyr 351–2; on the energetic prohibitions of the type *ne quis fecisse uelit*, common also in magistrates’ edicts, see Daube (1956: ch. 3).

9 Cf. Heusler (1921: §§330, 333, 428): some three dozen Old Icelandic verbs attest past infinitives in -o, morphologically speaking pl. 3 pret. indic. forms reinterpreted as infinitives and used esp. in the accusative + infinit. construction.

10 Andromache for Hector’s horses; see Kirk (1990: *ad loc.*).
translated iēnai or reddere with ‘for going’ or ‘for paying back’, we would get the original sense with fair precision. Some of these combinations, however, did not remain in use, so that this dative infinitive gives rise e.g. in Greek to the so-called ‘absolute’ (better: ‘limiting’) infinitive, or the infinitive after ωστε (‘so as to, with the result that’; in Homer only at II. 9. 42 and Od. 17. 20 but later very common).\(^{11}\)

A second very ancient group comprises infinitives with verbs of being able, wishing, and desiring, which in this context lost something of their independent meaning and were relegated to what we call ‘auxiliary’ status. We find this sort of construction already in the earliest Indic, where the infinitive is as a rule accusative in form.\(^{12}\)

In another instance, Greek continues an ablative infinitive. There is a Sanskrit word purā, which is either an adverb, ‘previously’, or a preposition, ‘before’, with the ablative either of a noun or of an infinitive. Now, this Sanskrit construction cannot be dissociated from the Greek use of πάρος (a close cognate of purā) + infinitive to form a temporal (‘before’) clause (in Homer, and still in a 4th-c. inscription from Stymphalus, IG V.2. 357, 33–4 πάρος τὸ δικαστήριον παῦσθαι δικᾶζον ‘before the court stops judging’). At Od. 23. 309 πάρος καταλέξαα ἀπαντά ‘before his (Odysseus’) recounting of everything’, a morphologically dative infinitive in -αι performs the function of the ablative infinitive in Vedic, which can also take a direct object—so, rightly, Delbrück (1893–1900: III, 436–7); for other accounts, cf. Sturm (1882: 6–15).\(^{13}\) Later, this πάρος + infin. was not merely extended on the model of other infinitive clauses (so that the infinitive could take any kind of specifier, including a subject in the accusative), but it came also to serve itself as model for the infinitive construction after πρὶν (‘before’, a synonym of πάρος in adverbial function), as at e.g. II. 9. 403 πρὶν ἔλβειν ἦς Αχιλλόν ‘before the sons of the Achaeans came’.\(^{14}\) Like πρὶν, πρὶν ἦ also takes an infinitive twice in Homer (II. 5. 287, 22. 266), and, from the fifth century, so do πρῶτερον ἦ, ωστερον ἦ (‘earlier than’, ‘later than’ [Thuc. 6. 4. 2]; cf. Herodas 6. 29 πρῶτερον ἦ [lit. ‘before than’] and (ms. add.) Parthenius 3. 3 oὐ μετὰ πολὺν χρόνων ἦ + infin. [lit. ‘not much

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\(^{11}\) Compare the infin. after the same types of verb in Sanskrit, e.g. hotum eti ‘he goes to offer in sacrifice’. On the infinitive of purpose (or result)—the types discussed here by W.—see Goodwin §§770–5 (the bare infinit. of purpose) and §§817–9 (ωστε + infin.), Schwzyer & Debrunner 362–5; on the absolute infin. (of the type ωτος ἔτος ἐπιέωσιν ‘so as to speak’), also called ‘limiting’ because it limits or qualifies the sentence or part of it, see Goodwin §§770–83, Schwzyer & Debrunner 378–9.

\(^{12}\) On the ‘object infinitive’ in Greek, see Goodwin §§746–50, in Latin, Gildersleeve & Lodge §423; on this (accusative) type in Sanskrit, after ‘be able’ and ‘be worthy’ (and also after verbs of motion), see Whitney (1889: §981).

\(^{13}\) On the ablative infin. in Sanskrit, used esp. with a ‘until’ in addition to purā ‘before’, see Whitney (1889: §983). On πάρος in Homer (twelve times with the infin., and never with the other moods), see Goodwin §636.

\(^{14}\) For this view of the origin of πρὶν + infin., cf. Delbrück (1893–1900: III, 436–7); Schwzyer & Debrunner 654 n. 2 compare the construction rather with ωστε + infin. (result / purpose).
time after than’), and φθάνειν ἣ (‘to anticipate, do something earlier than’, Herodotus 6. 108). Directly related to the Homeric πάρος + infin. is Theocritus 17. 48 πάροιθ’ εἰπ’ νῦν κατελθεῖν ‘before she (Berenice) came down to the ship’.\(^{15}\) Conversely, πρῖν + infin. served in later Greek as a model for ‘until’-clauses. Evidence for this is found first in the Septuagint in the use of ἔως, e.g. Genesis 10: 10 ἔως ἐλθεῖν (lit. ‘until you come’, i.e. ‘as far as’), ἔως οὖ, e.g. Ruth 3: 3 ἔως οὖ συντηλέσαι αὐτὸν πιεῖν καὶ φαγεῖν (‘until he has finished eating and drinking’), and μέχρις οὖ, e.g. Tobit 11: 1 μέχρις οὖ ἐγγίσαι ἐλσ Ὡμην ‘until he (or, they?) drew near to Niniveh’.

From the third century BC, there are further instances with ἀχρὶ (e.g. SIG 741, 37–8 [88 BC] ἀχρὶ ἀν ἀπ[ὁ] τῶν πολεμίων ἐμε | γενέσθαι (‘until I get away from my enemies’)—note the use of ἀν!), and with ἔως οὖ (e.g. P. Petr. III, 43 (3), 12 [3rd c. BC] ἔως οὖ τὰ ἔργα συντηλέσαι (‘until finishing the work’); cf. Mayser II.1, 270 n. 2, II.2, 522–6); from the imperial period, also with μέχρις (e.g. schol. Apoll. Rhod. 1. 769–73, p. 68, 10 Wendel μέχρις λαβέιν ὅρκον ‘until they took an oath’) and ἐστε (cf. Krebs 1884–5: I, 49–61).—It is striking to see a Proto-Indo-European usage bearing fruit so much later.\(^{16}\)

Unfortunately, I cannot now go into the detail of how the use of the infinitive was further extended on these foundations so as to achieve a closer association with adjectives and pronouns, and, surprisingly early, the capacity to stand in subject position, e.g. at Il. 7. 282 ἀγαθῶν καὶ νυκτὶ πιθέσθαι (‘it is good to yield to the night’)—indeed, much of this development has yet to be clarified. Let me, however, highlight a couple of especially notable uses.

One of the biggest surprises for anyone approaching Greek and Latin from the modern languages is the so-called accusative-and-infinitive construction, that is, the rule that after verbs of saying, perceiving, etc., the content of what is said or perceived can be rendered with an infinitive clause with accusative subject. How are we to explain this construction, which, incidentally, is found also in Gothic and Old Icelandic?\(^{17}\) The old view, that the accusative serves the same function with the infinitive as the nominative does with the finite verb, is a description, not an explanation, of what we find: the fact that the accusative

\(^{15}\) πάροιθε + infin. appears to be unique (Gow 1950: II, ad loc.). On these constructions, see Goodwin §§651–3, 655, 661; Schwyrzer & Debrunner 654–7.

\(^{16}\) Presumably, by the last sentence W. means that the infinitive in this paragraph is behaving like the case form of a noun, and, in Indo-European. He carefully sidesteps any debate regarding the Septuagint constructions. Blass, Debrunner, & Funk §403 and Soisalon-Soininen (1965: 110–11) regard the regular construction there as being ἔως ταῦ + infin. (also in e.g. Polybius, the New Testament and Josephus), i.e. ἔως + the genitive of the infin. with the definite article (cf. I, 272–3 below). Occasionally, ἔως + infin. is found without the article (Johannessohn 1925: 304) but, according to Soisalon-Soininen (1965: 111), this is always in later texts, and represents a contamination of ἔως + the definite verb with ἔως ταῦ + infin. See also Blass, Debrunner, & Funk §216.3 on these ‘improper prepositions’; §383 on the use and omission of ἀν (usual with the subj.: W. gives a nice example of contamination); and §433.3 on the occasional confusion (even in classical texts) between ὃς and ἔως (cf. modern Gk ὃς ‘until’).

\(^{17}\) On Old Icelandic, see Heusler (1921: §§427–9).
here serves the same function as the normal nominative is precisely what we have to explain. Wilhelm von Humboldt (1824: 117–18) tried to express it scientifically when he observed that, since an infinitive clause is governed by the main clause, its subject has to stand in the oblique case κατ’ ἐξοχήν (par excellence), viz. in the accusative. That is good sense, but it leaves the origin of the construction still unclear.

In essence, the matter is much simpler. The way has been shown by, above all, Georg Curtius (1875a: §566 & n. 1). The first point to make is that there are some accusative-and-infinitive constructions which even we find thoroughly natural. When, for example, after verbs of inducing or requesting the person induced is in the accusative and the action which s/he is induced to perform is given in the infinitive, then we have in a sense the subject of an infinitive in the accusative. In a Homeric clause, such as Od. 23. 258 αὐτὸς ποιήσας ἐκέθαβα ὦκον ‘the gods made you to come home’, σέ (‘you’) is both object of ποιήσας (‘(they) made’) and subject of ἐκέθαβα (‘to come’). Much of this sort is still there in very late Greek. In Latin we may compare e.g. the accusative + active infinitive after *tuere* ‘to order’ or *sinere* ‘to allow’. So, too, in German and English.

Fundamentally, this is not so very different from an acc. + inf. after a verb of saying. The language of Homer points us in the right direction. Here, after verbs of saying, the noun about which something is said can stand quite regularly in the accusative. At Il. 6. 479, Hector says of his little son Astyanax, καί ποιῆσαι πατρός γ’ δόει πολλόν ἀμείνων, ‘and one day someone will say, “He is far better than his father”’, and then adds, ἐκ πολέμου ἄνιοντα ‘when he comes (acc.) back from the fighting’, referring back in the accusative to the subject of the words πατρός γ’ δόει πολλόν ἀμείνων. In addition to this, there is another construction, not confined to Homer, which involves anticipating the subject of a clause dependent on a verb of saying as the direct object of the verb of saying, as e.g. at Il. 3. 192 (Priam to Helen of Odysseus): εἰπ’ ἄγε μοι καὶ τόνδε... διεισὶ δ’ ἐστίν λ. ‘Come, tell me also this man (acc.), who he is’. The only thing different in the acc. + inf. is that we have, not direct speech (as in Il. 6. 479 above) or a subordinate clause (as in Il. 3. 192 above), but the infinitive.

That the accusative in the acc. + inf. was felt to be a normal object accusative may be inferred from the fact that, if the verb is passivized, the accusative becomes a nominative: corresponding to the acc. + inf. *dicit illum uenisse* (‘they say that he came’, lit., ‘they say him to have come’) is the nom. + inf. *dicitur ille uenisse* (‘he is said to have come’).

18 Cf. Curtius (1875b: 229–32), where he responds to criticism of his theory.
19 For a historical survey of the infinitive in later Greek, see Jannaris (1897: §§2078–98 & App. 6).
20 Cf. Gildersleeve & Lodge §423.6.
21 In English compare the words of the possessed man in the Capernaum synagogue in the King James version of Mark 1: 24 (Luke 4: 34), ‘I know Thee who Thou art, the holy one of God’.
The acc. + inf. after verbs of perceiving is to be explained in the same way as that after verbs of saying. Suffice it to refer to Od. 3. 193 (Nestor to Telemachus:) Ἀτρείδην . . . ἀκοῦετε . . . ὀστὴ ἀλθείτε ‘you (Ithacans) hear the son of Atreus, how he returned’. If we replace ὀστὴ ἀλθείτε with ἐλθεῖν and so make an acc. + inf., we admittedly change the meaning of the sentence, by referring to the fact, rather than the manner, of Agamemnon’s homecoming, but the syntactic function of Ἀτρείδην is the same in both cases.—On Latin, see Lindskog (1896b), and Schmalz in Stolz & Schmalz (1910: 426–7), and (ms. add.1) note the Latin type dic hominem qui sit (lit. ‘say this man who he is’).22

Once this form of expression had emerged with verbs of saying and perceiving, it was retained even when the accusative construction that underlies it had been partly abandoned, and it was extended to synonymous and related expressions which could not have taken an accusative without the infinitive, such as passive verbs of saying and thinking. And, since in the acc. + inf. the accusative was regarded as expressing the subject of the infinitive, it became conventional to express with an accusative the subject of any infinitive clause which could not be supplied from the context. This is seen already in Homer, e.g. with πάρος and πρῖν (cf. I, 262 above). This was a very desirable achievement.

A nice parallel to our account of the origin of the acc. + inf. is offered by the formation of a dative + inf. in Gothic. After verbs of saying, hearing, thinking, and wishing, Wulfila keeps the acc. + inf. of the Greek original, but he translates e.g. Luke 16: 22 ἐγένετο δὲ ἀποθανεῖν τὸν πτωχὸν (‘and it came to pass that the beggar died’) with warþ þan gaswiltan þamma unledin, replacing the Greek accusative with the dative (þamma unledin); this is absolutely regular with warþ for Gk ἐγένετο in this sense. Originally, the dative went directly with warþ: in the example, ‘to the poor man became dying’, as it were; still in modern German a dative of this sort can go with werden: e.g. es ward ihm Genugtuung (lit., ‘there accrued to him satisfaction’). But then a shift occurred in the dependency relations, as Grimm already recognized, and in nearly every case the dative comes after the infinitive, that is to say, it relates more closely to the infinitive than to the finite verb.23

22 See now the descendant of Stolz & Schmalz (1910), Hofmann & Szantyr 353–63, with bibliography, and, more recently, Coleman (1989a), Pinkster (1990a: 57–8, 126–30).

23 For this, strong use of werden ‘happen, accrue’, see D. Wb., s.v., I. C. 1. At least in the second edition of the D. Gr. IV, 842, Grimm is frankly doubtful about dat. + infin; his long section (IV, 129–44) on the grammatical subject of the infin. is devoted almost entirely to the acc. + infin.
So far, we have met the infinitive only in dependent expressions, but there are uses of the infinitive in which it is not in any relation of dependence, or at least none that is immediately apparent. This applies to the so-called ‘free’ or ‘absolute infinitive’ in Greek—for a rich collection of examples of which, see GRÜNENWALD (1888). It is well known that Greek has infinitival expressions which appear to stand outside the syntax of the sentence, or at any rate not to be conditioned by any particular part of the sentence, such as e.g. ἐκῶν εἶναι ‘voluntarily’, κατὰ δύναμιν εἶναι ‘as far as possible’, ἑμοὶ δοκεῖν (‘as it seems to me’), ἑμοὶ εἰκάσαι (‘as far as I can judge’), and the like. These infinitives are best viewed as limiting (ἑμοὶ δοκεῖν ‘to the extent that my opinion is concerned’) and related to the dative meaning of the infinitive which underlies its final and consecutive use (thus e.g. ἑμοὶ δοκεῖν ‘for my opinion’; cf. I, 262 above). This can be applied also to the curious ἐκῶν εἶναι (‘voluntarily’), which linguists such as Gottfried HERMANN (1808: 210–12 = 1827–39: I, 227–8; cf. his notes to VIGER 1672 [1824: 238, 710]) and Wilhelm von HUMBOLDT (1824: 119–20) failed to explain. ¹ Here, a simple explanation is helped by precise observation of the facts. Of the thirty-four examples adduced by GRÜNENWALD (1888: 2 ff.), from fourth- and fifth-century literature, only two (Herodotus 7. 164. 1, and Antisthenes, Ajax 4. ²) use the phrase in a positive clause. All the others are with a negative, and there the infinitive is easily explained. Take Thuc. 2. 89. 8, where the Athenian admiral Phormio says to his people, τὸν ἀγώνα οὐκ ἐν τῷ κόλπῳ ἐκὼν εἶναι ποιήσωμεν ‘I will not fight in the gulf voluntarily [more precisely, ‘as far as my free will is concerned’].’ That is, ἐκὼν εἶναι limits the statement (GRÜNENWALD, ibid.). It hints that Phormio could be forced to fight. A limitation of this kind does not suit a positive clause, because there is no suggestion of another action to be done involuntarily. So the two instances mentioned above rest on misuse of the

¹ In fact, Gottfried Hermann’s account is not so different from W.’s. On Humboldt’s account, the infinitive limits but also affirms the sense of the nominative: he glosses the phrase ‘voluntary in terms of being, i.e. in truth’.

² Antisthenes (mid 5th–mid 4th c. BC) was one of the most prominent students of Socrates and the founder of the Cynic School of philosophy. The only complete works of his to survive are two epideictic speeches, forming a pair, the Ajax and the Odysseus. According to Radermacher’s edition (1961: 123), at Ajax 4 the transmitted reading is οὐκ ἄρετε, which is emended by some (including A. Winckelmann [Zurich 1842]) to ἔκορετε, by others (incl. Radermacher and F. Decleva Caizzi [Milan 1966]) to φάσκοντες ‘saying’.
language, εἶναι, so frequently attached to ἐκών, being occasionally used in contexts where it made no sense. Or should we simply delete εἶναι in both places?

These limiting infinitives do, then, fit into their clauses, albeit loosely. The label ‘absolute’ is more properly applied to two other types of infinitive, which are used quite independently: the imperative and the historic infinitive.

The use of the infinitive to give a command is best known in Homer but is in Greek by no means confined to Homer. Apart from the poets who use the epic style, the tragedians offer examples, and the usage is found even in early scientific and historical prose. Hippocrates, e.g., closes his famous work Airs, Waters, Places with the words, τὰ λοιπὰ ἐνθυμεῖσθαι καὶ οὗ άμαρτήσῃ ‘reflect on the remaining matters and you will not go wrong’. Thucydides has this infinitive for sure in one passage, in a warlike speech of Brasidas, § 9. 7 σὺ δὲ, Κλαερίδα, ὀστερον . . . , ἐπεκθεῖν καὶ ἐπείγεοσθαι . . . ‘but you, Clearidas, afterwards . . . charge out against them and make haste to . . . ’. Even more strikingly, it is found in inscriptions, those moreover with no pretensions to poetic ornament. On the famous sixth-century stele of Sigeum (Collitz & Bechtel no. 5531), a unique dialect-bilingual, the Attic text ends with the words, μελεθάινε με, ὥ Σιγειῆς ‘care for me, you Sigeans’.

As a rule, this infinitive corresponds to the second-person imperative, but it does occur also in third-person function. So, e.g., at Il. 7. 78–9, ‘If he kills me,’ says Hector, τεῦχε συλήσας φερέτω κοιλᾶς ἐπὶ νῆσας, | σῶμα δὲ οὐκαθ’ ἐμὸν δόμεναι πάλιν ‘let him strip my armour and bear it back to the hollow ships, but let him give my body back to my home’, where the infinitive δόμεναι is precisely parallel to the imperative φερέτω. So, too, at Theocritus, 24. 94–5 ὑψάτω, . . . ἀφ’ δὲ νέσσοταί (‘let her throw, . . . and let her come back’). The use of the imperatival infinitive in different persons is inherited. In Vedic and Avestan, it does service in all persons, not only for commanding other people (2nd and 3rd persons) but also for expressing the speaker’s resolve on his own action (1st person).5

Given certain usages about to be discussed, one would be inclined to compare the imperatival infinitive with the jussive use of the acc. + inf. Indic and Iranian speak against this, however, as does the fact that in Greek the person commanded

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3 This is the famous stele of Phanodikos from Prokonnesos, an island in the Propontis, found at Sigeion, on the southwestern approach to the Hellespont: side A is in Ionic, and was probably made on Prokonnesos, side B is in Attic. See Buck no. 1; Jeffery (1990: 72, 366–7, 371 nos 43–44, Plate 71). Comparable as a dialect-bilingual might be the 3rd-c. Thessalian inscription quoted above (I, 186, cf. n. 8, p. 239 above) which juxtaposes the King’s letters in the Koine with a Thessalian translation.

4 In fact, editors since Gottfried Hermann (including Gow and Dover) prefer a second impv., νεόσθω (as in a papyrus copy of c. AD 500).

5 See on the imperatival use of Vedic infinitives (esp. those in -dhyai and -sáñi), Whitney (1889: §982c–d), on Avestan (Old -diiai, Young -siai), Benveniste (1933: 98), and on both together, Disterheft (1981). Note that in impv. function Vedic (and Avestan) -dhyai infinitives frequently follow a finite impv. form, as in W.’s Greek examples earlier in this paragraph.
appears in the nominative (e.g. *Il. 6. 87–92* ἢ δὲ (nom.) ἔσωσα γεραιός . . . πέπλον . . . θείναι (‘and she (Hecuba) is to assemble the ladies of honour . . . and place a robe’); cf. *σοὶ δὲ (nom.)* addressed to Brasidas in the Thucydides passage above). An accusative in this role represents a later confusion arising perhaps through errors in transmission. This infinitive is foreign to later Greek, and is ventured only very exceptionally in Latin (see Bücheler 1909: 6–7; Müller-Graupa 1918). 6

It is still not quite clear how a case-form of a verbal abstract (as we have learnt to regard the proto-infinitive) was able to yield an independent command. Connections have been made with the dative infinitive and the view taken that (e.g.) μάχεσθαι really means ‘off to fighting!’. This works if originally a main verb was understood, such as a verb of calling with the Avestan dative *avaghe* (‘to help’). The imperatival infinitives of the modern languages, too, e.g. German *stehe bleibem* (‘stand still!’), are probably based on an ellipse. 7

It is right to ask whether any difference of meaning can be established between this infinitive and the true imperative. The fine syntactician C. Gaedicke maintained (1880: 214), in his excellent book on the accusative in the Vedas, that the infinitive signalled a command for the more remote future, roughly like the so-called future imperative in Latin (I, 218 above). He adduces passages such as *Od. 22. 437–9* ἄρχετε νῦν νέκυας φορέων . . . αὐτὰ ἐπείποτα θρόνους . . . καθαίρειν (‘now begin (impv.) to carry out the corpses . . . and then clean (inf.) . . . the chairs’ (cf. again Thuc. 5. 9. 7, quoted above). The evidence for this is, however, inadequate.

Three other Greek uses of the infinitive are reminiscent of the imperatival infinitive but must be kept separate from it. First, there is the very rare use of the infinitive in wishes with *ai ἱάρι ή eἰθε* (on which see I, 229 above). Two further types of clauses differ from these in having an accusative subject. First, there are prayers of the type *Od. 17. 354* Ζεῦ ἄνα, Τηλέμαχον μοί ἐν ἀνδράσιν ὀλβιόν εἶναι (‘Lord Zeus, may Telemachus be blessed among men’). Here we have an ellipse. Prayers very often began with δοσ (‘give!’ ‘grant!’) governing an acc. + inf. or a whole series of them. Accordingly, one got used to regarding the acc. + inf. even without δοσ as a way of addressing prayers to gods. Also arising out of an ellipse is the frequent use in legal language from very early on | of the acc. + inf. for giving

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6 According to Thumb (1910: 111) and Schwyzer 809γ, the infin. survives (including in impv. function and in the acc. + infin. construction) in the modern Greek of Pontus. On the imperatival infin. in Greek, see Schwyzer & Debrunner 380–1. In Latin, the infin. in prohibitions (with negative *non*: cf. English *not to worry!* appears to have been in use in the colloquial language from Republican times and is well attested in Romance; on the other hand, the imperatival infin. in Christian literature is held to reflect Greek influence. See Hofmann & Szantyr 366–7, with bibliography.

7 According to Lockwood (1968: 135), who does not attempt to explain it, the construction is not attested in German before the modern period. Dal (1962: 107), like W., presumes ellipse. Paul (1916–20: IV, §352), on the other hand, explains it in terms of the infinitive’s function of conveying the pure, basic meaning of the verb.
legal provisions. The starting point for this was a construction of a verb of deciding, such as ἐδοκεῖ ('it pleased') or ἐδόξη ('it seemed good'), with acc. + inf.

By the **historic infinitive** we mean the Latin use of the bare infinitive to move forward narrative of action in the past. This involves mainly active infinitives, and in their present form, although the passive is found, e.g. in the republican historian L. Cornelius Sisenna (1st c. BC), *FRH* 26 F71 (fr. 120 Peter) *milites . . . ciuitate donari* ‘the soldiers . . . were granted citizenship’, or at Caes. *Gal.* 3. 4. 2 (*nostri . . . repugnare neque ullum frustra telum mittere . . . occurrere et auxilium ferre*), *sed hoc superari . . .* (‘our soldiers . . . resisted and did not cast any missile without effect . . . and ran and brought assistance,) but they were **overcome** by this . . . . The historic perfect infinitive occurs only for verbs like *meminisse* ('to remember'; cf. Sall. *Jug.* 55. 3), perfect in form but present in meaning; the future infinitive is never so used.

The historic infinitive is proper especially to lively narrative. Nearly always we could add, ‘You should have seen/heard how . . .’. Also apparently characteristic is the fact that it serves not so much to relate ready-made stories as to give a vivid report; also that it rarely occurs singly, but usually in a series.8

The historic infinitive is common in Old Latin. Plautus evidently enjoys it. At *Mercator* 46–51, we have no fewer than seven instances one after the other. In the first century BC, it is still very much alive. Cicero and his correspondents use it a good deal, Cicero especially in his letters and his earlier speeches. In the speeches of his middle and old age, he avoids it almost completely, so that one has the impression that it faded from educated speech precisely over the course of his lifetime—just as in general we can show a number of changes and striking differences between the style of his youth and that of his old age (I, 34 above). Caesar knows the historic infinitive, but uses it in moderation, while Sallust, whose archaizing tendencies are well known, shows a marked predilection for it, and attests more numerous and more extensive instances of it than any surviving prose-writer of the earlier period. I remind you of passages such as *Jugurtha* 66. 1, or *Catiline* 31. 2–3, where eleven or twelve such infinitives follow one after the other. Tacitus imitates Sallust in this feature, too, and even goes further than his model, and the same is true of the archaizers of the second century AD. But it would be a mistake to think that the historic infinitive was preserved after Cicero only through archaizing imitation. It appears to have been still alive in everyday speech in the first century AD. It is very telling that Petronius has several

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8 Often a series of historic infinitives is preceded by a single finite form, e.g. Plaut. *Trinummus* 835–7 *circumstabant . . . frangere . . . ruere . . . scindere* (storm-winds) encompassed . . . snapped . . . rent . . . tore down’, and this prompted Poultney (1957) to suggest (on the assumption that the impf. was a periphrastic formation comprising infin. + a past form of ‘to be’, cf. I, 189–90 & n. 4, p. 244 above) that the historic infinitive arose by a sort of conjunction reduction (cf. n. 1, p. 210 above), in this case omission of the verb ‘to be’ on all but the first of the series. KS I, 136 comment that the passive is rare in the classical language but otherwise ‘fairly frequent’. 
examples. It should be stressed | also that high classical poetry, too, (including Vergil) did not spurn the usage. Later, however, it seems to have died out entirely.9

The question remains of the origin of this, to us strange, use. The fact that it was popular particularly in Old Latin rules out the hypothesis of a recent innovation. Its beginnings obviously pre-date the literary tradition. On the other hand, none of the earlier-attested Indo-European languages has anything of quite the same sort to offer. The best contribution in more recent literature is by KRETSCHEMER (1910). He appropriately compares the descriptive infinitives of German, as in Clärchen’s song in Goethe’s tragedy Egmont, act 3, scene 2 Langen und Bangen in schwebender Pein (lit., ‘longing and fearing in hovering anguish’) of the behaviour of the heart of one in love. These are seen to be nominal clauses consisting each of a substantivized infinitive. Evidence for viewing the Latin historical infinitive in this way is, first, that it often forms a sort of apposition, as e.g. at Sall. Cat. 31. 1–2 repente omnīs tristitia inuasit; festinare trepidare neque loco neque homini cuiquam satis credere (‘there was sudden and general gloom: an uneasiness, an apprehensiveness, little confidence in any place or in any person’); and, secondly, that it frequently stands in parallel with nominal clauses, as e.g. at Terence, Brothers 864 clemens, placidus, nulli laedere os, adridere omnibus (‘he was always) tolerant and easy-going, with never a black look for anyone, and a smile for all’. The addition of the subject in the nominative, although already attested in Comedy, would then be secondary.—The account (recently revived by KROLL 1920) that assumes an ellipse of coepit (‘began’) is to be completely rejected, as the idea of beginning is not at all a feature of statements expressed by a historic infinitive. And why should coepit have suffered ellipse? In virtue of its meaning, it was never automatically understood and therefore indispensable. An earlier explanation of my own (1888b), based on the fact that several languages use the imperative in lively narration and description, derived the historic use from the imperatival infinitive. This I now happily renounce. (ms. add.2: Note CAVALLIN (1936), and LOMBARD (1936).)

9 For more examples, see KS I, 135–8, and Perrochet (1932), for a survey and bibliography, Hofmann & Szantyr 167–8, and more recently Pinkster (1982: 314–15) and (1990a: 241). The statistics presented by Mellet (1988: 28), from a small corpus of works by Plautus, Cicero, Vergil, Caesar, Sallust, and Livy, nicely bear out some of what W. says here: from her corpus Mellet reports a total of 983 instances, of which 547 are from the historians and 441 of these from Sallust, 88 in the Catiline and 335 in Jugurtha; 12 examples are from Caesar’s Gallic War, 24 from the first six books of the Aeneid. On the other hand, the first six plays of Plautus yield only six instances, five of these in Amphitruo. Tacitus manages ten in a row at Agricola 38; Sallust, 13 at Jugurtha 94. 4–5; M. Cornelius Fronto, one of W.’s 2nd-c. archaizers, 17 in his preface to his (lost) history of the Parthian War (Principia Historiae 14, p. 210 van den Hout = II, 208–10 in C. R. Haines’s Loeb edition).

10 And still maintained by Kroll in the 3rd edn (1925), 57–9 (cf. n. 17, p. 90 above).
A curious counterpart to the development of the infinitive from an action noun (sketched above) is the phenomenon of the infinitive itself becoming again a noun and resuming the nature of a verbal abstract noun. We find this secondary substantivization of the infinitive in all the languages that concern us here. The end point of this reverse development might be said to be the eventual formation from old infinitives of nouns which are no longer felt to be true verbal abstracts, but which have in part or completely concrete meaning. German words such as *das Leiden* (‘suffering’), *das Sterben* (‘death, dying’), although treated as pure substantives, can still function as action nouns, but this is less easy with *das Vermögen* (‘power, ability; possessions, property’). Even more remote from the infinitive are French words such as *loisir, plaisir* (‘leisure’, ‘pleasure’, from Lat. *licere* ‘to be permitted’, *placère* ‘to please’), or *pouvoir* (‘power’), and even more so *les vivres* (‘food and drink’), in which Lat. *viuere* (‘to live’) has become capable of forming a plural and has acquired a thoroughly concrete meaning. It is in general remarkable how widespread the tendency was to substantivize the infinitive ‘to live’ in particular and to substitute it for older nouns. In German, *das Leben* (now, ‘life’) has ousted the old noun *Leib* (now, ‘body’) from this meaning (save in the compounds *Leibrente* (‘pension for life’) and the now old-fashioned *Leibzucht*, lit. ‘life-cultivation’\(^1\)), although English has preserved the cognate *life*. In Greek, τὸ ζήν, which rendered the abstract meaning of living, being alive more straightforwardly than βίος (‘life’), enjoyed striking popularity from the fifth century on. Later on, in the *Letter of Aristeas* (§208 Pelletier = Wendland) we find a rare subjective genitive (I, 273 below) in τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζήν (‘human life’),\(^2\) and the author of the pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus* (365d) even has εἰς ἐτερόν ζήν (‘into another life’), where the infinitive is treated exactly like a noun. Persius’ *nostrum istud uiuere triste* (‘that morose life of ours’, *Satires* 1. 9), noted by Quintilian (9. 3. 9) as a poetic replacement for *nostram uitam*, seemed to an old commentator to

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\(^1\) A form of institutional care of the elderly, *Leibzucht* (also known as *Altenteil* ‘old person’s part’) referred to the accommodation, care and maintenance until death of an ageing person, typically a farmer, guaranteed in law in return for the transfer of control of the property to the heir before the owner’s death.

\(^2\) This (prob. 2nd c. bc) ‘letter’ of Aristeas, a courtier of Ptolemy II Philadelphus, to his brother Philocrates, tells the story of the commissioning of the Septuagint, the 72 scholars appointed by the High Priest in Jerusalem to translate the Jewish Law into Greek for Ptolemy’s library. See further Jellicoe (1968: ch. 2), Fernández Marcos (2000: ch. 3).
be a Grecism, although uinure occurs as a noun already in Cicero (Att. 13. 28. 2).—Observe also the word Interesse ‘interest’, common to German and most of the Romance languages, which was established in German by fifteenth-century jurists along with its derivatives, which also stem from Romance. And finally, two words which have passed into the modern vocabulary, in which not the infinitive itself but derivatives based on it serve as abstractions: essentia, apparently coined by Cicero and not yet in ordinary use in Quintilian’s day; and the Late Latin uelleitas. Modern Greek preserves the old infinitive only in substantives: e.g. τὸ φαγεῖ ‘meal’ (ancient Gk τὸ φαγεῖν), τὸ φιλῆ ‘kiss’ (ancient Gk τὸ φιλῆν).

Wherever we look, the development of the substantivized infinitive runs to completion before our eyes, and so offers particularly good illustration of the historical, evolutionary view of linguistic phenomena which became prominent in the nineteenth century. Useful here on Greek is the survey by Birklein (1888), which shares both the strengths and the weaknesses of the works appearing in this collection. Beside this, note especially the fine remarks of Gildersleeve (1882: 193–202), and (1887b).7

We encounter the start of this development in Homer. The first hint of the infinitive being regarded as a noun occurs when an infinitive is set in parallel with a noun | because the clause admits either construction. So, for example, with ἀμείνων (‘better’), the sphere of activity in which superiority is shown can take either an accusative or an infinitive—e.g. acc. at II. 15. 139 βύθν καὶ χείρας ἀμείνων (‘better in strength and skill’), infin. at Od. 2. 180 ἄμείνων μαντεύεσθαι (‘better at prophecy’)—and both possibilities are combined at II. 15. 641–2 νῖός ἀμείνων παντοίας ἄρετάς, ἥμεν πόδας ἥδε μάχεσθαι (‘a son better at all talents, both in speed of foot and in fighting’). (Similarly, II. 1. 258 βουλήν...μάχεσθαι (‘in council...in fighting’); 10. 174 ἦ μᾶλα λυγρὸς ὀλέθρος Ἀχιλλος ἦ βιώναι (‘either sorry destruction for the Achaeans or life (infin.’)), and so still in Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus 607–8 (Oedipus to Theseus) μόνοις οὐ γίγνεται θεοίς γήρας οὐδὲ καθανεῖν ποτὲ (‘for the gods alone there is no old age and no death (infin.)

3 The ancient scholiast comments that the phrase is ‘a Greek figure, for nostram uitam tristem’; he is followed by Isaac Casaubon in his edn of 1603 and by, among more recent commentators, R. A. Harvey (Leiden 1981) and Kibbel (1990), both of whom have helpful notes ad loc.

4 Indeed, the word Interesse is first explained in German, in a 13th-c. glossary, as meaning ‘Schaden’ (‘damages’); see D. Wb., s.v.

5 The coinage essentia ‘essence, substance’, for Gk φύσις, is ascribed to Cicero by Seneca (Letters 58. 6), to others by Quintilian (2. 14. 2; 3. 6. 23; 8. 3. 33); cf. Leumann 264, 523. On the other hand, uelleitas ‘striving after the impossible’ (cf. French velleité ‘idle inclination’) is a product of medieval Scholasticism (see Stotz II, §50.6, with bibliography at §50.1 n. 107).


7 Note also Gildersleeve (1878), and for general surveys see Goodwin §§743, 788–814, KG II, 38–46, and Schwzyer & Debrunner 368–72. On the later history of the substantival infinitive in Greek, cf. Jannaris (1897: §§2071–7 and Appendix 6); Schwzyer & Debrunner 383–4; Blass, Debrunner, & Funk §§398–404; Turner (1963: 140); Mandilaras (1973: 331–51).
ever’). Fruitful for subsequent developments, however, was the combination of the infinitive with the article. Homer has one example, in a passage which we now regard as late.\footnote{ Cf., with more positive views of Book 20, the introductions of Russo (in Heubeck et al. 1992) and Rutherford (1992) to their respective commentaries.} \textit{Od.} 20. 52 (Athena to Odysseus) \textit{άνή} καὶ τὸ φυλάσσειν πάννυχον ἐγρήσοντα ‘it is a pain to keep watch and stay awake all night’. Even without the article, the infinitive would be quite acceptable here. We can best understand the article by comparing \textit{Od.} 1. 370 (cf. 9. 3) ἔπει τὸ γε καλὸν ἀκουόμεν ἐστὶν ἀοιδῷ ‘for this is a lovely thing, to listen to a singer’, or Tyrtaeus, fr. 10. 21–2 West \textit{αἰσχρὸν γὰρ δῆ τοῦτο, μετὰ προμάχους πεσόντα κεϊόμαι} (‘for this is a shameful thing indeed, (for an older man) to fall in the front line and lie’), and similar passages where an infinitive is announced by the neuter of a true demonstrative. Accordingly, we should translate \textit{Od.} 20. 52 (above) ‘this is a pain: to keep watch . . .’. The verbal meaning is announced in advance by the \textit{τό}, which points to it emphatically. \footnote{ Chantraine (1953: 309), West (1978a: on Hes. \textit{Works} 314), and Rutherford (1992: \textit{ad loc.}) allow this as an early example of the article with the infin.; Russo (in Heubeck et al. 1992: \textit{ad loc.}) is more cautious.} In keeping with this starting point for the combination of article and infinitive is the fact that Hesiod (\textit{Works} 314) and the lyric poets (except in such uncertain passages as Pindar, \textit{Olympian} 2. 97 τὸ λαλαγήσαι ‘chattering’\footnote{ See Kirkwood (1982: \textit{ad loc.}). On the articulated infinitive in Pindar, see Hummel (1993: 273–4).}) use it only in the nominative and nearly always with a particle \textit{δέ, γε, καί, or γάρ}; so, e.g. Hesiod, fr. 273, 1 Merkelbach & West (= Musaeus, Diels & Kranz no. 2, B7) ὣδο δὲ καὶ τὸ πυθέσαι (‘and it is also sweet to discover . . .’); Pind. \textit{Olym}. 9. 37 τὸ γε λοιπορήσαι θεοῦς ἐχθρὰ σοφία (‘to speak ill of the gods is a hateful skill’); Alcaeus, fr.4.00 Lobel & Page τὸ γὰρ Ἀρεῖ καθὰν καλὸν (‘for to die in war is noble’). Understandably, once the combination was available, it was used gradually more freely. A first step beyond the Homeric norm is seen in Alcman, fr. 41 Page ῥέπει γὰρ ἄντα τῷ σιδάρῳ τὸ καλῶς κυθαρίσδην (‘for when weighed against the steel, fine lyre-playing tips the scales’), where the infinitive accompanies the article in the middle of the clause, and the article has lost any demonstrative force.

Even the earliest tragedy shows developments way beyond Pindaric usage. Aeschylus uses the article + infinitive in all four cases, and it is even more frequent and varied in Sophocles, who even ventures to use it after a preposition (\textit{ἐίς, ἐν, πρό, or πρός}, resp. ‘into’, ‘in’, ‘before’, ‘towards’). The fullest development of the construction, however, is seen in prose, especially Thucydides, who uses the article + infinitive nine times as often as Herodotus. Thucydides admits it in all constructions | conceivable for an abstract noun: with nearly all prepositions, in the genitive after a comparative (4. 126. 5 τοῦ ἐς χεῖρας ἐθέλειν πιστότερον τὸ ἐκφοβήσαι ὑμᾶς (‘that scaring you is a safer option than meeting you hand to hand’)), and in the genitive absolute (3. 12. 3 ἐπ’ ἐκείνου δόντος . . . τοῦ ἐπιχειρεῖν (‘since the initiative lies with them’)). Furthermore, in the fifth century we find
some uses of this infinitive which are not even normal with abstract nouns and which have yet to be properly explained, such as in το γάρ ἄνεμον ἡμᾶς τὸν θάνατον (lit. ‘for this disaster exceeds the telling or the asking of the sufferings’). It is of no help at all here to say that these are accusatives of respect. A special case, attested particularly in Thucydides (1. 4, etc.), is the use of the genitive of the infinitive to express purpose (see KS II, 41).—A further development is seen in the gradual extension to the infinitive article of all properties of the infinitive without article. In early Greek, the article was used only with the present or aorist infinitive, while Thucydides has it also with the future (e.g. 1. 144. 1 τοῦ περίέσσαταί ὑμᾶς ‘of ultimate victory’). Early on, only active and middle infinitives occur, but then the passive appears, too (the first example being Aesch. Agam. 941 τοῦ νίκασθαι ‘being defeated’). Soph. Ant. 236 is the first example of the particle ἄν with this infinitive, Aesch. Agam. 1169–71, the first example of an accusative subject: (Cassandra:) ἄκος δ’ οἰδέν ἐπήρκεσαν τὸ μή πόλιν μὲν, ἄσπερ οὖν ἔχει, παθείν (‘they (the sacrifices) afforded no remedy against the city, as it is, suffering’), a passage which provides also an early example of an embedded subordinate clause. From Thucydides on, even the limiting infinitive can in certain circumstances take the article.

We should not be surprised that fifth-century writers, including again Thucydides, showed particular fondness for this form of expression and brought it practically to its high point. The need for abstract expressions was particularly great at that period, especially in Thucydides, and above all in his speeches, where the large majority of our infinitives occur. Purely nominal abstract nouns, especially those in -άσις, enjoyed an extraordinary growth in numbers at this time, but the substantivized infinitive had the advantage over them of being able (just like a normal infinitive) to behave like a verb in governing an object and in showing different shades of meaning with tense, mood, and voice. On the other hand, through substantivization, the infinitive acquired the ability to enter constructions proper to case-forms of nouns and any relation with other constituents of the clause.

This tool once forged was available to all, and no one failed to use it in speech or writing. It is no surprise that among the orators it is Demosthenes, the richest constructor of periods, who exceeds all others also in the frequency of this

11 I have replaced the example actually cited by W. at this point, namely 4. 126. 5, quoted above, which used to be read as τὸ ἔκφοβήσειν ἡμᾶς ‘the intention of scaring us’. Thucydides is also first with the pf. infin.: 1. 3. 3 τὸ ὡς ὁ πόλεμος ἀποκεκράθη ‘being separated off’.
12 Perhaps W. has in mind instances such as 2. 87. 1 ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ὡς ‘the sea-battle offers no just cause for alarm’ (cf. Goodwin §795).
13 On the history of formations in -άσις, etc., see Vowles (1928); Schwyzer 504–6; Buck & Petersen (1945: §74).
infinitive.\textsuperscript{14} In Demosthenes (and Xenophon) we see the final step taken to full substantivization in the use of the genitive for the subject (e.g. Demosthenes 19. 269 τὸ γ’ ἐὰν φρονεῖν αὐτῶν μμείσθη (‘their good judgement at least you can imitate’); cf. 19. 289, 37. 42). The starting point here was probably provided by passages such as Anabasis 7. 7. 24, the sole instance in Xenophon, where ἀλλαῖ τὸ ἵδη κολάζειν (‘actual punishment inflicted by others’) is parallel to the preceding noun phrase τὰς τοῦτων ἀπειλάς (‘threats from them’).

The Latin substantivized infinitive is related to the Greek, but differs from it in its nature and its history, not least because of the absence of the article. The most interesting treatment of it is by Wölfflin (1886); cf. also Nägelsbach (1905: §33.2).\textsuperscript{15} In Latin the substantival infinitive is attested already in Plautus, and increases in use from then on throughout the classical period. Thereafter, it is used especially by authors like Seneca, and then in the popular language and throughout Christian Latin, while elevated historical prose practically ignores it. The model of Greek certainly exerted a strong influence, both on the language of philosophy and on the colloquial language.

A first group of examples involves the bare infinitive standing, exactly like the accusative of an abstract noun, as the object of verbs which as a rule do not take an infinitive. The ground was prepared by passages like Plaut. Poen. 313, where Agorastocles says, \textit{at ego amo hanc} ‘but I love this woman’, and Milphio replies, \textit{at ego esse et bibere} ‘and I, eating and drinking’. The verb \textit{amare} does not take an infinitive before Horace, but because its meaning is related to verbs of wishing and desiring, which quite regularly take the infinitive, the poet could venture to set \textit{esse et bibere} in parallel with \textit{hanc}. Similar, but without a (pro)nominal accusative in parallel, is Plaut. Bacch. 158 hic uereri perdidit ‘he has lost his sense of shame’. As there was no abstract noun to \textit{uereor},\textsuperscript{16} the poet seized on the infinitive, on the model of e.g. \textit{desino} (‘cease’) + inf. [ . . . ]\textsuperscript{17} Later, Lucretius has similar instances, and he also uses the infinitive in nominative function, e.g. at 4. 765 \textit{praeterea meminisse iacet languetque sopore} ‘the memory also is put out of action by sleep’ (see Lachmann (1882) on Lucre. 4. 244, and Munro (1886–91)

\textsuperscript{14} See the figures given by Gildersleeve, his own (1882: 197) and those of an earlier study by R. Wagner (Gildersleeve 1887b: 332), which agree very closely (the latter include the orator Hypercides, who outdoes even Demosthenes. Gildersleeve’s figures range from 1 instance every 3 §§ in Demosthenes to 1 in every 25 §§ in Lysias). Birklein (1888: 91) also presents statistics, for all authors before Aristotle.

\textsuperscript{15} On the substantivized infinitive in Latin, see KS I, 664–6, and Hofmann & Szantyr 343–4, with bibliography.

\textsuperscript{16} At this point, W. adds a parenthesis ‘(uercundia seems to postdate Plautus)’, which is better removed (as Plautus uses the word at Mostellaria 139).

\textsuperscript{17} I have removed the following: ‘Yet more clearly substantival, and further removed from normal infinitival usage, is Ennius, Annals 255 Skutsch aut occasus ubi tempusue audere repressit “but when the setting or the dangerous circumstances suppressed boldness”’. Skutsch (1985: 437–8 and n. 3) shows that W. has mistaken both sense and syntax. He argues convincingly that the preceding line ended \textit{monuit res}, and translates, ‘when the situation (res) or the occasion or the time counselled boldness, he suppressed it’.
on 1. 331). Occasionally (e.g. at 5. 1297 conscendere ‘the art of mounting’), Lucretius’ examples are just like a Greek article + infinitive laden with all manner of determining elements. Here belong also | instances such as Seneca’s famous line (Letters 98. 11) habere eripitur, habuisse numquam ‘possession is snatched away, but never the consciousness of having possessed’ (lit. ‘to have had’).

Starting from cases such as esse et bibere and uereri (above), Old Latin ventured to give the infinitive a pronominal attribute, which, given the absence of the article, was the first clear indication of substantivization. Take, for example, Plaut. Curculio 28 ita tuom conferto amare ‘then direct your loving in this way’. One might compare Plato’s occasional use of αὐτό (‘itself’) or πᾶν (‘all, whole’) with the substantivized infinitive, e.g. Rep. 8, 551e2 ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μάχεσθαι (‘in the actual fighting’); Parm. 152e1 διὰ παντὸς τοῦ εἶναι (‘throughout its whole existence’). Cicero, in his philosophical and rhetorical works, where he models himself closely on Greek forms of thought and expression and hence has to render Greek infinitival abstracts, has numerous infinitives of this kind supported by pronouns: hoc non dolere (‘this absence of pain’, De finibus 2. 18), illud aemulari (‘that striving’, Tusculan Disputations 4. 46), sapere ipsum (‘wisdom by itself’, De finibus 3. 44), totum hoc . . . philosophari (‘all this philosophizing’, De finibus 1. 1), beate uiuere uestrum (‘happiness as you conceive it’, De finibus 2. 86), etc. But even in his letters, we find e.g. hoc ipsum uelle (‘this very state of desiring’, Att. 7. 11. 2), ipsum uinci (‘defeat itself’, Ad fam. 15. 15. 2, no. 174 Shackleton Bailey).

Not until Silver Latin can the infinitive take a subjective genitive; cf. the analogous development in Greek (I, 273 above). Note e.g. Valerius Maximus 7. 3. 7 cuius non dimicare vincere fuit ‘his refusal to fight was a victory’, and Seneca, Letters 101. 13 quod autem buius uiuere est? diu mori ‘but what is his life? A long process of death’.18

In Christian Latin, qualifying attributes are common: e.g. summum esse ‘the supreme existence’ (e.g. Augustine, On the Psalms 38. 22), commune uelle ‘the common will’ (Dracontius [late 5th c.], Tragedy of Orestes 293). Their forerunner was the Younger Pliny, with the Latin for dolce far niente (‘sweet doing nothing’) at Letters 8. 9. 1 illud iners quidem, incunctum tamen nihil agere nihil esse (‘that inert but pleasant doing nothing, being nothing’), following on from Cicero, On the Orator 2. 24 me . . . hoc ipsum nihil agere et plane cessare delectat (‘this very doing nothing and completely stopping delights me’). (Plaut. Curculio 177 totum insanum amare may not, of course, be compared; it is opposed

18 Note that at Val. Max. 7. 3. 7 Madvig changed cuius to cui, and is followed by John Briscoc in his Teubner edn of 1998. The Seneca passage is now read without the buius, and as a single sentence, ‘What sort of life is a protracted death?’ Wöllflin (1886: 76–7) quotes numerous examples of infinitive as a noun 343
to 176 pauxillum amare (‘to love a little’) and with a finite verb would be totus insanum amat (‘he loves insanely with his whole being’).

A special group comprises those instances in which the infinitive is governed by a preposition. In Greek, this occurs generally only with the article + infinitive, although the manuscripts of Herodotus in several places have ἄντι (‘instead of’) with bare infinitive (e.g. 1. 210. 6 (Hystaspes to Cyrus:) ἄντι μὲν δούλων (≠ ἄντι μὲν τοῦ δούλων εἶναι), ἐποίησας ἐλευθέρους Πέρσας εἶναι, ἄντι δὲ ἀρχεσθαί ὑπ’ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἀπάντων ‘you have made the Persians to be free instead of slaves, and to rule over all instead of being ruled by others’ (Reiske inserted τοῦ before ἀρχεσθαί). Also πλὴν ‘except’ can take a bare infinitive (instead of τοῦ + infin.), e.g. at Aesch. Eum. 125 (the ghost of Clytemnestra to the Furies:) τί σοι πέρπρωτοι πράγμα πλὴν τεύχευ | κακά; ‘what doing is fated for you except wreaking evils?’—Just so in German we are used to prepositions combining with the bare infinitive, especially zu (and its cognates in the other Germanic languages). Delbrück (1893–1900: II, 474) derives the infinitive construction of the semantically related Gothic du from the model of du + abstract noun: so, e.g. du saian in Mark 4: 3 ụrụnn sa saiands du saian (‘went out a sower to sow’) is modelled on du + dat. in e.g. John 9: 39 du stauai ik . . . qam (lit., ‘to judgement I . . . came’). On further prepositional combinations where again the infinitive has verbal character (um zu . . . ‘in order to’, ohne zu . . . ‘without’, and the like), Wilmanns, III, 125–31 may be recommended.—This kind of thing is found in Latin first in formal technical prose, obviously on the model of the Greek combinations of preposition + article + infinitive, and following the adoption of the substantivized infinitive (I, 273 above). Cicero has an example with inter ‘between’, in the sense of distinguishing between two things, at Fin. 2. 43 ut inter optime ualere et grauissime aegrotare nihil prorsus dicent interesse ‘so that they said there was absolutely no difference between the best state of health and the worst illness’; Cicero’s contemporary P. Nigidius Figulus has something similar, quoted by Aulus Gellius at Attic Nights 11. 11. 1 inter mendacium dicere et mentiri distat (‘there is a difference between making a false statement and lying’). (Contrast, with inter in another sense, e.g. inter potandum ‘in the midst of drinking’.) This use of inter is copied by the semantically and formally related praeter, e.g. in Hor. Sat. 2. 5. 69 praeter plorare (‘except lamentation’) and Ov. Her. 7. 164 praeter amasse meum (‘apart from my having loved’), the latter being also the earliest example of a clearly substantivized perfect infinitive. In Christian Latin, we find many other accusative prepositions governing an infinitive, such as Tertullian’s ultra credere (‘beyond belief’, On the Pretence of the Heretics 7. 13). Indeed, from Augustine on, ablative prepositions are permitted too, e.g. in facere . . . in pati . . . in iacere . . . in habere ‘in doing . . . in suffering . . . in lying . . . in having’, sine uinere ‘without
living’. To what extent French *pour, sans, après, avant de, afin de*, etc. + infin. belong with this development, I do not know.

The Germanic languages achieved full substantivization of the infinitive fairly early. At any rate, we have numerous instances from Old High German on. For more detail, see Runtzemüller (1903).

Greek extended the use of the infinitive more generously than Latin, and has this to thank in part for its great wealth of expressive means. But in the end Greek lost the infinitive. Except in the Pontic dialect, the old infinitive forms survive today only in a couple of nouns (I, 270 above). Aside from the very rich use of abstract nouns, they have been replaced by the combination of *νά* + subjunctive: e.g. to ancient Gk θέλω γράφαι (‘I wish to write’, infin.) corresponds θέλω νά γράφω (lit., ‘I wish that I may write’), to ancient πρέπει | δουλεύσαι (‘it is fitting to enslave’), modern πρέπει νά δουλεύσω, and so on, νά being the modern reflex of ancient ἴνα (‘so that, in order to’), the modern infinitive then being really a subordinate clause (on this development, cf. I, 195–6 and n. 32, p. 251 above). Because this same replacement of the infinitive with a subordinate clause originally of purpose occurs also in Bulgarian and commonly in Serbo-Croat, with something similar in Albanian, too, Miklosich (1876–83: III, 188) suggested that this was due to the influence of the language of the ancient Thracians. For Greek at least, such an assumption is hardly necessary, as colloquial Greek clearly shows earlier stages in the development. These are best to be seen in the New Testament, especially in the Fourth Gospel (I, 39 above). Very often here we find an ἴνα-clause where earlier, and still in educated writers of the Hellenistic period such as Polybius, an infinitive would be used. This is not only in expressions of wishing, but also in phrases such as John 1: 27 οὐ κείμη | ἔγω | ἄξιος, ἴνα λύσω (‘I am not worthy to unloose’), 2: 25 οὐ χρείαν ἔχειν, ἴνα τις μαρτυρήσῃ (‘he had no need for anyone to bear witness’), 4: 34 ἐμὸν βρῶμα ἐστίν, ἴνα ποιῶ (‘my meat is to do (the will of Him that sent me)’), and the like. Particularly characteristic of the examples from Paul is 1 Corinthians. 14: 5 θέλω δὲ πάντας ὑμᾶς λαλεῖν γλώσσαις, μᾶλλον δὲ ἴνα προφητεύῃ (‘I wish you all to speak in tongues, but even more to prophesy’), where the ἴνα-clause is in parallel with an acc. + inf. Practically

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19 Note that the first example (*in facere*, etc.) is from the *Categoriae decem* §114, a 4th-c. Latin summary of the *Categories* of Aristotle, formerly but no longer ascribed to Augustine; *sine uiuere* is quoted by Wölflin (1886: 81) from Marius Victor. Hofmann & Szantyr 344 cite instances of ablative infin. after in from Tertullian and after pro from the Old Latin Bible.

20 At all events, these combinations of preposition + infin. were gained at the expense of the gerund (see I, 281 below), which in Old French could take prepositions other than *en* (which, in its persistent refusal of the infin. is soon unique among French prepositions); for a brief survey, with further refs, see Harris (1978: 197–9) and n. 15, p. 352 below.

21 This sort of explanation from a putative source language is now called ‘substrate influence’. It is a desperate measure to invoke it when we have no information at all about the relevant feature of the language invoked, in this case ‘Thracian’, in which we know at best a few proper names.
the only contexts where the infinitive prevails in the New Testament without competition from Ἐνα (or ὁσ, ἀρι) are with auxiliary verbs and after πρίν: for further details, see Blass & Debrunner (1913 [=1961]: §§388–397). ²² (ms. add.²: On Greek influence on the infinitive in southern Italian, note also Rohlfs (1924: 64–5).)

²² W. perhaps slightly exaggerates the decline of the infin. in the NT: it actually extends its use after verbs of motion, and it remains common with the article after prepositions (cf. I, 274–5 above); cf. Turner (1963: ch. 10).
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Beside the infinitive, Latin had two other sets of forms with similar functions, the supine and the gerund. Greek has nothing comparable, (although Priscian, 8. 43 = GL II, 410, 9–10, al., influenced by the fact that Gk ἀναγνωστέος (‘(requiring) to be read’) corresponds to the Latin adjectival (gerundive) form legendus, tries to translate e.g. legendi Vergilii causa (‘for the sake of reading Vergil’) with Gk ἀναγνωστέον Βεργίλίου χάριν). So, even in Greek linguistic theory, the Latin grammarians found no model for evaluating and naming these forms. The terms that we use are attested only late on. Quintilian appears not to know them, for at Inst. 1. 4. 29 (a passage to which I shall return in a moment) he refers to forms like dictu and factu as ‘uerba participialia’, although he distinguishes them from true participial forms like dicto and facto. Similarly, the grammarian Diomedes (GL I, 342, 4), among others, refers to both sets of forms as ‘participialis modus’, while others are said to have called them ‘aduerbia qualitatis’ (‘adverbs of quality’, Charisius, p. 225 Barwick = GL I, 175, 27). Only later does the term ‘supinum’ appear. Crucial for its interpretation are passages such as Diomedes, GL I, 337, 13 and Charisius, GL I, 562, 10, where it is mentioned that the uerba neutra, both the passives with active endings, like ueneo (‘be for sale, be sold’) and the mixed type like audaeo (‘dare’) are sometimes called ‘supina’. So the term appears to refer to something between active and passive. This fits with the fact that supinus seems to be a translation of its Greek synonym ἐπιφάνεια, which is attested in the sense ‘passive’ (e.g. in the scholia on Dionysius Thrax §13, GG I.3, 247, 11; 401, 9; 548, 36 Hilgard). The expression ‘bent back’, ‘lying on the back’ denotes (with, according to the same scholiast, an image taken from the palaestra) the counterpart of the specifically active, Gk ὄρθων (‘upright’). However, the Latin grammarians regarded neutrality of voice as the key feature distinguishing the supine and gerund from the infinitive and participle.

The term gerundi modus is also used, as a free variant of supinum, to refer to both forms (e.g. by Diomedes, GL I, 352, 35; by Servius in his commentary on Donatus, GL IV, 412, 18; by Macrobius, De differentiis, GL V, 648, 26). The derived form gerundium (possibly formed on the model of participium) is found in Priscian (8. 44 = GL II, 409, 5) and gerundius, with the same broad reference, later still (GL VIII, 210, 5–9). The term seems to imply that the forms in question express only an action without further specification. The use in the name of an
example of the group denoted is deliberate, and happens everywhere in grammatical terminology. The archaic vocalism of -undi, rather than -endi, arises probably from the common use of forms with -u- in political and sacral formulae such as dictator rei gerundae causa (Mommsen 1887–8: II, 148–9), in his rebus gerundis (in a prayer at Macrobius, Saturnalia 3. 9. 11), etc.¹

Finally, the two terms supinum and gerundium came to be applied as we know them, gerundium being confined to forms like gerundi, and supinum being retained for the forms in -tum and -tu. Let us begin with the latter.

Semantically the supines are similar to the infinitives. Indeed, they represent a phase of development which the regular infinitive in Greek and Latin has gone beyond, though one could describe the two supines as infinitives of the Vedic and Avestan type (I, 258 above), i.e. as surviving in specific roles, while the general development of the infinitive went further. Apart from its neutrality with respect to mood and voice, the hallmark of that old type of infinitive is that it is clearly marked as the case-form of a noun in both morphology and meaning (I, 258 above). Now, the Latin supines were recognized already by the ancient grammarians as case-forms of some sort. Priscian (8. 47–8 = GL II, 412, 3–8) describes, first, the supine in -tum as a prepositionless | accusative, answering the question Where to? just like accusatives of names of towns, and, secondly, mirabilis uisu (‘wonderful to behold’) as being parallel to mirabilis uisione (lit., ‘wonderful in, or by sight’). Similarly, Quintilian already (1. 4. 29) treats dictu and factu together with vocabulis quae in aduerbium transeunt (‘nouns which tend to acquire an adverbial meaning’) such as noctu and diu (‘by night’, ‘by day’). And just as the supines have preserved the case-form character of the proto-infinitive, so they, like the infinitive, lack any distinction of tense or voice.

The supines differ from the verbal abstract nouns in -tus, such as habitus and usus (‘condition’, ‘use’), with which they belong formally, in having no other case-forms (in particular, no nominative), and in showing in their use old-fashioned and otherwise peculiar features not shared by the corresponding case-forms of nouns in -tus (or ordinary nouns generally). We see exactly these features in the Sanskrit infinitives built on stems in -tu.

The supine in -tum (the ‘first’ supine) is very common in Old Latin, and seems to be very much alive still in classical prose, to judge from Caesar, at least, although we see a certain reserve already in Cicero, while Sallust by contrast and the archaizing author of the Bellum Africum show a striking fondness for the formation, a fondness shared, to some extent, by Livy, too. In Imperial Latin

¹ Cf. the old formula iure dicundo ‘for the administration of justice’ (in Cicero, Livy, and Suetonius). Such forms in -undus are common in Plautus and Terence, and as archaisms in e.g. Sallust and Aulus Gellius. Compare also those forms lexicalized as adjectives, secundus ‘following, favourable’, oriundus ‘arising from’, labundus ‘gliding’, rotundus ‘round’. See Leumann 331.
this supine is hardly used any more, being normally replaced by the future participle or *ad* + gerund, although the more elevated writers and the archaizers use it still.²

The supine in *-tum* is used most frequently with *ire* (‘to go’) and its synonyms. Like the infinitive after verbs of motion (I, 262 above), it denotes the activity to which one is going (e.g. *nuptum ire* lit. ‘to make one’s way to get married’), the accusatival *-tum* matching the accusative of goal of ordinary nouns. The supine of any verb can be combined with *ire*, and the resulting sequence is close in meaning to a future (cf. I, 194 above). Priscian says expressly (9. 39 = GL II, 475, 18–19), ‘in *um* desinens supinum accepto uerbo infinito, quod est *ire*, facit infinitum futuri ut *oratum ire*…’ (‘the supine ending in *um* combined with the infinitive *ire* makes the infinitive of the future, such as *oratum ire*,…’). We saw earlier (I, 149, 194 above) how Latin in this way acquired a future passive infinitive. How closely joined speakers regarded the combination of supine with *ire* is seen in the frequent spelling *-tuir* (= *-tum iri*) from the early Empire on (for details, see Newe & Wagener III, 177–9).

Apart from *ire*, the supine is found from Plautus on with many other verbs of motion, such as *currere*, *prosilire*, *migrare* (‘run’, ‘leap forth’, ‘move, migrate’), and also very frequently with *dare* (‘give’) | as the transitive counterpart of *ire*: just as the bride *nuptum it* ‘steps into marriage’, so her father *filiam nuptum dat* ‘gives his daughter into marriage’. Synonyms of *dare* can also be used. The real core of the construction involves just the two groups of verbs, i.e. of motion, and of giving and bringing, including *ducere* and *uocare* (‘lead’, ‘call’), but authors like Sallust and Vergil go further, the former as an artificial archaizer, the latter as a poet. Outbidding *uocare* + supine, Sallust writes, *Histories* 3. 48. 17 Maurenbrecher (the tribune C. Licinius Macer to the populace:) neque ego vos ultum iniurias hortor ‘I do not urge you to avenge your injuries’. Even bolder is Vergil, *Aeneid* 9. 240–1 (Nisus to Iulus and the Trojans:) si fortuna permittitis uti | *quaesitum* Aenean et moenia Pallantea ‘if you permit us to use this good fortune to seek Aeneas and the city of Pallanteum’. The ancients found this construction so strange that they thought to transpose the lines and make *quaesitum* depend on *euntis* in the following line (243). They were certainly wrong: for the poet the supine in *-tum* was the older, choicer variant of the familiar *ad* + gerund or *ut*-clause of purpose, and so he used it here too, in a context where classical usage would have called for a gerund or an *ut*.³

² For more examples, see Bennett (1910: 453–6) and KS I, 721–4; for a survey, with bibliography, Hofmann & Szantyr 380–2, Leumann 354.

³ The transposition of the lines is in the Daniel Servius (cf. n. ii, p. 358 below) on line 240, and is followed by J. W. Mackail in his edn (Oxford 1910) and by Courtney (1981: 17–18). Others put a comma after *utii* and take *quaesitum* as the participle with *Aenean* and as the object of what follows (lit., ‘you will see that Aeneas having been sought will be present’); see the editions of Philip Hardie (Cambridge 1994) and J. Dingel (Heidelberg 1997).
Verbal abstract nouns could govern an object only in Old Latin and only in certain contexts, e.g. Plaut. Aul. 423 *quid tibi nos tactio *st? (‘what (business) do you have touching us?’), but with the supine this is quite regular. An accusative object is common from the start, and is still found at e.g. Catullus 66. 12 *uastatum fines ituerat Assyrios, ‘he (Ptolemy) had gone to lay waste the land of the Assyrians’. Rarer are objects in the dative, such as at Vergil, Aeneid 2. 786 (the ghost of Creusa to Aeneas:) *non Grais seruitum matribus ibo, ‘I shall not go to be a slave to Greek mothers’, although Plautus even has both cases side by side at Casina 102 *huc mibi uenisti sponsam praereptum meam, ‘you came here to snatch my betrothed from me’. Most often the supine stands alone.

Not only (as already noted) is the supine inherited as a type, but the oldest use of the supine in *-tum is also inherited. Latin *-tum ire has an exact match in Umbrian, where Iguvine Tables (Um 1 Rix) Ib, 10 *avef azeriatu etu (¼ VIb, 48 *auif aseriato etu) is identical5 with Latin aues obseruatum ito (‘let him go to watch for birds’)—notice the accusative object. Similarly, the Slavic languages, at least in their more archaic stages and representatives, have in addition to the infinitive a supine in *-tu (for earlier *-tum) which denotes the action aimed at after verbs of motion and takes an accusative object (VONDRÁK 1924–8: II, 271–2, 416–17). Lithuanian has something similar.6—A further indication of its age is the fact that this supine | is found formed to verbs which are no longer current in Latin. For example, *pessum ire (abire, subsidere, sidere) ‘to sink to the bottom; be destroyed’ and *pessum agere (dare, premere) ‘send to the bottom; destroy’ belong not, as many believe, with *perdere (‘to destroy, lose’) but with a verb preserved in other languages, ped- ‘to fall, get into’.7

Then there is the supine in *-tu (the ‘second’ supine). In keeping with its form, it behaves partly as an ablative.8 No passage is more instructive on this than Cato, On Agriculture 5. 5, where it stands in parallel with the accusatival *-tum: *primus

4 We find this curious use of the verbal noun in *-tio on one early legal inscription, once in Ennius and no fewer than 19 times in Plautus! In Plautus, it is a quasi-formula—*quid tibi (uobis) ACC. PRONOUN -tio (est / fuit)?—always in an indignant question, except Sidulus 283 and Aulularia 201, the latter missing from Bennett’s (1914: 352) collection of the examples. See further Löfstedt (1942: 253–5) and Hofmann & Szantyr 34.

5 Except in the first element of the compound verb ‘to watch for’, ob- in Latin vs Umbrian an- (cf. Latin *anbelo, anquiro, antestor, Gk ανδρί; see Unterweger (2000: s.vv. ‘an- 2’, ‘anseriato’). Note that this is the only example of the supine in Sabellic.

6 On Slavic, see Arumaa (1985: §221), who comments also on the use of the *-tu-abstracts in Baltic (Lithuanian and Old Prussian). On the Lithuanian infinitive in *-ti, see Senn (1966: §§1087–103, esp. 1092–3); on Old Prussian, see Ernst Fraenkel (1950).

7 On the verbal forms attested from this Indo-European root (in Indo-Iranian, Armenian, Slavic and Germanic, incl. Old English *ge-fæt ‘fell’), see LIV, s.v. ‘ped- ‘step; fall, sink’. For the regular sound-change whereby *ped-tum becomes Lat. *pessum, cf. *sessum (supine of *sedeo ‘sit’) < *sed-tum. The root *ped-is seen also in Lat. *pessinus (< *ped-tamos) ‘worst’ ← ‘lowest’.

8 Cf., however, n. 10 in this lecture.
cubitu surgat, postremus cubitum eat, ‘let him (the farm-manager) be the first to rise from bed (lit., from lying down, abl.), and the last to go to bed (lit., to lie down, acc.).’ The ablative function is clear also in opsonatu redire (‘to return from shopping’, e.g. Plaut. Men. 277) and ita dictu opus est (‘you need to say as follows’, Terence, Self-Tormentor 941). Similarly, in dignus / indignus memoratui (relatu) (‘worthy / unworthy of recounting’) in Vergil and historians from Livy on, the form of the supine corresponds to the ablative usual after these adjectives. On the other hand, an old dative has long been recognized in the supine in -tu when used to denote the sphere of application (like the infinitive in Greek) after adjectives such as facilis or horribilis. It is known that the dative of the fourth declension could also end in -u; indeed, Caesar is supposed to have preferred it. Consequently, we find occasionally also supines in -tui in this function, e.g. Plaut. Bacch. 62 istaec lepida sunt memoratui (‘these things are pleasant to recall’) (see KROLL 1920: 369), whence the perverse use in imperial Latin of -tui even after dignus.10

Beside the acknowledged supines in -tu are some (semantically distinct) true ablatives in -tu, which either lack other case-forms on the same stem altogether or acquire them only later (as, indeed, true supines like nuptum (‘to marry’) or toleratu (‘to tolerate’) had complete action-noun paradigms built to them). Examples include iussu ‘by order of’, iniussu ‘against the order of’, with a genitive or a possessive adjective as subject (and similarly mandatu, missu, permisssu, concessu (‘by order of’, ‘on the mission of’, ‘with the permission / concession of’), etc.). These denote the action of someone causing or permitting the action of another (for the attested examples, see NEUE & WAGENER I, 751–7, and for other case-forms, esp. dat. sg. in -tui, 757–61). Forms, too, like aduentu and discessu ‘on arrival/departure’ both occur more frequently than the other case-forms of these stems and are used in a way impossible for ablatives of other verbal abstracts, such as those in -tio (cf. NÄGELSBACh 1905: §§56–7, with references.)

Old Latin simītu (‘at the same time’) (with long second i, from earlier ei, like the

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9 pp. 54–5 of the 3rd edn (1925).

10 Note e.g. dignus memoratui ‘worthy to relate’ (in the so-called Historia Augusta, at the end of the life of the 3rd-c. emperor Probus by Flavius Vopiscus, 24. 6), facilis diuisui ‘easy to divide’ in Livy 45. 30. 2, but such cases are rare and subject to emendation by editors. Clearly, among speakers and writers of Latin there was some confusion between (a) regular case-usages of verbal nouns in -tus (the final dative in e.g. gustui dare ‘to give to taste’, the ablative of separation in e.g. cubitu surgat ‘let him rise from bed’, abl. after opus est, dignus, etc.), and (b) the ‘true’ second supine in -tui after certain adjectives. It is generally agreed that the function of the supine is in part at least datival (cf. the Skt infin. -tæve < dat. sg. *-tøy-ei), but it is disputed whether Lat. -tui can come by regular sound-change from -tui < *-tøy-ei, and if it were a genuinely old variant of -tui, we should expect to find more than the single instance of lepida memoratui (quoted above). Formally -tui may continue an old instrumental (cf. the next paragraph) or an old (endingless) locative in *-tou. Caesar is said to have prescribed -tui as the regular 4th-conjugation dat. sg. ending by Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 4. 16. 5–9, who quotes examples of -tui also from Lucilius and Vergil. See further Bennett (1910: 456–7), Hofmann & Szantyr 98, 382–3, Ernout (1953: 888), Leumann 121, 355, 442–3.
long ā in stātu at Plaut. *Mil.* 1389\(^\text{11}\) is another such formation meaning literally ‘(in) going together’. All these show certain similarities with the infinitive (and the Sanskrit absolutive\(^\text{12}\)). Semantically different is natu (‘by birth’), used especially with grandis, maior, etc. in indications of age, which does not receive an adjectival attribute before Nepos (*Datames* 7.1 *maximo natu* ‘the eldest\(^\text{13}\)'), and means roughly ‘in, by, with reference to growth’.

Again closely related to the infinitive is the gerund, the name of which was discussed above (I, 277). The gerund makes possible the expression of case relations with the infinitive (including by means of prepositions), something that Greek has to do by using the article + substantivized infinitive (I, 270–3 above). In the ablative, the gerund can denote an accompanying action, rather as the so-called absolutive in Sanskrit, a usage especially clear in imperial Latin from Livy on (see Nägelsbach 1905: §31.2–3). This involves an overlap between the gerund and the predicative use of the nominative participle. In passages like Tacitus, *Annals* 15.69.2 *nihil metuens an dissimulando metu*, ‘fearing nothing or dissembling fear’ this synonymy is particularly clear.\(^\text{14}\) Since the nominative participle must agree with the subject in number, while the ablative of the gerund is independent of the subject, the gerund is more convenient, if less precise, than the participle, and has consequently ousted it from this function in the Romance languages. It is well known that French chantant ‘singing’ (when not adjectival) and en chantant ‘while singing’ go back not to Latin cantans (pres. ptc.) but to cantando, in cantando (abl. of gerund). Apart from this usage, the gerund (and the so-called gerundive) disappeared from the colloquial language.\(^\text{15}\)

Unfortunately, I feel unable to treat these forms as I have tried to deal with others. This is because the origin of the -\(nd\)-forms (gerund and gerundive) and

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\(^{11}\) This anomalous ā is generally accepted, although an attempt has been made to remove it by rearranging the words to read *senex stat in stātu* ‘the old man is standing in position’ (see Soubiran 1995: *ad loc.*).

\(^{12}\) Also known as the ‘gerund’ or ‘indeclinable participle’, the Sanskrit absolutive in -\(tā\) (in the earliest Vedic, also -\(tāya\) and -\(tī\) (‘after . . . ing, while . . . ing’) is formally the old instrumental sg. of the action noun in -\(tu\)-, and this is the most probable account of these Latin forms, too (cf. n. 10). Again as in Latin, the Skt absolutive is nearly always made to the same stem as the past participle (Skt -\(ta\)-, Lat. -\(tus\)). For further detail, see Whitney (1889: §§989–94), Coulson (2006: 67–8).

\(^{13}\) Here, one manuscript has maximus, and is followed by Guillemin in her Budé edn (1961).

\(^{14}\) Strictly, W.’s example illustrates the gerundive rather than the gerund, for which note e.g. Livy 24.4.9 *dictitans . . . deponendoque* ‘professing . . . and by resigning’ (cf. Hofmann & Szantyr 380).

\(^{15}\) Certainly, the Latin gerundive is lost without trace in Romance (Va˚næn 1981: §128), although, rather confusingly, in French grammars the unchanging -\(nt\) form is called the ‘gerondif’. In French, broadly speaking, the Latin gerund in -\(ndum\), its abl. in -\(ndo\), and the pres. ptc. (in verbal function) in -\(ntem\) all coalesced in a single form in -\(nt\), which when functioning as an adjectival participle may inflect for gender and number, but otherwise is unchanging. Spanish and Italian, on the other hand, preserve a stronger formal opposition between the reflex of the gerund and the verbal participle (in -\(ndo\)) and that of the adjectival / nominal participle (in -\(nte\)). On the fate of the present participle and the gerund in Romance, and esp. in French, see Harris (1978: 199–201) and Grevisse §§885–92.
hence the roots of their very diverse uses have yet to be demonstrated. One thing only is clear, that this group of forms is Common Italic, as there are correspondences in Oscan and Umbrian. It deserves to be stressed also that not all verbs originally had a gerund: e.g. *uolendi* and *nolendi* (‘wishing’, ‘not wishing’, gen. sg.) are not found before the Church Fathers.16

16 The question whether gerund or gerundive is prior has been much debated: most recently, for the priority of the gerund are Blumel (1979) and Hettrich (1993), for the priority of the gerundive, Risch (1984) and Meiser (1993). In Sabellic, note e.g. Oscan *úpsannam* ‘for being made, to be made’ (fem. acc. sg.), Umbrian *pihaner* ‘for purifying, to be purified’ (masc. gen. sg.). Phonologically, the Sabellic gerundive (no gerund is attested) can continue a formation in *-ndo-* just like the Latin, and it has been regarded as a borrowing from Latin (refs in Meiser 1993: 258 n. 18). Most scholars, however, think that the formation continues a Common Italic use of an Indo-European suffix, even if it is thinkable that (some of) its syntax was borrowed by Oscan and Umbrian from Latin. Three IE suffixes have been proposed as the origin of the Italic gerundive: (a) *-nyo-* (Poulney 1980; Hoenigswald 1975—this goes back to Curtius); (b) *-tno-* (Risch 1984: 175—this goes back to Goetze); (c) *-dno-* (Meiser 1993; cf. Leumann 201). For surveys of forms and uses, with bibliography, see Bennett (1910: 441–52), Hofmann & Szantyr 368–80, Leumann 330–2.
Lecture I, 47

THE PARTICIPLE

The name *participium* (lit. ‘the act of partaking’), made to *particeps* as *aucupium* to *auceps*, is a translation of Gk μετοχη (explained above, I, 16).

The participle serves first and foremost to denote actions and processes preceding, accompanying, or following the content of the main verb. This sort of accompanying action and process may also be expressed by adverbial forms in related languages, including e.g. the absolutive in Sanskrit, which is to some extent comparable with Homeric forms like ἰγκύκολον ‘coming up close’ or ἰμογγίτι ‘without effort’, or with the Latin gerund in *-ndo* (discussed above). The participle had two advantages over this type of form: first, its case-ending indicated the subject of the action it conveyed,1 and secondly it marked tense and voice through its choice of stem and endings (active or middle). The use of the participle as an agent noun conveying these variables of verbal meaning is inherited. And it is a virtue of Greek that it has preserved the full range of inherited forms, added to them by making participles to new tense-stems, and even created the possibility of expressing modal nuances with the particle ἄν (I, 224 above).

Another indication that the participle is inherited is the fact that a number of forms have no corresponding verb that we can show, or at least not with the same form or meaning. This is less surprising in the case of forms which have lost their participial meaning and function only as nouns, such as German *Freund* (‘friend’) and *Feind* (‘foe’), originally participles to the lost verbs seen in Gothic *frijon* ‘love’ and *fijan* ‘hate’; or like Latin *potens* (‘powerful’), participle of a verb *potère* ‘have power over’, which survives in Latin only in *potui*, and in Oscan also with the present stem, and which was formed in Italic as durative to the inherited *potior* ‘get power over’ (I, 68–9 above). But even the thoroughly participial *libens* ‘willing’ does not fit with the impersonal *libet* (‘it pleases’), but presupposes an older personal verb *libeo* ‘I wish’ (corresponding to German *lieben* and English *love*); and compare the adjective (im-)pudens (‘(not) showing proper restraint’) beside *pudet* (lit., ‘it shames’). Similarly, *praesens* (‘being present’) belongs semantically with Gk παρείναι (‘be present’), not with Latin *praesse* in its secondary, narrower meaning ‘be ahead, in charge’.2

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1 The subject of the action of the participle is the (pro)noun in agreement with it.

2 Lat. *praesse* is very rare in the sense ‘to be present’.
The most interesting example, however, is Gk \( \epsilon k\omega\nu \) (earlier, \( \varepsilon k\varepsilon\omega\nu \)) ‘willing’, formed to a root \( \text{*u}\varepsilon\kappa \) - attested in Indic and Iranian with the meaning ‘wish’. Its use is straightforwardly participial: at all periods it is found in the genitive absolute, and, unlike the participles of many fully functional verbs, it rarely assumes a plainly adjectival function (but see I, 286 below).—This is not inconsistent with the fact that \( \epsilon k\omega\nu \) is negated with privative \( \dot{a} \)-, while otherwise participles from Homer on normally take the negative \( \circ\omega \) or \( \mu\eta \) (even in the personal name \( \text{O}v\kappa\alpha\lambda\varepsilon\gamma\omega\nu \) (II. 3. 148), made famous by Vergil, \textit{Aen}. 2. 312 \textit{proximus ardet Ucalegon} (‘the next to burn is Ucalegon’). Even the \( \dot{a} \)-negated \( \dot{a}\epsilon\kappa\omega\nu \) (Attic \( \dot{a}\kappa\omega\nu \)) ‘unwilling’ frequently occurs, from Homer on, in the thoroughly participial construction of the genitive absolute, e.g. at II. 1. 301 \( \dot{a}\epsilon\kappa\omega\nu\tau\omega\sigma\epsilon\mu\varepsilon\iota \) ‘against my will’, Herodotus 2. 120. 1 \( \eta\tau\omega\ \dot{a}\epsilon\kappa\omega\nu\ \gamma\epsilon\ \dot{a}\epsilon\kappa\omega\nu\tau\omega\sigma\epsilon\mu\varepsilon\iota\ \text{A}\lambda\varepsilon\zeta\alpha\nu\delta\rho\nu \) ‘(Helen would have been given back) whether Paris was willing or unwilling’, and in parallel with a regular participle at Thuc. 8. 3. 1 \( \mu\epsilon\mu\phi\mu\omicron\epsilon\gamma\omega\nu\ \kappa\alpha\iota \dot{a}\kappa\omega\nu\tau\omega\sigma\omicron\tau\omicron\tau\text{n} \) \( \text{t}\omega\nu\ \text{\textit{The}ssal}a\lambda\omega\nu \) ‘under the criticism and against the will of the Thessalians’. And we know from the oldest-attested Indo-European languages, like Sanskrit and Avestan (where the very same negated participle corresponding to Gk \( \dot{a}\kappa\omega\nu \) also occurs), that this form of negation of the participle is original. Latin, too, has clear examples with \( \text{in}- \) (\( = \) Gk \( \dot{a}(v)- \)), German and English \( \text{un}- \). Plautus and Cicero said for ‘without my knowledge’ not \textit{me nesciente} but \textit{me insciente}; and compare \textit{imprudens} in the sense of \textit{non prouidens}, e.g. at Cic. \textit{Sex. Rosc}. 21, 25 \textit{imprudente L. Sulla} ‘without L. Sulla’s foreknowledge’; notice also (\textit{ms. add}.\textsuperscript{2}) Terence, \textit{Brothers} 507 \textit{non me indicente haec fiunt} (‘I warned him this would happen’). In keeping with this is the fact that \textit{nolens} (‘unwilling’) does not occur as the participle of \textit{nolo} until A. Cornelius Celsus (1st c. AD) and Seneca; Classical and pre-classical Latin uses \textit{inuitus} in this role.—Similarly in the Germanic languages. Wulfila has e.g. 1. Corinthians 16: 10 \textit{un-agands} ‘unafraid’, Romans 10: 3 \textit{unkunnandans Gudis garaithein} ‘ignorant of God’s justice’. And Goethe and Mörke still know something of the sort, Goethe e.g. in his ‘Nineteen Letters from Switzerland’ (p. 287 Hempel = XIX, 300 of the Weimar edn), \textit{wo ich mein künftiges Schicksal unvorahnend} . . . \textit{Italien den Rücken zukehrte und meiner jetzigen Bestimmung unwillend entgegenging} (‘where I without presentiment of my future fate . . . turned my back on Italy and unknowingly went to meet my present assignment’; see \textit{BOHNER 1904a}: 130). The Romantic poet Eduard Mörke (1804–75) has it e.g. in \textit{Der Schatz} (\textit{The Treasure} [1856], 3. 177 ed. Fischer), \textit{unführend, wo ich stand, und des Respekts vergessend} (‘not sensitive to where I stood, and forgetful of respect’). In modern colloquial German, this \textit{un-} with a participle is now foreign, except in purely adjectival forms such as \textit{unwissend}

\textsuperscript{3} See Chantraine, \textit{s.v. ‘ek\omega\nu’}; \textit{LIV}, \textit{s.v. ‘\text{*u}ek\text{’ “wish”’}.}
I, 284

...which is used only of a property (see EULING, D. Wb., s.v. ‘un’, 14–16).

Of the numerous forms of the participle preserved in Greek, Latin retains only the present active. Vestiges of wider use in Latin survive only in some nominalized forms: *paren[s and *clie[n[s look like old aorist participles to *pario (‘beget’) and Gk κληνου (‘lean’), respectively, and corresponding to the Greek forms in -menos is Latin alumnus (‘nursling’), which ancient scholars already related to alere and glossed with nutritus, Gk ἐπερτός ‘nourished, reared’ and the like (I, 122 above).

The name of the god Vertumnus would also belong here, if the ancients were right to derive his name from ueste ‘turn’ (cf. esp. Propertius 4. 2), but as his temple was in the uicus Tuscus (the ‘Etruscan way’), and his cult borrowed from Etruria, his name too may be Etruscan—as its form perfectly well could be (SCHULZE 1904: 252)—and the connection with ueste, | determined by the poet’s view of the god, not original. Similarly, despite Augustine, diius Volumnus and diua Volumna are not from uelle ‘to wish’.

Not even the present participle in -ns is completely preserved in Latin. By no means every verb has it. Especially striking is the loss of *sens ‘being’. Apart from the old sacral expression Di consentes (connected by the ancients with consentire (‘agree with’), but rightly interpreted already generations ago by J. M. Gesner (1749) as meaning ‘being with’), the participle of ‘to be’ survives only in absens and praesens (and in the latter with a shift of meaning). After other preverbs and esp. as a simplex, it was lost in prehistoric times, whether already in Common

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4 W. thinks of *paren[s (cf. Gk δεκών) and *clie[n[s as aorist participles because the participial suffix is added to the bare root (par-, cl-) as opposed to the stem with its present-marking suffix (par-, cl-n-); compare the Old Latin subjunctives fi[uas, attig[ius, taq[ius, attulat, evenat, in which the subjunctive suffix is added directly to the root (clearly distinct from the present stem). Cf. Leumann 574, 583. For ancient accounts of Lat. alumnus, see Maltby (1991: s.v.). With alumnus compare Gōna ‘woman’ — ‘suckling, giving suck’ or ‘endowed with fruit or milk’ (see Benveniste 1933: 11–15), formed on the IE root seen also in Lat. fœcundus, fēx, fētus, filius, filia, etc.; Gk ἔξω ‘nurse, female’, etc.; see LIV, s.v. ‘δήχε(η) ‘to suck (mother’s milk)’; Ernout & Meillet, s.v. ‘fœcundus’.

5 Augustine’s criticism of the proliferation of pagan divinities at City of God 4. 21 is amplified by (less than fully serious) etymologies of their names. On the Etruscan words, see Ernout (1929: 98–101); on Vertumnus in particular, who was regarded as the chief Etruscan god and whose statue stood in the uicus Tuscus at the edge of the Forum, see Varro, Latin Language 5. 46 and esp. G. O. Hutchinson’s introduction to poem 2 in his recent edn (Cambridge 2006) of Propertius, book 4. Cf. Leumann 322 with further refs.

6 CIL XIV. 3945 (age of Augustus) insentibus interpreted by some as ‘for those who are in (the tomb)’ is more probably in sentibus ‘among the thorns’ (cf. Leumann 523 and ThLL, s.v. ‘insum’, 2045, 79–80). By good luck, Consentes (treated as a proper name) is in the only volume so far published of the Onomasticon intended to accompany the ThLL. Not consentes but the possibly related consentia sacra is implicitly connected with consensus ‘agreement’ at Paul. Fest. p. 65 Lindsay. Rather different ancient etymologies are given in Maltby (1991: s.vv. ‘Consentes’, ‘Complices’). Johann Matthias Gesner (1691–1761), schoolmaster and classical scholar, was a close friend of the composer J. S. Bach and became professor of rhetoric and poetry in the university of Göttingen on its foundation in 1734. In his Novus linguae et eruditionis Romanae thesaurus (Leipzig 1749)—miraculously available online at <http://www.uni-mannheim.de/mateo/camenare/gesner>—s.v. ‘consentes’, he wrote ‘Nec absurdum forte est Consentes dici, ut Praesentes uel Absentes’. On Lat. prae in praesens ‘present’ and praesum ‘I am ahead’, see W. (1919: 166–70) and Benveniste (1966 [orig. 1949]: 132–9). On consens, praesens, absens, see Pascucci (1961).
Italic we do not know. The old suggestion that *sons ‘guilty’ is the equivalent of Gk ὁμός and means ‘the one who is it’ does not deserve to be pursued.7—Latin’s loss is striking because other Indo-European languages not only have this participle but use it very frequently, and the earliest texts have examples of it (the Veda, the hymns of Zarathustra, Homer).8 Wulfila, too, uses *wisands no less than his Greek original, and occasionally has it even when the Greek does not: e.g. at Romans 11: 24 he translates παρὰ φύσει ἐνεκεντρίσθησ (‘contrary to nature you were grafted’) with aljakuns *wisands intrusgans warnst (lit. ‘being of another type, you were grafted’). And modern English and Dutch make frequent use of *being and *zijnde, respectively. In modern German, however, in striking agreement with Latin, the old participle *wesend survives only in anwesend and abwesend (‘present’, ‘absent’), and the more recent seienend is not in common use, save in the language of philosophy in the classroom (cf. D. Wb., s.v. ‘sein’, I, 3, (o), 244–5).

The reason for the loss of *sens is not clear. That it is monosyllabic—which might account for the lack of the participle *rens to reor (‘I think’)—is not a sufficient explanation, given that Latin tolerates *dans and *flens (‘giving’, ‘weeping’). One might speculate that *sens was ill suited, given its lack of semantic content, to the tendency, stronger in Latin than in Greek, to use the participle as a noun—although, like its Sanskrit cognate, it could have assumed the meaning ‘true, virtuous’ (cf. above on *sons).9 At all events, to begin with, Latin managed easily without this participle, because Latin-speakers felt the need less than the Greeks to link determiners to their noun with the copula. An essential difference between the Latin ablative absolute and the Greek genitive absolute is that the Latin can have a purely nominal predicate, e.g. in Cicerone consule (lit. ‘(with) Cicero [being] consul’, i.e. ‘in Cicero’s consulship’).

Nevertheless, with the emergence of more abstract thought and the need to translate from Greek, Latin certainly felt the lack of this participle. How Cicero, for example, surmounted the difficulties, is shown by NÄGELSCHACH (1905: §96.2). The translations of the Bible are instructive here, too. Matthew 6: 30 τὸν χόρτον τὸν ἀγροῦ σήμερον ὀντα καὶ αὐριον εὶς κλίβανον βαλλόμενον (‘the grass which is today of the field and is tomorrow cast into the oven’) can be rendered

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7 Nevertheless, possible connections between the participle of ‘to be’ and Lat. *sons have been explored; cf. Leumann 523, 582. The ancient explanation of sonsete as nocentes ‘harmful, guilty’ (compare *insons ‘innocent, harmless’) comes in connection with the word soticus ‘real, definite, legitimate’, notably in morbus soticus, a disease providing a legitimate excuse for not attending legal proceedings, already in the Twelve Tables (see Crawford 1996: II, 624; Maltby 1991: s.v. ‘soticus’).

8 And now we may add Hittite aiānt-. 9 The Sanskrit participle of ‘to be’ sānt- (and its derivatives, e.g. satyā- ‘true’) has its own dictionary entry and is richly attested with positive meanings deriving from ‘being, existing’; its fem., sati acute on last, apart from being a respectful form of address to a lady, denotes a good and faithful wife (it is the word behind English *sutee). The same positive meanings, ‘real, true’, are attested for the reflexes of the IE participle of ‘to be’ (*hseīnt-) also in Hitt. aiānt-, Gk ἔος-, and Old Norse *sannr; see further Puhvel (1984–: s.v.) on Hittite and EWAia, s.vv. ‘satyā’, ‘sānt-', both with further references.
exactly by Wulfila as *hawi haipjos himma daga wisando jah gistradagis in auhn galagip*, but Latin has to say, *foenum agri, quod bodie est et cras in clibanum mittitur*, with a relative clause (in which it is followed by Luther, here and in countless other places). The invention by Julius Caesar, on ‘Analogist’ lines (cf. I, 13 above), of *ens* (to *es(t)*), by proportional analogy with *potens* to *potes(t)*: cf. Prisc. 18. 75 = GL III, 239, 5–9) was of no practical significance, until the medieval philosophers revived the formation and even derived from it an abstract noun *entitas* (whence *identitas* ‘the state of being the same’).

On the other hand, the uses of the *-ns* participle were extended in Latin beyond their inherent limits, and the missing forms were thus in part replaced. So, e.g., pre- and post-classical *meminens* (‘remembering, mindful’) to *memini*, which was regarded as a present. Moreover, *-ns* is normal in the present participle of deponent verbs: *sequens* (‘following’) corresponds to Gk *ἔπομενος*, although we cannot decide whether *sequens* arose first because of the active meaning of the verb and caused the loss of the form corresponding to *ἐπομενος*, or (what is less probable) *sequens* came to be used only after this loss.\(^{10}\) Equally, *-ns* makes participles to passive verbs with intransitive or reflexive meaning, as in e.g. *volucentibus annis* (‘with the rolling years’, Verg. *Aen.* 1. 234) beside *voluitur annus* (‘the year rolls on’, Verg. *Georgics* 2. 402). In his note on the latter passage, Servius Auctus\(^{11}\) refers to *siliqua quassante* (‘as the pod rattles’, Verg. *Geo.* 1. 74) and *voluentia plaustra* (‘rolling wagons’, Verg. *Geo.* 1. 163), and comments, ‘... ali, quia deficit lingua Latina participio praesenti passiuo, praesens actium positum ulunt’ (‘others, because the Latin language lacks a present passive participle wish the present active to be used’).

Following Bücheler (1903) but going much further, J. B. Hofmann (1917/20: 183–90; and 1922a; but cf. Leumann 1921: 209–13) has recently shown very nicely how in general the active present participle in Latin can serve to mark passive meaning, as e.g. in *amantissimus* ‘most beloved’, a form extremely common from Republican times on (whence later *desiderantissimus* ‘greatly missed’, *reuerentissimus*, ‘right reverend’).\(^{12}\) Often external analogy played a part (as e.g. in

\(^{10}\) In this sentence, W. seems to assume that *-ns* is intrinsically active in meaning, although the next sentence, quite rightly, suggests otherwise.

\(^{11}\) Also known as ‘Servius Danielis’ (Daniel’s Servius, after its discoverer and the maker of its first edition [1600], Pierre Daniel; abbr. ‘DServius’, ‘DS’), Servius Auctus refers to the longer of the two versions of the commentary on Vergil, which is thought to be a 7th/8th-c. (perh. Irish) recension of the grammarian Servius’ 4th-c. commentary. Servius based his work on an earlier, now lost commentary by Donatus; Servius Auctus seems to include material from Donatus’ commentary not used by Servius. See on Servius Auctus, Kaster (1988: 169 n. 2) and Fowler (1997), both with further refs.

\(^{12}\) Relevant here, but of course unknowable to W., is the fact that the *-nt* participle (the only participle) in Hittite is passive in transitive verbs, active/intransitive in intransitive verbs. So e.g. *kunant* (to *kyen-* ‘kill’) means ‘killed’, while *akkant* (to *ak-* ‘die’) means ‘having died’. The only exceptions are *adanant-* and *akenant-* (to *ed-* ‘eat’ and *adw-* ‘drink’), which can be either passive (*’eaten’, ‘drunk’) or active (*‘having eaten’, ‘having drunk’), in the latter sense just like Lat. *cenatus, pransus, potus*, etc. (cf. I, 136 above and I, 288 below with nn.). On Hittite, see Friedrich (1960: §277).
Arrestant ‘prisoner’ formed to Malefikant ‘malefactor’), as did the inability of simple folk to use a rather unfamiliar form (as in the case of amantissimus, etc.). Of special relevance, however, is the general tendency to ascribe to a nominal constituent as functions of itself actions performed at or near it; there are parallels provided by ordinary adjectives. Familiar from modern languages are expressions such as fallende Sucht (‘falling sickness, epilepsy’), schwindelnde Höhe (‘giddy height’), cafe chantant, the dansant (a café with singing, a tea-dance; see Wilmanns III, 104–6), but equally Sophocles has the active ἐκὼν and ἀκὼν in the sense ‘wished for’, ‘not wished for’ at OT 1229 κακὰ ἐκῶντα κούκ ἀκῶντα (cf. OC 240, 977). Time and space prevent me from going into the similar bold uses of individuals such as Sallust¹⁴ or the interpolator of Aeneid 2. 567–88.¹⁵

A more important source of replacements for lost participles in Latin is the participial use of formations which originally had some other meaning. Varro (Latin Language 8. 58; 9. 110) emphasizes the imbalance affecting Latin through the lack of a past participle in the active and a present and a future in the passive. He claims three participles for Latin, setting beside the present active (amanus) a future active (amaturus) and a preterital passive (amatus). All ancient and modern grammars present this trio of forms, which is right for the classical and post-classical periods but only partly correct for earlier Latin. There is no future participle in pre-classical texts, and the forms in -tus, while indeed participial in our earliest texts, are participles in virtue of a prehistoric shift of meaning.

All writers from Plautus on use an etymologically obscure future infinitive in -turum (more often without esse than with it), which often ends in -um even if the subject is plural or feminine (Sommer 1914: §373),¹⁶ beside this there is the

¹³ Cf. die melkende Kuh ‘the cow that is milked’. Compare the invariably passive meaning of the German gerundive construction, su + pres. act. ptc. in -end, e.g. die zu melkende Kuh ‘the cow to be milked’. For participles of verbs involving more than one semantic participant, Haspelmuth (1994: here esp. 169–70) explores the notion of ‘orientation’ (active pts being agent-oriented, passive pts patient-oriented) and sets out clear instances of neutral and flexible orientation. See his further references and comparable examples from numerous other languages.

¹⁴ Sallust often uses the pres. ptc. as if it were a past active ptc., where good classical usage would call for a subordinate clause, e.g. Jugurtha 15. 1 bellum inferentem ‘although he had initiated the war’ (cum bellum intulisset); cf. 31. 10, 103. 4, 106. 1, 113. 1; see Hofmann & Szantyr 387 with further references.

¹⁵ The genuineness of this “Helen-episode” is a major problem of Virgilian scholarship. So begins R. G. Austin’s introduction to this passage in his commentary on book 2 (Oxford 1964), which gives a useful summary of the main arguments and bibliography from 1859 to 1961. The standard modern defence of Vergilian authorship, including discussion of the troublesome participle that W. must have in mind (58 merentis gen. sg. and act., or merentis acc. pl. but pass.), is Austin (1961: here at 191). The thesis of interpolation (of lines not by Vergil), argued for by Leo, Heinze, Norden, and Fraenkel, and here accepted without question by W., has found recent proponents (most notably Goold 1970), but most scholars now (in spite of Goold’s n. ad loc. in the new Loeb edn; cf. Fish 2004: 135 n. 63) believe the lines authentic. See esp. Berres’ monograph (1992) and Fish’s article (2004: esp. 123–9 and nn.).

¹⁶ It was Postgate (1891; 1894) who drew attention to the normal omission of esse and to the c. 14 examples in earlier Latin, prose and verse, of invariable -turum (e.g. Varro, Rust. 1. 68 pensilia (neut. pl.)… descendurum se minitantur ‘fruits that are hung… threaten to fall down’). (See the discussion in Gellius, 1. 7. 1–15.) Postgate inferred that -turum is the older form and derived it from a verbal noun in
periphrastic future in -turus (a, um) est (cf. I, 197 above). Before Cicero, however, a participle in -turus is found only in C. Gracchus (fr. 44 Malcovati; quoted by Gellius, ii. 10. 4) prodeunt dissuasuri, where it seems likely that an original dissuasum was corrected to dissuasuri in keeping with later usage.17 At Ennius,18 Trag. 319 Warnington ego cum genui tum morituros sciui (‘when children I began, I knew that they must die’), morituros is infinitive; Annals spur. 3 Skutsch carbasus alta volat pandam ductura carinam (‘high flits the flaxen sail that will lead on the curved keel’) is not genuine;19 the impossible rausuro at Lucilius 594 was corrected by Leo (1906: 852). See also Sjögren’s work (1906: 225 ff.) on the use of the future in Old Latin. In his youth, Cicero himself ventured in Against C. Verres II.1. 56 P. Servilius . . . adest de te sententiam laturus (‘P. Servilius . . . is here to judge you’); cf. Letters to Brutus 1. 17 (Brutus to Atticus), 2 mali auctor . . . radices habituri aliores (‘the author of an evil . . . which will have deeper roots’).20 Then, from his exile onwards (starting with Concerning his Own House 12 futura fames ‘future hunger’), he frequently uses futurus, usually attributively, but also in the neuter as a noun (e.g. On the Orator 2. 105). Caesar also has futurus (Civil War 1. 52. 1, with tempus ‘time’), his only instance of the future participle; compare the situation in Russian, where buduščě (‘future’) is the only future participle.

A variant on this | isuenturi boni (‘of a good thing to come’) at Cicero, Tusc. 4. 14, beside 4. 11 futurorum bonorum (‘future good things’). This state of affairs makes it clear that -turus was abstracted from -turus est, on the model of -tus in -tus est. This is in keeping with the fact that Cicero first uses the future participle with adest. The model of Greek will certainly have had a strong influence. This is clearest at Cic. Att. 8. 9. 2 (49 BC) quo nunc ipsum (Caesari) unde se recipienti, quid agenti, quid acturo (‘when Caesar is at this moment on his way from and to we all know where, doing and about to do we all know what’), on which Schmalz (1911: 351) correctly observes that the writer must have had in mind Gk τί πράστοντι; τί πράξοντι; as the combination of interrogative + participle is a Grecism.21

-tū + ‘comm ‘to be’ (with the infin. ending found in Oscan and Umbrian!): -tūrum would then have been reinterpreted as agreeing with an acc. sg. masc. and so treated as a ptc. and inflected, esse being (optionally) added for clarity, perhaps on the model of the pf. infin. pass. dictum esse. Blümel (1979: 104–6) was not the first to start from supine -tum + ire ‘to go’ > *-tūre (?), but fails to explain why it was replaced with -tūrum. For Leumann (1973; 1977: 618–19) -tūrum is an ‘indirect loan-translation’ of the Greek fut. infin. act. in -aev (invariable, as opposed to the variable ptc. *-ape, *-aaape, *-ape).17


19 See Skutsch (1985: ad loc.).

20 I have substituted this example (from Landgraf 1896: 49) for W.’s next, Letters to his Brother Quintus 2. 16. 3 aerum defensurus, where a normal periphrastic future eram defensurus ‘I am about to defend’ is to be read.

21 Hofmann & Szantyr 390 worry that the text of the letters is corrupt at this point. I have substituted Shackleton Bailey’s text and translation (his no. 188).
The less strict classical writers, such as Sallust and Asinius Pollio, then seized eagerly on the new formation. Pollio (quoted by the Elder Seneca, Suasariorum 6. 24) was the first to use it in the ablative absolute, and after him, Livy. From the Augustan age on, the form is common in poetry and literary prose, and later also in the hypothetical sense of Gk πολλῶν ἄν, πολίσας ἄν (‘such as would do’, ‘such as would have done’; cf. Nāgelsbach 1905: §115a). It scarcely penetrated everyday speech, and hence is absent (as is futurus) from the colloquial register of the Romance languages. The first correct account of -turus as a whole is by Landgraf (1896) following Hoppe (1875).23

From the earliest times, the formation in -tus serves to make the Latin perfect passive participle. Exactly the same is true in the other Italic languages, and by and large in Germanic, too.24 German forms in -(e)t (of the so-called ‘weak’ verbs; cf. English -(e)d) correspond to Latin -tus in both form and function, e.g. in geliebt, loved and amatus, the German forms in -en (of the so-called ‘strong’ verbs; cf. English -en) at least in function. But even in point of their morphology the Latin forms in -tus cannot be original perfect participles. Participles are formed to tense-stems, and reflect the tense in their meaning, but pulsus (‘driven’) shows no semantic relationship to pepuli (‘drove’), nor dictus to dixi (‘said’).25 Light is thrown here, as on so much in the prehistory of Latin, by Greek. The Greek forms in -τος corresponding to Latin -tus are not participles but ‘verbal adjectives’, which denote the action of the verb as actually or potentially affecting a (pro-) nominal constituent without direct reference to tense or voice. They do not take an object, and if the agent is mentioned (which is rare), it is originally in the genitive, as with verbal nouns: hence, the old compound Δῶδοςτος (‘given by [lit., of] Zeus’). The role of the verbal adjective in the clause as a whole is also different from that of the participle: it cannot express an accompanying action, not even in the manner of the conjunct participle, let alone of the absolute construction.

In this Greek use of the -to- formation, we see the original state of affairs, although even Sanskrit, the oldest attested Indo-European language, shows parallels to Latin.26 Now, Latin like Germanic has many usages of these forms

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22 That is, standing for the main clause of a conditional sentence (with a following ‘if’-clause): for examples, starting with Livy (3. 60. 8; 8. 17. 10, etc.), see KS I, 761.
23 On the periphrastic future and the fut. ptc. overall, see KS §§40.2–3, 136.4 (c); Hofmann & Szantyr 312, 390–1.
24 On passive participles across languages, see Haspelmath (1994). Note his concluding remark (1994: 173): ‘Participles of the type discussed here are . . . not very widespread . . . , and it is even conceivable that they are an areal phenomenon of Europe and adjacent areas, or a feature characteristic of languages of the European type (SVO, well-developed class of adjectives, relative clauses with relative pronouns, etc.).’
25 The verbal adjective in -to- was formed in Indo-European on the zero-grade of the verbal root. Cf. e.g. Gk ἁρός ‘that can be stretched’, with το < *r̥-, zero-grade of the root *ten- (seen in Gk τείνω, Lat. tendo).
26 W. means that the formation makes participles in Sanskrit, as in Latin. On the Sanskritt past passive ptc. in -(i)tta, see Coulson (2006: 47–9), Whitney (1889: §§952–6). The suffix -to- is found in all branches of Indo-European except Anatolian and Tocharian; see further Szemerényi (1996: 323–4) with bibliography.
which do not suit a perfect passive participle, but which are characteristic of the Greek verbal adjectives. First, they commonly have active meaning (cf. I, 136 above). At an early stage in learning Latin, one’s attention is drawn on this point to cenatus, pransus, potus, iuratus (‘having dined’, ‘having lunched’, ‘having drunk’, ‘having sworn, on oath’), but the phenomenon is much more widespread than this and affects almost whole classes of verb, such as verbs of motion (e.g. praeteritus ‘having passed’, occasus ‘having set’ [already in the Twelve Tables], emersus (‘emerged (from water)’), fluxus (‘flowing’), or verbs in -scere (e.g. cretus ‘grown’ and its compounds, adultus ‘full-grown’, quietus ‘at rest’). In some cases this is entailed by the meaning of the verb. To the first group mentioned above correspond in German ungemessen in the sense ‘fasting’, trunken (‘drunk’), Geschworener (‘one under oath, a juror’), and Gk ἀναμονής (‘not under oath’). In every case it involves the attaching to the (pro)noun of the meaning of the verb. If you have eaten or drunk, you have food or drink in yourself, and if you have sworn an oath, you are bound by it. The woman who nupsit (‘married’) is changed by the process and is consequently quite rightly called nupta. On the other hand, e.g. ὄνος, datus, gegeben, given could not be said of a donor, and are therefore always passive. Incidentally, later developments lead to even more examples of active use: on French, see Tobler (1902–12: I, 146–60). For example, Latin has no active form *uenutus corresponding to French venu (‘having come’), and despectus in Cicero means ‘despised’ (pass.), while Montaigne uses the corresponding despit in the (active) sense of ‘arrogant’.

Moreover, the action whose attachment is predicated is by no means always in the past, no matter whether the meaning is more active or passive. Hence, on the one hand, tacitus, Umbrian tačez, tases (‘silent’) (cf. German verschwiegen); status ‘standing still’, Gk σταθμός (in Homer, II. 6. 506, of a horse, in Sophocles, Phil. 716, of water), titubatus ‘trottering’ (Verg. Aen. 5. 332), innitus (‘unwilling’, cf. uis ‘you wish’), contentus (‘satisfied to continere ‘contain’); and compare Gk τάρης ‘enduring’, Gothic paursip ‘thirsty’. On the other hand, to pick a particularly clear—and ancient—example, note Naevius, Hector’s Departure 12 Warmington lactus sum laudari me aps te, pater, a laudato uiro (‘happy am I, my father, to be praised by you, a man whom others praise’), where laudato means not ‘who has been praised’ but ‘who is praised’. Paul (1905: 162–7) demonstrates that in German the passive ‘participle’ of imperfective verbs (I, 154–5 above) is present, e.g. in tiefgefühlter Dank (‘deeply-felt thanks’), das von Säulen getragene Dach (‘the roof

27 On cenatus, pransus, potus, cf. I, 136 and n. 12, p. 358 above, and Haspelmath (1994: 161): ‘what “drink”, “eat”, “learn”, “see” and “put on”, “wear” have in common is that the agent is saliently affected by the action’.


29 On these types as ‘resultative’ participles, see Haspelmath (1994: 157–61).

30 Huguet’s dictionary of 16th-c. French, s.v. ‘despit’, quotes the Renaissance essayist Michel de Montaigne (1533–92) under both ‘dépité, fâché, irrité’ and ‘méchant, revêché, irritable’.
supported by pillars’). Note also Gothic examples such as *fraisans* (pret. ptc. of *fraisan* ‘to tempt’) translating Gk πείραζόμενος (*being tempted* e.g. Luke 4: 2).

In one of his finest articles (1895), Brugmann showed how a participle corresponding to the Greek type λειτομένος (pf. mid.-pass. ptc.) evolved in Latin from the verbal adjective in *-tus*, a development that is easy to understand. The semantic distance from verbal adjective to participle is really not so great, especially if we think of the use of the adjective as a so-called predicative attribute. In a sentence like Plaut. *Poen.* 32 *matronae tacitae spectent* (‘the women are to watch in silence’; cf. Umbrian, *Iguvine Tables* [Um 1 Rix] VIa, 55 etc. *tases pesnimu* ‘then he is to pray in silence’), *tacitae*, while retaining its adjectival nature, is synonymous with the conjunct participle *tacentes*. Because the ascribing of the verbal action generally assumes its earlier completion, the adjective came to be associated with the perfect, and with the passive, since the noun to which the verbal action attaches tends to be its object.

Most of these innovations are shared with Osco-Umbrian. The use of the *-tus* adjective as a conjunct participle is seen e.g. in Oscan, *Tabula Bantina* (Lu 1 Rix) 9 *deiuatu[n]s tanginom deicans* ‘having sworn, they are to declare their opinion’ (where *deiuatus* is nom. pl. of a stem *deiuato*—from a verb meaning ‘to swear’ derived from the word for ‘god’ [Lat. *diuus*]); the use in the ablative absolute, e.g. in Umbrian, *Iguvine Tables* (Um 1 Rix) IA, 1 *aves anzeriates* = VIa, 1 *auies aseriatet* (=Lat. *auibus obseruatis*, ‘the birds having been observed’); the combination with the verb ‘to be’ in the periphrastic perfect passive and deponent, e.g. in Umbrian, *Iguvine Tables* (Um 1 Rix) VIa, 46 *pir ortom est* ‘fire broke out’.—

A further characteristic of true participles, the ability to enter verbal constructions with (pro)nouns, is probably not attested in Osco-Umbrian but is certainly there in Old Latin, in e.g. Plaut. *Truc.* 418 *relictusne abs te* (‘abandoned by you’) — although this marking of the agent was never permitted in the ablative absolute.—

Another fairly limited phenomenon, which also stems from the participle, is the combination of an active participle in *-tus* with an accusative object. This is found only if the corresponding finite verb is a deponent, and even with these in early and Ciceronian Latin not in the ablative absolute. Sallust was the first to venture expressions such as *Jugurtha* 103. 7 *Sulla omnia pollicito* (“Sulla having promised everything”), and he was followed by others.

To the three Varronian participles (I, 286 above) a fourth was added in later Latin. Priscian (11. 29 = GL II, 567, 7–8) equates the gerundive *amandus* not only

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31 On the predicative participle in Latin, see Laughton (1964: 1–2), Vester (1977), and Pinkster (1990a: ch. 8).
33 For details, see Untermann (2000: s.v. ‘deiuatud’).
34 Hofmann & Szantyr 139 mention particularly Livy, Valerius Maximus, the Elder Pliny, and Tacitus, and add that this is found in poetry from the Augustan period on.
with Gk ἐν ἀγάμει but also with φιληθησόμενος. Sacerdos (1. 45 = GL VI, 437, 33–4) calls amandus the future passive participle, and Diomedes (GL I, 354, 13) equates amandum esse with amatum iri.\(^{35}\) This is no mere grammatical sophistry, but is actually attested (Neue & Wagener III, 180–8), with the first secure examples being in Christian Latin. So, e.g., at Acts 28. 6, with reference to Paul’s snakebite, existimabant eum in terrorem convertendum et subito casurum (‘they thought that he would be turned to terror and suddenly fall down dead’), with passive -endum parallel to active -turm; and at Genesis 18: 18 | Gk ἐνευλογησόνται (‘shall be blessed’) is translated as benedicendae sint. Later the same is found also in pagan authors such as Vegetius.\(^{36}\)—The development of this meaning from the gerundive (‘requiring to be loved’) is explained by what we observed above (I, 196) about the use of ‘should’ and ‘must’ in the formation of futures. How easily the gerundive in particular could apparently or genuinely merge with a future-passive meaning, is seen in Horace, Epistles 1. 1. 1 prima dicte mihi, summa dicende Camena (‘[Maecenas,] you who were sung of by my first Muse and who will be sung of by my last’), where some commentators take dicende, against classical usage, as a future in straightforward opposition to dicte. A foreshadowing of later usage is seen also in Livy 21. 21. 8 inter labores aut iam exhaustos aut mox exhauriendos (‘either already or soon to be exhausted’).\(^{37}\)

\(^{35}\) On the grammarians Marius Plotius Sacerdos (?late 3rd c.) and Diomedes (?late 4th / 5th c.), see Kaster (1988: 270–2, 352–3).

\(^{36}\) In addition to the late-4th- / 5th-c. military and veterinary writer Flavius Vegetius Renatus (e.g. Epitoma rei militaris 3. 3. 5 esse uincendos ‘to be about to be overcome’), Neue & Wagener mention in this connection esp. the writers of the Historia Augusta, Ammianus Marcellinus, Symmachus, and Sidonius Apollinaris.

\(^{37}\) On the development of this usage of the gerundive, see Maguinness (1935), Hofmann & Szantyr 374.
Let us return to the inherited participles. By and large, the Latin participle in -\textit{ns} has in common with the Greek participles of the various tenses, both active and middle, that it is used either attributively, or predicatively (as a conjunct participle), or `absolutely' (on the term `absolute', we shall have to say a little more later on; see I, 292–4 below).

On closer inspection, however, it emerges that the two languages in fact behave differently. In Romance, the Latin present participle survives only as an adjective; as we saw above (I, 281), it is replaced in its true participial use by the reflex of the old ablative of the gerund. Now, common-Romance phenomena often have their roots in ancient colloquial language, and this seems to be the case here. In a penetrating study, Marouzeau (1910/11) showed that in early Latin true participial use was much more limited than in Greek, and that a comprehensive use of the participle comes only with the development of the high, literary language, which begins with Terence and reaches its acme in Cicero and the prose-writers immediately after him. So, Plautus knows the ablative absolute with the present participle only in a few fixed expressions such as \textit{praesente, absente, sciente, lubente} (lit., `being present', `being absent', `knowing', `being pleased'), of which the first two were so fossilized that one could even say \textit{praesente testibus} (`in the presence of witnesses', L. Pomponius [1st c. BC], fr. 168, p. 211 Ribbeck), \textit{absente nobis} (`in our absence', Ter. \textit{Eunuch} 649, etc.)—in other words, use them practically like the prepositions \textit{coram} (`in the presence of') and \textit{sine} (`without'); cf. German \textit{während}, Eng. \textit{during}.\footnote{German \textit{während} is the pres. ptc. of \textit{währen} `to last', as Engl. \textit{during} is of the now-obsolete verb \textit{dure} `to last'. On the Latin examples, see Hofmann & Szantyr 445.} And hardly ever does Plautus use this participle with a direct object. Marouzeau also shows (1910/11: 211) that in the work transmitted with those of Julius Caesar entitled \textit{Bellum Hispaniense} (of which the tendencies to colloquial expression are well known) the true participle is rare, while the use of the gerund at 36. 2 \textit{erumpendo naues... incendunt} (`charging out they set fire to the ships', with \textit{erumpendo} rather than \textit{erumpentes} or \textit{eruptione facta}) looks very like Romance usage. | Conversely, it is a mark of the refinement of the elevated language when Lucretius and Sallust make
participles follow particles such as *tamquam*, *quamquam*, or *siue* ('as if', 'although', 'whether') to make them more like subordinate clauses. So, the true participial use of the forms in *-ns*, although we think of it as normal, was in colloquial speech already greatly diminished and perhaps on the point of disappearing, while in the speech of the educated, and in higher written usage, it was retained and refined. It served to satisfy a complex set of expressive requirements, and without doubt, as in the case of *-turus* (I, 287 above), its use was influenced by a practical linguistic schooling based on the knowledge and use of Greek.

The place of the participle in ordinary speech in Latin (just described) is reflected in the tendency, more developed and frequent than in Greek, for the Latin participle to assume a nominal character. It acquires the ability, originally proper only to genuine nouns, to form the second element of a compound with a nominal first element. This was originally foreign to the participle, and never attained by it in Greek, where the Homeric formula δάκρυ χέουσα ('shedding a tear') may not be written δακρυχέουσα (see LOBECK 1853–62: I, 570–1). In Latin, this device is used especially in poetry (e.g. *altitonans* 'high-thundering', *frugiferens* 'crop-, fruit-bearing', and already in Naevius *arquitenus* 'holding the bow'). The high-poetic character of the compounds in *-potens* (attested from Ennius and Plautus on), of which *omnipotens* ('all-powerful'), taken over by Christian Latin, is longest-lived, is illuminated by Eduard Fraenkel (1922: 207–9; cf. 1960: 196–8). Servius Auctus (on *Aen.* 2. 530) takes exception to Ennius’ coinage *bipatens* (in the sense ‘opening in two directions’, *Annals* 52 Skutsch). The familiar endings of comparative and superlative in *-entior* and *-entissimus* to adjectives in *-dicus*, *-ficus*, and *-uolus* (whence also in Imperial Latin *pientissimus*) arise in connection with these compounds in *-ns*.—Furthermore, the Latin participle forms much more frequently than the Greek the basis for derivatives normally made to nouns: corresponding to the isolated Greek form ὁνόσια (on the stem of the participle of ‘to be’, with its compounds in ἀπ-, ἕξ-, παρ-, περ-) are hundreds of Latin abstract nouns in *-ntia*, some of which compete with old verbal abstracts; likewise, Greek adverbs in *-ντος* are rarer than Latin ones in *-nter*, and comparatives like *audentior* ('more daring'), or of the sort mentioned above, have practically no counterpart in

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2 W. might have mentioned Cicero, and many others, too. For detailed illustration and bibliography, see Hofmann & Szantyr 140–1, 385. On the use of conjunctions with the abl. absol., see Lease (1928).


4 On *bipatens* see Skutsch’s n. ad loc. (1985: 203–4).

5 On the history of Latin derivatives in *-ntia*, see Malkiel (1945), Hofmann & Szantyr 744, Leumann 291–2.
Greek.—A great many Latin participles have completely lost their participial function, becoming pure adjectives or even nouns, although this is not directly related at all to the fact that some -ns forms (in less than purely participial function) govern a genitive, e.g. metuens peridi, amans patriae (‘fearing (of) danger’, ‘loving (of) one’s country’). This genitive must not be treated like the adnominal objective genitive in metus periculi, amor patriae (‘fear of danger’, ‘love of country’). Rather, participles like cupiens (‘desiring, desirous of’), etc. have retained the old genitive governed by their finite forms (I, 67 above), even when the latter lost it, and on the model of these instances where the -ns form + genitive corresponded to a finite form + accusative, the genitive was extended to other participle-based adjectives.

Latin is not alone in its gradual loss of properly participial function from its old participial forms. In colloquial modern German the participle survives only as an adjective. Already in the eighteenth century, Gottsched objected to the reception by the literary language of expressions of Swiss writers of the form das und das tuend ging er von dannen (‘doing such and such, he went away’) (Kluge 1907: 51), and even today North German readers of Gottfried Keller are struck by his frequent participial constructions.

Having spent so long on the attestation and overall function of the participle, let us deal briefly with individual points of usage; the essentials are, after all, in general familiar. What we find most striking are the case forms of the participle used absolutely, the Latin ablative absolute and the Greek genitive and accusative absolute, of which there are only faint echoes in the modern languages. There is a general tendency to regard these constructions as relatively recent, arising in the course of the development of the individual languages. But, to begin with Italy, the ablative absolute is older than Latin, as Oscan has a secure example in the Tabula Bantina (Lu I 1 Rix) 21 toutad praesentid (‘the people being present’), and Umbrian shows the construction already extended to the forms in -to- (aves anzeriates; I, 289 above). In Greek, Classen in his fine observations on the language of Homer (1879: 165–88) thought that he could show the gradual emergence of the genitive absolute from the adnominal genitive in the earliest texts, viz. Homer. For example, at II. 12. 392 Σαρπηδοντι δ’ ἄχος γένετο Γλαύκου

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6 On the history of the use of the Latin participle as a noun, see Adams (1973).
7 The use of the pres. ptc. + gen. is common already in Plautus, fairly restrained in classical prose, but frequent in poetry and later prose from Livy on. For rich further illustration, see Hofmann & Szantyr 80.
8 I have been unable to find this precise objection anywhere in Gottsched (1758) nor in Part III. ‘On the syntax of the participles (Mittelwörter)’ in Gottsched (1762: 483–90) [= pp. 549–56 in vol. VIII.2 of the monumental Ausgewählte Werke ed. by P. M. Mitchell, Berlin and New York 1980–]. Here (Rule 4) he does castigate beginning a sentence with a participle, as in W.’s example, but as an un-German imitation of Greek, Latin, or Biblical language rather than of Swiss German. W., or Kluge, may have had another work in mind. For an excellent brief survey of Gottsched’s works on the German language, see Mitchell (1995: chs 2–4).
\[\text{ἀπιόντος} \text{ (‘and Sarpedon was grieved at Glaucus’ departure’), on Clasen’s account (1879: 171–2) \(\text{Πλαύκου ἀπιόντος} \) was properly to be understood as dependent on \(\text{ἄχος,} \) and later, because it also contained a determination of the clause as a whole, it was made to serve as a model for phrases without a case relation to any individual constituent of the clause (like \(\text{ἀδέκωντος ἐμείο,} \) lit. ‘of me unwilling’). Whether the prehistoric development of the construction followed this path remains perhaps open to question, but an unprejudiced examination of the Homeric examples reveals no differences from Attic usage: the absolute construction is fully formed already in Homer, and given that it is a feature of the earliest Sanskrit (in the locative and genitive), and not unknown in Gothic (dative absolute), there is no reason to deny it to Indo-European, although we cannot say for certain which case was originally so used and with what special sense. —The genitive of the Greek absolute, e.g., will originally have been associated with the genitive of time: to \(\text{Πλαύκου ἀπιῶν} \) (‘Glaucus departing’, ‘G.’s departure’) could be formed a genitive with temporal meaning (‘at Glaucus departing’), analogous to \(\text{νυκτός} \) (‘by night’). The dependence of genitive + participle on a governing noun or adjective will then have supported its absolute use, as seems to have happened in the case of the genitive absolute in Sanskrit in particular. Moreover, the mainly concessive meaning of the latter fits well with that of \(\text{ἀδέκωντος ἐμείο} \) (‘although I was unwilling’) and the like. Latin lost both the old temporal genitive (of which we have a fossilized relic in the archaic \(\text{nox} \) ‘by night’13) and the genitive absolute—although Marx (1909: 447–8) wanted to see an example in the Twelve Tables, 3. 1 \textit{aeris confessi} (Gellius, 15. 13. 11).14—The ablative absolute is probably based mainly on an old instrumental (see Brugmann 1895: 143–4 and n. 1). Brugmann observes quite rightly that even in the historical period of Latin new material continued to accrue to the absolute participle: for example, in Old Latin, \(\text{dis uolentibus} \) could still be used, to judge from the synonymous \(\text{cum dis uolentibus} \), with a sociative—old instrumental—sense, ‘with the gods as willing parties’, but then came to be regarded absolutely, along the lines of the inherited absolute ablative with bleached instrumental

\text{10} \text{ See Macdonell (1916: §205); Coulson (2006: 144–5).}
\text{11} \text{ On the origins and development of absolute constructions in Indo-European and early Indo-European languages, see most recently, in German, Keydana (1997), and now, in English, Ruppel (2007).}
\text{12} \text{ Alternatively, in e.g. ‘when water is heated, foam arises’, the genitive may be possessive (foam of the water); cf. Macdonell (1916: §205, 5); Coulson (2006: 145).}
\text{13} \text{ Adverbial \(\text{nox} \) is attested in the Twelve Tables 8. 12 (1. 17 Crawford), Plaut. \textit{Asin.} 597, Enn. \textit{Ann.} 423 Skutsch (cf. Skutsch 1985: \textit{ad loc.}), Lucilius, fr. 127 Warmington; cf. German \textit{nachts} ‘by night’.}
\text{14} \text{ Marx (1909: 447–8; cf. 1912: 395) saw here an instance of polyptoton, a genitive absolute being followed immediately by an ablative absolute (\textit{rebus … indicatis}). The phrase \textit{aeris confessi} is now taken not as ‘money having been admitted’ but (with gen. of sphere) ‘in respect of an admitted sum’ (see Crawford 1996: II, 625–8). However, Latin instances of the gen. absol. are recognized in the pseudo-Caesarian \textit{Spanish War}, Livy, Lucan, Tacitus, the Latin Bible, and later, esp. Christian writers. In Latin, it is probably—pace Bassett (1945)—a Grecism; see Hofmann & Szantyr 142–3, with further bibliography.}
meaning. With this instrumental abl. absol. in Latin we might compare Homeric ἀέκοντι γε θυμῷ (II. 4. 43, Zeus to Hera, ‘with my heart unwilling’), parallel to Latin me inuito (lit., ‘me unwilling’). The usual rendering ‘with unwilling heart’ seems inadmissible, because ἀέκον does not generally like to serve as attribute to a noun (except with the shift of meaning discussed earlier, I, 286 above); note, however, ἐκόντι νῦθ and ἐκόντι νῦτῳ (‘with ready mind’, ‘on my willing back’) in Pindar (Pyth. 5. 43, 8. 67; Nem. 6. 57).

In the Greek accusative absolute, two completely different groups of instances need to be distinguished. Those after ὡς (‘in the belief that, on the assumption that’) emerged in post-Homeric Greek from regular accusative constructions. At e.g. Herodotus 9. 42. 4 (Mardonius to the Greeks:) ᾨδεσθέ... ὡς περιεσομένως ᾨμέας ‘rejoice in the expectation that we will be superior’, the construction has essentially to do with the fact that verbs like ᾨδεσθα generally can take a direct object (e.g. ὧδομαι σε... ‘I rejoice at you . . .’) which may take a participle (cf. Soph. Phil. 1314). In contrast, archaic in its essence (although not attested outside Greek in ancient times, and in Greek itself only from the fifth century) is the specifically neuter accusative absolute of the type ἔξων, προσήκον, δόξαν (lit., ‘it being possible’, ‘it befitting’, ‘it having been decided’). This construction seems to rest on the ancient use in the neuter | (except concrete nouns) of the accusative as the general oblique case, and the tendency in some instances to avoid the other cases, e.g. in id gaudeo (‘I rejoice at this’), id stands for the ablative, in alia id genus (‘other things of this kind’, e.g. Suetonius, Augustus 75; Gellius 10. 20. 3), for the genitive. (For a detailed account, see now Havers (1924), adducing also absolute ταῦτα γινόμενα (‘when these things happen’) in Herodotus, 2. 66. 4, and others; and cf. I, 298 below on Lat. secur.) Accordingly, in this absolute construction, too, the accusative stands for the genitive.15

Whatever judgement is made on the origin of the absolute constructions, we should recognize how valuable they were for languages to have. They made it possible to refer to an action subordinate to the main action and yet with its subject clearly marked. They remained necessary until the development of the subordinate clauses, and even then had the advantage of brevity over the latter. Imagine Caesar’s commentarii without absolute clauses!

This form of expression is most developed in Latin. As noted earlier (I, 289 above), it was extended to forms in -tus already in Common Italic, a feature shared with Sanskrit. More a peculiarity of Latin is the admission of a noun in the ablative as predicate in place of the participle. It is easy to understand e.g. Ter. Enn. 988 me impulsore haec non facit (‘he’s not doing this at my prompting’),

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15 On the special syntactic role of the acc. of neuter nouns, see also Löfstedt (1933: ch. 2) and (1942: ch. 14), Schwyzer & Debrunner 87. On the accusative absolute in Greek, KG II, §487; Schwyzer & Debrunner 401–3.
where the quasi-gerund *meo impulsu* ‘at my impulse’ (I, 280 above) was also available, as agent nouns in -tor (Gk -τωρ, -τηρ, -της) are closely related to the participles in a number of respects, and are occasionally used even in Greek like an absolute participle: e.g. Soph. *Oed. Col.* 1588 ὑφηγητήρος οὐδενὸς φίλων (‘with none of his friends as guide’), *Oed. Tyr.* 966 ὤν ὑφηγητών (‘at whose message’; cf. 1260). Latin, however, also uses in this way e.g. any term for an office: *Cicerone consule, iudice populo* (‘in Cicero’s consulship’, ‘with the people as judge’; this is imitated in late Gk Γάλλω καὶ Φλάκκῳ Κορνηλίαν ὑπάτων ‘in the consulship of Gallus and Flaccus Cornelianus’: cf. I, 81 above), and in addition adjectives related to participles: e.g. *uiuo* for *uiuente* (‘living, alive’) is extremely common. This sort of thing is not found in Greek; Soph. *Oed. Col.* 83 (Antigone to Oedipus:) ὡς ἐμὸν μῶνης πέλας (‘since I alone am near’), with an otherwise un-Greek omission of *οὐδεσί*, is quite exceptional. [Add.: Note, however, Boeotian Ἐπιτίμω ἀρχό (‘when Epitimos was archos’) and the like, with ἀρχό (gen. sg.) for ἀρχοντος on inscriptions from Chaeronea (e.g. Cauer & Schwyzer no. 515; *IG* VII, 3301 ff.).]—See the valuable dissertation of Fredrik Horn on the history of the absolute participial constructions in Latin (Lund 1918), which assembles much instructive material from later Latin, and discusses many questions which I have been unable to go into here. This type was not inherited by Romance, save in artificial Latinisms such as in Metastasio’s *lui duce, te condottiere* ‘under his/your leadership’, cf. Flinck (1924: 216 n. 1).18

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16 In the Laurentian manuscript, the former is written as two words (ὑφηγητήρος); Lloyd-Jones prints both this and the latter (ὑφηγητών) as two words.

17 In the melodrama *Attilio Regolo* (1740; act 1, scene 1, and act 2, scene 3, respectively) by the writer and poet Pietro Antonio Domenico Trapassi, better known as Metastasio (1698–1782).

18 On absolute constructions, see more recently (in addition to the references in n. 11 in this lecture) Holland (1986) on their origins in Indo-European nominal sentences, König & van der Auwera (1990) on the role in them of adverbial participles and gerunds, Haspelmath (1995: 27–8) on the relation between absolute constructions and ‘converbs’. Let the last note in this section of the *Lectures* on the non-finite verb draw attention to the important concept of the ‘converb’, defined by Haspelmath (1995: 3) as ‘a non-finite verb form whose main function is to mark adverbial subordination’. The volume devoted to conversbs across languages (Haspelmath & König 1995) contains numerous examples from Indo-European languages and much of relevance to the foregoing discussion of infinitives, supines, gerunds, and participles, as well as an excellent introductory survey (with bibliography) by Haspelmath (1995).
The case-endings serve to mark the semantic relation of nouns and pronouns either to other constituents or to the clause as a whole. We can even say that it is a defining feature of the noun and pronoun to have case-endings, albeit with the reservation that not every nominal form has a visible case-ending, and that not every noun can be declined all the way through, in a complete paradigm.

The ancient grammarians, especially on the Latin side, dealt in great detail with indeclinable forms, i.e. words which can stand in any case relation without marking the relation with an ending. First of all, then, the numerals. In Greek (except Aeolic) from 5 (‘five’), in Latin from quattuor (‘four’), and up to 100, they have no case endings, their case-relation being always given by the noun they go with, so that it is hardly ever unclear. This inability of numerals below ‘ten’ to inflect is inherited, and so cannot be explained. In Greek and Latin, it was then extended to the tens and to ‘100’, and in Latin also to ‘1000’.

Other attributively used words also show this inability to change. The Latin grammarians present two antonyms: frugi ‘useful’ and nequam ‘useless’. It is easy to explain frugi: it is evident, especially from the phrase bonae frugi (synonymous with simple frugi), that frugi is really the dative of frux, and means ‘for, of use’. It is only natural that this dative remained unchanged, no matter what the case of the noun it went with, and that no other case-endings were added to it. It is, however, striking that, although rather awkward because of its lack of inflection, frugi replaced the adjective frugalis, whose existence early on seems assured by frugaliter and frugalior already in Plautus. Later on, from the latter forms and from classical frugalitas, the adjective frugalis is formed anew. Quintilian mentions it (1. 6. 17) as a form that a grammatical pedant could insist on; from Apuleius on, it was in current use, and from it derives frugal of the modern languages.—Something similar must lie behind nequam ‘worthless’; perhaps it is based on a whole clause (nē + subjunctive?).

1 In literary Lesbian, πέμπτε is declined, so that we find gen. πέμπτων in Alcaeus, fr. 350, 7 Lobel & Page.
2 On frugi and nequam, see Hofmann & Szantyr 158. The latter is explained as arising from the predicative use with the verb ‘to be’ of ‘not in any way (useful)’, as e.g. at Plaut. Asin. 178 nequam est nisi recens (amator) ‘(a lover) is no use unless he is fresh’. This assumes that nē- here is not the prohibitive, as W. seems to suppose, but a lengthened form of the declarative negative nē (cf. nēquīquam ‘in vain’).
Rather different is pondo ‘pound’. Strictly, it is the ablative of a lost 2nd-declension noun, *pondus or *pondum which meant ‘weight’ like the usual neuter pondus, gen. ponderis (for earlier *pendus). It occurs with this meaning (‘by weight’) until the imperial period, alongside libra (‘pound’) or words like uncia, sextans (respectively a twelfth and a sixth of various measures), etc. But libra could be omitted, so that pondo alone came to denote a particular weight (already in the Twelve Tables, 3. 3, we find quindecim pondo ‘fifteen pounds’), and the independent noun pondo survives in English pound, German Pfund, etc.

Less significant is a group of foreign words, like gummi (‘rubber’), sinapi (‘mustard’), git ‘cummin’, which remained und eclined because their endings prevented them from fitting a Latin inflectional pattern. Had they, however, been fully integrated among wide circles of Latin speakers, they would certainly have been given Latin endings. Here belong also indeclinable foreign place-names and personal names.

Much more interesting for the student of syntax is another group, of nouns which are used or attested only in particular cases. Nouns defective in case (like nouns restricted to one number: I, 85–9 above) were studied in great detail by the Latin grammarians, and the mass of examples offered by Neue & Wagener (I, 724–51) is based on them.

Sometimes the lack of a case-form is accidental. Probably, the fact that of the Greek word for ‘linen’ we have attested only dat. sg. λιτή and acc. sg. λίτα is merely because the word died out early and anyway occurs very rarely. The same is true of the hapax καρός (II. 9. 378 τιώ δε μιν ἐν καρός αἰσθη ‘and I value him at the worth of a shaving’). 4

Nor are we really concerned here with those nouns which seem to have lost part of their paradigms for purely formal reasons. Take Latin uīs ‘force’ as an example. We know that in the singular only nom. uīs, acc. uīm, and abl. de occur, while the plural is formed on a stem uīr-. The paradigm was probably reduced in order to avoid homonymic clash between pairs of case-forms (e.g. gen. and nom. sg.), but anyway the lack of a genitive was undesirable and awkward. In the language of the law, verbs of accusing and convicting take the genitive of the crime (probably the so-called genitive of ‘relation’): e.g. perduellionis accusare/damnare (‘accuse/convict of treason’), and analogously perduellionis reus ‘one charged with treason’. It would have been convenient to be able to use uīs (‘violence’, as a public offence) also as a genitive, and it is obviously of necessity that de + abl. was used (de uī damnare, etc.).

3 W. adds the parenthesis because we suppose that IE neuters in *-ēs/ōs- were formed on the e-grade of the root (cf. tempus, genus, decus), while the 2nd-declension masc. pondus has an inherited o-grade (cf. masc. modus, with -o-, vs neut. *medos, preserved in Umbrian mersto- < *medes-to-). Cf. Leumann 377–8, and now, on the formation in Indo-European and the history of its study, Meissner (2006: chs 1–2).

4 The obscure form καρός is traditionally connected with Gk κείμαι ‘I cut’. See Hainsworth (1993: ad loc.). With λίτα, λιτή (hardly found after Homer, and probably related to λίνος ‘flax, linen’) we may now compare the Mycenaean neut. pl. adj. rī-ta ‘of linen’ (see Aura Jorro, s.v., with bibliography).
Alongside the above—and this is what really concerns us from a syntactic point of view—are a number of words which are confined to particular cases in virtue of their meaning. Just as there are verbs which occur only in the imperative, so some nouns have only a vocative, because they are used only as forms of address. So, e.g., ὀ μέλε ‘poor fellow’, or ὀ τὰῦ ‘my dear friend’, which still awaits convincing explanation, which is frequent in comedy, and is a conventional affectation of Atticizing writers in the imperial period. Conversely, there are nouns which because of their meaning avoid the vocative. These include not only a large number of names for objects—addresses to an object or an abstraction being more or less confined to high poetry—but also some nouns denoting persons which have no vocative. Let me mention a couple of striking instances. The nominative λαὸς ‘people’ has no voc. *λαῖ, because in general a crowd was addressed not with a collective singular but with a plural (ὁ ἄνδρες, etc.). And the word for god, θεός, acquired voc. θεέ only among Jews and Christians because a pagan god had to be addressed, if the prayer was to be effective, only with his or her proper name. Latin, too, had no vocative of deus, and when Latin-speaking Christians needed one, they took the nominative form as in Greek (cf. I, 10 above, and n.).

Now, many other defective nouns lack case-forms because the noun was needed only in certain case relations, although we often cannot decide whether the missing forms were never there at all or lost over time. In attempting to establish the relevant facts, you must beware of the schematic treatment of nouns in dictionaries.

It is striking, for example, that a whole series of neuters are confined to the nom.-acc. sg. in -s, e.g. in Greek, ὄφελος (‘use, help’) and ἡδος (‘delight, pleasure’), in Latin, secus (‘sex, gender’) and fas (what is ordained by divine law). I do not wish to discuss the origin of fas—whether, as the ancients assumed, it is from fārī ‘to speak’, or whether, as in more recent etymologies, it is connected rather to fānum ‘temple’, fēstus, and fēriae (a religious festival, holy day). Nor will I discuss whether fas is really a nom.-acc. or rather a type of infinitive. Suffice it to say that it occurs to start with only in fas est ‘it is permitted in accordance with divine law’, and accordingly dies fāsti are those days on which legal proceedings are permitted by religion. The same is true of nefas (whence dies nefasti), of which the negative element nē- (identical with the old verb and sentence negative seen in e.g. ne-queo ‘am unable’, ne-scio ‘know not’) makes it certain that its only old use is as a clause, in nefas (est) ‘it is not permitted’, as Delbrück correctly saw (1893–1900: III, 534). A secondary development, not found in early poetry, is the promotion of fas and nefas to the status of free nouns, as in contra fas, fas uiolare, fas omnne in Cicero, or Vergil, Georgics 1. 505 fas uersum atque nefas (‘right and wrong are...
confused’), or Horace, *Odes* 1. 18. 10–11 *cum fas atque nefas exiguo fine libidinum /
discernunt* | *auidi* (‘when in their eagerness for lust they separate right and wrong
by a narrow line’);\(^7\) nefarius and nefandus (replacing infandus) presuppose this
secondary development. The neut. pl. nefantia ‘unspeakable’ in Lucilius, 136, 886
Warmington (the latter quoted by Varro, *Satires*, fr. 509 Astbury) is curious; and
note also infans ‘unheard of’ in Accius, 156 Warmington. But beyond this, to the
formation of further case forms, the language did not reach. There is a sort of
substitute genitive at Verg. *Aen*. 1. 543 *deos memores fandi atque nefandi* ‘the gods
who remember what is right and what is wrong’.

The word secus ‘gender’, of unknown origin but at any rate related to sexus, is
used at first in only one type of context, viz. *uirile secur*, *muliebre secur* ‘of male/
female gender’, functioning like other nom.-acc. neuter forms as a genitive of
quality (I, 294 above). Then, however, *secor* developed as *fas* and *nefas* did, and in
imperial prose it is used as a direct object in the accusative.

In other instances, isolated nom.-acc. forms not only had their function
extended but also had new case forms built for them.

Latin *uenum* (‘sale’), cognate with Gk *ονείσθαι* (‘to buy’),\(^8\) may once have had a
complete paradigm, although early and Classical Latin know it only in this one
form with the meaning ‘for sale’ as a determiner in the manner of a supine in
-*tum*, especially of *dare* (‘give’), in *uenumdare*, whence *uendere* (‘offer for sale,
sell’) and *ire* (‘go’). Since, however, *uenum* denoted a goal, it was replaced by
dative forms, as in *ueno dare* in Tacitus (*Ann*. 4. 1), and *uenui habere/subicere* in

Case-forms other than the accusative may occur in isolation. A Latin example is
the ablative *sponte* ‘at the behest of’, beside which acc. *spontem* and gen. *spontis*
appear later, or the archaic abl. *astu* ‘with cleverness’, which was rehabilitated in the
Augustan period and acquired a full 4th-declension paradigm. Remember also
the Attic terms for crimes such as *ἀμελείον*, *λαπομαρτυρίον*, *ἐξοίλης* (‘negligence’,
‘failure to appear as a witness’, ‘unlawful ejection from property’), and (ms. add.\(^1\))
*ἀγαμίου*, *ἀλογίον*, *λιποσαντίον* (‘not marrying’, ‘not having one’s accounts passed’,
‘desertion of naval duty’), all of which occur only in the genitive dependent on *δικήν*
(‘legal action’) and other legal words. The examples go on and on (cf. II, 288 below).

Before we start enumerating the cases, we must deal with the preliminary
question of the relation between **case-forms and adverbs**. There is no sharp
dividing line. The definition of an adverb will occupy us later; for now, let us
consider instances of transition from case-form to adverb and vice versa. Many
adverbs are simply fossilized case-forms. Comparative grammar has shown e.g. that
Lat. *raro* ‘rarely’, *bene* ‘well’, and probably also Gk *κακῶς* ‘badly’ are old ablatives and
instrumentals, Lat. *biō* ‘here’ and Gk *οἰκο* ‘at home’, old locatives. But less attention

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\(^7\) On the Horace, see Nisbet & Hubbard (1970: *ad loc*).

\(^8\) Both derive from IE *ʷu̞ е̞-о̞* ‘purchase price’, on the root *ʷes-* ‘buy; sell’ (cf. *LIV*, s.v.).
is paid to the fact that adverbs can shift into the function of case-forms. | Striking evidence of this is furnished by the Romance languages: in the French pronoun, for example, the genitives dont and en and the dative y have grown out of de unde, inde, and ibi, respectively, in such a way that these originally adverbial forms can refer also to persons. This development is foreshadowed already in Latin, unde matching French dont (and Romance cognates) in being used also of persons (= a quo, a qua ‘from whom’): legal Latin has the ancient phrase is unde petitur ‘the defendant’ (first in Ter. Eun. 11), and unde is used with audire and similar verbs from Plautus on (e.g. Men. 783). As always, the Augustan poets are bolder, Horace going the furthest when he uses unde for ‘by whom’, of the personal agent of a passive verb, at Odes 1. 12. 17 unde nil maius generatur ipso (‘by whom [Jupiter] nothing greater is created than himself’) and Satires 1. 6. 12–13 Valeri . . . unde Superbus Tarquinius regno pulsus (‘of Valerius . . . by whom Tarquinius Superbus was expelled from the kingship’). This is similar to binc iam scibo ‘I shall find out from him’ at Terence, Brothers 36, and ubi also sometimes shows a similar use.9 On inde and exinde in genitival function in Christian Late Latin prefiguring French en, see SALONIUS (1920: 212–14).

The same is true of the semantically related Greek form ποθέν. So, at Thucydides 1. 90. 2 ἀπὸ ἑχυροῦ ποθέν means ἀπὸ ἑχυροῦ τινὸς χωρίων (‘from some secure place’; there are parallels in Plato, e.g. Phaedr. 268c, Republic 544d). And this is the correct way to understand a common Homeric phrase, namely the question τίς πόθεν εἶς [more correctly, ἔσο] ἀνδρῶν; (II. 21. 150 and seven times in Od., e.g. I. 170), where πόθεν cannot be understood to have spatial reference (‘from which place?’)—although apparently it was often so taken in antiquity: cf. Eur. Helen 86–8 (Helen to Teucer:) ἀτάρ τίς εἶ πόθεν τίνος δ’ αὐτῶν σε χρή; (‘but who are you and from where? And as whose father should you be addressed?’), to which Teucer replies, ὅνομα μὲν ἡμῖν Τεῦκρος, ὅ δ’ ἐφόσας πατήρ Τελαμών, Σαλάμις δὲ πατρὶς ἡ θρέφασα με (‘my name is Teucer, the father who sired me is Telamon, and Salamis is the land which reared me’). Arguments against taking πόθεν in Homer as ‘from where?’ are (a) the presence of ἀνδρῶν, which goes both with τίς and with πόθεν, (b) the fact that a separate question about the addressee’s home always follows in the same line: πόθι τοι πόλις ἡδε τοκῆς; (‘where is your city and your parents?’), and (c) the ancient paraphrasing of πόθεν ἀνδρῶν with ἐκ ποιῶν ἀνθρώπων (lit., ‘from which men?’). Support comes also from the text on a gold tablet (OLIVIERI 1915: 14) τίς δ’ ἐσι; πῶ δ’ ἐσι; Γὰς νίος ἡμι καὶ Ὄρανω ἀτερώντος (‘who are you? Whose son are you?’—I am the son of Earth and starry Heaven’), of which KERN (1916: 560, n. 1) rightly observes (with a reference to the Greek scholar A. N. SKIAS) that πῶ δ’ ἐσι; has to mean τίνος νίος ἐσι; (‘whose son are you?’), failing only to see that Doric πῶ = πόθεν (AHRENS 1839–43: Π, 374–5; cf.

9 This use of ubi is restricted to clauses supplying placenames (of the type ad locum ubi X dicitur ‘to the place which is called X’), which is rather different (Hofmann & Szantyr 210); see, in addition to Saloniou (1920: 211–15), cited by W. immed. below, also Lindsay (1907: 48), and Hofmann & Szantyr 208–10.
Diels \& Kranz no. 1 [Orpheus], B17a, 5n.).\textsuperscript{10} Homer's question is therefore to be translated, 'Who are you, and who was your father?'; cf. H. Fraenkel (1925a: 2).\textsuperscript{11} It was for these two pieces of information that from very ancient times new arrivals were first asked. Geldner (1896–1904: 52) points out that Sanskrit epic and the oldest parts of the Avesta agree exactly in this type of question. In a patriarchal age, for the full identification of an individual, his father had to be named; this remained for long the case among the Greeks and the Romans, and is still so today in Russia.\textsuperscript{12}

The language of poetry in Greek uses \textit{-\theta.ev} as a case-ending in forms other than the interrogative. In Homer and tragedy, the personal pronouns \textit{\epsilon\mu\epsilon\theta.ev}, \textit{\sigma\epsilon\theta.ev}, and \textit{\epsilon\theta.ev} are used not only as ablatives but also in specifically genitival function, as Greek had lost the distinction between ablative and genitive; so e.g. at \textit{Od.} 20. 42 \textit{\Delta\iota\delta\varepsilon\tau\epsilon \sigma\epsilon\theta.ev \tau\varepsilon \epsilon\kappa\eta\tau\tau\iota} 'by agreement with Zeus and you', or Aesch. \textit{Pers.} 218 \textit{\sigma\omicron\iota \tau\epsilon \kappa\alpha\iota \tau\epsilon \sigma\epsilon\theta.ev 'for you and your children'.} In Lesbian, these pronominal genitives seem to have become standard, and Sophron attests (fr. 20 Kaibel = 19 in \textit{PCG} I) \textit{\mu\epsilon\theta.ev \acute{a} ka\phi\delta\iota\acute{a} ('my heart', lit. 'of me the heart') from colloquial Syracusan.}\textsuperscript{13} It is interesting that particularly the ablative adverb acquired the function of a case-form so readily, as the same occurs in Sanskrit.

Probably, the ending \textit{-\phi.i(v)}, which in Homer forms genitive and dative case-forms without distinguishing singular and plural, also arose from an adverbal termination (cf. Latin \textit{ibi}, \textit{ubi}, \textit{alibi}). On this \textit{-\phi.i(v)}, see now the penetrating remarks of Jacobsohn (1924: 210–13).\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{10} Diels took a different view in the 3rd edn of the fragments of the pre-Socratics, which is here cited by W. but which I have not been able to consult. There are in fact three gold leaves (from Eleuthernae on Crete, 2nd c. BC) each with a copy of this same Orphic text.

\textsuperscript{11} With this \textit{\pi\delta\epsilon\tau\iota\omicron} Hermann Fraenkel compares \textit{II.} 10. 68 \textit{\sigma\pi\tau\omicron\rho\omega\delta\epsilon\tau\iota}.

\textsuperscript{12} On the history of Russian surnames, the vast majority of which are patronymics (in -\textit{\omicron\nu\epsilon\iota\chi}, -\textit{\omicron\nu\epsilon\iota\chi\iota}), see Unbegaun (1972).

\textsuperscript{13} This is quoted by Apollonius Dyscolus in his work on pronouns (\textit{GG} II.1.1, p. 66, 3). On the Sophron fragment see Hordern (2004: \textit{ad loc.}).

\textsuperscript{14} Gk \textit{-\phi.i} (-\textit{\pi}i) is a regular case-ending in Mycenaean, functioning as instrumental (and \textit{?loc.} or \textit{?abl.}) plural in the 1st and 3rd declensions. On the Mycenaean -\textit{\pi}i case, see Lejeune (1957), Morpurgo Davies (1988: 81, 98–100); Coleman (1987); Hajnal (1995: 135–225); Waanders (1997). We now regard the chaotic use of Gk \textit{-\phi.i} in Homer as the effect of the retention by the bards—partly for metrical convenience—of an old grammatical element which they no longer ordinarily used or properly understood (compare the misuse of the English verb-endings -\textit{st} and -\textit{th} in modern imitations of Shakespearean language). It is important to keep separate Gk \textit{-\phi.i} and Lat. -\textit{bi} in \textit{ibi}, etc. Both are surely adverbial in origin, but, while Gk \textit{-\phi.i} derives from what had become a case-ending already in IE, namely instr. pl. *-\textit{\beta}i\textit{is} (cf. Skt instr. pl. *-\textit{\beta}\textit{is}); Lat. -\textit{\beta}i, earlier -\textit{\beta}ei (cf. Oscan \textit{pu-f}, Umbrian \textit{pu-fe} 'where') continues an IE adverbial suffix: either *-\textit{\beta}ei (perhaps seen in Hittite \textit{\kappa\nu\alpha\betai} 'where, when'; cf. Untermann 2000: s.v. '\textit{pu}f') or, on the more widely held view, *-\textit{\beta}ei(i) (seen in Skt \textit{ku-ha}, Avestan \textit{ku-d\textit{a}}, Old Church Slavonic \textit{ku-de} 'where', and cf. Gk adverbial -\textit{\beta}e, -\textit{\beta}i). See Leumann 168; Szemerényi (1996: 161); Meiser (1998: §72. 8); Weiss (forthc.: ch. 9.1, §§1.C.3.c, E.1.a; ch. 19.2, §§2.d, 5).
How many cases are there? Well, usually we recognize six in Latin, five in Greek, and four in modern German. The question arises how this disagreement is to be explained, and which of the three languages has best preserved the original state of affairs. In an earlier lecture, when I was trying to give an outline history of syntactic studies, I alluded to a curious statement of Gottfried Hermann, to the effect that, from the point of view of Latin grammar, there simply could not have been either more or fewer than six cases (I, 29 above). Now, this theory, however typical of grammatical thinking of the time, is obviously wrong. We now know that the Indo-European parent language, from which Greek and Latin derive, definitely had more cases than Latin, at least eight in fact. Alongside the cases recognized in Latin, Indo-European certainly had an instrumental (or sociative) and a locative. Indeed, when we look further afield, we find a number of languages with an even richer set of case-endings. Finnish has sixteen cases, and there are Caucasian languages with twenty-four distinct case forms. Beside these, however, we find languages with no nominal inflection at all, such as Chinese, which in its structure is not (as was once supposed) a very archaic language but very highly developed, indeed much more modern than the most modern European languages such as English. We can say that the movement in language change is to shift gradually down from a large number of case-forms, with a constant reduction in the number of inflectional forms.

1. W. is right to say ‘at least eight’: a ninth case, serving to indicate a goal, variously termed ‘directive’, ‘terminative’, ‘allative’, was proposed for Indo-European as early as 1928; for bibliography on this, see Szemerényi (1996: 159 n. 2). For up-to-date overviews of the case system of Indo-European, see Sihler (1995: 246–56), and Szemerényi (1996: 157–61), with rich bibliography.

2. For Finnish, Sulkala & Karjalainen (1992: 208) speak of ‘about 16 case forms’, although they here list only 15, the first four of which ‘perform clearly defined grammatical functions’: nom., acc., gen., partitive, essive, translative, inessive, elative, illative, adessive, abl., allative, abessive, instructive and comitative—there is also the prolative (and the lative, which is largely obsolete); of the first 15, Abondolo (1998a: 157) recognizes as true cases only the first 12, on the grounds that the ‘adverbial’ cases (abessive, instructive, and comitative) are ‘of restricted distribution and stylistically charged’. As to the Caucasus, in Udi, for example, an endangered language of the Lezgian subgroup of Northeast Caucasian, there are four grammatical cases—absolutive, ergative, gen., dat.—plus some 21 local cases (see Harris 2002: 23; 2003: 177–81); cf. Haspelmath (1993: §7.1.2) on the formation of the 18 (4 grammatical + 14 local) cases in Lezgian.

also in the languages which concern us here, as e.g. modern Greek shows a drastic loss of cases, and so, too, do the Romance languages.\(^4\)

We must now try to clarify by what processes this simplification occurred. In discussions of this question, there is one particularly key term: syncretism. If we show, for example, that the German dative has added to the functions of the old dative those of the ablative, locative, and instrumental, then we say it is a '\textit{syncretistic case}'. The best treatment of this subject is \textsc{Delbrück}'s monograph (1907) entitled ‘\textit{Syncretism: A Contribution to the Study of the Cases in Germanic}’.\(^5\) By ‘syncretism’ one means the merging of different cases as one. Naturally, one thinks of Gk κέρανειμ ‘mix’ and takes the term ‘syncretistic case’ to mean a mixed case. But this etymology cannot be right, if only because a derivative of that verb should have -\textit{krat}-, not -\textit{kret}- (cf. \textit{crater}, \textit{crasis}). In fact, the word συγκρητισμός, coined in late antiquity, has to do with the name of the island of Crete. The island was rich in cities (Homer calls it ἐκατόμπολις ‘with a hundred cities’) at \textit{Il.} 2. 649), and these cities were constantly at loggerheads, but when danger threatened from outside, feuding cities were seen to forget their quarrels and unite. So, just as ἐλληνίζειν, λακωνίζειν meant to feel that one is a Hellene, or a Spartan, whence the abstracts ἐλληνισμός, λακωνισμός, so συγκρητισμός denoted the sense of a common identity as Cretans (cf. \textsc{Plutarch}, \textit{On Brotherly Love}, 19 p. 490b [in vol. 6 of the Loeb edn of the \textit{Moralia}]). In the sixteenth century, the term was revived for analogous phenomena to refer to the uniting of different theological and ecclesiastical movements within Protestantism against Catholicism. The word was used rather pejoratively to mean the mixing and blurring of opposites, and modern theologians use it to mean simply a mixture of religions. In the nineteenth century, this group of terms was | extended to other fields, including medicine; \textsc{Pott} seems to have been the first to use it of grammatical cases—\textsc{Curtius} (1875b: 192–3) refers to \textsc{Pott} (1833–6: I, 22).\(^6\)

As to the question how \textit{reduction of cases} occurs, there are three principal factors to consider. First, a reduction reflects a sort of balancing. In Latin, for example, although we distinguish six cases, it is well known that not every stem has six distinct case-forms in both singular and plural. This continues in part a very ancient state of affairs: for example, the fact that in the plural throughout the

\(^4\) In fact, the reduction of the system in Greek (where nom., acc., and gen. survive in the modern language) is less drastic than in Romance (where, except in Romanian, systematic case-marking survives only in the pronoun). On the loss of the dative in Greek, see \textsc{Krebs} (1887–90), \textsc{Humbert} (1920), \textsc{Browning} (1983: 36–8), and \textsc{Horrocks} (1979a: 49, and see Index, s.v. ‘dative’). On the progressive elimination of the Latin cases in Romance, see the important articles by \textsc{Coleman} (1976) and \textsc{Plank} (1979).

\(^5\) Surprisingly little has appeared since W. For a brief review, see \textsc{Meiser} (1992: 188), and for general treatments of the subject, note, apart from \textsc{Meiser}, \textsc{Colpe} (1975), and again \textsc{Coleman} (1976) and \textsc{Plank} (1979).

\(^6\) Although he mentions neither \textsc{Curtius} nor \textsc{Pott}, \textsc{Meiser} (1992: 202 n. 2) infers from the absence of the term \textit{syncretism} from earlier key works by \textsc{Grimm}, \textsc{Schleicher}, and \textsc{Delbrück} that it was not really current in linguistics before the 1890s.
nominal system dative and ablative are never distinct, both ending either in -ı¯s or in -ibus, is an inherited feature, and we find exactly the same in Indic and Iranian.—Also very old, indeed in principle older still, is the identity in all Indo-European languages of nom. and acc. in all neuter nouns, both sg. and pl. The reason for this, to come straight to the point, is that a noun with a neuter form was never regarded as an agent but always as affected by the action of the verb (note especially the endings of the 2nd declension); even when functioning as the grammatical subject, a neuter intrinsically denoted an object in semantic terms.7—Similarly in the dual, too, from the beginning nom. and acc. were not distinguished, and in Greek the gen. and dat. were not either.

Inherited ambiguity of this kind in certain case-forms could lead to a weakening of the sense of opposition between the cases in question. Univocal case-forms corresponding to polyvalent case-forms in one of their roles received by extension the other functions of the polyvalent forms, and other univocal forms which originally signalled these other functions were lost. So, it was probably under the influence of the identity of the dat. and abl. in the plural that the Germanic dat. sg. acquired abl. meaning. The dative as heir of the abl. is seen especially clearly in Gothic, where corresponding to the Latin abl. in maior eo ‘greater than he’ (and to a genitive in Greek, of course) Wulfila uses the dat. maiza imma. The same happens in Old Irish.8 (On the abl. after a comparative, see I, 5–6 above.)

Of relevance in the present context is the fact that the roles of the Latin abl. are matched in Greek partly by the dat. and partly by the gen. The Roman grammarians already made some fine observations (I, 19–20 above) on the correspondence between the Latin abl. and the Greek dat., to which we shall return shortly (I, 305 below). As for the relation between abl. and gen., the situation is as follows. Originally, in the singular most nouns used the same form for both gen. and abl. functions, only the o-stems (the so-called 2nd declension) using a separate form for each case role. This original irregularity is preserved in Sanskrit, in the oldest parts of the Avesta, and in the cuneiform inscriptions of Old Persian.9 Everywhere else, levelling occurred. In Latin, the opposition between

7 This view (which goes back to Bopp) has been developed (notably by Uhlenbeck and Martinet) into the hypothesis that certain features of the case-marking of IE preserve traces of an earlier, ‘ergative’ stage of the language, that is, one in which a noun in agent function, typically as subject of a transitive verb, is distinguished morphologically (in the ‘ergative’ case, early IE *-s) from a noun in patient function, either as the object of a transitive verb or as the subject of an intransitive verb (in the ‘nominative’ case, early IE *-m). Neuters, never achieving agent status, appear always in the ‘nominative’. For a good recent, sceptical review of the whole theory, see Villar (1984: esp. 167–70, 188–90) with references to earlier literature.

8 So, e.g., màta alalīthiu ‘greater than another’; cf. Thurneysen (1946: 160).

gen. and abl. sg. inherited in the o-stems was extended to all other stem classes by making new abl. forms modelled on that of the o-stems. Oscar and Umbrian went in for this, too, so the innovation is Common Italic.\(^\text{10}\) Quite independently, Young Avestan extended the abl. sg. form to all stem-classes.—Greek went about it the opposite way. The usual pattern of most nouns in the singular was extended to all stems, in both sg. and pl., so that all inherited gen. forms acquired also abl. meaning, and the old abl. sg. form was lost, except in half-adverbial expressions such as Delphian ἐν τῇ οἴκῳ ('from one’s household, at one’s own expense'; Cauer & Schwyzter no. 323 = Buck no. 52, C23; early 4th c. BC). Slavic and Baltic also did away with the opposition between abl. and gen., but in the o-stems they extended the gen. function to the old abl. form,\(^\text{11}\) unlike Greek, which gave abl. meaning to the gen. form. With this genitival use of the abl. compare that of the prepositions German von and French de (both ‘from’ and ‘of’), of az in modern Persian,\(^\text{12}\) and of the ending -θεν in Greek (I, 300 above).

A second cause of simplification in the case system comes more from outside, and is especially relevant to Germanic and Romance. It is well known that weakening and loss of sounds occur most frequently at the end of the word, and these phenomena lead necessarily to the falling together of originally distinct case forms, giving rise to a single form which may signal very different functions, and which may then serve as a model for other paradigms. Even ancient Greek and Latin were not immune to this sort of purely phonetic merger of case-forms.\(^\text{13}\) The fact that e.g. the form ἡδεῖς is both nom. and acc. is due in the first instance to phonetic factors: ἡδεῖς as nom. arises by contraction from *ἡδεῖξες, while ἡδεῖς as acc. strictly goes back to *ἡδεῖς, the -ε in both cases being the same as in the dat. ἡδεῖς.\(^\text{14}\) This phonetic merger of nom. and acc. pl. in nouns in -ες (and -εσ) then led to the use of other nom. pl. forms in -ες also in acc. function: an acc. such as ενεγκεῖς | can be explained only as an analogical

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\(^\text{10}\) So, we find Old Latin abl. sg. in -ād, -ēd, -īd, -ūd (in e.g. sententiad, leged, died, conventiōnīd, magistratud) in analogical imitation of inherited -ōd; word-final -d was lost in Latin towards the end of the 3rd c. BC. Oscar attests -ōd and -ūd (in e.g. tōtud 'people', slaagid 'boundary'); word-final -d was lost early in Umbrian.

\(^\text{11}\) In fact, the o-stem gen. sg. ending of Old Church Slavonic -a and Lithuanian -o point not to *-ōd but to *-ād, of which the ă has yet to be explained. Note also that the ending corresponding in the Baltic language Old Prussian is -as < *-os, a variant of the IE gen. sg. ending *-o-sos. See Arumaa (1985: §81); Szemerényi (1996: 183–4).

\(^\text{12}\) The modern Persian prepositions az and be 'at, in, etc.' are characterized by Lazard (1989: 280) as ‘abstract and polyvalent’.

\(^\text{13}\) Formal mergers of this kind correspond to the first of Coleman’s (1976: 47) ‘three degrees of syncretism’. Meiser, however, terms (1992: 188–90) this sort of phenomenon ‘synenopsis’, reserving, in common with other scholars, the term ‘syncretism’ for the falling together not of individual forms but of functional categories (Coleman’s ‘third degree’).

\(^\text{14}\) In the acc. and dat. pl., this -ε is secondary, analogical on the nom. pl. (and gen. and dat. sg.): the nom. pl. originally ended in *-ε-ες, the acc. and dat. pl. in *-u-ες and *-u-ς. The original acc. pl. is seen in Cretan νίους ‘sons’ (and perh. in Homeric πολίς ‘many’, II. 2. 4).
imitation. This contributed to the fact that in the plural in modern Greek all nominatives of the old 3rd declension function also as accusatives. —In Latin, too, the nom. pl. in -ēs has a different origin from that of acc. pl. -ēs.

A third point takes us back to more semantic considerations. Two forms could be used originally as synonymous in terms of substance, although regarded from different points of view, and this could lead to the obsolescence and eventual loss of one of the forms. Let us take an example. One very striking and curious agreement between Greek and Germanic is that both came to lose the form used for marking instrumental, and to use instead the case-form serving also for locative. It seems that the explanation lies in the semantic proximity between the two case-functions. The instrumental is used when the noun is regarded as a tool or a companion, the locative, when it is a place or a container. Now, in many utterances, it is not really clear whether something is really to be regarded as locative or instrumental. In Latin currus uedi (‘to ride in a chariot’), for example, it is clear that Latin-speakers thought of the car as instrumental, but in German we would say rather im Wagen fahren. Both utterances convey the same substance, but the car is regarded as a tool in the Latin, but as a place in the German (and English). In keeping with this is the fact that, in word formation, derivatives denoting tools and places sometimes use the same suffixes. Note Greek words in -τρα, for example: ἀκέστρα means needle, the tool for patching, but μάκτρα ‘kneading-trough’ and φαρέτρα ‘quiver’ denote also the places where dough is kneaded (μάσσω ‘I knead’, root μακ-) and arrows carried (root φερ-). The local meaning is yet more dominant in cases such as ρχήστρα ‘dancing-floor’ and παλαιστρα ‘wrestling-school’. So, too, with the suffix -τρον, e.g. φέρτρον ‘bier’ denotes that by means of which, but also that on which, a corpse is carried. This semantic relation between instrumental and locative could easily lead to the widespread generalization of one of the two forms, and the gradual obsolescence of the other.—Then the locative and dative also fell together, in circumstances which we will not discuss here. And since in the Italic branch of Indo-European

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16 A few have alternative 2nd-declension endings, nom. -οι, acc. -οντα: e.g. μαστόρωι, μαστόρως beside nom.-acc. μάστορας, to μάστορας ‘skilled workman’; see Holton et al. (1997: 49–50), and cf. Thumb (1910: §§65–6).
17 The endings of the Latin 3rd declension represent a mixture of inherited consonant- and i-stem endings. In the pl., the consonant-stems ended nom. -ēs, acc. -ēs (< *-ēns < *-ēς), while the i-stems ended nom. -ēs (< *-ēs), acc. -īs (< *-īns).
18 Especially in view of φέρτρον ‘bier’, with different root-vocalism, this etymology of φαρέτρα ‘quiver’ is rather doubtful; cf. Frisk, s.v., and Risch (1974: §18b).
19 This merger seems to be well under way, if not complete, in Mycenaean, where in the sg. dat. -ει and loc. -ι are used interchangeably, and in the pl. the inherited loc. ending -σι already, as in the classical language, stands in both case-roles.
the same forms served for abl. and instr., the Latin abl. as marker of means and tools came to stand as the counterpart of the Greek dative.

This reduction in the number of case-forms occurred in most of the Indo-European languages, and one should add that it occurred in parallel with an increase in the use of prepositional expressions, which helped to make the distinctions for which case-forms alone did not suffice. In languages whose history we can follow over long periods, such as Latin, a portion of these two parallel and mutually conditioned developments happens before our eyes. In a number of languages, in the end, all the old case-forms were lost, unless they served to distinguish singular and plural. This is so in the Romance languages and in modern Persian, and English and Bulgarian are not far off that point.

Striking by contrast is the conservatism of certain other languages. Even today, Lithuanian and the Slavic languages (except Bulgarian) retain all the inherited cases in both singular and plural, except that they have given up the distinction between genitive and ablative (I, 303 above). Armenian has retained even this distinction, and instead sacrificed a separate vocative form. On this point Eduard Schwyzer (1917/20b: 166) has recently made the very acute observation that the languages just mentioned were in contact with non-Indo-European languages with rich case systems, Armenian with Caucasian, Baltic and Slavic with Finnish, and this contact favoured their retention of their old case systems. Indeed, Ossetic, an Iranian language, under Caucasian influence even increased the inherited number of cases to ten. Attention was drawn earlier to this sort of influence by Meillet (1920a); Jacobsohn (1924), however, rejects this sort of explanation.

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20 The standard modern descriptions of contemporary Persian (e.g. Boyle 1966: §11; Lazard 1992: §13) agree that case relations are expressed by means of particles and prepositions, but earlier accounts spoke of cases and set out paradigms (see Windfuhr 1979: §2.1.2). A number of modern Iranian dialects do seem to distinguish ‘direct’ and ‘oblique’ cases (see Schmitt 1989b: part 4, passim). On the notable exception of Ossetic, see below. On Romance, see n. 4, p. 378 above.

21 For a swift overview of the loss of inflection in English, see Lass (2006), with references to CHEL for further detail. On Bulgarian, see Entwistle & Morison (1949: §197) and Scatton (1993: 199).

22 Old Lithuanian (of the 16th and 17th centuries) has ten cases, the seven of IE (minus abl.) + three additional, agglutinatively formed local cases, adessive, allative, and illative, the last of which survives still in some dialects; for details see Senn (1966: §§84–5), Mathiassen (1996: 38–49). On Slavic, see Entwistle & Morison (1949), §§114–16 on Russian, §§164–5 on West Slavonic, §§198–203 on Slovene and Serbo-Croat (South Slavonic minus Bulgarian and Macedonian, which has similarly drastically reduced the inherited case system), and, for details on individual languages, the contributors to Comrie & Corbett (1993: Index, s.v. ‘case’), including Scatton (1993: 202–3, 245), who notes the survival of some cases in archaic dialects of Bulgarian in the Rhodope mountains.

23 Classical Armenian has seven cases, the eight of IE minus the voc., although a few personal names borrowed from Greek show distinct voc. forms (Clackson 2004a: 929). The gen. and dat. (sg. and pl.) are distinguished only in the pronouns, but the abl. sg. is distinct in all declensions except the o-stems! For details, see Godel (1975: 26–37) and Clackson (2004a: esp. 929–32) with good bibliography.

24 Ossetic, a North-East Iranian language spoken in the central Caucasus, is an isolated relic of the ancient Scythian-Sarmatian languages, cut off from other Iranian languages for some 2000 years. Recent accounts reckon with nine cases in eastern Ossetic (Iron), namely nom., gen., dat., abl., allative, inessive, adessive, equative, comitative, of which the last is absent from the western dialect, Digor. See Thordarson (1989: esp. 469), with bibliography.
In this course of lectures, I do not have time and space to go into the details of case usage or into the question of the basic and central meaning of each individual case. We shall return later to a number of these points in connection with sentence structure and case syntax.\textsuperscript{25} For the moment, let us discuss just one grammatical case in a little more detail, one which we shall not be able to consider in later sections, and which anyway occupies a rather special position.

\textsuperscript{25} Another forlorn hope: cf. pp. 25 n. 9 and 284 n. 2 above.
Lecture I, 51

THE VOCATIVE

I spoke earlier (I, 18 above) about the naming and evaluation of the vocative in antiquity. Here, then, to begin with something of its external history. Our languages have no special vocative form in the pronoun: if someone is called or addressed by means of a pronoun, | the nominative is used: so ἃυ (‘you’ sg.), ὤτος (‘hey, you!’; lit. ‘this man’). In the noun, the vocative is from the beginning confined to the singular. In Proto-Indo-European a singular vocative was normal for all stem types, but was largely replaced by the nominative in the daughter languages. In Gothic it hardly survives outside the stems ending in a vowel, and among the other Germanic languages Old English alone seems to have preserved some small traces; everywhere else it died out.1 Ancient Greek is roughly at the same stage as Gothic, except that it has preserved the old vocative form in more types of consonant stem, albeit very inconsistently. In modern Greek, however, all that is left is the -e of the 2nd declension. This restriction makes itself known already in Hellenistic times, although at that time the vocative could be signalled in another way, by omission of the -s of the nominative, even in foreign names, whence Ἰησοῦ (Jesu), voc. of Ἰησοῦς (Jesus), which may be compared with Vergil’s Greek form Panthū, voc. of Panthūs (Aen. 2. 322).—Latin underwent a very similar development, only much more rapidly. Already in the earliest Latin texts it is only stems of the 2nd declension that have a special vocative form, namely this -e ending (alongside the still puzzling -i of nouns in -ius).2 And in Romance, apart from a few fossilized forms, the Latin vocative has completely

1 In Gothic, note e.g. laisari ‘teacher!’ (Matthew 8: 19), voc. of the ja-stem laisares identical with the acc., or frauja ‘lord!’ (Luke 2: 29, the Song of Simeon), voc. of an n-stem, identical with the nom. See Braune & Ebbinghaus (1981: §85). On Old English, it is not clear what W. had in mind, as here there is no trace of a separate voc. form. Possibly, he is alluding to the fact that in Old English an adjective accompanying a noun in the voc. is often in the ‘weak’ form even in the absence of a demonstrative or possessive: this would continue a syntactic feature of Proto-Germanic (cf. Delbrück 1893–1900: III, 428, 430, with earlier references), but not one that is restricted to Gothic and Old English (Grimm, D. Gr. IV, 6(0–5). On the Old English adjectives and on the nom. as the case of address, see Mitchell (1985–7: I, §§114 and 1242–7).

2 It is now generally accepted that in an open syllable *-ie- became -i- already in Proto-Italic; cf. already Sommer (1914: 100) with earlier references. For an excellent account of the whole issue of the voc. of nouns and adjectives in -ius, see Dickey (2000b).
disappeared—although in Italian a new vocative is formed to personal names and words for members of the family.\(^3\)

A nice analogy to all this is offered by the Slavic languages. Their oldest representative, the Slavic of the Bible (Old Church Slavonic), preserves a special vocative form in vowel stems, but modern Slovenian, for example, knows such forms only in folksongs, where old forms are generally prone to survive. And modern Russian has preserved only a couple of vocative forms of particularly frequent occurrence, e.g. in the words for ‘god’ and ‘lord’.\(^4\)

This ousting of the vocative by the nominative seems to have been due in large part to the fact that in the plural and dual the nominative had vocative function too from the beginning. As in the instances discussed earlier (I, 302 above), the absence of a given case-opposition in one category or another led to the opposition being given up in all categories.

Independent of this general pattern of development are some special instances in which the two cases are confused. **First**, we find occasionally **nominative for vocative** on stems which otherwise make a vocative with absolute regularity. The phrase \textit{Zeůπáter Ηéλιος} ῥε, which is of Indo-European origin, and the Christian Latin \textit{dēsus} were discussed earlier (I, 7, 297 above). Here I should add that adjectives may originally have had no special vocative form: the antiquity of a phrase like \textit{φίλος} \textit{δο} Μενέλαιε (‘O dear Menelaus’, \textit{II.} 4. 189) appears to be demonstrated by Balto-Slavic parallels, and, related to this, vocatives of Gk \textit{εύσος} and strictly also Latin \textit{meus} are unheard of, whence, with assimilation of the noun to the possessive pronoun, Homeric \textit{γαμβρός} \textit{εύσος} ‘O my son-in-law’ (\textit{Od.} 19. 406), Latin \textit{oculus meus} (‘O my darling’, lit. ‘my eye’, e.g. Plaut. \textit{Pers.} 765) and the like. Latin acquired a special vocative form of the possessive only by a sort of reinterpretation, in that \textit{mi} (which corresponds formally to Gk \textit{μοι} ‘to/for me’) came to

\(^3\) On the use and loss of the Latin vocative, see Vairel (1981) and, on general issues concerning the syntax of address in Latin, Ashdowne (2002; 2007). In Italian, one finds on the one hand vocatives such as (in the North) \textit{pader, mader} ‘father’, ‘mother’ (cf. nom.-acc. \textit{padre, madre}), on the other, truncated forms (showing loss of all syllables after the stress) such as Neapolitan \textit{Carulìna} (nom. \textit{Carulina}), \textit{figliù ‘son!’} (nom. \textit{figliùlo}). There is also a post-Latin (albeit decaying) system of vocatives in Romanian (e.g. \textit{omule} to \textit{om} ‘man’; \textit{Radule to Radu}; \textit{soro to sorî ‘sister’}, originally reinforced by the rich case systems of the Slavic languages in contact with Romanian. On Italian shortenings of names, titles and forms of address, see Rohlf (1970: II, §§316–19); on Romanian, Mallinson (1988: 400; cf. 1986: 223–4); and on both Italian and Romanian, and Romance generally, Schmid (1976) with bibliography.

\(^4\) On the formation of the vocative in Old Church Slavonic, see Arumaa (1985: §§60, 78, 96) with remarks also on Baltic, Huntley (1993: 134–5), and Lunt (2001: §4.11). Vocatives in Slovenian (such as \textit{ženo ‘woman!}’), beside nom. \textit{žena} are said to be old-fashioned or characteristic of dialectal usage, where they may reflect Croatian influence; see Svane (1998: §238), and contrast Herrity (2000: §2.20) who mentions the vocative only as a function of the nominative. On Russian (including the forms \textit{Биес ‘O God}’ (nom. \textit{Boyg}, \textit{Господи ‘O Lord}’ (nom. \textit{Gospodin}), and \textit{vladýko ‘O master}’ (nom. \textit{vladyka}), see Entwistle & Morison (1949: 232–3) and Timberlake (1993: 856), who mentions also the new voc. (the bare stem of the noun) in colloquial Russian, e.g. \textit{Maś ‘O Masha}. In general, the voc. survives well in West Slavic languages, except Slovak and Lower Sorbian (see Stone 1993: 614), less strongly in South Slavic (though strongly in Serbo-Croat); in East Slavic, it survives in Ukrainian, but is vestigial in Belorussian as in Russian (above). For details, see Comrie & Corbett (1993: Index, s.v. ‘vocative’).
be confined to combinations with singular masculine vocatives. Old Latin *gnate mi* (‘my son’) may be compared with the form of address used in Greek tragedy τέκνον μοι. To Gk *ημέτερος* (‘our’), which represents a more recent type of formation than ἐμός, *ημέτερε* was formed already in Homer, to agree with πάτερ in addresses to Zeus, but never made it beyond this single collocation.

**Secondly,** Greek makes widespread use in forms of address of the nominative with the article. The starting-point for this is apparently pre-Greek. Once upon a time, in virtue of its demonstrative meaning (and like the Greek use of *οὖτος*, above), the pre-form of *ὁ* was used as an address-form and followed by the more specific nominal designation of the addressee. Subsequently, in Greek, (as with *γαμβρός* ἐμός, above) the noun assumed nominative form by assimilation to the pronoun and the whole expression took on a lordly tone (e.g. *ὁ παῖς* as summons to a slave). Independent of this is the Biblical *ὁ θεός* ‘O God’, in which the article + nominative combination is of Hebrew origin.

In Sanskrit, nominative forms that are used as vocatives receive the vocative accent, which differs from the usual accent of the noun. Nothing quite like this is preserved in the other, younger languages, but it goes without saying that Greek *ὁ παῖς* (in a master’s order) and Christian Latin *Deus* (in prayer) were uttered with a different intonation from when they were used as subjects in the nominative. We see in living languages what a special intonation is acquired by a name or any noun when it is used to call or address someone. It is a great deficiency of our normal study of language that as a rule it considers only what can be expressed in writing.

Given the numerous types of encroachment on the vocative by the nominative, we hardly expect to find the converse as well. | And yet there are two sets of cases in which the vocative replaces the nominative.

For the first, we should start from passages such as Aeschylus, *Persians* 674 (Chorus invoking Darius) ὃ πολύκλαυτε φίλοισι βανῶν ‘you who died much lamented by your friends’, or Euripides, *Trojan Women* 1221–2 σὺ δ’ ὁ ποτ’ ὁδὸς καλλίκικε ... μήτερ τροπαίων ‘you who were once rich in fine victories, mother of trophies’ (and cf. Soph. *Phil.* 760, Arist. *Birds* 627). Here, a predicative determiner or complement, which with a finite verb would be in the nominative, is made to agree with the vocative participle with which it belongs. It is conceivable that this happened in everyday speech, too, the vocative imposing itself for formal reasons; but, for the so-called predicative attribute to appear in the

5 On the material of this paragraph, cf. W. (1878: 280–2) and (1908a: 150–2). On the etymology and use of Lat. *mi*, see now Dickey (2002: ch. 7) and—also on *deus*—(2000a), where she argues that the ancient grammarians were right to treat *deus, meus*, etc. together. On the Balto-Slavic parallels to Homeric *φίλος* ὃ *Μενέλαος*—with which Brugmann & Thumb (1913: §439.2) compare Eur. *Andr.* 348 ὃ πλήρων ἄνερ ‘o wretched man’—see Delbrück (1893–1900: I, 436–8).

6 This is always in the phrase ὃ πάτερ ἡμέτερε Κροιόνι Ὁρατορίς ‘O our father, son of Cronus’, which is always addressed by Athene to Zeus, once in *Il.*, 8. 31, and three times in *Od.*, 1. 45, 81; 24. 473.
vocative (agreeing with a preceding vocative) after even a 2nd-person finite verb, is a poetic licence, as at Sophocles, Ajax 695–6 ὁ Πάν Πάν ἀλόπλαγκτε . . . φάνηθι ‘O Pan, Pan . . . appear ranging over the sea’, or Philoctetes 828 Ὑπνε, . . . εὐας ἡμῖν ἐλθοις ‘Sleep, . . . come to us with favouring breaths!’. In neither case can the adjective go attributively with the preceding vocative—in spite of Löbeck (1866) on the Ajax passage. Theocritus follows this Sophoclean usage at Idyll 18. 9 οὗτω δὴ πρωιζέ κατέδραθες, ὁ φίλε γάμβρε (‘so very early have you fallen asleep, dear bridegroom’; Wilamowitz (1910) prints πρωιζά (‘early’, adverb), with part of the tradition), and the same poet goes further still at 17. 66 ὅλβει κούρε γένοιο ‘may you become a blessed young man’, where he puts the real predicative complement of a 2nd-person verb in the vocative and in a sense gives this case the stamp of a 2nd-person nominative (cf. Callimachus, fr. 599 Pfeiffer). Wilamowitz (1914a) attributes this same use of the vocative even to Aeschylus, reading at Supplices 535 γενοῦ πολυμνήστορ ‘remember well!’, but it is probably better to retain the nom. πολυμνήστωρ of the tradition.8

In Latin, corresponding to Aeschylus’ πολύκλαυτε . . . θανῶν is Catullus 77. 1 Rufe mihi frustra ac nequiquam credite amice (‘Rufus, whom I in vain and to no purpose believed to be my friend’), and Propertius 2. 15. 1–2 et o tu | lectule deliciis facte beate meis (‘and you, dear bed, made blessed by my delight’). There are numerous counterparts to Sophocles’ εὐας . . . ἕλθοις, beginning with Tibullus 1. 7. 53 (sic uenias hodierne ‘so come to us today’), and Vergil (see C. F. W. Müller 1908: 3). On Aen. 2. 283 (Aeneas to the ghost of Hector) quibus Hector ab oris expectate uenis? (‘from what shores have you come, Hector, long-awaited?’), and 3. 382 (Helenus to Aeneas) uicinosque ignare paras inuisere portus ‘you are ready, mistakenly, to find harbours near at hand’), it was observed already by Servius that the vocatives expectate (‘awaited’) and ignare (‘mistaken’) stand for the nominative (by ‘antiptosis’). (ms. add.2: Note also Aen. 10. 327 miserande iaceres [‘you (Cydon) would be lying dead for men to pity’].)10 We then find the same sort of thing at Persius, 3. 28 and 3. 29, and it is strikingly common in the Merovingian poet Venantius Fortunatus (see Leo’s index, 1881: 422, s.v. ‘voc. pro nom.’), e.g. at 4. 15. 8 (ille deo uiuit, tu moriture peris ‘(he lives for God,) you perish as one consigned to death’. |—Indeed, Lucilius and Propertius use this vocative even as a predicative accusative referring to a 2nd person: Lucilius 565 Warmington nupturum te nupta negas ‘you say that as a wedded woman you will not wed’ (spoken to Penelope); Prop. 1. 8. 19–20 ut te felici praenecta Ceraunia

7 See Gow (1950) on both passages; at 18. 9, Gow like Wilamowitz prefers the adverb πρωιζά, regarding the voc. as ‘improbable in a question’.
8 The voc. is already in the editions of Dindorf (1827) and Gottfried Hermann (ed. M. Haupt 1832).
9 Unless hodierne is taken as a true voc., ‘you of the birthday that is today’, in address to the Genius of the family; see P. Murgatroyd’s commentary (University of Natal 1980), ad loc.
10 On 3. 382, Servius uses the Latin equivalent of antiptosis, namely casus pro casu ‘(one) case instead of (another) case’. See R. G. Austin’s commentary (Oxford 1964) on Aen. 2. 283, with further references.
remo | accipiat placidis Oricos aequoribus ‘may Oricos receive you with its calm waters when you have been conveyed past Ceraunia with fortunate rowing’, and 1. ii. 9–10 atque utinam mage te remis confisa minuitis | paruula Lucrina cumba moretur aqua ‘would rather that some little boat detained you, relying on small oars, on the Lucrine lake’. If we take these participles as ordinary nominatives functioning as accusatives agreeing with te, they can be paralleled in Latin only in cuss failures of agreement in very late authors, and even these failures never involve elements so close together as with te here. For another view of the Propertius passages, see F. Horn (1918: 72–3).11

In Latin this use of the vocative is found only in poetry, where it is probably a Grecism. But even Latin poetry does not go as far as Greek, and it is practically impossible to find anything in Latin exactly comparable with Theocritus’ ὤλιθε κοῦρε γένολο (above); the examples adduced by Müller (1908) from Ausonius and Paulinus of Pella are all based on conjecture. It is therefore doubly unlikely, despite the existence of mactus esto, that in the genuinely Latin phrase macte esto (‘be honoured’), macte is a vocative serving as a predicative complement (as maintained most recently by Wünsch 1914: 127–30). The origin of macte remains entirely obscure.12

Quite different is a second group of instances, in which a vocative has been extended beyond its original range of use, because it was a particularly frequently used form of the noun. (The orientalist E. Littmann has recently (1916) published a wide-ranging article on this.) An especially clear example is English domine (also written dominie and so pronounced), and Dutch dominee. The vocative of dominus was borrowed early from Church Latin into ordinary English speech as an address form, especially for addressing the clergy, just as e.g. Monsieur and Madame were borrowed from French. Now, as other nouns made no formal distinction between nom. and voc., this domine came in English at least from the seventeenth century actually to denote those addressed, viz. the clergy and, because of the close links between the two professions, teachers as well.13 Similarly in Dutch, it was used e.g. as a title for pastors of the Dutch Reformed communities in North America,

11 Horn’s suggestion, that Propertius’ participles are nominative absolutes, although apparently accepted by Ernout, was generally rejected: for references, see Fedeli (1980: on 1. 8. 19) in the context of a notable recent defence of W.’s reading of vocatives. Both of the Propertius passages have been controversial. On 1. 8. 19, Shackleton Bailey (1966: 24) adduces as a parallel for te + voc. Sidonius Apollinaris, Poems 23. 48 (5th c., but hardly one of W.’s ‘crass failures of agreement’), but rejects the usage for the classical period and defends against Löfstedt (1942: 104–5) the humanistic conjecture utere ‘enjoy!’ (which a number of modern editors have adopted). At 1. 11. 9, most since Paley and Leo take confisa ‘trusting’ with cumba ‘boat’. On both passages, see in addition to Fedeli (1980), Enk (1911: 28–9) and now especially Heyworth (2007), with details of other approaches to these passages and further references.

12 Today, the balance of opinion seems to be with Wünsch (and Osthoff) rather than with W. in regarding Lat. macte as the voc. (fossilized and treated as an indeclinable) of mactus, pf. ptc. of the lost verb *magere ‘to make great(er), increase’ (cf. the denominative verb made to mactus, mactare ‘to endow, honour; to offer in sacrifice’). Note, however, that Ernout & Meillet, s.v., remain, like W., sceptical. See most recently Gonda (1959) with further references.

13 See the OED, s.vv. ‘domine’, ‘dominie’.
whence in the north-eastern United States it is used also for clergy in general.\textsuperscript{14} But in Grimmelshausen’s \textit{Simplicissimus}, too, we find (bk 4, ch. 20 init.) \textit{ich war kein | ehrbarer Domine worden} (‘I had not become at all a reverend Domine’). Herman Lommel (p.c.) draws my attention to \textit{der alt amice} (‘the old friend’) in Hans Sachs.\textsuperscript{15}—The vocative also encroaches on the nominative in personal names, which again we can understand. In Boeotian there are hypocoristics with a stem originally in \textendash\textgamma- which in the nom. ought to end in \textendash\textepsilon\textupsilon\upsilon (in Boeotian orthography). But we find e.g. \textit{Mévvet}, with no \textendash\textomicron, which can only be an old vocative.\textsuperscript{16}—Furthermore, foreigners hear names most frequently in forms of address, whence it happens that in Syriac, for example, the Greek vocatives \textit{Paule}, \textit{Alexandre} function also as subject forms, alongside nom. \textit{Paulos}, \textit{Alexandros}; similarly in Coptic.\textsuperscript{17}—Finally, divine names are also prone to this shift, as they are used predominantly in prayers. In Assyrian, the vocative form of divine names has become the normal form;\textsuperscript{18} in Georgian, \textit{Jesu Christe} is nominative.\textsuperscript{19} And this helps us to understand the names of the most important Roman gods: \textit{Jupiter} corresponds formally not to Gk \textit{Zeús} \textit{πατηρ}, but to voc. \textit{Zeû} \textit{πατερ}. The original Latin nom. was \textit{Die\textsuperscript{m}peter}, but as \textit{pater} was both nom. and voc., and \textit{Jupiter} was more commonly heard, the latter came to be used also as nom. It is no accident that the word for ‘father’ was attached to the voc./nom. and not to the oblique cases, gen. \textit{Ioui\textsuperscript{s}}, etc. In Homer, too, the epithet is more frequent with the voc. \textit{Zeû} than with gen. \textit{Διο\textsuperscript{m}ος}, for it was above all in

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\textsuperscript{14} On Dutch, see \textit{WNT} (or, more briefly, \textit{van Dale}), s.v. ‘dominee’; on US English, see the \textit{Century Dictionary} (ed. Whitney), s.v. ‘dominic’.  
\textsuperscript{15} This is in the title, \textit{Der heuchler, der jung man und der alt amice} (\textit{The Cheat, the Young Man, and the Old Friend}), of one of ‘Thirteen Shrovetide Plays from the Years 1539–1550’ (VII, 169–82 in the edn of Sachs’s \textit{Werke} by A. von Keller and E. Goetze, 26 vols, Tübingen 1870–1908, repr. 1964). Hans Sachs (1494–1576) was an amazingly prolific poet and playwright and probably the best, certainly the most famous of the ‘Meistersinger’. He is repeatedly mentioned in Grimmelshausen’s \textit{Simplicissimus}, but was otherwise more or less forgotten until his rediscovery by Goethe and Wagner (who gives Sachs a major role in \textit{The Meistersinger of Nürnberg}). On foreign words in popular language, note also Lommel (1916).  
\textsuperscript{16} In Boeotian spelling, \textit{El}, \textepsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon corresponded to both \textit{H}, \textgamma (\textit{long, low /e\textordmasculine:/}) and \textit{El}, \textepsilon\upsilon\upsilon\upsilon (\textit{long, high /e\textordmasculine:/}) of Attic-Ionic; the two sounds were closer together in Boeotian, and soon merged. Note also the geminination of the middle consonant, characteristic of voc. forms (in other dialects, this name would be \textit{Mévvy}). See Buck \textit{§§}89.3, 108.2 on this name (Collitz & Bechtel no. 700, \textgamma = IG VII, 2427; mid 4th c. BC); on the unique Boeotian phonetic spelling (esp. of vowels) from the 4th c. BC to the 1st c. AD, Teodorsson (1987); most recently for background and bibliography on the Boeotian dialect, Votéro (1998–2001).  
\textsuperscript{17} In Syriac, the same holds for Greek names in \textendash\textacute{-as} (\textendash\textacute{-as} \textordmasculine~/–\textordmasculine;); see Nöldeke (1904: \textsection 444). On Coptic, see Heuser (1929: 89–90) and Layton (2000: \$126 [cf. \$137]). Compare the numerous Etruscan \textit{gentilicia} (family-names) based on the voc. form of borrowed Latin and/or Sabellian \textit{praenomina} (given names), e.g. Etr. \textit{Lauci, Pupli, Tite, Marce} ← the voc. forms of Lat. \textit{Lucius, Publius, Titus, Marcus}; see Rix (1994a: 63–4).  
\textsuperscript{18} This is stated by Brockelmann (1908–13: II, 35), but challenged e.g. by Gelb (1961: 187–8) and Lipinski (1997: 258–9) on the grounds that the same form is used also for place names and names of months, which are not plausibly regarded as old vocatives. Nowadays, the endingless form in question, which is not fully understood, is called the ‘absolute form’, or ‘status absolutus’, of the noun. While the vocative is recognized as one of its functions, the absolute form is standardly used also for adverbial and nominal expressions other than divine names. See von Soden (1969: \textsection 62); Huchnergard & Woods (2004: 246–7).  
\textsuperscript{19} Fähnrich (1994: 250) lists \textit{kriste} as a Greek loanword. The use of \textit{Jesu Christe} as nom. is facilitated by the fact that Georgian has both \textepsilon- and \textupsilon\upsilon\upsilon-stems, and zero ending in the nom. sg.; for these declensions, cf. Hewitt (1995: 39–41).
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prayer that one became aware of one’s child–parent relation to the highest god. Incidentally, the evidence of Vedic shows that the epithet ‘father’ for the sky-god is ancient and inherited, and constitutes our most important evidence of Indo-European religion.\(^{20}\)

Related to this use of the voc. for nom. is the generalizing of expressions such as \textit{monsieur} (orig. ‘my lord’), \textit{madonna} (orig. ‘my lady’), which occur in languages of the most diverse types. Originally, these words were used only when addressing or referring to a superior (or one identified out of politeness as a superior). For a long time they have been frequently used absolutely as well, despite the 1st-person possessive that they contain, when there is no relationship between speaker and referent, e.g. in \textit{ce monsieur}, \textit{la madonna} (although e.g. \textit{madame} and \textit{mademoiselle} can take \textit{cette} or \textit{la} only if they have another adjective preceding\(^{21}\)).—Note also English hypocoristic names of the type \textit{Ned}, \textit{Nol(l)} from \textit{mine Edward}, \textit{mine Oliver}.\(^{22}\)

It remains to consider the rules governing the use of the particle \textit{ô} in Greek and Latin with voc., or nom. used as voc. (of which the type \textit{ô} \textit{παῖς} (I, 307 above) is not relevant in this connection). The use of the other particles (including [\textit{ô}, \textit{oh}]) will not concern us here, but it deserves to be stated explicitly, first, that the addition of an interjection is entirely in keeping with the essence of the voc. and so is found in a very wide range of languages, and secondly that in the Indo-European languages in particular a number of other particles are similar to \textit{ô} in their function (so Skt \textit{he}, Lat. \textit{heus}; and cf. Arabic \textit{ya}).

In Attic, the use of \textit{ô} is almost obligatory. For instance, it was observed by the Zurich philologist Arnold HUG (\textit{Hug & Schöne 1909: 4 [on Symposium 172a]}) that in the \textit{Protagoras}, in the hundred-odd places where he has a personal name in the vocative, Plato always uses \textit{ô} with it, and in the \textit{Symposium} on 70 out of 78 occasions. In Attic, omission of \textit{ô} is always striking, and often an expression of dislike or disdain. In \textit{On the Crown}, Demosthenes always addresses his opponent Aeschines as \textit{Αἰσχίνη}, never \textit{ô} \textit{Αἰσχίνη} (cf. also \textit{Lobeck} (1866) on Soph. \textit{Ajax} 1154).

What is true of Attic, however, may not be regarded as true of Greek in general. The American philologist SCOTT has traced (1903; 1904; 1905) the use of \textit{ô} from Homer down to the fourth century BC, and established inter alia that \textit{ô} is not used in Homer in addresses of human to god, of wife to husband, or of


\(^{21}\) Cf. \textit{Littré}, s.v. ‘madame’ (6), although this is not quite the same as what W. says, and in any case any such rule had already been overtaken by popular usage.

\(^{22}\) Compare \textit{Nan} (\textit{Ann}), \textit{Nell} (\textit{Eleanor}), \textit{Nid} (\textit{Isabel}). See Coates (2006: 326), and, for an alternative account of their origin, McClure (1998).
servant to master; ὦ either expresses an emotion, or is familiar, and it is not seemly to make such an utterance to a superior—although, admittedly, Kieckers (1908/9: 358–62) has shown that metrical factors also play a part here. Gradually thereafter ὦ becomes a standard ingredient in appeals and addresses generally. It may be by chance that the Odyssey has twice as many instances of ὦ as the Iliad, but it is certainly not by chance that in Sophocles it is proportionally six times more frequent than in Homer and Hesiod (three times in every five addresses, compared with one in every ten). For a detailed account of ὦ in Ionic and Attic prose, see now Loewe (1925), and cf. Loewe (1923: 82, 175–9).—On the other hand, ὦ is unpopular in lower stylistic registers of Hellenistic Greek, e.g. in the whole of the New Testament, amid hundreds of vocatives, it occurs only twenty-seven times (never, in keeping with the usage mentioned above, in appeals to God). The Gospels in particular (according to Wellhausen 1904: 80) know the particle only in threats and laments (save Matt. 15: 28 ὦ γῆναι, in amazement), and never with a bare vocative. Epictetus, another exponent of plain speech, reduces the use of ὦ even further (see Johannesohn 1910: 8 ff.; cf. 1925).—Obviously, then, the almost obligatory use of ὦ is a peculiarly Attic feature based on a development in which the other dialects did not share. 23

All this is seen in a clearer light when we compare the other Indo-European languages. Latin has the vocative particle, but even in the classical period is more sparing than Attic in its use of it, as we see straightaway if we compare Cicero’s patres conscripti (‘members of the Senate’) and Quirites (‘Roman citizens’) with ὦ ἀνδρεῖς βουλευταί (‘gentlemen of the Council’) and ὦ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι (‘men of Athens’) of the Attic orators. It emerges even more clearly from Plautus that in natural Latin speech ὦ is used only in expressions of emotion, whether of rage, joy, or tenderness, or in particularly urgent appeals (cf. Richter 1873: 594–5). This matches Homeric usage, but then high poetry borrowed the more extended Greek usage into Latin. Hand’s Tursellinus (1829–45: IV, 350–5), whose assessment of Latin ὦ is in general quite right, already regarded as a Grecism an instance such as Verg. Ecl. 2. 54 et uos, o lauri, carpm et te, proxima myrte (‘and you, O laurels, I shall pluck, and you, neighbour myrtle’). 24

23 On the use of ὦ in Greek, see now Dickey (1996: 199–206), who provides an excellent survey of research on the subject before and since W., and numerous new statistics from her own corpus. Broadly, her findings agree with W.’s observations, her own summary of herself (Dickey 2002: 221) being that ‘it is likely that in the classical period most addresses in conversational Attic were preceded by this particle’. On the other hand, she amplifies W.’s allusion to metrical factors with the important consideration of avoidance of hiatus—that is, suppression of ὦ before words beginning with a vowel—which casts doubt on the interpretation reported by W. of Demosthenes’ ὦ-less addresses to Aeschines, and hence on the whole notion that the use or omission of ὦ reflects the tone or stylistic meaning of the address, which Dickey reviews and rejects (1996: 203–6).

24 On the Latin use of ὦ, see now Dickey (2002: 225–9), who elaborates the observations of the emotional and, in literature, grecizing functions and effects of ὦ, and adds the important point that in poetry phrase-initial ὦ serves also to mark as vocatival an extended or syntactically complex address, such as
Even more constrained than Latin in its use of ο is German, where ο is practically confined to elevated language, either sacred or poetic. Conversely, Old Irish, e.g., goes in the other direction even further than Attic Greek, in that the vocative cannot be used unless it is preceded by a. It remains to highlight a peculiarity in the use of ο. Terence uses ο before a vocative only at the start of the sentence or verse, and Plautus is almost as strict, too (Richter 1873: 595–6). But there are departures from this already in Homer, and in Attic—and generally in elevated prose—placing δ + voc. first is exceptional and confined to cases of heightened emotion (cf. Gildersleeve & Miller I, §§21–3). The following example is telling. In the treatise Περὶ σχημάτων (falsely ascribed to Herodian: cf. I, 21 above), as an example of polyptoton a pathetic passage of the third-century bc orator Cleochares is adduced (Rhetores Graeci, III, 97, 10–16 Spengel = VIII, 598–9 Walz), in which a sentence ends, after four clauses each beginning with a different case-form of the name of Demosthenes (nom. Δημοσθένης, gen. -ος, dat. -ει, acc. -ην), δικός τε ἀπέθανες, δι θυμόσθενες (‘and unjustly you were killed, O Demosthenes’). The rhetorical figure would really have required the vocative, just like the other four cases, to stand first in its clause. That the orator dispenses with this symmetry is comprehensible only if linguistic usage obliged him to postpone the δ-vocative. Incidentally, does not the sequence of the polyptoton here already presuppose the theoretical order of the cases (I, 17–18 above)?

[Dickey 2002: 228] Verg. Aen. 1. 229–30 (Venus to Jupiter) o qui res hominumque deumque | ac ternis regis imperis et fulmine terres (‘O you who rule the affairs of gods and men with eternal power and terrify them with the thunderbolt’).

25 Grimm’s examples (D. Wb., s.v. ‘ο’, II) are indeed elevated, sacred, and poetic, but he twice stresses the widespread, even ubiquitous use of ο, which he ascribes to influence and imitation of Graeco-Latin and Latin-Romance usage.

26 So, e.g., a cha 현실 ‘O Lord!’; cf. Thurneysen (1946: 146, 156).
II

Second Course of Lectures
Like the second edition of the first series of my *Lectures on Syntax*, the second edition of the second series, presented here, differs little from the first edition. The overall arrangement of the book has remained the same; additions and corrections have been made only on individual points, together with occasional improvements to the form of expression. In spite of the large number of these small changes, the page numbers of the new edition match almost exactly those of the first, so that references based on the latter remain valid. The indices have been enlarged, in particular to include all Greek and Latin passages quoted, not merely those of which the text or the interpretation is discussed.

On the whole it has not been possible to give critical consideration or detailed accounts of more recent publications, else I should gladly have drawn the reader’s attention to various studies which have taken the subject forward. This applies not least to the extremely valuable and fruitful works on Latin syntax which appeared while the present volume was in press, by E. Löfstedt (*Syntactica*, Lund 1928 [= the 1st edn of Löfstedt 1942]) and by J. B. Hofmann (in the second part of the new edition of Stolz’s Latin grammar [Stolz & Schmalz 1910] by Hofmann and Leumann, Munich 1928 [the predecessor of Hofmann & Szantyr]).

Explanatory remarks on the plan of my lectures or the content of the present volume are hardly necessary. I discussed in the preface to the first edition the factors that led to the treatment of the prepositions and the negatives occupying a disproportionately large amount of space. Let me add here a subordinate superficial observation, which applies to both volumes and both editions: Herodotus is cited, as in O. Hoffmann’s account of the Ionic dialect (Göttingen 1928), with the line numbers of Holder’s edition (Prague 1886) [editor’s note: these line numbers are now replaced with Hude’s §-numbers].

The production of the present volume extended over two years, as an understandable consequence of which there emerged numerous supplements and some corrections to what was already in print. Some of these are communicated at the end of the book, pp. 315–22 [editor’s note: on the treatment of this supplementary material in the present edition, see p. xx above], but much I have had to suppress in order to prevent the addenda swelling to excessive length.

That the second edition of this volume is so much freer of mistakes than that of the first volume is thanks to the devoted assistance of Dr S. Merian in Zurich.
There is hardly a page in the whole volume which has not benefited from his knowledge of the subject and his *oculi Lyncei* ("eyes as sharp as Lynceus"). I owe thanks also to Peter VON DER MÜHLL both for good advice and for corrections of mistakes.

Jacob Wackernagel

Basel, August 1928
AUTHOR’S PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

Here, following four years after the publication of the first, is the second volume of my Lectures on Syntax. I have dared to publish it because the first volume was much more favourably received than I had dared to hope or had any right to expect.

The remarks in the preface to the first volume apply on the whole also to this, the second. There are just a few things that I wish to add. First, here too I apologize expressly for my extremely uneven use of and reference to the scholarly literature. It was simply impossible for me to engage consistently with, or exploit fully in my discussion, all specialist studies or such excellent surveys as (e.g.) that of Brugmann’s in his Greek grammar [Brugmann & Thumb 1913] or that of Kretschmer in Gercke & Norden’s Introduction to the Study of Classical Antiquity [Kretschmer 1924]. Furthermore, for obvious reasons, works published since 1919 are referred to only in special cases; I would happily have included (e.g.) Sommer’s Comparative Syntax of the School Languages [Sommer 1921], or the account of the article in Greek, including modern Greek, which G. P. Anagnostopoulos has recently published in the journal Ἀθηνᾶ [Anagnostopoulos 1922].

Secondly, of the first volume it has been rightly observed that German, although mentioned in the title, throughout the discussion takes a back seat to the two classical languages. This shortcoming will be apparent also in this second volume. On many occasions, though not always, the German language is not analysed systematically but serves simply to illuminate individual points in what is said about Greek and Latin. This arises partly from the inclination of my own studies and partly from the fact that my audience consists mainly of classicists.

Most important is the third remark that I must make. The lectures of the Winter Semester of 1918/19 on which the present volume is based could not be realized in the appropriate fashion, in consequence partly of numerous external disturbances caused by contemporary circumstances, partly of other academic demands on my time. This had the result that there was even more unevenness than in the first course, and that especially the later sections came off badly in comparison with the earlier ones, to an unacceptable degree. When I was preparing the text for publication, I tried to some extent to make good this damage, possibly with the undesirable consequence that here and there the oral lecture style of the presentation receded and rather too much learned material came into the text. I hope it will not be held against me that an old predilection...
enticed me already in the oral version to give an especially extensive treatment of the prepositions; nor that the appearance of Jespersen’s fine monograph [Jespersen 1917] led me to decide on a substantial expansion of the section devoted to negation.—In the final part, which was supposed to present the study of clause-structure proper, a mere revision of the oral lectures was inadequate remedy, so that this part—perhaps the most important—is missing from this volume, too. Whether I shall be able to see into print as Volume III the account of this subject that I gave as lectures last Winter Semester, θεῶν ἐν γούνασι κεῖται (‘lies in the lap of the gods’).

The Table of Contents and the Index (in the preparation of which I was assisted by my son Dr. phil. Hans Georg W.) have been more generously elaborated in this volume than they were in the first. Still, in the Index locorum, I have signalled only those passages which are discussed at length or on which some text-critical remarks are made. In the Index of Words, I have confined myself to Greek, Latin, Gothic, and the modern languages; for the words cited from other languages, see the references to the relevant languages in the Index of Subjects.

In the preparation of this volume for printing, I was again able to enjoy the friendly assistance of Peter Von der Mühl. I owe renewed thanks to Dr Samuel Merian in Zurich, who read all the proofs with untiring accuracy and preserved the book from numerous misprints as well as a number of errors of its author.

Jacob Wackernagel
Basel, May 1924
Lecture II, 1

In the first series of lectures, we spoke many times of the meanings of the forms of nouns and pronouns, in particular of grammatical number in relation to the number of the verb, and, at least in general terms, of the cases. There remains to be considered a very remarkable thing, namely grammatical gender. This is an extremely difficult question, already much discussed in widely divergent terms, but difficulty and controversy do not entitle us to push anything to the sidelines: on the contrary, it is precisely such subjects which require more in-depth treatment than those on which there is general agreement.

We can trace the study of gender back to its very beginnings, for nothing in the grammar of the ancient languages was so early discussed, to judge at least from our surviving sources. And we can document this with a very amusing text, a passage from Aristophanes’ Clouds (423 BC).1 The plot is well known: Strepsiades, a narrow-minded farmer from Attica, in financial difficulties because of his son, wishes to receive teaching from Socrates on how successfully to defend an unjust case. When he comes to the Master, he must submit himself to formal school-instruction at his hands. After many theoretical lessons, on Strepsiades’ insisting finally to be instructed in the most unjust argument, Socrates says to him (658–9), ‘Before that, you must learn something else, namely which four-footed animals are rightly masculine’. Despite the trap in (rightly), Strepsiades thinks he needs no teaching on this matter and at once recites (661) the animal names (‘ram’, ‘goat’, ‘bull’, ‘dog’, ‘cockerel’). At the last item Socrates breaks in, not, as one might expect, because cocks don’t have four feet, but rather, as he says to his pupil (662–3): ‘What sort of stupidity is that?— can denote the female animal, too!’

Let us pause here a moment before going any further. Socrates’ comment presupposes that in contemporary Attic the word could mean also ‘hen’. That is indeed the case: Athenaeus (Sophists at Dinner 9, 373c–374c), with his usual learning based on old sources, gives us numerous instances from 5th- and 4th-century comedy, including some from Aristophanes, and in the same way the Atticist Phrynichus (Ecloga 200 Fischer = 207, pp. 307–8 Rutherford) prescribes (‘use

1 On this scene in Clouds, 658 ff., see now Willi (2003: 98–100) with further references.
both of the female and of the male, as the ancients did’). In Attic, then, the word was of common gender.

Let us see how the Clouds passage goes on. Defensive because of Socrates’ objection, Strepsiades asks (665), ‘All right, so how must I refer to this animal?’, to which Socrates replies, ‘You must call the hen ἀλεκτρυάνα, the cock ἀλέκτωρ.’

This reply is extremely striking. It makes Socrates propound the principle that nouns denoting sexual beings ought to have different endings according to the sex. This theoretical stricture is in line with a tendency of modern Greek, which we shall discuss later (II, 25–7 below). Note here by way of introduction examples such as θεά and θεάνα (‘goddess’) in Homer, συνείνα ‘wife’ in an inscription from the Doric-speaking island Astypalaea (Collitz & Bechtel no. 3485 = IG XII.3. 238), χοίρα ‘female piglet’ in a later literary text (a 2nd/1st-c. BC papyrus, Kern (1922) no. 41, vv. 41, 117), compared with earlier, inherited ἂ θεός, ἡ σύνεννος, ἢ χοῖρος. Incidentally, an early queen of Tegea is called Χοίρα.2

Also remarkable, however, are the means Socrates uses to effect the required differentiation. The masculine form that he teaches, ἀλέκτωρ ‘cock’, is a genuine word, but in Aristophanes’ day it was confined to the poetic style and only later found acceptance, along with its derivatives and compounds, in prose (of the Septuagint, Strabo, the New Testament). Here, then, a teacher prescribing a special masculine form has borrowed it from the poets. The next striking thing is that the feminine that he teaches is not the regularly formed ἀλέκτρωπος (attested in Epicharmus (early 5th c.), frs. 113. 23, 150 in PCG I), and frequent from Aristotle on, admittedly sometimes with reference to both sexes), but ἀλεκτρύανα, which stands to ἀλεκτρυών as δράκαινα to δράκον (‘snake’). This feminine form is found only here, and may with certainty be regarded as an invented form, especially as all other feminines in -ανα are formed to paroxytones.3 The theory, then, has caused violence to the language. Both ἀλέκτωρ and ἀλεκτρών are in fact names of heroes, which were extended to denote the bird, which the Greeks encountered after Homer; see Fick (1876: 169).4

Well, the grammar-lesson in Clouds goes on. In the course of the conversation, Strepsiades comes to refer to a kneading-trough as τὴν κάρδοπον (669), for which

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2 The name is recorded twice, in fact, each time as a nickname: by the historian Deinias of Argos (3rd c. BC), fr. 8 (from Herodian, GG III.2, 913, 5–9) for a Queen Perimede, and by Pausanias 8. 47. 2; 48. 3 for one Marpessa (LGPN IIIA, s.v.). Both refer to the same historical context (the digging of the Tegean plain by enslaved Spartans) and perhaps have a single point of origin.

3 There is at least one counterexample to this general claim, in θεάνα ‘goddess’ — θεός. Still, it is probable that ἀλεκτρυάνα would have struck the audience as a comic formation. On the suffix -ανα, see Chastraine & Meillet (1932), Chastraine (1933: 107–9), and Willi (2003: 100 n. 9, 171) with further references.

4 Both words are attested as male personal names in Mycenaean (Aura Jorro, s.vv. ‘a-re-ko-to-re’, ‘a-re-kutu-ru-wo’, with bibliography; cf. ἀλέκτωρ on 6th-c. Cyprus [LGPN I, s.v.]), but no bird is so named until Theognis 864 (mid-6th c.). On the birds, cf. Thompson (1936: s.v. ‘ἀλεκτρών’), and see now Arnott (2007). POLLARD (1977: 88–9) suggests that the bird reached Greece via Persia in the 7th c., but it is now clear that this is, at least a century too late: for full discussion of the evidence for the bird and its names, starting from precisely W.’s remarks here, see Risch (1990), who argues that it is absent from Homer as being not in keeping with epic style, a view very much in line with W. (1916: 224 ff.) on words ‘missing’ from Homer.
Socrates takes him to task (670–80): ‘You give it a masculine name, although it is in fact feminine; that is just as topsy-turvy as the masculine name of the effeminate Cleonymus. You ought to say καρδόπη, with the ending -η.’

This section is even more remarkable than what we have already discussed. The word κάρδοπος, although referring to a sexually indifferent object, is said to be ‘feminine’ (θῆλως) simply because its article has the form it usually has with nouns denoting female beings. So, the poet jokes, in κάρδοπος we have a similar contrast as in the case of Cleonymus: both are feminine but have masculine names. Here we have the essence and the starting point of the approach to gender that dominates still today, the practice of labelling a noun as masculine or feminine according to the gender of its article or other attributes. This corresponds fundamentally to the popular point of view; cf. II, 39–40 below.—We see that Strepsiades can understand the word θῆλως (‘female; feminine’) only in terms of natural gender, and hence cannot see why the kneading-trough should be called feminine. This is the first point.

The second extremely interesting point is that Socrates regards the ending -ος as wrong for a word which is feminine in meaning, and demands instead the ending -η (i.e. the form καρδόπη). Obviously, the observation that lies behind this is that nouns in -ος usually have the article ὁ, and that in nouns and adjectives marked for gender the article the article ἡ is followed by a noun in -η, that in ὁ by a noun in -ος: e.g. ἡ δούλη : ὁ δούλος (‘the female slave’ : ‘the male slave’), ἡ καλή : ὁ καλός (‘the beautiful woman’ : ‘the beautiful man’). Now, καρδόπη, the form suggested by Socrates as ‘more correct’, is again an invention, just like Ε/C220æ/C228/C39/C40/C39/C42 above, but it, too, reflects a development to be observed in the living language itself, namely the tendency to transfer 2nd-declension feminines to the 1st declension on grounds of gender. As with other innovations, Ionic led the way here, with e.g. ἡ ἀσβόλη (‘soot’, in Semonides of Amorgos, 7th c. BC), ἡ τάφρη (‘ditch’, in Herodotus; τάφρ- in a 4th-c. inscr. from Amorgos [SIG no. 963, 27]), ἡ ψάμμη (‘sand’, in Herodotus; but note also Doric ψάμμα at Arist. Lys. 1261), instead of ἡ ἀσβόλος, τάφρος, ψάμμος. We find ἀσβόλη also in the Septuagint and later, and so the Atticists warn against it (Phrynichus, Ecloga 82 Fischer = 90, p. 197 Rutherford). Theophrastus uses ἡ ἐβένη for ἡ ἐβενος (‘ebony’). Callimachus forms to the feminine νῆσος (‘island’) the gen. pl. νησάων (Hymn to Delos 66). In the imperial period, the island Ἡ Σύρος is referred to as Σύρα. In medieval and modern Greek, alongside the feminines βάτος (‘bramble, bush’), ὄδος (‘road’), πλάτανος (‘plane tree’) we find forms in -η, βάτη, ὄδη, πλατάνη, etc., the desire being to make the ending of the noun agree with the form of the article (cf. HATZIDAKIS 1892: 23–6).5

5 These particular forms in -η are not to be found in the standard dictionaries or grammars of Byzantine and modern Greek; Hatzidakis (1892: 25) quotes chapter and verse only for πλατάνη, (‘Trois Poèmes 23’): βάτη he ascribes to Chios, ὄδη to the Middle Ages! On the other hand, Browning (1983: 59) reports other ways of dealing with the anomalous feminines in -ος as follows: (a) shift of gender, to masc. (ἄ βάτος ‘bush’,
The third and final section of the grammar lesson in Clouds bears on personal names. Strepsiades mentions feminine names in -ιλλα, -ινα, -α, | and masculines in -ος and -ιας. On the latter, Socrates comes back at him (689): ‘how would you address Amyntias?’—‘With (the vocative) Αμυνία.’ But -α, continues Socrates, is the ending of women’s names, and if you use Αμυνία, you are calling Amyntias a woman. Strepsiades finds that entirely appropriate, as Amyntias avoids military service. This third remark, then, couches a joke aimed at an individual, but it is based on observations of the distinctive endings of male and female names.

This is all much more surprising than the ordinary reader, familiar with the teaching of gender in modern grammar books, might suppose. Let us ask ourselves first of all how it occurred to Aristophanes to put such considerations into the mouth of Socrates at all, when they suit neither Plato’s nor Xenophon’s depiction of him. Now, it has long been acknowledged that the Socrates of Clouds is just a mask for other philosophers of the time. The meteorological section (225–36) contains doctrines of Diogenes of Apollonia (Diels & Kränz no. 64, II, 51–69), and we know the real source of the ‘gender’ passage discussed here thanks to a testimony in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 3. 5, 1407b6–8 Πρωταγόρας τὰ γένη τῶν ὄνομάτων διήρει, ἀφενα καὶ θήλεα καὶ σκεύη (‘Protagoras distinguished the classes of nouns, masculines and feminines and things’), where the third term, σκεύη, lit. ‘tools, equipment’, must obviously refer to the neuters. It is clear from this that when Socrates in Clouds presents his doctrines on gender as something new and strange, he is merely retailing what Protagoras was teaching at the time (Diels & Kränz no. 80, II, 253–71).

Let us summarize Protagoras’ teaching on the basis of the evidence of Aristophanes. One of his theorems was that nouns denoting animate beings normally have different endings depending on whether the being denoted is male or female, those for male beings ending in -ίας, -ος, -τωρ, -ων, those for female in -ια, -αια. The second, and fundamentally more significant point was that he

δ’ πλάτανος ‘plane-tree’, δ’ αμμος ‘sand’) or neut. (τὰ βάσανο ‘torture’); (b) replacement by neut. diminutive forms (τὸ δινελ ‘vine’, τὸ βαλδὶ ‘rod’); (c) replacement by synonyms (ὁ ὀδὸς ‘road’ by ὁ δρόμος); (d) the formation of a few feminines in -ο or -ω (ἡ ἄμμο ‘sand’, etc.): this last type illustrates the development of a simple opposition between masc. (nom. -α: gen. -ήμα: fem. -η). On both the ancient state of affairs and later developments, cf. Schweizer 457–61, 585–6, Schweizer & Debrunner 30–5, Seiler (1987), Gignac (1976–81: II, 38 n. 1), and II, 49 & n. 44, p. 460 below.

6 The last of the pre-Socratics, hardly older than Socrates himself, Diogenes of Apollonia (probably the colony of Miletus in the Black Sea) is perhaps best known for teaching the ‘monist’ doctrine of Anaximenes of Miletus (mid 6th c.) that one element, air, was the source of all things, although Vander Waerdt (1994: 70–5) attributes to Diogenes all but one of the physical theories maintained by Socrates in Clouds. For Diogenes’ surviving fragments, and discussion, see Kirk, Raven, & Schofield (1983: ch. 16).

7 On Protagoras of Abdera, see I, 13 and n. 2, p. 23 above; on his teachings on gender in particular, Matthews (1994: 44 and nn.) and Willi (2003: 99–100). It has been shown that, in addition to Protagoras and Diogenes, other early philosophers, in particular Empedocles, Pythagoras, and Hippon, are alluded to in Clouds. On Aristophanes’ creation of a ‘composite Socrates’, ‘who holds Diogenean ideas, lives in a Pythagorean setting, and uses Empedoclean language’, see Willi (2003: 116 and ch. 4).
applied the terms ἄρρητος and θῆλος (‘male’ and ‘female’) also to those nouns denoting objects which took the forms of the article regularly used for male and female beings, and that he went on to demand that these nouns also should have distinctive endings, -ος for masculines, -η for feminines.

Altogether the above raise a number of problems concerning gender which are still contentious today, and it is gratifying that we know a little more about the teaching of Protagoras in this area; again, Aristotle is our witness. He reports (Sophistic Elenchi 14, 173b 17–22) that Protagoras rejected as solecistic the use as feminines of the words πηληξ ‘helmet’ and μῆνις ‘wrath’. What does this mean? Protagoras might have objected to πηληξ on formal grounds, as most nouns in -ξ are masculine. But why did he object to μῆνις as a feminine, given that, after all, most words in -ης are feminine? There is only one possible explanation: a helmet is normally worn only by men, and μῆνις denotes something violent and frightful. So Protagoras must have held the view that things which suit men, and also things which are violent and frightful, should preferably be denoted as masculines. This approach is found again in later thinkers, such as Jacob Grimm, and a parallel to Protagoras’s evaluation of μῆνις in particular is found in a linguistic doctrine from the end of the eighteenth century, where the masculine gender of the nouns Ζόρν (‘anger’) and Ηάσσ (‘hatred’) is motivated on the basis of their meanings (see JELLINEK 1906: 312–13).

Aristotle built further on Protagoras’ teaching. In the above passage of the Sophistic Elenchi and in Poetics 14, 1458a 8–17, he makes more detailed observations on different endings according to gender, and incidentally says that it is a failing of the neuters that they do not distinguish between nom. and acc. The most important point of principle, however, is that he retains the terms ἄρρητος and θῆλος, and replaces only ἑκείνος (which for him denotes an object) with τὸ μεταξύ, ‘that (which lies) between (masc. and fem.’), thus labelling the neuter in a purely negative way. Similarly negative is the term ὀδότερον (‘neither’), which arises after Aristotle and becomes standard, and which the Latin grammarians correctly rendered as neutrum. The names of the other genders stay forever on the foundation laid by Protagoras: ἀρσενικός, θηλυκός in later Greek, masculinum, femininum in Latin, whence our terms today.

This Protagorean reference to words for objects also as ‘male’ and ‘female’ (depending on whether they take the masculine or feminine form of the pronoun) is found also in the only developed linguistic tradition to have emerged independently of the Greeks, that of the Indian grammarians. They go even further than the Greeks in that they refer to even the neuters with a term proper to the sexual realm, using a word normally employed of eu nuchs and hermaphrodites
Our term *gender* (Latin *genus*) goes back to Gk γένος used in this sense from Protagoras on. This in turn rests on the use of γένος to mean ‘sex’, in both abstract and collective senses. Latin has the advantage of offering separate terms for natural gender and grammatical gender, and English is even more fortunate, now using the word *gender* (via French from Latin *genus*) exclusively in the grammatical sense, just as the English terms *noun* (Latin *nomen* ‘name’) and *tense* (Latin *tempus* ‘time’) are confined to grammar. Loanwords often have a narrower range of meaning in the borrowing language than in the language from which they are borrowed, because a foreign word is often required only for a specific use. The Anglo-Saxons were thoroughly familiar with the notions ‘sex’, ‘name’, ‘time’, but when it came to describing language they were dependent on earlier knowledge of other peoples.

On the further development of the theory of grammatical gender, with special reference to German, see Jellinek (1906: 295–316) and (1913–14: II, 184–90). For a large, summary account of the subject, see, in addition to the general linguistic works and grammars mentioned earlier, the article ‘Geschlecht (grammatisches)’ (‘Gender (grammatical)’) by the brilliant linguist F. A. Pott (1856) in Ersch and Gruber’s well-known encyclopaedia, and also Madvig (1836; German version 1875). There is also *La théorie du genre* by the French scholar de la Grasserie (1906; non vidi). Many other important works will be mentioned as we proceed.  

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8 In Sanskrit, *strī* means ‘woman’, ‘female’ and ‘feminine’, and *pumś* (nom. sg. *pumān*) means ‘man’, ‘male’ and ‘masculine’ (so, with reference to the natural gender of animals, *strī* and *pumś* are used); the word for gender itself is *liga*, which, although its basic meaning is ‘mark, sign’, also denotes the male organ or phallus. In his commentary on *Pāṇini*, under the first rule in a section teaching the addition of suffixes to express the feminine gender (4. 1. 3), Patañjali tries to explain the grammatical gender of asexual objects in terms of the different states of their various properties or qualities (*gunās*); see Raja (1990: 118 & nn.) with further references. I am most grateful to Jim Benson for help with this note.  

9 This is readily confirmed for W.’s day by a glance at the 2nd edn of the *OED*, s.v. ‘gender’. It emerges that sense 1 ‘kind, sort, type, genus’ is obsolete since the end of the 18th c., while sense 3 ‘transf. Sex’ is ‘now only jocular’.  

10 On lexical borrowing, see Hock (1991: ch. 14) with further references.  

11 This extraordinary monument to German idealism—the (unfinished) *General Encyclopaedia of Sciences and Arts* edited by the Halle professors J. S. Ersch and J. G. Gruber, of which 167 volumes appeared between 1818 and 1889 covering A-Ligatur and O-Phyxius—is miraculously available in its entirety online at <http://dz-srv1.sub.uni-goettingen.de/cache/toc/D144451.html>.  

12 To judge from Postgate (1910), a review of another book, on semantics, by de la Grasserie, this is no great loss.  

13 For a good, recent general introduction to grammatical gender, see Corbett (1991). On the functions of gender in the languages of the world, with special reference to Indo-European, see still the remarkable collection of material by the Dutch linguist Royen (1929), and, for more recent typological studies, note the collections of Unterbeck & Rissanen (2000) and Hellinger & Bussmann (2001–3), the comparison of Niger-Congo and Romance by Kihm (2005) and the broader survey of noun-categorization devices including gender by Aikhenvald (2000). The recent study of gender in Proto-Indo-European by Matasović (2004) may be cautiously recommended; on gender in Greek and the history of the declensions, see Morpurgo Davies (1968a) with further references.
outline in Meillet’s article on the category of gender (1921a), together with the comments of Jacobsohn in his review of the first edition of the present work (1926: 374–7).

But enough of the theory. It is time to consider more closely the facts themselves. The first thing to note is that there is a class of words belonging broadly to the noun, i.e. equipped with case forms, for which true gender distinctions do not exist. Thanks to August Schleicher (1876: §§264–5), it even became common to use the term ‘ungendered pronouns’ (‘ungeschlechtige Pronomina’) of the pronouns which we normally call ‘personal’ (in German, ‘personalia’) because they vary with the relevant grammatical person. This involves especially the first- and second-person pronouns and the reflexives. The term ‘ungendered pronouns’ makes no reference to the meaning and function of this class of words, but highlights a special peculiarity of them. And by and large we do indeed have here single forms, no matter the sex of the person referred to by the pronoun. This genderlessness of the personal pronoun, which already Apollonius Dyscolus (Syntax 2. 24 [GG II.2, 143–4 = pp. 93–4 Householder]) and Priscian (12. 16; 17. 65 = GL II, 588, 1–15; III, 147, 5–7) tried to explain (cf. also Harris 1751: 70), is not something we would necessarily expect, but rather a peculiarity of the Indo-European languages. Semitic, e.g., has two forms of each pronoun, singular and plural, for the second and third persons, depending on whether they refer to male or female beings, and similarly two sets of personal endings in the verb.14 In Indo-European, Tocharian makes this distinction in the first-person singular pronoun.15

In the Greek reflexive and related forms, gender is not always left unmarked. Two phenomena in particular are relevant here. First, Gk αὐτός (which inflects for all three genders) functions partly on its own as a reflexive and partly as a specifier with pronouns of all three persons when they are used reflexively. The former we see in Homer, e.g. at Od. 10. 27 αὐτῶν γὰρ ἀπωλόμεθα ἀφραδίσιον (‘we were destroyed by our own foolishness’), or in a compound such as αὐτόματος, literally

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14 Independent pronouns and ‘actor affixes’ are conveniently set out for all the major Semitic languages, and for Proto-Semitic, by Lipiński (1997: §§36.2, 40.2).

15 So, e.g. the nom. (Lat. ego) forms are: Toch. A masc. ȵës, fem. ȵuk, Toch. B masc. ȵëi, fem. ȵiš. Even in 1928, the Tocharian branch of IE (comprising two languages, Tocharian A [East] and Tocharian B [West]) was still a relatively recent discovery. Most of the largely Buddhist documents (of the 6th–8th c. AD) were unearthed in the twenty years or so immediately before the First World War, in the Tarim River Basin in Chinese Turkestan, and the Tocharian languages were first recognized as IE in 1907. This branch of the family is remarkable in all sorts of ways. For a good introduction, see Pinault (1989); there is a grammar and an etymological dictionary (of Toch. B) in English (D. Adams 1988; 1999), but the standard reference grammar is still Krause & Thomas (1960–4). On the sg. 1 pronouns, see Jasanoff (1989).
'following one’s own mind’. As a specifier it gradually fuses with the pronoun in Ionic and Attic, e.g. in ἐαυτοῦ (masc. gen. sg.), and in a different form in Doric (αὐταυτώ, etc.). Now, in both types of case, since the reflexive relation obtains as a rule only with a personal subject, only the masc. and fem. forms of αὐτός are so used, and it is as an oddity that the ancient grammarians highlight a passage of Euripides with the neuter, fr. 693 TrGF V.2 εἰς δή, ξύλον, ἔγειρέ μοι σεαυτό καὶ γάννυν θρασύ (‘O timber, please wake yourself, and become bold’). Secondly, as is well known, the third-person pronoun which begins in the singular originally with digamma and in the plural with σφ- is used also anaphorically (II, 84 below) in Homer and in later Ionic, at first probably just with personal reference but already in Homer also of objects, e.g. at Od. 4. 355 Φάρον δὲ ἐ κυκλῆσκουσιν (‘and they call it Pharos’), ἐ refers back to νῆσος ‘island’ in the preceding line, and at II. 5. 195 παρὰ δὲ σφν ἐκάστῳ δίζυγες ἐπιοι ἑστάσω (‘and by each chariot a pair of horses stands’), σφω refers to δίφροι ‘chariot’ in 193. A consequence of this anaphoric use was that in Ionic, since the acc. pl. σφεασ given its ending could not refer back to a neuter noun, a new neuter form σφεα was made (Herodotus 1. 46. 3, etc.). A certain indifference to gender is seen also in a second group of pronouns, namely the interrogatives (and indefinites). In German, if we ask for a noun to be supplied, we ask either wer? (‘who?’) or was? (‘what?’), distinguishing only between persons and things. Given an unknown entity, it is usually already clear whether it is a person or a thing, but only in certain cases is the natural gender certain, whether from the context or from the nature of the utterance. In Greek, τίς ἔγημεν; (‘who married?’) can ask only after a man, τίς ἔγήματο; (‘who married?’) only after a woman. In German, the dative of the pronoun is used exclusively in questions about a person: mit wem? (‘with whom?’), von wem? (‘by whom?’) are used to ask after a person, and womit? (‘with what?’), wovon? (‘by what?’) are their counterparts used when asking after a thing, although Luther, for instance, could use wem? also of a thing (e.g. Luke 13: 18, 20). The same is true also of the indefinite and relative uses of the interrogatives, so, too, in Greek with τίς; τις and τί; τι. And in Old Latin, quis is used even in questions in which a woman is clearly in mind, e.g. in the dramatist M. Pacuvius (c.220–130 BC), fr. 257 Warmington (Aeëttes to Medea) quis tu es mulier? (‘what woman are you?’), as is indefinite quis, e.g. Ter. Eun. 677–8 hunc oculis suis nostrarum | numquam quisquam uidit (‘none of us has ever seen him with her own eyes’). Similarly, in modern French you ask after a person with qui?, after a thing with quoi?. In non-Indo-European languages, too, the interrogative pronoun shows this sort of two-gender inflection, so in Semitic, in which personal

16 Cf. D. Wb., s.v. ‘wer, was’, Formen 2. (c).
pronouns distinguish masc. and fem. (cf. II, 6 above and n. 14, p. 405),\textsuperscript{17} in Finno-Ugric, which otherwise has no grammatical gender as such (Misteli 1893: 526 n.),\textsuperscript{18} and in the Caucasian languages (cf. Th. Kluge 1925).\textsuperscript{19} Compare also German jemand : etwas (‘someone’ : ‘something’), niemand : nichts (‘no one’ : ‘nothing’): cf. Latin nemo : nihil; French personne : rien.

This restriction of gender to the opposition between persons and things is reminiscent of the linguistic distinction between animate and inanimate, to which the term ‘gender’ is also sometimes applied. This distinction plays an especially important role in the Amerindian languages (see F. Müller (1876–88: II, 194) on Algonquian),\textsuperscript{20} but the Indo-European languages too are not unaffected by it: in Slavic, for example, the object is in the genitive when it is animate, in the accusative when inanimate.\textsuperscript{21}

On the other hand, in most languages obvious efforts are made to distinguish masc. and fem., even in this group of pronouns, especially when used attributively, whether by means of the alternative stem Lat. quo- (masc. and neut.) vs qua- (fem.) or by using derived or compound forms. While this is true of Latin, early Greek admittedly used even such unfeminine-looking forms as του, τη/τη (‘some, a certain’, gen., dat. sg. masc. or fem.) as attributes of fem. nouns; on this see most recently Kallenberg (1917/18: 481–97).

In contrast to the classes of pronoun so far considered, the so-called demonstrative pronoun (including German er, sie, es ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘it’) has three distinct forms in several cases, in particular in the nom. and acc., which, when used

\textsuperscript{17} The forms of the interrogative pronouns in the Semitic languages are set out by Lipiński (1997: §36.60), who notes (§36.58) that the South Semitic Ethiopic language Ge'ez has masc. and fem. forms for both ‘who?’ and ‘what?’.

\textsuperscript{18} In consequence, in Finno-Ugric languages there is a single form for ‘he’ and ‘she’: e.g. Finnish hän, Hungarian ű. The distinction between ‘who?’ and ‘what?’ is seen in e.g. Finnish kuka and mikä, Hungarian ku and mi. See Abondolo (1998a: 170; 1998b: 444–5).

\textsuperscript{19} In the matter of gender, the Caucasian languages are very diverse. Lezgi, for example, illustrates W.’s point, the only gender distinction here being between ‘who?’ and ‘what?’ (see Haspelmath 1993: §11.5). In other Nakh and Daghestanian (Northeast Caucasian) languages, however, two, three, four or five genders are distinguished (Nichols 2003: esp. 212–15, 223–33), while in Abkhaz (Northwest Caucasian) there are personal pronouns with distinct masc. and fem. forms (Klimov 1994: 64–5, 68).

\textsuperscript{20} Grammatical gender is relatively rare in North American languages, some of which show none at all (e.g. the Eskimo-Aleut family), while others (e.g. the Pomoan languages of northern California) mark gender distinctions only on the independent pronouns. For an excellent overview of gender in the languages of native North America, see Mithun (1999: 95–103; and Index, s.v. ‘animacy’). With regard to South America, Dixon (1999: 8, 10) includes the presence of gender or classifier systems in the list of features which he uses to characterize the languages of the Amazon and to contrast the latter with the languages of the Andes, where gender distinctions are very rare.

\textsuperscript{21} The gen. in this function is sometimes called the ‘genitive-accusative’. It arose in Proto-Slavonic because sound-change had caused nom. and acc. sg. of certain masc. stems to fall together, which gave rise to potential confusion between subject and direct object. This disambiguating use of the gen. led in effect to the creation of a new gender, sometimes called the ‘virile’. On its prehistory, see Schenker (1993: 108). In Old Church Slavonic, the gen.-acc. expanded from nouns denoting healthy, free, male persons to all animate masc. singulars, including animals. Personal names, however, tended to keep the acc. form. On OCS, see Huntley (1993: 136–8) and Lunt (2001: §§4.13, 18.21).
independently (and not referring to something already denoted by a noun), serve
to mark natural gender. So e.g. Gk ὁδός ('this', masc. nom. sg.) refers to a
creature of the male sex, ἀδη (‘this’, fem. nom. sg.) to one of the female sex,
while impersonal objects are referred to with τοῦτο (‘this’, neut. nom.-acc. sg.).
Variation of the form of the demonstrative pronouns in independent use, then, is
very much to do with marking natural gender. (The fem. τηλικοῦτος (‘at such an
age’) at Soph. El. 614 and Oed. Col. 751 is inexplicable.) This applies also of course
to the forms of the article when used pronominally.

No part of language is so closely involved in marking natural gender as these
pronouns. You know the line of Hebel (in ‘Der Schwarzwälder in Breisgau’) that
goes, ’s isch e Sie, es isch kei Er (‘it’s a she, not a he’), where the pronouns alone
serve to denote male and female creatures.22 This type of expression is wide-
spread, at least throughout the Germanic area. In German it is attested from the
Middle Ages on; cf. Jacob | Grimm, D. Gr. III, 307–8 n. ***, and Weigand &
Hirt (1909–10), s.v. ‘sie’. Even the article can precede, or a derivational suffix
follow. Hans Sachs uses Sielein in the sense of Weiblein (‘little woman’), and
huntsmen use Sieke of a female animal.23 [Add.: Compare Kanarien-sie (‘female
canary’), Sperling-siachen (‘female sparrow’), die sie (‘the female’) adduced from
the German of East Prussia by Prellwitz (1897: 95–6 n.).]—English also knows
this usage, in a he, a she meaning, exactly as in Hebel, ‘a male creature’, ‘a female
creature’. These may also take an attributive adjective, and form the plurals hes,
shes; and Tennyson speaks of she-society.24 Hence the usage that English has in
common with Danish25 of marking the sex of a living creature by prefixing the
pronoun to the noun, especially when the noun alone can denote a creature of the
other gender than the one intended: e.g. he-goat, she-goat ‘male goat’, ‘female
goat’, she-devil (cf. German Teufelin).

At the same time, however, often in the case of these (demonstrative) pro-
nouns and always in the case of the relative, which inflects in the same way, the
use of the forms which otherwise serve to mark natural gender is determined by
one word, the meaning of which the pronouns take up, and with which they
must agree. This will be the subject of the next lecture!

22 This is in the last verse of the poem ‘The Blackforestman in Breisgau’, composed in the dialect of
Wiesental, in the collection Alemannische Gedichte (Karlsruhe 1803; vol. 2, 168 of the complete works,
Karlsruhe 1814), for which the poet, theologian, and teacher Johann Peter Hebel (1760–1826) is best
known. Hebel is the most important of the poets who have written in the Alemannic dialect, and was
known to and much admired by Goethe, Gottfried Keller and the brothers Grimm. (Cf. p. xiv above.)
23 For references to instances of Sielein and Siehe, also of Siche and Sichchen (all consisting of the pronoun
sie ‘she’ + a diminutive suffix), see D. Wb., s.v. ‘sie’, II, 2, i, a and y, respectively. The form Siche is said to
have been used in birds, in particular, and esp. in northern Germany.
24 The coinage she-society, in the sense of female company, occurs in the prelogue (v. 158) of Alfred, Lord
Tennyson’s poem The Princess (1847), the inspiration of Gilbert and Sullivan’s Princess Ida.
25 In Danish, note e.g. hunbjørn ‘she-bear’, hambah ‘drone, lit. he-bee’.
Lecture II, 2

Well, we come now to gender in nouns. Here I must ask you straightaway at all costs to keep two things firmly distinct: it is one thing to say that Lat. rēx (‘king’) is a masculine and régina (‘queen’) its feminine, and quite another to say that ἀγρός (‘field’) is masculine and ὁδός (‘road’) feminine. The first pair involves the form of the word itself marking the sex, the natural gender, of its referent, while in the second what we call gender is expressed only through the accompanying article or the pronouns referring to the noun: the noun itself has nothing male or female about it. That first point, the use of different formations depending on whether a word denotes a male or female being, strictly does not belong in syntax, but it must even so be dealt with in order to prepare the ground for further discussion (just as e.g. Grimm in his chapter on gender (D. Gr. III, 307–551) deals with these formations with an infinite wealth of examples).

Now, if we ask how the male–female opposition is marked, we can distinguish three main ways. (On what follows, see especially Herman Lommel’s studies of Indo-European feminine formations (1912).)

Probably the most ancient device is to use completely different stems to denote the male and the corresponding female creature. For this sort of variation, much studied since Osthoff’s1 famous work on the nature of suppletion (1899: esp. 15–19 on fem. formations), the ancients used the excellent term ‘heteronymy’. We encounter it straightaway in names for members of the family, Lat. pater : mater, frater : soror, gener : nurus (‘father’ : ‘mother’, ‘brother’ : ‘sister’, ‘son-in-law’ : ‘daughter-in-law’), English son : daughter, all of them old inherited pairs of forms preserved in a number of Indo-European languages, and to which further formations of the same sort were added in the individual languages, e.g. Latin patruus : amita (‘uncle’ : ‘aunt’). The same is true of general terms referring to sex and age, although here the languages diverge markedly, as in the pairs for

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1 Perhaps surprisingly (but cf. p. xiii n. 15 above!), this is the first mention of Hermann Osthoff (1847–1909), professor of comparative linguistics and Sanskrit at Heidelberg from 1877, and one of the central group of the ‘Neogrammarians’. Osthoff was a close friend of Karl Brugmann, with whom he co-edited the Morphologische Untersuchungen and jointly authored the ‘neogrammarian manifesto’ (Osthoff & Brugman 1878). He discovered the sound-law, which bears his name, whereby an inherited long vowel is shortened before a cluster of resonant + consonant (e.g. in the nom. sg. of Gk nouns of the type βασιλεῖς, with -εὺς < *-έυς). On Osthoff’s life and work, see further Sebeok (1966: I, 555–62) and Morpurgo Davies (1998: 234, etc.).
‘man’: ‘woman’ or ‘male’: ‘female’, German Mann: Weib, Herr: Frau, Gk ἄνηρ: γυνή, Lat. mas: femina. The last differs from the pair uir: mulier in referring originally to the physical side of sexual differentiation, so that mas and femina are used also of animals—although later on mulier and femina came to be used interchangeably: cf. Italian moglie vs French femme. (ms. add.): For uir: femina note Cicero’s translation of Soph. Trach. 1062–3 at Tusc. 2. 20.) Note also Latin senex: anus and Greek γέρων: γυναῖ (both ‘old man’: ‘old woman’).—The same happens with animal names such as Latin taurus: uacca (‘bull’: ‘cow’), German Hirsch: Hinde (‘stag’: ‘hind’). In Gk κριός: αἰς and Latin aries: avis both (‘ram’: ‘ewe’/‘sheep’), the word used for the female denotes also the whole species, of either sex. The same is true of τραύος: αἰξ (‘he-goat’: ‘she-goat’) and κάπρος: αῖς / ἄς = Latin aper: sus (both ‘boar’: ‘sow’).

The second type comprises those cases in which a word is added to denote the sex. We spoke in the last lecture of this sort of use of the pronoun (II, 9 above). Greek uses θήλεια and ἀρσεν in this way, e.g. II. 8. 7 (Zeus to the assembled gods) μὴ τις ὡν θήλεια θεός . . . μὴ τις ἄρσεν (‘now let no female god. . . and no male god either (try to transgress my word’)), and in Old Latin femina is commonly added. Plautus speaks of a ciui femina ‘female citizen’ at Persa 475, Sallust, Hist. 2. 11 and Tacitus, Hist. 2. 13. 2 of a Ligus mulier and femina Ligus (‘Ligurian woman’), respectively. It is more frequent with animal names. For instance, Ennius (Ann. 65, 66 Skutsch) called the famous she-wolf of Romulus not lupa (which in Old Latin means only ‘whore’) but lupus femina, and still in Tacitus we find bubus feminis (lit. ‘female cows’, Germania 40. 3) in the account of a sacrifice, probably in imitation of ancient ritual language.

[Add.: In contrast to my account, Specht (1928: 13–18) assumes, if I understand him correctly, that Lat. femina as an epithet in this sense cannot be compared with Gk θήλεια or the similar sex-marking epithets of Old Irish, Armenian, and modern Persian. Rather, on his account, lupus femina in Ennius and porcus femina in Cato meant ‘suckling she-wolf’ and ‘suckling sow’, and on the model of these phrases misunderstood, femina came to be added to any animal name to mean ‘female’, and hence in its turn mas, too, for ‘masculine’. Specht’s interpretation of femina seems promising, at least in lupus femina, but it is scarcely credible that this whole use of the word femina rests on misinterpretation

² Compare the fem. generic terms avis ‘sheep’, capra ‘goat’, and contrast equus ‘horse’ and asinus ‘ass’, where it is the masc. form which serves as the generic term. On the hypothesis that the term generalized reflects the sex of the animal with which speakers are more familiar, mula ‘mule’ presents an interesting case: see Adams (1993) on the status and employment of female mules in the Roman world.

² Skutsch (1985: on Ann. 65) remarks that lupus femina is not necessarily older than lupa, but may have been chosen by Fabius Pictor, Ennius, and Varro ‘because lupa had generally come to mean a prostitute’. For femina bos, cf. Varro, Rust. 2. 1. 17, where the context is pastoral rather than sacrificial.
of this phrase. Specht himself has trouble with the appearance of *agus femina* in an early law ascribed to Numa (Aul. Gell. 4. 3. 3), and must acknowledge that the original meaning of the epithet *femina* that he supposes was lost already by the time of Plautus, in view of *Truc. 284 musca...femina ‘female fly’, and Persa 475 ciui femina ‘female citizen’. Incidentally, Specht (1928: 15 n., 17–18) wrongly adduces on this point Varro, *Latin Language* 9. 56 appellatur mas columbus, femina columba (‘the male is called “columbus”, and the female, “columba”’) and Cicero, *Nature of the Gods* 1. 95 et mares deos et feminas esse dicitis (‘you say that the gods are both male and female’), as in neither passage is *mas* or *femina* to be taken as an attributive. 4

I cannot go into other points of detail, and I should like just to touch briefly on a general issue. Specht takes the view that for animal names in -*us* a gender-marked form in -*a* (like *equa* beside *equus*) was a given, and hence that there was no need to use *femina* as an epithet with words like *lupus*, as you could just say *lupa*. But we now know that in the Indo-European languages sex-marking of nouns with -*a* emerged only gradually. It is precisely *lupus femina* (and (*lupus*) *feta* ‘having just given birth’ in the same line of Ennius, *Ann. 65* Skutsch) that proves that in the earliest Latin *lupus* meant also ‘she-wolf’ (cf. II, 24 below). Evidently, speakers of Old Latin were not interested in marking the difference between male and female wolves, if, that is, we may apply Varro’s theory to this case (II, 26–7 below); this does admittedly stand in striking contrast to the Indo-European formation of a feminine in -*i* to the word for ‘wolf’ (II, 11 below), though it agrees with the use of Gk *lýkos* for both sexes alongside the recent form *lýkaina* (‘she-wolf’).—As for *lupa*, ‘whore’, Benveniste has recently tried (1925) with reference to the Romance languages to show that it is the feminine of *lupus*. But even if he is right, this does not at all prove that *lupa* ‘she-wolf’ is an ancient form, but rather illustrates Lommel’s demonstration (1912: 77–80) that it is precisely when they are used in a transferred sense that *communia* and *epicoena* readily acquire a feminine ending: from his examples, note Gk *káρpainya* ‘libidinous woman’, and compare also Lat. *milua* (cf. *milus* ‘kite’) used at Petronius 75. 6 as a term of address by a man to his wife, but not used of the female kite until Late Latin. 6

This phenomenon is not confined to Latin. In Persian, e.g., the words for ‘man’ (*nar*) and ‘mother’ (*máda*) are added with the same effect to words denoting persons and animals which are in themselves neutral with respect to

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4 This is perhaps less certain in the Cicero passage, which could be translated, ‘you say that there are both male and female gods’.  
5 Cf. II, 11 below: *communia* are nouns which may be either masc. or fem. (without change of form but with change of agreement), e.g. δ ἵππος ‘stallion’, ἴππος ‘mare’; *epicoena* are nouns with a single, fixed gender which may denote either the male or the female of the species, e.g. δ ρῶς ‘mouse (male or female)’.  
6 On *milua* as an insult in Petronius, see Dickey (2002: 178); the fem. form denoting the female kite is attested for Latin only in a late glossary (*Gloss. Lat.* II, 587, 28; *ThLL*, s.v. ‘miluus’, 75–81), although it is reflected in certain forms in Romance languages (*REW*, s.v. ‘milvus’).
gender.\(^7\) In Old Irish, \textit{ban} ‘woman’ is regularly prefixed to the masculine form in order to make a specifically feminine form, e.g. \textit{ban-dea} ‘goddess’ beside \textit{dea} ‘god’ (THURNESSEN 1946: 164); cf. French \textit{la femme professeur} or (ms. add.:\(^5\)) \textit{la femme médecin} and the like, and see VENDRIES (1921: 109–10). Animal names often involve more specific additions of this kind, as in German \textit{Rehbock}, \textit{Hirschkuh} (‘roe-buck’, ‘hind (lit. stag-cow)’), or the pair \textit{Pfaubahn} and \textit{Pfaufenne} (‘peacock’ and ‘peahen’), and also in English \textit{tom cat}.

The \textbf{third means} is what is called in German ‘\textit{Motion}’, marking of gender by modification or extension of the ending. So in Greek \textit{ἐταῖρος} : \textit{ἐταῖρα} (‘companion’), \textit{θεράπων} : \textit{θεράπωνα} (‘servant’ : ‘female servant’), \textit{άναξ} : \textit{άνασσα} (‘lord’ : ‘lady’), \textit{ἀληθής} : \textit{ἀληθρής} (‘flute-player’ : ‘flute-girl’), \textit{βασιλεύς} : \textit{βασίλεια} (‘king’ : ‘queen’), occasionally \textit{βασιλίνα}, and from the fourth century BC on \textit{βασίλισσα}, the last formed with a suffix that eventually spread through all European languages, being added even to native stems as in e.g. Medieval Latin \textit{equitissa} (‘female rider’),\(^8\) English \textit{quakeress}.—Further, there is Latin \textit{dea} : \textit{deae} (‘god’ : ‘goddess’), \textit{uictor} : \textit{uictrix} (‘victor’ : ‘victorious woman’), and the rarer types \textit{aauus} : \textit{auua} (‘grandfather’ : ‘grandmother’), \textit{rex} : \textit{regina} (‘king’ : ‘queen’), \textit{accesspiter} (‘hawk’): \textit{accesspitrina} (Plaut. Bacch. 274),\(^9\) \textit{haedus} : \textit{haedilia} (‘kid’ : ‘female kid’, Hor. \textit{Odes} 1. 17. 9). Then there is the peculiar \textit{lea} ‘lioness’, first in Lucretius (s. 1318), alongside earlier \textit{leo femina} (cf. II, 10 above) and the Greek loanword \textit{leana}, first in Catullus (60. 1, 64. 154). The model for \textit{lea} could have been e.g. \textit{copa} : \textit{caupo} (‘female inn-keeper’ : ‘inn-keeper’), \textit{lena} : \textit{leno} (‘procuress’ : ‘pimp’), in which the masculine is formed to the fem.; on the model of \textit{lea}, the fourth-century poet Ausonius (\textit{Epigrams} 72. 4 Green) has \textit{paua} ‘peahen’ beside \textit{pauo} (‘peacock’).—In German, the only surviving gender-marking suffix is \textit{-in}, e.g. in \textit{Wölfhin} (‘she-wolf’). In OHG this was still \textit{wulpin}, which continues an inherited feminine formation with accented long \textit{-i}, a type that survives in the modern language only in \textit{Hahn} : \textit{Henne} (‘cock’ : ‘hen’).\(^10\)

\(^7\) So, in modern Persian we have e.g. \textit{shı¯r-i nar} ‘lion’ vs \textit{shı¯r-i mâda} ‘lioness’; \textit{nar ga¯v} or \textit{gāv-i nar} ‘bull’ vs \textit{mâda gāv} or \textit{gāv-i mâda} ‘cow’; cf. e.g. Levy (1931: 28).

\(^8\) For this form see Du Cange. There is a host of such forms in Medieval Latin, e.g. \textit{comitissa} ‘countess’, \textit{sacerdotissa} ‘priestess’, \textit{fratrissa} ‘sister-in-law’, even \textit{leomissa} ‘lioness’; see Stotz VI, §37 for further examples and references.

\(^9\) It is unlikely that \textit{accesspitrina} (if correct—it is a correction of the transmitted reading, and attested only in \textit{haedus} : \textit{haedilia} (‘kid’ : ‘female kid’, Hor. \textit{Odes} 1. 17. 9). Then there is the peculiar \textit{lea} ‘lioness’, first in Lucretius (s. 1318), alongside earlier \textit{leo femina} (cf. II, 10 above) and the Greek loanword \textit{leana}, first in Catullus (60. 1, 64. 154). The model for \textit{lea} could have been e.g. \textit{copa} : \textit{caupo} (‘female inn-keeper’ : ‘inn-keeper’), \textit{lena} : \textit{leno} (‘procuress’ : ‘pimp’), in which the masculine is formed to the fem.; on the model of \textit{lea}, the fourth-century poet Ausonius (\textit{Epigrams} 72. 4 Green) has \textit{paua} ‘peahen’ beside \textit{pauo} (‘peacock’).—In German, the only surviving gender-marking suffix is \textit{-in}, e.g. in \textit{Wölfhin} (‘she-wolf’). In OHG this was still \textit{wulpin}, which continues an inherited feminine formation with accented long \textit{-i}, a type that survives in the modern language only in \textit{Hahn} : \textit{Henne} (‘cock’ : ‘hen’).\(^10\)

\(^{10}\) In fact, \textit{wulpin} (the direct ancestor of modern German \textit{Wölfhin}) is also attested in OHG. In Germanic grammar, OHG \textit{henna} (< *\textit{banjno}; cf. Old English \textit{henna} and \textit{wulp}< *\textit{wulpjo})—and in fact all derived fem. forms in \textit{-in} (< *\textit{-injo})—belong to the so-called \textit{jo}-stems, which in OHG preserve only traces of the orig. \textit{-i} in the nom. sg. The latter form is well represented in Gothic, e.g. in \textit{mawi} ‘girl’ < *\textit{magw-i}, gen. \textit{maujòs} (formed to the stem of \textit{magus} ‘boy’). Germanic \textit{-i/-jo} goes back to IE *\textit{-i/-ya}– from *\textit{-iθ₂}/*\textit{-iy₂}: in

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On all this, there are three comments to make. First, there is a strong tendency for gender-marking to expand beyond its original boundaries, in Latin and Greek through the exchanges between the 1st and 2nd declensions, in German by means of the suffix -in. In this way, old cases of heteronymy (above) are eliminated. Names for family members include some old inherited instances of gender-marking, such as Latin nepos : neptis = NHG Neffe : OHG ni̇ft, OLG and hence NHG Nichte (‘nephew’ : ‘niece’), and Latin socer : socrus = NHG (obsolete) Schwäber : Schwieger (cognate with Gk ἐκυρός : ἐκυρὰ ‘father-in-law’ : ‘mother-in-law’), but also some recent creations, such as Gk ηὐθέα ‘uncle’ and ηὐθεὰ ‘virgin’ beside παρθένος (cf. Eupolis, fr. 362 in PCG V κόρη . . . ηὐθος ‘unmarried girl’). Recent forms in Latin include fratria and fíatrissa to denote one’s brother’s wife (for which Greek preserves inherited ἀνάτηρη (cognate with Lat. ianitricus pl.), and similarly servus replacing ancilla. In several Romance languages, Lat. nurus (also nurn), the inherited word for ‘daughter-in-law’, is replaced by a new feminine form in -a made to gener, ‘son-in-law’; see MEYER-LÜBKE, REW, s.v. ‘gener’.—In a different way, Gk ἀδελφός : ἀδελφή (‘brother’ : ‘sister’) and Latin fílius : fília (‘son’ : ‘daughter’), for example, have replaced the synonymous pairs of forms preserved in the other languages, implying a particular view of sibling and mother child relationships.

Gender-marking also encroaches on nouns which may be either masc. or fem. (‘communia’) and nouns which refer indifferently to members of either sex (‘epicoena’) (II, 2 & 10 above; II, 23ff. below), and further makes possible the formation of nouns denoting the female to those which originally applied only to males. As long as scientific healing arts were practised only by men, there was only one word—látropós, médicus, Arzt—to refer to the doctor. The participation of women in the profession, and the claim of midwives to a doctor’s status, led to the more recent formations látropia, látroña, médica, Ärztin. | Ancient myth knew only male

other words, this is a special type of -ê-stem. Vedic Sanskrit in fact preserves two distinct fem. declensions in -ê (represented by vrêk ‘she-wolf’ to vrêka ‘wolf’ vs devê ‘goddess’ to deva ‘god’), which have coalesced in favour of the devê type—or been lost—in other IE languages. There are traces of this type in Latin, e.g. in the -ê of the fem. agent suffix -têr- (and incidentally in amia ‘grandmother’, above), though by and large its members have been replaced by -stem. In Greek it survives more prominently, e.g. in feminines of the types µοῖα ‘Muse’ < *mōtyna and πότνia ‘mistress’, with -êa rather than -ê from *-êlê, at the end of the word. See Sihler (1995: §§268–70), and Szemerényi (1996: 188–92) with bibliography.

11 These words, together with Skt yâ-tà- go back to IE *h₂yēh₄-tà- ‘husband’s brother’s wife’.
12 Lat. servus (generally avoided in literature) is the technical legal term for female slave, while ancilla, the ordinary word for slave woman, is an older (diminutive) formation to ancula, fem. of anclusus ‘servant (in a religious context)’, the Latin counterpart of Gk ἄρφειός ὧς ‘servant, attendant’. On the etymology of these words and the history of slavery in ancient Italy, see Rix (1994a: esp. 30–4, 54–9).
13 From IE *µuōs ‘son’s wife, brother’s wife’: cf. Gk µψ Publishers, OLG and hence NHG, Skt ṭyāsā— Old English muru all ‘son’s wife’.
14 For ‘brother’ and ‘sister’, we reconstruct IE *bhṛēh₂-tér- and *swēsér- (cf. e.g. Lat. frater and soror), which survive in Gk φίλαρχος ‘clansman’ and ἐφρ ‘cousin’s daughter’, for ‘son’ and ‘daughter’, IE *ptūlē or *suhūnēs (also *suhūnē) and *dhēnā (bā-té-) (cf. e.g. Skt pṛtā-, Gk πυρός, Eng. son and Skt dhātār-, Gk ἀνθρώπη, Eng. sub). For a survey and discussion of IE kinship terminology, see MALLORY & ADAMS (2006: 209–18) with bibliography.
This page contains a discussion on gender and words related to females in Latin. The text mentions the use of certain words for female parasites, parasites, and female mimics. It also discusses the gender changes in Latin verbs and the development of new feminine forms. The text refers to various Latin words and their meanings, such as *socrus* (male companion) and *nurus* (female companion). The text notes that new feminine forms were created especially when occupations and positions practised in Greece only by men, and hence denoted only by masculine nouns, were brought to Rome and there taken up also by women (or at least ascribed to women in jest). There is *mima* (‘female mime’; mentioned by LOMMEL 1912: 18)—note that Gk μίμος is fem. at Plutarch, *Sulla* 36 μίμοις γυναιξί καὶ κιθαριστρίᾳ (‘with actresses and female cithara-players’), and Synesius of Cyrene (late 4th–early 5th c.), *Epistles* 110, p. 708 Hercher η μίμος Ανδρομάχη (‘the mime-actress Andromache’). And to *mima* should be added <philologa> (?’(learned’, Enn. *Incerta* 42, p. 562 Warington), *parentactae* (Varro, *Gramm.* fr. 89 Funaioli), 15 *parasita* (‘female parasite’, Horace, *Sat.* 1. 2. 98), and note also Petronius’ *zelotypa* (‘jealous woman’, *Satyricon* 69. 2).

Finally, changes were caused also by the urge to give a clear gender-marking suffix to words which from the first referred to females but had no ending that clearly indicated the sex of the referent. Hence, e.g. *Σεηρηνάων* (‘Sirens’) in Epicharmus (fr. 121 in PCG I), for Homer’s *Σεηρήνων*. [Add.: Epicharmus is apparently quoted in the Hesychius gloss Σεηρηνάων λόγους: ἀπατεώνων (‘Sirens’ words: (words) of cheats’), which seems to be abbreviated from Σεηρηνάων < . . . Σεηρήνων > λόγους: ἀπατεώνων (cf. Eur. *Andr.* 936 *Σεηρήνων λόγους*). It may be that the gloss, which stands between Σεηρέων and σφία, guarantees the spelling with ι rather than ει in the first syllable in Epicharmus and Euripides. Note also, on an Etruscan mirror (Pe S. 12 Rix; GERHARD 1843–97: II, plate 176), the name *Αθρπα*, instead of expected *Αθρε*πε, for Gk fem. *Ατροπός*, one of the Fates (DEVOOTO 1928: 334; cf. 1927: 259).] Then there is Gk τροφός instead of τροφός (‘nurse’) in three Rhodian inscriptions, 16 *παρθένη* for *παρθένος* (‘maiden, girl’) on a papyrus, and the woman’s name *Παρθένα* on two inscriptions (HATZIDAKIS 1892: 24) = *parthena* in Christian Latin. Latin has *ianitrix* ‘brother’s wife’ instead of *ianiter* that we expect in view of Gk ένατηρό (cf. *Παρθένα*, cf. *Socrus*, *nurus*, 18 and German *Hindin* replacing old-fashioned *Hinde* (‘hind’).—Similar is the extension that occurred prehistorically in the Latin word for ‘dawn’: the old fem. *ausōs* (cf. Aeolic Gk αὐως) gave way to *ausōs-ā*, whence by rhotacism *aurōra*.

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15 = Nonius Marcellus, p. 93 Lindsay. The masc. (παρηστακτός, an age-grouping of pre-adolescent boys, lit. ‘in regular training’) is in Lucilius, frggs. 140, 816 Warington.

16 See LSJ, s.v. ‘τροφός’. This form is reminiscent of the late antique lexicon entry (in Hesychius) ἄδραπατς: η γνώριμη παρά Δίκαιου ἄδραπατος: a Spartan word for “woman”.

17 For the forms *παρθένη*, *Παρθένα*, cf. Dieterich (1898: 174), Mayser I, §99.7; Gignac, on the other hand, (1976–81: II, 38–44) records only ὁ-stem forms of *παρθένον*. Cf. n. 5, pp. 401–2 above.

is legitimate to include this example here, as the dawn was always viewed in a quasi-personal way. (On this whole question of gender-marking by means of suffixation, see Lommel (1912), who gives further examples, and considers the subject also from other points of view.)

Secondly, a masculine is sometimes formed secondarily to the feminine, for instance if the role was at first taken or observed only by women: so e.g. laena (‘pimp’, mentioned above) to lena, and NHG Witwer, English widower, French veuf to Witwe, widow, veuve. (On secondary formations denoting male animals, see II, 27 below.)

Even more important for questions that will occupy us later is a third point. It would be wrong to suppose that alternation of inflection between the 1st and 2nd declensions served in the noun, as in the pronoun (II, 9 above), originally and principally to mark natural gender. Frequently, and to begin with more generally, it affected words not denoting persons: | in Greek note the gender-marking types represented by e.g. φῶρος : φορά (‘something that is brought, tribute’ : ‘carrying; being carried’), βιότος : βιοτή (both ‘life, means of living’). 19

A particularly striking case is that of Latin animus : anima.20 Until the beginning of the Empire, the meanings of the two words are clearly and sharply distinct: anima means (a) ‘wind, breath’, so that Cicero could still use it to translate Gk ἀτρ and πνεῦμα (cf. Timaeus 15 and 18), and (b) ‘(breath of) life’ or ‘departed soul’; animus by contrast denotes human mental activity, especially desire and feeling. In these senses the two words are often opposed to each other in early Latin: the third/fourth-century lexicographer Nonius Marcellus in On the Difference between Similar Words (p. 689 Lindsay) aptly cites Accius (fr. 274 Warmington) sapimus animo, fruimur anima: sine animo anima est debilis (‘intelligence is ours through the mind; enjoyment, in our breath; when mind is absent, breath is enfeebled’), and also Varro (in the Satires, fr. 32 Astbury) in reliquo corpore ab hoc fonte diffussast anima; hinc animus ad intellegentiam tributus (‘in the rest of the body from this source breath is diffused; hence the mind is devoted to intelligence’). Following this Lucretius uses animus : anima to translate Epicurus’ λογικόν : ἔλογον (μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς) (‘reasoning vs unreasoning [parts of the soul]’); see Heinze (1897: 83–4).21 Relatively early instances of animus for anima (Cic. Nat. deorum 2. 18) and anima for animus (Prop. 2. 10. 11) should certainly be

19 For discussion of numerous other such pairs, see Gagnepain (1959: 57–104), who on φῶρος vs φορά aptly cites (pp. 80–1) Thucydides 1. 96 on the payment of tribute to Athens by her allies.
20 Of recent bibliography on Lat. animus vs anima, note the articles by M. Isnardi Parente in the Enciclopedia Virgiliana, s.vv., the short article by Hamp (1987) arguing that the initial a- of anima is analogical on that of animus, and the monograph by Reis (1962: 100–13) with numerous further references.
21 In fact, Lucretius wishes to present animus and anima in these technical senses as complementary parts of the indivisible Epicurean soul, and so, after using the two words conjoined at 3. 161, 167, 212, says at 3. 421–4 that he will use them interchangeably for ‘soul’. See P. M. Brown’s commentary (Warminster 1997), ad loc. and Introduction, §4.
emended, and when Horace (at Odes 1. 12. 37) praises Aemilius Paullus as *animae magnae prodigum* (‘prodigal of his great anima’), admittedly the *magna* suggests his *magnus animus*, but *anima* itself means, as always, ‘life’. Elsewhere, too, the context of a passage can lead to *anima* having epithets which refer to mental qualities. So, Vergil in *Aeneid* 6 (817, 827) has occasion to describe *anima*, departed souls, as *superba* or *concordes* (‘proud’, ‘in harmony’). Cf. also Tacitus, *Agricola* 46 si quis *piorum manibus* locus, si . . . non *cum corpore* exinguuntur *magnae animae* (‘if there is any mansion for the spirits of the just, if . . . great souls do not perish with the body’).

In contrast, colloquial Latin of the later Empire loses *animus* and gives its meanings to *anima*. The chief evidence for this is the Latin Bible, where *animus* is entirely lacking in the Psalms and the Gospels, which are the oldest parts and those least affected by the educated language. But we see this also in Christian Latin generally: it is telling, for instance, that, while Lucretius (1. 74, 3. 398) and Cicero (e.g. Timaeus 28, *Laws* 1. 59) have *mente animoque*, Cyprian has instead *mens et anima* (Souter 1928: 35), and while Petronius (38. 5) speaks of *animi beatitudo* (‘supreme happiness’), Augustine (*City of God* 10. 2–3 Dombart & Kalb) has instead *anima* in the context of *beatitudo*, and his pupil the rhetor Favonius Eulogius in his disputation on Cicero’s *Dream of Scipio* (1. 1 van Weddingen) makes Cicero speak *de animae immortalitate* (‘of the immortality of the *anima*’), although Cicero consistently ascribes *immortalitas* to the *animus*. (Compare however Sallust, *Jugurtha* 2. 2, with *ingenium* ‘intellect’ and *anima* ‘soul’.) Furthermore, all the Romance languages have reflexes of *anima* meaning generally ‘soul’ (also of the mind), while none has a trace of *animus* (cf. *REW*, s.vv.).

The grammarians of late antiquity were aware of this semantic shift (cf. e.g. Macrobius (5th c. AD), in his disquisitions on the *Dream of Scipio* 1. 14. 3). When it arose and spread through ordinary speech, we do not know. Apuleius (2nd c. AD) seems to have the first secure instance (given that Seneca, *On Good Deeds* 4. 37. 1 *hominem uenalis animae* (‘the man of venal character’) should perhaps be emended). What is more important is to understand the reason for the shift. We should think less of internal Latin developments and more of the influence of Greek. The meaning of *anima* was extended on the model of Gk ψυχή, which was also fem. and which already corresponded to some of the meanings of *anima*. Under the Empire, in consequence of widespread bilingualism and the importance of translation literature, Latin underwent many such effects of Greek influence.23

22 In the Cicero passage, W. Ax in his edn (Leipzig 1961) defends *animus* against W. with reference to a parallel at 3. 27 (where, however, it seems that there is better manuscript support for *anima*!). In the Propertius passage, the emendation—voc. *anime for anima*—was proposed already by Heinßius in the 17th century, and is adopted in the edd. of e.g. M. Schuster & F. Dornseiff (Leipzig 1958), P. Fedeli (Leipzig 1984), and now S. J. Heyworth (Oxford 2007), who remarks that the nuance ‘breath’ is inappropriate to the context, and for the use of *animus* ‘in statements about poetic composition’ compares Catullus 65. 4; Verg. Ed. 9. 51, *Geo*. 3. 289; Ovid, *Amores* 3. 1. 26, *Met*. 1. 1.

23 On such ‘loan-shifts’, or ‘semantic calques’, in Latin (and Greek, too), see most recently Adams (2003: 461–8) with further references.
The origin of *animus* and *anima* was recognized already in antiquity. Lactantius (3rd–4th c.) in *On the Works of God* 17. 2 mentions the view that the words belong with Gk ἀνεμός (‘wind’) and originally meant ‘wind’ (cf. Cicero, *Tusculans* 1. 19, and Pohlenz (1912: 50–1) *ad loc.*). We can add that a verb ‘to breathe’ preserved in Sanskrit underlies these forms, so that their earliest meaning was ‘breath’.24 Greek used the word to denote the wind, abandoning its old name, which survives in Latin *ventus*, NHG Wind, English wind. Compare Gk πνεῖν ‘to breathe’ and its family of forms, esp. πνεύμα (‘wind’). Do mythical representations play a part here? See Oldenberg (1919: 68), and Keller’s *Sinngedicht*, end of ch. 11: *das Meer gehorcht nur dem Schöpfer und den Winden, die sein Atem sind* (‘the sea obeys only the creator and the winds, which are His breath’). Latin anima remained truer to its old meaning. For the rest, the analogy of Gk ψυχή is instructive for both words in Latin: originally ‘breath’, then in Homer—just like anima—‘breath of life’, ‘life’, ‘departed soul’, after Homer ψυχή acquires in addition the meaning of animus.25 The only obscure point is how Latin, unlike Greek, where only masc. ἀνεμός is attested, acquired a fem. form as well and divided the meanings of ψυχή in the manner described between masc. and fem. Given its correspondence with Gk ἀνεμός, animus is perhaps the older form, and may for that reason have reached earlier the end point of its development, where it is confined to the mental sphere. In compounds and derivatives, with the exception of animatus (‘disposed, minded’) and animosus (‘bold, spirited’), the meaning of anima is underling.26

[Add.: The Oscan curse-tablet from Cumae published by Ribezzo (1914: 293–4; Cm 13 Rix), contains the sequence anamum aítatum, which in Latin would be formally *animum aetatem* but which presupposes the meaning of Lat. anima for the masculine. This agrees with the view put forward above of the semantic development of animus and its relation to anima. In pre-Latin the masculine was still very close in meaning to the original sense ‘breath’ (cf. Gk ἀνεμός ‘wind’). In historical Latin, we find that it has developed to the meaning ‘soul, spirit’, while the old meaning is transferred to what we suppose to be a new form, anima, which alone survives in later colloquial Latin.27—On the use of words for ‘breath’ in the sense of ‘soul’, there are numerous examples from a very wide range of languages in Arbman (1927: 9 n. 1, 68–71, 180 n. 1). Cf. also Lat. *spiritus* and Gk πνεῦμα.]


25 On the history of the word ψυχή, see most recently Bremmer (2007).

26 The (earlier) meaning of anima is seen even in animatus in the sense ‘filled with breath, life’, and animosus in the sense ‘full of air, life’.

27 In fact, as the object of a curse, Oscan anamum could plausibly be either ‘breath’ or ‘spirit’; and unfortunately the context of nom. sg. anams (Cm 17 Rix) is quite unclear. See Untermann (2000: s.v. ‘anams’) with further references.
Let us take another example, which is rather different: Gk πέτρας : πέτρα. The form in -ός (mainly masc., although in Hellenistic texts also fem., perhaps on the model of ἡ λίθος ‘stone’) means ‘boulder’, ‘stone’, and as a simplex is generally confined to poetic and elevated language. In contrast, the common word πέτρα means first of all ‘crag, cliff’, i.e. a sort of collective or augmentative to πέτρας, and later assumes also the meaning ‘piece of rock’, ‘stone’. The name of the Apostle Peter, Πέτρος, if it really means ‘crag, (bed)rock’ and corresponds to Aramaic kyp’ (‘rock’; as a personal name, ‘Kephas’: cf. e.g. John 1: 43 Ἐφασ), cannot be directly related with πέτρας, which was rather rare and did not have this meaning, but must be a masculinization of πέτρα; cf. Matthew 16: 18 αὐτῷ Πέτρος, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ πέτρᾳ οἰκοδομήσω μου τὴν ἐκκλησίαν (‘thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church’).—Latin borrowed πέτρα early, first in the sense of rupes (‘crag, cliff’), later also that of lapis (‘a stone’). In the colloquial language and accordingly in Romance, it partially replaced lapis (e.g. in French la pierre); cf. Löfstedt (1911: 109).

One further point requires particularly emphatic attention. Greek has a whole series of pairs of words, one 1st-, one 2nd-declension, in which the alternation not only fails to correlate with natural gender (II, 12 above), but runs directly counter to the use of this alternation for gender-marking: so e.g. τροφός, in spite of its ending -ός, denotes a female (‘nurse’), τροφή with its so-called fem. ending, ‘nourishment’. Similarly in other cases a 2nd-declension oxytone denotes a male or female person, while the 1st-declension counterpart denotes something impersonal: e.g. αἰωνός ‘singer’ (male or female), fem. at Hes. Works 208 : αἰωνή ‘song’; φονός ‘murderer’ at Pindar, Pyth. 4. 25ο29 : φονή ‘murder’; πομπός ‘person escorting’, fem. at Od. 4. 826 : πομπὴ ‘act of escorting’; ἀρωγός ‘helper’, fem. at Apoll. Rhod. 4. 839 : ἀρωγή ‘help’, and so on. (ms. add.2: Cf. Alcman, fr. 1, 44 Page χοραγός fem., Soph. OT 751 πτωχός fem.)

Alongside all this, we have, as in the interrogative pronoun (II, 7 above), a class of nouns formally distinct from masc. and fem., the so-called neuters. These are the words which in the nom. and in part the acc., too, have different case-endings from those of nouns denoting male and female beings, endings which—and this is remarkable—are the same in nom. and acc. (cf. I, 302 above). In German this formal characteristic of neuters has almost completely disappeared in the noun, in that even

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28 This question, of the relationship between Πέτρος ‘Peter’ and ταύτη τῇ πέτρα ‘this rock’, has excited enormous controversy. There is evidently a wordplay in the Greek and therefore, it has been supposed, in the Aramaic original. For extensive discussion and full bibliography, see Luz (2001–7: II, ad loc.), Davies & Allison (1988–97: II, ad loc.), and most recently Nolland (2005: ad loc.) with a bibliographical appendix on works prior to 1980.

29 This is W.’s own conjecture (1913: 242–3), accepted by many editors since (listed with a ‘?’ by Slater 1969), for the transmitted Πελιασφόνον ‘Pelias-slayer’, which, however, is printed and defended by Braswell (1980) and (1988: ad loc.); cf. Schwyzer & Debrunner 614 (φόνον).
outside the neuter only a few nouns distinguish formally nom. and acc.—though in earlier phases of Germanic, e.g. in Gothic, the distinction is still clearly there.  

By and large, as in the interrogative pronoun, these neuter forms serve to denote inanimate objects, although this is not to say that they were ever the only means of referring to things. We shall return to this later. Here, let us reflect on just one observation made independently by two of the most outstanding linguists of the present day. In Indo-European languages there are two words for fire: on the one hand, a neuter—Gk πῦρ, Umbrian pir, German Feuer 31 and on the other, a masc.—Latin ignis, Lithuanian ugnis, | Russian ogóñì, etc. In the historical period, the two words are divided between the individual languages, but originally they were used alongside each other in the following way, as SCHULZE (1918: 774–83) and MEILLET (1920b) both saw: the neuter was used when fire was viewed purely as an object, the masc. when it was seen as a personal, active force. Hence Skt a¯pañś, which corresponds to Latin ignis, denotes also the much-revered fire-god (Agni; ms. add. 2: cf. Gk *Hfʌaيوσις and Lat. Volcanus as counterparts to Agni, and WILAMOWITZ (1931–2: I, 2o) on Empedocles’ search for personal names for his four elements). The same can be shown for the words for water. Beside the neuter (attested in Gk ὀὐδΌορ, Umbrian utur (with abl. une < *udmi), NHG Wasser, Hittite 32 wa¯tar), which conveyed an objective view of the substance, there were originally also fem. forms, the personal nuance of which is seen in that surviving in Indic and Iranian. This is consistent with the fact that the Germanic fem. (Gothic ahw¯a, corresponding to Latin aqua), unlike Wasser (cf. Gk ὀὐδΌορ), can denote the living water, a river (cf. II, 31 below). 33

Occasionally, neuters are used also to denote animate beings. There are plenty of examples in the classical languages, in diminutives for a start, as in Greek and German: Gk γόύναου, NHG Weibchen (‘little woman’), Gk θυγάτριον, NHG

30 In the noun, in Gothic the nom. and acc. sg. are identical only in the ὀ-stems, the nom. and acc. pl. additionally in the n- and ὔ-stems. The situation is very similar in Old Icelandic, but in Old High German nom. and acc. are rarely distinct in the sg. (notable exceptions being the ὔ- and n-stems), and never in the pl. All three languages distinguish nom. and acc. more consistently in the adjectives and pronouns. For details, see resp. Jasanoff (2004: 895–5), Heusler (1921: 65–76), Braune & Reiffenstein §19e.

31 The two words are reconstructed as *pēhɔyr (seen also in Hittite pah∂ur, Tocharian B puwar and of course English fire) and *h_initial “nis. For further comparative evidence, discussion and bibliography, see Mallory & Adams (2006: 91–2, 122–5).

32 This is W.’s one and only reference in the Lectures to Hittite. His actual word is ‘(pseudo-)hetitisch’ (spelled het- in ms. add.): see the front of the dust jacket), which reflects (well-founded) contemporary doubts that this was the most appropriate name for the Indo-European language recently discovered (in earnest, since 1914), alongside documents in other languages, in the royal archive of the imperial capital Hattusa; for bibliographical orientation, see Cowgill (1986: §5) and Watkins (2004).

33 The first series of words (which includes also, more obviously, English water and, less obviously, Latin unda) derives straightforwardly from IE *wōdr (neuter). The Indo-Iranian fem. forms to which W. refers must be Skt ṭ̥p- and Avestan āfσ both meaning ‘water’, also used as the base of divine names, and reflecting an IE root *hेप- (seen also in e.g. Lat. amnis, English Avon). Note, however, that Skt ṭ̥p-, etc. and Lat. aqua, etc. derive from two separate words, the latter attested only in Latin and Germanic. For details and further references, see Mallory & Adams (2006: 125–8).
Töchterchen (‘little daughter’), Gk παιδάριον, NHG Kindchen (‘little child’), Gk κοράσιον, NHG Mädchen (‘little maid’); for more on the neuter in Greek diminutives, see Jacobsohn (1926: 375–6). Latin does not share this feature, since (with a few exceptions in the colloquial language) Latin diminutives receive the same gender as the base-word: e.g. musculus (‘little mouse’), masc. like mus, muliercula (‘little woman’), fem. like mulier, etc. But even apart from diminutives, a neuter word may come to be used of an animate being. This can be brought about especially by the type of formation: Gk τέκος and τέκνον ‘child’ really mean ‘that which is born’. No thought is given here to the personhood of the being, merely to its coming into being; the fact that it is a person is ignored. Exactly the same is true of Gothic barn and NHG Kind (both ‘child’); and compare genus (‘offspring’) in formal turns of phrase in e.g. Vergil (Aen. 12. 515) and Horace (Odes 2. 18. 38). The origin of the Greek neuter ἰδράπαδον ‘slave’ is quite different. Originally, it occurred only in the plural (e.g. dat. pl. ἰδραπάδες at II. 7. 475), and as such was formed, as BRÜGGMANN recognized (BRÜGGMANN & THUMB 1913: 197), in imitation of τετράποδα ‘four-footed, domesticated animals’. In the context of booty taken in war, a distinction was made between τετράποδα and ἰδράπαδα, between four-footed and ‘person-footed’ booty. 34—Naturally, a personal neuter of this sort could arise also through metonymy. In his list of flattering names used by lovers for the girls they love, Lucretius (4. 1169) mentions for instance that a girl with overfull lips is called φίλημα (i.e. Gk φιλήμα ‘a kiss’), which is confirmed by φίλημα, the name of a hetaira (on which cf. BECHTEL 1902: 129–40, esp. 137). | At a lower level we encounter prostibulum ‘public prostitute’ (from prostare ‘to stand for sale’) and scortum ‘prostitute’, which, according to Varro and Festus, originally meant ‘hide, skin’. 35

The neuter as used in animal-names is curious. Following Varro (Latin Language, fr. 9 Goetz & Schoell = fr. 8 Kent), 36 Servius (on Verg. Georg. 1. 207) teaches as follows: ‘nullum habet Latinitas nomen animalis quod neutri sit generis’ (‘Latin has no animal-name of the neuter gender’). This is a correct observation, and problems were caused not so much by the general term animal, as by ostreum, the word for oyster in Lucretius, Horace, and Juvenal. The anomaly was correctly explained with reference to Greek, where oyster is ζώα (neut.). Strictly in Latin, the neuter ostreum referred only to the shell, and the animal itself was called ostrea (fem.; cf. French huître). Greek is quite different in this regard. While θηρίον (‘wild animal’) may be regarded as a diminutive, ὁρεύον ‘bird’ and κύτος ‘sea-monster’ are unequivocal examples of neuter animal names. An oddity is the substantivized adjective τὸ ἄλογον (lit. ‘the unreasoning (thing)’), which in later Greek became the ordinary word for horse. The way to this form was prepared by

34 On these words, see further W. (1890: 298).
35 See Maltby (1991: s.v.).
36 This is attributed to Varro by the grammarian Cledonius (Kaster 1988: Prosopography, no. 31), GL V, 41, 24–8.
the use of the plural τὰ ἀλογά as an all-embracing term for the animal world from Democritus and Plato on (cf. Hatzidakis 1892: 34–5).—From a German point of view, neuter animal names are no surprise. The general word Tier (‘animal’) apart, Rind, Ross, Schaf, Schwein, and Huhm (‘bull/cow’, ‘horse’, ‘sheep’, ‘pig’, and ‘chicken’) are all, if not morphologically, at least syntactically neuter, and we should not forget either the still unexplained word Weib (‘woman’).37

A brief review is called for of those cases in which a neuter and a non-neuter on the same stem exist side by side. This is another sort of gender-marking (‘Motion’). In many instances there is no recognizable difference of meaning between the form in (Gk) -ov, (Lat.) -um and that in -os, -us. But a first set of instructive examples is offered by pairs such as pīrum : pīrus (‘pear’), cornum : cornus (‘cornelian cherry’), etc., where the neuter denotes the fruit, the fem. the tree. This is not confined to Latin; in Greek we find exactly the same in κόμαρον ‘the fruit of the strawberry tree’: κόμαρος (fem., rarely masc., ‘the strawberry tree’), and with 1st-decl. fem. προύμον : προύμη (‘plum’), δον : δα (‘sorb-apple’ : ‘service-tree’). The oldest example of this is ἔλαιον (whence Latin oleum) : ἔλαι(ὗ) (whence Lat. òlìu ò, and ἔλαιος (‘wild olive’), where however the neuter denotes not the fruit itself but the substance produced from it; in Attic the fruit is called by the same name as the tree. Jacobsohn (1926: 376–7) has nicely compared in the same way NHG Bucht : Buche (‘book’ : ‘beech’), the word for book being originally the material produced from the beech.—Exactly the same can be seen in Sanskrit, and similar things in the Slavic languages, and a Dutch scholar has even added parallels from the language of an Indian tribe in British North America.38

On the other hand, it is true, the Romance languages have not preserved this inheritance. On other relations between feminines and neuters, see Johannes Schmidt’s book (1889) on neuter plural formations in Indo-European.

Different again is Latin uallum ‘rampart’ : uallus ‘rampart-stake’, where the masc. denotes the single piece, the neuter, the mass or collection of them. The

37 The etymology of German Weib, English wife and woman (from Old English wifmann), and cognates, remains controversial; see Kluge, s.v. ‘Weib’ with bibliography.
38 For further Latin examples, see Neue & Wagener I, 936. In Sanskrit, note e.g. āmra- masc. ‘mango-tree’, neut. ‘mango (fruit)’; see Delbrück (1893–1900: I, 93). For Slavic parallels, see Jacobsohn (1926: 376–7). Jacobsohn refers also (1926: 374–5) on American Indian languages to Franz Boas (the ‘father of American anthropology’ 1884–1942) writing of gender patterns in Chinook (British Columbia) in the first volume of his pioneering Handbook of American Indian Languages (1911–22: I, 598–9, 603). Note the lovely example of the word for canoexe, which, though ordinarily masc. (i-knim), when used as a container (e.g. for fish that one has caught) is fem. (a-knim): see Mithun (1990: 97–8) with further references. However, Boas was from Minden in north central Germany, and W.’s allusion to a Dutch scholar’s work is most probably to the study of noun inflection in Blackfoot by the renowned linguist C. C. Uhlenbeck (1866–1931), who also published on Indo-European languages, including etymological dictionaries of Gothic and Sanskrit; see Genee (2003). Uhlenbeck (1913: 7) includes examples such as mistis [animate] ‘tree, log’ vs [inanimate] ‘stick’, naipista [animate] ‘blanket’ vs [inanimate] ‘wool’. An alternative, though less likely allusion is to the thesis of de Josselin de Jong (1913) on gender patterns in Algonquian and Indo-European (esp. ch. 3); for the last two references and information about the respective works I am indebted and grateful to Inge Genee. On gender in Northern Iroquoian, see the interesting article by Chafe (2002).
same relation seems to hold between *forum* ‘market’ and *forum* ‘platform, gangway’. Here belongs also the case of Gk μῆρα : μηρός (I, 89 above), and cf. Homeric ἄστρα *the constellations*, to which a singular was formed after Homer (Alcaeus, frs. 347, 352 Lobel & Page; Alcman, fr. 1, 63 Page), alongside ἄστρον (‘star’); (ms. add.1: ἄστρα pl. is given as an Atticism by Hesychius.) At this point let me remind you that neuter plurals take a singular verbal predicate (I, 101–3 above). (On the alternation in Italic between neuter and masculine names of towns and territories, see II, 31 below.)

Not all languages which have to any degree preserved old gender distinctions have retained a separate neuter; Lithuanian e.g. no longer has neuter nouns, and equally the Romance languages have lost the neuter as a result of a development beginning in the colloquial language of the Empire: the singular is continued in the masculine (e.g. French *le voile* ‘veil’ < Lat. *velum*), the plural, in the fem. (French *la voile* ‘sail’ < Lat. *vela*).39

Now we come to the main point. So far with regard to gender I have spoken of the formal manifestation of nouns, but in grammatical study when we say that a noun is masc., fem., or neut., this really refers not to its ending but to the form of the pronoun that relates to the noun. As Varro puts it (*Latin Language* 9. 41), ‘*ea uirilia dicimus, non quae uirum significant, sed quibus praeponimus hic et hi, et sic muliebria, in quibus dicere possumus haec aut haec*’ (‘the nouns we call “masculine” are not those which denote a man, but those before which we use the forms *hic* or *hi*, and similarly “feminine” nouns are those of which we can use *haec* or *haec*’); reference is made to the same principle by the ancient commentators on the parallel definition in the Greek tradition (e.g. by the scholiast on Dionysius Thrax, *Ars* 12, *GG* I.3, 361, 15–17). We saw earlier (II, 9 above) that in the pronoun—and here we include of course the article—there are two forms for denoting male and female beings, and a third form for denoting objects. Now, the strange thing—which on closer reflection should strike us as really quite odd—is that these pronouns when used with or for a noun vary not only in accordance with their basic meaning; for the pronominal forms used in reference to male and female creatures are used extremely often also to refer to objects. In German one says not only *der Mann* (‘the man’, masc.), *die Frau* (‘the woman’, fem.), but also *der Fluss* (‘the river’, masc.), *die Quelle* (‘the spring’, fem.), where really in accordance with the basic meaning of the pronouns, *das* would be expected.

In our review of this so-called ‘grammatical’ gender, I should like to begin with something easier, namely with the question of the form of the pronoun when it

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39 For an overview of the loss of the neuter in Latin, see Harris (1978: 51–4) and Vincent (1988: 41–4). There are some vestiges of the Latin neuter in some Romance pronouns (see Harris & Vincent (eds) 1988: Index, s.v. ‘neuter’). In Baltic, the neuter is lost also in Latvian, but preserved in Old Prussian; as in Romance, traces survive in both Lithuanian and Latvian (Senn 1966: §93; Mathiassen 1996: 37, and 1997: 40). On loss of gender in Slavic and more generally in Indo-European languages, see Priestly (1983), and note also Szemerényi (1996: 155–7) with rich bibliography.
relates to a neuter noun. Now, the basic rule is well known, that here the
pronoun too appears in its neuter form, and, since neuters as a rule denote non-
personal objects, here is another simple and natural relation between a noun and
a word connected to it. We have seen, however, that words neuter in form
occasionally have personal referents, and in fact a certain inconsistency of usage
prevails here. As a rule, the pronoun reflects the form of the noun, and one says το
σον θυγάτριον (‘your little daughter’), hoc scortum (‘this prostitute’), das Kind (‘the
child’). Occasionally, however, account is taken of the natural gender of the
noun’s referent, and already in Homer we find φίλε τέκνον ‘dear child’ (e.g. II.
22. 84, Hecabe to Hector). Or take the Attic hetaira-name Γυνέριον, with a
neuter ending conditioned by the diminutive suffix: the accompanying article is
η. Exactly analogous is mea Glycerium in Terence (Andria 134, 969), and other
such names borrowed from Greek, e.g. hanc Philocomasium (Plaut. Miles 1296).
Of the same type is German die Fräulein, a frequent variant of das Fräulein (‘the
young woman’), but this is not restricted to diminutives, as the same occurs in
instances of metonymy. In Terence we read e.g. Eunuch 302 ut illum di deaeque
senium perdant qui me bodie renoratus est (‘may the gods and goddesses ruin that
[masc.] old man (neut., lit. old age) who delayed me today!’), on which Donatus
comments ‘nec mireris post senium qui additum, non quod, ideo quia declinationem
ad intellectum rettulit’ (‘do not be surprised that senium is followed by qui rather
than by quod, since he has made the inflection agree with the meaning’).

A similar case occurs with a very interesting word in Gothic, guþ, which
corresponds to German Gott, English God. By its inflection, this word is neuter
(so, nom. pl. guða, like waurda ‘words’), and it must originally have denoted an
object, and assumed the meaning ‘God’ by metonymy. Well, the word is treated
as a masculine in the pronominal forms which refer to it: e.g. Matthew 27: 46 guþ
meins (θεε μου) ‘my God’, although tellingly the compound galiuga-guþ (‘idol’, lit.
‘pseudo-god’) takes a neuter attribute. So, it is a neuter in form, but its gender for
purposes of agreement is masculine.

In origin, Latin Venus also belongs here. This word must have started as a
neuter meaning ‘grace, charm’, like the corresponding Vedic word vánas. Then a
goddess, who embodied these qualities, was named after them, and the word
combined with fem. pronoun and adjective, and only at this point (albeit already
in the oldest Latin we have access to) transferred to the non-neuter inflection
with an acc. singular Venerem instead of *Venus, and pl. Veneres. In Latin,

40 That is, there is a conflict between gender assignment based on morphology and that based on
semantics: such nouns are now commonly called ‘hybrids’; for further discussion and illustration, see
Corbett (1991: 66–7, 183–4 and Index, s.v. ‘hybrid nouns’).
41 Lat. venus remains in the classical language, from Lucretius on, ‘one of the standard neutral nouns of
the educated language for sexual intercourse’ (Adams 1982: 189; cf. Langslow 1999: 212). The classic study
of the word is Ernout (1956); cf. Leumann 378, and p. 478 n. 15 below.
conversely, the original masc. nouns *uolgus* (‘a crowd, the public’) and *niřus* (‘poison’) were treated as neuters because of their meaning, and in the nom. and acc. sing. followed the old neuters in -us (such as *genus* ‘stock, offspring’, *uulnus* ‘wound’); cf. Zimmermann (1924b: 238–41). Note that Skt *viśa*- and Avestan *viś*-/*viša*- (both ‘poison’) are neuters.42

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42 On the other hand, the Greek cognate *lós* is masc.; this word, based on a verbal root *yeis* ‘flow (slowly)’ (LIV, s.v.), is well attested in Indo-European languages, from Irish in the west to Tocharian in the east (Mallory & Adams 2006: 263). For a more circumspect treatment of Lat. *niřus* and *uolgus*, see Leumann 450.
I had announced that I would speak today about the distribution of nouns between masc. and fem., i.e. about the question which nouns the masc. and fem. forms of the pronoun and article go with. I now see, however, that I must say something more about the form of the nouns themselves by way of preliminary.

We have established that the neuters are characterized by a peculiarity of inflection. Are masculines and feminines distinguished in the same way? In Latin, when the old neuter uenus was elevated to denote a goddess, its inflection had to be changed, and it had to be given the non-neuter forms Venerem and Veneres (acc. sg., nom.-acc. pl.). But the other genders are not distinguished at all in inflection: the masculines agricola (‘farmer’), pòpulus ‘people’, piscis (‘fish’), exercitus (‘army’) are declined exactly like the feminines with the same terminations as terra (‘earth’), pòpulus ‘poplar’, nauis (‘ship’), quercus (‘oak’), and so too dies (‘day’), whether treated as masc. or fem. (II, 34–7 below), always has the same inflection. (A slight difference in the adjective we shall deal with later!) Here Latin has preserved an ancient feature: the opposition of gender, except in the neuter, had originally nothing to do with inflection as such.

Nevertheless, in German and Greek, the gender of nouns subsequently exerted an influence on their inflection. With reference to German, I can be brief. In the plural, a distinction may be recognized in that the ending -er (with dat. pl. -ern) is foreign to the fem. This is understandable, as it is the reflex of a termination of certain neuters. In the singular, by contrast, it is a characteristic of the feminines to keep by and large the same form in all cases, while throughout the masculine two or three case-endings appear. How this state of affairs arose, I cannot explore now.¹

¹ The modern German plural ending of masculine (e.g. Mann : Männer ‘men’) and neuter nouns (e.g. Kind : Kinder ‘children’) -er derives ultimately from the IE suffix *-es/-os- (seen in e.g. Gk and Lat. 3rd-decl. neuters of the type γέως, genus). Old High German neuter nouns bearing the suffix lost it by regular sound-change in the nom.-acc. sg. and were then assimilated into the a-stem declension, which also contained masc. nouns; the suffix survived in the pl., was reinterpreted as a marker of pl. and extended to masc. nouns. For details see Braune & Reiffenstein §§197, 232 with further references, and de Boor & Wisniewski §85. To give just one example, from the i-stems, of the contrast between masc. and fem. declension touched on by W.: already in Middle High German the single form kraft (fem.) ‘power, strength’ could take any case function, as the older, unumlauted gen.-dat. krefte yielded to ‘endless’ kraft; masc. gast ‘guest’, by contrast, continued into early modern High German to distinguish nom.-acc. gast, gen. gastes, dat. gaste; for a lucid and convenient survey, see de Boor & Wisniewski §§68–90.
More interesting is what we find in Greek. In what we call the 2nd and 3rd declensions, there is admittedly no difference of inflection between masc. and fem., but in the 1st declension separate paradigms for masc. and fem. are taught from the beginning in school grammars: in the nom. and gen. sg., we find in the masc. e.g. (nom.) πολίτης, νεανίς ('citizen', 'young man') vs (gen.) πολίτου, νεανίου, but in the fem. (nom.) τυμή, ἀρά ('honour', 'prayer') vs (gen.) τυμής, ἀράς. Now, it can be shown that this distinction is not original. To begin with, the masculines were declined like the feminines. We still encounter frequent nom. forms without -s of the type Σύνοπτα, Καλλία, Φιλοκλέδα in Locrian, Phocian, Boeotian, and further west (cf. Homeric ἵπποτα ('horseman'), and the like2), and in some Greek dialects the masculines have the same genitive ending as the feminines, namely -ās, which we know from Latin pater familias to be old | (on this, see now BECHTEL 1921–4: I, 268 [on Boeotian]).3 But because the 1st-declension masc. nouns were so frequently accompanied by 2nd-declension masculines (including the pronouns) and stood in agreement with them, they were assimilated to them, as follows: (a) in the nom., -ā/-η was gradually replaced by -ās/-ης on the model of -ōs; (b) in the gen., the secondary nature of the masc. ending allows us to show convincingly that Attic and Ionic, for all the closeness of their relationship, on this point diverge, as it is impossible to derive Att. πολίτου and Ion. πολίτεω ('citizen', gen. sg.) from a single form. The situation is as follows. Attic πολίτου has simply taken over the 2nd-declension ending, *ἀγαθὸν πολίτης ('good citizen') being replaced by ἀγαθὸν πολίτου already in pre-Attic. In other dialects, the 2nd-declension ending was not simply taken over but taken as a model. The oldest 2nd-declension genitive ending that we have is Homeric and Thessalian -oio; this yielded *-oow and thence by contraction -ouv.4 Now, at the time when the 2nd-declension form still ended in -o, it was taken as a model for the 1st declension (except in Attic) and in imitation of ἄγαθος: ἄγαθόο (or -oio) to the nom. πολίτας a gen. πολίταο was made. In Homer this is still the normal 1st-decl. gen. sing. masc. ending. By regular sound-change, this -ōo became -ā in Dorian and its sister-dialects, -āv in Arcadian and Cyprian, and -ēw in later Ionic.5 This, then, is a clear instance of gender influencing form, and

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2 Elean τελεστά (cf. Attic τελεστής, an official; Olympia, 6th c. BC) is probably a better comparison. Forms such as ἵπποτα 'horseman', μὴτέρα 'counsellor', with short a, are now generally regarded as old vocatives (of agent nouns in -ίας, occurring originally in fixed formulae of address but redeployed as nominatives. On the other hand, the possessive compound εὐρύπο 'wide-voiced' is an old acc. sg., similarly redeployed. See further, on all these types, Risch (1974: §§14d-15b) with references.

3 Note e.g. the Boeotian nom. sg. πιθονικα 'victor in the Pythian games' (IG VII. 1888, B.9), or the Arcamanian gen. sg. Προκλείδας (Buck no. 95; 5th c. BC). For further examples of masc. nom. sg. in -a (Bocotian, Elean, and NW Greece) and gen. sg. -ās (Megarian and NW Greece), see Buck §103 and LGPN IIIIB.


5 From -ηο, by a sound-change (common to Attic and Ionic) called 'quantitative metathesis', which also affects ηα > εα, whence the Attic acc. sg. βασιλεία 'king' vs Homeric βασιλῆ. In effect, the long η and the immediately following short ð or ε exchange their quantities; see Rix (1976: 57), Sihler (1995: §79.3). On the declension of masc. ð-stems, see further Rix (1976: 129–32), Sihler (1995: $267), Szemerényi (1996: 190 & fn.).
I should add as a footnote that broadly analogous, if not identical, inflectional distinctions between masc. and fem. arose also in Sanskrit. — A parallel to pan-Gk Σκότας for (Locrian) Σύνατα is furnished by the Greek rendering of Latin personal names in -a, in forms such as Gk Σύλλας and Νόμας (or Νομᾶς) for Lat. Sulla and Numa.

Very rarely, these new masculines in -ās (-ης) have feminines in -ā (-η) on the same stem alongside them, so that something like gender-marking has emerged. So, e.g. Γέλας and Ιμέρας are the Sicilian rivers on which the towns Γέλα and Ιμέρα stand; and there is Boeotian πύας ‘meadow’ (< *ποίας CAUER & SCHWYZER no. 485, Thespiae, 3rd c. BC) beside pan-Greek ποία, πό ‘grass’. The former type (Γέλας, etc.) is explained by the desire for masculine river names, and may be paralleled more broadly in Italy, where the river (and perhaps mountain) names Ticinus and Tifernus stand beside the towns Ticinium and Tifernum, etc. (cf. SCHULZE 1904: 537–8). The masculinizing of ποία to ποίας, on the other hand, remains unexplained: the one sure thing is that the meaning ‘meadow’ is the older, as the exact cognate in Lithuanian pį́evą (fem.) means ‘meadow’.

But now let us proceed to the main question, why particular nouns have a specific gender, and which. I begin with Greek and Latin, and I take first those nouns which denote animate beings and, it follows, sexually determined beings, since the school textbook’s rule speaks for itself, that nouns denoting men and peoples are masc. and those denoting women are fem., never mind which declension they belong to. Let us first go through the declensions one by one.

In the 1st declension, things are clear and simple. I stress just one point to note, namely that in Latin the -a inflection is used as much to denote male as female beings, and in one common group of words in particular, namely compounds of the type agricola, transfuga, parricida (‘farmer’, ‘deserter’, ‘parricide’), the ending -a has never had any connection with the feminine. We now know that here, as in the Greek 1st-declension masculines, we have an old formation for denoting human beings, especially agents (performers of the action of the verb). These include a few Proto-Latin simple forms such as scriba (‘scribe’, to scribo ‘I write’) and numerous borrowings from Greek, in which the Greek ending -ās / -ης is replaced in Latin with -a, as in nauta (‘sailor’) or the man’s name Sosia, from Greek ναῦτης, Σωσίας. Varro reports (Latin Language 8. 41, 81; 9. 41; 10. 27) that the Anomalists added Perpenna, Caeccina, Spurinna as instances of men’s names with female ending, but these, as well as Numa, Porssenna, Sisenna, are borrowed from Etruscan, where -a was a common ending of names. Thanks to SCHULZE’s famous work on Latin personal names (1904), we now know how thoroughly

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6 So, for example, nouns with stems in -a- (< *-o-) are all masc. (or neut.), while those with stems in long -ā-, -ē-, -ē are very largely fem.; see Whitney (1889: 112–16, 124–30).

7 On Indo-European words for types of land and domesticated plants, see Mallory & Adams (2006: 163–7); for ‘open meadow’ they reconstruct (p. 166) *poih₁weh₂.*
permeated Latin names were by foreign elements of this sort. (Vendryes (1922) has recently made the plausible suggestion that certain vulgar derogatory terms such as scurrus 'city idler, buffoon' and epithets like Nasica also owe their -a to Etruscan influence.) Of another type again are cognomina like Asina, Catilina (lit. ‘dogmeat’), Ouiicula: these are fem. appellatives used as individualizing epithets. 8

In the 2nd declension, Greek and Latin part company. Latin nouns in -us denoting animate beings all refer to males, while Greek has a number of old words in -os which denote females and therefore take the fem. forms of the pronoun and the article. Let us first recall two well-known words, ἡ παρθένος (‘maiden, girl’), of which the etymology is still uncertain, and ἡ νυός from | IE *smusó-s, which survives also in German in the form Schmur, which in earlier German (e.g. in Luther) is the word for ‘daughter-in-law’ (modern German Schwiegertochter), and in which the r is an example of the same rhotacism (i.e. r from earlier *s) that we see in the alternation verlieren (‘lose’) : Verlust (‘loss’), English forlorn : lose. 9 Now, Greek is the only IE language to have this word with 2nd-declension inflection, but the different forms in the other languages are easily explained as secondary. Its cognate in Latin is nurus (where the r has the same explanation as in the Germanic forms above), 10 which belongs to the 4th declension because Latin is resistant to 2nd-declension forms denoting female beings, and because, as the word for ‘daughter-in-law’, it forms a natural counterpart to socrus ‘mother-in-law’, which, as Sanskrit (*svas̱ru̱-) and Slavic (OCS svekry) show, is an old u-stem. 11

Because it was assumed, on the basis of Latin and Sanskrit, that 2nd-declension nouns denoting female beings could not be original, numerous attempts were made to explain away such words as νυός and παρθένος (‘daughter-in-law’; ‘maiden, girl’). But we must just calmly recognize that stems in -o- could also denote female beings and accordingly that they had feminine gender. This is

8 Schulze (1904) is still indispensable and has been recently reprinted (1991), with corrections by O. Salomies. Nevertheless, he (and hence others, incl. Vendryes) is perhaps inclined to exaggerate the extent of Etruscan influence. Most of the cognomina in -a listed and discussed by Kajanto (1965: 105–7) have manifestly Latin etymologies; alternative explanations of the -a ending include appeals to ellipse of one sort or another (Rix 1963: 230; 1995b: 730) or to old collectives (Klingenschmitt 1992: 90–q.v. on the important role of personal names among Latin 1st-decl. masculines). For a brief recent overview, with essential bibliography, of Etruscan and Roman personal names, see Rix (1995a; 1995b); for longer standard accounts of praenomina, gentilicia, and cognomina, see, respectively, Salomies (1987), Rix (1972), and Kajanto (1996).

9 For further information on rhotacism (r < Proto-Germanic z < IE *s) in North and West Germanic (not Gothic), see e.g. de Boor & Wisniewski §§23–6, Braune & Reiffenstein §§102-4, 168, Szemerényi (1996: 51), Fortson (2004: 303, 315, 320).


11 On the place of IE *smusós and *svekrůs in Indo-European kinship terminology, and for the numerous other attested reflexes of the words (incl. Old English smur and swejer), see Mallory & Adams (2006: 210, 213).
further supported and confirmed by the existence of whole categories of words of this type. I referred in an earlier lecture (II, 15 above) to the use of agent nouns in \( -\delta s \) of female agents.

On nouns in the other declensions I want to make just one point, namely that the use to denote a person of originally non-personal words (and I don’t mean only neuters—cf. II, 19 above) can give rise to a shift of gender. A well-known example is the Italian masculine \( \text{id po} \text{desta} \) (‘governor, magistrate, podestà’), which continues the Latin fem. \( \text{potestas} \) ‘power of an office’, which occurs already in the classical period of the holder of the office (rather like the originally abstract \( \text{magistratus} \) ‘magistrate’ ← ‘magistracy’): so, Vergil not only calls Jupiter (\( \text{Aen. 10. 100} \)) \( \text{pater omnipotens, rerum cui prima potestas} \) (‘the all-powerful Father, the highest power in the universe’), but makes Venus address him directly (\( \text{Aen. 10. 18} \)) as \( \text{o pater, o hominum rerumque aeterna potestas} \) (‘O father, O eternal power over men and the world’). Similar to \( \text{po} \text{desta} \) is Latin \( \text{optio} \), originally ‘free choice’, with the usual fem. suffix \( -\text{tio} \) added to the lost verb underlying \( \text{optare} \) (‘wish, choose’): as the title of a military assistant who has come forward voluntarily, it is masculine. \(^{12}\)

Next: the nouns of common gender (\( \text{nomina communia, Gk δύοματα κοινά} \)). \(^{13}\)

This is the familiar term for nouns denoting animate, sexual beings, which can denote either the male or the female without change of form—although, depending on the sex of the referent, a pronoun in agreement will have either the masc. or the fem. form. In the 1st declension Latin has examples. Grammarians such as Priscian (4. 6, 5. 6 = GL II, 121, 4; 144, 5) teach explicitly that words like \( \text{agricola} \) (‘farmer’), \( \text{aduena} \) (‘foreigner’), etc. are used also as feminines, when they refer to female agents. Examples of this type include Plautus, \( \text{Poenulus 267 seruolicolas sordidas lit. ‘dirty slave-tenders’ (of prostitutes who give themselves to slaves),} \(^{14}\) and in the 2nd–1st century Atellan farces of L. Pomponius (line 16 Ribbeck) \( \text{conuiuas meas ‘my (female) table-companions’ (cf. K. Meister 1916: 49).} \)

In the 2nd declension we find this phenomenon not in Classical but in Old Latin, obviously as a relic from prehistoric times. Ennius used \( \text{lupus} \) (‘wolf’) also as a fem. (\( \text{Ann. 65 Sk. lupus feta} \)), and the old religious language knew \( \text{agnus} \) (‘lamb’) and \( \text{porcus} \) (‘pig’) too as nouns of common gender (on \( \text{lupus femina} \) and the like, see the remarks above, II, 10). That the special feminines \( \text{agna, lupa} \) (in

\(^{12}\) The OLD takes the underlying verb in \( \text{optio} \) in a passive sense (s.v., 2.): ‘a junior officer chosen by a centurion or decurion to assist him’. On \( \text{optio} \), cf. Leumann 366, and on the whole class of Latin masc. nouns in \(-\text{io}, -\text{ionis}\), see Gaide (1988).

\(^{13}\) Also known as ‘double- (multiple-)gender’ nouns; for general discussion and further illustration, see Corbett (1991: 67, 181–3).

\(^{14}\) The first word in this phrase is transmitted as \( \text{seruolicolas} \), which has been defended and taken (e.g. by J. L. Ussing and F. Skutsch 1902: 103) as a ‘diminutive’ adjective (\( \text{seruilitis ‘servile’ + -culus} \)) rather than as a compound in \( \text{-cola} \). Maurach (1988: \( \text{ad loc.} \)) either misprints the word or has changed his mind since the 1st edn of his commentary (1975); he scarcely comments, but he does refer helpfully to Conrad (1930: 143), who clearly takes the word as W. does.
Old Latin always ‘whore’), and *porca* represent innovations was recognized in part already in antiquity (Quint. 8. 3. 19; Servius on Verg. *Aen* 8. 641).—In Greek, 2nd-declension nouns of common gender are numerous, and include ὅ and ἡ ἀδώδος (‘singer’—and the others listed above, II, 15), together with ὅ and ἡ τῆμωρός ‘avenger’, and in addition animal names such as ὅ and ἡ ἐλαφός, κάμηλος (‘deer’, ‘camel’). I should like to draw your attention to one word in particular, horse: this is ὅ ἦττος and ἡ ἦττος, not ἡ ἦττη (the hetaira’s name ἦττη proves nothing), although we have *equus* : *equa* with gender-marking in Latin, and the Sanskrit and Lithuanian cognates display special feminine forms. It is highly probable that Greek shows the oldest state of affairs. Let me mention in passing an interesting special usage, nicely discussed by Brugmann (1909). You may know from the Greek historians that ἡ ἦττος denotes not only the mare but also the cavalry. The singular is no surprise (see I, 92–4 above), but why in this particular case the feminine? It is true that mares were often preferred to stallions as chargers and race horses, but the explanation here lies deeper. It is common generally to use a salient feature of any group as a way of referring to it. The Latin neuter pecus -oris (‘cattle; herd, flock’), to judge from its Greek cognate πέκος (‘wool, a fleece’, cf. πέκευν ‘to comb, card’, πόκος ‘wool, a fleece’) originally meant ‘fleece’, and then (influenced by inherited pecu ‘cattle; flock’ [cf. German Vieh], and by pecus -udis (fem.) ‘a single head of cattle; sheep’) ‘flock’, ‘small domesticated animals’, ‘animals’ collectively (forming a plural in Classical Latin, though not in Cicero, and not being used of a single animal until the Augustan poets).

II, 25 Similarly, military | units for example are named after their equipment, *Waffe* (‘weapon’) being used of the bearers of a particular weapon (e.g. in *Ansturm der scharfen Waffe* (‘attack of the lancers’ in Freytag, quoted by Grimm, *D. Wb.*, s.v. ‘Waffe’, II. 3(f), col. 280)). In earlier French, *lance* denoted a detail of ten knights (Littré, s.v., 6), and just so in Sophocles (*Oed. Col* 1312) and Euripides (*Phoen* 442) λόγχη is a troop of lancers. Even commoner in this sort of meaning was ἄσπις (lit. ‘shield’): so e.g. Herodotus 5. 30. 15 δικασταισχιλίνη ἄσπιδα ‘8,000 hoplites’ (and so too αἰχμη, πέλτη, κόπη, lit. ‘spearhead’, ‘small, light shield’, ‘handle, hilt’). Analogous to this then is ἡ ἦττος for cavalry (whence Herodotus 1. 80. 12 also has ἡ κάμηλος for the part of the army riding on camels), the fem.

15 W. here includes also ἀρκτος ‘bear’ as a noun of common gender, but its use as a masc. is doubtful and it is more plausibly regarded as a fem. *epicenum* (Jannaris 1897: §244).

16 As probable reflexes of an IE word for ‘mare’, note in addition to Skt a´s´va¯ - and Lith. esˇva`, also Avestan aspa¯; see Mallory & Adams (2006: 139).

17 The preferability of the female in various working contexts is reflected also in the semantic development of the Latin general term for working equids, male and female *iumentum* — French *la jument* ‘mare’. Note, however, that Varro, *Rust* 2. 7. 1 Guiraud, and Pliny, *Nat* 8. 165, imply that it was usual to prefer the stallion for war; see Adams (1993: 45 n. 24, 54). On the use of the horse in the Greek and Roman worlds, see Vigneron (1968).

18 This is in ch. 17 of the popular social-historical work *Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit* (‘Pictures from the German Past’; 5 vols, 1859–67) of the German dramatist and novelist Gustav Freytag (1816–95).
being favoured because of the above-mentioned fem. words, and perhaps also
because of the general terms ἳ τάξις (‘rank, battle-array’) and ἐρ (in the sense
‘band, body’ of men, esp. soldiers).\footnote{For further examples, see Brugmann (1909a), Schwzyer & Debrunner 42, Löfstedt (1942: 14) adding French le canon ‘artillery’; for basic bibliography on Greek and Latin military terminology, see De Meo (1986: ch. 4, esp. 204).}

Another very interesting case is the word for ‘divinity’ in Greek. You know that in Attic θεὸς is a noun of common gender, which you can as well use of Athene θεὸς as of Apollo or Zeus. It would be silly to look for anything more behind this than the ability of 2nd-declension nouns to denote female beings, but in this word in particular we can observe the move to eliminate 2nd-declension nouns of common gender and in a sense to be more precise by confining forms in -ος to the masculine gender and making new forms in -ά for denoting females. As a result of this, we find in dialects other than Attic—and in Acolic in particular—the form θέα, and thus it is that in Homer, whose language contains Acolic elements of course, the word for goddess is so often θέα. Homer attests also the form θεά,\footnote{Gk θέα is confined to the formula πάντες τε θεοί πάνω τε θεάναι ‘all gods and all goddesses’, II. 8. 5, etc., and derivative expressions, e.g. Od. 8. 341 (on the latter, see Hainsworth in Heubeck, West, & Hainsworth 1988: ad loc.).} with the suffix of τέκανα (see II, 2 above).—Latin goes further in this direction: we have already mentioned (II, 24 above) agna, lupa, porca, and equa, and with Gk η (and ο: see n. 15, p. 430 above) ἄρκτός we can contrast Latin ursus : ursa (‘male bear’ : ‘female bear’).

Nouns of common gender are still more frequent in the 3rd declension, e.g. in Gk ὁ and ἡ ἄλεκτρον, δελφαξ, ὅρνις (‘cock’, ‘pig’, ‘bird’; cf. Athenaeus, Sophists at Dinner 9, 372b, 373c, 375b, and II, 1–2 above). We encounter some instances involving words which generally mark gender or which, given their morphology, could mark for gender. Although the Latin suffix -trīx is known as early as Plautus as the fem. form of -tor, the form auctor alone is used also of women, especially in the phrase auctor sum (e.g. Plaut. Stichus 129, pl.). The meaning of auctor, ‘strengthen’, ‘guarantor’ (from augeo in the sense ‘give power’), originally did not admit a female referent, and so the word was left in its masculine form, even when used of a woman, and merely given fem. gender (e.g. Ovid, Fasti 5. 192 optima tu proprii nominis auctor eris ‘you (Flora) will be the best guarantor of your own name’). Only late on did writers venture auctrix (first in Tertullian), which did not achieve widespread currency; cf. Bücheler (1909: 3–4). Compare the use in French of auteur and peintre of female authors and painters. | The words antistes ‘priest’ and hospes ‘host, guest, visitor’ sometimes admit both genders, and sometimes alternate with the fem. forms antistita and hospita. Ennius wrote Annals 60 Sk. Ilia, dia nepos (‘Ilia, godly granddaughter’), probably because he (like the grammarians, e.g. Charisius, pp. 114–15 Barwick = GL I, 90, 24–7) felt
that the gender-marked form *neptis*, although still current in his day (II, 11 above), was too unusual,\(^{21}\) while *nepos* had support for its use in both genders from e.g. *custos* (‘guard’) and *sacerdos* (‘priest’). In Late Latin, however, the last-mentioned word in the meaning ‘priestess’ was given the more clearly marked forms *sacerda* and *sacerdotissa* (cf. II, 11 above), and *neptis* was replaced by *neptia* (like *auiia* ‘grandmother’; cf. French *nièce*). Of the same type are the feminines *coniuga* and *compara* (‘wife’, ‘consort’) attested in imperial inscriptions, for *coniux* and *compar.*\(^{22}\)

Beside the *koivá*, or *communia*, the ancient grammarians recognize a category of *ēpíkoivá*, which may be translated roughly as *quasi-communia*. Latin speakers were unable to form a corresponding expression with the resources of their own language, and so simply borrowed the Greek term, and in this we must follow them. Nouns called *epicoena* are those which denote beings with natural gender, but which are used in just one grammatical gender to refer both to the male and to the female: in other words, the grammatical gender does not correlate with the sex of the referent.\(^{23}\) This type is well known in German, where the words for e.g. fox (*Fuchs*), mole (*Maulwurf*), and eagle (*Adler*) are masculine, goose (*Gans*), duck (*Ente*), and nightingale (*Nachtigall*) feminine, without in any case making special reference to either the male or the female. We find exactly the same in the classical languages: suffice it to mention Gk ἡ ἀλώπηξ and Lat. *haec uulpes* (both fem., ‘fox’) and Gk ἡ χελιδῶν, Lat. *haec hirundo* (both fem., ‘swallow’).

Valuable for us at this point is an observation of Varro (*Latin Language* 9. 55–6; cf. also *Rust.* 3. 5. 6). He first establishes that both male and female animals are referred to sometimes with masculines (*ille coruus* ‘raven’, *ille turdus* ‘thrush’), sometimes with feminines (*illa panthera* ‘leopard’, *illa merula* ‘blackbird’), and then mentions that some theorists have seen in this evidence of the essential irregularity of language, given that in numerous other cases natural gender was distinguished by the endings -*us* : -*a*. He then makes the acute comment that languages distinguish sex only when it is of practical significance: it is important to distinguish stallion and mare, hence *equus* vs *equa*, but in the case of the raven it does not matter whether a given animal is male or female, and here a single form can suffice. He illustrates this nicely also with the word for ‘pigeon’: In the old days, before pigeons were kept ‘in eo usu domestico quo nunc’ (‘in the same

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\(^{21}\) O. Skutsch (1985: *ad loc.*) disagrees: ‘Ennius probably preferred *nepos* here because *neptis* sounded too homely…., especially if, as seems likely, Ilia was addressed as “grandchild of gods” rather than “my granddaughter” ‘.

\(^{22}\) *coniuga* is attested in imperial literature (Apuleius, Martianus Capella) as well as on inscriptions; *compara*, in only one inscr. (*CIL* VI. 1082 = *Anthologia Latina* II.1, no. 218, 3, of a mare *cursando flabris compara* ‘in speed the equal of the winds’); see *ThLL*, s.vv. ‘coniuga’, ‘compar’, col. 2004, 30.

\(^{23}\) I retain W.’s term ‘epicoenum’, pl. ‘epicoena’, but note that ‘epicene’ (adj. and noun, pl. ‘epicenes’) is now common in linguistic literature; for a general discussion of the type and further illustration, see Corbett (1991: 67–8).
domestic use as today’), people said just *columba*, even for the male. Now, however, since it has become increasingly common to domesticate pigeons, *columbus* and *columba* are distinguished. This is in accordance with actual usage. Before Cicero, we do indeed find only *columba*—at Plautus, *Rudens* 887 *illīc in columbum credo leno vertitur* (‘that pimp, I think, is being turned into a pigeon’), Schöll was probably right to insist on emending to *columbam*. Catullus is the first to attest the masculine securely, and both of his instances are characteristic. The one (68. 125–6 *neq tantum niveo gauisa est ulla columbo | compar*, lit. ‘nor did ever (female) partner enjoy so much a snow-white male dove’) concerns the tenderness of the female pigeon compared with the male; and in the other (29. 8) Mamurra is insulted for doing the rounds of all the women *ut albulus columbus* (‘like a little white pigeon’). In both passages, *columba* with feminine ending would have been unsuitable. Similarly, the masculine form at Horace, *Epistles* 1. 10. 5 makes good sense: the poet compares himself and his friend Aristius Fuscus with *utuli notique columbi* (‘an intimate old pair of pigeons’), the masc. pl. denoting the pair of one male and one female bird, where *columbae* would neither have expressed the idea of a couple nor suited a comparison with two men. These instances apart, *columbus* did not establish itself until the Empire, and, in complete contrast with the passage of Horace just quoted, is avoided by Propertius at 2. 15. 27 *exemplo iunctae tibi sint in amore columbae, | masculus et totum femina coniugium* (‘let doves be your example, joined together in love, male and female, a perfect union’). Incidentally, in Greek the corresponding word περιστερά (fem.) is standardly an *epicoenum*, while the masc. περιστερός is a rarity, just once or twice attested in Attic comedy (cf. Athenaeus 9, 395b).25

With these secondary formations, *columbus* and περιστερός, we may compare Cicero’s *beluus* for *belua* (Post red. senat. 14: see Klottz 1915: 212–15), and also cases in German where alongside *epicoena* special forms are created for one sex or the other: e.g. beside feminine *epicoena*, the expressly masculine *Kater, Tauber, Ganser/Gänserich, Enterich* (‘tomcat’, ‘cock-pigeon, ‘gander’, ‘drake’; and more rarely *Schwalberich, Spinnerich* ‘male swallow’, ‘male spider’26) for the male of the species, or conversely beside masculine *epicoena* the expressly feminine *Hündin, Wölfin* (‘birch’, ‘she-wolf’; and more rarely *Füchsin, Äffin, Häsin* ‘vixen’, ‘she-ape’, ‘female hare, doe’). Indeed, beside fem. *Katze* (‘cat’) we also find the formation

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24 Schöll prints *columbam* in his edn of 1887 (III.3 of the complete works ed. by F. Ritschl), and he defends it in the critical preface to the 1896 edn of *Rudens*, in the complete works edited by himself and Goetz—where, however, *columbum* of the manuscripts is printed, as it is generally by editors ever since. This passage is the first example under ‘columbus’ in the *ThLL* and the *OLD*, and, as W. implies, the only one before Varro.

25 And satirized as un-Attic in Lucian’s *Solecit*, 7.

26 I have been unable to find either *Schwalberich* or *Spinnerich* in any of the large-scale dictionaries of German (including D. Wb. and the Schweiz. Id.). A local Austrian native-speaker informant tells me that the words are fully part of her active vocabulary, but she, too, is unable to find them in any dictionary, even in those of Austrian German!
Kätzin; Eduard Mörike in his poem ‘Mausfallen-Sprüchlein’ (‘Little Spell for a Mousetrap’) even ventures ‘liebe Mäusin oder Maus’ (‘dear Mrs or Mr Mouse’; cf. Lommel 1912: 79); and Hanns Oertel draws my attention to a similar saying in ch. 18 of the novel Ekkehard (1855) by Joseph Victor von Scheffel (1826–86) with the words Talpin and Hämsterin (‘female mole’, ‘female hamster’).

We shall have more to say later about other shifts involving epicoenum animal names, but let me here mention the curious fact (highlighted already by Quintilian, 9. 3. 6) that Vergil uses as masculines the epicoena damma ‘deer’ and talpa ‘mole’, although they are usually fem. in accord with their endings, and Vergil is not referring specifically to the male (cf. Ital. and Span. topo ‘mole’). Conversely, Homer uses χοίρος (‘goose’), which is usually masc., also as a feminine although without special reference to the female.
A few words more on the epicoena! While they generally involve animal names, this is not always the case. Charisius (4th c. AD), a Roman grammarian and purveyor of wisdom not his own, makes an interesting observation (pp. 130–1 Barwick = GL I, 102, 20–3). He contends that words like heres, pares, homo (‘heir’, ‘parent’, ‘person’), which are semantically of two genders, can be used of both men and women, and yet are always masculine; that no one refers to a female person succeeding to an inheritance in second place after someone with a prior claim as a secundam heredem (‘second (fem.) heir’), nor does one speak of a malam hominem (‘bad (fem.) person’) or a bonam parentem (‘good (fem.) parent’). Charisius adduces positive examples, too, such as the phrase in a letter probably from Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi, to one of her sons: tuus pares sum ‘I am your (masc.) parent’.

The observation is correct in itself, and as far as a word like heres is concerned, which cannot take a fem. attribute before the Empire, the situation is entirely understandable in that inheritance was originally through the male line. Homeric χηρωσταί (far-off kinsmen, who prey on the property of one dying without heirs; II. 5. 158), etymologically related to Lat. heres, is exclusively masculine. Even in German, where the fem. Erbin exists, there are situations where the masc. Erbe is used of female persons (cf. GRIMM, D. Wb., s.v. ‘Erbe’ (6), col. 712). But of the words discussed by Charisius, it is pares that deserves special attention. Karl Meister has a nice discussion of pares in his exciting book on Greek and Roman proper names (1916: 124–5). He shows that to begin with the only really common form was the plural parentes (which strictly one could regard as a masc. epicoenum, just like other plurals which embrace both males and females), alongside masc. pares denoting one of the two members of the parental couple in cases where the distinction between father and mother was not being considered. Cover-terms for persons tend indeed to be masculine. So, in a law of the king Servius Tullius (quoted by Festus, p. 260, 8 Lindsay), as a dire

1 On Flavius Sosipater Charisius, see Kaster (1988: Prosopography, no. 200).
2 This letter is transmitted in the manuscripts of Cornelius Nepos (frs. 1–2 Guillemin; Courtney 1999: ch. 8). For a balanced review of the question of its authenticity, see Horsfall (1989: 41–2); Courtney (1999: 136) argues more strongly that it is a free composition found by Nepos in one of his literary sources.
3 This remark seems to have been removed from the new edn of the D. Wb., vol. 8 (1999), s.v. ‘Erbe’.
consequence for one who raises his hand against his parents, si parentem puer uerberit, ast olle plorassit, puer diuis parentum sacer esto (‘if a puer has beaten a parens, and he then brings a charge (or: calls for witnesses), the puer is to be consecrated to the gods of the parents’), where clearly parentem denotes simply one part of parentum (‘father’ or ‘mother’), and where incidentally puer is gender-neutral and to be translated as ‘son or daughter’ (SCHULZE 1918: 499 n. 3). Just so, in Cornelia’s letter above, we must translate e.g. ‘I am (in the position of) a parent of yours’. —Later, however, in the classical period, parens can denote just the father when masc., and just the mother when fem., although the latter is at first possible only in a metaphorical sense, as when Cicero (Att. 9. 9. 2) speaks of his patria (‘homeland’) as antiquissima et sanctissima parens (‘most ancient and sacred parent’). The Augustan poets then go somewhat further, as e.g. at Verg. Aen. 9. 84 where Cybele refers to herself in relation to Jupiter as tua cara parens (‘your dear parent’). This is poetic and not attested before the Augustan period.

The word homo—the third masc. epicoenunum mentioned by Charisius—may be taken together with German Mensch (‘human being, person’; also jedermann ‘anyone’, niemand ‘no one’, Old Icelandic mabr ‘man; person’ [GRIMM, D. Gr. III, 315]) and Gk ἄνθρωπος (‘human being, person’). This last word, of which the etymology is still unresolved, has some interesting aspects for us in the present context. First, in later Greek (according to the tradition, already in Aeschines, 3. 157) it comes to mean ‘man’ (i.e. male human being), just like Latin homo in Romance. In both cases, this development, while occasioned by the notion that the man represents humankind par excellence, was favoured also by the fact that both words are grammatically masculine. Moreover, in Ionic and Attic, corresponding to this use of ὁ ἄνθρωπος, a fem. ἡ ἄνθρωπος split off from the epicoenunum as a part-disdainful, part-sympathetic word for γυνὴ ‘woman’. —Incidentally, the Aeolic-Homeric word βροτός (‘human being’: see below, II, 286) also shows the development to the meaning ‘man’ (note e.g. Arist. Thesmo. 683 γυναιξὶ καὶ βροτοῖς ‘women and ?men’), and, conversely, is occasionally fem. (Od. 5. 334 βροτός αὐδήσασι ‘a mortal woman with human voice’, of the sea-nymph Ino).

Add.: The meaning ‘man’ is also presupposed by the personal name Ἀντιβρότη of an Amazon in Quintus of Smyrna, Posthomerica 1. 45, on the model of the Homeric formula Ἀμαξίωνας ἀντιανεῖρας.—On the substance of the foregoing section, see also LOBECk (1837: 27) and Ernst FraENKEL (1910–12: I, 27).]

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4 On the text and interpretation of this provision, see Szemerényi (1969) with further references.
5 In ms. add. W. deletes the last two sentences, and adds references to Cic. Phil. 2. 49 parens tua (of Julia, mother of M. Antonius), and to Hofmann (1932: 174).
6 Cf. French homme, Italian uomo, Spanish hombre, etc.; but see the various meanings collected in REW, s.v. ‘homo’.
7 This is much more likely to be a humorous surprise: ‘women and mortals’ for usual ‘gods and mortals’ (cf. the comm. of C. Austin & S. D. Olson (Oxford 2004), ad loc.)
In German, note also the examples adduced by Grimm (D. Gr. IV, 333–5) and Wilmanns (III, 731–3), including der Kranke (masc., ‘the patient’) even of a woman, and the saying die Not ist ein herber Gesetzgeber (‘need (fem.) is a harsh law-giver (masc.’). Note also the use of Herr of a woman, e.g. in Luther’s translation of 1 Timothy 2: 12 einem Weibe gestatte ich . . . nicht, dass sie des Mannes Herr sei (‘I do not allow a woman . . . to be the man’s master’); in the Gk original αὐθεντεῖν : Lat. dominari : Gothic fraujinon). Wilmanns adduces also two instructive passages from Schiller’s tragedy Maria Stuart (1801): first, act 3, scene 6 Du warst die Königin, sie der Verbrecher (‘you were the queen, she the criminal’), where Mortimer calls Elizabeth Verbrecher (masc.) because he is concerned with her general position vis-à-vis Mary, whom he is addressing, which, had he used the fem. Verbrecherin would not have emerged so definitely; similarly, a little earlier, Mary says to Elizabeth, act 3, scene 4 regierte Recht, so läget Ihr vor mir im Staube jetzt, denn ich bin euer König (‘if right prevailed, you would now be lying before me in the dust, for I am your king’).—Finally, an expression which properly suits only one sex may be extended on an isolated whim to a member of the other, if s/he is different from the rest. Early in Otto Ludwig’s story Die Heiterethei und ihr Widerspiel (‘Heiterethei and her Opposite’, of 1857), the inn-keeper’s wife says to Heiterethei du bist ein Spitzbub das ganze Jahr (‘you’re a rascal (masc.) the whole year’); cf. also Tobler (1902–12: V, 3–7) on French mon chéri (‘my darling’, even to a female person) and the like.

I come now to the second main class of nouns (cf. II, 22 above), namely those denoting inanimate objects. If both semantic and formal criteria are set up by the rules for gender which are pressed into young heads at school, well, this corresponds to the historical linguistic reality. A given gender was attached both to certain meanings and to certain endings, and often both aspects can be shown to be not only part of the ancient inheritance but also a factor that never ceases to cause shifts and transfers.

We should now consider in the first instance the facts of the two classical languages, especially Latin. On the use of the genders in Latin—thanks both to the ancient grammarians (note the many rare cases assembled by Nonius Marcellus in Bk 3, ‘De indiscretis generibus’ (‘On indistinguishable genders’, pp. 279–344 Lindsay), and to Neue & Wagener I, 889–1019—we are much more comprehensively and accurately informed than in regard to Greek, for which there exists no complete collection and assessment of the actual evidence.

In Latin, generally masculine are the names of rivers, winds, and months. Of these three categories, only the first calls for further comment, as the masculine gender of the other two is determined by the ancient masculines uentus and mensis, respectively, most wind- and month-names being in origin attributes of these. The same is true in Greek, where the head-nouns were ἀνεμός and μήν. In the case of river-names, things are not so straightforward. (ms. add.²: Cf. on
Indo-European river-names Kretschmer (1937).

Of the three Latin words for river, only *fluuius* is masc. at all periods: *flumen* (originally ‘a flow(ing)’) is always neuter, and *amnis* (which incidentally disappeared early from ordinary speech and was hence avoided by Caesar, is very rare in later literature such as the Vulgate, and is not continued in Romance) was often (perhaps exclusively?) fem. in pre-classical Latin and not consistently treated as a masculine until the classical period, in all probability precisely under the influence of *fluuius* and because of the general gender rule. But in the context of the ancient view of rivers as male divinities (see Nissen 1883–1902: I, 300), all Italian river-names are masc., from *Tiberis* and *Anio* on. This normally applies even to 1st-declension names like *Albula* and *Cremera*, even though they are the only masc. *a*-stems with non-personal reference (save, in poetry, e.g. *Aetna, Oeta, Ossa*, which are masc. under the influence of *mons* ‘mountain’). The rule generally applies even to foreign river-names, especially those of Gaul and Germany, including many in -a, such as *Sequana, Garumna, Isara*, and even *Mosella*, which rhymes with *puella* and similar feminines (although [ms. add.²:] in Ausonius’ poem about the Mosel, the river names *Druentia* at 479, and *Garumna* at 483, are fem.). The rule holds also in Greek, where, although springs and streams are feminine, the lead for rivers is apparently taken by the appellative ποταμός masc. (‘river’, lit. ‘broadening out’, cognate with English *fathom*, NHG *Faden* (‘six feet’), Proto-Germanic *faþma* ‘span of the arms, arms’ breadth’). Accordingly, the fem. river-names of India are always masculinized in Greek, *Ganga* becoming Γάγανα, *Asiknı* (lit. ‘the black one’, fem.) becoming Ακεσίωνης, *Candrabhaṇga* Σανδροφάγος, *Vitasta* Υδάσπης, *Sindhu Ινδός.*

A word needs to be said here about German river names, where the fem. gender is overwhelmingly predominant. Just think of those in German-speaking Switzerland, beginning with the most basic name, *die Aa* (cf. Gothic *ahwa* ‘river’, Lat. *aqua*; cf. II, 16 above). This word recurs in the -a ending of North German river-names like *Fulda* and *Werra*. And then—just to confine ourselves to the surrounding area—there are the *Aare*, the *Birs*, the *Emer*, the *Ergolz*, the *Glatt*, the *Limmat*, the *Reuss*, the *Saane*, the *Thur*, and so on; the *Birsig*, now masc., was once fem. as well. On the other hand, the names of several large, famous rivers, such as the *Rhein*, the *Main*, the *Neckar*, and the *Inn* are masc., but the contradiction is only apparent, as all these latter names are non-Germanic and date from before the period when the Germanic peoples settled on the banks of these rivers so named.

French river-names are also mainly feminine, with exceptions including *le Rhône*, where the background is similar to that of the Rhine, etc. Its ancient

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8 This etymology, which relates the noun ποταμός ‘river’ to the verb πετάνυμι ‘spread out’, is advanced tentatively by Fick (1890–1909: I, 473), and is weighed by Frisk (with bibliog.) and Chantraine, s.v.
name, Rhodanus, was also masc., probably a Ligurian name, for it recurs on Corsica, having then an origin of pre-Celtic date, and retaining its masc. gender through all changes of population and language. In the German of the canton Wallis (in southwest Switzerland), they call the Rhone der Rotten (masc.), but in other Alemannic dialects and in written German the French form has been borrowed and accorded fem. gender as is usual with German river-names and as is suggested by the French ending.

The rule whereby certain semantic categories have the fem. gender concerns mainly the nouns of the Latin 2nd declension, although an important part of the rule whereby names of towns, states, and islands are fem. is not relevant to Latin. Genuinely Latin names of states are either neuter like Latium, Picenum, Bruttium or fem. in -a like Apulia, Gallia, Corsica. So, too, names of towns: on the one hand Antium, Lanuvium, Praeneste, Tibur, on the other, Roma, Alba, Capua, plural Fregellae, Fidenae—although there are also masc. plurals, such as Gabii and Veii. All town names in -us are Greek, Corinthus no less than Rhodus: in these, as in words denoting persons, Greek had no objection to feminines in -ος, the fem. gender being suggested by γῆ (‘land’) and πόλις (‘city’).

Native to Latin, on the other hand, are the fem. tree-names in -us, like fagus, ulmus, and populus (‘beech’, ‘elm’, ‘poplar’). These are inherited, as the Greek fem. φοιescortos (‘oak’) shows. This use of the feminine is of interest especially for its parallelism with the corresponding neuter denoting the fruit (II, 17 above): in anticipation of our later general discussion, we may say that the tree was regarded as the bearer, the fruit as the thing borne (cf. Meillet 1921a: 217).

These two categories apart, the feminine is barely represented in the Latin 2nd declension. In two instances, it originates in an underlying or closely related fem. monosyllable. This is certain for humus, which has developed (the intermediate stages do not concern us here) from the Indo-European word for ‘earth’ (continued in Gk χθόν ‘earth’, χειμ-ai ‘on the ground’). The other, Latin domus (‘house’), corresponds to the Greek masc. δόμος, but, as Gk δεσπότης (‘master’, lit. ‘house’s lord’, with the first element < gen. sg. *δεσμος-) and Sanskrit dām-pati-show, there was once an old stem dem-/dom- with the same meaning, from which domus could have somehow inherited its gender. The few other feminines of

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10 Lat. humus, Gk χθόν, Skt ksam-, Hitt. tėkan (all meaning ‘earth’) and numerous other cognates, including Old English guman ‘man’ (seen in the second part of the modern English compound bridegroom), all continue one form or another of IE *dhegot ‘earth’; for further details and bibliography, see Mallory & Adams (2006: 120–1, 131).

11 For IE *dɒm- / dom-, with nom. sg. *dóm, note also Gk δῶ, Skt dām, Armenian tow-, and Gothic Avestan dām-patīr- (= Skt dām-patī-) ‘master of the house’. For further detail, also on the verbal root *dēm(b)ī- ‘to build’, and bibliography, see EWAia, s.v. ‘dām-‘, LIV s.v. ‘*dēmhs-‘, Mallory & Adams (2006: 220–2, 229).
this declension—*aluus, colus, uannus* (‘belly’, ‘distaff’, ‘winnowing-basket’)—we must just accept as relics of an earlier widespread usage such as we see in Greek.

For in Greek, even apart from the big semantic categories, there are numerous feminines in *-ος*. On the assumption—suggested especially by Sanskrit—that *-ος* was in origin an exclusively masc. ending, great efforts have been expended on explaining away these feminines in *-ος*. I draw your attention particularly to the observations directed at this aim by Bußmann (1830–9: I, §35 n. 2) and Delbrück in his ‘Foundations of Greek Syntax’ (1879: 12–13). Now, some instances can certainly be explained as the result of a transfer. For example, the fact that *δρόσος* ‘dew’ is fem. can be explained by the influence of its synonym *ἔρυη* (*‘dew’, pl. ‘raindrops’*; which, as a 1st-declension noun, is fem. from the start: cf. Skt *varśā* ‘rain’). Or if *οἶμος* ‘road’, which to begin with is always masc., can be used from the fifth century also as a fem., then *ὅδος* may be behind it. Similarly *γνάθος* (*‘jaw’*) like the old inherited fem. *γένυς* (*‘jaw’*). But in the majority of cases there is no such way out. How are we going to explain itself, or *ʔέρσι* (*‘disease’, ‘excrement’, ‘stone’—the last of which is sometimes fem. already in Homer)? There is no alternative: we have to say that from a very early date nouns in *-ος* could be either masc. or fem. This agrees with what we established in an earlier lecture (II, 22–3 above) about nouns in *-ος* denoting living beings. Let me add expressly that the language of poetry and the other dialects attest many more examples even than Attic. I would mention from Homer (e.g. *Il. 16. 361*) the peculiar word *ʔροῖζος* ‘whistling, whizzing’, from Apollonius of Rhodes (4. 1290), *ʔσπέρεος* ‘evening’. And *λιμός* (*‘hunger, famine’*) shows a curious inconsistency, fem. in Doric or Doricizing texts and also in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter (312), but otherwise masc. (though without a secure attestation of its gender in Homer).

We noted earlier (II, 3) that the Greeks themselves felt their fem. in *-ος* to be an anomaly, and subsequently transferred many of these nouns to the first declension. Incidentally, this must be the explanation also of NHG *Buche* (*‘beech’*, from Proto-Germanic *bōkō*, in the declension corresp. to Gk and Lat. *ā*-stems: contrast 2nd-decl. Gk *φυγός*, Lat. *fāgus*): when the Germanic word was borrowed by Slavic, it still had an *o*-stem (see Jacobsen 1926: 367–8). In Latin, the situation was occasionally remedied by isolated admission of masculine use, as e.g. of *aluus, colus, and humus* (‘belly’, ‘distaff’, ‘earth’)—whence the Romance masculine tree-names such as Ital. *pero* ‘pear-tree’, *pruno* ‘plum-tree’, etc.—or by transfer to the 4th declension, which, except in the nom. and acc. sing., had different case-endings from those of the masc. pronoun and adjective, so that no anomaly was perceived: *colus* and *humus* are again examples, and so too are *fāgus* and *laurus* (*‘beech’, ‘laurel’*), which fitted well with *quercus* (*‘oak’, an old *u*-stem), and—an
especially early and frequent instance—domus, although in this word a further factor was probably involved in the u-stem inflection.12

For our purposes, third-declension nouns in both Latin and Greek defy closer study, as they show so many uncertainties (cf. Quintilian, 1. 5. 35). For certain stem types the gender was inherited (cf. II, 37 below), and then conflicts could arise between morphological type and general semantic rules for gender. Let us take two sets of examples from Greek. Nouns in -ων denoting living-quarters or places where things are found, when used as appellatives, are always masc. (e.g. ὀ νόοσ ‘men’s room’, ὀ καλαμίου ‘reed-bed’), but when, as often happens, they serve as names of towns, they can sometimes be fem., although this practice does not become fixed. Already in Homer we find Ὄλιζόνα τρηχείαν (‘rough (fem.) Olizon’, II. 2. 717; according to Fick (1909: 18), the name of a place where many ἄλτει ‘white poplars grow’),13 and equally Ἀχερόδος and Πλευρόν as feminines. Ancient scholars were led to comment especially on the uncertain gender of the most famous place-name in -ον, Μαραβόν (note e.g. the Atticist grammarians Philemon of Athens in Porphyry of Tyre (3rd c. AD), Homeric Questions, Bk 1 (p. 288 Schrader = pp. 38–9 Sodano), and the 14th-c. Byzantine grammarian Thomas Magister, Selection of Attic Words, s.v. (p. 242, 5–8 Ritschl).14—Another large group of place-names is of those formed in -(Ϝ)έντ-, with a meaning similar to -ων. When they denote islands, (since νήσος ‘island’ is fem.) they are always formed from the start with the fem. form of the adjective, e.g. Άνθεμέθεσσα ‘the (island) rich in flowers’, the name of the Sirens’ island in Hesiod (fr. 27 Merkelbach and West), while as names of country areas and demes they are masc., e.g. Λχερόδος lit. ‘area where many pear trees grow’. | But such names formed as masculines could then in turn become town names, and then uncertainty set in. So, Άνθεμεθσα, the name of a town in Chalcidice, is masc. in Thucydidcs (2. 99. 6), but fem. in the best manuscripts of Demosthenes (6. 20—although the tradition is not unanimous). And the Sicilian town name Σέλενος (‘place where much celery grows’), which is formed in the same way, in Diodorus is masc. at 13. 75. 6 but fem. at 13. 43. 6, 59. 4.—It is regrettable that specialists in the Greek language have yet to produce a reliable collection of all the material.

Latin 4th-declension nouns are mainly masc., but do include some feminines other than those semantically determined (cf. II, 23, 33 above), such as porticus (‘portico, colonnade’), tribus (‘tribe’), and in Old Latin metus (‘fear’). The

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12 W. is probably alluding to the suggestion, raised on the basis of cognate forms in Slavic, Sanskrit and Armenian, that a u-stem *domu- should be reconstructed for IE. This idea is now generally rejected; see Walde & Hofmann, and Ernout & Meillet, s.v. ‘domus’, and Leumann 276–7, all with further references.


14 For bibliographical orientation on Thomas Magister (active 1301–46) and the two Greek glossographers called Philemon, including the later one whose work on Herodotus is here used by Porphyry, Philemon of Athens (c. AD 200; no. 14 in PWRE XIX.2, 2152), see Dickey (2007: 15, 98–9).
etymology of the last has yet to be determined, but it can hardly belong with the verbal nouns in -\textit{tus}.\textsuperscript{15}

In the 5th declension, most nouns retain the fem. gender they inherited. The gender of \textit{diēs} (‘day’) is a story in itself, and has caused considerable debate both in antiquity and then again in the last twenty years. (See most recently the \textit{ThLL}, s.v., and also three extensive and finely argued studies: LÖFSTEDT (1911: 192–5), Ed. FRAENKEL (1917), and SALONIUS (1921/2). And now compare also KRÄTSCHMER (1923a) and (1924), ZIMMERMANN (1924a), and WACKERNAGEL (1925).) So it is perhaps appropriate to devote the time that we saved on the 3rd and 4th declensions to a detailed consideration of this word.

Latin \textit{diēs} continues an Indo-European word which meant both ‘sky’ and ‘day’ and at the same time was the name of the chief god (the latter preserved in Gk \textit{Zeôs} and Lat. \textit{Iupiter}, the old voc. (I, 310 above), and \textit{Diespiter}, the old nom.). The meaning ‘day’ survives in Greek only in derivatives such as \textit{êôdiôs} ‘at midday’, apart from the statement in Macrobius (\textit{Saturnalia} 1. 15. 14) that the Cretans ‘\textit{\tau\nu \iota\mu\eta\varphi\alpha\nu uo\kappa\alpha\tau}’ (‘use the word \textit{\delta\iota\alpha} [i.e., acc. sg. of \textit{Zeôs}] to mean ‘day’). Conversely, in Latin the word is practically confined to the meaning ‘day’, although ‘sky’ is attested in the old phrase \textit{sub diu} (to which \textit{sub diuo} is only very distantly related) and \textit{sub Ioue}, both ‘out in the open’. I do not know how individual poets in the early Empire came to use \textit{diēs} in the sense of \textit{caelum} (Ov. \textit{Met.} 1. 603; Lucan 1. 153, 7. 189, 8. 217).\textsuperscript{16}

According to both the ancient grammarians and the evidence of our texts, \textit{diēs} has two genders, their use being determined by chronological, semantic, and stylistic factors. For referring to an agreed day, as in \textit{status diēs}, our earliest texts (the Twelve Tables, Naevius, and Ennius) know only the masculine, feminine use not being attested before Plautus.\textsuperscript{17} This is consistent with the fact that all phrases of prehistoric origin including \textit{diēs} are masculine: so the collocations of \textit{diē} with an adjective in the locative, e.g. \textit{postrı¯-diē} (‘on the next day’), \textit{merı¯-diē} (< *\textit{\textacute{m}e}-\textit{diē} ‘at midday’), to which later a complete paradigm—nearly always masc.—was built, with nom. \textit{meridies}, \textit{diē crastini}, \textit{diē quarti} (‘the day after’, ‘three days later’), etc.; the calendar phrases \textit{ante diem quartum} (‘four days before \textit{X}’), etc., \textit{diē ater} (‘unlucky day’), \textit{diē fastus} (‘judicial day’),\textsuperscript{18} and lastly the especially ancient \textit{nudiustertius} ‘the day before

\textsuperscript{15} According to Leumann 276–7, 355–6, \textit{porticus} is fem. in imitation of \textit{domus}, and \textit{domus} is a \textit{u}-stem in imitation of \textit{porticus}. On \textit{metus}, see Ernout (1957).

\textsuperscript{16} Cf. \textit{OLD}, s.v., 2(b) ‘the open sky’, (c) ‘the weather’, citing also Phaedrus, Seneca, Statius, the Elder Pliny and (fig.) Tacitus. This sense of \textit{diēs} is attested first in the Ovid passage and remains always poetic, acc. to F. Bömer in his commentary (Heidelberg 1969), \textit{ad loc}. In the second and third Lucan passages, A. E. Houssain in his edn (Oxford 1926) took \textit{diēs} as ‘longitude’; this is well discussed by R. Mayer in his edn of bk 8 (Warminster 1981), \textit{ad loc}. and Appx 1.

\textsuperscript{17} In Plautus, \textit{diēs} is masc. at e.g. \textit{Curculo} 5, in the sense ‘appointed day’, but fem. at e.g. \textit{Epidicus} 544 ‘lapse of time’. Plautus is more fairly called a contemporary of Ennius, while Cn. Naevius (fl. 235–204) really does belong to the generation before.

\textsuperscript{18} Roman calendars marked in red and black, resp., \textit{diēs fasti} and \textit{nefasti} or \textit{atri}, days on which public business was or was not permitted to take place.
yesterday’ (lit. ‘now is the third day’), with *nudiusquartus, etc., *dius being an old nom. form. That the exclusively masculine use is original may be inferred also from the cognates of the word in other Indo-European languages, where the use of the word as the name of a male god deserves special attention. Conversely, it is precisely as an innovation that the fem. is easy to explain. Given that all other 5th-declension nouns were fem. from the beginning, admission of dies as fem. would have been almost impossible to avoid. The strong influence of formal factors in the gender of dies is seen for one thing in its near-total avoidance of the fem. in the plural. Latin nouns in *-īs, with the exception of the one-off *facierum (‘faces’) in a speech of Cato the Elder (fr. 98 Malcovati = 71 Jordan), are not found in the plural before the second century AD (Neue & Wagener I, 575–9)—and Cicero really struggles to decline species (‘form, type’) in the plural at Topica 30—so that dies was subject to their influence only in the singular. The effect of morphological influence is seen also in the exclusively fem. diminutive, diecula, which matched recula and specula (‘a small amount’, ‘slight hope’) in Plautus, and nubecula, sedecula, and nulpecula (‘small cloud’, ‘small seat’, ‘(small) fox’) in Cicero, while masc. *dieculus would have been formally quite isolated. By contrast, in the corresponding Oscan diminutive form zicolom (acc. sg. / gen. pl., etc., five times on the Tabula Bantina, Lu 1 Rix), the masculine gender has been retained.

From the time of its first appearance until the prose of the classical period, this fem. dies is almost completely confined to one particular meaning (in which it predominates over the masc.), ‘appointed day’ (and the related sense ‘term’) in the legal or business sense, either in a general sense or with reference to a specific day. Right up until the present day numerous attempts have been made to understand this, without yielding a convincing explanation. Most probable, although of course not certain, is still the old thesis of Kretschmer (1909), according to which dies acquired fem. gender in the period before Plautus on the model of tempestas fem., which means ‘appointed time’ in the laws of the Twelve Tables, i.e. solis occasus suprema tempestas esto (‘sunset is to be the latest time’), or the synonymous fem. tempestus -ītis in the Books of the Augurs (acc. to Varro, Lat.

19 Nom. sg. *dius, or *dīus, is thought to continue *dīeu- and so to be exactly comparable with Gk Zeós, Skt dyaus, the Germanic war-god Tyr, seen in Old English Tīw (cf. mod. Engl. Tuesday), etc. (cf. I, 310 & n. 20, p. 390 above). Acc. sg. *dieum > Gk Zívī, Skt dyām, Lat. diēm, whence the new nom. diēs. The underlying root of *dīeu- is *dīeq- ‘be bright’; *dieu- serves in turn as the base for the derivative *deiu-o-, the most frequently attested word for ‘god’ in IE languages (Lat. deu-, Skt devá-, etc.). For further information on the Indo-European background, and bibliography, see Mallory & Adams (2006: 300–1, 306, 408–9, 414).

20 Cicero argues for his term formae in preference to species as a translation-equivalent for Gk ἐκπνύον on the grounds that the gen. and dat.-abl. pl. forms specierum and speciebus are not Latin and that even if they were he would not care to use them.

21 On Oscan zicolom and the synonymous (?dialect variant) iúkleı́ (loc. sg.), see Untermann (2000: s.v.v.) with further references.

22 Cf. tempestas for tempus ‘time’ in early and classical poetry, and in historical prose, esp. Sallust and Livy (OLD, s.v., 1).
II, 36  *Lang. 7. 51*). This model did not affect other time expressions | because only *dies* had an ending that so decisively called for feminine gender. (Note *tempestas* = *dies* at Cic. *Div. 1. 52 tertia te Phthiae tempestas laeta locabit* (‘gladly the third day [from now] will place you in Phthia’), a translation of Socrates’ allusion to *Il. 9. 363* at Plato, *Crito 44b2 ἡμείς κεν τριτάτῳ Φθίην ἐρίβωλον ἥκοιο* (‘on the third day you would reach fertile Phthia’).

Admittedly, this semantic restriction did not always hold—in colloquial speech, for one thing, where naturally formal analogy was more influential than in the educated language. Inscriptions of the imperial period show how the fem. is gradually admitted more and more for all the senses of *dies*. Suffice it here to mention that, according to the figures given in the *ThLL* (s.v., col. 1024), in the late Empire while the classicizing Ammianus and Augustine’s no less stylized work *On the City of God* have between them 150 examples of the masc. compared with only four of the fem., the Vulgate has beside 343 instances of the masculine no fewer than 615 of the feminine. According to Löfstedt (1911: 194–5), a contributory factor in this increase in the use of the fem. was the frequent collocation of *dies* with *hora* (on which, note also Jeanneret 1922: 15–16); according to Salonius (1921/2: 25–9), it was especially the Christian Latin word *feria* ‘day of the week’. In the case of bilinguals, the Greek fem. *ἡμέρα* (‘day’) might have had an influence, too (cf. II, 37, 46 below).—The full enfranchisement of the fem. in all meanings of *dies* is reflected in the Romance languages, most clearly in the word for Sunday, which although masc. in the west (*[dies] dominicus* > Span. and Port. *domingo*) further east is fem. (*[dies] dominica* > Fr. *dimanche*, Ital. *domenica*, Rom. *dumenica*).

Freer use of the fem. is seen in addition in high poetry of the classical period. The pattern of use in Vergil is very clear: he simply exploits the possibility offered by the living language of varying the gender of *dies* in the interests of the metre. (This was seen first by Köne (1840: 85–6), in his excellent book on the language of Roman epic.) As attributive determiners tend to precede their nouns, it was convenient for a dactylic poet to be able to use a word ending with *-a* rather than *-us* before the iambic *dies*. Vergil has the pattern *-a dies* in numerous combinations, including the notable *atra dies* (fem. ‘black day’, *Aen. 6. 429*) as opposed to the formal religious term *dies ater* (cf. n. 18, p. 442, above). That it was metrically conditioned is particularly clear from the fact that, in contrast with combinations of *dies* + *adj.*, with the pronoun it is always *ille* (masc.) *dies* (cf. Ed. Fraenkel 1917: 62), as the fem. pronoun offered no prosodic advantage over the masc. The same applies to *Georgics 3. 66 optima quaque dies* (‘all the best days’) and *Aen. 10. 467* (Jupiter to Hercules) *stat sua cuique dies* (‘there stands for each man his allotted day’), as in these fixed phrases the superlative and the possessive had to stand immediately before the pronoun, and *optimus quisque* and *suus cuique* would not | have fitted the dactylic metre. Only very rarely does Vergil have *dies fem.*
when there is no metrical need. A striking instance is at Geo. 1. 276–7, where 276 *dies alios* (‘some days’) is followed by 277 *quintam fuge* (‘avoid the fifth!’), with the fem. modelled on Hesiod, *Works* 802 πέμπτος ἐξ ἀλέασθαι. 23 By and large, the same is true of the poets before and contemporary with Vergil, and of several epic poets of the imperial period (*ms. add.2*: cf., however, Lucan 7.254 *illa dies*). By contrast, Propertius and, even more so, Ovid use the fem. very frequently without any metrical necessity. This can hardly be due to the influence of the colloquial language, although for other features of Propertius’ language this factor cannot be ruled out. SALONIUS neatly suggests (1921/2: 14–24) that the fem. *lux* in the sense ‘day’—so frequent in the Augustan poets in particular—may have played a part here: note e.g. how Ovid, *Ars amatoria* 1. 413–16 uses *qua luce* and *quaque die* as synonyms (‘on which day’) and in parallel.

It is well known that imperial literary prose from Livy on is strongly influenced by earlier poetry. Consequently, it not infrequently uses the fem. *dies* outside the boundaries set in the classical language; this is particularly prominent in Tacitus.

23 Note, however, the alternative, argued for by R. Mynors in his commentary on the *Georgics* (Oxford 1990), *ad loc.*, that we should understand *quintam* as ‘fifth moon’ (*lunam*) rather than ‘fifth day’. On Hesiod, see West (1978a: *ad loc.*).
Such are the facts of the use of the genders in Greek and Latin. How are they to be explained? Here we need to bring the other languages, especially German, into the picture, and on this point let me refer you emphatically to the rich presentation of the use of the genders in Germanic in the third volume of Jacob Grimm’s *German Grammar* (D. Gr. III, 342–57), one of the finest sections of this fine work. [Add.: A work that I should have used and quoted in this section is Madvig’s article on gender in language (1836; German tr. 1875).]

One point needs to be made at the outset. Speakers of Greek, Latin, and the Germanic languages were not the first to distribute their nouns between various genders. No, the principle of having three genders was inherited, and each inherited word had its own particular gender. Hence the numerous agreements across the languages that concern us here. Apart from nouns denoting persons, where agreement is only to be expected, inherited masculines include: Lat. *dens* : NHG *Zahn* (‘tooth’), *pes* : *pous* : Fuss (‘foot’), *mensis* : *μόνυ* : Mond/Monat (‘month’; cf. II, 35 above on *dies*); inherited feminines include: Lat. *nox* : Gk νύξ : NHG *Nacht* (‘night’), Gk γένους (‘jaw’) : Gothic *kinnum* (‘check’), Lat. *nauis* : Gk ναύς (‘ship’), Lat. *biems* : Gk χιόνιον (‘winter’), Lat. *uax* : Gk ὁφ (‘voice’); and inherited neuters include: Lat. *cor* : Gk ἄρσεν : NHG *Herz* (‘heart’), Lat. *genu* : Gk γόνον : NHG *Knie* (‘knee’), Gk ὁδός : NHG *Ohr* (‘ear’). Similarly, it can be shown that all suffixes have each an inherited gender: e.g. the fem. gender of the Greek abstracts in *(=)*, -(=) has its exact counterpart in Latin, in forms such as *uestis* (‘attire’), *pars* (< *partis* ‘part’; cf. the adverb *partim* ‘in part’), beside NHG *Macht*, Geburt, Schuld (‘power’, ‘birth’, ‘guilt, debt’); dulcedo (‘sweetness’); and *ciuitas* (‘state, city’), respectively, and the same is true of the other derivational types. The numerous shifts which nevertheless occur will not be discussed here.

Given all these agreements, we find ourselves thrown back a stage, to the Indo-European parent language, although the problem remains the same. There are really


2 German *i*-stem nouns, incl. reflexes of Proto-Germanic *(< IE *-tis)*, have regularly lost final *(< IE *-tis)* before the Old High German period, although they are still referred to as *i*-stems; for details, see Braune & Reiffenstein §§44, 82b.1, 218–19.

3 This question is less prominent in recent surveys of gender in Indo-European, such as Sihler (1995: §251), Szemerényi (1996: 155–7), Meier-Brügger (2003: 188–90).
two questions: first, why are words for non-personal objects not always neuter (II, 15–18 above)? In other words, why are the words for e.g. ‘ship’ and ‘house’, since they denote things, not neuter in Greek and Latin, as they are in German (Schiff and Haus)? And secondly, of these non-neuter words for non-personal objects, by what criteria do some acquire masculine gender, others feminine?

One particular theory, which (as we saw earlier, II, 5) fundamentally goes back to Protagoras, is in fact enshrined in our terminology, and equally in the broadly corresponding terminology of the Indian grammarians. This is that, by giving words denoting things non-neuter form and by using with them forms of the pronoun and article that are usually applied to male and female beings, we attribute to objects features characteristic not of objects but of male or female nature. How to account for this is something that prompted reflection already in antiquity. An interesting piece of evidence for this is to be found in the commentary of the Platonist Ammonius (3th/6th c. AD) on Aristotle’s On Interpretation (ed. A. Busse, CAG IV.5, 35–6).\(^4\) According to Ammonius, the creators of language in determining gender had regard to analogies between objects and male or female creatures, an active, giving object being treated as masc., a passive, receiving one, as fem. Let me pick out his comment on the moon, because here things are rather more complicated. Ammonius himself (p. 36, 1–10 Busse) regards the opposition 
\(\delta\ \tilde{\eta}\lambda\iota\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\) (‘sun’, masc.) : \(\acute{\eta}\ \sigma\epsilon\lambda\upsilon\eta\nu\eta\) (‘moon’, fem.) as natural, because the moon receives its light from the sun, although he is bound to acknowledge that another view is possible. For one thing, he mentions that the Egyptians regard the moon as male (obviously not merely in linguistic terms, but in their mythology),\(^5\) because (he supposes) the moon gives light to the earth. He then refers to the fact that Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium (190b2–3) has the moon be both male and female.\(^6\) This is plainly because in Attic alongside \(\sigma\epsilon\lambda\upsilon\eta\nu\eta\) the old masc. \(\mu\upsilon\nu\) (or \(\mu\epsilon\iota\varsigma\)) survived meaning not only ‘month’ but also ‘moon’ (though with the latter meaning only in a transferred sense).\(^7\) It is well known that other languages, too, disagree over the gender of the words for ‘sun’ and ‘moon’.\(^8\)—Ammonius also (p. 36, 10–12) uses \(\omega\iota\rho\iota\alpha\nu\varsigma\varsigma\) : \(\gamma\upomicron\iota\) (‘heaven’ : ‘earth’) for his theory, in a manner very reminiscent of Varro (cited by Augustine, City of God 7. 28) much earlier, and indeed already suggested by the old Greek myth of creation. It is remarkable that in this pair of meanings, although the words vary, nearly every language agrees on

\(^4\) On Ammonius, see Blank (2005) with bibliography.
\(^5\) The Egyptian for ‘moon’, \(\tilde{n}h\iota\), is masc. (as is the word for sun, \(r\)) (cf. Gardiner 1997: 34, 486); and the Egyptian moon gods, Thoth and Khons(u), are both male (cf. Budge 1904: I, 412–13; Erman 1907: 11–12; Morenz 1973: 264, 270).
\(^6\) Ammonius’ word is \(\acute{i}p\rho\iota\nu\circ\omicron\theta\eta\omicron\omicron\nu\) ‘hermaphrodite, of both sexes’ (LSJ), ‘mascufeminine’ (Blank).
\(^7\) Perhaps W. means that the only 5th-c. example of \(\mu\upsilon\nu\) ‘moon’ (as opposed to ‘month’) is in an inscr. (IG I\(^2\), 403, 65 = I\(^2\), 387, 32), where the word denotes an ornament in the shape of a crescent moon. However, \(\mu\upsilon\nu\) and \(\mu\epsilon\iota\varsigma\) are attested of the moon itself in the 4th c. (LSJ, s.v. ‘\(\mu\epsilon\iota\varsigma\)’, 2).
\(^8\) Closest to home is German, where the sun (die Sonne) is fem. and the moon (der Mond) masc. See further below.
gender. Like Gk ὄρατος, Lat. dies (at least early on: II, 35 above) and NHG II, 39 Himmel (‘sky, heaven’) are masculine; and in Latin beside the usual neuter caelum (‘sky, heaven’), we find Caelus, caelus in Ennius (Annals, frs. 24 [as a theonym], 559 Skutsch) and in Vulgar Latin (cf. II, 46 below and n.). Equally, among words for the earth it is not only γη that is fem. but also, in Greek, the old inherited word χθόν, and αῖα; in Latin, humus, terra, and tellus; and in Germanic, NHG Erde and its cognates from Gothic airþa on.

This type of explanation, with its starting point in the grammatical terms, has always been predominant. It is often called ‘Grimm’s account’, as nowhere is it set out with a better combination of scope and subtlety than in Jacob Grimm’s grammar (D. Gr. III, 342–57). It is like a summary of all earlier accounts tending in this direction, when he encapsulates (p. 357) the fundamental view: the masculine is the manifestation of what is prior, larger, active, etc., the feminine of what is posterior, smaller, passive, receptive, etc., the neuter of what is created, material, general, insensate, etc. He accounts for gender, then, in terms of the analogies between the characteristic properties of objects and those of the natural genders. And really the only general difference between Grimm and Ammonius is that for Grimm the origin of what he calls (p. 343), in the words of Wilhelm von Humboldt (1827: 12), this ‘extension of natural gender to each and every object’ lies in imagination, in the physicality of the earliest language, while in the Greek philosopher’s account, the putative language-maker is led by λογικής ἐπίνοια ψυχῆς (‘the inventiveness of a rational soul’) — a telling contrast!

Grimm assumes actual personification only in isolated cases, and does not regard it as a general foundation of the phenomenon of gender. But before Grimm that was the view of J. G. Herder, the great discoverer of the primitive, the folk, the poetic, for whom gender was based on a sort of anthropomorphizing of inanimate nature.10

It is possible to support this view of Herder’s with all sorts of examples. To be sure, the fact that the Greeks regard Helios as a god, and Selene as a goddess, while the Germans speak of a female sun and a masculine moon, and many examples of this sort, could all be secondary effects of gender, a possibility already taken into account by Grimm, for whom the masc. or fem. starting point in ἰλιός, die Sonne establishes the sex of the associated figure when personification

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9 The word is masc. sg. also at Lucretius 6. 483 (perh. alluded to by Cicero, Ad fam. 9. 26. 3). The fact that the word is always masc. in the pl. suggests that the masc. sg. is also old and that the neut. sg. is an innovation of the literary language (Ennius has it at Ann. 205 Sk.); see Skutsch (1985: on fr. 24) with further references.

10 On the philosopher, theologian, critic, and poet Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803), who exerted immense influence also on Goethe and on German romanticism at large, see Forster (2001) with bibliography. Herder’s idea that the primary locus of a language was in the people that spoke it was seized on and developed by Wilhelm von Humboldt; on this aspect of his philosophy of language, see C. Taylor (1985: esp. 227–34) and Morpurgo Davies (1998: ch. 5).
occurs. So, too, the opposition between the medieval Frau Minne (‘Lady Love’) and the boy Eros of antiquity is explained in the same way, simply as the result of the different genders of MHG minne (fem.) on the one hand and Gk ἔρως (masc.) on the other. Another nice example of this sort was adduced by Wilamowitz.\(^\text{11}\) We regard death as a man, as in the medieval folksong: es ist ein Schnitter, heisst der Tod (‘there is a reaper, his name is Death’); so, too, the English poets, despite the fact that English otherwise has no gender (cf. II, 41 below). In contrast, it is very striking that Goethe in Götter, Helden, und Wieland (‘Gods, Heroes and Wieland’, a farce written in his youth, 1774) speaks of a goddess of death, a female escort to Hades, doubly surprising in that the context is the story of Alcestis, in which Euripides long before had made the male Thanatos (Death) appear. But everything is made clear by the knowledge that Goethe was here dependent on a French model: in French, death is feminine (la mort), and hence death for French-speakers is a woman.\(^\text{12}\)

It is, however, important to remember how often, quite apart from gender, objects are named in personal terms. Take, for example, κρατήρ ‘mixing-bowl’ or λαμπτήρ ‘lamp’ (whence—via the Latin loanword lanterna—English lantern, German Laterne, etc.): both Greek words are attested already in Homer, and numerous words for tools ending in the same suffix could be added from Ionic and Attic (see Ernst Fraenkel 1910–12: I, 1–2). Now, of course nouns in -ήρ really referred to persons, and denoted a conscious agent. Here, then, we find quite clearly dead tools conceived of as performing an action. We can compare German words for tools such as der Heber (‘jack; siphon’, lit. ‘lifter, heaver’), or words for ships such as der Kreuzer, der Schnellsegler (‘cruiser’, ‘fast sailing ship’). Furthermore, in a word like Stiefelknecht (‘bootjack’, lit. ‘boot-servant’), this personal image is expressed not through a mere suffix, but through the second element of a compound; cf. Szadrowsky (1918: 19 n. 3) on the words Herr and Knecht (‘master’ and ‘servant’).\(^\text{13}\) I remind you also of the animal names used for war machines: Gk κριός, σκορπίος (‘ram’, ‘scorpion’), Lat. testudo, aries (‘tortoise’, ‘ram’): here, because the thing moves, it is regarded as an animate creature. Here belongs in a sense also the use of personal names to denote objects, as

\(^{11}\) On the other hand, in his last great work, on Greek belief, Wilamowitz (1931–2: I, 315) was at pains to deny the personification of death as a god. I have been unable to trace W.’s source here, whether it was Wilamowitz or (as in the 1st edn of the Vorlesungen) W.’s Göttingen colleague Eduard Schwartz.

\(^{12}\) Might W. mean rather Italian? He is surely referring to Gluck’s opera Alceste (1767, orig. in Italian), the revised version of which, with French libretto, was not performed until 1776. The point about the gender of the word for ‘death’ applies as well to Italian la morte as to French la mort. In Goethe, it is Euripides who makes Hercules invoke the Todesgöttin.

\(^{13}\) Szadrowsky documents Herr and Knecht as terms of viticulture for, respectively, the main stock and a secondary shoot. Szadrowsky’s other examples under plant names include the transferred use of words for ‘son’, ‘grandmother’, ‘millionaire’. 
when the people of Strasbourg named a gun das Kätherle von Ensisheim\(^\text{14}\) (ms. add.\(^\text{1}\)): Geffcken [p.c.] adds the gun names Long Tom, from the second Anglo-Boer War, and die dicke Bertha [‘Big Bertha’] from the Great War), and as indeed from time immemorial, ships, and more recently locomotives, have taken proper names (see most recently Kahle (1903), with special reference to Icelandic). In other ways, too, it was entirely natural in antiquity to think of objects as animate, to make ships and trees speak. In the context of Grimm’s emphasis on the use of masculine words to denote whatever is bigger and stronger, Roethe (D. Gr., III, xxix) reports that in an African language the thumb is called the ‘male finger’, and on Borneo heavy rain is called the ‘he-rain’\(^\text{15}\). Enno Littmann informs me of similar phenomena in the Tigrinya language.\(^\text{16}\) In American slang, he functions as an augmentative: he-man ‘strong man’, he-Americans, he-magazines(!), he-idea(!) (the last three in an article by Sinclair Lewis, New York Nation, 10 Sept. 1924,\(^\text{17}\) a reference I owe to Hanns Oertel).

Herder and Grimm see in this sexual view of non-personal objects a particular virtue of the language, especially in poetic usage: in their view, this causes an attraction to movement to be diffused throughout the language, and a mass | of

\(^{14}\) Kätherle is a diminutive form of Katharina; cf. Martin & Lienhart (1899–1907: s.v. ‘Käthrin’). This gun is important in Swiss, and Baslean, history—and hence perhaps familiar to W.’s audience—as its capture by the Swiss was a significant moment in the battle of Dornach (22 July 1499), the battle which ended the bitter ‘Swabian’ War—for the Germans, the ‘Swiss’ War—and marked the start of the de facto independence of Switzerland from the Holy Roman Empire (Treaty of Basel, 22 September 1499); see further Winkler (1999) and Gordon (2002: 22).

\(^{15}\) The languages to which Roethe refers are, respectively, Bullom and Dayak. Bullom (or Bulom, Bolem; no. 25B in Mann & Dalby 1987) is a language or a small cluster of dialects (including also Kisiel, Bom, Krim) spoken in Sierra Leone and belonging to the West Atlantic group of the Niger-Congo family. It was famously first described by the missionary Nylander (1814), and it was the first language of sub-Saharan Africa (other than to Ethiopian) to boast a complete translation of a Gospel, published by Nylander in 1816; on Bullom and related languages, see Westermann & Bryan (1962: 12–13, 20–4), Sapir (1971), and for further bibliography, Meier (1984: 747). As for the Dayak people of Borneo, Roethe’s source is Tylor (1913: i, 302), who quotes the phrase ujatn arai, ‘a! a he rain, this!’ (with ref. to Journal Ind. Archip. 2, 27); this is evidently a different language from that described by von der Gabelentz in his ‘Grammar of the Dayak language’ (1852), which has a single pronominal form for ‘he’ and ‘she’ (tä). Grimes et al. (1995: 153) list 28 dialects under Dayak, a Western Malayo-Polynesian language.

\(^{16}\) Enno Littmann (1875–1948) was one of the last great European orientalists and exerted a defining influence on the new field of Ethiopic studies in particular. Prior to his move to Tübingen (where he was professor of oriental studies 1921–31), he was briefly (1914–15) a colleague of W.’s at Göttingen. Both Tigrinya and closely related Tigre (for which Littmann is better known) belong to the Ethiopic branch of South Semitic and are spoken mainly in Eritrea in northern East Africa. What Littmann reported to W. (this is clear from ms. add.\(^\text{1}\)) was that the same words may be masc. or fem. according to the size of the referent: he once mistakenly referred to a small stone in the masc.! Compare the use in Tigrinya of the fem. suffix to create a diminutive / pejorative (Leslau 1941: §42), and the masc. augmentative (described by Palmer in his rich account (1962: 48–62) of the derivational categories of the Tigre noun relating to size and number); on gender in Tigre, note also Leslau (1945: 181–3), who has also published a bibliography on the Semitic languages of Ethiopia (1965).

\(^{17}\) The first (he-Americans) is used in the first sentence by the smart New Yorker ‘I’ of the piece; he-magazines and he-idea are in the direct speech of the satirized inhabitant of the imaginary Gopher Prairie, Minnesota.
expressions for dead and abstract concepts thereby to acquire life and movement. However, both in antiquity and in more modern times, gender has been appraised also in a quite different way. So-called philosophical grammar saw gender, not altogether without justification, as an unnecessary burden. Gottfried Hermann (1801: 136) found gender ‘prope superfluum’ (‘almost superfluous’), and already in that feisty Church Father Arnobius the Elder we find the comment (Against the Pagans 1. 59; soon after AD 300) that it is no more than an arbitrary tradition to say *hic paries* (‘this wall’) but *haec sella* (‘this chair’), as walls and chairs have no sex: one could equally well be saying *haec paries* and *hic sella*, if that had seemed a good idea at the start and been subsequently retained. In a way these rationalists have done what Protagoras did much earlier (only in another direction) in anticipating the development of language itself: in the most rational modern language, English, gender has been eliminated altogether, and an earlier stage in this development is seen in the modern Scandinavian languages.\(^{18}\)

As a rule, those who despise grammatical gender fail to give serviceable accounts of its existence. It is, however, suggested e.g. in the grammar of Port Royal (1660) that it began with the masculine and feminine forms of the pronoun and adjectives being applied, in accordance with the rules of agreement, to the words for man and woman, and that this differentiation was then used to mark the relation of adjectives and pronouns to their nouns (!).

A little over thirty years ago, however, a very serious opponent emerged to what is known as Grimm’s theory of gender. In a now-famous article (1889), Brugmann declared that the assumption that gender is based generally on personification and simultaneous sexualization of the world was unfounded, and presupposed a quite pathological condition of the human mind—a view subsequently developed by V. Michels (1891).

But Brugmann and his followers are starting from a completely mistaken basic conception. They apply to this question of gender the principle of the so-called ‘Neogrammarians’, that linguistic behaviour has always been subject to the same laws as it is today, and that therefore we must strive to illuminate the unknown past from our knowledge of the present. Since, therefore, it would never occur to anyone today to think of a chair as a man, this view should not be ascribed to a person of a past age either. This is simply wrong. We have known for a very long time that people of earlier times thought, and accordingly spoke, much less logically and abstractly than we do today, that linguistic expression has

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\(^{18}\) W. is alluding to standard Danish and Swedish (and some varieties of Norwegian—the situation is complicated there), where masc. and fem. have merged into a single ‘common’ gender opposed to the neut.; the same is true, incidentally, of Dutch. Most Norwegian dialects, like Faroese and Icelandic, have retained masc., fem., and neut., and fem. nouns were marked in the wordlists of the Swedish Academy as recently as 1923; on the other hand, some Finnish dialects of Swedish have under Finnish influence given up gender distinctions altogether. For further details, see Haugen (1976: 287–90, 370–1). On the elimination of gender in English, see Lass (1992: 105–8; 2006: 70–1).
tended to become ever more logical and abstract, and that what is called linguistic progress has been achieved mainly in this direction. The extent to which primitive thought is almost entirely without logic has been richly documented above all by the French scholar Lucien Lévy-Bruhl in his book on mental functions in less advanced societies (1922).  

Furthermore, there are plenty of linguistic parallels documented for taking a sexual view of objects, even apart from those already adduced. To begin with a more remote one: it is well known that in the Slavic languages nouns are treated differently syntactically according as they denote animate or inanimate things, an animate direct object being given not in the accusative but in the genitive (cf. II, 8 and n. 21, p. 407 above). And now the Danish linguist Holger Pedersen has shown (1907: 153–4) with examples from Russian and Polish that in this dichotomy of the vocabulary a whole series of labels for non-personal things such as a corpse, a punch, and names of coins, playing-cards and dances are put with nouns denoting animate beings: i.e. when they are in object position, they are in the genitive.  

As for gender itself, English is very instructive. By and large, English has lost gender and has implemented the innovations of not merely using the same form of the article (the) with all nouns—and adjectives, too, are invariant—but also restricting the use of he and she to persons and referring to things solely with it. English, then, fulfils the requirement of referring to all non-personal objects with neuter forms. But secondarily even in English (at all events from the Middle Ages on) speakers have returned to the habit of treating certain objects as male or female, and referring to them as he or she (cf. Grimm, D. Gr. III, 534–5). In elevated speech, the sun is spoken of as masc., the moon as fem., but manual workers, too, often think of their tools as persons, calling e.g. their scissors him, their needle her. For poets, but also for mariners themselves, ships are women (as tanks were in the last war; cf. Spitzer 1923: 648). It is striking

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19 Ch. 5 of Lévy-Bruhl (1922) is entitled (in the 1926 English translation) ‘Prelogical mentality in relation to numeration’, and sets out to illustrate the theory of ch. 4, ‘The mentality of primitives in relation to the languages they speak’. On the uniformitarianism of the Neogrammarians, see Morpurgo Davies (1998: 231–3 and Index, s.v.). On the question whether there is progress in language change, see Aitchison (2001: ch. 17).  

20 Grimm is most entertaining on this theme: note also D. Gr. III, 348–9 (on ‘sun’ and ‘moon’), 364 (on the old fem. in words for ‘bee’), and 443 (on the use of she in English even of ships with man in their names—man-o-war, Indiaman, merchantman). On the worker, Grimm comments (334) ‘he treasures and cares for these things as for his wife’, and he observes (335 and n.) both how inconsistent English writers are, and apropos of Chaucer’s ‘sir mirth’ how early the feeling for the earlier grammatical gender must have been lost, since in German *Herr Freude ‘Mr Joy’ is still unthinkable (Freude is fem.). On the ongoing debate about secondary gender in English, see now Lass (1992: 107–8) and the most interesting article by Pawley (2002), both with further references. In the First World War, from 1916, British tanks were produced in both male (with two guns and three machine-guns) and female (with machine-guns alone) versions. They seem, however, to have been referred to as ‘it’, at least by middle-ranking and more senior officers, including e.g. Watson (1920), with rare exceptions (e.g. on pp. 42–3 ‘nothing is more inexorable than the slow glide of a tank and the rhythm of her tracks’). On male and female tanks, see further, in addition to Watson (1920), Fuller (1920), and Guderian (1992: 31).
how deep-seated the tendency is to think of ships in this way. It is fun to recall the
dialogue of the triremes in Aristophanes’ *Knights* (1300–15), which are conceived
to be entirely as young women, or the almost exclusively female names of Athenian
ships (Boeckh 1840: 81–4), or the fact that in Latin, despite its lack of fondness
for feminines in -us, the Greek loanwords lembus and phaselus (both types of fast,
light sailing-boats), although masculine in Greek (λέμβος, φάσηλος) are sometimes fem.,
and analogously Vergil can say (*Aen. 5. 122*) Centauro inuehitur magnā ‘he rides on the great (fem.) ship Centaur’. In Greek and Latin, however,
vaōs and nauis acted as models, | their ancestral form having been fem. in Indo-
European (II, 37 above). But we may still ask why.—Here it needs to be stressed
that this phenomenon is attested even in the dialects of English, where there is no
question of influence from archaic or French usage (as there is in poetry). In NW
Somerset, for example, abstracts are treated as neuters, but objects as male
beings. In English, then, we see happening practically before our eyes what
Grimm and his predecessors suppose for linguistic prehistory. Indeed, some of
these phenomena were used already by Harris in *Hermes* (1751: 44–62) for the
explanation of gender in general. For the most recent discussion, see Morsbach
(1912) on grammatical and psychological gender in English.23

Grimm’s theory is then thoroughly well founded, and moreover Brugmann’s
own attempt to explain gender is unsuccessful. His view (1889: 103–8) is, more or
less, that forms ending in long -a (in Greek, -a or -a) owe their association with
the female sex simply to the influence of a word such as Gk γυνη, Skt gna (`woman’). If this were right, we would have to suppose that the ending -a
served to mark female beings originally and especially in nouns. That this is not
the case emerged from an earlier discussion (II, 15 above). As a marker of natural
gender, the ending -a is ancient and general only in the pronoun. And it is surely
unthinkable that pronouns were influenced before nouns by a word such as gna,
γυνη and received their gender-specific meaning from it.

But even granted that Brugmann’s explanation of the feminine meaning of the
ending -a in the definite article (Gk ἰ, etc.) were unobjectionable, then the
use of ἰ with nouns in τη would be explicable purely because of the rhyme: but
how would we be supposed to account for ἰ vaos, ἰ πιστis (`ship’, ‘trust’) and the
like? For these cases Brugmann has effectively no solution, and the problem is

21 Boeckh includes a catalogue of ship names on pp. 84–100. Perhaps most famous are, in myth, the
Ἀργώ, and, in history, the Σαλαμίνα. Cf. Schwyzer 635 n. 3 with further references, Schwyzer & Debrunner

22 I have substituted ‘sometimes’ for W.’s ‘often’: phaselus is quite frequently fem. (first in Ovid, *Amores*
2. 10. 9), but lembus, although allowed as fem. as well as masc. by Priscian (*GL* II, 169, 15), is attested as fem.
only once, in the (2nd-c. bc) comic poet Turpilius, fr. 98.

23 Morsbach’s (and W.’s) source on the dialects of Somerset was Kruisinga (1905). For some parallels
from other English dialects and further references, see Wakelin (1977: 113–14, 177).
not much helped e.g. by his suggestion that all abstracts, with no matter which ending, modelled themselves on Ἰ ἄρετῇ (‘excellence, virtue’).

One significant difficulty not dealt with at all by BRUGMANN is the first of the two points mentioned above (II, 38), namely why countless words for objects have not neuter endings but the endings found in words for persons. In any event, something like personification must have occurred.

Still, one thing has to be conceded. GRIMM generally just took the data and believed pretty well that he could show for every masc. word a connection with maleness, for every feminine a connection with a female being. But there can be no question of this. As it stands, his theory is correct only for the foundations in the parent language, not for the individual instances of historically attested and living languages. In countless cases, the gender of a word is determined simply either by its form or by semantic analogy with another word. Countless transfers have occurred (cf. WILMANNS, III, 725–30), but only in semantic transfers was anything of the original sense of the gender able to survive.

**Change of gender** has been much studied. The factors involved, both formal and semantic, are revealed with particular clarity by the study of loanwords, where we always know for certain which gender is earlier and which later. With reference to Slavic, MEILLET makes some fine observations in his etymological studies of Old Church Slavonic (1902–3: I, 187–8), on which cf. SKOK (1925). Instructive on the gender of nouns borrowed from German by Czech is BEER (1910); (ms. add.2: on English loanwords in American German, see ARON (1930).) Our concern here is especially with Latin vis-à-vis Greek, and German vis-à-vis Latin and the Romance languages.

From each of the three declensions in Greek Latin has borrowed words the gender of which was bound to cause problems in Latin. To begin with the first declension: in Old Latin, Greek masculines in -α, -ης acquired the ending -a in the nom. (II, 22 above). If they denoted persons, they retained their masc. gender, but those denoting things, so Varro teaches (fr. 15 Goetz & Schoell = fr. 14b (cf. 14a) Kent), were transferred to the fem. (cf. Priscian 5. 6 = GL II, 143, 5–16): δ χρυσία hæc cochlea (‘the snail’), δ Ερμής hæc herma (‘the pillar-bust, herm’),

24 δ χάρτια hæc charta (‘the paper’), to which we can add from pre-classical texts e.g. artopta (‘bread-pan’, Plaut. Aul. 400), catapulta (‘catapult’), Plaut. Capt. 796), margarita (‘pearl’, Varro, Satires 283 Astbury) for Gk ἄρτιππης, κατασείτης, μαργαρίτης. The reason for the transfer is self-evident: Latin knew masculines in -a only in words denoting living beings. In the classical period, the Greek nom. ending and the Greek gender were also taken over by Latin, as a result of which

24 Lat. herma is not otherwise attested as a fem. noun, as far as I can discover (unfortunately, the ThLL cannot be consulted for this word, which was scheduled for the Onomasticon).
we find e.g. in Cicero, *Letters to Atticus* 1. 8. 2 (no. 4 Shackleton Bailey) *Hermae tui Pentelici* (‘your herms of Pentelic marble’, masc.), and in the Elder Pliny, *Natural History* 5. 59 *intra nouissimum catarracten* (‘below the last cataract [of the Nile]’, masc.), but the Old Latin practice must have survived in the popular language, to yield probably—in cases where learned (masc.) forms did not interfere—French *la comète*, *la planète* (‘comet’, ‘planet’—although these may have been influenced by the gender of *l’étoile* ‘star’), and German *die Herme* (‘herm’).

Furthermore, given what was explained earlier (II, 32), Latin must have been uncomfortable with Greek feminines in -ος. The learned language adhered strictly to the Greek model (e.g. *atomus* ‘atom’ is fem. in Cicero, like Gk άτομος), but those words which made their way into the popular language tended to be made masc., whence French *le synode*, *le dialecte* (‘synod’, ‘dialect’). In Russian, too, η σύνοδος transferred into the masc. gender (*sinód*), and the ruling body of the Russian Orthodox Church used to be called ‘der Heilige Synod’ (‘the Holy Synod’, 1721–1917).25

Greek names of towns in -α if they were neuter did not suit Latin either, as Latin town-names in -α were all fem. like *Roma*, | and Latin neuter town-names were all singular like *Lamuuium*. This is why e.g. *Megara* (neut. pl. in Gk) is fem. sg. in those authors who were not tied to the Greek model.

A fourth group comprises the Greek neuters in -Ἀ (on what follows, cf. Priscian 6. 7 = *GL* II, 199–200). Historically, these are identical with the Latin nouns in -men (e.g. Gk κρίμα (better κρέιμα) ‘a judgement’ is in fact the same word as Lat. *crīmen*),26 but speakers of Old Latin, who borrowed words of this type, naturally had no access to this knowledge. For them, Gk -μα rhymed only with 1st-declension nouns, and since they (unless denoting a person) were fem. in Latin, σχέμα for example (the Hellenistic form of σχῆμα) was declined as a fem., *schēma*, gen. *schēmae*. The French linguist Michel Bréal & Bailly 1885: s.v.) has correctly traced Lat. *lacrima* (fem.), which could not be explained in Latin terms, to a borrowing from Gk δάκρυμα, the Hellenistic form of Aeschylus’ δάκρυμα, with long υ (neut.). This shift of gender did not occur in later learned borrowings, but it persisted in popular speech of all periods: on an old funerary inscription from Capua (*CIL* I2. 1590) we read *Philemae suae amantisimae* (i.e. *amantissimae*); and Petronius in *Trimalchio’s Banquet* has several times *stigmam* ‘brand-mark’. And the effects of this phenomenon are still apparent in Romance: *phantasma* ‘apparition, ghost’ becomes fem. in Spanish *fantasma*, Italian *fantasima*, as does *chrisma*.

25 The Russian masc. gender is retained in this context even in German, where *Synode* is usually fem.
26 The suffixes Gk -μα and Lat. -men continue directly, by regular sound-change, IE *-mē* (cf. Gk παρόν ‘stretchable’, Lat. *tentus* ‘stretched’ < IE *η-tn-o*), *-mē* being the zero-grade form of the suffix seen in Gk -μην, -μεν, -μον, -μαν, -μεν. The forms κρίμα and κρέιμα (Aesch. *Suppl*. 397) are doubtful, the usual form being κρήμα. The root is that seen also in Gk κρίνω, Lat. *coerno* ‘sift, separate, decide’ (see further *LIV*, s.v. *'kreh,(y)-').
function, unguent') in French crème. In the Middle Ages, even someone needing or wishing to speak good Latin could fall into a shift of this sort: still at the Council of Constance (1414–18), the Emperor Sigismund was guilty of uttering, to the outrage of the assembled clergy, the phrase *hanc schismam* (‘this schism’, with *schisma* fem. instead of neut.).

The corresponding phenomena in German have already been reviewed by Jacob Grimm (*D. Gr. III*, 537–44), who displays here again his wonderful wealth of learning, though admittedly with few explanations; for the most recent account of shifts of gender in German, see Polzin (1903). With loanwords into German, too, form plays an important role (*D. Gr. III*, 544–51). So, NHG *Frucht* (‘fruit’) will owe its fem. gender (in contrast with the Latin masc. *fructus*) to the fact that it rhymes with *Flucht*, *Sucht*, *Zucht* (‘escape’, ‘addiction’, ‘breeding’); in the Old Saxon *Heliant* the word is still masc. Or take the word *Echo*. Given its source in Gk ἔχω, we should expect it to be fem., and so it was to start with—and there is an example still in Schiller. But the neuter appeared early, evidently because words for objects in -*o* borrowed from Italian are mainly neuter (e.g. *Agio*, *Lotto*, *Motto*, *Risiko*, *Tempo* ‘premium’, ‘lottery’, ‘motto’, ‘risk’, ‘speed’). In Ital. and Span. *eco*, it is even easier to understand the transfer to the masc., as these languages have countless nouns ending -*o*, nearly all of them masc.

There are, however, exceptions to what was just said about German words in -*o* being neuter—der *Kakao* (‘cocoa’), der *Salto mortale* (a death-defying somersault on the high trapeze)—and this leads us to the second factor relevant in shifts of gender, the semantic. We say der *Salto mortale* (masc.) because it is synonymous with der *Sprung* (masc., ‘leap’), and der *Kakao*, because it denotes a comestible used in parallel with *Kaffee* (masc., ‘coffee’) and *Tee* (masc., ‘tea’). And German-speakers who say in Italian fashion der *Palazzo* have der *Palast* (masc., ‘palace’) in mind. Already quite early we find die *Mauer* (fem., ‘wall’), in contrast with Lat. *murus* (masc.), modelled on die *Wand* (fem., ‘wall’); die *Pfalz* (fem., ‘palace’), vs Lat. *palatium* (neut.), like die *Burg* (fem., ‘castle’); and later die *Mythe* (fem., ‘myth’), vs Lat. *mythus* (masc.), like die *Sage* (fem., ‘saga’). The historical novelist

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27 Solving the ‘Western Schism’—at the time three popes were each claiming legitimacy—was the main purpose of the Council. Sigismund is reported to have replied, ‘ego sum rex Romanus et super grammaticam’ (‘I am king of the Romans and above grammar’) and so to have won the nickname *Supergrammaticam*! See Hoensch (1997).


29 This is in the final scene of the unfinished dramatic fragment *Der Menschenfeind* (publ. 1790)—but Schiller later altered it to the neut., and the only example from Schiller in *D. Wb.* is neut. However, Schulz, s.v., quotes two fem. examples from Herder (one of them from *On the Origin of Language*, 3), and according to the new edn. of *D. Wb.*, *Echo* fem. is attested from the 17th to the early 19th c.; *Echo* was also masc., on the semantic analogy of *Widerschall*, *Widerhall* ‘echo’ and *Ton* ‘sound’ (all masc.); the neut. is attested from the first half of the 17th c.
Charles Sealsfield says *die Rifle* like *die Flinte* (‘shotgun, rifle’).\(^{30}\) The opposition between *der Senat* (masc., ‘senate’) and *das Consulat* (neut., ‘consulship’) is due to the respective models of *Rat* (masc., ‘council, board’) and *Amt* (neut., ‘office’). The model is not always self-evident. Polzin (1903: 4) accounts nicely for the surprising neuter gender of *Fenster* (‘window’) vs Lat. *fenestra* (fem.) as modelled on the native term for this object, which survives in English *window* < *wind-eye*, which in German would be *Wind-auge, Auge* being neuter.\(^{31}\)

Also semantically rather than formally determined was the transfer to the neuter in Latin of Greek names for metals. In Latin, as in German and Sanskrit, all metal-names are neuter, which we may regard as an inherited state of affairs, but in Greek they are no less consistently masculine. So, when Gk κασσίτερος ‘tin’ and ὀρείχαλκος ‘brass’ were borrowed by Latin, it went without saying that they emerged as *cassiterum* and *aurichalcum* (the latter with a folk-etymological assimilation to *aurum* ‘gold’). (In neither case is the neuter securely attested before the Empire, since the dat.-abl. sg. form *aurichalco* (three times in Plautus) does not betray its gender.)—Of obscure origin is the neuter gender of *spinter* ‘bracelet, bangle’ (again three times in Plautus, always in the nom.-acc. sing.) vs Gk σφυγκτήρ (masc.). The near-synonyms *fibula* (‘brooch’) and *armillae* (‘arm-bands, bracelets’) and the rhyming *linter* ‘barge’ ought rather to have caused a transfer to the fem.

The gender of words borrowed from genderless languages such as English is determined quite freely, with reference merely to words of similar sound or meaning in the borrowing language.

The opposite phenomenon, i.e. the conditioning of the gender of a native word in imitation of its correspondent in a foreign language, occurs especially—like other syntactic borrowings (cf. I, 8–12 above)—in periods and areas of bilingualism. Apuleius’ use of *fimus* (‘dung’) as fem. must be determined by Gk ἔρυκτος, and the masc. pl. *caeli* (‘heavens’, vs neut. sg. *caelum*) in the translation of a Greek philosophical saying and in Christian Latin must reflect Gk οἱ οὐρανοὶ—although *caelus* is attested in Archaic and Vulgar Latin (cf. II, 39 above and n.; on Lat. *dies* : Gk ἡμέρα, see II, 36–7 above).\(^{32}\)

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\(^{30}\) Charles Sealsfield, best known for his novels in German (though he published also in English), was revealed in his will to be the pseudonym of Carl Anton Postl (1793–1864), a former priest in the Order of Knights of the Cross with the Red Star, who fled to America in 1822. In his German writings, he uses many American words as if they were fully naturalized in German. W.’s example, *die Rifle*, is in Ralph Doughby’s Esq. Brautfahrt (3rd edn, Stuttgart 1846, pp. 116, 158, 191; 1st edn Zurich 1835). Heller (1941: 119) lists numerous similar examples, from *das Antidote* (cf. German *das Gegenmittel*) to *der Far West* (cf. German *der Westen*), in his fascinating study of Sealsfield’s ‘atypical’ German.

\(^{31}\) English *window* is in fact a borrowing from Old Norse *vindauga* (which survives in modern Scandinavian, e.g. in Danish *vindue*); other related forms include Middle English *windoge*, Shetland *windag*, *windag*, Manx *winning* (see de Vries 1962: s.v.).

\(^{32}\) Julius Caesar reportedly wrote in his work *On Analogy* that *caelum* should never be used in the plural (Gellius, *Attic Nights* 19. 8. 3). In a Christian context, the Gk pl. *οὐρανοί* is in turn imitating the Hebrew. The philosophical example that W. refers to is presumably Lucretius 2. 1097.
It remains to say a word about the gender of adjectives. Those with three terminations, behave just like pronouns which inflect for gender (II, 8 above): used absolutely (and therefore as nouns), they denote, depending on the ending, men, women, or things, while, when in agreement with nouns, they mark grammatical gender.

Not all adjectives, however, have three gender terminations. They do in modern German in the so-called ‘strong’ declension, 33 but three terminations are not found in all types in Latin or Greek, and this is certainly an ancient feature. In the Greek third declension, masc. and fem. are generally distinguished only in stems in -ντ- (viz. the participle and the type χαρίεις, stem χαριεντ-), in -ν- (type ἡδος), and one or two in -ν (e.g. μέλας, stem μελαν-, τέρηπ), but not in the others, and, as Sanskrit shows, both patterns are inherited from the parent language. 34 Departures from this occur in two directions: on the one hand, masc. forms are used as feminines, as in ἡδος ἀντιμή, etc. in Homer (Od. 12. 369, ‘sweet smell’), ταρφός with θρίς and μυρίας in Aeschylus (Septem 533 ‘thick hair’, Persæa 926 [an emendation] ‘dense myriad’), πυρῶν τελεσθέντων in Pindar (Ol. 6. 15, ‘the pyres having been completed’), 35 on the other, new feminines are formed to adjectives which originally did not distinguish masc. and fem. (e.g. ἡργείνεια to ἡργείνης ‘early-born’, πρόφρασσα to πρόφρον ‘willing, earnest’, πένησα to πένης ‘poor”). 36

In third-declension adjectives in Latin, by contrast, any opposition between masc. and fem. has practically disappeared. Only in stems in -ri- (which in Greek

33 Germanic adjectives inflect, broadly speaking, in one of two different ways, which since Grimm’s grammar (D. Gr. I, 309; cf. D. Wb., s.v. ‘stark’, II. 7b) have been called ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ (these terms are defended by Grimm, D. Gr. IV, 601 n. against such rivals as ‘definite / indefinite’, ‘determinate / indeterminate’, ‘abstract / concrete’, etc.). W. says a little more about the distinction at the start of the next lecture, II, 52 below. The contrast is syntactically conditioned: essentially, strong forms (reflecting fairly closely the inherited (pro)nominial endings) are used when the adjective + noun phrase is indefinite (e.g.), weak forms (a Germanic innovation, characterized by the addition of an -n- suffix) when the adjective + noun phrase is definite (determined by e.g. the definite article or a demonstrative pronoun) or when the adjective stands as a noun. Hence, the contrast in modern German between e.g. (strong) ein guter Mann ‘a good man’ and (weak) der gute Mann, der Gute ‘the good man’. The three-way contrast in the strong adjective, mentioned by W., is seen in e.g. ein guter Mann ‘a good man’: eine gute Frau ‘a good woman’: ein gutes Ding ‘a good thing’. On the history of the description of this phenomenon to the end of the 18th century, see Jellinek (1913–14: II, §§393–401); for a brief historical account in English, see Lockwood (1968: ch. 2).

34 For example, corresponding to Greek 3-termination adjectives in m. -εις f. -εσσα n. -ες, is the Skt type m. -विन f. -वति n. -वत; and to the Greek 2-termination type m.-f. -μενής n. -μενες corresponds Skt m.-f. -मनाः n. -मनस. For details, see Sihler (1995: 348–56).

35 For parallels with the Homeric and Aeschylean examples, see Chantraine (1958: 252), Risch (1974: §30a). The Pindar passage is quite different, highly problematic, and should probably be removed. It is very doubtful whether there are any parallels for the use of a masc. ptc. for fem. Editors have tended either to emend πελεσθέντων, to make it agree with πυρὼν, or to take it with νεκρῶν ‘corpses’; see the commentaries of L. R. Farnell (London 1932) and Kirkwood (1982: ad loc.), and Slater (1969: s.v. τελεω, d. ‘dub., ‘reckon up’). Either way, problems remain: on this passage, see esp. Hutchinson (2001: no. 18, ad loc.).

36 With ἡργέεινα (a type of secondary fem. common in compound names and epithets in -ης), compare Τριγιγέεια (epithet of Athene), and see Risch (1974: §50c); Homeric πρόφρασσα is probably modelled on its near-synonym ἐκασσα ‘willing’, the older fem. of ἐκόν (see Risch 1974: §50a); πένησα is only in Hesychius.
have the same form for masc. and fem.: e.g. ἄδρυς ‘knowledgeable’) has a secondary contrast been introduced in the nom. In early Latin, the nom. alternated between -er and -ris without regard to gender, but, since in -ro-stems the ending -er was exclusively masc., the same was applied to -ri-stems, too: so, on the model of adjectives like macer and pulcher, alacer came to be confined to the masc.37

Third-declension adjectives have a peculiar attitude to the neuter. In Greek, most types have neutral forms, both singular and plural; this includes those in -aw, -ης, and -ις (note τρόφι κύμα ‘a swollen wave’, II. 11. 30738), which do not distinguish masc. and fem. However, in those with stems in simple stops, such as πένης (‘poor’, stem πενητ-) and the many compounds of which the second element is a root-form (ἄ-ζυς ‘unyoked, unwed’, παρα-πλης ‘struck from the side’, etc.), neuter forms are practically unheard of. In the plural, we seem to have attested only ἐπηλων (‘incoming, arriving’, of ἐθνεα ‘peoples’ in Herodotus, 8. 73. 2), together with σύγκλων (‘mixed’, lit. ‘washed together’, in Hesychius, s.v.), as forms in -ζυγα can be from -ζυγος (Ernst Fraenkel 1910–12: II, 162 n.). In the singular, we find only ἐπηλυ (not before the Empire) made to masc./fem. ἐπηλας on the model of θηλα : θηλας (‘female’), πάμπολα : πάμπολας (‘very large, numerous’), and the like, and also | possibly ἰθυ-τηρη (?: ‘bored straight’, in Democritus, Diels & Kranz, no. 68, B128). This absence of neuter forms cannot be due to the morphological fact that the neuter singular of e.g. ἄζυς would have been *ἄζυ, and hence unrecognizable, as this does not affect the plurals. And even in the oblique cases, where there is no difference between masc. and neut., these adjectives are rarely used in the neuter (cf. Lobeck 1837: I, 254, 264, 287). While we do find, for instance, Eur. Electra 372 ἐν πένητι σώματι (‘in a poor body’), one or two grammarians proscribed altogether the use of adjectives like πένης in the neuter (cf. Etym. Magm. p. 110, 25 Gaisford). The truth is that the neuter use of all such adjectives was simply not inherited: in origin, they were normally used almost exclusively as attributes of animate beings.

Greek helps to clarify Latin usage, although in Latin the number of unchanging adjectives was greatly increased by the loss of gender marking in the present participle, and by the formation of the many adjectives in -âx and -âx, types practically unknown in Greek.39 By the standards of Greek practice, it seems

37 I have substituted ‘in early Latin’ for W.’s ‘originally’ at the start of this sentence. By regular sound-change in Latin, *-CrVs > -Cer (hence also ter < *tris ‘three times’). So, masc.-fem. acris should by rights have yielded masc.-fem. âcer, which in a sense it did, but masc. âcer and fem. âcer are very rare (cf. e.g. Naevius, Punic War fr. 48 Warington, Ennius, Annals 368, 420 Sk.; Lucretius 4, 160). Note that a few adjectives retain masc.-fem. -is (e.g. medioâr ‘moderate’, illustre ‘illustrious’). For further detail, see Sihler (1995: §342), Meiser (1998: §104.2), Weiss (forthc.: ch. 12, §IV.A.6; 14, §I.1).

38 A ‘unique expression’ in Homer (Hainsworth 1993: ad loc.) and a very rare type of formation (Monro 1891: §163; Risch 1974: §60).

39 On the Latin types capâx ‘capacious’, edâx ‘voracious’ and ferâx ‘fierce’, velâx ‘swift’, see Leumann 375–7 with further references. The levelling of the endings of the pres. ptc. (inherited masc. *-nts, fem. *-nti, neut. *-nt all become -ns) was the result partly of regular sound-change and partly of analogy; it may have influenced the other ‘single-ending’ Latin adjectives (in -ex, -âx, -âx); see Sihler (1995: §347).
almost to be expected that in the singular only the i-stems have a special neuter form (e.g. *dulce < dulce to masc.-fem. dulcis ‘sweet’), but Latin was less content than Greek with the inherited paucity of forms in the consonant-stems (in part perhaps precisely because of the larger number of words affected), and unlike Greek did not do without the use of these adjectives in the neuter. Rather, in the plural Latin made freer use than Greek of the convenient possibility of forming nom.-acc. forms in -a: e.g. already in Naevius, Punic War 28 Warmington atrocia exta (‘ugly vitals’), Terence, Adelph. 721 flagitia ingentia (‘immense crimes’), Cato Agr. 135. 3 coria nostratia (‘native hides’). In the singular, when it came to putting such adjectives with neuter nouns, Latin had recourse to the masc.-fem. form in -s, which was made plausible by the fact that it involved mainly nouns denoting attributes or properties of persons. It seems that in pre-classical Latin audax (‘bold’) and ferox (‘fierce’), for example, appear in the neuter only with facinus, imperium, and ingenium (‘deed, misdeed’, ‘authority, command’, ‘character, disposition’); and bidens (‘having two teeth; an animal for sacrifice’) and indigena (‘indigenous’) appear first with animal names and only later with ferrum (‘iron blade’, Accius, p. 594 Warmington) and uinum (‘wine’, Plin. Nat. 14. 72), respectively. Nevertheless, the use of these forms in -s also as accusatives did represent a considerable departure from their original meaning (probably the earliest example of the acc. is Rhet. Her. 4. 55 qui . . . atrix periculum . . . suscipiat ‘who undertakes terrible danger’).

Conversely, second-declension adjectives in Latin are absolutely consistent in having three gender forms, including a fem. form made like first-declension nouns. The single exception—CIL II 25, 12 [quinqueresm]osque triresmosque nauis (‘ships both quinqueremes and triremes’) on the famous Columna rostrata of C. Duilius—is of no significance, having been artificially created by the real author of the inscription, a scholar of the 1st century AD, on the model of Greek two-termination adjectives (BÜCHELER 1884: 103).40

Greek, you see, just as it differs from Latin in the noun by favouring feminines in -os (cf. II, 22–3, 32–3 above), so, too, in many second-declension adjectives it used the same form for both masc. and fem. The grammars will give you the facts, and for a special study see WIRTH (1880).41 Usage is very inconsistent, varying

40 This inscription, on a column decorated with ships’ rams, honours C. Duilius for Rome’s first-ever naval victory (c.260 BC), in the First Punic War. It was seen in the Roman Forum by the Elder Pliny (Nat. 34. 20; before AD 77). The text of the inscription is certainly not original as a whole, but some words in it may be. Doubts have been raised as to whether a 1st-c. fabricator would have known to restore (correctly) the *s in -resmo-, although other examples of this sound-change (-VN- > -VN-) are well attested in the Roman grammatical tradition (e.g. cesna as the earlier form of cena ‘dinner’); see on this point Leumann 209, Vine (1993: 118 & nn.), and on the inscription as a whole W. (1919), and Gordon (1983: no. 48) with further references.

41 Cf. Schwyzer & Debrunner 34, Gagnepain (1959), Morpurgo Davies (1968a), and the studies referred to in n. 5, pp. 401–2 above.
markedly according to dialect and period, and high poetry allows itself great freedom. The rule of two terminations is at its firmest in compounds. Verbal adjectives in -τος, for instance, are two-termination as simple forms only in poetry (see Lobeck (1866) on Ajax 224), but when they are compounded, this is the norm. Meaning and accentuation are also to a degree relevant here, in that a special fem. in -τη is formed only to oxytones indicating possibility, although it is sometimes found also when the compound is no longer clearly perceived as such. Schwyzer (1917/18: 434–6) has recently drawn attention in this connection to αὐτομάτη and αμάται τέχναι (dat. sg., ‘without ulterior motive’; lit. ‘with unminded art’) in an oracular inscription from Dodona (Collitz & Bechtel no. 1568),42 αὐτομάτη being from Homer onwards the only fem. form of αὐτόματος (‘following one’s own mind, spontaneous’). The second element of these compounds (-ματος = Lat. -mentus in commentus) was lost early on as a simple form.43

Why compounds in -τος have as a rule no fem. remains to be explained, although in possessive compounds (‘bahuvrīhi’44) of the type ἀδύνατος, βοδοδάκτυλος (‘deathless, ‘rose-fingered’), the fem. in -ος is clearly original. What we know of their development tells us that the noun, θάνατος (‘death’), δάκτυλος (‘finger’), etc., originally retained its form even in this sort of compound: Ἡώς βοδοδάκτυλος is really just ‘Dawn rose-finger’, and explicit marking of fem. in e.g. ἄθανατη is no less secondary than the masc. marking in βαθυ-δύνης (lit. ‘deep whirlpool’) (cf. II, 21 above). The use of -ος for both masc. and fem. was then extended to compounds in which the second element was a fem. originally in -ά (‐ή), e.g. in Homeric δρυὸς ὑφκόμωιο (gen. sg., ‘high-leafed oak’, with the second element from κόμη ‘foliage’) or the frequent epithet of women λευκόλενος (‘white-armed’, with ὀλένη ‘arm’).

Similarly, in view of instances such as ἕτροφος, ἕδαιδος (‘nurse’, ‘female singer’) discussed above (II, 15; note also γῆ φορός ‘fruitful earth’ in Theophrastus, Explanations of Plants 3. 20. 3), we seem to have something original in the two-termination inflection of compounds with the second element functioning as an agent noun, e.g. Herodotus 1. 59. 2 γυναῖκα ... τεκνοποιῶν (‘a wife ... to bear children’). There are admittedly counterexamples from Homer on, although nearly all in poetry (see Lobeck (1866) on Ajax 172). Let me highlight two examples. In a

42 Note that Collitz & Bechtel still print ἄμαται τέχναι as ἄμα τά τέχναι ‘together with skill’!! Schwyzer also draws attention to (presumed) adverbial ἄματα (with the same meaning?) in a treaty between the Aetolians and the Acarnanians of c.270 BC (SIG 421A, 5, 26).
43 Gk -ματος, Lat. -mentus and Skt mata ‘thought, believed’ continue IE *mṛ-tiś (with the zero grade of the root *mṛ- ‘think, remember’). On adjectives in -τος in general and in compounds, see Risch (1974: §§1cb, 75c).
44 Like the other Sanskrit grammatical terms for types of compound words, bahuvrīhi ‘rich man’, lit. ‘(one who has) much rice’, is an example of the type that it denotes. On bahuvrīhi compounds and on verbal-governing compounds (the subject of the next paragraph) in Homer, see Risch (1974: §§68, 74).
famous ode of Sophocles, the goddess who bewitches the senses is called (Ajax 172) Ταυροπόλα Διός Αρτέμις. Euripides at Iph. Taur. 1457 has Αρτέμις Ταυροπόλων θεάν, and that this is really the normal form emerges from the use of the form Ταυροπόλος at all the cult-places of the goddess, as well as from ἡ ἀμφίπολος ‘female servant’, ἡ πρόπολος ‘priestess’, ἡ περίπολος ‘female companion’. But then LOBECK comments (1866: on Ajax 172), ‘Homer has twice πολυφόρβος γαία (Il. 14. 200, 301 πολυφόρβον πείρατα γαίας ‘the limits of the bountiful earth’), and once πολυφόρβη γαία (Il. 9. 568 γαίαν πολυφόρβην χεραίν αλοία ‘beating with her hands the bountiful earth’), following either no principle at all or . . . one that we cannot explain’. It is almost comforting to catch a great master of classical philology in a minor weakness: πολυφόρβον (or -φορβοῦ?) γαίας is the normal form, but the poet could not say πολύφορβον γαίαν for the simple reason that it would have violated the well-known Law of Wernicke, whereby a spondaic fourth foot cannot end in a syllable made up of short vowel + consonant (which is long only by position before the consonant beginning the next word). Consequently, Homer gave the attribute of the fem. noun a specifically fem. ending (cf. [ms. add.²] MEISTER 1921: 25). [Add.: I retain this paragraph as it stands in the first edition. The observations of Thea STIFLER (1924) against Wernicke’s Law may be right in general—I do not feel competent to pass judgement—but in any case her account of Homeric πολυφόρβην is inadequate. She tries to justify it by comparing Homeric feminines like πολυμνήστη, ἀργυρωτή, ἀθανάτη (‘much-wooed’, ‘easy to be known’, ‘deathless’), but these differ from πολυφόρβην in that they refer to people (cf. my remarks on ιφθίμη below, II, 50), and there is a further reason why ἀργυρωτή and πολυμνήστη in particular carry no weight: it looks very much as if in the case of compounds in -τη, the earlier state of affairs was to make a fem. in -τη, and the elimination of gender-marking was secondary and analogous on the bahuvrīhis; agent-nouns in -ός, on the other hand, were from the beginning two-termination. It follows that πολυφόρβην remains odd, and seems to suggest that there is something in Wernicke’s Law. In any case, in LOBECK’s day the law was uncontested.]

Then there are numerous simple two-termination adjectives, notably those in -ιος, -ιος, -ειος. Writing, apart from Latin, Sanskrit—the most archaic Indo-European language—also knows the declension corresponding to Gk -ός only

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45 Otherwise expressed, ‘words with a long penultimate syllable and a short vowel in the final syllable are placed for preference where they can scan . . . – or at verse-end’ (West 1987: 20). The tendency was observed first by E. Gerhard in 1816 (West 1982: 37 n. 15). For further discussion and references see Erbse (1997 [1972]: 290–2 & nn.) and Devine & Stephens (1976).

46 On these types, see Risch (1974: §§37, 40, 48) with further references.

47 W.’s word is altertümlich, which can mean either oldest attested or most archaic. It has already been pointed out (n. 1, p. 14 above) that Sanskrit is no longer the earliest-documented Indo-European language. In any case, oldest does not necessarily mean most archaic, in the sense of most conservative: Sanskrit, compared with Latin, Greek, and now Hittite and the Anatolian languages, is to different degrees in some respects innovative (e.g. in its phonology), in other respects conservative (e.g. in its case system).
for the masc. adjective, and always uses a separate form for the fem., the
general view is that this is an innovation of Greek. On the other hand, even though
here, too, Sanskrit agrees with Latin, since in two categories of compound
adjective—namely, bahuvrīhis, and those with an agent noun as the second element
(cf. above)—there are grounds for regarding the Greek pattern of two termin-
ations as original, fem. forms such as πάρηγος and the like should be regarded as
ancient, and the extension of the three terminations as a secondary development.
This corresponds to what we established earlier (II, 22–3, 32 above) regarding fem.
nouns in -ος, and the subsequent history of the adjective in Greek and Latin
territory. Modern Greek, you see, knows only three-termination adjectives, \(^{48}\) and
analogously French (e.g.) has replaced single masc.-fem. forms such as Lat. grandis, mollis, errans (‘big’, ‘soft’, ‘wandering’) with pairs of forms opposing
descendants and place names of the type Gran(d)ville have remained untouched
by the new fem. form grande.—Possibly of fundamental importance is the old
observation that in Homer ἴθιμος has ‘masc.’ forms when agreeing with fem.
nouns denoting objects (so e.g. II. 1. 3 ἴθιμος ψυχᾶς ‘mighty souls’, II. 11. 35 ἴθιμος κεφάλας ‘mighty heads’), but when referring to words for women is made
to mark the gender (e.g. II. 5. 415 ἴθιμη ἄλοχος ‘mighty wife’, Od. 16. 332 ἴθιμη βασίλεια ‘mighty queen’; and cf. [ms. add.] \(^{2}\) αἰσθήμη ‘right-minded’ of Penelope at
Od. 23.14). |

How strange Greek fem. adjectives in -ος seemed to speakers of Latin and
Germanic may be inferred from the shifts that they underwent in these languages
when borrowed by them. Admittedly, in isolated instances Latin retained the
Greek pattern: e.g. Cicero (Against Verres II.5. 27) speaks of a lectica octaphoros
‘a litter carried by eight men’, but Laberius (com. 38 = fr. 24 Panayotakis) has
columnas monolithas (‘monolithic columns’), and Seneca, Martial, and Statius
attest enthea (‘god-inspired; frenzying’) with mater and other fem. nouns.
I would also note Wulfila’s translation of 1 Timothy 3: 11 (γυναῖκας ... σεμνάς,
μη διαβόλους, νηφαλίως, πιστάς ‘their wives [should be] ... grave, not slanderers,
sober, faithful’) qinos ... garinuos, ni diabulos, gafaurjos, triggwos, where the fem.
ending -o(s) (cf. masc. -ans) is used even on diabulos ‘slander’ taken directly from
the original text (διαβόλους).

The opposite development is to be seen in the numerals. Originally, the first
four cardinals had separate forms for each of the three genders, but Latin and

\(^{48}\) A very few apparently two-termination adjectives (masc.-fem. -ον, neut. -ον) survive in the modern
language, but are subject to variation and of doubtful status (Holton \et al. 1997: §3.12). For a succinct
survey of the two basic types of modern Greek adjective (in -ος and -ο), see Thumb (1910: §§106–15) and
Holton \et al. (1997: ch. 3). The tendency to make new fem. forms in the Greek adjective is well under way
by the time of the New Testament; for further detail and illustration, see Hatzidakis (1892: 27–8), Jannaris
Greek have already given up the opposition between masc. and fem., and while in Luther and in a number of dialects there is the opposition masc. *zween*—fem. *zwo*—neut. *zwei*, in modern written German a three-way gender contrast is found only in the word for ‘one’ (*einer, eine, ein(e)s*), and more or less the same applies to Romance, too. The reason for this development is ultimately the fact that the numerals from five upwards did not inflect for gender.

49 On the various forms for ‘one’ in modern German, see Hammer & Durrell (1991: §9.1.3).
We can at last leave gender behind, and have a closer look at nominal forms (nomina) as parts of speech. It is traditional and natural to divide the nominals into nouns (or substantives) and adjectives. This division is justified, as there are marked differences between the two classes, in terms both of meaning (which I do not propose to discuss here) and of function within the clause, in that a true adjective is confined to predicative and attributive use and, like a verb, is determined by adverbs. Adjectives are characterized further by having basically three genders, the capacity for gradation (or comparison), and the ability to form an adverb. On closer inspection, however, this division is not so sharp and clear.\(^1\) Nouns, too, can denote properties, albeit in the abstract; nouns, too, can stand in attributive and predicative function, and in general any feature said to be peculiar to the adjective is not completely alien to the noun. What does need to be stressed is the difference with regard to the division into the two classes between the classical languages and German. In German—and this goes back to the beginnings of Germanic speech—adjectives are sharply distinguished formally from the nouns.\(^2\) Already in Proto-Germanic, in the majority of their functions they have assumed pronominal endings. So, for example, the dative endings -em (masc. neut.) and -er (fem.) in e.g. deinem Hause, deiner Frau (‘your house’, ‘your wife’) are pronominal in origin, as comparison with the forms of the article dem, der shows, and were extended from the pronoun to the adjective. They are foreign to the noun. Beside these endings is the so-called ‘weak’ inflection, with endings which also occur in many nouns, but it is a peculiarity of the adjective to have this n-inflection restricted to certain functions, above all to its combination with the definite article. Then there is also the total absence of inflection that the adjective shows when it is predicative. In German, then, adjective and noun are very different. This formal distinction is foreign to the classical languages, which explains why adjectives fail to appear in any ancient theory of the parts of speech as an independent word-class, as one of the principal ‘partes orationis’. True, the term which Lat. adiectuum translates is part of ancient Greek theory: the term

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1 Cf. I, 70–1 above on distinguishing nouns and verbs, and the notes and further references there. See Croft (2000) for a lively defence of regarding nouns and adjectives as ‘typological prototypes’ and as language universals.

2 On the declensions of the adjective in Germanic, cf. II, 47 and n. 33, p. 458 above.
\(\textit{ἐπίθετον}\) (and later \(\textit{ἐπιθετικῶν}\)) occurs already in Dionysius Thrax, but it denotes precisely just a subtype of \(\textit{όνομα}\) (‘noun’).\(^3\)

It is very frequent for a word to stand sometimes as a noun and sometimes as an adjective. We are very familiar with the use as nouns of words which as a rule, or at least in origin, are adjectives. In all our languages, the masc. and fem. forms of the adjective can be used independently as nouns, to denote the male and female bearers of the relevant quality: e.g. \(\textit{οἱ ἄγαθοι, boni, die Guten, the good}\); this applies to the comparative and superlative, too: Cicero in a letter to a friend (\textit{Ad fam.} 3. 7. 4, no. 71 Shackleton Bailey) can refer to a certain Aulus Varro as \(\textit{tuum familiarissimum}\) (‘your most intimate friend’).\(^4\)

Also common to all of our languages is the use as a noun of the neuter of the adjective to denote anything (not more closely specified) possessing the quality denoted by the adjective, or the property itself in the abstract. This usage is inherited, and e.g. NHG \(\textit{Gut}\) (‘good’) and \(\textit{Übel}\) (‘evil’) may be traced back to early Germanic, and the abstract meaning of the neuter of the verbal adjective in \(-\text{to}-\) seems certainly inherited from the parent language—in Latin, this is common especially in the ablative, e.g. \(\textit{properato opus est} ‘\text{there is need of haste}\) (cf. Gk \(\tauο \varepsilonπιστον ‘\text{uspicion}\)). These neuters served especially the needs of philosophical discourse: REINHARDT observes (1916: 252), ‘there is hardly a single question of principle in earlier Greek philosophy which did not centre, from a grammatical point of view, | on one of these neuters: the \(\textit{άπερον} ‘\text{the Limitless}\) of Anaximander; ... the Eleatic \(\epsilon\nuν, \varepsilonν, \delta\circ\mu\iota\circν, ταύτο ‘\text{what is, Being, the one, the like, the same}; Heraclitus’ \(\sigma\sigma\phi\circν ‘\text{wisdom, the wise}; the qualities of \(ν\gammaρ\circν, \varepsilon\etaρ\circν, \thetaερμ\circν, \psiθερμ\circν ‘\text{the wet, the dry, the warm, the cold}.\(^5\) We might compare the fact that the oldest Indian philosophical text (in the \textit{Rigveda}) begins with ‘what is’ \((\textit{sat, lit. ‘the being}); and ‘what is not’ \((\textit{asat, lit. ‘the not-being}); and add that the frequency of these neuters which strikes the reader of Thucydides has certainly to do with the philosophical stamp of the period.\(^6\)—For an excellent treatment of the whole phenomenon, with clear partition of the various nuances of use, see TOBLER (1902–12: II, 177–210), with reference to French in the first instance, but also looking further afIELD. On the very modern fondness for this sort of

\(^3\) We owe our sharper distinction between the ‘noun substantive’ and the ‘noun adjective’ to the medieval Modistae, such as Petrus Helias and Thomas of Erfurt (see Robins (1997: 99) with further refs).

\(^4\) I have removed W.’s comment at this point ‘Varro says \(\textit{familiarissimius noster} ‘\text{your most intimate friend}\). The superlative \(\textit{familiarissimus}\) is especially frequent in Cicero (cf. \textit{ThLL}, s.v., 246, 57–69), including in the passage that I have substituted referring to Varro, but seems not to be attested in the writings of Varro himself.

\(^5\) \textit{Rigveda} X, 129, a cosmogonic poem, begins: ‘There was not the non-existent nor the existent then’; this is included in Macdonell (1917).

\(^6\) For a striking recent comparative quantification of expressions of the type \(\tauο \varepsilonπιστον ‘\text{hopelessness}\) in Thucydides, see Dover (1997: 46–9, esp. 49); but not less than their sheer frequency, it is Thucydides’ use of qualifiers with \(\tauο \varepsilonπιστον \text{to} \varepsilonπιστον ‘\text{the hopelessness of permanency}\); cf. Denniston (1952: 20–1, 36–7).
expression (’irrévélé ‘what is unrevealed’, le déjà vécu ‘what has already been lived’, etc.), see Spitzer (1918: 381). 7

All these cases apart, the use of an adjective as a noun occurred very frequently through what is called ellipse, whereby in a combination of noun + adjective the noun is dropped because it is self-evident. Latin Corinthia (neut. pl.) could refer only to uasa Corinthia (‘vessels of Corinthian bronze’), praetexta ‘the edged’ (fém.), only to the toga edged with purple. Similarly, dextra (manus) (‘right (hand)’), tertiana (febris) (‘tertian (fever)’), Latinae (feriae) (lit. ‘Latin (festival)’, a religious ceremony of the peoples of Latium), merum (uinum) (‘neat (wine)’), conditiuum (cubiculum) (‘burial (chamber)’). So, too, uia (‘road’) can be omitted: already in Cicero we find Appia and Salaria for the Appian / Salarian Way, and later Flaminia, etc. Aemilia—also in Cicero, of the road (Letters to his Friends 10. 30. 4, no. 378 Shackleton Bailey)—since it looked like a name for a region, could also denote the area traversed by the road (cf. Martial 6. 85. 6 tota planctus in Aemilia ‘lamentation in the whole of Aemilia’), and this is still seen in the modern name of the north-Italian province, Emilia-Romagna. 8

A little more needs to be said about the opposite kind of shift, from noun to adjective. We traced this development earlier on (I, 104 above) in another context, with reference to the larger numerals, which became adjectives under the influence of the originally adjectival numeral ‘one’. Here I should like to begin with a class of nominals in which we may not even be entitled to speak of a shift, as both functions have always been present. The nominal forms that we call collectively ‘agent nouns’ (’nomina agentis’) occur in the classical languages partly as free-standing nouns, partly as attributes of nouns. This is easily demonstrated in all the languages that concern us here: for example, in a single author (cf. e.g. Thucydides 4. 4. 2 and 4. 69. 2), a word like λιθωργός ‘stone-worker/working’ alone may be either a noun denoting the worker or an adjectival epithet of λειμν (‘tool’). And again, it is impossible to say out of context whether Gk φορός should be translated rather ‘bearer’ (noun) or ‘bearing’ (adj.). The same is true of Latin | nominals in -ō, -ōnis: for example, tiro means ‘(raw) recruit’, but you can also say exercitus tiro, tirones milites (lit. ‘a recruit army’, ‘novice soldiers’); and curio (a priest presiding over a curia) is used with a jocular shift of meaning by Plautus (Aul. 561–3) so much as an adjective that he can combine magis (‘more’) with it. 9

Words of this kind were from the outset capable of both functions.

7 For fuller discussion and illustration of the situation in modern French, see Grevisse §195.
8 For details concerning these roads, see Chevallier (1989: maps on 133, 135, and Index, s.vv.).
9 I have retained W.’s last example because curionem (an emendation by Gulielmius [16th c.]) has been accepted by most editors—with the notable exception of Lindsay, who retains curiosam of all the manuscripts, including those of Nonius Marcellus (p. 729 Lindsay). Prescott (1907) ingeniously proposed reading curiosam as the Greek word κουριόσαρ ‘in need of a shearing’, and this seems to be translated in Nixon’s Loeb. For an alternative proposal, see Comfort (1933) and, for a survey of the problem, W. Stockert’s commentary (Leipzig 1983), ad loc.
This may be seen particularly well in the class of words which is most confidently labelled ‘nomen agentis’, namely that inherited formation which ends in Greek in -τῆρ and -τωρ and in Latin in -tor. Often these nominal forms are found combined attributively with nouns denoting the person performing the action of the verb. Latin goes especially far in this direction. A word like victor means not only ‘the victor’, you can also speak of an exercitus victor (‘victorious army’); bellator is not just ‘warrior’, but is also admissible in equus bellator ‘war-horse’. An extension of this usage is seen in the fact that these nominal forms occur also with words for things, as e.g. in Cicero, On the Orator 1. 150 stilus optimus . . . dicendi effector (‘the stilus [i.e. writing] is the best means of achieving eloquence’), Juvenal, 13. 195 animus tortor (‘the mind that tortures’), Nemesianus (late 3rd c. AD), Cynegetica 297 altores suci (‘nourishing juices’), and in that these nouns in -tor can be determined by an adverb, e.g. in Cicero, To Quintus his Brother 1. 1. 19 in . . . tam corruptrice provincia ‘in so corrupting a province’ or Ovid, Heroines 9. 55 totiens errator ‘so frequently wandering’ (of the River Maeander).

The last example but one illustrates that the fem. form in -trix was also capable of adjectival function, and a further development from this point was the neuter use, attested first in Vergil, who uses uictricia arma (‘victorius arms’, Aen. 3. 54) on the model of the semantically related uictrices copiae, uictricibus nauibus (‘victorious forces’, ‘victorious ships’; pseudo-Caesar, Alexandrian War 11. 6; 40. 3). Later poets took this up, adding uictricia to other neuter plurals or creating new forms of this type such as ultricia (‘avenging’, already in Statius [1st c.]), altricia (‘nourishing’, Ennodius [5th–6th c.]).—It is of course easy to understand why fem. uictrices copiae, etc., and not masc. victores equi, served as the model: no specifically neuter form could be made to victor, but Vergil was able to create uictricia to uictrices, on the model of felicia tela beside felices animae (see SKUTSCH 1908: 39–41). But Vergil’s experiment was restricted to the unambiguously neuter ending -tricia; only later did anyone think of gen. and dat. pl. uictricium armorum (Seneca, Letters 120. 7, Val. Max. 1. 1. 11), uictricibus armis (Quint. Decl. mai. 4. 5), and not until very late on of singulars such as uictrici solo (‘victorious soil’, Claudian [c. AD 400], Panegyrict of the Sixth Consulship of the Emperor Honorius [poem 28], 25) and lacte altrici (‘nourishing milk’, Ennodius, Letters 1. 9).

The same occurs with other labels for persons with reference to occupation or age, such as hospes ‘host, guest-friend, guest’. In origin, this is a masc. noun, pes being related to the ancient word for ‘lord’ (Gk πῶς, cf. III, 56 below). Only very rarely does it denote a woman, and its use as an adjective is late (e.g. Statius, Thebaid 12. 479 hospitibus testis ‘guest-dwellings’), although the latter is richly developed in the fem. form hospita ‘female stranger, foreign woman’, which, attested first in Plautus (Miles 488), was formed like antistita : antistes (‘priest(ess)’), also already in
Plautus (Rope 624). Not only is hospita often used in poetry as an adjectival epithet of fem. nouns, whether personal like coniunx (‘wife’) or non-personal like terra, unda (‘earth’, ‘water’), but Vergil even allows himself to transfer this form into the neuter plural and to say hospita aequora (‘the seas that receive you’, Aen. 3. 377–8), and similarly, like inhospita Syrtis (‘the inhospitable Syrtes’, Aen. 4. 41), even inhospita saxa (‘inhospitable rocks’, Aen. 5. 627). Later poets have both usages, and very late writers attest acc. pl. fem. hospitas, inhospitas (for references see Neue & Wagener II, 34–5). That a Roman poet could even permit himself to use an expressly fem. adjective in -a as a neuter plural is seen in the use of the Greek Phoenissa by Silius Italicus (1st c. AD): not only does he use it as usual in the sense ‘Phoenician woman’, and as an epithet of fem. nouns such as classis, but he even says Phoenissa agmina (‘Phoenician columns (neut. pl.)’), Punica 17. 146.

Of words denoting persons with reference to age, senex and iuuenis (‘old man’, ‘young man’) are by and large nouns, but each has from the outset a comparative (senior, iunior). And Plautus is hardly innovating when he uses anus ‘old woman’ also in the combination anus sacerdos (‘old priestess’). But the poets of the Ciceronian and Augustan ages ventured to go further: you may remember from Catullus charta anus (‘old paper’, 68. 46) or fama anus (‘old lady rumour’, 78b. 4).—Similar is the case of servus (‘slave’). Strictly, it is a noun meaning ‘watcher, protector’ related to servare (‘observe, watch’). Since the main function of a male servant was originally watching over the animals (remember Eumaeus in the Odyssey, esp. bk 14), the word for ‘watcher’ became the term for ‘slave’. And then servus becomes an adjectival attribute even of fem. and neut. nouns denoting something in the role of a servant, so that we meet not only phrases like serva ciuitas (‘state enslaved’, Livy 25. 31. 5), serva capita (‘individual slaves’, Livy 29. 29. 3), o imitatores servum pecus (‘O servile flock of imitators’, Horace, Epist. 1. 19. 19), where persons are intended, but also e.g. servum operam (‘the work of a slave’, Plaut. Persa 280a), and the legal language of the age of Cicero knows already praedia serva ‘estates subject to a servitude’ (On the Agrarian Law III, 9).—Similar observations could be made of Lat. minister (‘servant’, which again seems to have emerged from an adjective—a comparative) and Gk δοῦλος (‘slave’), and also of Gk παρθένος and Lat. virgo (both ‘maid’en’). We cannot go

10 I have corrected (with ms. add.)—a correction overlooked by W. in the preparation of the 2nd edn of the Lectures) Terence to Plautus as the first author to attest hospita, and slightly modified the translation. On the (unusual) coining of feminine forms to 3rd-decl. nouns (esp. in Plautus), see Leumann 283–4. On Lat. hōspes (< IE *ghosti-potis: cf. OCS гospodi ‘lord, master’), see Benveniste (1969: I, ch. 7); note also Benveniste (1954: 259–64) and Mallory & Adams (2006: 207, 269) with further references.

11 The Lat. suffix -uo- (–wo- or –uwo-) makes adjectives as well as nouns (e.g. Lat. arnus ‘arable’, utuus ‘alive’); cf. Leumann §§264, 280. With Lat. servus we can compare very closely (inter alia) Homeric Gk ὁφή ‘protector’ (used of Nestor) and Avestan -hauruua- ‘watching, guarding’ (in compound adjectives applied to a sheepdog and a guard-dog), all of these by regular sound-change from IE *sar-wo-ś ‘who keeps watch, guards’ (for the root, cf. LIV, s.v. *ser- 1.); on the etymology of servus, see Rix (1994a: ch. 3).
into these examples in greater detail, but let us just go on to consider an instance of the prehistoric evolution of a noun to an adjective.

Latin has a whole series of formations containing an element *pot* - with very different meanings, and for which no common source is to be found within Latin: (1) the verb *possum* (‘am able, can’), most of whose forms are to be explained as combinations of *potis* or *pote* with the verb ‘to be’ (I, 69 above); (2) the comparative and superlative *potior* and *potissimus* (‘preferable’, ‘most prominent’), with associated adverbs; (3) the adjectives *compos* (‘in control, possession of’) and *impos* (‘not in control, possession of’). To all these there corresponds in other Indo-European languages a single word, a straightforward noun, *potis* ‘lord, husband’ (cf. Gk ἀνέστη ὁ ἀνέστη). Although we can trace all of the above forms back to this word, its basic meaning is preserved in Latin at most in the phrase in the Books of the Augurs, Varro, Latin Language 5. 58 *diui [qui] potes* (‘potent deities’; = Gk θεοὶ διώκτοι). In Sanskrit, an old word for ‘lord’ (*śvara*) was used predicatively in the sense ‘(is) able’, and as such could take a fem. or neut. ending depending on the subject, just like an adjective: this is exactly the case of *potis, pote* (actually neuter) in *possum*. The use through fossilization of phrases like *potis* (nom. sg.) *sunt* has equally an analogy in Skt śvara-, which occasionally retains the masc. nom. sg. form even with a plural or fem. subject; and cf. also NHG *Herr werden*, e.g. in Goethe’s Novelle (publ. 1828; at the very end of ch. 1) *sie sind eben Herr geworden* (‘they [the trees] have just gained control’).—In addition, given its basic meaning, *potis est* could also have the sense ‘is authoritative’, ‘has validity’, whence expressions involving comparison such as Terence, Phormio 533 *potior sit qui prior ad dandum est* (‘let the first to pay be preferred’) and Plautus, Menaechmi 359 *potissimus nostrae domi ut sit* (‘that he should be the most important in our house’), which were followed by the attributive use of *potior* and *potissimus* and the formation of the adverbs *potius* and *potissimum* (‘rather’, ‘above all’).—Finally, from *potis est alicuius rei* ‘has control over something’ emerged its counterpart in the privative compound *impos* (‘having no control’), as well as *compos*; here, too, predicative use will have preceded attributive.

Furthermore, words denoting beings which are the bearers of a particular quality can easily become adjectives referring to this quality. This is characteristic of primitive speech. LÉVY-BRÜHL in his well-known book on mental functions in less advanced societies (1922) notes that in Tasmania the word for ‘hard’ is literally ‘like a stone’, ‘high’ is ‘long legs’, and ‘round’ is ‘like the moon’.12 Many colour

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12 This is on p. 170 of the English translation by L. A. Clare (1926). Lévy-Bruhl’s source was Ling Roth (1899: 181), who was in turn quoting in extenso from an account written by Joseph Milligan in about 1847. The native languages of Tasmania have been extinct since the last quarter of the 19th c., in consequence of the actions (amounting to genocide) taken by the British following their invasion of the island in 1803; Szemerényi (1981) rightly counts this as an egregious instance of the rare phenomenon of ‘Sprachmord’ (language-murder). For a survey of what can be pieced together today of the Tasmanian languages, and bibliography, see Crowley & Dixon (1981), esp. 396–9 on the historical background and surviving sources of linguistic information.
terms of quite early and very recent times are of this sort: think of German rosa, lila, English rose, lilac.—Further, words denoting living beings characterized by a quality can eventually come to denote the quality itself as adjectives. Remember French bête (‘animal’ and ‘stupid’), chien (‘dog’ and ‘miserly; greedy; harsh’); cf. II, 65 below on Lat. magis asinus (‘more of an ass’).—In the case of adjectival patruus ‘of | the uncle’ (Horace, Odes 3. 12. 3 patruae linguae), menstruus (‘monthly, of a month’) is probably relevant as a formal model. 13

Related, but again slightly different, is a case of adjectivization which took place in prehistoric Latin. According to the dictionaries, Latin has two words uber: on the one hand, a neuter meaning ‘udder’, on the other, an adjective meaning ‘fruitful’, both identical in form. Well, do these two words belong together? And, if so, how? Comparison with related languages is helpful here, as uber has clear cognates in a whole series of other languages, including Gk οὐθαρ (‘udder’—with θ corresponding to Lat. b as in ἐρυθρός : Lat. ruber ‘red’), NHG Euter, English udder, Skt uδḥar. All these are used only of the body-part in animals (Aeschylus’ use of Gk οὐθαρ ‘udder’ at Choephoroe 532 to refer to Clytemnestra’s breast is dismissive), although Roman poets from Lucretius on, and prose-writers in the Empire use uber also of a woman’s breast. On the other hand, the adjective uber has no correspondence anywhere, and we have no alternative but to try to derive the (non-inherited) adjective from the (inherited) noun. 14 This is not impossible, as the metonymic use of Gk οὐθαρ is ancient. At II. 9. 141 = 283 (Agamemnon’s offer to Achilles) we read εἰ δὲ κεν Ἀργος ἱκοῖμεθ' Ἀχαϊκόν, οὖθαρ ἄρουρης (‘and if we get back to Achaean Argos, the most fertile of lands’), a phrase taken up in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter (450), and by the poets of Old Comedy in imitation of elevated speech (Aristophanes, fr. 112 in PCG III.2, Cratinus, fr. 235 in PCG IV). What is absolutely clear in this phrase (which is far from easy to translate) is that Achaean Argos is referred to as an ‘udder’ because it puts forth fruits as richly and abundantly as an udder yields milk. Curiously, Latin has a similar usage. Vergil several times uses the noun uber to refer to fertile land (e.g. Georgics 2. 275 in denso ubeere ‘in close-planted fertility’ 15) or, more abstractly, the abundant richness of the land (e.g. Geo. 2. 185 fertilis ubeere campus ‘a level space prolific with fertility’). Recently, people have tried to derive this from the Homeric model, but the Vergilian passages are too numerous, and differ too much in sense and phraseology from the Iliad passage, to have a chance of depending on it. Moreover, this usage recurs in Latin not only

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13 For other, perhaps more plausible models (including assiduus ‘land-owning’, ingenuus ‘free-born’—closer semantically, if more distant formally), see Leumann 303.

14 Szemerényi (1955) challenges W.’s account of Lat. uber, adducing comparative evidence to support his contention that the adjective is inherited (from IE *ουδῆ-ερο-ς) no less than the noun (from IE *ουδῆ-ή; cf. Hamp (1970) on the comparative evidence.

15 ‘This line is not easy to translate; see R. A. B. Mynors’ commentary (Oxford 1990) ad loc., with numerous parallels for this use of ubeer in Latin.
in literary prose-writers such as Tacitus, who are following Vergil, but also in writers on agriculture. Obviously, rural Latin—from which Vergil was borrowing in this case—knew the noun *u¯ber* as a way of referring to fertile land and the fertility of the land, such a transfer being quite plausible in country speech. From here we can make good progress: we understand now that a phrase such as *ager uber* (e.g. Catull. 46. 5) originally meant ‘a piece of land that is purely and simply an udder, sheer fruitfulness’. It is not so different from the expressions discussed by Ernst Fraenkel (1909b: 239–41) following J. Schmidt, namely Horace, *Odes* 1. 4. 16 *fabulae Manes* ‘the manes, which are nothing but | stories’;\(^*\) and in Demosthenes Φθόρος ἄνθρωπος (13. 24, ‘pestilential fellows’) or ὄλεθρος γραμματεύς (18. 127, ‘pestilent scribe’, of Aeschines). In the course of time, the appositional relationship evolved into an attributive one, and *ager uber* (‘udder(-like) field’) was perceived and used no differently from *ager fecundus* (‘fertile field’). In this way, *aber* became an adjective, and the process may have been favoured by phrases such as *arua ubera* (‘fertile fields’, cf. Vendryes 1921: 154).\(^{17}\) Plautus already makes a non-neuter acc. *ubem* (*Rudens* 637) and superlative *uberrimus*; and the abstract *ubertas* (lit. ‘being an udder’, hence ‘fertility’) must be old, as *uidertas* ‘dearth, unfruitfulness’, formed on the model of *ubertas*, is already in Cato (*Agr.* 141. 2).\(^{18}\) The adjective *u¯ber* did not produce a normal adverb in the positive grade, but the superlative *uberrime* is already in Plautus (*Trin. 31*), and, on the model of *confertim* ‘closely packed together’, Catullus (66. 17) ventured the form *ubertim* ‘plentifully’.—It is normal to explain *uetus* ‘old’ in the same way as *u¯ber* ‘fertile’. It is formally equivalent to Gk ἕτος ‘year’, but in spite of Skutsch’s attempt (1908: 35), it remains to be made clear how the meaning ‘old’ could develop from ‘year’.\(^{19}\) The phrase πιαρ ὀδός, which is added in linguistic studies, would be even closer to *uber*, but Buttmann has shown (1825–60: ΠΙ, 41–6) that in the Homeric clause ἐπεὶ μάλα πιαρ ὑπ’ ὀδός (*Od. 9. 135*) πιαρ is not an attribute of ὀδός but a noun: ‘fat, richness is under the ground’. I cannot here go further into the instances which belong to this group in the broadest terms, such as NHG *schrade, ernst* (‘a pity, unfortunate’, ‘serious, earnest’), French *dommage* (‘a pity’), which were earlier used only as nouns; on these, see Wilmanns, ΠΙ, 506–8.\(^{20}\) On the other hand, we do need to speak of another sort of shift across the boundary between noun and adjective.\(^{20}\)

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\(^{16}\) This example is not so straightforward; see the discussion of Nisbet & Hubbard (1970), *ad loc.*

\(^{17}\) The only occurrence that I can find of *arua ubera* (pp. 129–30 of the Engl. tr. of Vendryes 1921), probably an invented phrase, is in the 1st-c. AD geographer Pomponius Mela, *I. 37 uberrima arua.*

\(^{18}\) On Szemerényi’s account, the metaphorical use of *uber* ‘udder’ → ‘fertility’ is not in Latin before Vergil (who depends closely on the single (repeated) occurrence in Homer), and is of very limited occurrence after Vergil, and *ubertas* is formed regularly to the inherited adjective *uber*.

\(^{19}\) On the still-problematic cases of Lat. *uber* and *uetus*, see also Hofmann & Szantyr 158–9, and Leumann 269, 374, both with numerous further references.

\(^{20}\) Cf. Vendryes (1921: 154), who cites the MHG comparative *schered* ‘more harmful’ (cf. superl. *schedist*).
Among the words of which it is unclear whether adjectival or substantival use is prior are many which denote belonging to a people. True, in many instances the noun and the adjective are distinct: e.g. Ἰόνιος ‘the Ionians’ vs Ἰωνικός ‘Ionic, Ionian’, but e.g. ἰόρικός, although in Attic it means ‘Dorian man’ as opposed to the adjectives ἰορίκος, ἰορίακος (‘Doric, Dorian’), is used by Pindar as an attribute of λαὸς and κόμιος (‘people’, ‘victory procession’; cf. Ol. 8. 30, Py. 8. 20);\(^1\) and Greek ethnics in -ός and Latin ones in -ānus and -ēnsis are practically indifferent to the distinction between noun and adjective. So, too, are Latin ethnics in -cus: Cicero and Livy say both Etrusci for ‘the Etruscans’ and disciplina Etrusca, bellum Etruscanum (‘Etruscan lore’, ‘Etruscan war’), and this twofold nature is proper also to Auruncus, Oscus, Volscus, and Graecus—the last together with its archaic/poetic by-form Graius. Beside Etruscos and Volscus there used to be base-forms without the c-element, which were purely nouns: for Etrusco this is seen in Etruria (from *Etrus-ia), and for Volscus, in the Greek form of the name of the people, Ὀλυσσι.\(^2\)—In Greek, this double use is to be observed especially in the feminine, but one sees that dialects and genres vary in this regard, e.g. from the rule of the Atticist Phrynichus (318 Fischer = 321 Rutherford) ‘Λάκαναν μὲν γυναῖκα ἑρείς, Λάκαναν δὲ τὴν χώραν οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ Λακώνικὴν’ (‘a Spartan woman you should call Λάκαναν; the land you should call not Λάκαναν but Λακώνικὴν’). According to Phrynichus and his commentators, this rule applies generally to Attic, although Plato ventures Λάκαναι σκύλαικες (‘Spartan puppies’, Parmenides 128c). In Ionic and tragedy there is no objection to Λάκανα χώρη, χθών, πόλις (‘Spartan land’, ‘earth’, ‘city’), and Lucian risks even Λάκανα λίθος (‘Laconian marble’, Hippias 5). For further discussion in this direction, see Lobeck (1843: 47 and n. 55), and Rutherford (1881: 21).

From this starting point, high Roman poetry made free use of ethnics, especially Greek ones, in adjectival function. On the model of Homer’s Δάρδανος ἄνδρ (‘a Trojan (man)’, II. 2. 701, 16. 807), Vergil ventured not merely Dardana pubes (‘Trojan young men’, Aen. 5. 119) but even Dardana arma (‘Trojan arm(ie)s’, Aen. 2. 618), and Horace Dardanas turris (‘towers of Troy’, Odes 4. 6. 7), in contrast to

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1 Cf. Slater (1969: s.v. ‘ἰόριεσ’).
2 In the 4th-c. Periplus (Voyage round the World) attributed to Scylax of Caryanda, §§9, 21 Müller.
Homer’s properly adjectival πυλάων Δαρδανίων (‘gates of Troy’, II. 5. 789; 22. 194, 413)—although conversely for metrical reasons Homer does have to use as nouns the adjectival forms Δαρδανίων at II. 2. 819,3 and Βοιώτιος, -ον at II. 14. 476 and 17. 597 (both before the bucolic caesura!4), instead of Δαρδάνον and Βοιωτός. Horace’s Italos modos (‘Italian measures’, Odes 3. 30. 13–14) also belongs here, and in poetry and later prose we can see the same shift affecting Afer and Sardus (‘African’, ‘Sardinian’), although in Cicero they are always nouns. The same applies to Hispanic (‘Spaniard’ → ‘Spanish’), except that already Ennius (Ann. 471 Sk.) ventures the adverb Hispanic alongside Romanes. [Add.: This instance in Ennius incidentally shows clearly how the form of the suffix (¬ānus) favoured the adjectival and adverbial use of such nouns.5 Conversely, Propertius’ Phaeacēs . . . siluas and Athamana ad litora (‘Phaeacian woods’, 3. 2. 13; ‘by the shores of Athamania (i.e. Epirus)’, 4. 6. 15) surpass other liberties of this kind taken by the Augustan poets in being based on consonant stems.]

In Latin, the adjectival use of town names is also very widespread. Many Italian place names were substantivized adjectives (see Schulze 1904: 8–10, 535–43), which is part of the reason for instances such as Tibullus 1. 7. 57 Tuscula tellus (‘land of Tusculum’), Vergil Aen. 7. 710 Amiterna cohors (‘a contingent from Amiternum’), 2. 312 Sigca freta (‘straits of Sigeum’), 3. 689 Megaros sinus (‘gulf of Megara’), and Ovid Met. 6. 446 Piraea litora (‘shore of Piraeus’). And since names of regions such as Bruttium and Picenum possess an adjective on the same stem (Bruttius, Picenus), the poets felt entitled to spin from Latium an adjective Latius, which (attested from Ovid on as the equivalent of Latinus and Latinaris) blended easily into the numerous ethnic adjectives in -ius. Vergil is bolder at Aen. 10. 179 in making Alpheae Pisae (lit. ‘Alphean Pisae’) out of the river-name Alpheus, as earlier (Geo. 3. 180) he had ventured only Alphea flumina Pisae (lit. ‘the Alphean river of Pisa’).6

And finally, one more phenomenon belonging in this group, which has been correctly explained by Schulze (1904: 510–12). | We have the month name August, i.e. Lat. mensis Augustus, but how did Augustus come to be an adjective? You might be tempted to claim that augustus had always been an adjective (cf. Enn. Ann. 155 Sk. augusto augurio ‘by august augury’), only this is not relevant to mensis Augustus, the month dedicated to the memory of the Emperor Augustus, for which we should really have expected something like mensis Augustalis. And yet we find that this Augustus in the sense of an adjective derived from the name

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3 On the original distinction between Trojan and Dardanian, see Kirk (1985: ad loc.). On these names of peoples, places and derived adjectives, see Risch (1974: 117–18).

4 The bucolic caesura is a word-break at the end of a dactylic 4th foot in the dactylic hexameter, and is common already in Homer (47% of lines); see West (1987: 21, 78–9). Note that both of these instances are also with proper names.

5 Cf. Skutsch (1985: ad loc.).

6 Cf. S. J. Harrison’s commentary (Oxford 1991), ad loc.
Augustus is absolutely normal in other contexts, too: we have not only Augusta ratis in Propertius (‘the ship of Augustus’, 4. 6. 23) but also in official usage forum Augustum as the name of a forum instituted by Augustus, fossa Augusta of an arm of the River Po, and lastly the countless names of towns including Augusta (or Caesaraugusta), which stand in curious contrast to town names such as Ἀλεξάνδρεια, in which the founder’s name (Alexander the Great) is followed by a derivative suffix.

The question arises where to look for the source of this anomaly. For our starting point, we need to go back to the month name August. When, probably in 8 BC, the mensis Sextilis acquired the name mensis Augustus, this was done in imitation of the renaming (in 44 BC) of the mensis Quin(o)tilis (‘July’) as mensis Iulius in honour of Julius Caesar, and mensis Augustus seemed the perfect match for mensis Iulius. However, mensis Iulius is a perfectly normal formation, as Roman gentilicia in -ius are actually adjectival patronymics, just like Homeric Τελαμώνιος (vīōs) Aiās (‘Telamon’s—lit. Telamonian—[son] Ajax’, i.e. ‘Ajax, son of Telamon’): Tullius is in fact ‘the one born of Tullus’, Iulus ‘the one born of Iulus’. Consequently, the gentilicia in -ius were always capable of adjectival function: something belonging to a member of the gens Iulia belonged equally to the whole gens, was Julian, and it was perfectly correct to refer to a lex Antonia, a basilica Aemilia, or a uia Flaminia (‘law of Antonius’, ‘basilica of Aemilius’, ‘road of Flaminius’). This then led to the adjectival use also of names such as Augustus, and hence mensis Augustus like mensis Iulius. And literal translation of Augustus yields Gk Σεβαστός in the sense ‘Augustan, of Augustus’ (see REITER 1925: 649); some Greek calendars introduced a new month Σεβαστός, others a month Καίσαρ. Understandably, the poets also made free use of this morphological flexibility, but in the case of the adjective Romulus it is not confined to poetry (e.g. Romula tellus ‘Roman land’ in Vergil, Aen. 6. 876–7, Romulae gentis ‘Roman people’ in Horace, Odes 4. 5. 1–2): the old city of the Turdetani, Hispalis (modern Seville), as a colony of Julius Caesar (45 BC) was called Colonia Iulia Romula, the formal model here being provided by names like Siculus (‘a Sicilian’), which were from the first both noun and adjective.

It is interesting that the Popes imitated this ancient anomaly in naming things: e.g. Italian Acqua Paola is the name of the aqueduct of Pope Paul V (1605–21), formed on the model of Aqua Iulia / Augusta / Traiana (aqueduct of Julius

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7 For information on the vital interventions in the Roman calendar by Julius Caesar and Augustus, see Hannah (2005: ch. 5, esp. 116–19), with references to ancient and modern sources.

8 The first of the new month Kaisar (which replaced the Macedonian month-name Dios in the Greek cities of the Roman province of Asia) coincided with Augustus’ birthday (23 September). For the decree instituting it, see OGIS 438, 54 (and nn. 36, 43), with Brind’Amour (1983: 13–14), and for further information on the aftermath of Augustus’ leap-year reform, see Hannah (2005: ch. 6).
Caesar / Augustus / Trajan), although the ancients did not themselves venture to use the cognomen Paul(l)us as an adjective, using rather the genitive in basilica Paul(li) in contrast to basilica Aemilia.

Well, after this detailed—perhaps too detailed!—discussion of the boundary line between nouns and adjectives and the many sorts of shifts across it, a word more on each of these two categories. First, the noun.

One or two ancient scholars distinguished nomen proprium (Gk ὄνομα [κύριον]) and nomen appellativum (Gk προσηγορία) as separate parts of speech, like verb and adverb, but the standard theory, at any rate since Aristarchus and Dionysius Thrax, viewed both just as subtypes of the nomen (cf. Quint. i. 4. 20), and the Roman grammarians did the same. Accordingly, the common noun is termed ‘ὄνομα προσηγορικῶν’, of which nomen appellativum is a translation. Incidentally, the term ‘proper name’ (NHG Eigenname, French nom propre) is based on a misunderstanding, to which Schömann drew attention in his fine book on the parts of speech (1862: 82, n. 2): in the underlying Latin term nomen proprium, proprius means not ‘one’s own property’, as the English and other translations suppose, but ‘in the proper sense’. The Latin term translates Gk ὄνομα κύριον, the formation of which is well understood: in ordinary speech, ὄνομα meant just ‘name’, but in linguistics it was required in its ‘true’ sense only when a genuine name was intended. Compare Aristotle’s ἡ κύρια ἀρετή ‘virtue in the true sense of the word’ (e.g. Nicom. Ethics 1144b4), κυρίως διδάσκαλος (‘in the proper sense a teacher’) in Plato, Meno 96b4, and the use of Gk κύριος, Lat. proprius in rhetoric to denote an expression that is not metaphorical or otherwise artificial or unusual.

This use of κύριος ‘real, actual’ is based on the meaning ‘valid, normal’ that the word has in ordinary Attic. Horace misunderstands when he translates κύρια ὄνοματα (in the rhetorical sense) with dominantia nominata at Ars poetica 234, misled perhaps by Gk κύριος ‘lord’, although Vahlen, curiously, allows it (1914: 127).

[Ftn.: Incidentally, Greek must once have possessed a nominal form *κυρός (accent?) ‘strong, having the power to’ (cf. Skt śúra-, Av. súra- ‘strong; hero’). This is supposed by ἄκυρος ‘invalid’ and κυροῦν ‘to validate’. The abstract τὸ κύρος, ‘power, decision, validity’ stands to this *κυρός as τὸ μάκρος (‘length’, Arist. Birds 1141) to μακρός (‘long’), except that the earlier abstract *τὸ κέ(ᾶ)ος (Skt śvānas ‘strength, power’) was earlier ousted by the new formation as μήκος (‘length’) was by μάκρος.—It remains to establish why this old *κυρός was lost, and on what

9 In fact, the Acqua Paola was the result of the rebuilding (1605–12) of the 1st-century Aqua Traiana; see P. Virgili’s article ‘Aqua Traiana’ in Steinby, s.v.
10 The distinction between ὄνομα and προσηγορία is ascribed to ‘the Stoics’, and to Diogenes of Babylon in particular; see Matthews (1994: 33, 35 & nn.).
11 The key ancient discussions include Aristotle, Rhetoric 3, 1404b; Cicero, On the Orator 3, 149; Orator 80; Quintilian 8. 3. 24.
12 ‘H[orace]’s word is an imaginative touch rendering the κυριεῖν of τὰ κύρια in Latin. In his now familiar manner H. does what he teaches, offering dominantia in place of the common word for “familiar” or “literal” ’ (C. O. Brink, commentary [Cambridge 1971], ad loc.).
models κύριος (attested from at least the fifth century) came to take its place. (ms. add.¹: Debrunner suggests the proportional analogy ἀτιμος : τιμος : : ἀκυρος : κύριος; ms. add.²: cf. Frisk (1938: 5 ff.) for a different view.)³

The ancients counted as proper names only individual names, i.e. nouns expressing an ‘ἰδια οὐσία’ (‘a particular, individual substance’), and these do indeed show syntactic peculiarities, e.g. in the use of the article, which is not the same with proper names as with other nouns; (on the plural of proper names, see I, 91 above.)

The distinction between proper names and appellatives is clear (except that family names often belong with individual names), but transfers between the two classes are frequent. Ultimately, all proper names start life as appellatives or adjectives, and conversely individual names can become in various ways partially or exclusively appellatives. A phenomenon much discussed from antiquity on is the use of a god’s name to denote the element or area in which the god is active. A few instances of this sort are already in Homer: Ἀρης can mean also ‘war, fighting’, as in Homeric Ἀρης κτάμενος ‘killed in the fighting’, ἑγείρομεν ἐξων Ἀρή (II. 2. 440, ‘that we might stir up fierce fighting’), or ἄρημος ‘warlike’; similarly Ἡφαῖστος is simply ‘fire’ (II. 2. 426 σπλάγχνα . . . ὑπείρεσον Ἡφαίστωι ‘they held the entrails over the flames’), and Ἀφροδίτη is ‘love-making’ = δώρο Ἀφροδίτης (‘the gifts of Aphrodite’); cf. Od. 22. 444–5 ἐκκλελάθων τὴν Ἀφροδίτης, τὴν ἀρ’ ὑπὸ μνηστήραν ἐχον (‘may they [the faithless maidservants] fully forget the love which they had in the suitor’s arms’). And yet for Homer Ares, Hephaestus, and Aphrodite are also fully alive divine characters, conceived in entirely personal terms. After Homer, further examples appear. While Homer refers to bread and cereal as Δημήτερος ἀκτῆ (‘Demeter’s corn’, e.g. II. 13. 322), i.e. he regards them as the gifts and attributes of Demeter, the goddess’s name serves later to denote the earth or even more frequently the fruits of the earth; cf. Hesychius δαματρίζειν τὸ συνάγειν τῶν Δημητριακῶν καρπῶν. Κύριοι (‘daamatriēzein means to gather in the fruits of Demeter, in Cypriot’). Parallel to this are the use of Βάκχος for wine, Αμφιτρίτη for the sea, Μοῦσα for song. Recourse was had to this type of expression both in the high style and in jest. Sometimes a name originally used of a god in person could be reused in fun of his element: e.g. II. 18. 392 Ἡφαίστε, πρόμολοι ὅδε, Θέτις νῦ τι σείο χατιζει (‘Hephaestus, come this way: Thetis has something to ask of you’), the words spoken in Homer by Hephaestus’ wife, Charis, to summon her husband, when Thetis comes to visit, were addressed—with the substitution of Πλάτων for Θέτις—by Plato to the fire in which he planned to burn

¹³ Others reject the assumption of lost Gk *κύριος masc. ‘hero’, and explain ἀκυρος either as a regular thematic adjective formed to *κύριος ‘power’ (Schwyzer 727 n. 2, with references), or as the result of a four-part analogy (e.g. τιμος : ἀτιμος :: κύριος : x, whence *ἀκύρος — ἀκυρος (Meissner 2006: 171 n. 27). Cf. Frisk and Chantraine, each s.v. ‘κύριος’; on Skt śūnas- and cognates, and other reflexes of the IE root *kēh-, ‘to swell up’ (including Gk κύηο ‘am pregnant’, κύμα ‘wave’, Lat. causa ‘hollow’), see EWAia and LIV, s.vv.
the poems of his youth (Diogenes Laertius, 3. 5). As in Homer, ἄρης and derivatives are very close to appellatives in later Greek, too; in Herodotus, for example, ἄρηος ‘warlike’ is very common.

This phenomenon is easy to understand. Personal and objective conceptions of divinity overlapped in ancient popular belief since time immemorial. This is always the case with Helios and Eos, Uranos and Ge (the sun and dawn, heaven and earth), but even of Zeus the natural meaning, ‘sky’, remained long current (cf. II, 34, 38 above). Furthermore, abstract concepts like πόλις, ἀνάγκη, φόβος, and χάρις (‘fortune’, ‘necessity’, ‘fear’, ‘beauty’) represented at the same time divine powers, and so it was reasonable to extend a more-or-less appellative usage to gods’ names which may never have had non-personal reference; for a very fine article on the use and development of this usage, see Haupt (1875–6: II, 166–74).

In Latin the phenomenon is even commoner. Already in Naevius, one of the earliest Roman poets, we find side by side in a single passage Neptunus for fish, Ceres for bread, Venus for vegetable, Volcanus for fire, Liber for wine (fr. com. 121 = inc. 30 Warmerington). Some of these are comic improvisations, but Ceres and Volcanus are attested elsewhere in these senses, especially Ceres, particularly in derivatives. When Caesar, shortly before his death, instituted an office for the supervision of the corn-supply, he named the holders of the office aediles Ceriales, and Cerialia, the festival of Ceres in Varro, Cicero, and Livy, means in Pliny ‘cereals’ (Nat. Hist. 23. 1), whence the modern word. In poetry, Neptunus stands for the sea, and Venus not only in poetry for the joys of love. As with Gk ἄρης, the use of Mars as an appellative is very frequent, and is again not unknown in prose. Quintilian, who discusses (8. 6. 23–4) this usage of gods’ names under the figure metonymy, or hypallage, expressly characterizes the idiom uario Marte pugnatum est (‘they fought with varying Mars [i.e. fortune in battle]’) as proper to ‘eruditus sermo’ (‘an educated turn of phrase’). Latin lympha (from Gk νύμφη) normally means water, and while terra is first and foremost an appellative (lit. ‘the dry (element)’), and the goddess Terra mater secondary, tellus is probably an old divine name which gradually acquired the capacity for appellative function (Jacobsohn 1911: 407–14); even so, C. Cornelius Gallus (1st c. BC) ventured

14 According to a different version of the story (though involving the same quotation) in the Homeric scholia, Plato despaired of his poetry because of the quality of the simile at II. 17. 263–6; see Edwards (1991: ad loc.).

15 The word [i.e. venus] became one of the standard neutral nouns of the educated language for sexual intercourse . . . ; venus is common from Lucretius onwards, in writers who deal with sexual activity in a technical and neutral tone (Adams 1982: 189); cf. Ernout (1956) with numerous examples, Langslow (1999: 212–13) on the distribution of the usage. Quintilian, 8. 6. 24 characterizes venus as ‘more decent than the word coitus’. Cf II, 19 and n. 41, p. 423 above.

16 On the terminology, Quintilian here alludes to Cicero, Orator 93. Today, Mars ‘war’ is usually termed an instance of metonymy (broadly, the use of one noun for another), while hypallage denotes a transfer of epithet (e.g. a cold glass of water) or syntactic construction (e.g. entrust the winds to the fleet); see Lausberg (1998: §568.1b and §§509, 685, 1237 ff.) on ‘mythological metonymy’ and hypallage, respectively.
tellures duas (‘two lands’, fr. 1).\textsuperscript{17} It is easy to see why this usage came naturally in Latin: divinities were regarded much less personally in Roman than in Greek religion (cf. Wissowa 1912: 9–10). Naturally, for many Latin poets this form of expression was mere conventional ornamentation. It is instructive that Lucretius, who himself uses Bacchus and Neptunus in this way, permits names of this sort to someone for whom they have no religious association (On the Nature of the Universe 2. 655–60).\textsuperscript{18}

Other types of appellative usage attach to individual names for human beings. Names of persons who are characterized by a particular quality, and who possess it to an especially high degree, often serve to denote people in general who have this quality (I, 91 above). There are already abundant examples of this usage in Attic comedy. In the oldest surviving play of Aristophanes, for example, we have Acharnians 270 μαχών καὶ Λαμίχων ἀπαλλαγές ‘rid of fighting and Lamachuses [war-mongers]’, but even earlier Aeschylus (Agam. 1439) makes Clytaemnestra speak of the Χρυσηδών...τῶν ὑπ’ Ἄλω (‘of each Chryseis before Troy’), as if Agamemnon had possessed a string of concubines like Chryseis. This is found throughout ancient literature. | In Latin, Martial, for instance, offers many well-known examples. Alluding to Homer’s doctor Machaon, he uses Machaones to mean ‘doctors’ (2. 16. 5), and his Maecenates (8. 55 (56). 5) provided the model for the modern usage whereby a connoisseur of the arts is called a ‘Maecenas’, NHG Mäcen.—A name like this can even become almost an adjective: note Cicero, Letters to his Friends 9. 2. 2 (no. 177 Shackleton Bailey) quis est tam Lynceus? ‘who is so sharp-sighted?’; alluding to the Λυνκεύς of Greek mythology, one of the Argonauts, whose look could penetrate solid objects, and who already for the Greeks was the paragon of sharp-sightedness.

There is a lovely example in Slavic. There is a Pan-Slavic word meaning ‘king’ (OCS krali, Russian korol’, Polish król—borrowed into Hungarian as kiraly). Josef Dobrowsky (1753–1829), one of the founders of Slavic philology, recognized that this word is simply the German name Karl.\textsuperscript{19} It was not only throughout the West that Charlemagne was the type of the mighty ruler: even the Slavic peoples came to experience his power, and so his name became for them the most reverent designation of a ruler in general.

\textsuperscript{17} This line of Gallus, hailed as the inventor of Roman love-elegy, is quoted by the 4th/5th-c. ‘geographer’ Vibius Sequester in his entry for the River Hypanis in Scythia (mod. Bug); it was the only line known until the great papyrus discovery of 1978 (see E. Courtney’s article in OCD). Lat. terra (\textltt{< *terā}), together with torreo ‘I cause to dry out, parch’, Gk τέρωμαι ‘I am, become dry’, Engl. thirst and many other cognates, derives from the Indo-European root \textltt{*ters}; see LIV, s.v., and Mallory & Adams (2006: 345–6). Lat. tellius is usually now regarded as an old appellative and compared with Old English feol ‘floor’, Old Irish talam ‘earth, ground’, Skt talā ‘surface, bottom’, etc.; see EWAia, s.v. ‘tala-‘, and Mallory & Adams (2006: 224–5).

\textsuperscript{18} ‘Provided’, Lucretius adds, ‘that he genuinely refrains from polluting his mind with the foul taint of superstition.’

\textsuperscript{19} Cf. Dobrowsky (1822: 240, s.v. ‘krali’) and Vasmer, s.v. ‘κορόλις’, with further bibliography.
Of similar, though not identical origin is an even older Slavic title for a ruler, *Czar*, OCS česarí, a formation parallel to German *Kaiser*, both being based on the name *Caesar* (Gk Καίσαρ), the title of the Roman emperor in the Greek East. As the title of the ruler of the world, the word travelled as far as India, where in the second century AD a King Kaniška refers to himself on an inscription as ‘Kaı¨sara’. It even made its way into Arabic, and from there into Hindustani, whence the title of the King of England, *Kaisar-i-Hind* (‘Caesar of India’). I owe this information to Enno Littmann, who tells me also of a very interesting parallel: in Persian and Turkish, Alexander the Great is called ‘Dārā-i-Rōm’, literally ‘the Darius of Rome’.

A personal name can also become typical of a whole class, if it occurs mainly and commonly among the members of a particular group. In Latin, the praeonomen *Manius* must have had peasant or lower-class associations. That is how the proverb *multi Manii Ariciae* (lit. ‘there are many Maniuses at Aricia’, Festus pp. 128–9 Lindsay) is interpreted. At any rate, Persius (6. 56) and Petronius (45. 7) seem to use *Manius* in the sense of ‘lad, bloke’. Certain personal names went exactly the same way in medieval and modern times. Think of *Jack*, or German *Hans, Peter*. The great French Peasants’ Revolt of the fourteenth century was called the ‘Jacquerie’, because *Jacques* was the typical farmer’s name.

Just for the sake of completeness, let me note that all sorts of objects are also denoted with a personal name, whether that of the inventor or through some other connection. On all the above, cf. Wilhelm Wackernagel’s article on the use of names as appellatives in German (1872–4: III, 59–177), and Jespersen (1922: 439). The adjective also has many points of interest for the student of syntax. For example, the restriction of some adjectives to attributive, of others to predicative function has to be identified and explained. Then there is the meaning and construction of the comparative and superlative

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20 See further Vasmer, s.v. ‘царь’.
21 There are several rulers with the name Kaniška among the great Kuśāṇa kings, whose dynasty began in about AD 78; cf. Salomon (1998: 88 and Index, s.v.). For the title *Kaisara*, see *Epigraphia Indica* (a journal of the Archaeological Survey of India) 26 (1941–2), Index, s.v.; Sircar (1966: s.v.).
22 By ‘Hindustani’ W. must mean the language of administration of British India. Hindustani was synonymous with Urdu until the partition of India in 1947, when a Persianized variety, written in Arabic script and called ‘Urdu’ became the official language of Pakistan, while India retained the devanāgarī script and adopted as its official language ‘Hindi’, a Sanskritized register of Hindustani. On the history of the names of the languages, see Singh (1995: 1–8) with further references.
23 This (Persian) title (of which ‘Empress of India’ was the first English translation) was introduced by the Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli in 1876 and proclaimed in India on 1 January 1877.
24 Festus (p. 128 Lindsay) implies that the proverb was taken to refer either to famous or to ugly men. At Petronius 45. 7, some editors have accepted the conjecture *nannos* ‘dwarves’; see M. S. Smith’s commentary (Oxford 1975), *ad loc*. On the Persius passage, see Kißel (1990) with further references.
25 The origin of *Jacquerie*, the name of the revolt of 1358 (‘la grande Jacquerie’), which subsequently came to denote any peasant uprising, is uncertain: competing accounts derive it either from the nickname of one of the ringleaders, Jacques Bonhomme, or from the name for a type of jerkin worn by peasants; see further Bessen (1985).
forms. Valuable is the comprehensive and penetrating presentation of O. Schwab (1893–5) on the historical syntax of comparison in Greek classical literature. On comparison in Latin (and Romance), see in particular Wölflin’s monograph (1879). Ziemer takes a more general approach in his comparative synta of comparison in Indo-European (1884; cf. I, 49 above). I must confine myself to highlighting just one point here, namely that the formation of comparative and superlative, while in general a peculiarity of adjectives (II, 51 above), occurs also in nouns. I am thinking here not so much of words like ἄγρότερος and ἀφέστερος (‘wild, of the country’, ‘of the mountains’, which have been wrongly compared with Lat. finitumus ‘neighbouring, on the boundary’ and the like), which do not express an intensification of the meaning of the base-word, but are adjectives of place like πρότερος (‘in front’). Rather, I am thinking first of Homeric βασιλεύτερος, βασιλέυτατος (‘kinglier’, ‘kingliest’), of which the base-form, βασιλεύς (‘king’) falls in the category of nouns which belongs in the transitional area between noun and adjective (discussed above, II, 53–61). On this model, in comedy comparatives and superlatives are formed to ethnics and animal names, meaning ‘representing the essence of the people or animal in a higher/the highest degree’: e.g. Aristophanes, fr. 270 (PCG III.2) Δαναώτατος (‘extremely Greek’); Plaut. Poen. 991 nullus me est hodie Poenus Poenior (‘today no Carthaginian is more Carthaginian than I’); Sophron, fr. 117 (PCG I) προβάτων προβάτερον, οἷος οἴότερον ‘more sheep than a sheep’ (so Ahrens 1839–43; II, 388 & n. 4, 475 no. 96),26 which is well matched by Plaut. Pseud. 1361 homines magis asinos nunquam uidi (‘I have never seen greater asses of men’; cf. French bête, and II, 56 above). More striking is Plautus’ oculissimus ( = carissimus: ‘in the highest degree dear as my eye’, Cur. 15, 120a, remarked by Festus, pp. 188–9 Lindsay). As modern parallels, Ital. salutissimi (‘heartiest greetings’; this from Spitzer) and the jocular sub sigillissimo (‘most secret’) may be adduced.27

Something does need to be said about certain archaic uses of the adjective, which seem strange to our modern linguistic feelings. One is taught in school that in Greek the usual way of saying ‘they arrived on the third day’ is τρίταιοι ἄφικοντο: in other words, what we regard as determining the action, and so relate to the verb as an adverbial or prepositional phrase, is expressed in Greek by means of an adjective related to and agreeing with the subject. The adjective τρίταιος is derived from τρίτη (scil. ἠμέρα ‘third [day]’), so that a literal translation of the above example would be ‘(they came) as third-dayers’. The word | is surprising, because

26 Ahrens is in fact appropriately tentative, since the passage of Herodian from which this quotation comes (GG III.2, 238) is corrupt and obscure, and the example is at best uncertain; see PCG I and Hordern (2004: ad loc).
27 Salutissimi is used especially at the end of a letter. For numerous further examples in Latin, see Hofmann (1911: §84), and for Italian parallels, see Rohlfis (1970: II, §404), Maiden & Robustelli (2007: 352–3), and above all Spitzer (1922: 183–4)—though I have not found W.’s source for his two examples here.
in itself the subject has nothing to do with the third day, but this type of expression in particular persists throughout Greek beginning with Homer, e.g. Od. 14. 257 πεμπταίοι δ’ Αἰγυπτιον εἰρρείσην ἰκόμεσθα ‘on the fifth day we came to the lovely stream of Aiguptos [i.e. the Nile]’. And there are other adjectives of time formed in the same way, still in Attic prose. Thucydides, apart from expressions of the type τριταίοι ἀδικοντο, also uses αἰφνίδιοι and χρόνοι in agreement with the subject, meaning ‘suddenly’ and ‘after a long time’, and equally attests 3. 29. 1 σχολαίοι κοιμεθέντες ‘having been brought slowly, in a leisurely fashion’; and Hippocrates similarly has several times δληγήμερος ‘after a few days’. But this sort of expression is much more richly represented in Homer and the poets who followed him. Closest to τριταίοι is χθιζός ἔβη ‘he went yesterday’, but there is also ημάτιος ‘every day’ or ‘by day’ (at Od. 2. 104–5 in parallel with νύκτας ‘during the nights’, acc. pl.), πανημέριος ‘all day’ and πανύχιος ‘all night’, ὑπηρίοις and ἕσπεροι ‘in the morning’ and ‘in the evening’, and so on. The most striking example is II. 9. 470 εἰνάνυχες . . . ἑαυτοί ‘they kept watch . . . for nine nights’, lit. ‘as nine-nighters’.

Something that is easier to understand is the ascription to the subject of adjectives of place, as e.g. at Ill. 24. 10–11 (of Achilles) ἀλλτο’ ἐπί πλευρᾶς κατακείμενος, ἀλλότε δ’ αὖτε | ὑππίος, ἀλλότε δὲ πριγνής: τότε δ’ ὀρθὸς ἀναστάς (‘lying sometimes on his side, sometimes on his back (adj.), and now again prone on his face (adj.); and then he would stand upright (adj.)’). Similar instances occur still in prose, as do adjectives denoting position in a sequence like πρῶτος, πρότερος, and ὅστερος (‘first’, ‘former’, ‘latter’). In these cases the disposition of the subject really is determined by the adjective, and we can add πεζός (‘on foot’, lit. ‘as a foot-goer’), which is common in Homer (cf. later adverbial πεζός), and δρομαῖος ‘at a run’ in tragedy (e.g. Soph. Trag. 927).

Other examples include in prose of a river μέγας (or ἀφθονος) ἰέ’ (‘it flows [lit.] mighty / abundant’), or of an orator πολύς ἐνέκειτο ‘he vigorously attacked’ (lit. ‘he laid in in large quantity’, Thucydides 4. 22. 2), where size and vigour attach not only to the flowing and the attacking but also to the river and the orator. The same applies to adjectives denoting the mood accompanying an action, and also—to anticipate our discussion of the pronoun—to the occasional use of ὅδε, ὅτος, ἐκεῖνος (‘this, ‘that’) where we expect ἐνθάδε, ἐνταῦθα, ἐκεῖ (‘here’, ‘there’).

German has nothing quite comparable. When Goethe, following Homer, ventures nächtig instead of nachts (‘by night’) or (die) morgendlich(e) instead of am Morgen (‘in the morning’), it strikes us as strange and fails to match its model.28 In this respect, even French is closer to Greek than German, the

French for *er kam zuerst / zuletzt* (‘he was the first/last to come’) being *il est venu le premier / le dernier*, like Gk πρῶτος / ὅστις ἡλθε. Latin corresponds here with *primus / ultimus*, and there are other correspondences in Latin, although in general Latin is more reserved than Greek in this regard. | Roman comedy and classical prose avoid in particular that striking Greek use of *adjectives of time* (II, 65–6 above). The adverbial use of *recens* with participles in -*tus* does not really count, as the origin of *recens* is uncertain, and in its earliest attestations (Plaut. Capt. 718 *recens captum*, Cist. 136 *recens natum* ‘recently captured, born’) is already treated exactly like an adverb; on this, see Wölflin (1882: 111–14). Until we can explain the oddly formed *noctuabundus*, we cannot use Cicero’s *noctuabundus ad me venit . . . tabellarium* (‘a night-bird courier came to me’, Att. 12. 1. 2 = no. 248 Shackleton Bailey). Real examples are, first, Lucilius 1020 *serus*31 . . . *a ludo bene potus recessit* (‘he withdrew late from the game well oiled’; cf. Cic. Fam. 7. 22 (no. 331 Shackleton Bailey) *bene potus seroque redieram* ‘I had returned well oiled and at a late hour’—which I owe to Ed. Fraenkel), and then the Augustan poets, including Horace, who uses *nocturnus, serus*, and *uespertinus* like Gk νύχιος, ὅστερος, and ἐσπερίος (‘at night’, ‘late, later’, ‘in the evening’). It is clear that Tibullus’ *sic uenias hodie rine* (I, 308 above) reflects Greek poetic language, and similarly in Apuleius (Metam. 5. 6. 2) *et perdia et pernox nec inter amplexus coningales desinis cruciatum?* ‘and all day and all night do you not stop your anguish even in your husband’s arms?’ is based indirectly on Homeric phrases such as πανημέροι κρίνονται Ἀρηί (‘they measure themselves all day in battle’, cf. II. 2. 385) and εἴδων παννύχιοι (‘they slept all night’, II. 2. 24. 678). The word *pernox*, already unknown in Classical Latin,32 is attested in archaizing fashion as an attribute of the moon (‘shining all night long’, e.g. Livy 5. 28. 10, Plin. Nat. 2. 42), and was revived by Gellius (e.g. 2. 1. 2) and Apuleius in imitation of παννύχιοι. On this model he enlarged the equally archaic adverb *dius* ‘by day’ (e.g. Plaut. Mercator 862) with the prefix *per-* and used it as a predicative adjective.33 And Sallust’s *multus atque ferox instare* (‘he attacked with weight and ferocity’, Jugurtha 84. 1) is also a clear imitation, this time of Thucydides’ *πολὺς ἐνέκειτο* (above).

29 Cf. Verg. Geo. 3. 156 sole recens orto ‘just after sunrise’. On this and other similar instances of adverbial usage, see Leumann 270.
30 The form is allowed by Leumann 332, queried by OLD, obelized by Shackleton Bailey.
31 Note, however, that *serus* is a 16th-c. conjecture (of J. Douss) for *secur* of the manuscripts; in W. Krenkel’s edn (Leiden 1970), the line reads: 1044 *serus cum et medio ludo ac bene potus recessit*.
32 It may have been used by Vergil, Geo. 3. 220, but if so was very early changed to *pernox*. I have presumed that W. meant ‘archaistisch’ (for printed ‘archaisch’: there are no instances of the word in early Latin) and have so translated.
33 The origin of the form *dius* (and the quantity of the *n*) is uncertain, but it is generally regarded as gen. sg. *dius* < *dīui-* (cf. Gk Δίος, Skt divi); cf. e.g. Klingenschmidt (1992: 120), Meiser (1998: §100.4). In function, *dius* is a (rare) variant of *diui* (< loc. sg. *dīui; cf. interdius ~ interdiu*).
By contrast, in one related type of expression, Latin goes further than Greek, namely in the use of *nullus* for *non*. The best discussion of this is by Haupt (1875–6: I, 75–8), who shows that this use of *nullus* belongs to the colloquial language, and hence is to be found in comedy, e.g. *nullus creduas* ‘don’t believe’, *nullus dixeris* ‘don’t say’ (e.g. Plaut. *Trin.* 606, Ter. *Hecyra* 79), then still in Cicero in his letters to Atticus (e.g. 15. 29. 1 = no. 408 Shackleton Bailey *ad M. Aelium nullus tu quidem domum* ‘don’t even think of going to see M. Aelius at his house’) and in Catullus in a scatōn,34 8. 14 *cum rogaberis nulla* ‘when you are not asked’, which is imitated at *Ciris* 177. This usage had already been eliminated in more elevated registers, and Cicero does not venture to use it in his speeches or his didactic works. Passages such as *For Sextus Roscius* 128 *haec bona in tabulas nulla redierunt* prove nothing, as *nulla* here means *nulla eius bona* ‘none of his goods (were entered on the public registers)’, and the usage disappears until Apuleius revives it with archaizing intent in *nulli scitis* ‘you do not know’ (*Metam.* 8. 19; cf. 7. 17) and the like.35—There is nothing comparable to this in Greek, but in Vedic Sanskrit a word corresponding to *nullus* (*nākis*) is used also to mean ‘not’, although admittedly it retains its singular form even with a plural subject.36

On the whole, then, this phenomenon is in decline, and has an archaic feel to it.

Haupt (1875–6: I, 75) sees in it the expression of a ‘liveliness and as it were nimbleness of thought common to the Greeks and the Romans’, and similarly for Kühner & Gerth (KG I, 274) it is an effect of striving for clear expression. I cannot accept this view, any more than Delbrück can (1893–1900: I, 460). Rather, what we have is simply a relic of the primitive urge to accommodate other elements of the clause as far as possible to the subject: there will be more to say about this, when we discuss agreement and related phenomena.

The growing dislike of this type of expression based on agreement with the subject is reflected not only in the replacement of adjectives by adverbs and oblique case forms (e.g. of *πεζῶς* by *πεζῇ*, *δρομαῖος* by *δρόμῳ*) but also in that nominative adjectives in predicative function become fossilized as adverbs. On the latter, see Brugmann (1910) following Büheler and Skutsch (1892: 15–17), albeit with the addition of much that is unprovable, and even wrong.

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34 Or choliambic, that is, an iambic trimeter that is limping (*ακάξων*) or lame (*χαλῶς*) in that its penultimate syllable, usually short, is long.

35 ‘The source of *nullus = non* seems to be syntactic reanalysis of sentences such as Plaut. *Amph.* 792 *hic patera nulla in cistula*’s ‘there is no bowl in this little chest’ (where *patera nulla est* is very close to *patera non est*). For discussion and further illustration, see Lindsay (1907: 51), Hofmann (1951: §77), Hofmann & Szantyr 205.

36 Vedic *nākis* ‘no one’ — ‘not at all, never’ is a fossilized compound of the sentence negative and the nom. sg. masc. of the indefinite pronoun (*ne-kwīs*); it is frequent in and almost exclusive to the *Rgveda*, where the corresponding prohibitive *mākīs* is also found (*mē-kwīs*: cf. Gk *μὴ-τις*, Lat. *nē-quis*). See Macdonell (1916: 236–7, 240).
Lecture II, 8

There is another situation in which the adjective competes with a non-adjectival form of expression, again with the result that its use gradually fades. (On what follows, cf. Delbrück (1893–1900: I, 441–8), Wackernagel (1908a), and Neumann’s dissertation (Münster 1910) on the relation between genitive and adjective in Greek.) The reader of Homer is struck by the fact that the ship of Nestor is called Νεστορέη νηός; the house of Peleus, δόμος Πηλήσιος; Hector’s tunic, Ἐκτόρεως χιτών; the mares of Neleus, Νηλήϊαι ἔπποι—in other words, that the possessor is named attributively, not as in English or German with a genitive, but with an adjective derived from the name of the possessor. The examples are very numerous, and include in particular expressions of relationship like Ἰξιόνης ἄλοχοίοι (‘of Ixion’s wife’) or Τελαμώνιος νιός (‘Telamon’s son’), and also expressions without νιός such as Τελαμώνιος Αἰας, Νέστορα Νηλήσιον, and of a grandson Αντιλόχος Νηλήσιος (lit. ‘Telamonian Ajax’, ‘Neleian Nestor’, ‘Neleian Antilochus’).

Not that these are the only forms of expression in Homer. We find genitives, too: the type δόμος Ὀδυσσής is commoner than the type δόμος Ὀδυσσίος (‘the house of Odysseus’), and the same is true of indications of relationship, e.g. ἄλοχος Διομήδεος, ἄλοχος Σθένελον (‘the wife of Diomedes / of Sthenelus’), countless instances of νιός (‘son’) + gen., and with θυγάτηρ (‘daughter’) only the gen. is found at all. Naturally, only the gen. is used with πατήρ and μήτηρ: the father and mother cannot be designated by the addition of a possessive adjective as the property of their children. It seems that only the bare gen., without νιός (which is the rule in Attic), is not attested until after Homer. In Οἰλήσιος ταχύς Αἴας (7 times: Il., 2. 527, etc.), we can easily read Ὀιλήσιος, and probably the oldest example of the bare gen. is in the Hymn to Hermes, 4. 145 Διὸς ἔρωτίνος Ἕρμης (‘the son of Zeus, the good runner1 Hermes’).

It is easy to show that the use of the genitive is the more recent. For heroes of other cycles, the poet uses adjectival forms such as βίος Ἡμακλητή / Ἐτεοκλητή / Ἡφικλητή (‘the strength of Heracles / Eteocles / Iphicles’), obviously because he

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1 The translation of Gk ἐρωτίνος as 'good runner' reflects the etymology offered by Latte (1955) (viz. ἐρό- intensifier + Arcado-Cypriot οὐν- 'run', attested in various glosses) which seems to be accepted by Chantraine, s.v.; Hainsworth in Heubeck, West, & Hainsworth (1988: on Od. 8. 322–3); Edwards (1991: on Il. 20. 34–5). As Colin Macleod notes in his commentary (Cambridge 1982) on Il. 24. 360, the word may well have been obscure to Homer and his audience.
found them in the tradition. For his own heroes, in this kind of periphrasis he must resort to the genitive: Πριάμωσυ βίης, Πατρόκλωσυ βίης (‘the strength of Priam / Patroclus’), etc. Equally, many adjectival place names were ready-made for him: Αἴπωσυ τύμβος ‘the tomb of Aiputos’, Ἕρμαιος λόφος ‘the hill of Hermes’, Αἰόλης νῆσος ‘the island of Acolus’, and, on SCHWYZER’s imaginative interpretation (1917/20a), νῆσος Αἰαίη ‘the island of the Dawn’. The last two stand in palpable contrast with the νῆσος Ηέλιοιο and νῆσος Σειρήνοιιν (‘the island of the Sun / of the (two) Sirens’): probably there was no more ancient reference to these two islands. We might add that, as was observed already in antiquity, Πέλοπος νῆσος (‘the island of Pelops’, whence by assimilation Πελοπόννησος (‘Peloponnese’), as in Hesiod and the Hymn to Apollo) is not known to Homer (cf. CYPRIA 11. 3–4 Allen νῆσον ἄπασαν Τανταλίδον Πέλοπος ‘the whole island of Tantalus’ son Pelops’). Had Homer found and wanted to use a name for this part of Greece formed with reference to Pelops, it would have been similar to that used by APOLLONIUS OF RHODES, Πελοπηίδα γαίαν (ARGONAUTICA 4. 1570, 1577).

On the other hand, these adjectival forms are not confined to Homer. All sorts of instances are found through into late Greek, and in all parts of the Greek-speaking world. The usage is best established, especially in indications of family relationship, in the Aeolic (i.e. Lesbian-Thessalian-Boeotian) dialect group. A typical example is on a Thessalian inscription from Larissa, IG IX.2 638, 1–2 (3rd c. BC) Ποιτάλα Ποιτάλεια κόρα Τιτυρεία γυνᾶ ‘Poutala, daughter of Poutalos, wife of Tityros’. In patronymics in this area the old habit remained standard for a very long time. In Bocotia, e.g., not until the end of the fourth century did the genitive come to replace the patronymic adjective, and it did not oust it completely until the end of the third century (BECHTEL 1921–4: I, 295–7).3

In this respect post-Homeric usage is more archaic than that of Homer, and with this we can compare something else. After Homer, possessive adjectives can be formed to all sorts of divine names, and the most persistent among these are those substantivized as names of festivals and sanctuaries, e.g. Ἡραία, Ἡραίον (‘festival (neut. pl.) of Hera’ ‘sanctuary of Hera’). Pindar, however, has also the purely adjectival form Ἀπολλόνιος (‘of Apollo’, Pyth. s. 23, 90, etc.), in tragedy we find Ἑρμαῖος (‘of Hermes’, e.g. Aesch. Agam. 283), and Ἀφροδίσιος (‘of Aphro-

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2 This example can stand, although the name of Circe’s island is now regarded as being derived from Αἰα, the land of the Sun god in the extreme east of the world (later identified with Colchis, the goal of the Argonauts); on Aia, see especially Lesky (1948)—incl. pp. 23–4 on Schwyzser’s etymology—and Heubeck in Heubeck & Hoekstra (1989: on Od. 10. 135–9), with further references.

3 Schmitt (1977: 72) dates the coming to dominance in Bocotian of the patronymic genitive to about 250 BC, but notes that the adjective survives even longer, into the 1st c. BC (Schmitt 1977: 82). On the Aeolic patronymics, see ERNST FRAENKEL (1911: 231–5) and now MORPURGO DAVIES (1968b), with special reference to Thessalian, and MEIER-BRÜGGER (1992: II, 21–2) with further references. The patronymic adjective is attested in Mycenaean, e.g. e-te-wo-he-re-we-i-jo /Etewoklewehios/ ‘son of Eteocles’.
dite') is in general use. As late as the second century BC, an old boundary-inscription of a shrine of Heracles was renewed in the form ἡδος Ἡρακλεὸς περίετος (IG II² 3, 2609). In Homer by contrast, apart from ἄρης 'warlike', which, given the appellative use of Ἀρης (II, 62 above), is not really relevant, this sort of thing is found only in place names (cf. above) and in Ποσειδήνων ἄγλαιων ἄλσος ('the shining grove of Poseidon', II. 2. 506; cf. Hymn to Apollo 230) and Ποσειδήμων (Od. 6. 266, of a shrine of Poseidon). It seems to follow that Homer inherited adjectives formed to divine names, but recoiled from using them in his own narrative. This fits very nicely with his use of the adjective δίος. Its original meaning, ‘belonging to Zeus, born of Zeus’, is still current in Tragedy (e.g. Prometheus Bound 619 βοῦλευμα Διόν, 654 Διόν ὡμα 'decision / eye of Zeus'), and is implied at Plato, Phaedrus 252ε, but is found in Homer once at most (II. 9. 538 διόν γένος ἰοχέαμα ‘child of Zeus, shooter of arrows’, of Artemis; cf. Hymn to Dionysus 2); otherwise in Homer the word means roughly ‘bright’ (of αἴθήρ ‘the upper air’) or—its normal function—serves as a respectful epithet.—It is not obvious what caused Homer to innovate in this way and avoid possessive adjectives made to divine names. In this respect, Latin, and Italic generally, proceeded very differently (II, 71 below).

In Attic, if we exclude tragedy, the genitive ousted the possessive adjective to a far greater extent even than in Homer. That this is not coincidental may be seen from parallels in other languages (which we shall consider shortly). Substitution of the genitive, which had indeed gradually become the general adnominal case, saved the effort of, first, forming a derivative and secondly making the attribute agree with the case-form of the noun being determined.

Latin, too, has numerous adjectives of this sort, which express belonging and are formed from the name of a possessor or author. (On these, see Nägelsbach (1905: §20.3), and Wichert’s monograph (1875) on the use of an attributive adjective in place of the genitive in Latin.5) In high poetry, some of them can perhaps be ascribed to the influence of Greek poetry: e.g. Vergil’s Aeneia puppis (‘Aeneas’ ship’, Aen. 10. 156) and coniungis Hectoraeae (‘of Hector’s wife’, Aen. 3. 488) are clearly modelled on Homer’s Νεστορέᾳ νητ (‘Nestor’s ship’) and on Ἐκτορέῳ ἀλχων (‘Hector’s wife’, Ilias parva, fr. 19. 2 Allen), but this is not the whole story. Even Vergil’s Aeneia mutrix (‘nurse of Aeneas’, Aen. 7. 1) has no Greek τροφός for its model, but rather Latin phrases such as that adduced by Schulze (1904: 513) nontrix Paperia (‘the nurse of the Papirii’, CIL I² 45).6 Indeed, Latin is even more abundant than Greek in adjectival expressions of this type. Greek may have

4 J. Kirchner, the editor of IG II², takes the view that this inscription is not later than the 4th c. BC.
5 For further illustration and more recent bibliography, see Hofmann & Szantyr 66, 151–2, 155, 161.
6 On this 3rd/2nd-c. dedication from a sanctuary of Diana in Aricia, Wachter (1987: 383) comments: ‘The designation of the mutrix (‘nurse’), presumably a slave, with the adjective rather than the genitive of the gentilicium makes particularly good sense in this case, since a nurse in terms of her function belongs more to the whole family than to her legal owner. The Papirii are a very ancient family from the city of Rome.’
adjectives derived from gods’ names (cf. above), but as far as I know they are never used to denote the priest after the god he serves: i.e., Greek has nothing to compare with Lat. *flamen Dialis / Martialis*, etc., *virgo Vestalis*, or *sacerdos Veneriae* (‘priest of Jupiter / Mars’, ‘virgin of Vesta’, ‘priest of Venus’), save at best the late names of cultic groups such as *Διωνυσασταί* and *Αγαθοδαμουσασταί* (guilds of worshippers of Dionysus, and of the ‘Agathos Daimon’ [good divinity]; cf. LSJ, s.v.v.). In this context, it is always normal to use a genitive, from Homeric ἤρεις Ἡφαιστοῖο (‘priest of Hephaestus’), etc. onwards. We see this contrast also in corresponding expressions on bilingual inscriptions, in *CIL* I². 725 (early 1st c. BC) poplo Romano vs τῶν δῆμων τῶν Ρωμαίων (‘for the Roman people’), 692 populus Delphius vs ἄ πόλις [τῶν Δελφῶν] (‘the people / city of the Delphians’)——although there is also the converse in *CIL* I². 725 restituei in maiorum leibert[atem]: κομισάμενοι τὴν πάτριον δημοκρατίαν (‘restored to their ancestors’ freedom’ : ‘having recovered their ancestral democracy’).

Even so, we see in Latin the same development as in Greek, viz. ousting of the adjective by the genitive, although the popular language continues well into the later period to show a certain fondness for the derived adjective. This is illustrated by Löfstedt (1911: 76–81), with reference to, inter alia, the frequent use of *dominicus* (‘the Lord’s’); and cf. Schmalz in Stolz & Schmalz (1910: 612, §6). Let me mention two areas in this connection, starting with patronymics. Latin, too, once possessed the type represented by Gk *Τέλαμώνιος Αίας*, witness the old gentilicia derived from individual names: *Quintus Marcius* once meant ‘Quintus, son of Marcus’, before *Marcius* became the name of a family tracing descent from a certain Marcus, just as in Attica old patronymics in -δῆς survive as names of families, phratries, and demes. However, for the meaning ‘son of Marcus’, from the beginning only *Marci filius* is attested. The situation is the same among the relatedItalic peoples. Their family names also reveal old patronymic adjectives, but their inscriptions again give the father’s name only in the genitive, although with the difference that, as in Attic, the genitive is added on its own, without the word for ‘son’. In the context of the realm of the divine, the old pattern is preserved in Paelignian *iunois pucois* (‘for the sons of Jupiter’, i.e.

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7 Cf. the references in Hofmann & Szantyr (in n. 5 in this lecture).
8 So, e.g., *Ἀλκμαιώνιδα* (a family), *Ἀλθαλίδα* (a deme), *Δημοτωνίδα* (a phratry); for numerous examples of the last two types, see the index of Lambert (1993). This suffix is anglicized to -id (*Alcmaeonids*, etc.); it was borrowed by Latin (e.g. *Romulidae* ‘sons of Romulus, Romans’), even by German: see further Schwyzer & Debrunner 509 – 10.
9 This is true of the Oscan group of the Sabellian languages (Oscan, Paelignian, Marrucinian, Vestinian)—and also of Etruscan (non-IE), but it is not true of the Umbrian group (Umbrian, Volscian, Marsian, Aeuvian), where the father’s name, when it is written in full, is in the form of a derived adjective, and is always placed between the individual name (*praenomen*) and the family name (*gentilicium*); Venetic, more distantly related but still possibly Italic, very clearly uses a system of individual name + patronymic adjective. Latin’s closest relative Faliscan shows both types, with a preference for the adj. (and there may be variation between gen. and adj. also in South Picene, although interpretations here are still uncertain). The *locus classicus* on the whole subject of personal names in Latin and Italic is still Rix (1972: 705–7).
the Dioscuri, Castor and Pollux, Pg 5 Rix, from Sulmo; similarly in Marsian, VM 4 Rix, from Supinum), which corresponds to Euripides’ Δίος παῖς and to Old Latin Herko Ioio (‘Hercules son of Jupiter’, CIL I2 394 = Diehl 1959: 70; cf. also Wissowa 1912: 114, n. 1)\(^{10}\)

A second area is striking. Corresponding to Gk Ἰησοῦν οἶdos (‘Jason’s Road’, Apoll. Rhod. 1. 988) and δρόμοις Ἀχιλλῆος (‘Achilles’ Racecourse’, Herodotus 4. 55; 76. 4), there is an early attested via Herculanæa in Campania (Cic. Leg. agr. 2. 36), and the famous roads built by the Romans take the name of their builder in adjectival form, starting with the Via Appia. But in the case of the market towns established along these roads, the name of the founder is regularly added in the genitive, again starting with Forum Appi. Adjectival determiners (as in e.g. Forum Iulium instead of Forum Iuli) occur really only as mistakes of the tradition or as writers’ quirks—notice, however, Cic. Fam. 12. 5. 2 (no. 365 Shankleton Bailey) Forum Cornelium for usual Cornelii, and Catil. I. 24 Forum Aurelium.\(^{11}\) This pattern—which Schulen highlights (1910: 63) without explaining it—is the stranger in that in naming the fora that he himself established in the city of Rome, Augustus used the adjectival formula, on the model of the Forum Romanum: the forum founded by Caesar was Forum Iulium, and that founded by himself was Forum Augustum. The former, however, came early to be called also Forum Caesaris, and analogously later we have Forum Nervae and Forum Traiani. Curiously, the town Forum Popili is translated as ἀγορᾶς Ποπιλίας (adj.) by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities 1. 21. 4: was Dionysius perhaps misled by a Latin genitive Fori Popili?\(^{12}\) Incidentally, in place-names involving Portus (‘harbour’), the genitive again predominates.\(^{13}\)

Adjectives of this kind are found derived from other sorts of expressions denoting individuals, not just proper names. Plautus is full of examples, which shows that the type was genuinely at home in popular speech, examples such as erilis filius ‘the son of my master’, or conversely serulæ nuptiae ‘the wedding of the slave’. Still popular later are patrius and paternus ‘of the father’, as e.g. in Ovid, Met. 8. 211 patriae tremuere manús ‘his father’s hands shook’ (of Icarus’ father, Daedalus).—In Greek, πάτριος occurs in a similar way, e.g. in Pindar, Ol. 6. 62

\(^{10}\) The patronymic is one of several non-Latin dialectal features of CIL I2. 394; see Wachter (1987: 410). On Sabellian iouiois puklois, see Untermann (2000: s.v. ‘pukloim’) with bibliography. As far as I can see, any conceivable occurrence of δίος παῖς, with the patronymic adjective, in Euripides (e.g. Bacchae 417, 581; Hippolytus 555) is now read with gen. Δίος.

\(^{11}\) Via Herculanæa is Cicero’s way of referring to the legendary dam built by Hercules on the Lucrine Lake, the coastal lagoon between Baiae and Puteoli (reported by Strabo 5. 245 and Pliny, Nat. 36. 15, and alluded to by Propertius 1. 11. 2, 3. 18. 4, and Vergil, Aen. 9. 710); see Radke (1973: 1514–15), who also nicely illustrates (1465–72) Forum + gen. as the preferred construction for places along the public roads.

\(^{12}\) W. is alluding to the fact that the form Popili is ambiguous, either gen. of the name Popilius, or gen. sg. neut. of the derived adj. popilius, -a, -um of ‘Popilus’.

\(^{13}\) So, for example, Portus Cornelii, Portus Licinii near Rome, Portus Delphini near Genoa. For further information on all the places and roads in or near Rome in this paragraph, see Steinby, s.vv. (Cf. also PWRE XXII.1, s.v. ‘Portus’: e.g. Portus Albini, Achaeurum, Hannibalis, Orestis, Veneris.)
πατρία δόσα ‘his father’s voice’ (of Apollo, father of Iamus). Compare Od. 11. 521 = 15. 247 γυναῖων εἴνεκα δώρων ‘because of (lit.) the wifely presents, i.e. those that his wife had received’. Derivatives from words for objects also merit mention here, such as Homer’s νηία δόορα ‘the ship’s timbers’. An excessive artifice of the fourth century is in Tiberianus, Anthol. Lat. 719b Riese, 28 fames aurea (lit. ‘golden hunger’), for fames auri (‘hunger for gold’, cf. Verg. Aen. 3. 57).14

Before I turn to German, I should point out that the appearance of a genitive for an expected adjective cannot always be regarded as an innovation. In the first place, a second determiner of the possessor named in a possessive adjective can be in the form of a genitive in apposition. Two Homeric examples are well known: II. 2. 54 Νεστορέη παρά νηλ Πυλογενέος βασιλής ‘(lit.) by the Nestorean ship, of the Pylos-born king’, and II. 5. 741 Γοργεύη κεφαλή δεινοῦ πελώρου ‘(lit.) the Gorgonian head, of the dread monster’. This pattern is ancient. Nice parallels have been found in Lesbian and related dialects of Greek, in Phrygian, and in Slavic (see Ernst Fraenkel 1911: 229–31).15 In Latin, note e.g. Verg. Aen. 12. 739 arma dei Volcania (lit. ‘the Vulcanian weapons of the god’, i.e. ‘the weapons of the god Vulcan’) [. . .]. 16 Only Attic, once again, does not share in this feature: when Plato characteristically applies the second Homeric phrase above to Gorgias (Symp. 198c), he has to say Γοργιῶν κεφαλῆν δεινοῦ λέγεω ‘the head of Gorgias, that formidable orator’; he could not have ventured Γοργιαίαν . . . δεινοῦ (adj. . . . gen.). (On a similar point relating to the pronoun, see below.)

Secondly, we find coordination of possessive adjective with possessive genitive, especially if for the second element there was no usable derived adjective available. So, e.g., Aesch. Persians 8–9 άμφι δε νόστο τῷ βασιλείῳ καὶ πολυχρόσου στρατιάς ‘about the return of the king (adj.) and of the army rich in gold (gen.)’: instead of στρατιάς, the poet could in need have used the adj. στρατίω, (although in fact στράτιος ‘of an army, of war’ is hardly found in possessive function), but he was able to express the attributive ‘rich in gold’ only with the genitive.—Quintilian 3.

II. 73

8. 9 C. Sallustius in bello Iugurthino et Catilinae has | been explained by Wölfflin (1884a: 277–9). Sallust was able to call his work on Jugurtha ‘bellum Iugurthinum’ because bellum Punicum and bellum Persicum (‘Punic war’, ‘Persian war’)

16 I have removed W.’s second example: ‘and Cic. Att. 4. 3. 3 ex Anniana Milonis domo ‘from the house of Annius Milo’, although in the latter Milonis should perhaps be deleted’. (Milonis was deleted by Cobet.) This example cannot stand since Cicero is referring to a second house of Milo, ‘the Annian house’, i.e. the one inherited from T. Annius (cf. Cic. Mil. 64), and contrasting it with the house in the Cermalus area of Rome just referred to in this letter; see D. R. Shackleton Bailey’s commentary (vol. 2, Cambridge 1965) ad loc. (no. 75 in his numeration) and his Loeb edn (vol. 1).
had ensured that this sort of adjectival label was already thoroughly well established in Rome. From *Catilina*, however, even Cicero had no derivative, and hence it had to be ‘*bellum Catilinae*’. Equally straightforward is *patruus patruique*... *mans* ‘the departed souls of his father and his uncle’ in Silius Italicus, *Punica* 15. 10–11. From *patruus* (‘uncle’), the only derivative was *patruelis*, which was more or less confined to the term for the cousin, *frater patruelis*. Pindar, on the other hand, was under no such linguistic constraint when he wrote (*Nem.* 8. 2) παρθενηΐος παύενων τ’ ἑφίζοισα γλεφάροις ‘settling upon the eyes of young girls (adj.) and boys (gen.)’, as he could have used παύενος in parallel with παρθενή, but formal similarity was precisely what he wished to avoid. And there is also another feature of his style that needs to be noted.

It is true that in general the derived adjective is especially at home in poetry, because it is in fact older than the attributive genitive, but occasionally the genitive is preferred by the poets, in particular when the adjective is in ordinary use and replacing it with a genitive elevates the language above the everyday. You will be familiar with the term Ἀρεῖος πάγος as the name of the old Athenian council and court which met on the ‘Areian Hill’, the Areopagus. In this case, because it is a name, the old adjectival pattern was retained in all forms of Greek until a very late date, but precisely for this reason it seemed too trite for elevated style, and, as the possessive adjective still had the same force as the genitive, Sophocles referred to the Ἀρεῖος εὐβουλοῦν πάγων (‘Ares’ wise hill’, *Oed. Col.* 947), and earlier and even more freely Euripides spoke of an Ἀρεῖος ὀχθός (‘mound of Ares’, *Electra* 1258)—although Euripides had retained the adjective in other variants of the name (*IT* 961, 1470; *Or.* 1651), and Aeschylus had contented himself with reversing the order of the elements (πάγος Ἀρεῖος at *Eumenides* 685, 690).—In just the same way, Pindar refers to the Ἀρεῖος εὐβουλοῦν πάγων not only with the derived adjective (*Ol.* 1. 111, 5. 19, etc.), but also as Ἀρεῖος ὀχθός, ὀχθός Ἐρών, πάγος Ἐρών (*Ol.* 8. 17, *Nem.* 11. 25, *Ol.* 10. 50); and similarly he refers to the Pillars of Hercules as Ἡρακλέος σταλάν (with gen.) at *Ol.* 3. 44, in contrast to σταλάσσων Ἡρακλείας (adj., dat. pl.), the form in general use, at *Isth.* 4. 13.—This is imitated by the Roman poets. Suffice it to refer to *Martis Kalendae* and *Phoebi uada* (lit. ‘Kalends of Mars’, ‘the pools of Phoebus’) for *Kalendae Martiae* (‘Kalends of March’) and *Aqua Apollinares* (some famous baths in Etruria) at Martial 9. 90. 15 and 6. 42. 7, along with Hor. *Epist.* 1. 18. 20 *Brundisium Minuci melius uia ducat an Appi* (‘whether to Brundisium the road of Minucius is preferable or that of Appius’), where the references are to the *Via Minucia* and the *Via Appia* (cf. Hor. *Epist.* 1. 6. 26).

There are similar instances in elevated prose. The hall serving the Athenian Archon Basileus was called until the imperial period the στοὰ βασιλείως (‘the stoa of the king [adj.]’), but in two significant passages—the introduction to *Euthyphro*,...
II, 74 2a and | the conclusion of Theaetetus, 210d—Plato refers to it as τήν (τοῦ) βασιλέως στοάν (with gen.).—There are similar instances in Silver Latin, e.g. in that ‘coiner of words’ Pliny the Elder, tribuni aeris for tribuni aerarii (a property class below the equites, Nat. 33. 31; cf. Mommsen 1887–8: III, 190, n. 1), in Tacitus, virgines Vestae (Ann. 1. 8. 1, for Vestales), campus Martis (Ann. 1. 8. 5, etc., for Martius), bella ciuium (Hist. 3. 51. 1, etc., for ciuilia, ‘civil wars’), and Sibyllae libri beside the long-established libri Sibyllini (‘Sibylline Books’); on similar instances in Tertullian, cf. Løfstedt (1915: 104–5 and n. 1).

The use of the derived adjective has been most consistently preserved in Slavic, another indication of the archaic nature of these languages. But German also deserves a brief word. Grimm documents (D. Gr. IV, 299–300) how older German often expresses as an adjective what in modern German is the first element of a compound, e.g. hantliche Tage, NHG Hundstage, Engl. dogdays, Lat. dies caniculares, and many other such cases are to be seen. For the ἐλαιών (Mount of Olives, Mark 11: 1, Luke 19: 29) of the Gospels, modern German says Ölberg, but in Gothic Wulfila has fairgunja alewja, with an adjective derived from alew ‘oil’. Luther, too, renders Greek genitives with derived adjectives, e.g. at 1 Cor. 1: 12 ἐγὼ μὲν ἔμοι Παῦλου . . . ἐγὼ δὲ Χριστοῦ (‘I am of Paul . . . and I, of Christ’) becomes ich bin Paulisch . . . ich bin Christisch (‘I am Paulian . . . I am Christian’). I recall also the adjective eng(e)lisch as a derivative of Engel (‘angel’) modelled on Lat. angelicus; this is now obsolete save perhaps with the meaning ‘like an angel’. A well-known phrase is der englische Gruss, of the Angel’s greeting to Mary (‘Ave Maria’, Luke 1: 28), and phrases in old hymns such as mit Menschen- und englischen Zungen (‘with human and angelic tongues’, 1 Corinthians 13: 1), mit engelischer Schar (‘with an angelic host’), which are now replaced in hymn books with Engelszungen (‘angel-tongues’), etc. (in agreement incidentally with Luther); here admittedly the uncomfortable homonymy with the ethnic adjective englisch (‘English’) also tended against the use of the derived adjective. So, too, genus humanum, earlier rendered as das menschliche Geschlecht, is now Menschengeschlecht, like English mankind; and while adjectives in -isch made to names of provinces (Länder) are still common today, those made to names of towns are either old-fashioned, e.g. in Göttingische Anzeigen von

18 In Old Church Slavonic, ‘in the singular, when the head noun is modified by a single word, the adjective is especially highly preferred for human stems whose adjectives refer exclusively to individual persons’ (Huntley 1993: 177; cf. Lunt 2001: §18.3d). For illustration and discussion of individual modern Slavic languages, see Comrie & Corbett (1993: Index, s.v. ‘adjective, possessive’).
19 The new edn of the D. Wb., s.v., reports that the word has been obsolescent since the end of the 19th c., but quotes an example from 1960 in the sense ‘angel-like’.


On the whole, it is true to say of modern German that the adjective is confined to the role of denoting a quality, and that a relation of straightforward belonging is expressed by means of a compound or a noun in the genitive. This was highlighted eighty years ago by Becker in his *Organism der Sprache* (1841: 101–12), and recently illustrated by Dornseiff (1921b) from the point of view of style. In the German dialects, the use of the adjective has declined even more than in the written language; see Schiepek (1899–1908: I, 370–1) on the syntax of the dialect of the Egerland, and Binz (1888: 18–20) on that of the city of Basel.

For Greek and Latin, too, attempts have been made to find a difference of meaning between an adjective denoting belonging and a genitive, in general without success. Still, small differences may be noted with the help of three passages in Latin. First, Cic. *Mil.* 34 *gloria* (scil. *Milonis quaec cotidie augebatur frangendis furoribus Clodianis, iam Clodii morte cecidit* (‘Milo’s renown, which his suppression of the demented violence of Clodius (adj.) augmented every day, has now fallen as a result of Clodius’ (gen.) death’): here, the madness affected Clodius permanently, while death affected him for an instant. Secondly, Phaedrus says of his own fables (4. pr. 11 ff.), *quas Aesopias non Aesopi nomino, quia paucas ille ostendit, ego plures fero usus uetusto genere, sed rebus nouis* (‘I call them not “Aesop’s” but “Aesopian”, since he published just a few, while I offer more, using an old genre but new material’): evidently, the *fabulae Aesopi* are those written by Aesop, *fabulae Aesopiae*, those bearing the character of Aesop. And thirdly, of peahen’s eggs Petronius (33. 5) writes first, *pauponina oua diuisere conuiuis* (‘they (the slaves) distributed peahen’s eggs to the guests’), and then immediately afterwards, (Trimalchio to his guests:) *paunonis oua gallinae iussi supponi* (‘I gave orders for peahen’s eggs to be put under a common hen’), in the latter case with *paun* in the genitive in order to mark a contrast with *gallina* (‘hen’).

The opposition between adjective and genitive/compound could be pursued also in words for materials. On the whole here, too, we see the adjective in decline. If we compare French with Latin, the *ferrea aetas* of the Romans (‘Age of Iron’, Hesiod’s *γένος σιδήρου* is *âge de fer* in French (but note Ovid, *Met.* 1. 127 *de duro est ultima ferro* ‘the last age is of hard iron’). German, with its adjectives of material, is more archaic, but even so the German for the ‘Milky Way’ is *Milchstrasse*, in contrast not only with its close relative English but also with Gk *κύκλος γαλαξίας*, Lat. *orbis lacteus*, and French *voie lactée*.

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20 This was the title from 1753 to 1801 of what has appeared since 1802 as the *Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen*, the oldest surviving scholarly journal in the German language (publication began in 1739 under the title *Göttingische Zeitung(en) von gelehrten Sachen*); see the contributors to Smend (2002).

21 The Egerland (also known as the Bohemian Vogtland) is today in the (northwest of the) Czech Republic, to the south of Saxony and to the east of Bavaria, but from the 13th c. until the end of the Second World War, the area was ethnically and linguistically predominantly German; see further Povejiš (1997) with bibliography.
Lecture II, 9

Let us turn now to the **pronoun**, a part of speech which in virtue of its peculiar forms and functions has excited from the first the keenest interest among grammarians. From antiquity let me mention the work of the grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus, *Περὶ ἀντωνυμίας* (2nd c. AD), which became known only a hundred years ago, thanks to the edition of Bekker in his *Anecdota graeca I* (1814), and is now best used in the revised edition by Schneider (*GG* II.1.1), which he followed with a useful commentary (*GG* II.1.2). The appearance of the work was greeted above all for the many new pieces of information that it contains, especially from the dialects; it is only thanks to Apollonius’ work that Ahrens was able to give his very full account of the pronoun in Doric (1839–41: II, 247–78). But the theoretical parts of the book are also not without value, as the author deals with a number of problems that occupy us still today.

From the great mass of more recent literature, let me pick out two works which more than any others break new ground in the historical and general linguistic treatment of the pronoun: Ernst Windisch’s investigations into the origin of the relative pronoun in the Indo-European languages (1869), to which we shall return with reference to the study of the complex sentence; and Karl Brugmann on the demonstrative pronouns in the Indo-European languages (1904a). Brugmann calls his article (in the subtitle) ‘a study in historical semantics’, and in this respect it is extremely fruitful; it would have been even more fruitful, if Brugmann had included consideration of more recent developments, in particular of those in Romance, and if he had looked a little beyond the borders of Indo-European.¹

The Latin term ‘*pronomen*’ is a translation of Gk ‘ἀντωνυμία’, the name given by the Alexandrian philologists to the part of speech earlier called ‘ἄρθρον’; the translator’s formal model were formations like *proconsul* (‘proconsul’, an official holding the rank of consul). The parallel formation ‘*pronuocabulum*’ is used by Varro (*Latin Language* 8. 45) to refer to the interrogatives (and relatives), which

¹ For more recent bibliography, see Szemerényi (1996: ch. 8, *passim*), and note in particular a general article by Benveniste (1946), and the surveys of pronominal systems in a wide range of languages in Forchheimer (1953), Wiesemann (1986), and (from social, psychological, and anthropological perspectives) Mühlhäuser & Harré (1990).
correspond to the appellatives (in Varro’s terms, ‘nucabula’), while he confines the term ‘pronomen’ to those pronouns which stand for words with particular individual meanings—i.e., in the first instance, proper names (II, 61 above), which means the demonstrative and personal pronouns. In this he was not followed by later writers.

The Greek term itself denotes those words of this type which stand in for nominal forms. This is a rather empty term, and misleading in that one could infer from it the view that the mere reference to an object provided by the pronouns was more recent than the descriptive denotation provided by nouns—when in fact the pronouns belong to the earliest stage of languages. No less wrong is Varro’s formulation,2 fr. 122 Goetz & Schoell = 260 Funaioli ‘pronomen, quia non fungitur officio nisi praemisso nomine: ideo haec pars a Varrone “succedanea” dicitur’ (‘the pronoun is so called because it does not perform its job unless a noun precedes: hence Varro calls this part of speech “substitute, scapegoat”’), which applies only to the anaphorics. All this apart, the term prompts the question: to what extent do the pronouns partake of the properties of nouns and adjectives, and of nouns in particular?

Well, first of all, pronouns like nouns have case forms, and case-forms which correspond exactly to those of the nouns. There are a few small differences: the pronoun in the languages of concern to us here has no separate vocative form except in the 1st-person possessive, and even this is attested, in Greek, only in the Homeric form of address to Zeus, Ὅ πατερ ἡμέτερος Κρόνιδης (‘O our father, son of Cronus’), and, in Latin, only in the form mi (which in Pre-Latin was not confined to the vocative); | in pre-classical and Classical Latin, it was used only with the masc. sing., but from the second century AD it is found also with feminines; the grammarians felt the need to inveigh against the use of forms of address such as mi Aemilia, mi Paula (Neue & Wagener II, 367–70).3 Apart from the above, in modern Greek a vocative αὐτός was formed to the pronoun αὐτός for addressing someone not well known to the speaker, or whose name he cannot call to mind.4 The fact that the nom. of the 2nd-person pronoun and of a demonstrative pronoun with close deixis can be used in vocative function, occasionally with a vocative particle like Gk ὧ, Lat. o, heus, is self-explanatory. Apollonius Dyscolus (GG II.1.1, 21, 10–15; 57, 18–19) refers to ὧστος, καθεύδεις; (‘hey, are you asleep’?, Cratinus fr. 55, PCG IV) and ὧστος, τί πάσχεις; (‘hey, what’s the matter’?, Arist. Wasps 1) in Attic comedy, and to ὧ ὧστος, ἣ οἶη στρατεύαν ἔσαείσθαι; in Sophron

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2 According to the grammarian Cledonius, GL V, 49, 21; but the text is uncertain.
3 On Gk ἡμέτερος and Lat. mi, cf. I, 307 & nn. 5 and 6, p. 386 above.
4 Also ἄνωτος (lem. ἄντι); cf. Jannaris (1897: §251b), who localizes the usage in the north of Greece and refers to an article by G. Hatzidakis, and Thumb (1910: §144.2), who adds that it is used when one has temporarily forgotten someone’s name – this is the only function noted by Holton et al. (1997: 319), who characterize the usage as ‘vulgar’. 
forms (ample, at between article and noun. There are similar instances in Herodotus. For example, a curse cited in the tenth-century Byzantine encyclopaedia the Suda no. (Persians) the empire which his father had ruled'), stood as Latin pater eius, and on a Cyprian inscription (Collitz & Bechtel no. 26[=ICS no. 84]) we read o μοι πόσας (‘my husband’), with the pronoun curiously placed between article and noun. There are similar instances in Herodotus. For example, at 3. 15. 3 ἀπέλαβε τὴν οί δ πατήρ εἶξε ἀρχήν (‘he received back (from the Persians) the empire which his father had ruled’), οἱ δ πατήρ can only be understood as Latin pater eius, German sein Vater, English his father. Note also the curse cited in the tenth-century Byzantine encyclopaedia the Suda, ὁ γυνὰ τοῦ μοιχὸν ἔχοι (‘may your wife have a lover’). It fits very nicely with the view advanced here that the Sanskrit and Old Iranian forms corresponding to Gk μοι, σοι (τοι), oι equally combine genitive and dative functions, and the same is true of Old Lithuanian mi (a reference I owe to Ed. Hermann). Furthermore, Brugmann rightly notes (Grdr. II. 2, 407) that the Latin vocative mi (above) is in fact identical with Gk μοι, so that Lat. gnate mi corresponds exactly to Gk τέκνον μοι, and this also contributes to a sense that the pronominal form is genitive. But then, under the influence of the accented | forms (ἐμοί, σοι, etc.),

5 In tragedy, note e.g. Aesch. Supp. 911, Soph. Ajax 71, 89, Oed. Col. 1627; Eur. Alc. 773, Med. 922 (αὐτή, fem.); in Plato, the start of the Symposium, 172a5.

6 On Homeric κληθὶ μοι (rather than μεν), see Meier-Brügger (1986), who shows that while there is good manuscript support for the form μεν in certain contexts, including after κέκλητε ‘hear!’, the tradition attests no less clearly the genitival use of μοι in old formulae, notably after κληθὶ or κλήρε.

7 This curse comes three times in the Suda, s.vv. ‘δακδόμενοι’, ‘επισοί’, ‘οἰκοδομῆ’. The amount of the Suda available online at <http://www.stoa.org/sol/about.shtml> has been growing rapidly in recent years.

8 For references to earlier discussions, see Schwzyer 600–3 and, esp. on Indo-Iranian, Ai. Gr. III, 474. Of the Old Lithuanian gen.-dat.-acc. enclitic pronouns (-μi(į), (-)t(į), (-)s, only the last survives in the modern language. These forms are studied in detail by Ed. Hermann (1926: 15–95), who suggests that the short forms -m, -t continue not a gen.-dat. but an unstressed acc. form *-mē. While the Old Church Slavonic enclitics dat. mi, ti, si may continue forms with diphthongs (cf. Gk μοι, Old Avestan miθi, etc.), there is disagreement as to whether the same can be true for Baltic mi, ti, si; see Arumaa (1985: §119), and note also Arumaa (1933: 34 ff.), Ernst Fraenkel (1955–65: s.v. ‘mi’) and Senn (1966: §243).
the enclitics in -o₁ were early on confined to the dative, and new, unambiguously genitive forms were created alongside them. But, for the earliest period, we have here a clear case of a falling together of two functions in a single form such as does not occur in the noun or adjective.—Notice incidentally the identity of dative and accusative in several of the German personal pronouns. This too goes back in part to an early period.⁹

Now, what about grammatical number in pronouns? We spoke about this earlier in another context (I, 98–101 above). We know that in the pronoun, as in the noun and adjective, there is a distinction between singular and plural, and in Greek and the earliest Germanic a dual as well—indeed, we saw earlier (I, 76) that in early Germanic the dual is marked only in the pronoun, having been lost in the noun and adjective. Even so, here too, certain provisos need to be made. I do not wish to go into the morphology of the pronominal forms, or into the fact that the dual and plural endings of the personal pronouns are quite different from those used in the other pronouns and the noun and adjective (viz. in that distinctions of number are marked not, or not only, by endings but by a change of stem).¹⁰ Rather, I prefer to focus attention on a fact of usage familiar from German, namely that the reflexive pronoun makes no distinctions of number, and e.g. modern German dat.-acc. sich refers as well to a plural as to a singular subject. The marking of number is dispensed with, because there is no risk of ambiguity. This is inherited. We find exactly the same not only in the earliest stages of all the Germanic languages but also in Latin, where se and sibi equally can refer to a plural or a singular subject. This feature has been retained to the present day both in Romance and in Germanic.¹¹

In Greek, however, things appear to be different. Here there is a sharp distinction between the forms ἐ, ὄ, ὅ (or the compounds ἐαυτόν, etc.), which are related to the German and Latin 3rd-person reflexives, and are used for referring back to a subject in the singular, and the forms in ἀφ- for reference back to a plural subject. It should be recalled straightaway that both sets of forms are used not only as true reflexives but—at least in Homer and Ionic—also anaphorically with free reference back to an earlier item. This distinction of

⁹ In Middle High German, this is true of uns ‘us’, as the old acc. unsich (Old High German unsiḥ) is replaced by the dat., and in the same period the converse encroachment begins of the 2nd-person acc. pl. ieh on dat. pl. iu (see de Boor & Wisniewski §93); in the modern language, the agreement of acc. and dat. is seen not only in uns and euch but also in the general 3rd-person reflexive sich.


¹¹ On Germanic, see the references in the last n.; on Romance, see Harris (1978: 101, 105), and Harris & Vincent (1988: Index, s.v. ‘reflexives’). On the typology of reflexive pronouns, see Geniušienė (1987) and Frajzyngier & Curl (1999b).
singular and plural forms of the reflexive is a Greek innovation, and Greek itself still has relics of the ancient and original state of affairs. So, e.g. in Syracusan ὅν is used for ὁδῷ (‘of them’, not reflexive) with plural ending, but with the stem of the singular. And | on the other hand, the forms in ὅ- appear occasionally as singulars, at least in early lyric and tragedy, and conversely again the acc. ὑμι as a plural.

The possessive adjective of the reflexive was also originally unmarked for number. Latin suus -a -um can refer to the property of a plural subject, as can its counterpart in Gothic, e.g. Luke 9: 60 ἄφες τοὺς νεκροὺς θάψαι τοὺς ἐαυτῶν νεκροὺς (‘let the dead bury their own dead’) is rendered by Wulfila with let pāns dusfams usfilban seinans navins. In the dialects, this broad function of the Germanic possessive has survived to the present day, although already in Old High German sin is restricted to singular reference, and for the plural a form based on the gen. pl. of the ‘he’-pronoun is used. There was a similar development in Romance (e.g. Fr. leur, It. loro), but in modern Italian poetry it is still possible to use suo with plural reference. In Greek, in parallel with the forms of the true reflexive, already in Homer the possessive ὅ refers only to singular subjects, while ὅ- forms (σὸς, σφέτερος) are used in the plural—although at II. 3. 244 ἐγὼ ἐν πατρίδι γαῖᾳ in Zenodotus’ reading (‘in their own native land’, with ἐγὼ for φίλη), ἐγὼ may refer back to (plur.) τούς. The ὅ- forms are then subject in later poets to the same vagaries of usage as the reflexive itself.—Attic σφέτερείζεσθαι ‘claim as one’s own’ belongs here in a sense, though it is a special case. As a derivative of σφέτερος, it was originally used only of claims by more than one person, as in its earliest attestation, Aesch. Suppl. 38–9 σφετερίζαμεν πατραδέλφειαν τίμιᾳ ‘claiming as their own their cousins on the father’s side, us’, but Plato and Demosthenes use it also with a singular subject. For formal reasons, a verb like this could not have been made to ὅ (Lat. suus ‘his/her/its own’) (but cf. MHG sich gesīnen and Lith. (pa)šavinti, both ‘to appropriate’, both derived from the reflexive possessive, sin and savēs, respectively).

12 This is in Sophron, fr. 86 in PCG I, and seems to be isolated (Schwyzer’s attribution of the form to Epicharmus being in error for Sophron?), so that Wilamowitz’ conjecture of ὅν (= αὖν ‘therefore’) deserves consideration; cf. PCG I and Hordern (2004) ad loc.

13 For details concerning these and related pronominal forms (which are oddly absent from Sihler 1996), see Schwyzer 600–8, and cf. n. 1, p. 512 below.

14 The use of OHG sin ‘his, its’ only in the sg. matches the restriction to the sg. of the gen. of the reflexive pronoun sin, and the appearance of sin also as a replacement for the masc. gen. sg. of the 3rd person pronoun; cf. Braune & Reiffenstein §§282–4. Note also Howe (1996: Index, s.vv. ‘genitive/possessive’ and ‘reflexive’).

15 Indeed, It. suo ‘their’ has until recently been usual in all parts of Italy, loro being a literary intruder; cf. Rohlfis (1970: §§427–9). Fr. leur and It. loro are from Lat. illorum: cf. II, 81 and n. 22 in this lecture.

16 The usage is censured by Apollonius Dyscolus; cf. Hesiod, Theogony 71, Works 88, and West (1978a) on the latter.
The situation of the pronouns with regard to gender was discussed earlier (II, 6–9). Let me mention just one further point here. Although in German sich is indifferent with respect to gender, the possessive sein, which originally belonged with sich,\(^\text{17}\) can be used only with masculines or neuters; for the feminine, ihr is used, formed from the fem. gen. of the 3rd-person pronoun. This contrasts with French son and the reflexive possessives of Greek and Latin, and can be shown to be based on an innovation within Germanic. Gothic seins (formal counterpart of modern German sein ‘his, its’), though confined strictly to reflexive function, can refer not only to plurals but also to feminines, as e.g. at John 12: 3 skuifia seinamma for ταῖς θρεξίν αὐτῆς (‘with her hair’); the same holds in the Scandinavian languages and Old English.\(^\text{18}\) The innovation may be connected with the emergence of secondary anaphoric function, which calls for greater precision of reference than the reflexive. It is not confined to High German: modern English makes an even sharper distinction with his, her, its, although one determined only by natural gender (cf. II, 42 above).

Fourthly, and lastly, as in the noun, so in the pronoun a distinction can be made between noun and adjective. The personal pronouns are like nouns, albeit without being capable of all the syntactic relations of true nouns (such as that of taking an attributive adjective). The pronouns which inflect for gender are at the same time both adjectives and nouns, while the so-called possessives can be used only as adjectives. The term ‘possessive’ (borrowed from the Latin grammarians, who used it to translate Gk κτήτηκός) is fully appropriate only for the German possessives, which are used only in the sense of the possessive genitive—or of the closely related subjective genitive. In early Greek, the possessives are used also in the sense of the objective genitive, e.g. in Homer οὕς πόθος, αἱ ποθῆ ‘longing for you’, with similar things in tragedy, and Thucydides still combines e.g. δέος with ἡμέτερον and with φόβος ὑμέτερος to mean ‘fear of us/of you’. In the same way, Terence has e.g. Phormio 1016 neque neglegentia tua neque odio id fæcit tuo (‘he didn’t do it out of either disregard or dislike of you’), and there are isolated instances of this sort in later writers. We may compare patria pietas ‘piety towards one’s father’ in Vergil (Aen. 9. 294, 10. 824) and φόνοι πατρώοι, πατρώος φόνος ‘patricide’ in Sophocles (Oed. Col. 990, Electra 955).

As for the actual usage of the possessives, I refer back to earlier remarks on the parallelism and alternation between possessive adjective and possessive genitive of the noun (II, 68–75 above). In Greek, the development in the pronoun is similar to that in the noun and adjective, that is to say, use of the genitive is from the outset admissible as an alternative to the adjective, and gradually gains ground at the expense of the adjective. The possessive duals, 1st pers. νοιτέρος

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\(^{17}\) Cf. n. 14 above (this lecture).

\(^{18}\) On Gothic seins and its cognates in early Germanic, see Seebold (1984: 49–51), Lehmann (1986: s.v.).
and 2nd/3rd pers. ἁφωνέτερος are confined to epic; ὁς (‘his, her, its’, = Lat. suus), attested once in Herodotus (1. 205. 1 γνωίκα ἤν ‘as his wife’) and once in Plato (Republic 3, 394.46 τὰ ἀ δάκρυα ‘his tears’), is otherwise unknown in Attic. In the Greek Bible, the possessive is very rare. Matthew and Mark have no examples of ἴμεπερος and ἴμεπερος, and possessives are entirely absent from some books of the Old Testament. In modern Greek the old possessive has been ousted completely by the genitive forms μου, σου, etc., and survives only in the Pontic and Cappadocian dialects.19 By contrast, in Latin and the languages deriving from it, and in German, the pronominal possessive is longer-lived than the nominal, and for referring to | a possessor mentioned in pronominal form it has practically no rival. The Latin vocative mi, although genitival in origin,20 is no longer regarded as such. Latin and German even form new possessives out of genitives, to supply certain functions of the reflexive possessive, which (as we saw earlier, II, 79–80 above) came to be restricted in its use. NHG ihr as fem. sg. possessive (‘her’) and pl. possessive (‘their’) has its origin evidently in the fem. gen. sg. and the gen. pl., respectively.21 Very much the same is true of Fr. leur and It. loro, which simply continue Lat. illorum, their origin being reflected in the absence of a matching fem. form (*leure, *lora (!); contrast NHG ihr ‘their’, which inflects as an adj.). The French plural leurs was still unknown in the Middle Ages and became gradually standard only in the modern period.22

The fondness of Latin for possessive adjectives in the pronoun (which is incidentally evident also in the noun) is seen also in the fact that it forms a possessive even to the interrogative-relative: quius, later cuius, is attested from Plautus on in the sense ‘belonging to whom’, although this possessive adjective did not have the same vitality as those made to the personal pronouns. In Classical Latin it was eliminated from the high literary language. It is used by Cicero only in works prior to 70 BC, and appears nowhere in later prose, save in a juristic idiom in Pliny (quoted by Gellius 9. 16. 5 cuiua uxor fuit ‘whose wife she was’), until it is revived by archaizers such as Gellius, Apuleius, and Arnobius. Its famous occurrence in Vergil’s Eclogues, 3. 1 dic mihi, Damoeta, cuium pecus? an Meliboei? (‘tell me, Damoetas: whose flock is it? Is it Meliboeus?’) is completely

19 On the possessive pronoun in New Testament Greek, see Turner (1963: 189–92); on the situation in modern Greek, see Holton et al. (1997: 97) and with more information, including on the Pontic and Cappadocian dialects, Thumb (1910: §§142–3 and n. 3).
20 Cf. the Old Latin forms meu and (with gen. marker) mis; see Szemerényi (1996: 214) and Dickey (2000a) and (2002: 214 & n. 1).
21 The origin of these forms lies in OHG ira ‘of her’ and irr ‘of them’, respectively, that is gen. sg. fem. and gen. pl. all genders of the 3rd-person pronoun ēr, sīu, iz, cognate with Lat. is, ea, id; cf. Seebold (1984: 72–3), Braune & Reiffenstein §§283–4.
22 The final -s in the plural of the French possessive adj., leur–leurs ‘their’, is analogical on (originally adjectival) noûres, vôûres, etc. The functions of the Lat. gen. pl. masc. illorum have been extended in Romance to include the fem. and the dat. For a very clear account of both the French and the Italian developments, see Harris (1978: 88–90, 93, 102, 105–11); note also Nyrop (1899–1930: II, §129).
isolated, and even contemporaries took exception to it from the point of view of High Latin. A certain Numitorius derided it in his *Antibucolica: die mihi Damoeta, “cuium pecus”, anne Latinum? :: non, uerum Aegonis nostri: sic vure loguntur* (‘tell me, Damoetas: is “cuium pecus” Latin?’ :: No, it’s our friend Aegon’s: that is how they talk in the countryside’). The parodist may not even have seriously thought that the word was characteristic of rustic speech, but in fact his comment was closer to the truth than Servius’: *cuium* antique ait uitans homoecuteleuto, ne diceret *cuius pecus* (‘he uses *cuium* as an archaism in order to avoid a homoecuteleuto in *cuius pecus*’). As for Vergil, it is surely more plausible that he is borrowing in this passage from rustic speech than from the archaic literary register. Earlier we felt entitled to suppose the use by Vergil of a country idiom in the word über (II, 57 above; but cf. the n.), and THURNEYSEN (1904: 11) suggests an agricultural origin for the terms *abolescere* and *abolere* (‘to fade’, ‘to destroy’), first used in literature by Vergil.24 And that this possessive, although rejected from higher registers, really did remain current in popular speech, is demonstrated by its survival in Sardinia and the Iberian peninsula: Logudorese *kuyu*, Span. *cuyo*, Port. *kujo* are direct reflexes of | *cuius* (cf. MAROUZEAU 1922: 271).25—Possessives made on the stem of the interrogative are found also in Lithuanian and Slavic, languages which again favour adjectival expression of the relation of possession.26

The genetic relationship between this adjective *cuius* -a -um and the gen. *cuius* has still to be worked out. The standard view, that the genitive is simply the fossilized nom. sg. masc. of the possessive adjective, is scarcely tenable.27 Remarkable is the old ethnic interrogative *quiaitis*, later *cuiás* ‘born where?’, which

23 This couplet is quoted in the sole surviving part of Donatus’ commentary on Vergil, the prefatory *Life of Vergil*, 43. For the translation, about which I remain uncertain, I have adopted the punctuation of R. G. G. Coleman in his commentary on the Eclogues (Cambridge 1977), ad loc.; see also the commentary of W. Clausen (Oxford 1994). On Numitorius, see Courtney (1993: 284).

24 The *ThLL* accordingly quotes Columella 3. 2. 4 as the only example of *abolesco* in its ‘proper sense’ of withering (of crops), but the etymology and history of these and other words which, rightly or wrongly, have been connected with them are confused and controversial: for a survey of proposals and further references, see Walde & Hofmann, and Ernout & Meillet, s.vv. ‘aboleo’, ‘adoleo’, ‘alo’.


26 In the Lithuanian dialect of the Vilna region, the gen. *kienaid ‘whose?’ has yielded a derived adjective *kienis* (not in Senn 1966 or Mathiassen 1996); cf. Ernst Fraenke (1935–66: s.v. ‘kia- (i)’). On Proto-Slavonic and Old Church Slavonic *kají ‘which?’ and *cič ‘whose?’ (Russ. *čič*), see Arumaa (1985: §138) and Schenker (1993: 89), and on the other Slavic languages, Comrie & Corbett (1993: Index, s.v. ‘pronoun, interrogative’).

27 The more recent standard view—which goes back to Sommer (1914: §284) and W. (1912–13: 268–71)—is that the gen. sg. of the pronoun *cuius* (in Old Latin *quoius*) is from *quioi < *kwaisy < IE. *kwaιyo, with the addition of final -i as a marker of gen. sg. (the same would apply also to the other pronominal gen. sg. forms in -ius: *cius*, *bhnius*, *illius*, etc.). The adj. *cuius* -a -um is then supposed to have arisen through reinterpretation of the ending -ius of *cuius* (in e.g. *cuius seruus* ‘whose slave is it?’) as marking masc. nom. sg. in agreement with *seruus* (cf. *tius seruus* ‘your slave’); see Sihler (1993: §375.1a), Meiser (1998: §113.4), Weiss (forthc.: chs 16.1, §II.A.1.c; 27.2, §4.b.v.2). Problems remain, which affect also the dat. sg. *cuiut, et, buic*, etc.; for more detail and further bibliography, see Leumann §376.
Cicero uses to translate Gk ποδατός (Tusc. 5. 108), and which even Livy uses once (27. 19. 9—possibly following Enn. Ann. 235 Sk. cuiatis siet ‘whatever his country’), although he avoids adjectival cuius. It rhymes with ethnics like Arpinās and Fidenās (‘from Arpinum’, ‘from Fidenum’), but it is hard to understand why an ethnic of this sort should be derived from, of all things, the possessive pronoun.

The phenomenon we observed with possessive adjectives, whereby the genitive of a noun can be added in apposition to them, is to be found from the outset also with possessive pronouns, e.g. at Od. 1. 409 ἐὰν αὐτόν χρείας (‘business of his own’); or in an old Attic epigram ἄν αὐτό κτεάνων (IG I3. 647; c. 510–500 BC), which, as Wilhelm saw (1899: 223 n. 5), should also be read at Theognis 1009; or in the Gortyn Law Code II, 49–50 ἐς τὸν Φόνας κρημάτων (Collitz & Bechtel no. 4991). It is also self-explanatory that an answer to the interrogative possessive may be given in the genitive, as in the passage from Vergil’s third Eclogue quoted above. And lastly, let us note that in a phrase in which only the pronominal possessive was normal, in a later stage of the language the genitive of a noun may be inserted. While Cicero uses only mea/tua/sua sponte (‘with my/your/his/her agreement’), and from Vergil on sponte (‘freely, spontaneously’) could be used on its own, Lucan (followed by later writers) has sponte ducem/deum (‘by the will of the generals/gods’), i. 99, 234.

Another occasional sort of alternation of the possessives is with ordinary adjectives: in Greek, with ἴδιος, ἴδικος (‘one’s own’), and in Homer φίλος (‘own’, lit. ‘dear’); in Latin, more rarely with proprius (most tellingly in sponte propria ‘of one’s own accord’ in Ammianus, e.g. 30. 5. 8); in German, with eigen.

We should add at this point a note of another formal peculiarity of the pronouns, which is of syntactic significance, too. Inflected pronominal forms can be so closely combined that full univerbation occurs. Here belong, for instance, the fuller forms of the Greek reflexive: on the one hand, those of Ionic-Attic, with second element αὐτός (e.g. Ion. ἐσχιά, Att. ἑαυτή = ἐσχιά αὐτή); on the other, those of Doric, with polyptotic gemination of αὐτός (e.g. αὐταυτάς < αὐτά αὐτάς)—though the further development of these two types does not concern us here. Then there are the indefinite relatives, Gk δότης and

28 This is the story of Socrates’ answer when asked for his nationality; cf. Arrian, Epictetus 1. 9. 1. 29 W. omits to mention nostrās ‘from our country’, a promising link between Arpinas and cuius, used by Cicero a little earlier in the same passage (Tusc. 5. 90). On the suffix -āti-, see Leumann §309 with further references.

30 Of the Gortyn Law Code see now the edition of Willetts (1967). At Theognidea 1009, West prints τῶν αὐτοῦ κτεάνων of the mss.


32 In his ‘Doric’ example αὐταυτάς, W. may have in mind the literary Syracusan of Sophron (fr. 18 PCG I) and pseudo-Epicharmus (fr. 278, 7 PCG I). Reflexive αὐτός αὐτός, either with double inflection or in a
Lat. quisquis (both ‘whoever’), and NHG dieser (‘this (man), he’) is also based on a fusion of two pronouns.\(^{33}\) Enclitic particles can also be closely attached, as in Gk ἐγὼ-γε, τί-νη, οὗτος-ι (‘I, for my part’, ‘you’, ‘this man here’), Lat. ego-met, quis-nam?, quis-piam (‘I, for my part’, ‘who, tell me?’, ‘someone, anyone’). It seems that οὗτος contains more than one pronoun and a particle as well; its relation | to \(\delta\) made possible the analogical extension of τοῖος, τὸσος, τηλικός to τοιοῦτος, τοσοῦτος, τηλικοῦτος (‘such’, ‘so great’, ‘of such an age’).\(^{34}\) And finally we should recall those instances in which the case-form of a pronoun has fused with that of a noun or adjective of which the pronoun was the attribute. The clearest case is Lat. quo-modo (‘in what way’ \(\rightarrow\) ‘as, how’), but NHG heute (‘today’), heuer (‘this year’) and, in the opinion of many, Lat. bodie (‘today’—with bo- for abl. *bo-?)—also contain the case-form of a pronoun, and words such as NHG diesjährig, Lat. bornus (both ‘of this year’), Gk τῆμερον (‘today’), and τῆτες (‘this year’) are based ultimately on mergers of this sort.\(^{35}\)

Genuine compounding, however, as we know it from nouns and adjectives, is from the first foreign to the pronouns. The exceptions are easily explained, including those involving Gk αὐτός ‘self’, which in its stem-form αὐτό- is common already in Homer as the first element in such ancient formations as αὐτό-ματος ‘of one’s own will’ (II, 49 above) and αὐτό-κασάγνητος ‘true sibling’ (lit. ‘born of your own mother’), which are comprehensible only in terms of pre-Homeric language: but then αὐτός is not an ancient pronoun, but somehow of nominal origin.\(^{36}\) Then, in the fifth century, Greek writers ventured to intro-

\(^{33}\) This account of German dieser as containing two inflecting pronominal stems has recently been revived by Klingenschmitt (1987), although the standard view has been (and remains?) that dieser was in origin more like, say, Lat. ipse < *is-ipse ‘he himself’, in comprising the inflecting demonstrative \(\delta\)er and an unchanging particle -se (cf. the OHG gen. sg. masc.-neut. dés-se, with the case marked only on the first element, or Old Latin nom. sg. fem. ca-se ‘she herself’). On either view, there was a period in which both elements inflected (cf. OHG gen. sg. dés-se), and then a single stem-form was fixed for the first element and its inflection dropped: e.g. OHG dat. sg. masc. dés-seme; Lat. nom. sg. fem. ipar; cf. de Boor & Wisniewski §99, Braune & Reifenstein §288, Kluge, s.v. ‘diese’. On compounding as a source of new pronouns in Germanic, see Howe (1996: 102–4).

\(^{34}\) The analysis of Gk αὐτός to which W. alludes is seen best in the neut. τοῖον < pronoun τοῦ + particle *u + pronoun τος; indeed, the formation may have its origin in the neuter, as the second syllable always begins with τ-, even in the masc. & fem. nom., where the pronoun/article begins with \(\beta\)- (< IE *s-: Gk ὁ ὑιός of \(\alpha\)ί). Mycen. \(\tau\omega\tau\) and early Ionic \(\tau\omega\rho\rho\), and then a single stem-form was fixed for the first element and its inflection dropped: e.g. OHG dat. sg. masc. dés-seme; Lat. nom. sg. fem. ipar; cf. de Boor & Wisniewski §99, Braune & Reifenstein §288, Kluge, s.v. ‘dieser’. On compounding as a source of new pronouns in Germanic, see Howe (1996: 102–4).

\(^{35}\) For details, see Kluge, Ernout & Meillet, and Chantraine, s.vv.

\(^{36}\) W. himself had proposed (1895: 17–18) to derive Gk αὐτός from an adverb in -τός or an abstract noun in -τά on the root *asw- ‘life’ (cf. Skt ṣvṣ- ‘life’). An alternative view—one of Brugmann’s alternative accounts of the word, still advocated by Rix (1976: §197)—compares the first syllable of Gk αὐτός (cf. already Mycen. \(\eta\u142\eta\omega\) with the particle αὐτε, αὐτὲ ‘in turn, again’. Frankly, αὐτός is still without a secure etymology. For surveys of these and other attempts, with bibliography, see Schwyzer 613–14, Frisk, and Chantraine, s.v., and cf. n. 34 above.
duce into compounds the adjective-like pronominals τοιούτος and τοσούτος (‘such’, ‘so great’): from ὀμότροπος, ὀμοιότροπος ‘of the same sort’ and ἕτερότροπος ‘of another sort’, it was no great step to τοιουτότροπος ‘of such a sort’ (in Herodotus, Hippocrates, and Thucydides). It is debatable whether Aeschylus wrote, at Persians 432, (πλήθος) τοσουτάριθμον (‘[a host] so numerous’) or τοσοῦτ’ ἄριθμον (‘so great as to number’) but it is certain that Aristotle used τοσαῦτα as the first element of compounds, on the analogy of the numerals and of its near-synonym πολλά: τοσαυταπλάσιος (‘so-many-fold’, Problems 917b23, etc.) like δεκαπλάσιος, πολλαπλάσιος (‘ten-fold’, ‘many-fold’). In German, particular theories have thrown up such stiff compounds as the Nicht-Ich (all that is Not-Me) of the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814), or Ichbezug, ichtüchtig (lit. ‘I-reference’, ‘I-addicted’), etc. in the writings of Jean Paul (1763–1825).37—On the other hand, I will not deny that a number of scholars regard Gothic hwileiks (‘of what sort’ = NHG welcher ‘which, who’), Gk ποῖος; ὅς, τοῖος (‘of what sort?’, ‘of such a sort’, ‘of that sort’) and πηλίκος (‘of what size, age’) and Lat. qualis (‘of what sort’) as ancient compounds of a pronoun-stem with a noun.38

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37 For Fichte’s Ich, see D. Wb., s.v. ‘ich’, (7), col. 2031; D. Wb. cites only Jean Paul for Ichbezug and ichtüchtig (and also Ichsucht ‘egoism’, Ichsuchtler ‘egoist’).

38 The Greek and Latin forms are generally regarded as suffixal derivatives (see Schwyzer 612, Chantraine, and Ernout & Meillet, s.vv.), although there have been relatively recent attempts to derive Gk -ź-Lat. -al- from a noun meaning ‘age’ (related to Lat. al‘nourish’; see Leumann 483 with references). Gothic hwileiks, on the other hand, is pretty clearly a compound of *kwi- ‘who?’, what?’ + leik- ‘body’; see Lehmann (1986: s.v.).
Lecture II, 10

In the age of more developed thought and language, the pronoun took over a number of features wholesale from the noun. It is to this that we may attribute the combination of the relative with a possessive genitive (actually determining the antecedent of the relative) that we see especially in Thucydides, as at 4. 109. 1 oι Μεγαρῆς τὰ μακρὰ τείχη, ἀ σφῶν oι Ἀθηναῖοι εἶχον, κατέσκαψαν (‘the Megarians razed to the ground their (own) Long Walls, which the Athenians had held’), and similarly, with an anaphoric demonstrative, e.g. I. 115. 1 ταῦτα γὰρ εἶχον Ἀθηναῖοι Πελοποννησίων (lit., ‘these (places) of the Peloponnesians the Athenians had held’). (This is distinct from the use, found even in tragedy, of partitive genitive with substantivized neuter adjective.)—Plato goes even further: with the anaphoric, e.g. Timaeus 52c2–3 (εἰκών) οὐδ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ἐθ’ ὦ γέγονεν, ἑαυτῆς ἐστιν (‘(for an image) not even the very thing for which it exists is within its control’), where αὐτὸ τοῦτο refers to the word εἰκών (‘image’); and with the interrogative, e.g. Republic 10, 597d1–e2 ἢ καὶ (προσαγορεύομεν) τὸν ζωγράφον δημιουργόν καὶ ποιητὴν τοῦ τοιοῦτον; —οὐδαμόσ.—ἀλλὰ τι αὐτὸν κλίνης φήσεις εἶναι; . . . μιμητής, οὔ ἐκείνοι δημιουργοί (‘and (are we to say) that the painter also is manufacturer or maker of such a thing (i.e. a bed)?—No.—Then what will you say that he is in relation to the bed? — . . . that he represents that of which they (i.e. god and the carpenter) are the manufacturers’). Related to this are the Greek combinations of article with a genitive or a prepositional or adverbal phrase, which were imitated in Latin by means of the demonstrative, e.g. Cic. Brut. 83 illa Laeli ‘that (i.e. the speech) of Laelius’, picking up oratio Laeli just before. But other sorts of attributive determination of the demonstrative are found already in Old Latin, e.g. Plaut. Mil. 16 illum dices cum armis aureis ‘you mean the one with the golden armour’.—Further obvious imitations of the nominals include the combination of a substantival pronoun with the article (II, 137–8 below), and Aristotle’s coining—on the model of adjectives of material like λίθνως and ἔιλονως (‘made of stone’, ‘of wood’)—of ἐκείνως ‘made of that’; on σφετερίζεσθαι (‘to appropriate’), see II, 79 above. Not until the seventeenth century did the pan-European word egoism appear with its associated forms.

1 W. must mean cases of the type Soph. Ant. 1265 ἐμῶν ἀνωθεν βουλευμάτων lit. ‘the disasters of my decisions’, i.e. ‘my disastrous decisions’; see further KG I, 278–9.
In connection with the so-called demonstratives, although not exclusively in their regard, we must now say a word about two old terms for specific functions of the pronoun. In his work on the pronoun, Apollonius teaches that "any pronoun is either ‘deictic’ or ‘anaphoric’, " (GG II.1.1, 9, 17). A pronoun is ‘deictic’ (lit. ‘pointing’), he continues, when it refers directly to a constituent not previously mentioned; ‘anaphoric’ (‘referring back’; cf. Att. ἀναφορά ‘carrying back’), when a constituent already mentioned and known is taken up again by the pronoun. In deictic function a pronoun gives the πρώτη γνώσις (‘first knowledge, acknowledgement’), in anaphoric function, a δεύτερα γνώσις (‘second knowledge, acknowledgement’). It is to Windisch, in his article on the relative pronoun (1869), that the credit goes for rediscovering this distinction (together with the term ‘anaphoric’), making it fertile for research, and elaborating it in a more refined way (pp. 251 ff. of his article); he was able to compare similar theorems from the Indian grammarians. Windisch was then followed by Brugmann in his work on the demonstrative pronouns (1904: 18). Not anaphoric are the personal pronouns of the 1st and 2nd persons, the interrogatives, and the indefinites; conversely, always anaphoric is the relative pronoun, and also in German er, sie, es, in Latin is, ea, id, and in Greek the enclitic forms of the 3rd-person pronoun (ἐς, ὦ, ὦ, etc.) together with αὐτός, αὐτὴς (= Lat. eius), etc. (i.e., all the forms for ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘it’, ‘him’, ‘her’, etc.). On the other hand, the demonstratives as a rule combine both functions (cf. II, 101–2 below).

This relation between deictic and anaphoric may be understood not only in semantic terms but also historically. The tendency over time is towards using expressions of physical showing or pointing more and more for weak reference to something already known, and for genuine pointing to resort to new forms which stress more strongly the notion of deixis. For an illustration of the degrading of a deictic pronoun in this way, we can use Lat. is, ea, id.

Neither Plautus nor Cicero could use is or any of its forms for genuine deixis, whether to a near or a distant object, or even for denoting a place or time closer to or more remote from the interlocutor: for them, is was purely anaphoric. But it is easy to show that the restriction of this pronoun to anaphoric function was not original. Sanskrit has a pronoun corresponding exactly in form, some of whose forms can be used also anaphorically, but which in the first instance is unequivocally deictic, by making reference to the near neighbourhood of the speaker. We
have a relic of this in Greek, in a derivative which is found only in a compound. You know from Homer and Greek poetry the word ἵθαγενής (with its later by-form ἵθαγενής), which means predominantly ‘native, born in its own land’ (in one passage of the *Odyssey*, 14. 203, it is used of legitimate sons as opposed to a bastard). The first element in this ἵθα-γενής is to be compared with a Sanskrit adverb ḷa, originally *idha ‘here’, formed to the stem whose nom. we have in Lat. *idha means ‘here’, and ἵθα-γενής, ‘born in our land’, so that we have here preserved in Greek an instance of i-making reference to the location of the speaker. It is possible that in Cyprian this stem was used also anaphorically, as in Latin: note Hesychius’ gloss ὁ... αὐτήν, αὐτόν. Κύπριοι (*ὡ = ... her, him, in Cypriot*).4

What is true of is, is true also of its Germanic cognate, NHG er, ihm, ihn, ihr, es, which is purely anaphoric already in Gothic (*is = NHG er ‘he’, *ita = NHG es ‘it’); on the fem. *sie = Gk ἦ, see Wackernagel (1916: 167–8).5

The semantic devaluation which occurred prehistorically in the case of *is*, was repeated in later Latin and Romance with another pronoun. The pronoun *ille*, which was originally strongly deictic, and pointed at distant objects, survives in Romance only as an anaphoric: e.g. in French *il ‘he’, le ‘the’, both bleached of any deictic force. This same shift from deictic to purely anaphoric function is seen also in English *he*, which is based on the same pronominal stem as that in NHG *hier, heute, bienacht, heuer* (‘here’, ‘today’, ‘tonight’, ‘this year’) and Lat. *cis, citra* (‘on this side of’), which refers to the location of the speaker in the same manner as Gk ἦ deceive.6

Now for a few remarks on the anaphoric pronouns, beginning with a detail of case usage. In languages in which the verb can mark the person without a pronoun (cf. I, 107–8 above), in cases of unemphatic anaphora, there is no need of a nominative pronoun: a previously mentioned item can be understood as the subject without being specially signalled. (In Greek, this has also influenced the genitive absolute, where, if the subject is clear from the context, the participle often stands without a (pro)nominal genitive, e.g. Thuc. 3. 70. 2 ἀφικομένης Αττικής τε νεώς καὶ Κορινθίας πρέσβεις ἄγουσαν καὶ ἐς λόγους καταστάντων (scil. τῶν πρέσβεων ‘the representatives’: when a ship from Athens and a ship from Corinth arrived with representatives on board, and they (the representatives) debated the matter). And by the by, another related, familiar

4 On Gk ἵθαρ ~ ἵθαρ-, see Risch (1974: 217); on the Indo-Iranian cognates of *idha* (*idha* is attested in Pali and Buddhist Skt), see EWAia, s.v. The equation of the two forms is not straightforward (see Chantraine and Frisk, s.v., the latter with bibliography); on the other hand, Skt *idha* has been compared with Lat. *ibi* ‘there’ (see Walde & Hofmann, s.v., with bibliography).

5 On the history of the Germanic forms, see Krahe & Seebold §61, de Boor & Wisniewski §96, and Braune & Reifenstein §283 with bibliography.

6 Lat. ci- and Germanic *bi- continue IE *ki-, the regular reflex of which before a vowel (*i- or *t-, according to dialect) is seen in Gk ἲμὲρον, τὸ ἦμερον ‘today’ < *ki-ämēr-.
feature is the frequent omission of αὐτῶν or αὐτοῦ (= Lat. eum, eius ‘him’, ‘of him’) where in German or English we would expect it.) It is for this reason that the Greek enclitic ὸι has a gen. ὸ and an acc. ἐ, but no nom., and that equally the anaphoric use of αὐτοῦ, etc.—which according to the grammarians could be treated as an enclitic, and was certainly subject to the word-placement rules of enclitics—is restricted in Attic to the oblique cases. Only later was nom. αὐτός used in the sense ‘he’. Modern Greek uses it in this way without any emphasis, and the Greek Bible shows stages on the way to this situation, e.g. Mark 1: 8 ἐγὼ μὲν ἐβάπτισα ὑμᾶς ἐν ὑδαίς, αὐτὸς δὲ βαπτίσει ὑμᾶς ἐν πνεύματι ἀγίω (‘while I have baptized you in water, he will baptize you in the Holy Spirit’), where in Attic ἐκεῖνος would have been used instead of αὐτός (the Latin Bible here has ille). Here there is still a certain emphasis on the pronoun, but in a passage such as Luke 4: 14–15 (‘... and a report concerning him went out through all the surrounding country’) καὶ αὐτὸς ἐδίδασκεν ἐν ταῖς συναγωγαῖς αὐτῶν ‘... and he taught in their synagogues’, the modern Greek stage has already been reached. The fact that the Vulgate here has et ipsa docebat in synagogis eorum is no argument against this, since, in striking parallel with Gk αὐτός, ipsa in later Latin was reduced semantically to the value of (earlier) is (cf. MEADER & WÖLFLIN 1900: 389–90). Instances like that of Luke 4: 15 are to be found already in the Septuagint (e.g. Genesis 12: 12).7

A further point: the term ‘anaphoric congruence’ (‘anaphorische Kongruenz’) is first used in KRÜGER’s Greek grammar for schools (1873–91 [cf. Cooper 1998, 2002]: §58.4), which I described earlier (I, 32 above), and the phenomenon mainly concerns the pronouns. (See, on earlier Greek, BRUHN (1899: 10–12); and on German, GRIMM, D. Gr. IV, 292, and WILMANNS III, 765–72.) When a pronoun refers back to an item given earlier, it goes without saying that it agrees in its form with the noun to which it refers back; admittedly—in contrast with clause-internal | agreements—it does not agree in case (which is determined by the clause in which the pronoun stands), but certainly in gender and number. In the large majority of instances, this general requirement is fulfilled, but there are exceptions of various sorts.

First, with regard to gender. If a person is denoted by a neuter noun (II, 16 above), the pronoun referring back to it may have regard to the natural gender, the marking of which is a function of the gender-forms of the pronoun (II, 8–9 above). Luther often proceeds in this way where he translates Gk γυνή (‘woman’) with the German neuter noun Weib, e.g. at Matthew 5: 28 wer ein Weib (neut.)

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7 On the emergence and development of non-emphatic αὐτῶν –ὑ ‘he, she, it’ in Hellenistic and later Greek, see Jannaris (1897: §§539–43, 1422–3), Thumb (1910: §136), Blass, Debrunner, & Funk §288.2, and Turner (1963: 3, 40–1). In Latin, the weakened use of ipsa (which comes to serve in Sardinian and some Sicilian dialects as the definite article) is attested possibly as early as Cicero and Propertius, and securely from Curtius Rufus on; see Hofmann & Szantyr 189–91, with further references, and on the demonstratives in the Latin Bible and in their wider Latin context, Abel (1971).
(Gk γυναικα) ansicht, ihrer (fem.) (Gk αὐτή) zu begehren, der hat schon mit ihr (fem.) (αὐτή) die Ehe gebrochen in seinem Herzen (‘whoever looks on a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart’), although in this Luther is simply following ancient convention. The same occurs in Greek after τέκνην (‘child’), if a son is intended: e.g. Eur. Suppl. 12–14. θανόντων ἐπὶ γυναικῶν τέκνων (neut.) . . . οὕς (masc.) . . . Ἁδραςτος ἡγαγε (‘as the seven true-born sons (neut.) are dead . . . whom (masc.) . . . Adrastus led’), and there is an exact parallel to this in Wulfila, with the word barn ‘child’, e.g. Luke 1: 59 qemun bimaitan pata barn (Gk τὸ παιδίου) jah haihautn ina (Gk αὐτῷ) . . . Zakarian (‘they came to circumcise the child (neut.) and they called him (masc.) . . . Zacharias’). Naturally, the same applies with females, too, as for example with κοράσιον (‘little girl’) or σῶμα γυναικεῖον (‘female slave’) in Delphian inscriptions (e.g. Collitz & Bechtel nos 1705; 2154; 6). So, too, at Mark 5: 41 κρατήσας τῆς χειρὸς τοῦ παιδίου λέγει αὐτῇ (‘taking the child (neut.) by the hand, he said to her (fem.)’) becomes Gothic fairgraip bi handau pata barn qaphu du izai, where the ‘constructio ad sensum’ is common to both the original and the translation.—Conversely, a masc. or fem. noun for an object is sometimes referred back to with a neuter anaphoric (several times at Plato, Rep. 1, 358c [of δικαιοσύνη ‘justice’, fem.] and in inscriptions, Meisterhans & Schwyzer 197, §82.5).

We find the same sort of thing in metonymic reference to persons. Let Ovid, Tristia 4. 10. 91 serve as an example: ad uos, studiosa, reuertor, | pectora, qui uiae qaeritis acta meae (‘I turn again to you, keen hearts (neut.), who (masc.) wish to know the events of my life’). Terence admits the same with scelus (neut., lit. ‘crime’, e.g. Andria 607), and Cicero with furia (fem., lit. ‘madness’, Letters to his Friends 1. 9. 15), when a person is referred to.

A related phenomenon is when the anaphoric shows the gender of a synonym of the word it refers back to. So, e.g., at Phil. 758 Sophocles picks up νοσήματος (‘disease’, neut., in line 755) with αὐτή (‘it’, fem.) because he has the word νόσος (‘disease’, fem.) in mind. This sort of thing is found already in Homer, and then subsequently it recurs in everyday Greek. So, on two Attic inscriptions, one of a set of previously mentioned ὁφραγίδα (‘signets’, neut., diminutive) is picked up with ἡ δέ, as the writer was thinking of the base-word ὁφραγίς (Meisterhans & Schwyzer 197, §82.6).

Such failures of agreement are found also in number, in particular with a plural anaphoric referring back to a collective noun. So, in Greek after words such as λαὸς ‘people’, βουλῆ | ‘council’, πόλις ‘city’, χθόν ‘land’, when the speaker has in mind the plurality of the constituent individuals or inhabitants.

8 These expressions, sometimes combined, are very frequent in manumission documents, and are usually followed by the name of the freed slave-girl introduced by ὧν ὄνομα ‘whose (fem.) name (is)’.

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Thirdly, in the type of languages where the possessor is regularly denoted by means of a possessive adjective (II, 68–72 above), it is common for the anaphoric to refer to the base-word underlying the adjective: so e.g. at Soph. Trach. 259–60 ἔρχεται πόλιν τὴν Ἐθνοστίαν τὸνδε (i.e. Eurytus) γὰρ μεταίτας . . . ἐφασκε ('he [Heracles] went against the city of Eurytus [lit. the Eurytian city], for he it was whom he held responsible'), or Thuc. 2. 45. 2 γυναικεῖας ἀρετῆς, δόαι νῦν ἐν χρείᾳ ἐσονταί 'of the virtue of women [lit. womanly virtue], all those who will now be widows'; cf. also Pind. Isth. 1. 16–17.—In Latin this is very common in Plautus. At Rudens 598, e.g., he speaks of a hirundinines nidus ‘a swallows’ nest’ but then goes on to say, neque eas eripere quibat (‘but he [the monkey] could not snatch them out of it’), because he is thinking of the hirundines themselves. There are similar cases in Lucretius (see MUNRO’s commentary (1886–91) on 4. 934) and in classical prose: cf. Plin. Nat. praef. 22 Tulliana simplicitate, qui . . . Platonis se comitem profitetur (‘the [lit. Tullian] openness of Cicero, who declares himself a companion of Plato’). This applies also to the possessive pronouns: e.g. Soph. Oed. Col. 730–1 τῆς ἐμῆς ἑπεισόδου, ὅν μὴν ἀκνεῖτε (lit. ‘of my arrival, whom do not fear!’; i.e. do not fear me!), and in Latin e.g. Cic. De or. 2. 15 culpa mea, qui me senem esse sum oblivus (lit. ‘through my own fault, who forgot that I am an old man’).

Fourthly, and finally, an anaphoric may refer to an element of a compound with the gender and number which it would have as a simplex. So in Homer, II. 9. 381–4 Θῆβας Ἀιγυπτίας . . . αἱ θ’ ἐκατόμπυλοι ἐάναι δυνάσσοι δ’ ἀν’ ἐκάστας (ancient v.l. ἐκάστην) ἀνέρες ἐξοικεύοντο (‘Egyptian Thebes . . . which are hundred-gated; and through each gate march two hundred men’), where ἐκάστας (‘each’, fem. pl.) refers to the πύλας (‘gates’) contained in ἐκατόμπυλοι (‘hundred-gated’)—this is a legitimate example here, as ἐκατόστος is very close to the pronouns. This is found even in technical prose: Arist. Pol. 5, 1311a33–4 τῆς ὅβρεως οὖσης πολυμεροῦς, ἐκατον αὐτῶν αἱ ἑγένεται τῆς ὄργῆς (lit. ‘as ill-treatment is many-faceted and each of them [i.e. the facets] is a cause of anger’). Sometimes the anaphoric relation is even looser, but here I content myself with bare reference to Eur. Iph. Aul. 446–7, Plaut. Mil. 752–3, and the remarks of Blass & Debrunner (1913 [ = 1961]: §282).

Another very interesting case (which belongs in the series of phenomena discussed earlier, I, 51–2) is when the anaphoric agrees not with its true antecedent, but with a predicate in the neuter referring to it, simply because the latter is closer to it. One example each from Greek and Latin: Plato, Laws 11, 937ε1–2 δίκη ἐν ἀνθρώποις πῶς οὐ καλόν, δ (for ἦ) πάντα ἡμέρωκε τὰ ἀνθρώπινα; (‘of course, justice among men is a fine thing, which has civilized all human affairs’), and Plautus, Capt. 222–3 doli non doli sunt . . . sed malum maxumum, si id (for ei) palam prouenit (‘tricks are no tricks at all . . . but the worst possible thing, if it [for ‘they’] gets out into the open’). While this may be easy to understand, it is harder to
see how it came about that in later Latin (Löfstedt 1911: 131–3) the masc. forms of the relative could be used also to refer back to fem. and neut. nouns, especially given that in the interrogative, to which the Latin relative is very closely related, there was always a sharp distinction between persons and objects. This was certainly a feature of popular speech, as the Romance languages show. 9

9 ‘Whereas in Latin all the grammatical properties of the relativized noun—case, gender, and number—could be recovered from the form of the relative pronoun, in Romance the possibilities are considerably more limited . . . , but the patterns differ from language to language’ (Vincent 1988: 55; and see Harris & Vincent 1988: Index, s.v. ‘relative pronouns’); for a detailed account, not limited to French, see Harris (1978: ch. 10).
The so-called reflexives may be regarded as a subtype of the anaphoric pronouns, in that they, too, refer back to a given constituent, although this may not be any earlier item, but is always the subject of the sentence. For this type of reference back, all the languages concerning us here have a special pronoun inherited from the parent language, which originally began with *s- or *sw-. Related to this are the Greek pronouns in σφ-, although their etymology has yet to be clarified.1 (We spoke of their grammatical number in the last lecture but one, II, 78–9 above.)

In the individual languages, other pronouns and pronominal forms were used alongside the inherited reflexive either to intensify it or to replace it: so NHG selbst, English self; Lat. ipse, Gk αὐτός. Gk αὐτός was often used alone as a reflexive, several times in Homer and in other dialects, and we find traces of this even in Attic-Ionic, as in αὐτόματος (II, 7, 49, 83 above) or αὐτόνομος (properly, ‘having one’s own laws’), 2 while Doric is characterized by polyptotic reduplication (e.g. αὐτοσαυτόν, αὐτωντάς; II, 7, 82 above). But αὐτός turned out to be especially successful as an accompaniment to the old reflexive (II, 82 above). To start with, it was optional, as it is in Homer and outside Attic-Ionic: cf. Hesiod, fr. 10a Merkelbach & West [10 Most], 62 ἐν δ᾽ αὐτῶθ’ θανάτου ταμής ‘for himself steward of death’ (of Endymion). Then in Ionic and Attic it came to be used in the direct (accusative) reflexive. In the singular it was obligatory, and univerbalization occurred: Ionic (gen.) ἑαυτοῦ, Attic ἑαυτοῦ, which later could also be made plural: ἑαυτῶν, etc. And in parallel with this, reflexives were built for the 1st and 2nd persons: Att. ἑμαυτοῦ, σεαυτοῦ (Ion. -ωντοῦ); cf. Fr. (moi-, toi-)mème, Eng. (my-, your-)self.—It was observed by ancient scholars that these compound reflexives in each of the three persons represented a secondary development and were as yet unknown to Homer, who in direct reflexives either omitted αὐτόν, etc. altogether—e.g. Il. 10. 378 ἐμε λύσομαι (‘I shall ransom myself’; Dolon to Odysseus and Diomedes)3—or used it without compounding it with the personal pronoun: e.g. Od. 13. 313 σὲ γὰρ αὐτὴν παντὶ ἐξεκείς (‘for you can liken yourself


2 On reflexive pronouns in Herodotus, see Powell (1933), on their use in Thucydides and Xenophon, Powell (1934) and Goodall (1976), respectively.

3 See Hainsworth (1993: ad loc.).
to anyone!’; Odysseus to Athene). Here, then, an ancient grammatical description is imbued with a historical perspective—a very rare situation indeed! The ancient grammarians already had a special name for this pronoun. Indeed, our term ‘reflexive’ is, as far as I am aware, not ancient. Priscian uses instead ‘pronomen reciprocum’, a translation of Gk ἀντανακλωμένος used by Apollonius, lit. ‘bouncing back’. The term refers to the fact that (as Apollonius explains, Synt. 2. 141, GG II.2, 236–7) these pronouns denote the action of the subject as turning back (‘ντοπτέρφουσα’) on the subject itself; with the same idea in mind he notes that they are also called ‘αὐτοπαθείς’ (On Pronouns, GG II.1.1, 44, 17). The Latin translation ‘reciprocus’ is entirely appropriate in that the adjective can be used of something that returns to its starting point—cf. Varro, Latin Language 7. 80 with reference to Accius’ tela reciproca (‘flexible weapons’, fr. 554 Warmington)—but we cannot use it because in imperial Latin reciprocus means also affecting both parties equally and hence is used by us for Gk ἀλλήλοις (‘each other’) and its counterparts. Who introduced the now-standard term ‘reflexive’, I do not know—in antiquity, ‘reflexio’ is used to translate the rhetorical term ‘ἀνάκλασις’, e.g. in the Carmen de figuris, p. 84, 3 Halm = p. 72, 13 Squillante. In so far as the reflexives are capable of marking gender and number, they are subject to the same rules of agreement as the anaphorics, and occasionally show the same departures from the rules. So, we have reference back in the plural to a collective singular subject in a fifth-century Attic inscription (IG I3. 40, 66–7; cf. I, 183 & n. 4, p. 236 above) οὓς ἀν ἐληταὶ ἦ βουλή σφῶν αὐτῶν ‘whoever the Council chooses (sg.) from their (pl.) own number’ (cf. MEISTERHANS & SCHWYZER 199, §83.6); and to the noun underlying a possessive adjective at Thuc. 5. 105. 1 τῆς ἀνθρωπείας . . . ἐς σφᾶς αὐτῶς βουλῆσεως (lit.) ‘the human tendency against themselves’. The use of the reflexive has points of contact with that of the middle (I, 124–9 above), and can be used in combination with the verb even as a substitute for the middle (or, secondarily, the passive). Once again, we can see this in translations: e.g. Gothic leihwan (cognate with Gk λείπεω ‘to leave’) renders δανεῖζεων ‘to lend’ but δανεῖζεσθαι ‘to borrow’ is leihwan sis (with the dat. reflexive pronoun). In Germanic and Romance, the verb is often combined with this reflexive, or with the oblique forms of the 1st- and 2nd-person pronouns used reflexively, in a manner reminiscent of the middle, in instances where combining the verb with an oblique case of a noun is either impossible or has a different meaning (cf. 4 On the development of the reflexives in Greek, with special reference to εἰσερ-, see Woodard (1990). 5 The rhetorical figure of ‘anacasis’ or ‘reflexio’ is the deliberate re-use (or, ‘reverberation’) in a response of a word used in the preceding utterance; see LAUSBERG (1998: §§665–4). The anonymous Latin Poem on the Figures of Speech (c.AD 400) describes and illustrates the figures of speech in 186 hexameters; note the editions of K. Halm (in Rhetorici Latini minores, 1863), M. Squillante (Rome 1993), and R. M. D’Angelo (Hildesheim 2001).
Wilmanns III, 496–503). In the combination sich befreien (‘free oneself’), e.g., sich stands in the same relation to the verb as the noun das Volk in das Volk befreien (‘free the people’), but NHG sich fürchten (‘to be afraid’), Fr. se saisir (‘to take possession of’) are only superficially comparable with NHG den Feind fürchten, Fr. saisir la proie (‘fear the enemy’, ‘catch the prey’); the same is true of Fr. se taire (‘be silent’). This special use of the reflexive is even more marked when it is with verbs which are normally intransitive, as in Fr. s’en aller or se mourir (‘to go away’, ‘to die’; cf. VENDRYES (1921: 131) on verbal aspect in this connection), or when the verb is not found without the reflexive, as in NHG sich sehnen, Fr. s’emparer (‘to long for’, ‘to take hold of’). The above example sich fürchten is particularly instructive, as in Slavic and Baltic, too, the verb of fearing takes the reflexive pronoun, while in Sanskrit the corresponding verb has middle inflection. It would be instructive to follow this group of phenomena in greater detail through the individual languages; in this connection note also the remarks of LÖFSTEDT (1911: 140–3) on Late Latin uadere se, fugere sibi, and the like.

In the Scandinavian languages, univerbation of combinations of verb + reflexive has given rise to a medio-passive with partial extension of the true reflexive to the 1st and 2nd persons (II, 94–5 below). The theory of BOPP (1833–52: III, §§476–7) that the r-endings of the Latin (more precisely, Italo-Celtic) deponent and passive conceal the reflexive se has recently been revived by an outstanding linguist. I regard this as impossible.

A strictly reflexive meaning—i.e. with the pronoun referring to the subject of its own clause—is not consistently maintained, either by the reflexive itself or by its possessive adjective. A first type of case is easy to understand, namely when in Greek and Latin these forms are used in subordinate clauses (and with infinitives and participles) to refer back to the subject of the main clause. Latin uses exactly the same forms as in the direct reflexive relationship, while in Attic there is a distinction made, and in general this indirect reflexivity is expressed by the bare forms oū, oī, ē not strengthened with æP/C244/C252/C242, which could no longer be used for the direct reflexive (II, 89 above). These forms are especially common in those parts of Plato’s dialogues which are in indirect speech; elsewhere in Attic prose,

6 Cf., in Slavic, Old Church Slavonic bojati se, in Baltic, Lithuanian bijótis, and Skt bhāyate, with middle inflection; see Vasmer, s.v. ‘bojáť se’, LEW, s.v. ‘bijótis’, and EWAia, s.v. ‘BHAY’.
7 On this type of (apparently pleonastic) reflexive in Latin, see now Dahlén (1967) and (1977). Dahlén (1977: 27–8) raises doubts about the reality of uadere se, as intransitive verbs of motion otherwise have the dat. of the reflexive, as in fugere sibi (1977: 12–20).
8 W. is alluding to Holger Pedersen (1908–13: II, 396–402). Note that Bopp earlier blurred the distinction between active and passive, and derived (1816: 102–3) (c.g.) amatur, amantur < *ama-sut, *ama-sunt.
9 W. is right in this case, not least because the r in the corresponding endings of Anatolian and Tocharian cannot come from ‘s. However, it is still common to find pronouns involved in historical accounts of the Indo-European middle endings: see e.g. Rix (1988—in English!) and Szemerényi (1996: 241 n. 4).
we find only ὦτ, and even this not frequently (ms. add.²: in Lysias, e.g., apparently only at 13. 41, 23. 13). Editors often treat these forms thoughtlessly as enclitics, although they can occur also at the start of the clause (e.g. Plato, Symp. 174e2). In this function we find also the forms in ὦφἡ (II, 89 above), without αὐτῶν, αὐτοῖς, etc., and in Sophocles (fr. 471 Radt in TrGF) the fem. ἦ. For a comprehensive account of the use of the indirect reflexives in Attic and Herodotus, see Kallenberg (1925) (ms. add.¹: with plentiful statistics but without a sense of linguistic history).

Then there is a second type of situation. Often the subject of a subordinate clause is the same as that of the main clause. In such cases in Latin, with an infinitive requiring an accusative subject, it is normal to use acc. se—although in earlier Latin, and when Greek influence is present, this is not invariably so. § With this we can compare Old Icelandic acc. þ infinitive constructions such as hann svaghe-sk ekke hafa, which is just like Lat. dixit se nibil habere (‘he said he had nothing’, cf. Heusler 1921: §§427–9). Analogously, ablative se is used as the subject of an ablative absolute embedded in reported speech, e.g. at Caes. Civil War 1. 29. 3 Galliam tentari se absente nolabat ‘he did not wish any attack to be made on Gaul, while he (himself) was absent’. On this basis, Quintilian even ventured to use this se in an ablative absolute in a main clause: Inst. 8. 2. 2 ille qui in actione Hibericas herbas, se solo nequiquam intellegente, dicebat (‘the man who in a speech in court spoke of “Iberian grass”, a meaningless phrase which he alone understood’). Compare Ovid, Am. 2. 12. 13 me duce ad hunc uoti finem, me milite ueni (‘I have reached the goal of my desire with myself as general and myself as foot-soldier’), and also Thuc. 8. 76. 4 ἐχύντων σφῶν τὸ πάν ναυτικόν, . . . ἀναγκάσεων ‘as they (the Athenian army in Samos) had the whole of the fleet, they would force (the other cities to pay)’ (similarly Thuc. 2. 83. 3).—In Greek, this sort of subject accusative is much rarer, although later on it becomes under Latin influence more frequent. Instead, and in addition to the nominative forms of αὐτός, a new nominative of the plural reflexive is made available (Ion.-Att. ὦφείς).§§

Parallel to the use of ὦτ, ὦτ, ἦ as indirect reflexives in the prose of Plato is that of the corresponding possessive adjective ὦτ. As far as I know, there is only one example, but it is a telling one: at Rep. 3, 394a6–7, the Homeric line τείσειαν Δαναοῖ ἐμὰ δάκρυα σοῖοι βέλεσι (‘may the Danaans pay for my tears with your missiles’, Chryses praying to Apollo at Il. 1. 42) is rendered into indirect speech as κατηγύχειο

10 See the references in n. 2 in this lecture.

11 The accusative subject of the infinitive is often omitted, especially in early comedy (see Bennett 1910: 396–7, 399–412) but also in classical prose and poetry (Hofmann & Szantyr 362). On the nominative + infinitive in Latin, which is sometimes in imitation of Greek, see Hofmann & Szantyr 363–5, and cf. I, 11 and n. 16, p. 20 above.

12 W. adds (ms. add.²) a note of regret that he did not treat ὦφείς and ἦ, and quotes a scholiast on Il. 22. 402 to the effect that neither of these forms was known to Homer. On ὦφείς and ἦ, see Schwyzer 607–8 and Schwyzer & Debrunner 199, both with nn.
In addition to their indirect reflexive use, the reflexive forms became usable also as anaphorics with reference to constituents other than the subject. This sort of development is clear in the possessive adjective, which from the outset, in both Latin and (wherever it is preserved) Greek, can refer to any constituent prominent within the clause, especially the object: e.g. *Il. 6. 500 γόνν Ἐκτορα ἄνει οἶκῳ τοῖς ἔκεινοι βέλεσιν* ‘they lamented Hector in his own house’, *Od. 9. 369 ὕστιν ἓγὼ πύματον ἔδωκα μετὰ οἶς ἐτάροισιν* ‘Noman I'll eat last among his companions’, and so frequently (as also in Classical Latin); and notice that the possessive can even stand in the nominative (as in the indirect reflexive usage): e.g. *Il. 16. 753 ἑ nostra ωλησεν ἀλκή* ‘his own strength destroyed him’, Plaut. *Cist. 100 ei ducendast sua cognata* ‘he must marry his own kin’. This loosely reflexive use of *suus* is especially common when it refers to an immediately following case-form of *quisque* (‘each’).13

Only on very rare occasions do Greek and Latin writers go further than this. Homer offers a striking example at *Il. 10. 255–6 Τυδεῖδη μὲν δῶκε ... Ἐθαρσυμηγής | φάσαγαν ΄αμφῆκες, τῶ δ’ ἐὼν (nominative!) παρά νηι λέειπτο* ‘Thrasymedes gave a double-edged sword to the son of Tydeus, as his own had been left behind at his ship’—unless, against normal Homeric usage of the pluperfect and with an unparalleled middle of *λέειπτο*, we understand ‘he had left his own behind at his ship’. Less blatant are the examples adduced from, say, | Cato, *De agricultura*: 31. 2 (*materies*) *tum erit tempestiua, cum semen suum maturum erit* ‘(the wood) will be ready for use when its seed is ripe’ goes only one step beyond the indirect reflexive use regular in oratio obliqua, and the instance at 37. 3 *uitis si macra erit, sarmenta sua concidito* ‘if a vine is thin, then cut up its shoots’, falls in the category discussed earlier (II, 91 above) if one reads dat. *uiti* with the best manuscripts. Even so, it may have been on the basis of cases where even in classical Latin *suus* was not strictly reflexive that in registers of Latin lacking in Classical purity *suus* gradually acquired the anaphoric function of the genitive forms of *is*, in keeping with the general tendency of Latin in favour of using adjectives for expressing possession (II, 70 above). In the later period, this development became more marked: BONNET in his well-known book on the Latin of Gregory of Tours (1890: 696–7) gives numerous examples from Gregory of *suus* being used for *eius*, and one where it stands for *eorum*. The end point of this evolution has been reached in Romance, where the modern reflexes of Lat. *suus* denote simply belonging to any given constituent.14

13 Cf. e.g. *suum cuique* ‘each to his own’, lit. ‘his own for each’; see Gildersleeve & Lodge §318.3, KS §119.6(b), Hofmann & Szantyr 199–200.
14 On the developments from Latin to Romance, see Harris (1978: 87–8).
An exactly parallel extension of usage took place in Germanic, where the earlier
and the later stages may be nicely distinguished. For an example, let us take the
Bible passage that we used earlier (II, 79), John 12: 3 ἐξετάσαν θησεὶ αὐτῆς τῶς
πόδας αὐτοῦ (‘she wiped his feet dry with her hair’). The Gothic translation agrees
exactly with the Latin: biswarb fotuns is (gen., ‘of him’) skufta seinamma (dat. pl.
poss. adj., ‘her’) :: extersit pedes eius capillis suis. Both use the genitive of the
anaphoric for the already-known possessor of the feet, and the reflexive posses-
sive for the possessor of the hair, who is also the subject. But in Old High
German, Tatian (Harmony of the Gospels 135.1, p. 199 Sievers\textsuperscript{15}) renders it with
sunarb sine fuozi mit iru fahsu, and Luther similarly with trocknete mit ihrem Haar
seine Füße, in other words, where Gothic and Latin have the genitive of the
anaphoric pronoun is, both High German versions use the possessive, which we
see has become capable of referring to any previously mentioned constituent.

\textit{(ms. add.\textsuperscript{2}}: For the same pattern, cf. 2 Timothy 2: 19, where Greek, Latin and
Gothic have a gen. anaphoric but Luther has the poss. adj. as a noun, \textit{die Seinen}
‘his own’.) Why at the same time High German gave up the old possessive
sein with the word for ‘hair’, is a question we touched on earlier (II, 79–80 above).

Analogous weakening of the substantival reflexive pronoun is confined in
Latin and German to certain special cases. Latin suum sibi (for suum ei in pre-
Classical Latin and still in Cicero) arises through a sort of assimilation.\textsuperscript{16} Latin
per se (‘by himself, personally’; in Late Latin, ‘only’: cf. LÖFSTEDT 1911: 335–6),
NHG an sich, an und für sich (‘in itself’, ‘in and of itself’) are collocations which
referred originally to the subject and then came to be isolated from the reflexive
with a specific meaning. The use of sibi für ei in Medieval Latin is documented by
J. GRIMM, \textit{D.} | GR. IV, 435–6.\textsuperscript{17}—It is true that already in the earliest Greek—
Homer and the other dialects—enclitic \textit{Fo}i ‘for him’ (= Lat. \textit{ei}) is common, a
form which differs only in its accent from \textit{Fo}i ‘for himself’ (= Lat. \textit{sibi}).
Often, although not everywhere, we find beside this \textit{Fo}i matching genitive and
accusative forms, which are also enclitic. This has yet to be explained, as, on
the evidence of Indo-Iranian, we should expect o\textit{i}, without initial \textit{w}.\textsuperscript{18} In spite of
the presence of the indirect reflexive o\textit{i}, the anaphoric o\textit{i} is unknown in Attic: its

\textsuperscript{15} For links to two online versions of this, the standard edition of Tatian, by Ed. Sievers (1892; repr.

\textsuperscript{16} For illustration, see KS 606 n. 4 and further references.

\textsuperscript{17} On Medieval Latin, see now STOTZ IV, IX §8.5–6 with further references, his first example being
Venantius Fortunatus (6th c.), \textit{Poems} 4. 15. 10. In fact, however, both \textit{sibi}, etc. for \textit{ei}, etc. and the converse
(\textit{sum}, \textit{eius}, etc. for \textit{se}, \textit{suus}, etc.) are attested in antiquity: see Hofmann & Szantyr 174–6.

\textsuperscript{18} The Indo-Iranian enclitics (acc. Vedic \textit{sám}, Avestan \textit{šim}, Old Persian \textit{šom}, and gen.-dat. Prákrit and
later Sanskrit \textit{se}, Gathic Avestan \textit{hōi}, Old Persian \textit{šaity} show, like Gothic \textit{si-k} initial *\textit{s} rather than *\textit{sw}.
Greek presumably shows the result of contamination with the possessive adj. *\textit{sēwos} and the sg. 2
pronoun *\textit{te}, contamination to which Indo-Iranian is not wholly immune (e.g. Avestan dat. reflexive
\textit{xōd} < *\textit{hōd}); see \textit{AR. Gr.} III, §§237–8 for the Indo-Iranian evidence, RIX (1976: §193), Szemerényi (1996:
220–1) with bibliography.
occurrences at Plato, *Laws* 3, 688b and Xen. *Cyr. 3. 2. 26 cannot of course be taken as evidence for pure Attic (cf. Kallenberg 1925: 71). (Anaphoric *αὑτόν* ‘him’ (= Lat. *eum*) has nothing to do directly with the reflexive *αὑτόν* ‘himself’ (= Lat. *se ipsum*: II, 89 above), but represents rather a weakening of *αὑτόν* ‘him himself’ (emphatic), as can easily be shown on the basis of Homeric usage.)

What has stimulated discussion of the old reflexive forms is not so much their free anaphoric use as their use as 1st- and 2nd-person forms, especially in the wake of Brugman’s book entitled *A Problem in Homeric Textual Criticism* (1876). It is clear that fairly early in colloquial German, *sich* came to be widely usable as a general reflexive in all three persons, especially in close combination with verbs and prepositions. From *Simplicissimus* Grimm adductes *darauff setzen wir sich* and the like (D. Gr. IV, 379). Or note from our fellow-citizen Thomas Platter (1499–1582; p. 23 Fechter19) *dem wollte ich bindersich weichen . . . fiel aber bindersich über den Felsen* (‘I wished to step back [lit. behind oneself] to give way . . . but I fell backwards [lit. behind oneself] over the rock’). Still today in Swiss German we find *nid si, ob si, für si, hinder si* (‘downwards’, ‘upwards’, ‘forwards’, ‘backwards’), and the like, no matter what person the subject is in.20 The reflexive here is, to use Brugmann’s word, ‘hardened’ (‘verhärtet’). Related to this is the formation of the North Germanic medio-passive (mentioned earlier, II, 91 above), where already in Old Icelandic *sik* occurs also with 2nd-person verb-forms. This is a secondary phenomenon, a feature generalized from the commonest form of the reflexive, that of the 3rd person. This sort of thing is not found in the earliest Germanic. It is telling that Wulfila translates Gk *ἐαυτόν* etc., which is used in all persons in the Greek Bible, in different ways depending on the person. Especially instructive are passages such as 2 Cor. 10: 12 ὁ γὰρ τολμῶμεν ἐγκρίναι γὰρ συγκρίναι *ἐαυτός* πιστὸν *ἐαυτός* συνιστάντων (‘for we dare not count ourselves among or compare ourselves with some of those who commend themselves’): *unte ni gadausum domjan unsis silbans aipbau gadomjan uns du þaim sik silbans anafilhandam*, where the repeated *ἐαυτός* in the original is translated in two different ways depending on its exact sense.21—In other languages, too, this sort of thing is clearly an innovation. Examples of Fr. *se* in place of a 1st- or 2nd-person pronoun, e.g. *nous se repentons*, are adduced by Schuchardt (1884: 106), R. Merzdorf in Brugman (1876: 144),22 Tobler (1902–12: III, 142–3). Again, as

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19 A prominent figure in the Reformation in Switzerland, and from 1544 director of the Latin school in Basel, the Humanist Thomas Platter is best known for his autobiography, written at the behest of his elder son Felix Platter (1536–1614), a notable figure in the history of medicine. The importance of the autobiography as a source for the social and cultural history of the 16th century is acknowledged in the subtitle of the edition by D. A. Fechter (Basel 1840), to which W. here refers (D. Gr. IV, 379 refers also to pp. 22, 28, 29, 33). For further information on the Platters, see the article by W. Genneken in *BBKL* VII.

20 See further *Schweiz. Id.*, s.v. ‘sich’, (4).

21 The notion that Gk *ἐαυτός* is unmarked for person has been recently developed by Woodard (1990: 103).

22 Merzdorf reported (p.c.) to Brugman (sic) the use in the dialect of Mentone, near Monaco, of pl. 1 reflexives in *nautre se* (for French *nous nous*).
in Old Icelandic, the se is felt to be a part of the verb.—Corresponding phenomena in Greek may be assessed along the same lines. Already in the ‘Doloeia’ we read, *II. 10. 398* (Dolon to Odysseus) φύειν βουλεύοιστε μετά σφίσαν (‘(whether) you Achaeans are planning flight among yourselves’), which so offended the Alexandrian critics that they either declared the line spurious | or substituted the pl. 3 βουλεύοισιν, although the contemporary scholar and epic poet Apollonius of Rhodes ventured on this Homeric model to use μετά σφίσαν, ἐνὶ σφίσι with 1st-person reference (3. 909, 2. 1278), and even εἰς, ἐς, ἐς αὐτῷ for ἐμαυτῶν, etc. (2. 635, 2. 796, 3. 99), and ἐς for σεαυτῷ (1. 893) (cf. H. Fraenkel 1925b: 492 and [ms. add.2] 1936: 473). Indeed, examples of ἐμαυτῶν, αὐτοῦ in this sense are found earlier on already, in Herodotus and in Attic, from tragedy on (a list of instances, albeit in need of some sifting, is given by Kühner & Gertz I, 572, §455.7b). Plainly, the only concern of the speaker using these forms was to express the reflexive relationship: there was no risk of ambiguity.

If, in view of the above, the use of the true reflexives outside the 3rd person seems not to have been original, and to have emerged gradually and sporadically, yet it deserves to be stressed that in Baltic and Slavic it is found from the beginning of the tradition, and that there is a faint trace of it in Avestan.23

The situation is similar, if not identical, in the case of the reflexive possessive adjective. No weight is to be attached to the colourful, artificial usage of the later epic poets such as Apollonius of Rhodes and Nonnus, who even use σφοιτερος (properly 2nd person dual, ‘belonging to you two’) to mean τις, τις, or eius. However, already in Hesiod we find in an address to the Muses, *Works 2 σφέτερον πατέρ’ ήμείουσαι* (‘hymning your (pl.) father’), with σφέτερος used as reflexive possessive of the 2nd person plural, perhaps on the misleading model of σφός (du. 2), which is certainly ancient (cf. Wackernagel 1916: 149–50).24 And, more importantly, in Homer himself we find *Od. 9. 27–8* ὅτι ἔγωγε | ἶς γαίης δύναμι γλυκερωτέρον ἀλλο ἰδέασαι (‘and I for my part know of no sweeter sight than my own country’), and *Od. 13. 320–1*—admittedly a later interpolation25—ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ φρειν ἴαν ἔχων δεδαίγμενον ἄτορ | ἤλώμην (‘but I wandered with my heart stricken’), i.e. with forms of ἴα = ἐμαυτό (and in Zenodotus’ text of Homer were a few further instances). On this basis, Brugmann felt justified in the book mentioned above (1876) in attributing to Homer the use of ἴα and ἐα as a general reflexive, indifferent with respect to person and number, and in substituting it in the text for an article that he found objectionable, or for the—on any account, curious—form ἐῆος. From a historical linguistic point of view, this could well be

23 For details, see on Baltic and Slavic Senn (1966: §240), Arumaa (1985: 164–5), LEW, s.v. ‘savės’, Vasmer, s.vv. ‘ceiò’, ‘ce’; on Avestan, where the use of the one reflexive form in all three persons is more usual than W. implies, Reichelt (1909: §600).

24 On the example in Hesiod, see West (1978a: ad loc.).

25 W. seems to follow Aristarchus, who condemned 13. 320–3, 320 in particular because of the 1st-pers. use of ἴαν; see Hoekstra’s excellent note (also on Od. 9. 28) in Heubeck & Hoekstra (1989: ad loc.).
justified, since given the evidence of Sanskrit (see below) Gk ἐός really may have been originally a general reflexive possessive. But I do not dare to do so much violence to the Homeric tradition, and a specific point against BRUGMANN’s procedure is that it commits him to taking ὅς and ἐός also as non-reflexive pronouns of the 1st and 2nd persons (at II. 19. 331, Od. 11. 492, II. 24. 422).26

In this context we need to say a word about Lat. suus as well, with reference to Aeneid 6. 743 quisque suos patimur manes (‘each of us suffers his own fate’; on the peculiar meaning of manes here, almost | reminiscent of Buddhist karma, see NORDEN’s commentary (1957), ad loc.).27 What interests us here is the fact that the poet, in spite of the pl. 1 verb, uses suos and not nostros. Now, apart from the fact that the line-opening quisque suos was suggested by a passage of Accius (Annals, p. 592 Warmington), or perhaps by Accius’ model, Ennius, the truth is that for emphasizing possession in close collocation with quisque, suus alone was normal. The poet could have avoided the consequent failure of agreement by writing patitur, but he was concerned that the speaker should include himself among those suffering, and this feeling is continued in the next line with pl. 1 mittimur and tenemus (‘we are sent’, ‘we possess’). It can hardly be assumed that an original patitur would have been assimilated in the tradition to the following mittimur.—Otherwise, Lat. suus is never used with other than 3rd-person reference (there is nothing to be made of Cato, Agr. 25 or 132. 2).

While the reflexive was ancient and inherited, for the related notion of reciprocity new forms had to be made—although already in the parent language the middle forms of the verb could gently imply reciprocal action (I, 128–9 above). As a result, our languages diverge markedly at this point, and even individually show no uniform picture. This is especially true of Latin, which unlike Greek and German failed to establish any specifically reciprocal pronoun and uses all sorts of different expressions side by side. This contrast with Greek is pointed out already by Priscian (17. 139–41 = GL III, 177–8), and is discussed from the point of view of German by NÄGELSBACh (1905: §89). Because of this diversity of the Latin forms, we too will have most to say about Latin, the material for which has been appropriately collected and ordered by THIELMANN (1892). Instructive on the usage of the Septuagint is JOHANNESOHN (1925: 374–6).—It needs to be noted in advance that expressions of strict reciprocity (i.e. those in which simultaneously a interacts with b, and b with a) are often used also for expressing rather a series where the relation of b to a is matched in those of c to b, d to c, etc.

26 On the extended use of the possessive adjectives (esp. ἐός, ὅς), see Monro’s discussion (1891: §255), Chantraine (1958: 272–5), and SCHWYZER & DEBRUNNER 204–5 (also on ὄφός, ὀφέρεος), all with further references.

27 The reference to Accius (and ?Ennius) below is also Norden’s. On the whole passage, see the very helpful notes of R. G. Austin in his commentary (Oxford 1977) on 743 and 743 ff.
It is premature to speak of an expression of reciprocity if the description of mutual action is divided into two statements, as at Plautus, *Most.* 305 *tu me amas, ego te amo* ('you love me, I love you'), or more briefly *Pseud.* 233 *ego haec et mi hic bene volumnus* ('we are well disposed, I to him and he to me'), or differently again, with the addition of a word denoting reciprocity, at Catullus 45. 20, of the love of Septimius and Acme, *mutuis animis amant, | amantur* ('with mutual feelings they love [and] are loved'), and Livy 4. 46. 2 *contemnere in uicem et contemnui* ('they despised [each other] and were despised in turn'). But such awkwardness of expression occurs only exceptionally.

One way of signifying reciprocity from an early date and in all our languages was **polyptoton**, the juxtaposition of two case-forms of the same word. The most primitive form involves the repetition of nouns, although this is applicable only to reciprocity between members of the same set, as in patterns such as Hesiod, *Works* 23–6 *ζηλοὶ δὲ τε γείτων γείτων ... καὶ κεραμέων κεραμεῖ φθονεῖ καὶ τέκτων τέκτων | καὶ πτωχῶς πτωχῷ φθονεῖ καὶ ἄοιδος ἄοιδῳ* ('a neighbour envies a neighbour ... and a potter bears ill will to a potter, a builder to a builder, a beggar to a beggar, and a bard to a bard'). 28 We find this sort of pattern everywhere (once or twice in Hebrew, too, and hence in the Septuagint: cf. JOHANNES SOHN 1925: 374–5); we shall return to it in another context (for the moment, note LANDGRAF (1888) on instances of ‘substantival parataxis’; *ms. add.*1: cf. Hor. *Odes* 3. 1. 9 *uiro uir* ‘one (man) another’, and the Russian for ‘one another’ *drug druga*, lit. ‘a friend a friend’).

More important than this form of polyptoton—which is in any case cumbersome and restricted in its use—is that involving repetition of a word for ‘the other’. So in Gothic: Ephesians 4: 25 *unte sijum anþar anþarís liþus* for Gk ὅτι ἐσμέν ἀλλήλων μέλῃ ‘as we are members of one another’. And so in Latin, from Plautus on in *alius alium, alter alterum* or with another oblique case in second position, and of course also in the plural, e.g. Livy 9. 5. 8 *alii alios intueri* (‘they looked at one another’). In Greek, this is frequent with ἔτερος, e.g. Plato, *Theaetetus* 180bc οὐ γίγνεται τῶν τοιούτων ἔτερος ἔτερον μαθητής ... καὶ τῶν ἔτερων ὃ ἔτερος οὐδὲν ἣγείται εἰδέναι (‘such people do not become students of each other ... and each thinks that the other knows nothing’; cf. JOHANNES SOHN 1925: 374). This idiom is based on the fact that, unlike German *der andere* or English *the other*, all these words denoted not merely the (second) item set alongside an initial item, but either of the items in a pairwise juxtaposition, and hence, to begin with at least, ἔτερος, etc. could mean also ‘the one’. For example, in the sentence from Plato above, because each item stands as ἔτερος with respect to the other, both the nominative role and the genitive/accusative role applies to each member of the pair, and hence reciprocity is expressed.

28 For parallels, see West (1978a: *ad loc*).
This idiom is very ancient and in several languages has been fossilized to a genuine reciprocal pronoun. This is the case with several forms in Sanskrit and in Old Iranian, and furthermore the Greek reciprocal pronoun which begins ἀλληλ- goes back to a juxtaposition of the nom. ἄλλος with an oblique case of the same word (the formal development does not concern us here). The subject of the clause is either clear from the context or is expressly given. So for example in Homer at II. 16. 765 εἰδρός τε νότος τ’ ἐμπαίνετον ἄλληλοις ('east wind and south wind fight it out with each other') ἄλληλοις is equivalent to ἄλλος ἄλλῳ ('the one with the other'), while at II. 2. 151 τοί δὴ ἄλληλοισι κέλευον ('and they were shouting to one another') ἄλληλοισι = ἄλλοι ἄλλοισι ('the one group to the others'), i.e. it is either dual or plural depending on the number of the items between which the reciprocal relation holds. In the Odyssey, the first part of ἄλληλ- can also correspond to an object in the accusative, e.g. at 14. 14 συφεός δινοκαίδεκα σοίει πλησιόν ἄλληλων ('he [Eumaeus] had made twelve sties, all near to one another'), and after Homer also to a genitive or a dative, e.g. at Plato, Laws 1, 633b ἐν ταῖς πρὸς ἄλληλον (= ἄλλον πρὸς ἄλλον) ταῖς χεραί μάχαις ('in the manual contests of one against another'), and other instances (e.g. at Lysias 20. 12) are freer still; indeed, ἄλληλ- can be an element of compounds: already in Pindar we find ἄλλολοφόνος, -φονία ('murdering one another', fr. 163 Maehler; 'mutual slaughter', Ol. 2. 42), and from Aristotle on παράληλος ('side by side'). [Add.: Attic does not use ἄλληλο- as the first element of a compound: ἄλληλοφθοιρία ('mutual slaughter') at Plato, Prot. 321a is occasioned by the poetic character of the passage, and ἄλληλοφαγία ('mutual eating') at Epinomis 975a is a coinage of Philippus of Opus and contrasts with Plato's own ἄλληλον ἐδωδή / ἐδωδαί (Laws 6, 782b7, and Political 271c1; cf. F. Müller 1927: 10).]

It is curious that our Greek record attests only rarely the polyptoton ἄλλος ἄλλον and the like that is presupposed by ἄλληλ-. The so-called ‘Antiatticist’ lexicographer (Becker 1814–21: I, 81, 8) highlights as something peculiar the use by the fourth-century comic writer Araros (fr. 2, PCG II) of ἄλλος ἄλλον παρεκάλει ('one was calling another') instead of ἄλληλους παρεκάλειν ('they were calling one another'; cf. another anonymous lexicographer in Becker (1814–21: I, 379, 9) ἄλλος ἄλλον instead of ἄλληλος). [Add.: With this compare Eur. Heracles 951 καὶ τίς τὸς εἶπεν, ἄλλος εἰς ἄλλον δρακόν ('as they looked at one another, one of them said...'), with Wilamowitz ad loc., and Orestes 1418 προσεῖπε δ’ ἄλλος ἄλλον ('they spoke to one another'), and Dem. 20. 158 τὸ τιν’ αὐτόχειρ’ ἄλλον ἄλλον

29 On Skt anyonya-, itarrata-, paraspara- (each lit. ‘the other the other’) and their counterparts in Iranian, see Ai. Gr. II.1 §121, III §242; on the formation of Gk ἄλληλος, Brugmann & Thumb (1913: §164.2).
30 A pupil of Plato, the 4th-c. bc astronomer and mathematician Philippus of Opus is said by Diogenes Laertius (3. 37) to have transcribed Plato’s Laws and to have composed the dialogue Epinomis.
31 Another of the ‘lexica Segueriana’ (named after the President of the French Academy Pierre Ségui (1588–1672); see Sandys (1906–8: II, 287)) edited in that volume of the Anecdata Graeca.
γίνεσθαι (‘for anyone to become the killer of another’, which picks up 157 οἱ περὶ ἄλληλοις φόνοι lit. ‘the murders against one another’), although Lycophron 257 ἄλλην ἐπ’ ἄλλῃ συμφορὰν δεδεγμένων is different, meaning ‘who have suffered disasters one on top of another’. And again, Babrius, for instance, has 47. 13 ἕν δ’ ἄλλος ἄλλου χωρίς ήτε τὴν γνώμην (‘if you disagree with one another in your opinions’), as opposed to 15. 10–11 ἕν μὲν ἄλληλοις ὁμοφωνῆτε πάντες (‘if you all agree with one another’), and the only possible meaning of Apollonius Rhod. 4. 1250 ἄλλος δ’ αὐτ’ ἄλλον . . . ἐξερεύνειν is ‘they asked one another’.—The reason for the rarity of this polyptotic use of ἄλλος is that in the historical period ἄλλος means, in contrast with ἔτερος, only ‘the other’, no longer ‘the one’, and so has undergone a narrowing of sense compared with Lat. alius. That speakers from the fourth century on did venture to express reciprocity through polyptoton of ἄλλος must be due to imitation of the corresponding use of ἔτερος (cf. αὐτάλλος for αὐτότερος, II, 269 below). [Add.: For reciprocal ἔτερος . . . ἄλλον of two people, note Plato, Laws 11, 933ε ὅσα τις ἐν ἔτερος ἄλλον πιθήνῃ (‘in all cases where one man causes damage to another’) and Theocr. 7. 36 ταχ’ ὑπότερος ἄλλον ὄνοσει (‘perhaps each shall benefit the other’): on the latter the scholiast comments, ἣμαρτημένως ἐξενήχους ὑπότερος < ἄλλον > . . . (‘ὕποτερος ἄλλον is erroneously worded’) and paraphrases ὁ ὑπότερος τὸν ἕτερον . . . ὑφελήσει.]

In this context we need to say a word about a remarkable form of later Latin, namely alterutrum, which is equivalent to Gk ἄλληλοις and is attested from the second century AD on. It is used sometimes with the case-ending corresponding to its function, e.g. in the second-century poet and rhetorician P. Annius Florus manu alterutrum tenentes (‘holding each other’s hand’, Vergil 1. 5) or in Tertullian pro alterutro mori ‘to die for each other’ (Apologeticum 39. 7), sometimes as an adverb in the form alterutrum (more rarely alterutro), or even as an adjective meaning mutuus (‘mutual’). It is common in the Latin Bible, especially in its less classical versions: so while Jerome renders John 13: 14 ὁφείλετε ἄλληλον νήπτειν τοὺς πόδας (‘you must wash one another’s feet’) with debetis alter alterius lauare pedes, the manuscript versions include not only debetis inuicem lauare pedes (on inuicem, cf. II, 101 below) but also debetis alterutrum lauare pedes. Similarly, Galatians 6: 2 ἄλληλων τὰ βάρη βαστάξετε (‘bear one another’s burdens’; cf. Luther: einer trage des andern Last) is given in the Vulgate as alter alterius onera portate, but Jerome mentions the translation alterutrum onera uestra portate (cf. Thielmann 1892: 373–9; Bücheler 1904: 38–9).

What is the source of this formation? Several explanations are thinkable, none of them certain. A connection could be made with the use, attested from Pliny (Nat. 2. 38) on, | of alteruter in the sense of uterque, which is based on the

32 Gk ἔτερος and ἄλλος occur in parallel already in Homer, e.g. II. 9. 313, 13. 731, although not (pace Gow 1950: on Theoc. 7. 36) in reciprocal function.
extension of its classical meaning, ‘either one of two’, to ‘each of two’, just as other indefinites can take on the meaning ‘each’ (II, 118 below). We would then have to suppose that, on the model of *alterruter alterum, which was then contracted by haplology to alterutrum. Alternatively, if it is purely accidental that this reciprocal pronoun alterutrum is not attested until late on, and if it was part of the colloquial language already in the early period, one could suppose that it is based on a univerbation of alter alterum, which developed to *alteralterum, with the vowel-alternation known from e.g. saľto : insulťo, scalpo : insculpol (‘jump’; ‘scratch’; cf. II, 172 & n. 6, p. 613 below), and then lost its second l by dissimilation.

Polyptoton of the word for ‘one’ in reciprocal function is rarer than that of alius and its synonyms. It is found (apart from in Middle Indo-Aryan and Lithuanian) in New Testament and later Greek, e.g. at 1 Thessalonians 5: 11 ὁικοδομεῖτε εἶς τὸν ἕνα : Latin aedifice alterutrum: Luther baut einer den andern (‘edify one another’). This rests on the use of εἶς in the sense of ἑρεπός, which is found already in Homer in combination with μέν and δέ.

And just as in Greek, too, εἰς μέν may be set beside ἑρεπός δέ, and in Latin unus beside alter, so in sub-elite Latin one finds patterns such as cum unus premit alterum (‘one [ox] burdens the other’, Vitruvius, On Architecture 10. 3. 8), and dicunt unus ad alterum (‘they say to one another’, Ezekiel 33: 30), and similarly, with the same use of the numeral ‘one’, Fr. l’un l’autre, Ital. l’un l’altro, English one another, and (ms. add.) modern Gk ὅ ἑνάς τὸν ἄλλον, and again in German e.g. eine Hand wäscht die andere. Here, too, univerbation occurred early. In NHG einander, where the ein- represents an old nominative, we have a counterpart to Gk ἄλληλον, although admittedly it has not achieved the very advanced stages of development seen in the Greek word, in that it can be used neither in the genitive nor as the first element of a compound. (See Grimm, D. Gr. III, 75–7, on the earlier stages and alternative forms of this collocation, attested since Middle High German; especially remarkable is the illogical assimilation of the case of the first element to the second, e.g. in OHG ze cinemandoeremo ‘to one another’.)

Related to the expressions discussed so far, but logically more precise, is the introduction of the word for ‘each’, ‘each of two’ as the first element of the collocation, as in English each other (similarly in Old Icelandic, the modern

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33 In this parenthesis, I have substituted ‘Middle Indo-Aryan’ for ‘Sanskrit prose’ on the strength of Ai. Gr. III, §244a, where it is clear that W. was persuaded by Hanns Oertel that Skt ekäka- (redupl. of ekä- ‘one’) means rather ‘each one’, while MIA ikka- ikka- and Prakrit ekhekka- are demonstrably reciprocal. In Lithuanian, the construction is more like English ‘one another’, vienas ‘one’ in the nom. sg. being followed by the appropriate case form of kiti- or aiur- ‘other’; see Senn (1966: §279b), Mathiassen (1996: 76).

34 Both Blass, Debrunner, & Funk §247 and Turner (1963: 187) state that this New Testament usage of εἰς τὸν ἕνα for ‘one another’ is an Aramaism.

35 Note that this instance is not reciprocal, although that is what W. (and Hofmann & Szantyr 176) seems to imply.
Scandinavian languages, and Dutch), and Latin *uterque alterum* (cf. Lucretius 3. 333 *quaque sine alterius uti* (‘either [mind or body] without the power of the other’), and later also *unusquisque alterum*). More precise still is the use of these words in both parts, as in Lat. *uterque utrumque* from Terence on (e.g. *Phormio* 800—with the variant *uterque alterutrum*, once *alteruter* had become synonymous with *uterque*), and in Greek *ékáteros* *ékáteron* (Plato, *Laws* 5, 734c, and elsewhere), *ékáteroi* *ékáteron* (Plato, *Rep.* 5, 470d); for an instance of *ékáteron* on its own in the sense of *ἄλληλων*, note Thuc. 5. 25. 3 ἀπέσχοντο μὴ ἐπὶ τὴν ἕκαστην γῆν στρατεύσαι (‘they refrained from invading each other’s territory’). The negative counterpart to this is *neuter alterum* (from Caesar on), on the basis of which the impossible *neuter utri inuidet* at Plautus, *Stichus* 733 must be amended with Goetz to *neuter alteri inuidet* (Guyet’s *neutri neuter inuidet*, with the nominative in second position, cannot be right). On *ékástoros* as the first element in the Septuagint, see Johannesson (1925: 374); cf. also *man ōdrumu* ‘one man the other’ in the Old Saxon *Heliand* (v. 4107 Behaghel).

We now come to two ways of expressing reciprocity completely different from what we have seen so far. Just as the middle endings of the verb, in addition to referring back to a specific subject, can also be used with reciprocal meaning (I, 128–9 above), so, in all the languages which concern us here, it is common for the reflexive to be used rather imprecisely with the meaning ‘one another’: so in German, *sich*, in Greek, *ἐαυτώς* (and sometimes also an oblique case-form of the pl. 1 or 2 pronouns), and in Latin, too, the reflexive is found used in this way, and in the Latin Bible in translations of Gk *ἐαυτῶς* with 1st- or 2nd-person force also *nobis et ipsis*, *nobis met ipsis*. In Latin, however, the habit developed early of putting *inter* before such expression of a reciprocal relationship, in order to represent the reciprocal action as moving to and fro ‘between’ the subjects (ms. *add.*: cf. the similar use of modern Gk (ἀνα)μεταξύ, ἀνάμεσα (–o)). That this was well established already in early Latin we see not only from Plautus but also from our oldest surviving official document in Latin, the so-called *Senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus* (composed in 186 BC), where we read the clause (line 14) *neue quisquam fidem inter sed dedis(s)e uel(l)et* (‘and let no one be minded to exchange oaths’). Here *inter sed* (*sed = classical se*) does not suit at all the singular subject and singular verb, but has been transferred from a clause in the plural in the author’s mind. If the expression had only recently emerged in the language, such

36 Cf. Old Icelandic *hvern annan*, (e.g.) Danish *hverrand*, etc., Dutch *elkander*; cf. D. Gr. III, 77.
37 The emendation to *neuter alteri inuidet* is in Goetz’s 2nd edn of F. Ritschl’s edn of the complete plays of Plautus (II.4, Leipzig 1881). The edition of G. Goetz & F. Schoell (Leipzig 1893–6) has *neuter utri inuidet*. H. Petersmann in the apparatus to his edn (Heidelberg 1973) reports only *neuter neutri* (Kellerhoff, Leo), and *neuter neuter* (Guyet, Ermout).
38 On this inscription, a copy of which was available to Livy as he composed his account of the ‘Bacchanalian conspiracy’, see Gordon (1983: 83–5) and J. Briscoe’s commentary (Oxford 2007) on Livy 39. 8–19.
a failure of agreement would be unthinkable.—Originally, the role of this *inter se* in the clause was no different from that of any other determining prepositional phrase. The passage just quoted could perfectly well be translated, ‘they should exchange no oath among themselves’, although *inter sed* stands for a dative, and in Greek would be ἀλλήλοις. Then, however, prepositional *inter se* shifts directly into the role of an object in the accusative, e.g. at Cic. *Nature of the Gods* 1. 122 *dii inter se diligunt* ‘the gods love one another’, Caes. *Gallic War* 6. 40. 4 *inter se cohortati* ‘encouraging one another’, or a dative, e.g. at Seneca, *Letters* 109. 13 *prodesse inter se sapientes possunt* (‘wise men can benefit one another’). This is particularly clear where *inter se* stands in parallel with a particular case-form or prepositional phrase.—When the subject is 1st or 2nd person, Classical Latin uses regularly *inter nos*, *inter uos*, but later on, as a result of a fossilization reminiscent of the later use of the reflexive (cf. II, 94–5 above), *inter se* appears even after a 1st-person subject: e.g. Minucius Felix 18. 1 *inter se singuli dissimiles inuenimur* (‘we are found to be different from one another’).—With this Latin use | of *inter se* compare French reciprocal verbs of the type *s’entr’aimer* (‘to love one another’). 39

The simplest way of expressing a reciprocal relationship is through the addition of an adverb or a prepositional phrase. This sort of thing is found especially with the reflexive or a reflexive personal pronoun. So, at John 6: 43, Wulfila translates μη γογνύξετε μετ’ ἀλλήλον ‘do not murmur among yourselves’ with *ni bivodei mih izwis misso* clarifying the *izwis* ‘you’ with *misso* ‘mutually’. The corresponding expressions in Latin are *mutuo*, *uicissim*, *pariter*, *simul*, and especially *inuicem*. A passage of Livy with *inuicem* was quoted earlier (II, 97); it is found with the reflexive from Tacitus on, e.g. in the fine description of the marriage of Agricola, *Agr.* 6 *uixerunt per mutuam concordiam et inuicem se anteponendo* (‘they lived in mutual affection and unselfishness’, lit. ‘by each in turn putting the other first’). But even without *se*, *inuicem* is very common in Imperial Latin and, like *inter se*, can do service for a dative or an accusative. This usage is widespread in the Latin Bible, especially before Jerome, e.g. Galatians 5: 13 *seruiet inuicem* for Gk δουλεύετε ἀλλήλους (‘serve one another’), 1 Thessalonians 5: 11 *consolamini inuicem* for Gk παρακαλείτε ἀλλήλους (‘comfort one another’). Here, indeed, it can be ‘governed’ by any conceivable preposition, e.g. James 5: 16 *orate pro inuicem* for Gk προσεύχεσθε ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων (‘pray for one another’). Numerous instances are listed by Thielmann (1892: 362–9).

It is easy to understand the common tendency to combine several of these forms of expression in order to convey the reciprocal relationship with especial emphasis, whether in more casual speech—suffice it to refer to Plaut. *Truc.* 381

39 W. actually says that the Latin and French types were ‘considered earlier’, but I cannot see where. The examples of this French type in Grevisse §748 are mostly hyphenated (*ils s’entra-regarderent* ‘they looked at one another’) and without elision (*nous entre-aduler* ‘to adore one another’), although it is observed that the orthography is not fixed in this type of compound.
cum inter nos sordebamus alter de altero (‘when we used to defile each other, you me and me you’; cf. I, 244–5 above)—or in rigorous scholarly prose, e.g. Cic. Off. 1. 22 homines hominum causa esse generatos, ut ipsi inter se alii aliiis prodesse possent (‘[the Stoics believe that] human beings are born for the sake of other humans, so that they can be of personal mutual benefit to one another’); cf. also (ms. add.\(^1\)) Plaut. Pseud. 1260 and Cato, Origines, FRH 5 F82 = fr. 79 Peter.

I thought it legitimate to speak at rather greater length about expressions of reciprocity, as it seemed to me most instructive to consider the wide range of different ways in which a newly emerging need for an expression is satisfied in our languages, and how many analogous formations the languages reveal in the process.\(^{40}\)

\(^{40}\) Furthermore, it is clear from ms. add.\(^{1+2}\) that W. had a great deal more to say on this subject. At this point, ms. add.\(^2\) highlights the illogical oðhếtepori ἀλλήλοις (lit. ‘neither side [attacked] each other’) at Thuc. 1. 30. 4, and refers to Polle (1891).
First, a word on the so-called **demonstratives** (Gk ἀντωνυμίαι δεικτικαί) following on from the excellent article by **Brugmann** (1904) to which I referred (II, 76 above) in the introduction to this whole section on pronouns; cf. also (ms. add.\(^2\)) **Schwyzer** (1909). The distinguishing feature of the demonstratives as compared with the other pronouns lies in the fact that they contain an indication of something from the point of view of the speaker. They are pointers in sound, audible gestures, and in effect always contain a ‘Look over here!’ In this respect they are related to the deictic gestures which often accompany them. Their function is most fully expressed in genuine deixis, when a piece of present reality is being pointed out—Brugmann calls this the ‘dramatic’ sense—but they can also indicate something previously mentioned or otherwise known or merely conceived, in that the speaker treats his whole conceptual world on the model of the world he currently perceives. Even in the latter case, there is more indicative force in them than in the pure anaphorics like \(\textit{ἀντωνυμίαι δεικτικαί}\), (as is observed already by Apollonius, \textit{Synt.} 2. 11–12, \textit{GG} II.2, 135–6).

Now, Brugmann has had a happy thought. He observes that, just as we speak of different Aktionsarten of the verb, so it is instructive and indeed desirable with the demonstratives to distinguish the various possible types of pointing, and to follow their marking through the individual languages. For ‘pointing’, he uses the Greek term \(\textit{δεικτικά}\), and shows that in the various languages four types of deixis \(\textit{δεικτικά}\) are distinguished, according to the distance from the speaker (\(\textit{διάστημα}\) in Apollonius, \textit{Synt.} 2. 13, \textit{GG} II.2, 136, 10) of the thing pointed at. There is, first, ‘I’-deixis (‘Ich-Deixis’), which is used when the pointing is at the speaker himself, and the addressee is enjoined to direct his gaze at the ‘I’ of the speaker, at his sphere, at what must lie closest to his circle of thought. This type is expressed—to clarify it straightaway with linguistic facts—in Greek especially with \(\textit{αὐτός}, \textit{οί}, \textit{είσ}\) (as is observed already by Apollonius, \textit{Synt.} 2. 11–12, \textit{GG} II.2, 135–6).

Secondly, there is ‘You’-deixis (‘Du-Deixis’), whereby the addressee’s attention is directed at something confronting the speaker, as is sometimes the case with Gk \(\textit{οὗτος}\), and more obviously with Lat. \textit{iste}.—Thirdly, comes ‘that’-deixis (‘Jener-Deixis’), which serves to indicate something more remote in space.

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\(^1\) For a very clear example of this opposition of \textit{hic} vs \textit{iste} in Latin (ms. add.\(^M\) V. 40), note Terence, \textit{Heauton} 74–5.
or time, or something beyond a certain limit, and is marked by Gk ἐκεῖνος, Lat. ille, German jener. We should note straightaway that these pronouns and related formations with ‘that’-deixis are applied from early on to the heavens, the abodes of the departed, and the invisible world. There are expressions corresponding to German Jenseits and French l’au-delà (‘the hereafter’) in Sanskrit, Avestan, and Greek: think for example of Plato’s pronouncement at Apology 41c, εὕδαιμονβοροὶ εἰς αὐτὸν ἐκεῖ τῶν ἑνθάδε (‘those who are in the hereafter are more fortunate than those in the present world’; cf. Phaedo 117c), or of Aristophanes’ nice evaluation of Sophocles at Frogs 82 ὃ ἐκολοὺς μὲν ἑνθάδε, ἐκολοὺς ἐκεῖ (‘he was easy-going in life, and is easy-going in death’).—Fourthly and finally, we must distinguish ‘this’-deixis (‘Der-Deixis’), in which no distinction is made between the near and the remote, but a rather vague indication is given of something not immediately adjacent to the speaker: in Greek and German, this is marked by the pronoun from which the article developed (although, as we shall see when we consider the pronominal use of the article in Greek and German, this is sometimes also used with ‘I’-deixis).

It is obvious that the first and second types of deixis are very close in meaning to the 1st- and 2nd-person pronouns, and this is brought out in the terminology. Accordingly, Gk ὃδε and Lat. hic can be used to mean simply ‘I’, and I remind you of the 2nd-person use of oὗτος in forms of address (II, 77 above) and its collocation with σύ. This correlation of particular demonstrative pronouns with the three grammatical persons is most clearly developed in Armenian, as was seen already by Wilhelm von Humboldt (1832: 15–24 = 1903–36: VI.1, 319–28); the same is true in Bulgarian.

This type of approach is very fruitful, and, as I said earlier (II, 76), it would have been even more fruitful, had the linguistic horizons been drawn more broadly. The terms coined by BRÜGMANN are not very appealing, although elsewhere when the need has arisen for new terms, he has sometimes had just the right touch (I recall his excellent coinage ‘injunctive’; cf. I, 212 above). In line with what we said much earlier (I, 25 above), he should at least have avoided German pronouns. In my opinion, something like 1. ‘hic’-deixis, 2. ‘iste’-deixis, 3. ‘ille’-deixis, and 4. ‘ὧδε’-deixis would have been preferable.

Terminology apart, I should like now to highlight a few important points. In the first place, not all four types of deixis are to be found in every language.

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2 Cf. e.g. Skt ayām lokaḥ ‘this world’ vs asāu lokaḥ ‘the hereafter’, ibi ‘here, on earth’ vs amūtra ‘there, in heaven’; see Brugmann (1904: 46 ff.) and Ai. Gr. III, 310. Note also hic mundus, et sim. ‘this world’ in Christian Latin; see Abel (1971: 194–8).

3 Armenian distinguishes ‘hic’, ‘iste’, and ‘ille’-deixis (marked by the three stem formants -s-, -d-, and -n-, respectively) not only in its pronouns, anaphorics, and demonstratives but also in its uninflected postposed definite article (-s, -d, -n); see Clackson (2004a: 932) and Lamberterie (1997). On the ‘triple’ definite article of the conservative Bulgarian dialects of the Rhodope mountains, see Scatton (1993: 245), and note the very similar phenomenon in Macedonian (cf. Friedman 1993: 261).
Sanskrit and Old Iranian have no special forms for ‘iste’-deixis, and in Latin there is no special set of pronouns for ‘isto’-deixis, save in some regular derivatives. Moreover, the boundaries between the various types are not everywhere the same: Lat. *iste* has a much stronger connection with the addressee (2nd pers.) than Gk *oðtos*, which sometimes even refers to the person of the speaker (e.g. Pind. *Ol.* 4. 24. *oðtos* ἐγὼ ταχυτάτα ‘such am I in swiftness [of foot]’). And even under the sort of semasiological approach that we are taking here, it is important to note that there is no class of words in which our language family shows less etymological agreement than in the demonstratives. Even within Greek the various dialects do not always use the same stems: corresponding to ὅδε is Thessalian ὅve (with similar forms in Arcadian and Cyprian and once or twice in Boeotian: cf. BECHTEL 1921–4: I, 185), and in Doric and West Greek generally τῆρος is used as a variant of *oðtos*. The sense of τῆρος was misunderstood by the ancient grammarians and correctly seen by AHRENZ (1839–41: II, 267–71). It is derived from Homeric τῇ ‘look here’, ‘take this’, which occurs also in Theran τῇ ‘here’ (BECHTEL 1921–4: II, 126–7). In Italic, Latin and the Osco-Umbrian dialects, which are in other respects so closely related, diverge completely from each other in this respect: in Osco-Umbrian there is no trace either of hic or of ille. German agrees with Greek only in the form of the pronoun that serves also as the article, although on this point in the earliest Germanic the agreement with Greek is so complete that even the difference in initial segment between nom. masc./fem. and the other case-forms is reflected: Gothic *sa so* vs *pata*, like Gk *ὁ* ἦ vs ἵ. Greek and Latin differ from each other in all forms of deixis. This morphological diversity pervades the whole of the Indo-European family—though (ms. add.) E. HERMANN reminds me that the Baltic and Slavic systems are very similar, and a proof of the close relationship of these two groups of languages.


5 Apart from τῆρος (which Buck §125 treats as a variant of ἐκεῖνος rather than of *oðtos*), the variation within Greek concerns mainly the particles added to the demonstrative stem (ὁδε vs ὅνε vs ὅν, etc.). Note, however, that there is some dialectal variation in the stem form of *oðtos* (e.g. nom. pl. ταῦτα, ταῦτα in West Greek, and conversely neut. sg. ὅτα, pl. ὅτα in Boeotian); for details, see Buck §§123–5.

6 The main attested Sabellic demonstratives are Oscan *eko- / ekso- ‘this, hic’, and Umbrian *es(s)o- and *esto-, which have often (most recently by Wallace 2004a: 826) been taken as two distinct demonstratives—‘this, hic’ vs ‘that, iste’—but which it now seems are much more probably two stems constituting a single paradigm, with *esto- (like Osc. *eko-)* in the nom. and acc., and *es(s)o- (and Osc. *eko-)* in the other cases; for excellent discussion of these and other Sabellic demonstrative forms, see Penney (2002).

7 Both continue directly IE *s* < *s* < *tod*; for further comparative evidence and the reconstruction of this paradigm, see Szemerényi (1996: 204–6).

8 For rich bibliography on systems of deixis in Indo-European and cross-linguistically, see Szemerényi (1996: 203–4).
Now, in order to achieve a better understanding of this state of affairs, we need to adopt also the historical approach, which enables us to see, first, how the meaning of the attested pronouns shifts. In later Greek, oistros ousts ὁ δὲ almost completely (Blass & Debrunner 1913 [ = 1961]: §§289–290); exactly analogous is the use in the Septuagint of ἐκταῦθα, ἐκτεῦθεν in the sense of ἐνθάδε, ἐνθάδε (ἐνθάδε being used only in 2 Macc. and 3 Macc.)—rather differently in the New Testament, although ἐκτεῦθεν takes over the function of ἐνθάδε, ἐνθάδε acquires that of ἐκταῦθα. Exactly parallel to the Greek development is the replacement of hic by ıste in Imperial Latin, first in Valerius Maximus—on which see the recent discussions by Löfstedt (1911: 122), Salo(nius (1920: 251), Linderbauer (1922: 271). We can also see new forms arising. German der goes back to Indo-European (though admittedly not in all case-forms), and jener apparently to Proto-Germanic, but dieser is a more recent formation, the first part of which makes use of the old der pronoun (II, 82 above). The Romance languages are instructive on this point, as on all questions of linguistic development. Of the three Latin demonstratives, hic disappears completely, except in adverbial hic > Fr. y ‘here’, and bodie (‘today’). As an independent form, ille has weakened in sense to yield on the one hand an anaphoric, on the other the article (above, II, 85; below, Lecture II, 14), save in illac > Fr. là ‘there’. It retains demonstrative function only with the addition of a deictic particle: Ital. quello is from Lat. eccum illum, Ital. questo from Lat. eccum istum. With regard to the latter point, it should be noted that the hic pronoun required the addition of -c(e) already in Latin in several of its case-forms, including the nom. hic, and that the collocation of demonstratives with ecce is seen already in Plautus’ eccum (ecce + *hum = hunc without affixed -c(e)), eccistum, eccillum.—Now, this sort of development occurred already in prehistoric times. Greek, for example, caused older markers of ‘hic’- and ‘iste’-deixis to be replaced by new formations made by the addition of deictic particles to the to-pronoun: ὁ δὲ is at it were ‘the one here’, ὁ ὁ-τοὺς ‘the one there’ (cf. the above remarks on Gk τήνως, and II, 82–3 & n. 34, p. 503 above on the formation of oistros). The origins of the Latin demonstratives, on the other hand, remain almost entirely obscure.

There is obviously a universal tendency to mark the act of pointing in the clearest and most vital way possible, either by reinforcing inherited forms, which may have lost their sharpness, by means of affixes such as Gk -ί, or by dropping them in favour of new forms derived or developed from deictic particles.

It is incidentally impossible to separate study of the demonstrative pronouns from that of the adjectives and adverbs which are formed from them or at least

9 Lat. bodie > Fr. bai (as in aujourd’hui); see FEW, s.v. ‘bodie’.
10 In addition to Walde & Hofmann and Ernout & Meillet, see most recently Leumann 466–72, and Meiser (1998: 159–64), and now Weiss (forthcoming: chs 27.1, 27.2).
semantically related to them. So related to the *to*-pronoun in Greek and Latin are the pronouns of quantity and quality, Gk τὸσος, τοῖος, τηλίκος, and Lat. *tantus, talis, and tot*, some of which are very ancient. The Greek forms in general remained in use wherever the *to*-pronoun preserved its pronominal function, and they retain contact with it even in points of detail such as in the gemination (still in Attic) τόσος καὶ (or ἦ) τόσος, τοῖος καὶ (η) τοῖος, and moreover find themselves extended, on the analogy of the relation of ὁ to οὖσος, ὅτε, to τοσοῦτος, τοσόοςε, etc., in order to retain an explicitly deictic force. On the other hand, the Latin forms just mentioned attest the earlier existence of the *to*-pronoun in Latin, which formed the basis also of adverbs like *tam* and *tum* (‘to that extent’, ‘at that time’), which, like the adjectives *tantus* and *talis*, correspond to formations on the interrogative-relative stem. Here belongs also the adverb *topper*, quoted by Roman scholars from the earliest Latin texts with the meaning ‘immediately’. As is gradually being acknowledged, this goes back to *tod-per*, corresponding to Gk τό περ, and must originally have meant ‘at that very moment’ (to(d) matching Homeric adverbial τό ‘therefore’, and -per being formally and semantically identical with Gk περ).11

It would be pointless to list all the local and modal adverbs which were formed in Greek to the various demonstratives, or to recall ἐκεῖ (‘there’), which corresponds to the first part of ἐκεῖνος (‘that (one); he’) and, together with its extended forms ἐκεῖθεν and ἐκεῖσε (‘from there’, ‘to there’), represents the local adverb of this pronoun. We should, however, note first Lat. *citra, cis* ‘on this side of’, which presuppose a stem *ci*- showing ‘hic’-deixis, which matches Lith. *sis, Latvian *sis, Old Church Slavonic *sí, and also Gothic *hi- in himma*, etc. (related to NHG *heute, heuer, hier*)—and (ms. add.) Hittite ká-/ki- ‘this, hic’—and is further contained in Gk τῆμερον ‘today’ < *κε-αμερον* (II, 83 above), and related to the particle *ce*—in Lat. ce-do ‘give (it) here’ and huius-ce, etc.12 As in the case of *tantus* and company, then, here, too, an old demonstrative pronoun survives in Latin through its derivatives.—Gk ἕνθα ‘there, thither’ and ἕνθεν ‘from thence’ have no etymological cognates outside Greek. In their use, they are strikingly parallel to the *to*-pronoun. In Attic, | their use in their unextended forms matches exactly the pronominal use of the article, namely when they are repeated in a single expression (e.g. ἕνθεν καὶ ἕνθεν ‘from here and there’ like τὰ καὶ τὰ ‘this and that’), when they are used with the particles δέ, μέν, or ἦ attached, and also in relative function (i.e. ‘where’, ‘from where’)—though admittedly all these uses are

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11 In the absence of adequate context, the meaning of Lat. *topper* (which is quoted by Quintilian (i. 6. 40) and Festus (p. 482 Lindsay) and attested in Livius Andronicus, Pacuvius, Ennius, Coelius Antipater and other early writers) remains uncertain; see Leumann 470, Livingstone (2004: 17–22).

12 For these and other cognates, cf. e.g. on Baltic and Slavic, LEW, s.v. ‘sis’, Vasmer, s.v. ‘cei’; on Gothic, *GED, s.v. ‘hi-‘; on the Hittite demonstratives, Friedrich (1960: 134–5).
found only in Thucydides, Plato, and comedy, and are avoided by the orators. Furthermore, the two adverbs are extended in the same forms and with the same meanings as the to-pronoun itself and its nominal derivatives. Beside τά : ταύτα, there is εὖθα : εὖθαυτά, εὖθεν : εὖθεύτεν (with transposition of the aspiration in Attic ἐνταυτά, ἐντεύθεν); and beside τά : τάδε, similarly εὖθεν : εὐθένδε ‘from this place’, and εὖθα : εὐθάδε ‘here’ (which can also mean ‘in this world’ in contrast with the hereafter, as in the passages quoted earlier, II, 102 above, and at Soph. Ant. 74–5 πλείων χρόνος ὅν δει μ’ ἀρέσκειν τοῖς κάτω τῶν εὐθάδε ‘there is more time for me to please those below than those in this world’).

In the foregoing, it has been simply assumed that in the case of the demonstratives the physically deictic meaning was the original one. This view is justified by the linguistic facts, and by the general consideration that as a rule such words start life with a palpably spatial sense. Even so, this general observation is not universally true. To take an isolated example at random: it is quite certain that Lat. novus (‘new’) had originally a purely temporal meaning. This is confirmed by the usage of Latin itself, by the use of the cognates of novus such as English new, German neu, Gk νέος, and by its etymological connection with Gk νῦν and Lat. nunc. And yet, in expressions such as nouissimum agmen, the superlative of the adjective has a spatial sense, ‘the rearguard’, since the newest, the most recently arrived, is precisely the hindmost. In this case, then, the spatial sense is secondary to the temporal.13

In the pronoun, too, there are examples of words acquiring deictic meaning secondarily; see Brugmann (1904: 121 ff.). I recall Swiss German selb ‘that (one), he’ (= Lat. ille), which probably emerged from der selb as an intensified form of ‘τό’-deixis, and note also Basel German sell, e.g. in sellmol, selbezmol, like Bavarian sellmals ‘at that time’, NHG damals; see Schwyzer in Brugmann (1904: 123 n.), Schwyzer (1909: 285), and Schweiz. Id., s.v. Curiously, words for ‘self’ occasionally acquired demonstrative meaning also in Greek and Latin. Least striking are Gk αὐτῷ ‘here’ (e.g. II. 10. 444 ἥ με δῆσαντες λίπετ’ αὐτῷ ‘or bind me and leave me here’) and αὐτόθεν ‘hence’ (e.g. Plato, Laws 5, 738c θυσίας...κατεστήσαντο εἶτε αὐτόθεν ἐπιχωρίαν εἰν’ ὅν Τυρρηνικάς...εἶτε ἄλλοθεν ὅθεν οὖν they instituted sacrifices either of native origin or imported from Etruria...or from elsewhere’). These adverbs really mean ‘just where (from where) I am’, and this was an easy starting point for the development of ‘hic’-deixis. Rather stranger is the use of αὐτός from the New Testament on in the sense of αὐτός, as in e.g. ἐν αὐτῷ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ | ‘on this day’. In modern Greek this αὐτός is found also as a noun (the voc. of which, αὐτέ, was adduced above, II, 77). The formal echo of

13 For the temporal sense of Lat. nouus, note the adverb nuper ‘recently’ < *noui-per (unless it is formed directly to *nū ‘now’); cf. Ernout & Meillet, s.vv. ‘nouus’, ‘nune’, ‘nuper’, and EWAia, s.vv. ‘náva- (new)’ and ‘nú’.
oûtos certainly played a role in this development. From Latin-speaking territory, note Ital. issa ‘now’ < Lat. ipsa (hora); cf. also Meyer-Lübke, REW, s.v. ‘ipse’.

On the other hand, demonstratives can become similar in meaning to the indefinites; cf. Brugmann (1904: 130 ff.), Sonny (1915), and (ms. add.2) Svennungen (1935: 294–9, 639). We have already mentioned more than once the double placement of pronouns and pronominal adverbs like τὰ καὶ τὰ, ἐνθὰ καὶ ἔνθα (or with ἦ instead of καὶ). Properly, expressions of this sort served to draw attention to various definite things that one was looking at or had in mind, but early on speakers acquired the habit of applying this double placement (or juxtaposed forms of corresponding pronouns and pronominal adverbs) even when there was no intention of pointing at anything but merely the desire to emphasize the diversity of objects or places, etc. In this connection, one can compare passages such as Ter. Brothers 823–4. duo quom idem faciunt saepe ut possis dicere, hoc licet impune facere huic, illi non licet’ (‘often two men do the same thing and you can say, “This one may safely be allowed to do it, while the other may not”’), as well as what we shall note below on Gk... (lit. ‘I say to this man, Go, and he goes; and to another, Come here, and he comes’), which Luther translates with, ich spreche zu einem: Gehe hin, so gehet er hin; und zum andern: Komm her, so komsst er; while the Latin and Gothic versions have huic... and θamma... an̄θaramma... (both, ‘to this one...to another’) like the Greek original.

A further use of the demonstratives is not so easy to explain. German der und der, da und dort, hierhin oder dorthin (‘such and such’, ‘this or that’, ‘here and there’, ‘this way or that’) —In a curious way, the demonstrative in this sense may be in contrast with Gk ἄλλος: Luke 7: 8 λέγω τούτων πορεύθητι, καὶ πορεύεσται καὶ ἄλλων ἔρχου, καὶ ἔρχεται (lit. ‘I say to this man, Go, and he goes; and to another, Come here, and he comes’), which Luther translates with, ich spreche zu einem: Gehe hin, so gehet er hin; und zum andern: Komm her, so kommst er, while the Latin and Gothic versions have huic...alii... and θamma...an̄θaramma... (both, ‘to this one...to another’) like the Greek original.

A further use of the demonstratives is not so easy to explain. German der und der, da und da (‘such and such a person’, ‘in such and such a place’) can also be used to mean that the speaker has something particular in view and wishes the addressee so to regard it, but wishes to refer to it only in indefinite terms. This

14 This shift of meaning in Lat. ipse is presupposed also by Spanish ese and Port. esse ‘this’. It has been debated on both Greek and Latin sides whether the development is based on the ellipse of a ‘true’ demonstrative (αὑτός [oûtos], ipsa [bac]). On Lat. ipse = hic, see Hofmann & Szantyr 190 with further references. On demonstrative αὑτός in the New Testament, see Blass, Debrunner, & Funk §288.2 and especially Turner (1963: 194), both with further references. On modern Greek, see Thumb (1910: §144) and Holton et al. (1997: 317–19).
can be the result of laziness or shyness, or because the speaker is giving a report of or a prescription for a repeated action, and leaves it to the addressee to think in each instance of a specific item in place of the pronoun, or to use it directly to complete the sentence. | That the double placements discussed above could also be used in this situation is explained by Brugmann (1904: 132) as follows: ‘the repetition of the pronoun conveys the idea that you can think this or that about what it is, what it’s called; let it remain in doubt’. The pronominal article and its derivatives are found in Attic used in this way, e.g. Plato, Laws 4, 721b ἐκαίνεωσθαὶ γρήμασι τὲ καὶ ἀτμιὰ, γρήμασι μὲν τόσοις καὶ τόσοις, τῇ δὲ καὶ τῇ ἀτμιὰ (‘he shall be punished both by a fine and by loss of rights, the fine being of such and such an amount, the degrading of such and such a kind’): the amount of money to be paid as a fine, and the nature of the loss of rights to be imposed are to be set in each individual case. Similar double placement of δὲ is found in Aristotle and in the Greek of the Empire, e.g. Dio Chrysostom, Oration 33. 48 μετὰ τῶν καὶ τῶν ἄνωμαξεσθαὶ (‘to be classed with any old city’). Compare the Letter of James 4: 15 ποιήσομεν τούτο ἡ ἐκεῖνο (‘we shall do this or that’; Luther: wollen wir dies oder das thun).¹⁵

A link with the next use is provided by instances in Aristotle such as De anim. gen. 737a26 μετὰ τὸδὲ γέγνεται τὸδὲ ‘after A occurs B’,¹⁶ or Cic. Verr. s. 118 ut adeas, tantum dabis; ut . . . liceat, tantum (‘a visit will cost you so much, permission to [bring food] so much’), the words often repeated to the victims of Verres by his prison-warder, cui ex omni gemitu . . . certa merces comparabatur (‘who earned a fixed price from every cry of pain’). In other words, it is possible to use a demonstrative on its own in this peculiar sense without the sort of opposition seen above. The best-known instance is in the Letter of James 4: 13 σήμερον ἡ αὔριον παρευσάμεθα εἰς τὴν τὴν πόλιν (‘today or tomorrow, we shall go into such and such a town’; Lat. hodie aut crastino die ibimus in illam ciuitatem: cf. below), which Luther translates with a remarkable double placement, heute oder morgen wollen wir gehen in die oder die stadt (Weizsäcker’s in diese Stadt is wrong). This use of simple δὲ is found also in Plutarch (e.g. On Superstition 7, 168D) and, I believe, in the papyri, and survives in modern Greek in δ τὸδὲ ‘Mr So-and-so’.¹⁷

In addition, Dio Chrysostom uses simple τοσοῦτον in the sense of Attic τόσον καὶ τόσον (‘this much or this much’, e.g. 26. 3, 74. 9).

You will have observed, however, that in the second passage from the Letter of James above, the Latin translator uses ille. This is in keeping with a widespread usage, common especially in the register in which the Latin Bible originates (cf. Salonius 1920: 234), but a double example is to be found already in Suetonius’

¹⁵ For a development of W.’s implication that Gk σοίτοσ also can mean ‘so and so’, see Blomquist (1973).
¹⁶ Cf. the accumulation of instances at Topis 7, 150b27, quoted by Von der Mühl (1953).
life of Caesar, where he is narrating how the dictator controlled the elections of the comitia tributa, Jul. 41 edebat per libellos circum tribum missos scriptura breui: ‘Caesar dictator illi tribui. Commendo nobis illum et illum, ut uestro suffragio suam dignitatem teneant’ (‘he circulated brief directions to the tribes: “Caesar the Dictator to such-and-such a tribe of voters: I recommend So-and-so and So-and-so to you for office”’). Naturally, in each letter illi tribui was replaced with the name of the tribe, and each illum with the name of a recommended candidate. Indeed, this usage, although unknown in Classical Latin, goes back to the earliest period. It occurs in an ancient praetorian interdict de ui quoted by Cicero (Pro Tullio 44), and Sonny (1915), following Werth (1901), has shown that very probably certain old formulae including the form ollus (obsolete already in Plautus’ time) | for ille are also to be understood in this formulaic sense: e.g. the herald’s call attested by Varro and Festus at the announcement of a burial, ollus quiris leto datus est would mean simply, ‘citizen So-and-so has died’, and in each concrete instance the name of the deceased would be inserted.18

This is very remarkable. The Greek usage could be explained as a sort of haplographic shortening of the double placement, but this is out of the question in the case of ollus and ille. Rather, it is in striking agreement with the use in the earliest Sanskrit prose of āsau, the simple pronoun with ‘ille’-deixis, in the sense of ‘So-and-so’ (Ai. Gr. III, §252); only in later Sanskrit, as far as I can see, do we find double placement of the demonstratives in this sense. A remarkable parallel! For in this case there can be no question of common inheritance. But how did it come about that a demonstrative—and the one used to indicate remote objects at that—is used in this way?

Greek has the advantage of having created a special pronoun for this peculiar type of definite-indefinite reference, ὃ δεῖνα, originally indeclinable, with gender and number being marked on the article (ἡ δεῖνα, τὸν δεῖνα, etc.). In the fourth century, on the basis of the accusative τὸν δεῖνα, where -a could be regarded as an acc. ending, there appear in Attic τὸν δεῖνος, τῷ δεῖνι, τῶν δεῖνων, and in Syracusan a nom. ὃ δεῖν (Sophron, fr. 48, PCG I); a stem -deiνατ- (gen. δεῖνατος, etc.) is also attested. But all this is secondary. Solmsen (1892) and, following him, Brugmann (1904: 90–1) attempt to connect this formation with the double placements discussed above. They take the oldest form to be the nom.-acc. neut. pl. τὰ δεῖνα, and analyse this as τὰδεινα, with *ενα showing the pronominal stem eno-attested in southern German ēner (= NHG jener ‘that’), so that the basic meaning would be ‘this and that’.19 But as ὃ δεῖνa usually refers to persons and in the singular, the starting point cannot have been the neut. pl.—indeed, τὰ δεῖνa seems

18 (Cf. Var. L. 7. 42, Fest. p. 304L.) On Gk ὅδε and Lat. ille ‘So-and-so, such-and-such’, see further Blass, Debrunner, & Funk §289, Von der Mühl (1933), Schwyzer 612, Hofmann & Szantyr 182.
19 IE *eno- ‘that’ is reflected also in Old Church Slavonic omū, Lith. ānis, Hitt. ani- ‘that’ and the second part of Gk ēkeivos (if from *(e)-ke-enos); cf. Schwyzer 613, Chantraine, s.vv. ‘δεῖνα’, ‘ἐκείνος’. 
not to be attested at all. Even so, ὁ δεῖνα conceals the ὅδε that we met in the Letter of James, and the ending must contain an adverb (ίνα ‘here’, according to Schömann (1846: 248); cf. Persson (1893: 228–32)). Its use in Attic agrees with the definition of this form of expression given above (II, 107). To the rich collection of examples adduced by Baunack & Baunack (1886–8: I, 46–55), we should add from the Vitae patrum 5. 7. 10 ἥ δεῖνα, δεῦρο μεθ’ ἡμῶν ἐλήσ τὸ βαλανεῖον (‘[Sister] So-and-so, come with us to the bath!’) rendered by the ancient Latin translation as nonna illa, ueni nobiscum ad balneum, nonna being the title to be used before the personal name in place of illa; cf. Salonius (1920: 439).20

I hardly need to remind you that personal names can also be used in the same way as ὁ δεῖνα, in general statements with reference to persons, names which, because they are so common, are taken as typical: so e.g. the name Gaius in the Roman jurists, in the English jurists John Doe and Richard Roe (I owe this information to Hanns Oertel), in Old Icelandic Jon, in Sanskrit Deva-datta-, Maitra-, Caitra-.

But to return from this excursus to the normal use of the demonstratives, I refer you on all points of detail—apart from the standard grammars—to Bach (1891); Meader & Wölflin (1900–2); and the valuable attempt by Havers (1906) to apply Brugmann’s theory on one particular point (‘ille’-deixis) to the whole of our Greek record.

20 On the etymology of ὁ δεῖνα, see most recently Moorhouse (1963), with a review of earlier proposals.
Lecture II, 13

Of the main classes into which the pronouns are normally divided, we have still to discuss the relatives, the interrogatives, and the indefinites. Incidentally, the first to assign all of these to the class of pronouns were the Roman grammarians; the Greeks had combined the relative with the article in a single category (II, 125–6 below), and had grouped the others together with nouns and adjectives. We shall have to consider the relatives when we come to the study of the clause—this applies to the **interrogatives**, too, of course, but these call for some brief comment here because of their relation with the indefinites.

In Indo-European there was a pronoun which had, when accented, interrogative meaning, and, when enclitic, indefinite meaning. It is continued in Gk ἄσ, Lat. *quis*, NHG *wer*, with the same duality of meaning and a similar correlation between accent and meaning. It is easy to understand why the same word did service for both interrogative and indefinite expressions: in both cases it concerns something unknown. Equally easy to understand is the difference of tone or accent: questions in general are characterized by a high tone, while a subordinate (enclitic) position in the clause suits a reference to an item that one will not or cannot denote precisely.

We saw in an earlier lecture (II, 8–9 above) that, in general and certainly in origin, this pronoun marks only the opposition between persons and things, and not that between male and female. In many languages (including German, Slavic, Lithuanian), it is confined to the singular: if something was unknown, its number could be unknown, too. In Greek and Latin, a plural is made, but as far as I can see, at least in the interrogative, it is not common in these languages either. It is hardly by chance that in the whole of the *Iliad* the interrogative and the indefinite (excluding ὃστις ‘whoever’) are attested just once each in the plural (*Il. 24. 387 and 15. 735*).—The restriction in German of *wer*, *was* (‘who’, ‘what’) to substantival function is matched in Slavic and Lithuanian (and incidentally Romance), while Greek and Latin use the old pronoun also as an adjective.¹ Latin shows a partial morphological opposition between nominal and adjectival use (*quis*, *quid* vs *qui*, *quid*.

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quae, quod), which it seems to share with the other Italic languages (cf. I, 66–7 above), but the origin of which has otherwise yet to be explained (for the facts, see Neue & Wagener II, 430–50). We shall shortly suggest how both adjectival function and the other distinctions lacking in the inherited pronoun came to be expressed by means of various derived forms.

Indeed, this stem formed the basis not only of numerous adverbs of place, time, and manner, but also of a series of nominal formations, which show the same duality of meaning and accentuation as the base-form, but which, being predominantly adjectival, were not subject to the above-mentioned restrictions with regard to gender and number. For the most part, they stand in correlation with demonstratives and relatives with the same endings; in Latin, like the base-form itself, they are used themselves as relatives. This is true also of NHG welcher, but otherwise German uses more recent periphrastic expressions in place of these derivatives.—It is incidentally thinkable that in certain instances the indefinite function arose secondarily alongside the interrogative role, on the model of the base-form and its adverbs. It is perhaps no accident that Homer uses ποῖος, πόσος, and πότερος (‘of what sort’, ‘how great’, ‘which of two’) only in questions—and πόσος only once, at II. 24. 657 πόσονέμαφ (‘for how many days?’). The widespread pattern of correlation with demonstratives and relatives may also reflect a gradual development: τηλίκος (‘of such an age’) is already in Homer (alongside ἡλικία, ἡμῆλικα, and derivatives), but πηλίκος and ἥλικος are attested only much later, while -δαπός occurs at all on pronominal stems only after Homer, who attests only τηλιεδαπός (‘from a far country’). Naturally, chance could have played a role in all this, but ‘of whatever nature’ and ‘of whatever size’ are concepts unlikely to be called for before an age given to theorizing. Indeed, to the best of my knowledge, indefinite ποῖος and ποσός are not securely attested before Plato, and not elsewhere in Attic; and, while ποῖος, ποσός, and ποιότης are quite common in the reports of later writers on the teachings of the Pre-Socratics (most strikingly ἀποίος ‘without quality’ in an account of Democritus’ atomic theory, Plut. Reply to Colotes 8, 1110f = Diels & Kranz no. 68, A57), these words never occur in a verbatim quotation from a Pre-Socratic.

Only two of these derived interrogatives are certainly inherited: Lat. quot, and Gk πότερος = Lat. uter—this is not the place to discuss the peculiar initial vowel of uter, which is in contrast also with that of its Oscan cognate pîtreie-pid ‘in which (of two)’ and related forms.2 The latter forms (πότερος, uter) were used from the outset in cases where the question or uncertainty was between just two items; see Debrunner (1927: 23) on Plato, Phaedo 78b. This pronoun is found in

2 Like Lat. uter vs Oscan pître-, note also e.g. Lat. ubi and ut vs Oscan puf and puz. The question is whether the Latin pattern (u- at the start of the word vs i in the middle of the word: ali-cubi, si-cubi, etc.) is the result of regular, conditioned sound-change or of analogical change; see Leumann 149–50, Meiser (1998: §72.8), Weiss (forthc.: ch. 9.1, §I.E.1.a).
Germanic, too: English still has it in *whether* (lit. ‘which of two’), and there are traces of it in German in the conjunctions *weder* and *entweder* (‘neither’, ‘either’), and it is concealed also in *jedweder* and *jeder* (‘any’, ‘each’; see II, 122 below). This is not the only place where the suffix -*τεπος* serves to mark an opposition between two members of a pair (cf. e.g. Gk ἕτεπος ‘one of two’), and this is the source of its use for the comparative.—If the uncertainty surrounded not a pair but any larger number of items (‘one of those’), originally a formation corresponding to the old superlative was used. This survives in Old Latin *quotumus*, although the meaning of this word has shifted slightly under the influence of the ordinals which have a similar ending: e.g. Plaut., *Pseud.* 962 *quotumas aedīs* ‘the howmanyeth house’, 1173 *quotumo die* ‘on the howmanyeth day’.

Inherited *quot* asks for a number (cf. the corresponding demonstrative *tot* ‘so many’), and so is a ‘*plurale tantum*. The expected Greek cognate *ποτι* is not preserved, and its meaning is conveyed instead by the plural of an adjectival derivative (πόσα(σ)οι, pl. of πόσα(σ)ος < *πότιος*), which also serves in all numbers to indicate questioned or indefinite size, corresponding to demonstrative *τόσος* and relative *διος*.

Alongside *quot* corresponding to the cardinals, Latin has a pronoun matching the ordinals in *quotus* (probably from earlier *quotitus*, and, if so, inherited⁴), which acquires a demonstrative counterpart in *totus* (first in Lucretius, 6. 652). It asks not only for the position of something in a series (‘the howmanyeth?’), but also for the number of items in the group: so, clearly at Hor. *Epist.* 1. 5. 30 *tu quotus esse uelis, rescribe* (‘write back and tell me *quotus* you wish to be’), where it would make no sense to think of rank-order, and which is always translated as ‘one of how many?’, ‘in how big a company?’. This corresponds exactly to the other meaning of the ordinals (for which we must not be misled by the name ‘ordinal’). Horace’s *quotus* corresponds closely to expressions such as Gk αὐτὸς τρίτος, Fr. *lui troisième*, German *selbstdritt* (lit. ‘oneself third’, i.e. one of three), or Hellenistic Gk δέυτεροκοιτείν ‘to sleep with a partner’. In this way the collocation *quotus quisque* also becomes comprehensible in passages such as Cic. *Planc.* 62 *quotus quisque disertus, quotus quisque iuris peritus est, ut eos numeres, qui | uolunt esse?* (‘so few are eloquent or trained in the law, even if you count those who consider themselves to be so’), or Tac. *Ann.* 1. 3. 7 *quotus quisque reliquus, qui rempublicam uidisset?* (‘few indeed were left who had witnessed the republic’). For in Latin the ordinals in this sense were frequently combined with *quisque*, e.g. at Plaut. *Pseud.* 954 *in foro uix decimus quisque est, qui ipsus sese nouerit* ‘in the forum

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³ Lat. *quotumus* is more probably an analogical nonce formation (on the model of *septimus, decimus*) than an old form comparable with Skt *katama*- ‘which (of more than two)’; cf. Sommer (1914:457).

⁴ This view (linking Lat. *quot(it)us* with Skt *katithás*), which goes back to A. Fick, is rejected by Walde & Hofmann, and by Ernout & Meillet, each s.v.; with Lat. *quot*, however, we may compare directly Skt *kāti*, Avestan *ēitī*, Old Irish *cuit*, and other Celtic forms.
hardly one man in ten knows himself’, or Caesar, *Gallic War* 5. 52. 2 *cognoscit non decimum quemque reliquum esse militem sine ulnere* ‘he knew that not one soldier in ten was left without a wound’. Similarly, then, *quotus quisque* meant first ‘one of how many?’ and thence acquired its regular meaning.—Greek did not preserve the Indo-European word corresponding to *quotus*, but still felt a need for an interrogative ordinal. Addition of the suffix -οστός, which appears in many of the ordinals, to the stem of πόσ(α)οι ‘how many?’, led to the derivative πόστος (shortened from *πόσ(α)οστός*), which appears first in the last book of the *Odyssey* at 24. 288, Laertes asks πόστον δὴ ἔτος ἐστίν; (‘how many years has it been?’, lit. ‘the howmanyeth year is it?’), to which Odysseus replies (309), τόδε δὴ πέμπτον ἔτος ἐστὶ (‘this is now the fifth year’). Unlike Lat. *quotus*, even in later Greek πόστος asks only for the position of an item in a series. This is striking in that the identically formed ὁλιγ-οστός and πολλ-οστός agree exactly with *quotus* in meaning ‘in a small company’ and ‘as one of many’ (their other meanings need not concern us here).

The other derivatives of the interrogative pronoun relate (in interrogative or indefinite function) to size, nature, and occasionally even age and origin. Let me say a brief word just about ποίος. That its basic meaning is ‘of what sort?’ is immediately clear from the parallel forms τοῖος and ὁδός (demonstrative and relative), and is consistent with the Homeric usage of the word, including in the common phrase ποίον ἔειπες or ποίον τὸν μύθον ἔειπες (lit. ‘what sort of word have you said?’, hence ‘what a terrible thing to say!’), or at Od. 21. 195 (Odysseus to Eumaeus and Philoetius) ποίοι κ’ εἶτε ... ἀμνὲῖμεν ‘what sort of defenders would you be?’. But when at Od. 1. 406–7 Eurymachus asks Telemachus about the Taphian Mentes, unfamiliar to him, (ἐθέλω σε περὶ ξείνου ερέσθαι, ὅπποθεν οὗτος ἄνηρ,) ποίησ δ’ ἐ’ εὐχέται εἶναι γαίης, we are not entitled to translate, ‘(I wish to ask you about the stranger: where is this man from,) from what sort of land does he say that he comes?’ Eurymachus is not interested in the nature of Mentes’ home, he wants to know its name, and he could have used τῶος. But ποίης was also justified because closer identification of the country of origin asked about could have been supplied in adjectival form (cf. e.g. Ἀχαιῶος αἰής, ‘Achaean land’, at Od. 13. 249), and an ethnic adjective is also in a broad sense an attribute and hence analogous to pronominal forms in -οίος. And in fact, Telemachus understands from the question as asked what Eurymachus wants to know: he answers at line 417 with the noun phrase ἐκ Τάφου. So, too, in other cases, ποίος was able as the attribute of a noun to ask about a particular object, and in general to do service for τίς. Consequently, it sometimes appears in straightforward alternation with τίς, e.g. at Eur. *Electra* 907 τῶ’ ἀρχήν πρώτα σ’ ἔειπο βαπακώ; ποίας τελευτά; τίνα μέσον τάξω λόγον; (‘what beginning am I to

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I have let this stand, but cf. the two nn. preceding.
make to my tale of woe? What end? What words am I to put between?'; cf. Eur. Androm. 299–300, Theocr. 2. 90–1). In modern Greek, ποίος proceeded to become the true interrogative, in both substantival and adjectival function, while the forms of τίς disappeared almost completely, save in certain idioms.⁶

A completely different view of this matter is taken by an acute American linguist, Walter Petersen (1915), who regards ποίος as a purely formal variant of τίς, built on one of the case-forms of τίς, and accordingly explains the decidedly qualitative meaning of ποίος as secondary. But how is this secondary meaning supposed to have emerged? And the corresponding demonstrative and relative, τοίόν and ολός, are never equivalent to οὗτος and ὁς, as we should have to expect if Petersen were right, especially as ολός in Homer is infinitely more common than ποίος, and hence can hardly be modelled on it. But especially telling is comparison with the developments in Romance and Germanic: Lat. qualis means ‘of what sort?’, while its reflex in French, quel, means ‘which?’ (and lequel ‘who, which’, interro. or rel.), and German welcher itself continues an old interrogative adjective of quality related to Gothic hwileiko.⁷ There is a similar development in Slavic.⁸

Of the indefinites, the most ancient are those which (accent apart) are identical with the interrogatives.⁹ These fade, however, gradually but significantly, and are supplanted by new formations which in part convey refinements of the indefinite sense. In Greek, it is true, τίς is everywhere maintained beside the adverbs derived from it, and indefinite πότερος ‘either one of two’ is found sporadically at least: several times in Plato, and in ἄπεροι πότεροι (a close parallel to Lat. alteriter) in an Aetolian inscription (SIG no. 421 = IG IX.12.1. 3, 31; Thermos, c.262 BC); indeed, ποίος and ποσός (‘of some kind’, ‘of some size’) appear to be new formations (II, 111 above). But we clearly see the demise of the simple form after a negative, where in normal Attic (except οὗ τί ‘in no way’) οὗ τίς is replaced by the more dynamic denial in οὐδείς (lit. ‘not even one’), which is then in turn ousted in Attic by a restoration of the sharper basic forms οὐδεὶς εἷς, οὐδ’ εἷς (whence οὐδείς). The beginnings of this replacement are seen already in Homer in οὐδέν, which is common, and masc. οὐδενί, which occurs twice (Od. 11. 515, II.

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⁶ So, e.g. γιατί ‘why?’, τι λόγος ‘of what sort?’, and gen. τίνος ‘whose?’ is common in masc. and neut., though never in the fem.; see Thumb (1910: §§131–2) and Holton et al. (1997: 99, 324–7, 414–18).
⁷ These Germanic forms, and e.g. Old Icelandic hvílíkr, Old English hwile, OHG hwelih, continue a Proto-Germanic compound of the interrogative pronoun + *leika- ‘body’; cf. Lehmann, s.v. ‘huileiko’ (and n. 38, p. 504 above).
⁸ Probably, W. means the use of e.g. Russ. kakói properly ‘of what sort’ to mean simply ‘which’, especially in questions involving an ordinal numeral; cf. Wade (1992:§122.4).
⁹ On indefinite pronouns in the languages of the world, note esp. Haspelmath (1997), a detailed comparative typological study of a sample of forty languages (including Latin, five Romance languages, modern Greek, five Germanic languages), the indefinite pronouns of which are described in some detail in appendix A, together with more superficial data from a further sample of 100 languages (including ancient Egyptian, Akkadian and Hittite!) summarized in appendix B.
For reference to pairs of items, Greek has no counterpart to οὗ τις (such as *οὗ ποτερός, like Lat. neuter), but just οὐδέτερος matching οὐδείς; cf. also Wackernagel (1916: 117 n.).—It is striking, however, that the old, originally enclitic indefinites occasionally rise above their subordinate position in the clause. Notice τις, for example, in the Ionic idiom ἦ τις ἦ οὐδείς, lit. ‘either one person or no one at all’, i.e. ‘virtually no one’, and in Attic and later Greek in the sense ‘someone (or something) of significance’, e.g. at Theocr. 11. 79 κῦρον τις φαίνομαι ἆλλον (‘it is plain that I too am somebody (of importance)’), where it is hard to justify seeing proper enclisis (cf. ὁ τις ἀνθρωπός and the like in Aristotle, e.g. Categories 1b). This evolution of free-standing forms occurred even more readily in disyllabic forms, which had been rendered oxytone by the Greek laws of enclisis (cf. clause-initial τις at Pl. Theaetetus 147b et sim.). So with ποτέ: its verse-initial position at Soph. OT 1085 can be explained by the special rules of the Sophoclean trimeter,11 but at Eur. Or. 44 it is at the start of the clause (so, too, at Dem. 36. 50), and we also find from the tragedians on ποτὲ μὲν . . . ποτὲ δὲ. Independent ποιῶς and ποσῶς are common in Plato (cf. II, 111 above), and hence Plato was able to form the abstract ποιότης (‘quality’, Theaetetus 182a; cf. Wackernagel 1908b: 214–15 n.**), which was followed by ποσότης (‘quantity’) attested first in Aristotle. When a philosophical language was being created in Latin, both terms were translated literally: qualitas was coined by Cicero, who comments on it very instructively at Acad. 1. 29–30; he felt no need to translate ποσότης, and the corresponding quantitas appears first in the Augustan period (in the architect Vitruvius). Both Latin words can be understood only as translations, since the indefinite meaning that they presuppose for the respective pronominal adjectives is never attested for Lat. quantus, while for qualis it is rare and clearly also a Grecism (II, 116 below).

But to return to Greek, this development from enclitic to free-standing word is presupposed also for ποιῶς by Hellenistic ποιῶμαι ‘acquire a certain quality’—cf. Hesychius’ gloss πεποιωμένων ποιότητα ἔχουν (‘having a quality’) —and also by ἄποιως ‘without quality’ and μονόποιως ‘having a single quality’, both late. The similar formation ποσῶν ‘to count’ (Theophr. Char. 23) is probably based rather on interrogative πόσοι (‘how many?’). Later, we find this development also with monosyllables, e.g. πῆ μὲν . . . πῆ δὲ (‘on one side . . . on the other’) in Xenophon and Hellenistic Greek, ἦ πῆ ἦ ἄπλως (‘either in some (particular) way or simply so [i.e. in an unqualified sense]’) in Aristotle (Prior Analytics 1, 49a8), and so on.

10 Cf. Gow (1950: on Theocr. 4. 30).
11 Cf. Jebb’s commentary (Cambridge 1902), ad loc.: ‘where the movement of the thought is rapid, one verse can be treated as virtually continuous with the text’.

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Of course, indefinite meaning admits a number of different nuances, from which new meanings can arise. If you say τις, you can be thinking of the action of an individual (‘someone’) or of a vague plurality (‘one, anyone’); ποτέ not only means ‘at any time’ but, because it is so often used in reports of the past, it acquires specific reference to past time, as in Plato, Parmenides 152b, where τὸ ποτέ ‘the past’ stands in contrast with τὸ νῦν ‘the present’ and τὸ ἐπειτά ‘the future’. It is also used of actions urgently awaited, accompanying the imperative for instance, e.g. at Soph. Phil. 816 (Philoctetes to Neoptolemus) μέθες ποτέ ‘just let me go!’, and in reports of past time even if the time is known (e.g. δἰέ ποτε ‘only late on’), exactly like Lat. aliquando. Different again is the use of τίς and ποι with the elimination of all temporal/local meaning. And I spoke earlier (I, 110–11) of the use of τίς in 1st- and 2nd-person function.

Greek extended the means of expression of indefinites by using abbreviated general relative clauses, Ion. ὁς ὁ, Att. ὁσις ὁν, ὁπότερος ὁν, ὁσις δὴ ποτε: at Thuc. 5. 18. 11 ὁπότεροι ὁν καὶ ὁσιν πέρι . . . ‘whichever of the two parties and concerning whichever matter . . .’ the ὁν of ὁπότεροι is to be understood also with ὁσιν. Then in Plato and the Alexandrians, ὁσις is used on its own (note indefinite and relative ὁσις in close proximity at Callimachus, Hymn to Artemis 18 πόλιν δὲ μοι ἥτινα νείμον, ἥτινα λής ‘assign some city to me, whichever you wish’), like ὁπότερος ‘either of two’ (from Andocides 3. 26 on). Finally, the whole notion of indefiniteness is expressed more strongly by Hellenistic ὁς δὴ ποτε and the like than by ποιος and τις (cf. μὴ δ’ ὁποίος in Polybius).—Other means of strengthening or differentiating meaning hardly exist in Greek. Whether the repeated τις τις in an inscription from Argos (IG IV. 554, 1) is more than a simple mistake cannot be decided as long as it remains the only example. In some cases, a δὴ inserted immediately before the τις—e.g. εἷς δὴ τινα τόπον in Plato (‘to a certain place’, Phaedo 107d), ἐν δὲν δὴ τινι τῶν κομιῶν in Aristotle (‘now, in one of these villages’, fr. 558 Rose12)—seems to have an intensifying effect, as in the indefinite relatives, but δὴ τις did not develop to a fixed collocation (although Ed. Hermann draws my attention to Boeotian καὶ ὁν δὲ τινα τρόπον). In modern Greek, καν- (< καὶ ἂν) prefixed to ποιος, ποιος, εἷς serves to form indefinite expressions.

Latin shows a very different picture, as does German. In German, indefinite wer, was, and plural welche, if unextended, are effectively obsolete; in Classical Latin, quis is retained almost exclusively in close dependence on clause-opening particles like ne, si, num, ec-, but note still e.g. Tib. 1. 10. 13–14 et iam quis forsitan hostis | haesura in nostro tela gerit latere (‘and some foeman maybe bears the weapon that is to stick in my side’). More or less the same is true of uter, (c)ubi, quando, while the other formations derived from the same interrogative—such as quot, quotus, quantus, (c)unde, and so on—are not at all (or no longer) capable of indefinite meaning.

12 This is quoted by Athenaeus, 8, 348b, from Aristotle’s Constitution of Naxos.
This meaning is lacking also for *qualis* in early Latin and generally in the colloquial language, but the model of Gk ποιός (II, 111 above) led to the admission of indefinite meaning, as it were on an experimental basis at Cic. *Acad.* 1. 28 *illa effici quae appellant ‘qualia’* (‘[the Stoics believe] that matter is made into those things which they call “qualified”’, i.e. Gk ποιά, lit. ‘things of a certain quality’). But this experiment found practically no echo, in contrast with the word *qualitas*, which has achieved core-vocabulary status in all modern languages. | II, 117

On the other hand, by enlarging the old indefinites with both prefixes and suffixes, Latin has made possible a range of variation in the expression of indefiniteness far beyond anything in Greek.  

13 Gk τις is matched by Lat. *aliquis* (and the other forms in *ali-*) when the reference is to something indefinite but actually present—so, too, in the idiom touched on above (II, 115) seen in Latin in Seneca’s *iste se aliquem putat* (‘he thinks that he is someone [important]’, *On Anger* 3. 37. 3). If, conversely, the reality of the indefinite object is doubtful or denied, Latin uses the forms with *-quam* (also *ulus ‘any’). Then there is *quidam* (to which *quondam* stands in the same relation as *quom* (= *cum*) does to *quis*) for reference to things known to the speaker which he does not wish to tell the hearer about in more definite terms. Like τις in Greek from Homer on, Lat. *quidam* is often used also after adjectives, in order to indicate that the adjective does not express exactly what is intended, that it only approximates the intended meaning (*quidam* = ‘very’), or gives it too fully and definitely (*quidam* = ‘somewhat’). There is no particular nuance in *quispiam*, which probably became obsolete in the popular language at an early date, for it is rare even in Classical Latin, does not occur in e.g. Petronius, and is not reflected in Romance. If *quispiam* contains *iam*, and *quisquam* probably *quam* (‘how(soever)’), the origin of *ali-* and *-dam* is unfortunately obscure.  

14—By way of a coda, we should mention *nescio quis* (‘I don’t know who’), in which the closeness of the collocation is shown by the short quantity of the *-o*, and which survives in Romanian as a polite indefinite. MHG *neizwer*, *neizwaz* and related forms provide an exact parallel to it.  

15 The expression is a sort of counterpart to *quidam*, in that it emphasizes the ignorance of the speaker. For all the above meanings, in Greek really only τις and associated derivatives are available.

13 For an elegant and concise account of the Latin system, see Haspelmath (1997: 253–6) with further references.

14 Lat. *ali-* in *alius* (also *alter, aliquis, etc.*) is usually compared with Gk ἄλλος, Skt *anya-, etc. ‘other’, which are all thought to continue IE *alwro, an adj. made to the adverb *al* ‘there, on that side’; see Walde & Hofmann, s.v. ‘*alius*, and Leumann 471–2, 474–5 with further references.

15 On Romanian *ne*ṣṭine ‘someone’, and other forms comprising the reflex of *nescio +* the interrogative pronoun, see *REW*, s.v. ‘*nescio*’ with further references. MHG *neiswer*, *neizwaz* were lost from the written language before becoming established as regular pronouns, but the same structures survive in the Swiss German pronouns *neiss-wer, neiss-welch*; see Paul et al. (1998: §415).
A further relevant point in this context is the fact that τίς in the Greek Bible is translated in Gothic in two different ways, each with a sharply distinct meaning: on the one hand, with the etymologically related *hwas*, for indefinite entities whose existence is denied or posited only as possible; on the other hand, with *sums*, with reference to entities which are definite but not more closely described, or with reference to indefinite parts of definite entities; see the nice discussion by Behaghel (1917). Cognates of *sum*- are used similarly in OHG and MHG, and still today in many Swiss dialects; this is English *some*. In the Sanskrit *Rigveda* there is a corresponding pronoun *sama*- , which even shows enclisis, which was apparently pretty well eliminated in Germanic. Both the pronoun and any derived formations were lost in Greek and Latin.16

There is no need to describe the modern German indefinite forms, which show certain similarities to the Latin, although I shall have to go into individual details later on. Something I must do here, however, is to say a brief word about expressions for the meaning ‘each’ in our three languages—and on this I refer you straightaway to Brugmann’s monograph on expressions of totality in Indo-European languages (1894). From the outset, the old indefinite was used also in this function, as it could denote an indefinite item which was to be thought of as recurring any number of times. To quote Delbrück (1893–1900: II, 511), ‘In emphasizing the notion of “as . . . as you like”, one raises the notion that no one is exempt’. When Homer makes Agamemnon say at *Il.* 2. 382–4 εὐ μὲν τὶς δόρυ θηξάσθω, εὖ δ’ ἄσπίδα θέσθω, | εὖ δὲ τὶς ἵπποισιν δείπνον δότω ὠκυπόδεσαν, | εὖ δὲ τὶς ἀρματος ἀρφὶς ἰδὼν πολέμῳ μεδέσθω (‘let each man [lit. someone] sharpen his spear, adjust his shield, feed his swift-footed horses, check his chariot and prepare for war’), while we can translate the repeated τίς with English *some*one, German *einer*, Latin *quis*, the instruction applies to ‘each’, and in Greek in particular we often find the indefinite pronoun used like this. But in all our languages, and from an early date, the need for more precise expression was felt, and satisfied in various ways: in the first place, by the adding of particles to the indefinite pronoun, above all in Lat. *quisque*. In an early article, Skutsch (1902b: 86–91) tried to equate this *-que* exactly with the copulative particle *-que* (‘and’), and thought to see the starting point in clauses such as Cicero, *Tusculans* i. 41 *quam quisque norit artem, in haec se exerceat* (cf. n. 20, p. 548). According to Skutsch, this was originally to be understood as ‘the art *which* *qua*m* someone understands, and the one who (quis-que) understands it, in this (art) let him practise’, and in the further transmission of clauses of this type *quisque* was then reinterpreted. This account is intelligent, and has found many adherents, but it is wrong. This accomplished scholar has been led astray, on this point as on others, by the tendency to treat Latin in isolation from its sister languages, and to explain

16 Cf., however, Gk ἄμει ‘somehow’, ἄμοδεον ‘from somewhere’; see further Ai. Gr. III, §262.
all linguistic phenomena as far as possible from the surviving Latin record itself. First, if quis in the above sentence is a relative, then the appearance of the linking particle -que is in conflict with the normal pattern, as in a series of interrogative—or derived relative—clauses in the ancient languages the pronouns are normally in asyndeton. Secondly, the semantic shift of quisque supposed by Skutsch and its transfer into non-relative clauses is difficult to explain. On the other hand, Gothic offers—in hwazuh and hwarjizuh—words for ‘each’ which correspond exactly to quisque in comprising the indefinite pronoun þ the cognate of -que. But this particle is in origin precisely not confined to copular function: in keeping with its etymological connection with the indefinite, it has also a generalizing function. We should recall Gk ὁστε, ὠστε, and in particular the fact that Homer also knows ἄσ is ἄτε (formally the exact counterpart of quis-que)—albeit not precisely in the sense of quisque—e.g. at II. 2. 292–3 καὶ γὰρ ἄσ is ὁνα μήνα μένων ἀπὸ ἃς ἄλοχοι ἃ ἄσγαλα (‘for any man who spends one month away from his wife is vexed’).17 So, quisque means literally ‘someone in general’, ‘anyone at all’, very like Oscan pu´tereı´-pı´d (‘in either of the two’, loc. sg.), in which pı´d, which is certainly generalizing, has exactly the same effect as -que in uterque, the exact cognate in Latin.18 As a rule, quisque combines with other words, especially with those with which it has a close semantic connection, such as suus (II, 92 above) or the ordinals (II, 113 above). As it is disyllabic, however, it occasionally—already in Old Latin—comes to stand at the start of a clause or a verse, like the disyllabic indefinites in Greek (II, 115 above). Its predominantly enclitic placement renders improbable an alternative explanation which would be otherwise thinkable, to wit, that originally the only use of quisque was that attested in Old Latin as an indefinite relative like quicunque (‘whoever’), and that the meaning ‘each’ developed secondarily from this usage in the manner of the instances discussed below.

A different approach was taken in Greek, where τὶς τὰ (formally the exact counterpart of quis-que)—albeit not precisely in the sense of quisque—e.g. at II. 2. 292–3 καὶ γὰρ τὶς θ’ ἔνα μήνα μένων ἀπὸ ἃς ἄλοχοι ἃ ἄσγαλα (‘for any man who spends one month away from his wife is vexed’).17 So, quisque means literally ‘someone in general’, ‘anyone at all’, very like Oscan pu´tereı´-pı´d (‘in either of the two’, loc. sg.), in which pı´d, which is certainly generalizing, has exactly the same effect as -que in uterque, the exact cognate in Latin.18 As a rule, quisque combines with other words, especially with those with which it has a close semantic connection, such as suus (II, 92 above) or the ordinals (II, 113 above). As it is disyllabic, however, it occasionally—already in Old Latin—comes to stand at the start of a clause or a verse, like the disyllabic indefinites in Greek (II, 115 above). Its predominantly enclitic placement renders improbable an alternative explanation which would be otherwise thinkable, to wit, that originally the only use of quisque was that attested in Old Latin as an indefinite relative like quicunque (‘whoever’), and that the meaning ‘each’ developed secondarily from this usage in the manner of the instances discussed below.

A different approach was taken in Greek, where τὶς was prefixed with ἕκας, a derivative of the reflexive pronoun, which originally meant ‘with separation of oneself’, ‘by oneself’ (though the question how ἕκας τὶς was then remade to *

17 W., in an article published posthumously (1942), compared Gk ὁστε with Skt sn ca ‘if, when’, as one example of the use of IE *kwe in subordinating conjunctions (he discusses also Gk ἔστε ‘until’ and Lat. abique ‘[if without]’. In the light, however, of Mycenaean o-te ‘when’, we must now acknowledge that the two functions of Gk τε—linking and generalizing (the latter often called ‘epic’ τε)—reflect the phonetic merger of two distinct particles, IE *kwe ‘and’ (-qe in Mycenaean) and another particle, -te in Mycenaean and ‘epic’ τε roughly ‘as we all know’ in Homer. On ‘epic’ τε, see Monro (1891: §312), Chantraine (1953: §§335–4, on relative ὅς τε), and above all the monumental book on the subject by Ruigh (1971); for bibliography on linking τε, qe, *kwe, in Greek, Mycenaean and Indo-European, see Meier-Brügger (1992: I, 107–8), and, on Mycenaean qe vs -te, Aura Jorro, s.vv. ‘o-τε’, ‘qε’.

18 See Untermann (2000: s.v. ‘pu`tereipid’) with further references.

19 This ingenious etymology of Gk ἔκαστος was proposed by W, himself (1888a); the ending -τος is due most probably to analogical influence from ordinal numerals and/or superlatives; for further references, see Schwyzer 630 n. 4, and Frisk and Chantraine, each s.v.
nuance of separateness receives strong emphasis; cf. Lat. *pro se quisque* and *unus quisque* (‘each for himself’, ‘each individual’). We see nicely both the closeness and the difference of meaning between τις and ἕκαστος in a well-known proverb, ἔρυθι τις, ἵνα ἕκαστος εἰδεῖ τήν μην, where both τις and ἕκαστος mean ‘each’, but while the injunction of the main clause is made to apply generally to everyone, the subordinate clause stresses the individual: lit., ‘let a man practise the art which each commands’.

Most of the Germanic words for ‘each’ are based again on prefixed forms of the indefinite pronoun, recently discussed in illuminating fashion by W. Horn (1923: 59–60) in his bold book on linguistic form and linguistic function, which, although rather superficial with reference to the classical languages, opens up wide new vistas. So, for example, NHG jeglich goes back to OHG io-gi-hwelìh, where the indefinite hwelìh (NHG welcher) is preceded by the word io ‘always’ and the prefix ge- familiar in the modern German verb. Both prefixed elements make good sense. The first is reminiscent of the distributive use of NHG je (‘each, each time’), while the gi- is to be understood collectively, as in NHG Gebirge (‘mountain range’), a collection of mountains, and thus has a function similar to that of Lat. -que in quisque. That the NHG form preserves nothing of the old indefinite j II, 120 stem is explained by Horn’s discussion; on NHG jeder (‘each’), which has a similar explanation, see II, 122 below.

So, our first group of words for ‘each’ comprises Lat. quisque, etc. on the one hand, Gk ἕκαστος, etc., on the other. A second group is formed by Latin expressions based on whole clauses. Like Gk ὁσίς δή ποτε ‘anyone at all’ (II, 116 above), Lat. quisquis and quicunque in the sense ‘each, no matter who’ represent abbreviations of generalizing relative clauses. Note in passing that Skutsch (1902: 84–6) explains quisunque—which has a cognate in Umbrian pisi pumpe ‘who at any time, whoever’—as coming, just like quisque, from a phrase meaning ‘who and when’. But again his explanation is false, as -cunque stands to cum as quisque to quis, and hence means ‘each time, always’, so that quisunque means ‘whoever’. (Note cunque without relative at Hor. *Odes* 1. 32. 15 *mibi cunque salue rite uocanti = mibi salue, quandocunque rite uoco* (‘give me aid, whenever I make due invocation’), although admittedly this cannot be used as evidence for either account of quisunque.)—To this group belong also Gk ὁσέτη

20 The source of this proverb, characterized as such by the scholiast on Arist. *Wasps* 1431, is unknown; it was familiar enough for Cicero to expect Atticus to recognize it from the first two Greek words alone (*Att*. 5. 10. 3, no. 103 Shackleton Bailey), and it appears in Latin verse in three different forms (*Cic. Tusc*. 1. 41 [cf. II, 118 above], Hor. *Epist*. 1. 14. 44, Propertius 2. 1. 46); see the commentary of D. M. MacDowell (Oxford 1971), on *Wasps* 1431.

21 For details and further references, see Untermann (2000: s.vv. ‘pis, ‘pumpe’).

22 And, it should be noted, this cunque has provoked immense controversy in Horatian scholarship: even those who have accepted it (over Lachmann’s mediocunque [for mibi cunque], defended by Nisbet & Hubbard and printed by Shackleton Bailey) have argued about its meaning; see the valuable note ad loc. in Nisbet & Hubbard (1970).
‘every year’, Lat. *quotannis* (remade from *quot anni*, as indeed ὅσερη shows), and similar forms.

It is nice how we are able to observe the origin of *quiūis* ‘any’. Manifestly, it contains the sg. 2 form *uīs* ‘you wish’, which incidentally has nothing to do etymologically with *ulo* (‘I wish’), in spite of recent attempts to make this credible, but rather, as was long ago recognized, belongs with *in-uitus* ‘unwilling’.23 More original forms of the use of *nelle* in generalizing expressions are found in passages like *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 4. 22 *ad quam uolemus indignatione animum auditoris adducemus* ‘we shall bring the hearer’s mind to any kind of indignation’, or Cato, *On Agriculture* 52 *quod genus uis propagabis* ‘propagate each and every kind’. In both passages, we find *nelle* in the same person as the main verb, i.e. still in verbal function, but we could substitute regular *quiūis* without significant change of meaning by writing *quamuis indignationem* in the *Rhet. Her.* and simply by uniting *quod* and *uis* in *quoduis genus* in the Cato. Regular *quiūis* makes reference from the outset to the wish, not of the subject of the main verb, but of the addressee. For this, we must assume either an ellipse of the type *qui uis (legat), legit* ‘who you wish (to be reading) is reading’, or that an original accusative such as *quemuis* ‘whom you wish’ had its case accommodated to the clause as a whole; we may have a prototype of the latter at e.g. Cic. *Brutus* 83 oratio *Laeli de collegiis non melior quam de multis quam uoles (= quaeuis) Scipionis* (‘but the speech of Laelius on the priestly colleges is no better than any one of the many speeches of Scipio’). In any event, the notion of the addressee must have gradually faded, just as with the conjunction *uel* ‘or’, literally ‘(if) you wish’. We must imagine the evolution of *quilibet* in similar terms. We may have an instance of individual poetic licence at Lucretius 3. 388–9 *nec repentis itum cuius uis cunque animantis sentimus* (‘nor do we notice the passage [across our body] of each and every crawling creature’), but in the superficially similar use at Martial 14. 2 *quouiscunque loco potes hunc finire libellum* (‘you can finish this little book at whichever point you wish’), *uis* can still be understood as a verb.24

There are nice Greek parallels to these developments in Plato, e.g. at *Cratylus* 432a ἡ δέκα ἡ ὅσις βούλη ἄλλος ἀριθμὸς ‘the ten or any other number you like’, or *Gorgias* 517a ἐργα τοιαῦτα ὅλον ὅς βούλη εὑρισκεῖ ‘deeds such as any of these people you like has performed’. Compare Demosthenes 22. 52 (= 24. 163) τίς ὅποιον βούλεσθε ὁλιγαρχίας ‘the oligarchy in any city you like’, and Plato, *Laches* 180d ἄνδρα ὁπόσον βούλη ἄξιον (‘a man worth as much as you like’) beside Plaut. *Epidicus* 410 σερουμ quautius preti (‘a slave worth any price’). Analogously, Umbrian *pis-her

23 Probably, the inherited sg. 2 form *uelsi* survives in *uel ‘or’; for details and bibliography on this much-debated topic, see Walde & Hofmann, s.vv. ‘invito’, ‘veis’, Ernout & Meillet, s.v. ‘uis’, Leumann 526, and most recently Meiser (1998: §146.2) and Weiss (forthc.: ch. 33, §I.D.6).

24 E. J. Kenney in his commentary (Cambridge 1971) on the Lucretius passage regards *quuisiscunque* both here and in the Martial as an emphatic blend of *quiuis* and *quicunque*.
'whoever' is taken back to a combination of the indefinite relative pis (= Lat. quis) with a form of the Osco-Umbrian verb 'to wish', of which the root is her-.25

In addition, the so-called distributive expressions also come into play. In primitive speech, the repetition of a noun could serve to convey the notion of indefinite repetition of the nominal concept; as we shall see, this has as a rule become foreign to cultivated languages. In Greek this function is served by κατά + accusative, so that e.g. κατά μήνα means 'each month', and καθ’ ἡμέραν 'each day'. In this sense this Greek preposition was borrowed into later colloquial Latin, especially that of the Christians: in the Latin Bible we read e.g. cata mane for 'each morning'. This applies especially to the combination with the cardinal numeral 'one'. From Attic καθ’ ēva 'one by one' there developed in Hellenistic Greek, on the analogy of phenomena which we shall consider in our section on case syntax, a form καθεῖς 'one by one'; transferred into Latin, this survives in Old Italian cad(a)uno ‘each’. This cata also lies behind the first syllable of Fr. chaque, chacun (‘each’, ‘each person’), and in Span. and Port. cada it serves as an independent form in the meaning ‘each’.26 It is well known incidentally that the genuine Latin distributive singuli (‘one by one’) comes very close in meaning to quisque.

With reference to Gk πᾶς and all other expressions which in one way or another belong here, I again refer you to BRUGMANN’s article (1894). We have in any case strayed rather a long way from our presentation of the pronoun, and we now return to quisque and ἐκαστὸς. In both, there is the underlying idea of a plurality, and, as with the interrogative and the regular indefinite pronouns, here, too, a need was felt for a special expression for situations when just a pair of objects was concerned. In Latin, this was done simply on the basis of the interrogative-indefinite formation: uterque (‘either of two’) and hence uterūs, uterlibet (‘whichever of two’), in parallel with quisque, quīūs, and quīlibet. In Greek, where the etymological connection between the word for ‘each’ | and the indefinite was obscured, there was no such simple way in evidence. Here, to ἐκαστὸς, on the model of ἄντερος (the older form of ἄντερος ‘one of two’),27 ἐκάτερος was formed meaning ‘each of two’ (in the pl., ‘the one side or the other’, e.g. at Thuc. 4. 16. 2, s. 25. 3), which although not attested in Homer is presupposed by Homeric ἐκάτερθε ‘on both sides’; it is attested at Delphi as early as the fifth-century Labyad inscription.28

25 It is unclear precisely which form of the verb *heriom ‘to wish’ is abbreviated to yield Umbrian -her; for details and further references, see Nussbaum (1976) and Untermann (2000: s.vv. ‘pisher’, ‘heriad’).

26 On Gk κατά (and ἰδία, again in distributive function) in later, especially Christian and technical, Latin, see Hofmann & Szantyr 254–5, with further references. W.’s cross-reference above is again in vain.

27 Gk ἄντερος, with ἄ- from IE *smy-, is the two-way contrastive formation to one of the inherited words for the numeral ‘one’ (seen also in Gk ἐγ’ ‘one’ < *sem-s), ‘one or the other; this one rather than that’; cf. n. 21, p. 608 below.

28 Buck no. 52, A, 49 (c.400 bc); it is also in the (slightly earlier) Gortyn Lawcode, Willetts (1967) = Buck no. 117, I, 18.
This ἐκάτερος was lost again in later Greek, as we see already in the Greek Bible: it occurs still a few times in the Septuagint, but not at all in the New Testament. In its place, when ἄμφοτεροι could not be used, ἐκαστὸς was used, even for pairs of objects, and even by careful stylists like Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and as a result one or two ancient scholars ventured to attribute this usage to Homer, with some apparent plausibility at II. 3. 1 and 9. 656, if wrongly (cf. HAUPT 1875–6: III, 383–4). In line with this development, πότερος, too, disappears in pronominal function: striking is Xenophon, Memorabilia 2. 1. 23 (Vice to Heracles) ὄρω σὲ ἄποροῦντα, ποιαν ἄδων ἐπὶ τῶν βίων τράπη (‘I see that you are in doubt which road to take towards life’) in contrast with 2. 1. 21 ἄποροῦντα, ὀποτέραυ τῶν ἄδων τράπηται (‘not knowing which of the two roads to take’). Analogously, in Latin from the 1st-c. fable-writer Phaedrus on, quisque appears for uterque (like quis for uter); indeed, when there is stress on the distributive sense, quisque is preferred even in Classical Latin, so after suus (e.g. Cic. Rosc. com. 32 suam quisque partem iuris possideat ‘let each demand his own legal share’, of two joint owners of a property) or after sibi (e.g. Lucr. 3. 333–4, quoted above, II, 99).—But the converse is also found. WILAMOWITZ (1900: 58) adduces an instance of ἐκάτερος for ἐκαστὸς in a papyrus of the imperial period, where it is probably fair to say that the uneducated author knew ἐκαστὸς only from the speech of others and hence misunderstood its use. Still, we should recall that German jedweder and (what seems to be its abbreviation) jeder go back to the pronoun proper to pairs (OHG io-(gi-)wēdar = Lat. uterque ‘each of two’, with (h)wēdar ‘which of two?’ corresponding exactly to Gk πότερος). In other words, in the course of the development of the living language, a pronoun meaning uterque ‘each of two’ could shift to meaning quisque; cf. also ἄμφοτεροι (classically, ‘both’) in the meaning ‘all’ in late Greek.

Just as words for ‘every, all’ are close to those for ‘each’, so, beside Gk ἐκάτερος and Lat. uterque, is the old inherited word for ‘both’, Gk ἄμφω, Lat. ambo. It was used to bring out the notion that the two items belonged and worked together. In Greek there appears beside it from Homer on the dual ἄμφοτέρῳ in all genders, and the neuter singular ἄμφοτερον; on these forms, see now DEBRUNNER (1927: 21–5). Strictly speaking, the suffix here makes no sense, as -τερος really serves to mark a contrast between two objects (II, 112 above), but those | forms are really analogous on words to which the word for ‘both’ can easily correspond, such as ἄτερος or πότερος, as e.g. at II. §. 257–8 τοῦτο δ’ οὐ… ἀποίκεστον ὁκέες ἵπποι | ἄμφω ἄφ’ ἡμείων, εἰ γοῦν ἄτερος γε φύγησαι (‘these two men, their swift horses will not carry them both back away from us, even

29 On New Testament usage and comparisons with it, see Moulton (1906: 79–80), Blass, Debrunner, & Funk §§105, Turner (1963: 198), all with further references.
30 On the OHG indefinite pronouns, see Braune & Reiffenstein §§294–300.
31 For Gk ἄμφοτέροι ‘all’, cf. Blass, Debrunner, & Funk §64.6 with further references.
32 On the antecedents of Gk ἄμφω and Lat. ambo, see Jasanoff (1976).
though one may escape’), or Plato, *Rep.* 6, 499c...πότερα (indef.) ἡ ἀμφότερα (‘either or both’).

There are two reasons why Greek, unlike Latin, tried a new formation of this kind: first, the need for a neuter form, which was not provided by the inherited word, and secondly, the need for a word which agreed with the noun in gender and number. And then only ἀμφότερο- could form the base for adverbs like Homeric ἀμφότερωθεν, ἀμφότερωσε, or Attic ἀμφότερος (‘from/on both sides’, ‘to both sides’, ‘in both ways’). The success of the extended form was favoured in Homer by his striking lack of the old genitive-dative form ἄμφοιν (although this form is attested in the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes*, v. 50, in Pindar, *Pyth.* 3. 57, *Isth.* 5. 18, and apparently in Hesiod—see Arist. *Wasps* 725—quite apart from Attic), and by the fact that forms with the prosody ~~ and ~~~ were particularly desirable for the hexameter. Later Greek eventually gave up the older form altogether in favour of the younger, and this is anticipated by one or two earlier authors: Thucydides has ἀμφότεροι countless times, but ἄμφω and ἄμφοιν (apart from § 29. 2) only in the text of treaties that he quotes; ἄμφω and ἄμφοιν are not found at all in Ionic.

From the fourth century BC on, ἀμφότερο- can replace the ancient and usual ἄμφω- ‘on both sides’ as the first element of compounds (see below). There is a clear distinction between ἀμφότεροι and ἐκάτεροι, as described by Ammonius, *On the Difference of Meaning between Related Words* pp. 14–15 Valckenaer = 35 Nickau ἀμφότεροι καὶ ἐκάτεροι διαφέρουσιν. ἀμφότεροι μὲν γὰρ ἔροιμεν, ὅταν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πράττοισιν...ἐκάτεροι δὲ, ἐπειδὰν χωρίς ἐκάτερος τὸ ἐαυτὸ πράττῃ (‘ἀμφότεροι and ἐκάτεροι differ as follows: we use ἀμφότεροι when people are acting together and to the same purpose...ἐκάτεροι, when each is acting separately on his own task’). Quite often the words stand in direct contrast; see the standard dictionaries, and Debrunner (1927: 21).

The distinction made by Classical Latin (and Oscan, in its cognate words; II, 112, 119 above) between singular *utereque* ‘each of two individuals’ and plural *utrique* ‘each of two groups’ is not consistently applied in Greek. Homer uses ἄμφω in both meanings, though that of *utrique* is found only at *II.* 2. 123 εἰπέρ γὰρ κ’ ἐθέλομεν Ἀχαιοὶ τε Τροίες τε ἄμφωθήμεναι ἄμφω (‘for if we Achaeans and Trojans were willing for both sides to be numbered’), and is rarer in later Greek, too. There is the same ambiguity in ἀμφότεροι, but the dual ἀμφότερος is used only of a single pair, never of two pairs. Of ἐκάτερος we would expect the singular to mean *utereque*, and the plural *utrique*, but, because the word always...
refers to more than one item, the dual and the plural are also found already in Attic with reference to a single pair. How tempting this use of the plural was, we see from Latin, where even Caesar uses *utrique* | in the sense of *uterque* (Galic *War* 1, 53, 4), and already in Homer *ἐκαστοί* can mean not only ‘each group’ but also ‘each individual’ (e.g. II, 7, 100, 9, 66). For this development, *άμφοτέρω* and *άμφοτέροι* may have served as an additional model, but conversely, the singular *ἐκάτερο* provided the model for singular *άμφοτέρος* (apart from the old neuter *άμφοτέρον*), which is very rare in early Greek (Pind. *Nem.* 7, 94 *άμφοτέρας χειρός* ‘on either hand’; Aesch. *Pers.* 131), slightly more common in later poetry (Callim. *Hymn* 4, 168), and not found in prose before the imperial period (note, however, *ἀνωάμφοτερος* ‘both together’, in a collective sense, in Plato, *Philebus* 21c).—On the grammatical number of words for ‘both’ (in other languages, too), see the fine discussion by BRUGMANN (1907: 46–55).

A word more needs to be said about the origin of the words for the different sorts of indefinite expression. Beside old pronominal stems we find also old nouns and adjectives, and I do not mean just the first numeral (e.g. NHG *einer*, English *one*, late Greek *καθεῖς*) but also various nouns. A clear instance is NHG *jedermann* (‘anyone, everyone’; cf. Gk *πᾶς ἄνὴρ* e.g. at Arist. *Frogs* 1125), and the ‘man’ word is contained also in NHG *jemand, niemand* (‘someone’, ‘no one’) and above all in *man* (‘one’), which refers to an unspecified number of persons. Here, German is exactly like French, where Lat. *homo* is continued both as a noun in *homme* and as a pronoun in *on, von* (in dialect, *non*). The agreement extends to the fact that both NHG *man* and Fr. *on* are usable only in subject function—although, in Old High German, Notker ventured also the dative *manne*; other case functions are supplied by *einer* in German, while French uses *nous* or *vous*, and also under the accent *soi* (which is also used as a nominative; cf. TOBLER 1902–12: III, 139 ff.). On the Biblical use of *ἀνθρώπος* in the sense of *τις* as a Semitism, see WELLHAUSEN (1904: 69) on Matthew 13: 28 *ἐξ θρῶς ἀνθρώπου* (‘an enemy’). [Add.: MEILLET (1927c: 95) points out that German *man*, like Armenian *mard* and French *personne* (immediately below, and II, 273), was originally used only in negative clauses; cf. *ne . . .homme* in thirteenth- to fifteenth-century

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35 For the numerous different reflexes of Lat. *homo* in indefinite pronoun function in the history and dialects of French, see FEW, s.v. *‘homo, 2.’* (and the discussion at the end of the art.). Forms with initial *n*- (presumably from the indef. art., Lat. *unum*) range from Old Norman *non* to 20th-c. Parisian *nou*; FEW cites *non* from Sancerre and Puy-de-Dôme, and *nou* from Swiss French.

36 In Notker, *man* is still transitional between noun and pronoun: in indefinite function, it may be preceded by an article and referred back to by *er* ‘he’; cf. D. *Gr.* III, 6–7; IV, 255–7; D. *Wb.*, s.v. ‘man, 2.;’ SEHT & LEGNER (1955: s.v.).

37 WELLHAUSEN simply states baldly that it is an Aramaism. Blass, Debrunner, & Funk §301.2 compare the use of *ἀνήρ* for *τις* at Luke 9: 38, and give further references on the Semitic parallels, but they also point out the similar use of *ἀνθρώπος* in Homeric and Classical Greek (KG I, 272). Certainly, generic nouns are a common source of indefinite pronouns: HASEPLMATH (1997: 182–3) finds them in 42 languages in his 100-language corpus.
Whether and to what extent colloquial Latin knew homo in this sort of function, I do not know, but it serves to recall the semantic bleaching of nemo ‘no one’, where the sentence negative ne has merged with the old nom. *hemo* (the earlier form of *homo*) in the sense ‘not anyone’. It is used not only like English *no one*, NHG *niemand*, but Vergil has at *Aen. 9. 6 duiom nemo* (‘none of the gods’), noticed by ancient commentators. In pre-classical Latin, we have *nemo ciuis*, *nemo uicina* (‘no citizen’, ‘no neighbour’, and Prudentius ventures even *nemo dies* (‘no day’). The greater age of the negative, *nemo* compared with *on*, has a parallel in Germanic, in that, unlike modern German, Gothic uses the *man* word as an indefinite only with the negative (cf. Meillet 1921: 276–7).—In negative expressions, the use of old nouns is in general widespread: think of Fr. *personne* ‘nobody’, and NHG *nicht(s)*, Lat. *nibil*, Fr. *rien* ‘nothing’ (see further II, 270–3 below).

But what is true of NHG *man* and Fr. *on* applies also to e.g. Hebrew, where *šî* ‘man’ means also ‘one, someone, anyone’.—Other nouns, too, are also used in this sort of way. In English, for instance, *body* and *thing* serve to form indefinites with reference to persons and objects, respectively, in combination with *any-, every-, some-, no*.

We have already seen how even verbal forms can contribute to the formation of indefinite expressions, as in Lat. *quiuis*, *quilibet*, and *nescioquis* (‘you wish’, ‘it pleases’, ‘I don’t know’, respectively). Horn (1923: 64–5) draws attention to OE *lóca hwa¯* ‘whoever’, lit. ‘look who’, and OHG *sibhwer* ‘anyone’, lit. ‘see who’.

In line with Bopp’s approach, nineteenth-century linguistics made a sharp distinction between pronominal and nominal stems, and with good reason, but the original boundary between the two classes was often crossed, and it was not only in the indefinites that nouns acquired pronominal value. This is true especially of polite forms of address (which arose alongside or as replacements for the old personal pronouns), and of words for ‘self’.

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38 This view, which was held also by Meillet (1932: 93), is rejected e.g. by FEW, s.v. ‘hômo, 2.’ (p. 458) on the grounds that the development is so old (arguably, already in Latin) and so general in Romance.
39 There are certainly very few examples: note perhaps *Itin. Eig. 13. 1 si tamen labor dici potest, ubi homo desiderium suum compleui uidet* ‘if the word “labour” can be used of when one sees one’s desire fulfilled’; see Hofmann & Szantyr 198, and Pepe (1975/6) for further references.
40 Including Servius, *ad loc.*, and Charisius, p. 123 Barwick = GL I, 96–7. Note that *nemo* is in any sense rare in epic; cf. P. Hardie’s commentary (Cambridge 1994), *ad loc.*, with further references.
41 These words continue or contain (the reflex of), respectively: Lat. *personam* ‘person’, OHG *wiht* ‘a being, thing’, Lat. *hɪlum* ‘a small bit’ or ‘thread’ (?: see Walde & Hofmann, s.v.), Lat. *rem* ‘thing’.
42 Note, however, that (generic) noun and (derived) pronoun are distinct lexical items, each with its own syntactic and semantic constraints; on Hebrew *šî*, see Haspelmath (1997: 28) with further references.
43 The lexicalization of these phrases is a development of early modern English. By the end of the 17th c., -*body* was at least as common as -*one* for indefinite reference to persons; see Quirk et al. (1985: §6. 45–7), Raumolin-Brunberg & Kahlas-Tarkka (1997), Denison (1998: 104), and Rissanen (1999: 196–7).
44 In his Comparative Grammar (1833–32, etc.: §§228, 248, 274, 280), Bopp repeatedly stresses this distinction and treats pronouns (after adjectives and numerals) quite separately from nouns.
Lecture II, 14

THE ARTICLE

The word ‘article’ is from the Latin word *articulus*, which is attested from Plautus on in the sense ‘joint’ (of the human body) and as a grammatical term in the earliest Latin text that contains grammatical terms at all, Varro’s *De lingua Latina*—in what sense, we shall see, when we have discussed the prehistory of the term.

Lat. *articulus* is a translation of Gk ἀρθρόν, and an appropriate translation at that. Analogously, the Latin medical writers translate ἀρθρίτις as *morbis articularius*, and Lucretius renders Plato’s διαρθροίζεται (φωνήν ‘to articulate speech’, in *Protagoras* 322a) with *articulare* (*uoces*, at 4. 549). As a grammatical term, ἀρθρόν is found in Greek linguistic theory from the fourth century on. Unfortunately, the most important passage (Aristotle’s *Poetics* 20, 1457a6) is incurably corrupt (cf. esp. Vahlen 1914: 111–17, 285–90), and reveals merely that Aristotle used ἀρθρόν to denote a class of words. But from Theophrastus and the Stoa on, the word appears clearly as the name of one of the four principal parts of speech, along with ὄνομα, ῥήμα, and σύνδεσμος, and, in Stoic theory at any rate, as the term for the pronouns. Indeed, for the relative pronoun in particular the name ‘joint’ is very suitable, and the term ἀρθρόν was retained for the relative by the Alexandrians when they invented the new term ἀντωνυμία for the personal and demonstrative pronouns. | At the same time, they made ἀρθρόν refer also to the article, which did after all have two points of contact with the relative: first, through the agreement of form in the nom. sg. fem. and the nom. pl. masc. and fem. (ἡ, οἱ, αἱ—the distinct accentuation of these forms according to their function is not original), and secondly through the frequent use outside Attic from Homer on of the forms of the article as a relative. Subsequently, a distinction was made between the article ὁ as ἀρθρόν προτακτικών (‘prepositive’) and the relative ὅς as ἀρθρόν ὑποτακτικών (‘postpositive’).¹

¹ On the ἀρθρόν in Aristotle, the Stoics, and the later Greek grammarians, see Matthews (1994: 29, 34 with nn.), and with special reference to the 2nd-c. BC grammarian Aristarchus of Samothrace the recent monograph of Matthaios (1999: 491–519).
Corresponding to the changing meaning of *ἀρπονος*, Lat. *articulus*, too, has several different meanings. Following earlier theories, Varro (*Latin Language* 8. 45, and similarly in other passages) groups together the *pronocabula*, i.e. the interrogatives (II, 76 above) and the *pronomina*, i.e. the demonstratives (and indeed the personal pronouns) under the label *articulus*. But the other Roman grammarians followed the system that prevailed at their time and distinguished *articulus* from *pronomen*, at the same time further reducing the former category by transferring the relatives along with the formally similar interrogatives to the *pronomen*. After this last reduction, *articulus* was left just with the use familiar to us, so that our term ‘article’ means what it does almost by chance, and teaches us nothing about the function of the part of speech it denotes. But this is far preferable to seizing on a transparent but senseless term like NHG ‘Geschlechtswort’ (‘article’, lit. ‘gender-word’), which tells us nothing about the real job of the article, and is right only in that adding the article is the easiest way of giving the gender of a noun. This silly term, which is still used today even by respectable linguists out of an excessive purism, is attested first in the work of seventeenth-century scholars, but behind it is a theory that had a number of proponents already in antiquity. This is documented above all by Apollonius Dyscolus (I, 1–2 above), who in his work *Περὶ συντάξεως* (1. 38–42, *GG* II.2, 35–8) discusses in detail the view that the article is there in order to indicate the gender of words. He opposes this view energetically with a long series of counterarguments: evidently, at the time it must have been a widely held view. The matter is so obvious that it would not be worthwhile to reproduce this polemic here.

So let us now turn to the substance of the article itself. The article is a peculiarly remarkable object for the sort of comparative study of languages that is concerned with observing how new expressive needs arise and with what linguistic means they are met (cf. *de la Grasserie* 1896). Traces of an article are to be found all over the world; the most diverse families of languages can show an article, but nowhere as something universally prevalent. Nearly everywhere, it is the case that only some of the languages belonging to a given family possess the article, and that the manner of its formation and use vary sharply. A few years ago (1913), a famous Swiss linguist, Renward Brandstetter, published a monograph on the article in Indonesian, in which he not only adduces a number of remarkable usages (some parallel to, some diverging from, those of the Indo-European family), but also shows that certain Indonesian languages do not have

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2 The *D. Wb.*, s.v., quotes Christian Gueintz (1592–1650), J. G. Schottel (1612–76) and Johann Bödiker (1641–95), on whom, see Jellinek (1913–14: I, §§69–82, 112–13).

3 Among more recent typological studies of markers of definiteness, note Krámský (1972) and Chesterman (1991), esp. ch. 2 concerning traditions of research on definiteness.
an article at all. Among the Finno-Ugric languages, as far as I know, only Hungarian has an article.

Or let us take the Semitic languages. Akkadian in the North and Ethiopic in the South have no article; the other languages have one, but of a range of very different types. On the one hand, in Aramaic and South Arabian, the role of article is served by an element attached to the end of the word. On the other hand, we find an article similar to ours in terms of use and placement in the two Semitic languages most interesting for us, namely in Hebrew, where ha-(C)- before the noun has roughly the same function as our article, and in Arabic, in the familiar 'al-', with which so many Arabic words begin.

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4 Some of Renward Brandstetter's essays on Indonesian (unfortunately, not this one) are available in English (Brandstetter 1916). Krámský (1972: 84–5 n. 14) cites Brandstetter (1913) as a principal source of information on articles in Indonesian languages, but adds the following caveat: 'Brandstetter’s statements must be taken with reservation; it is often uncertain whether articles or demonstratives are concerned.' E. Uhlenbeck, in his important survey and bibliography of Indonesian and Malaysian linguistics (1967), acknowledges Brandstetter as a pioneer in the field but does not include him in his bibliography. See Uhlenbeck's introduction on the unsatisfactory term 'Indonesian languages'.

5 The Semitic demonstrative originally followed its noun, so that postposition of the article is, if anything, rather to be expected (Stempel 1999: 86–7). The Aramaic postpositive -ā(ʔ) certainly marks definiteness at an early period, although with time nouns in -ā(ʔ) came to be generalized in indefinite as well as definite function, and one should perhaps be cautious about calling it simply a definite article and comparing it closely with Arabic 'al- or Hebrew ha-(C)- (John Healey, p.c.). It is thought by some to have the same origin as Hebrew and Phoenician ha-(C)- (cf. Aramaic ha’‘here’), and is characterized as 'the most notable difference between Aramaic and the other NW Semitic dialects' (Kaufman 1997: 123); on the origin of the West Semitic definite markers, see Lambdin (1971) with further references. Old South Arabian has a postpositive def. art. -ā, cognate with Aramaic and Ethiopic deictic pronouns (Stempel 1999: 87); Modern South Arabian, on the other hand, alone among the South Semitic languages, has developed a prepositional art. of the form C(a) (Faber 1997: 11).

6 W.'s 'Assyrisch', 'Assyrian', must refer to the Semitic language that we now call 'Akkadian', rather than to one of its dialects: Assyrian and Babylonian are the two principal dialects (in the north-east and south, respectively) of Akkadian; see Buccellati (1997).

7 Modern accounts of markers of definiteness in the Semitic languages vary according to definitional criteria which are left implicit. On the one hand, in his survey of the ways of forming the 'determinate state' of the noun in the Semitic languages, Lipiński (1997: §§33.13–14), includes postpositional markers of definiteness in Old Akkadian and the Ethiopic languages, and Moscati et al. (1964: 99) attribute to Ethiopic 'very elaborate syntactical means for the periphrasis of the definite article', while several of the contributors on Ethiopic languages to Hetzron (1997: 431, 450, 464, 528, 541) speak straightforwardly of a definite article in Tigrinya, Tigré, Amharic and Argobba, Silte, and Outer South Ethiopic, respectively. On the other hand, Classical Ethiopic (Ge’ez) has nothing corresponding to a definite article—probably this is what W. means by 'Äthiopisch'—and Stempel (1999: 86–7) recognizes a definite article only in Canaanite (i.e. Hebrew and Phoenician), Aramaic, Arabic, and South Arabian.

8 The Semitic demonstrative originally followed its noun, so that postposition of the article is, if anything, rather to be expected (Stempel 1999: 86–7). The Aramaic postpositive -ā(ʔ) certainly marks definiteness at an early period, although with time nouns in -ā(ʔ) came to be generalized in indefinite as well as definite function, and one should perhaps be cautious about calling it simply a definite article and comparing it closely with Arabic 'al- or Hebrew ha-(C)- (John Healey, p.c.). It is thought by some to have the same origin as Hebrew and Phoenician ha-(C)- (cf. Aramaic ha’‘here’), and is characterized as 'the most notable difference between Aramaic and the other NW Semitic dialects' (Kaufman 1997: 123); on the origin of the West Semitic definite markers, see Lambdin (1971) with further references. Old South Arabian has a postpositive def. art. -ā, cognate with Aramaic and Ethiopic deictic pronouns (Stempel 1999: 87); Modern South Arabian, on the other hand, alone among the South Semitic languages, has developed a prepositional def. art. of the form C(a) (Faber 1997: 11).

9 The C in Hebrew ha-(C)- indicates that the prefixing of the article causes doubling of (most) word-initial consonants. On the article in Hebrew, cf. Steiner (1997: 152–3), McCarter (2004: 346, 361), and for much fuller accounts the works cited at the end of n. 11 in this lecture; on the very similar article in
A similar picture is presented by the Indo-European family. Most present-day Indo-European languages have an article, but it is absent in the languages of India, in Persian, Lithuanian, Latvian, and in most Slavic languages, and if we go further back, its occurrence is more restricted still, as we shall see in a moment in the languages that principally concern us here. As for Slavic, it is certain that to begin with it did not have a proper article at all. Where it now occurs, as Miklosich (1876–83: IV, 125–6) observes, it arose as a secondary development, formed in imitation of German by urban speakers of Slovenian and inhabitants of Lusatia, and in Bulgarian modelled on Romanian. A Serbo-Croatian colony in Italy makes direct use of the Italian article (Vendryes 1921: 343).

In general terms, this is the second characteristic feature of the use of the article, that, where it appears, it can be shown to be a recent phenomenon, as having arisen in the course of the development of the language in question. Again the Semitic languages offer immediate illustration of this. Hebrew was mentioned above as a language with an article, but there are also ancient Hebrew inscriptions which lack the article. The same can be observed in the language with the longest unbroken recorded history, Egyptian: in the oldest documents, we find no article at all; the definite article starts to appear in the colloquial language of the Middle Kingdom, and the indefinite article is more recent still.

The article is, then, in some ways a counterpart to the dual (I, 79–80 above): both occur in the most diverse languages, the dual as an archaism on the wane, the article as an innovation in the process of development. The dual is a hallmark of linguistic conservatism, the article, one of progress, of linguistic cultivation.

As for the use of the article in general terms in the two classical languages, two main points occupied scholars already in the Greek world, the evaluation of which is made easier by the foregoing remarks: namely, the absence of the article in Latin, and its rarity in Homer. Plutarch in the Platonic Questions (10. 3, 1010D)


10 For details of the definite article in Bulgarian, Macedonian, Serbo-Croat, and Slovene, see the contributors to Conrie & Corbett (1993: Index, s.v. ‘article, definite’), on (colloquial) Slovene, see also Herrity (2000: §§6), on Bulgarian see the monograph by Mayer (1988), and on Bulgarian, Macedonian, and Romanian, cf. n. 3, p. 529 above and n. 17, p. 561 below; note that there is no mention of a definite article in Sorbian (the West Slavic language of Lusatia) in Stone (1993a).

11 ‘[T]he article proper… is a very late acquisition of the Semitic languages’ (Lipinński 1997: 267); for Syria-Palestine, in particular, Garr (1985: 89) regards it as an innovation of the early 1st millennium. The (relatively few) ancient Hebrew inscriptions, the earliest of which date from the end of the 2nd millennium, have been recently edited with a concordance by Davies (1991–2004). As a complement to the language of the Bible, they are valuable especially since they have not been subject to recension. The famous ‘Gezer calendar’ (10th c. BC) was discovered not long before W. wrote, in 1908. In his brief chapter on the language of the inscriptions, Saenz-Badillos (1993: 67) observes ‘some interesting examples of the omission of the article, although… not systematic… [which] might reflect a colloquialism’. In ancient Hebrew, the article is often omitted in poetry; see e.g. Gesenius §§35, 126; R. Meyer (1966–72: II, §§2); in English, Waltke & O’Connor (1990: §§13.7). On Egyptian and Coptic, see Loprieno (1980) and (2004: 179), and Layton (2000: §§42–5, 52–3).
seeks to justify the proposition that the only essential components of speech are
noun and verb, all other words being mere accessories, with among other
arguments the point that the λόγος of the Romans, ‘καὶ υἱὸς τοῦ πάντος
ἀνθρώπου ἁρώνται’ (‘which now nearly all peoples use’), not only manages with
few prepositions, but also does without the article entirely, leaving its nouns as it
were unadorned. This is not at all surprising, he continues, as after all Homer,
too, uses an article only in exceptional cases, and yet his language possesses
perfect clarity and beauty.

The use of the article in Homer is indeed an exception, and very far removed
from its regular use in Attic. 12 This is nicely illustrated by Delbrück (1893–
1900: I, 508) in Plato’s paraphrase of Il. 1. 17–42 at Rep. 3, 393d8–394a7. But it is
not legitimate to sharpen this observation into the proposition that the article is
found in Homer only in later interpolations. The very opening of the first book
of the Iliad contains instances of the most developed use of the article, in lines
where neither interpolation can be assumed nor the form of the words changed:
e.g. line 6 τὰ πρῶτα (‘in the first place’), 54 τῇ δεκάτῃ (‘on the tenth day’), 70 τὰ τ’
ἐώντα τὰ τ’ ἐσαόμενα (‘the present and the future’), and so on and so on. What we
must say is rather that presumably the article was completely absent from the
inherited epic language, in its strict use, but that the Homeric poets occasionally
resorted to it under the influence of their own spoken language (rather as they
mixed plurals in with dual expressions, because they themselves were unfamiliar
with the dual). (Krüger’s pronouncements on this (1873–91: II, §50.3 n. 1)
are absolutely right.) Apart from Homer and other poetry, we have no record
in the Greek language in which the article is unknown. Even the earliest
Cretan and Elean inscriptions have it in its fully developed form, and it looks
almost as if it were a Common Greek innovation. In this case, its absence in
Homer must be something extremely ancient, and we have here yet another
indication that the roots of the epic language reach back into darkest prehistory
(cf. Kalenberg 1914). 13

Latin managed without the article much longer than Greek—this may be
evidence of a slower intellectual evolution. Closer contact with Greek culture

12 For recent bibliography on the article in Greek, see Meier-Brügger (1992: II, 146–7) and (2003:
with early Greek thought.

13 There is no example of the article as such in Mycenaean, where all relevant to- forms are demonstra-
tives (e.g. PY Na 520 το-ι-γε /toiskε/ ‘and for them’); one could, however, take the view that the article is
not to be expected in archival documents, which is all that we have in Mycenaean. See Aura Jorro, s.vv.
‘to-c’, ‘to-jo-γε’, and cf. Palmer (1962: 50), who interprets some of these as verbs. Some early occurrences
of the article in 1st-millennium Greek are still close in meaning to the demonstrative; on some notorious
eamples, see Morpurgo Davies (1968e), including (pp. 83–4) an assessment of W.’s account here. In
Elean, note e.g. τοῖς βασιλεῖς ‘the kings’ in Buck no. 61, from before 380 BCE; in Cretan, οἱ δήμοι ‘the public
officials’ in Buck no. 116, 6th c. On the article in Cretan, see Bile (1988: 284–6); on its functions in the Aeolic
and language then made the gap evident, in the first place when it came to dealing with scientific concepts on Greek models, e.g. when Latin-speakers had to talk of words as words. In Greek it was possible to insert any form whatsoever into a clause by putting an article in front of it; the Romans out of necessity had resort to the demonstrative pronoun, e.g. at Cic. Or. 154 ex eo est ‘mecum’ et ‘tecum’, non ‘cum me’ et ‘cum te’, ut esset simile illis ‘nobiscum’ atque ‘nobiscum’ (‘hence mecum and tecum are used, not cum me and cum te, so as to resemble [the forms] nobiscum and nobiscum’). In this admittedly the scholars of the classical period were anticipated by Old Latin: cf. Plaut. Miles 819 ([Lucr.:] sorbet dormiens. [Palaestrio:] quid, sorbet? [Lucr.:]) illud ‘stertit’ uolui dicere (‘he’s asleep and swallowing’ :: ‘What do you mean, swallowing?’ ::) ‘I meant [that other word] “snoring”’. Here, it is true, illud ‘stertit’ cannot be equated exactly with Gk τὸ ἐφηκεῖ; rather, the pronoun is meant to serve only as a sort of syntactic prop for the verb-form, as at Miles 27 illud dicere uolui ‘femur’ (‘I meant “femur”’), and in other passages where illud is separated from the word-form about to be quoted (at Pseud. 844, the phrase referred to stands on its own). Better evidence of Greek influence is then the substantivization of the infinitive with an auxiliary pronoun (discussed above, I, 274), as in hoc non dolere, illud aemulari (‘absence of pain’, ‘emulation’).

Under pressure from the model of Greek, the grammarians then developed the habit of equating particular demonstrative pronouns when adjacent to a noun with the Greek article. Of the many such instances, suffice it to highlight two. First, Probus, GL IV, 133, 7–13 ‘Plinius Secundus hic tunc uoluit dici “pronomen”, quando solum reperitur declinari, ut puta hic huius et cetera sequentia; at uero si cum alia parte orationis inueniatur declinari, “articulum” appellari, ut puta hic Cato, huius Catonis et cetera sequentia’ (‘Pliny wanted hic to be called a “pronoun” when it stands on its own, as in hic, huius, etc.; when it occurs with another part of speech, as in hic Cato, huius Catonis, etc., he wanted it to be called an “article”’), a distinction which Probus rejects along with ‘cunctis artis latoribus’ (‘all teachers of the art [of grammar]’). And secondly, Priscian 5. 1 (= GL II, 141, 10–13) ‘commune articulum siue articolare pronomen tam masculini quam feminini generis assumit, ut hic sacerdos et haec sacerdos, neutrum autem separatum ab utroque genere articulum asciscit, ut hoc regnum’ (‘nouns of common gender take the article, or articular pronoun, in either the masculine or the feminine, e.g. hic sacerdos and haec sacerdos [‘this priest’, ‘this priestess’], while the neuter, distinct from either gender, takes only the article, e.g. hoc regnum [‘this kingdom’]). Recall in connection with this utterance of Priscian what was said earlier (II, 126) about the view of the article as a ‘gender-marking word’ (‘Geschlechtswort’).—Furthermore, the Latin translators of the Greek Bible have to a large extent taken this as their guiding principle. When, for instance, in the Greek the indeclinable Ἡακώβ is marked as dative by means of τῷ Ἡακώβ, this is rendered
in the Latin with *huic Jacob*, and the Greek substantivization of νῶν in ἀπὸ τοῦ νῶν is answered in the Latin with *ex hoc nunc*.

While Greek influence is very clear in this sort of case, Greek would hardly have been able to impose itself if the tendency to article-like use of the demonstratives had been completely foreign to the living language. Through the research of Rönsch (1869: 410–24; 1887–9: II, 17–19), Wölfflin (1886: 86), and others, we now know that this sort of use emerged in the popular language in general, especially in the later Empire, and here, in contrast with the writings of the grammarians, this function was served mainly by *ille* and *ipse*; see now esp. Wolterstorff (1920), on the development of *ille* into the definite article. This is significant, as it is precisely from these two pronouns that the Romance article arose, from *ipse* in Sardinia, Majorca, and Gascony, from *ille* everywhere else. We can, however, infer that the full development of the article as a category does not pre-date the dialectal stage of the individual Romance languages, not only from its various etymological sources just mentioned, but also inter alia from the fact that in Romanian the article follows its noun, while in the other languages it precedes.

The Germanic development chimes with what Greek and Latin have to teach us, although the article is extensively used already in the oldest literary record, Wulfila’s Bible, and is known in every single old Germanic language. At the same time, it is clear that it was not always there. The Gothic Bible in the majority of cases leaves the Greek article untranslated, and hardly ever uses an article where the Greek has none. In other words, the possibility was there of using the demonstrative as an article, but this had not yet become habitual. Equally, in Old Icelandic texts, especially the earliest, the use of the article is not consistent. And rather as in Romance, so in Germanic it is not always the same pronoun that becomes the article. The modern Scandinavian languages differ from the rest of

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14 Five times in the Book of Psalms (112: 2, 113: 26, 120: 8, 124: 2, 130: 3) and in Micah 4: 7. For *huic Jacob, huic David*, et sim., note e.g Micah 7: 20, Psalms 96: 1, and see Rönsch (1869: 420–1) and Hofmann & Szantar 191–3 with further references.

15 Note esp. the work of Meader & Wölfflin (1900–2).

16 That is, Sardinian *su*, *sa*, Balearic Catalan *es*, *sa* (Vincent 1988: 53), and (REW, s.v. ‘ipse’) *se* in Old Gascon, a dialect of Old Occitan. Vincent ascribes a reflex of *ipse* also to ‘a few southern Italian dialects’ (cf. Rohlfis (1970: §420), who explores first the possibility that the sibilant in *se, sa* in the dialect of Scanno in the province Aquila is the regular reflex of intervocalic *(l)l*, and Harris (1978: 71) quotes an example from medieval Castilian.

17 So, e.g., Rom. nom.-acc. *lup-ul*, gen.-dat. *lup-ul-ui* ‘the wolf’ vs *lup* ‘wolf’; for an outline of definite and indefinite noun-declension in Romanian, see Mallinson (1988: 398–401). A postposed def. art. is found also in Bulgarian *-ta* (Scatton 1993: 234–5) and Albanian *-se*, and is one of the peculiar characteristics of the Balkan linguistic area; see Hock (1991: 495), and cf. n. 32, p. 251 and n. 5, p. 253 above.

18 On the history and prehistory of the article in Germanic, see Klingenschmitt (1987) and EWAhd, s.v. ‘der’ (with a mass of information and further references on IE generally). On the article in medieval German, see Hartmann (1967: 17–22), and on modern German, Grimm (1986) and Pattee (1994).
Given the above, you will be wondering what sort of older forms of expression in general furnished the material for the article. Well, in fact, the answer is everywhere the demonstrative pronoun, which in its anaphoric function is matched very closely by the use of the article. This has been demonstrated also for languages outside our particular group. So, Arabic 'al, e.g., seems to have meant originally ‘this’ (Lat. hic), as it occurs also in the words for ‘today’ (al-yaoum(a)) and ‘now’ (al-ân(a), orig. ‘this time, moment’); we saw the same just now in the Romance languages, although the base-form for the article is usually ille, as in North Germanic (with cognates of jener ‘that’) — and Coptic Egyptian. In contrast, most of the Germanic languages (even Scandinavian in isolated instances) agree with Greek in developing the article from the old *to-pronoun. As *to- in adjectival position served also an emphatic anaphoric function from early on, it was in a sense predestined to become the article.

While the Romance and Scandinavian languages have not retained the old pronominal function alongside the use of the pronoun as the article, German der, die, das is still used in its old full meaning, except that it then has a stronger accent than when it is used as the article, and—partly related to this—in pronominal use fuller forms are usual. In certain dialects, including Swiss German, there is a formal contrast all the way through the declension, and in the written language at least gen. sg. and pl. and dat. pl. have fuller forms in pronominal usage. Univerbation with prepositions (e.g. am < an dem ‘at the [masc. neut.]’, im < in dem ‘in the’) is confined to the article function.

The corresponding form in Greek—δὴ τὸ—did not immediately give up its old functions either, when it became the article. In Attic, however, the old meanings survive only under certain conditions. The forms are always somehow supported, for instance by an immediately following μὲν (compare Thuc. 1. 69. 2 or γάρ ‘for they . . . ’), or by a following or preceding δέ (particularly striking being the idiom

19 On the use of the article in Gothic, see Streitberg (1920: §281.2); on Old Icelandic enn (and himn), hardly known in early poetry and inconstant in early prose, Heusler (1921: §239 and esp. §§406–11). In Scandinavian, a noteworthy feature of Swedish and Norwegian (although not Danish) is the ‘double definite’, or ‘overdefinite’: if a definite noun has an attributive adjective with it, then definiteness is marked with the— to English and German eyes, more familiar-looking—‘adjective article’ before the adjective in addition to the postpositive article (< inn < hin < *hinaz) on the noun, e.g. Norwegian den gamle mannen ‘the old man’. This was common in Old Swedish and Old Norwegian, less so in Old Icelandic and not at all in Old Danish. It is now characteristic of Swedish, present in most forms of Norwegian, but taboo in Danish. For deict surveys, see Haugen (1976: §§6,5.12, 11.4.9) and (1982: §§4.3.2, 6.9.3) on Scandinavian as a whole, and Askerdal (1994: 247–8), Andersson (1994: 288–9), and Haberland (1994: 330–1) on Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish, respectively.


21 So, in the pronoun, gen. sg. masc. neut. dessen, fem. derv, gen. pl. deren, dat. pl. denen vs in the def. art. des, der, der, den, respectively.
familiar from Plato ἣ δʼ ὁς / ἣ δʼ ἤ ‘said s/he’), or more rarely by a preceding καὶ.
The old meaning survives also if the pronoun is repeated (II, 107–8 above), as in
tὸ καὶ τὸ, τὰ καὶ τὰ (‘this or that’), etc. (alongside single τὸ, τὰ in Demosthenes 9. 68 and Proem 50. 3), and if the pronoun refers to an immediately following relative, as at Lysias 23. 8 τὸν ὁς ἡγη δεσπότης τοῦτον εἶναι (‘the man who claimed to be his master’)—also in Demosthenes and Plato, and the latter also has τὸ γε ὁτι (‘that which . . . ’). There are other isolated instances, such as clause-initial τὸ ‘therefore’ (Plato, Theaet. 179d); on πρὸ τοῦ, see below.

The old pronominal usage is retained much more fully in Homer and, in imitation of him, in all high poetry. More particles can serve as supports here than in Attic. I would highlight the frequent combination αὐτὰρ ὁ, which occurs even in hiatus before words beginning with a vowel and is then frequently emended in our text of Homer to αὐτὰρ ῦ (ε). The pronoun is found in close repetition, as in Attic, at II. 20. 255 | γυναῖκες . . . νεικεῦσ᾽ ἀλλήλησι πολλά τ᾽ ἑόντα καὶ οἶκεί· χόλος δὲ τὰ καὶ τὰ κελεῦει (‘women . . . say insulting things to one another, many things that are true and many that are not, as anger prompts them to say this or that’), probably preferable to the τε καὶ τά of the manuscripts; cf. in other ancient literature Pindar, Pyth. 5. 55 τὰ καὶ τὰ νέμων, and Olymp. 2. 53 τῶν τε καὶ τῶν καρφῶν.22 Similar to this is the juxtaposition in polyptoton πρὸ ὁ τοῦ ‘the one before the other’ at II. 10. 224 and ὁ τὸν ‘the one the other’ at II. 22. 200 (of pursuer and pursued). Here, as in the opposition of two individuals or two groups with ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ δὲ, ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ δὲ, both in Homer and later, the ὁ pronoun does not have to be anaphoric, but can pick out a pair of contrasting members of a pair or larger group, known or unknown: so e.g. Demodocus of Leros (6th c. BC) fr. 2 West Λέρωι κακοί· οὐχ ὁ μὲν, ὁς δ’ οὐ· πάντες . . . (‘Lerians are bad: I don’t mean that some are and some aren’t, but they all are . . . ’,23 cf. II, 107 above). The form often occurs in pronominal function even without a supporting element, especially in clause-initial position, and from this use at the start of the clause its use as a relative pronoun arose, which is common to Homer, all the dialects except Attic, and incidentally Germanic; on this see most recently BECHTEL (1921–4: I, 113 [on Lesbian]).

Rather different is the use of the *το-pronoun in the sense of Gk ὁδές, i.e. to refer to the here or now. This is familiar from German, and already in Gothic e.g. in þamma aiwa ‘in this (earthly) body’, þai sunjus þis aiwins ‘the children of this (present) age’. It is not found everywhere in Greek. Homer appears not to know, but it is in Laconian, for instance: remember the famous words of the Spartan mother to her son going off to war, with a gesture to his shield, ἣ τῶν ἦ ἐπὶ τὰς lit. ‘either this or on this’, i.e. ‘either bear this shield back, or be borne back on it

23 This elegiac couplet was ascribed, by Strabo and hence modern editors, to the 6th-c. gnomic poet Phocylides of Miletus, on whom see West (1978b) and (1992: II, 95).
dead. In Attic it occurs in προ τοῦ ‘before’, i.e. ‘before this moment’, and in Thessalian note the synonymous ὑππροτάς (scil. ἀμέρας), along with τὸ τάμων ‘today’ (both in IG IX.2, 517 = Buck no. 32, 43–4; Larisa, 3rd c. BC [cf. II, 231 below]), although Homeric τῆμος (the Aeolic form of which in adjectival function yields the Thessalian) is anaphoric and means ‘then’. Compare the use of τῆμος ‘today’ in Apollonius of Rhodes (4. 252), which people earlier tried to emend, but which is now assured by the Thessalian, although Apollonius cannot have taken it from Thessalian. This puzzle remains.

We cannot establish exactly to what extent the ancient Greek article had this sort of pronominal value (as it does in German) when it stood as an adjective next to a noun. We find this in Homer—e.g. II. 6. 185 καρπὶστὴν δὴ τήν γε μάχην φάτο δύμεναι ἄνδρῶν (‘[Bellerophon] spoke of that as the most terrific battle he had ever fought against men’)—and it is presupposed by Thessalian ὑππροτάς (above). Pronominal value is most assured when the pronoun follows the noun, in conflict with the normal rules of word order. This occurs in | Homer mainly, though not only, when a relative clause picking up the noun immediately follows (cf. II, 131 above), so e.g. in the common phrase ἐμοι τῷ, δτὲ . . . ‘on that day when . . . ’, or Od. 10. 73–4 ἀποσέμπεν τῶν ὅσ γε θεοῖσιν ἀπέχθηται μακάρεσσιν (‘to give onward escort to that man who is detested by the blessed gods’).—However, as the placement shows, this latter use did not form the basis of the use of the pronoun as the article, as the article of course always precedes.

Well, now it is time to say a few words about the actual use of the article. By and large, I can content myself here with a few general points, as this topic has always been very fully handled in the standard grammars (though on the Greek side it is worth adding the information in MEISTERHANS & SCHWYZER 222–34 §86). Moreover, the languages which possess a definite article, even the modern ones, differ from one another on many points of detail (cf. MEILLET 1919b: 178–9); only the basic outlines are common to all.

The ancient grammarians teach quite rightly that the article is used when the speaker is concerned with a προσφεστώσα γνώσις, a notion that is already given. More or less three main types can be distinguished. First, the type of the anaphoric article, i.e. the article that is used when the notion has already been mentioned in an earlier utterance. The anaphoric article differs from a genuine anaphoric pronoun attached to a noun in that the article is always used with a noun mentioned before, the pronoun only when there is a strong need for a reference back. In this function it is particularly easy to see how the article

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24 This, the oldest version of this famous saying is from Plutarch, Sayings of Spartan Women Unknown 16, p. 241f; see Hammond (1979/80: esp. 99–100 & n. 12).

25 LSJ still present separately, s.v. τῆμος’, II., the Apollonian and Thessalian occurrences of τῆμος ‘today’, which is retained and defended for Apollonius by E. Livrea in his edn of Book 4 (Florence 1973), ad loc.
developed from the pronoun. In Greek two possible paths suggest themselves, both of which may have contributed to the development of the article. Either we have to suppose that the $\delta$-pronoun like other demonstratives became closely attached to a noun in the manner of an adjective for the expression of reference back, or (as Krüger believes, 1875–91: II, §§50.3 n. 2) the starting point was provided by phrases such as Homer’s $\eta$ $\delta$ $\alpha k\epsilon\omicron\upsilon\sigma\upsilon\acute{\alpha} \alpha\mu\alpha \tau\omega\varsigma \gamma\eta\nu \kappa\iota\epsilon\nu \acute{\iota}$ ‘and the woman went silently with them’ (Il. 1. 348), where the pronoun functions as a noun and refers back, with the noun following in apposition (‘and she, the woman’); compare passages such as Arist. Thesmo. 505 το $\delta$ ειδέθη αραυις εν χύτρα το παιδίον (‘it, the child, an old woman brought home in a jar’), where in accordance with Attic usage the noun in apposition has the article. In any event, by the time the usage is developed, article and noun have moved close together, though, in contrast with German and English, Attic can still place small particles like δε, μεν, γάρ between article and noun. Only in tragedy can principal constituents of the clause be inserted, on the Homeric model, even in dialogue, e.g. at Soph. Oed. Tyr. 1024 $\acute{\iota}$ γάρ πρώ αυτόν εξέπεια $\acute{\alpha}$παιδία ‘his till now childless state persuaded him’. This applies of course also to the other usages, to which we shall come shortly.

A second type comprises those cases where the article indicates the referent of the noun as being known and given for speaker and hearer, even if it has not been mentioned earlier, e.g. of Hector at Il. 22. 405 $\dot{\varphi}$ς το $\mu\epsilon\nu$ κεκόντω κάρη $\acute{\alpha}$παν $\dot{\varphi}$ δε $\nu\nu \mu\acute{\iota}\tau\rho\upsilon \tilde{\tau}i\lambda\lambda\kappa\acute{\alpha}i\nu$ (‘so his whole head was enveloped in the dust; and his mother tore her hair’), where the only mother possibly relevant is that of Hector, or Il. 23. 465 ‘(I cannot see the first team of horses) $\acute{\iota}$ $\tau$ων $\acute{\iota}$νιχων $\phi\acute{\iota}$γων $\acute{\iota}$νια ‘or the reins have eluded the charioteer’, where the mention of the team of horses entails the existence of a particular charioteer. It needs no detailed explanation to see how easily this second use could develop out of the anaphoric use.

The same can be said, although not so straightforwardly, of the third, the so-called generic, use of the article, i.e. its use with abstract nouns (e.g. $\acute{\iota}$ φιλοσοφία, or with reference to a species or set, either in plural form (e.g. $\acute{\iota}$ $\iota$πποι ‘horses’, i.e. all horses), or with the noun in the singular (e.g. $\dot{\varphi}$ $\iota$ππος ‘the species horse’). This use of the article is not so universal across languages (e.g. the type $\dot{\varphi}$ $\iota$ππος ‘the species horse’ is not found in Old Irish);$^{26}$ in Greek, too, it is clearly more recent, and, apart from certain substantivizations, still rare in Homer, although individual examples are incontestable. So, Il. 3. 108–10 $\acute{\iota}$ $\alpha$ει $\dot{\varphi}$πλοτέρων $\acute{\alpha}$νδρων $\phi\acute{\iota}$νες $\acute{\iota}$ρεθονται: $\dot{\varphi}$ς $\dot{\varphi}$ $\dot{\varphi}$ερων (δε $\gamma$ρων: Nautck) $\acute{\iota}$μετέχαν, $\acute{\alpha}$μα $\acute{\iota}$πράσαω καί $\acute{\iota}$πάσαω $\acute{\iota}$λεύσαε (‘the minds of young men are always unsteady, but when an old man is involved, he considers not only the past but also the future’); and similarly Il. 13. 278 $\dot{\varphi}$ $\tau$ $\acute{\iota}$ $\acute{\iota}$ειλόσ $\acute{\alpha}$νήρ (‘the cowardly man’), although these words belong to a line

$^{26}$ So, e.g., $\acute{\alpha}$υμε ‘man’ (as a species); cf. Thurneysen (1946: 295–6).
which is certainly due to later interpolation, as only here in Homer does δειλός have its later meaning ‘fearful’: elsewhere it means ‘wretched’ (cf. δόν ‘misery’) and apart from this line the ei stands under the ictus only at II. 21. 464, Od. 8. 351 (and in an Attic variant at II. 24. 528).—All that we can say in explanation of this third type is that, as soon as one arrives at the concept of species, they are something fixed and given for everyone, so that the article is appropriate in a sort of extension of the second usage.

For all its appeal, we cannot undertake to investigate in detail how far the languages which have an article agree or disagree in its use, and what sort of shifts of usage have occurred within individual languages. A glance at any careful account of Greek, German, or English, will quickly show how much there would be to say. In our present context, we have to limit our business to picking out a few individual cases which illustrate the difference between Greek and German idiom.

27 II. 13. 278 is similarly criticized by Shipp (1972: 282), but defended by Janko (1994: ad lac.), with further references. The ‘Attic variant’ of II. 24. 528 is κηρών ἐμπλεκότι, ὁ μὲν ἐσθιών, ἀντίρ ὁ δειλόν ‘(Zeus’s vessels) full of destinies, one of good ones, the other of wretched’, quoted by Plato at Rep. 379d.
Much discussed from antiquity onwards is the following passage from the *Dolomeia, II. 10. 252–3* παρφύωκεν δὲ πλέων (πλέω? πλέον?) νῦξ τῶν δύο μοιράων, τριτάτη δ’ ἐτι μοῖρα λέσηπται ‘more than two parts of the night are past, only the third yet remains’. As is seen particularly from Porphyry’s detailed discussion in his *Homeric Questions* (I, 147–52 Schrader),¹ it was commonly not understood in antiquity how, if more than two parts of the night were already past, a third could still remain. This objection was correctly countered by those with insight with the observation that one should not count so precisely and that τριτάτη μοῖρα should be taken with a grain of salt. For the linguist the point of interest is quite different.

For all who laboured over the passage it went without saying that the phrases τῶν δύο μοιράων (lit. ‘two parts’) and τριτάτη μοῖρα (lit. ‘third part’) were to be understood as ‘two thirds’ and ‘one third’, respectively. This is not natural for us, but it was normal in ancient languages, in dividing a whole into equal fractions, to oppose one part as 1/n to the previously mentioned n-1 remaining parts without in the latter expressly mentioning the denominator, as this would be clear from the following context. Let us take as an example the commonest division, into three parts: in the Book of Zacharias 13: 8 the Hebrew, Greek, and Latin versions all agree in having (Hebrew) ‘it shall come to pass that two parts of it will be thrown away . . . and only the third part remain’ : (Greek) τὰ δύο μέρη αὐτῆς ἐξολεθρευθῆσαι . . . τὸ δὲ τρίτον ὑπολειφθῆσαι ἐν αὐτῇ : (Latin) partes duae in ea dispergentur . . . et tertia pars reliquetur in ea. The Latin version is not mere translationese. We find the same duae partes : tertia (pars) in Caesar (e.g. *Civil War* 1. 82. 4), who also offers *Gallic War* 1. 12. 2 certior factus est tres iam partes (3/4) copiarum Helvetios id flumen traduxisse, quartam fere partem citra flumen Ararim reliquam esse (‘he was informed that the Helvetii had transported three quarters of their forces across this river, while roughly the other quarter was left on this side of the Saône’). And this is the basis of the widespread use of the

¹ Porphyry’s discussion is quoted in full in Dindorf’s edition of the *Iliad* scholia (Oxford 1875–8), and summarized by H. Erbse in his edition (Berlin 1969–88) in a note on *II. 10. 251. H. Schrader’s edition (Leipzig 1880–2) is not satisfactory, but has been replaced to date only for bk 1 (by the edn of A. R. Sodano, Naples 1970). On this work of Porphyry, thought to derive in part from a lost work of Aristotle on Homer, see Dickey (2007: 27) with further references.
ordinal with reference to fractions: the τρίτον μέρος, the *quarta pars* is added to the two or three other parts and makes the whole (of three or four parts) complete. The use of the ordinal of the so-called ‘impure’ fractions (with a numerator $>1$), as in French *deux tiers*, NHG *zwei Drittel*, is a secondary development from this. With the Homeric τῶν δύο μισχῶν in particular, there is an exact correspondence in the noun τὸ δύο μισχὸν at Aesch. *Suppl. 1070*; see the scholia and WILAMOWITZ (1914a), *ad loc.*, and note that the translation of this word as ‘half’ in the pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus* 366c is wrong.—There is an illuminating treatment of these matters by the well-known Egyptologist Kurt Sethe in his excellent book on numbers and numerals in ancient Egypt (1916), which also takes account of the classical languages. 

As for our immediate purpose, it remains to say a word about the article in τῶν δύο μισχῶν. This is in contrast with German and English usage, which would translate ‘two parts’, ‘two thirds’, without the article. But this Homeric example is not isolated, and corresponds to Greek usage generally. In Attic prose, we have exactly the same in τὰ δύο μέρη (lit. ‘the two parts’), e.g. in Thucydides 1. 74. 1, 2, 10. 2, 2. 47. 2; Andocides, *On the Peace with Sparta* 9, and particularly close to the Homeric passage is Thuc. 1. 104. 2 κρατοῦντες . . . τῆς Μέμφιδος τῶν δύο μερῶν πρὸς τὸ τρίτον μέρος . . . ἐπολέμουν (‘having gained control . . . of two-thirds of Memphis, they campaigned against the remaining third’; so, too, Cassius Dio 47. 17. 2, and the passage quoted above from the Book of Zacharias). Related to this is Thuc. 1. 10. 2 τῶν πέντε μισχῶν τὰς δύο ‘two of the five parts’, and on this point the Romance languages behave like Greek. Just like this last phrase from Thucydides is an instance adduced by MÉYER-LÜBKE (1890–1902: III, 184) from the old Italian book of novellas, XII, 18 Biagi’s *perdè delle dodici parti le diece di tutto il reame suo* (lit., ‘lost from the twelve parts the ten of all his kingdom’), and the French for ‘three quarters’ is *les trois quarts* (cf. STIMMING cited by SETHE 1916: 107 n.). In German or English we can get a feel for the sense of the article if we translate, ‘the remaining parts’: the number becomes definite in virtue of the contrast with the other parts that are immediately named or at least assumed.

Well, in Greek—and again also in Romance (see MÉYER-LÜBKE 1890–1902: III, 184)—the article is used in this same way wherever numbers are used of parts or fractions, even without a word for ‘part’ or a fraction. Just as Pierre Corneille

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2 Note the edition of the scholia on *Supplices* and the *Oresteia* by O. L. Smith (Leipzig 1976), and see the commentary of H. Friis Johansen & E. W. Whittle (3 vols, Copenhagen 1980), *ad loc.*

3 This book is available online at <http://historical.library.cornell.edu/math/about.html>.

4 That is, the edn by Guido Biagi (Florence 1880) of *Cento novelle antiche* (also known as the *Novellino*, or *Il libro di novelle et di bel parlar gientile*), the most famous of the new, Tuscan novellas, produced in the last quarter of the 13th century, and widely regarded as the single most important source of inspiration for Boccaccio’s *Deamereon*; Biagi’s edition has been superseded by those of (e.g.) A. Conte and G. Favati, of which the latter is available online at <http://www.bibliotecaitaliana.it/> (with the passage quoted by W. in novella no. 6).
(1606–84), for instance, says,5 des trois les deux sont morts (‘of the three [the] two are dead’), so we find in Herodotus 1. 18. 4 τὰ ἐξ ἐτεα τῶν ἐνδεκα ‘six of the eleven years’, and in Plutarch’s Sayings of Spartans, p. 220C τὰς δύο τῶν ἐννέα (χορδῶν, ‘two of the nine strings’). Similarly, Thuc. 8. 39. 3 καὶ περιποίητες ναυοὶ δέκα Ἀθηναίων τὰς τρεῖς λαμβάνουσι κενάς (‘meeting with ten Athenian ships they captured three of them without their crews’; this usage is frequent in Thucydides), and Dem. 18. 238 τῶν . . . τριήμην, τριακόσιοι υδάτων τῶν πασών, τὰς διακοσίας ἡ πόλις παρέσχετο (‘of the triremes, three hundred in all, our city supplied two hundred’). In these and similar instances, a single definite number is separated off from a larger amount and labelled with the article, but the article can be used even when each of several different amounts into which a larger sum is divided is given a number. | In this sort of case, the article goes either (a) with only the first element, e.g. Od. 6. 62–3 (Nausicaa to Alcinous) πέντε δὲ τοί φίλοι υἱὲς ἐνὶ μεγάρωις γεγάσασιν, | οἱ δὴ ὄπτωντες, τρεῖς δ’ ἡθεοὶ (‘then there are five sons of yours in the palace, [the] two married, and three bachelors’; cf. Thuc. 1. 116. 1 ναυαῖς ἐξῆκοντα . . . ταῖς μὲν ἐκκαίδεκα τῶν νεῶν . . . τεσσαράκοντα δὲ ναυαὶ καὶ τέσσαραί . . . ‘with sixty ships . . . with [the] sixteen of them . . . while with forty-four ships . . . ’); or (b) with the second and subsequent elements, e.g. Od. 10. 116 (three companions having been sent out) αὐτῇ’ ἐνα μάρφας ἐτάρων ὀπλίσασατο δεύτερον | τῶ δὲ δύ’ αἴξαντε φωγῇ ἐπὶ νῆας ἰκέαθην (‘he [Antiphates] at once pounced on one of my companions to eat him for supper; the other two sprang back and fled and reached the ships’; cf. Thuc. 7. 25. 1, etc., and Corinna, fr. 654 Page,6 col. iii, 12–18); or finally (c) with both/all elements, e.g. Il. 5. 270–2 τῶν οἱ ἐξ ἐγένοντο ἐνὶ μεγάροις γενέθλησι, τοὺς μὲν τέσσαρας αὐτὸς ἔχων ἀπίταλλ’ ἐπὶ φάτνη, τῶ δὲ δύ’ Αλνεία δώκεν (‘from these [horses] were bred for him a string of six in his great house: four of these, keeping them himself, he reared at the manger, but the other two he gave to Aeneas’; cf. Herodotus 1. 142. 4 αἱ μὲν δύο . . . ἡ δὲ μία [‘the] two [of the three] . . . while [the] one [of the three]’). Very similar to the last example is a passage of Cervantes’ Don Quixote, part 3, ch. 23, cuatro zagales, los dos criados y los dos amigos míos ‘four boys, [the] two of them servants and [the] two of them friends of mine’. In all such cases the partitive relation—or, in Krüger’s terms (1873–91: I, §50.2 n. 8), the ‘expletive’ relation between the elements—gives rise to a notion of definiteness, which Greek and Romance like to express by means of the article. [Add.: On the use of the article with numerals, see especially Kalenberg (1914: 662–5), who discusses also instances where the article is omitted from designations of constituent parts, a usage which, in spite of the many examples widespread throughout the literature, is still sometimes not

5 In his tragedy Horae (produced 1640), line 995.
6 W. refers to the first edn of this papyrus, by Schubart & von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Berliner Klassikertexte V.2 (1907), 19 ff.
recognized. At Matthew 20: 24 καὶ ἀκούσαντες οἱ δέκα ἤγανάκτησαν περὶ τῶν δύο ἀδελφῶν (‘and when the ten heard it, they were moved with indignation against the two brothers’, cf. Mark 10: 41 καὶ ἀκούσαντες οἱ δέκα ἤρξαντο ἄγανακτεῖν περὶ Ἰακώβου καὶ Ἰωάννου and when the ten heard it, they began to be indignant against James and John’), Luther translates οἱ δέκα as die Zehn, and he is still followed by even very recent translators including Weizsäcker, Wellhausen, and Wiese. But ‘the ten’ is not a fixed group of disciples as ‘the twelve’ is, and (so ms. add.2) Hermann Menge7 (whose translation [1926] DEBRUNNER drew to my attention) is the first to translate correctly ‘the ten remaining disciples’ (cf. Blass & DEBRUNNER (1913 [ = 1961]: §265), and (ms. add.2) Luke 15: 4, 17: 17, Acts 2:14).]

The Greek article differs from the German and the English also in its use as an **accompaniment to pronouns.** It is easy to understand the difference of usage in the case of the demonstrative: Gk ὁ δὲ άνήρ (‘this [the] man’) has the article because it always refers to a definite man; German dieser Mann and English this man (and their Romance counterparts) do not have the article, because the noun is made sufficiently definite by the pronoun. But Greek combines the article even with the interrogatives τίς and ποιός (‘who?, what?’, ‘of what sort?’). This development has not been reached in the early period, and is not found in Aeschylus save at Prometheus Bound 249 τὸ ποιόν εὑρὼν τήδε φάρμακον νόσου; (‘after finding [the] what sort of remedy for this disease?’), and we know that the language of this play is not Aeschylean.8 But ὁ ποιός is securely attested in the other two tragedians, in comedy, in Plato, and in Aristotle. In drama it is used to ask an interlocutor to add more detail to a statement, e.g. Soph. OT 119–22 (Creon and Oedipus) πλὴν ἐν οὐδὲν εἴξ’ εἴδος φράσαι :: τὸ ποίον . . . ; :: ληστὰς ἐφασκε . . . (‘he could say nothing for certain except one thing’ :: ‘[the] what sort of thing? . . . ’ :: ‘he said that robbers . . . ’). The article is used because what is asked for is something definite, known to the person questioned, who has already hinted at its existence. In comedy, τὸ τί is used in the same way, e.g. at Arist. Peace 696 εὑδαιμονεῖ, πᾶσχει δὲ θαναματῶν :: τὸ τί; :: ἐκ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γύγνεται

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7 This is indeed the schoolmaster Hermann August Menge (1841–1939), known to classicists for his question-and-answer teaching-manuals (‘Repetitorien’) of Latin (1873) and Greek (1878) syntax, both still very much in use (Menge, Burkard, & Schauer 2005; Menge, Thierfelder, & Wiesner 1999).

8 Aeschylean authorship of the Prometheus Bound has been questioned in print since the 1860s. Prominent cases against authenticity have been made since the 1910s, the most important recent statements being Griffith (1977) and West (1990: 51–72); important defenders of authenticity have included Wilamowitz (1914a) and very recently, though uncertainly, Lloyd-Jones (2003). Those reluctant to deny Aeschylus’ authorship altogether have excused its metrical, linguistic, theological, structural and other oddities on one or more of a range of hypotheses including that it was Aeschylus’ last play, that it was composed in Sicily, that it was left unfinished by Aeschylus and completed by his son the tragedian Euphorion, that it was produced only after Aeschylus’ death. Good recent brief histories of this fascinating question include Bees (1993: ch. 1), who tends against authenticity, and Appendix 1 in the edition of the play by A. J. Podlecki (Oxford 2005), who is inclined to defend Aeschylean authorship.
Συμπληγής (‘he is happy, and something extraordinary is happening to him’: ‘[the] what?’: ‘he is turning from Sophocles into Simonides’).—In philosophical prose of the fourth century, ὁ ποῖος; occurs also when an expression containing the article is expected as the answer, e.g. in Plato, Phaedo 78b the question is asked, τῷ ποίῳ τινα ἀρα προσήκει τοῦτο τῷ πάθος πάντων... καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποιοῦ τινὸς δεδείηναι μὴ πάθη αὐτῷ, καὶ τῷ ποίῳ τινι <οὔ>; (‘what sort of thing is it that would naturally suffer this fate... for what sort of thing should we fear this fate, and for what should we not?’)—where in spite of the article, | τίς, which heightens the interrogative effect, is added all three times—to which the answer is, τῷ μὲν συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέτω ὃντι φύσει προσήκει τοῦτο πάντων (‘it is natural for a composite object or a natural compound to suffer this fate’). Compare pseudo-Plato, Mínos 318a, and esp. Callimachus, Epigrams 45 Pfeiffer, 1–2 εἴπα Πανήμον εικάδιν καὶ Λώου τῇ τίνι; τῇ δεκάτῃ (‘that’s what I said on the twentieth of Panemon, and in the month of Loos on which date?—on the tenth’).—Further instances are uncertain. At Plato, Lysis 212c ὁ πότερος οὖν αὐτῶν ποτέρον φίλος ἐστι; (‘then which of the pair of them is the friend of which?’), ὁ πότερος would correspond to lequel des deux? in French, where lequel is used as the interrogative when the question is about an unknown member of a known set. This use of the article is easy to understand, but in Attic it is attested only here, where the ὁ should be deleted, as it stands oddly beside the following bare ποτέρον.9

From the fourth century on, the indefinite pronouns of quality and quantity can also take the article, in connection with their acquisition of independent use which we discussed earlier (II, 115 above); cf. Demosthenes 8. 20 τοὺς στρατιώτας... τοὺς ὁποίους τινὰς οὖν (‘the soldiers... of whatever sort they may be’). And Aristotle uses phrases of the type ὁ τίς ἄνθρωπος (‘any particular person’) in order to denote a token as opposed to the type (BONITZ 1870: 763a, 41).—The use of the article before relative forms in a clause such as Plato, Laches 180d οὖτοι... οἱ ἡλίκοι ἐγὼ ἐπὶ γεννώσκομεν τοὺς νεωτέρους (‘it is not possible for those who are as old as I still to know the younger generation’) hardly requires comment.

What is very striking is the combination of the article with the personal pronoun. Apollonius (On Pronouns, GG II.1.1, 13, 16) sees in this a ‘παράλογος σύνταξις’ (‘an irregular construction’), but is obliged to cite examples of it from Menander (fr. 364 PCG VI.2) and Callimachus (Aetia, frs. 28 and 114, 5 Pfeiffer).10 In some ways clearer than these instances are the few examples in Plato. At Lysis 203b, Hippothales calls to Socrates, δεῦρο δή, εὐθύνῃ ἡμῶν (‘come here, straight to us’), to which Socrates replies, ποῖ... λέγεις καὶ παρὰ τίνας τοὺς ὑμᾶς; ‘where do you mean? and who are the people you call “us”?’, i.e. with τοὺς ὑμᾶς

9 The article here was in fact deleted by R. B. Hirschig in his edition of 1877–80.
10 The Menander seems clear enough, but Apollonius seems to have misconstrued both lines of Callimachus; see R. Pfeiffer’s edn (Oxford 1949–53), ad loc.
meaning ‘those termed “us” by you’. The expression is bold, but the article quite correctly used. By contrast, in τὸν ἐμὲ (at Theaet. 166a, Soph. 239b, Phileb. 20b) and τὸν αὐτὸν (Phaedr. 258a), the article seems to lend the self-reference a mock-formality, ‘Mr Me’, as it were, being used as if a distinguished title followed instead of the pronoun; at Lucian, Hermotimus 15 we even have τὸν νῦν δὴ τοῦτον σεαυτὸν and κατὰ τὸν νῦν ἐμέ (‘yourself as you are now’, ‘as I am now’).

We cannot discuss here in detail how the use of the article develops when its noun has an attribute. Let me remark only that from Homer on it is not only adjectival attributes (in agreement with the noun) that may be squeezed in between article and noun, but others, too. Admittedly, | in Homer this is still very rare. A genitive is found in this position, e.g. at II. 16. 503 ἡ Προμάχου δάμαρ (‘the wife of Promachus’), and Od. 3. 145 τὸν Ἀθηναίης δεινὸν χόλον (‘the terrible wrath of Athene’)—cf. e.g. at II. 10. 408(?), 15. 74, Od. 11. 298, on the basis of which Ὠλλός [better, probably: Ὠλής] ταχὺς Αἰας (‘swift Ajax, son of Oileus’) was misinterpreted as ὁ Ἰλίως ταχὺς Αἰας (‘the son of Ileus’) at II. 2. 527, 13. 66, etc.; an adverb of place or time is found at e.g. II. 14. 274 οἱ ἐνερβεθε θεοὶ, 9. 524 τῶν πρόσθεν ἀνδρῶν (‘the gods below’, ‘of the men of former times’). In later Greek, however, it was greatly extended, first in that even intensifying adverbs are occasionally so inserted: λίαν in the Prometheus Bound (1) 123 διὰ τὴν λίαν φιλότητα βροτῶν (‘because of my excessive love for mortals’) and in fourth-century prose, including Plato, Xenophon, and Demosthenes—St Paul even ventures ὑπερλίαν at 2 Corinthians 11: 5 = 12: 11 τῶν ὑπερλίαν ἀποστόλων (‘die hohen Apostel’, Luther; ‘die Extra-Apostel’, Weizsäcker; ‘these superlative apostles’, R. S. V.). The use of πάνω in this position, popular in the imperial period, is found already in Xenophon, Mem. 3. 5. 1 Περικλεῖ τῷ τοῦ πάνω Περικλέους νῦν (‘to Pericles son of the great Pericles’). In addition, the insertion and affixation of prepositional phrases also becomes common. Thucydides even allowed himself at 2. 96. 1 τοὺς ὑπερβαίνοντες Ἀλμών Γέτας ‘the Getae beyond [lit., for one having crossed] the River Haimos’, which is modelled on idioms such as 1. 24. 1 Ἑπιδαμμός ἐστι πόλες ἐν δεξιά ἑσπλέοντι τῶν ἱλιών κόλπων (‘Epidamnus is the city on the right as one sails into the Ionic Gulf’). Plato and Demosthenes went even further, Plato in enclosing e.g. an infinitival clause, as at Phaedo 88a ἐν τῷ πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς χρόνῳ (‘in the time before we are actually born’), Demosthenes by squeezing in a finite subordinate clause at 19. 27 τὴν δὲ ἀδωροδόκητος ὑπήρχε προαίρεσιν αὐτοῦ τῆς πολιτείας ‘his policy deliberately chosen when he was as yet un bribed’. And bolder still by far than adventures of this sort are the constructions transferred to deverbal nouns from their underlying verbs. We shall return to this later, in the chapter on case syntax.11 Here let me just adduce a particularly striking example from Thucydides, who goes furthest in this sort of construction: 1. 137. 4 τὴν τῶν

11 Another forlorn hope; cf. n. 2, p. 284 above.
γεψφρν ὄν ψευδός προσεποίησατο τότε δι’ αὐτὸν οὐ διάλυσιν ‘the false claim that it was thanks to him that the bridges had not been destroyed at that time’.

Now, we are not entitled to suppose that the purpose of the article from the outset was to make possible the addition of all types of attributes, for even in the sorts of combinations adduced above, the article retains the meaning appropriate to it, and conversely the article is not actually required for the addition of attributes. Thucydides, for example, occasionally attaches a dative (taken from the construction of the verb) to deverbal nouns without an article, e.g. at i. 73. 1 ἐὰν ἀντιλογίαν τοὺς ἔμετέρους ἔμμαχοις ‘in order to speak against your allies’, or 1. 122. ἐπιτείχισμος τῇ χώρᾳ ‘the establishment of a base for attacks against the land’. But what is especially valuable here is comparison with Latin. Some time ago, Usener | pointed out (1912–13: I, 251 n.*12) that Cicero was able to translate Gk ὃ μετὰ τῶν θάνατον χρόνος without an article as tempus post mortem (‘the time after death’, Tusculans 1. 16), and a phrase such as On the Orator 3. 202 rerum quasi gerantur sub adspectum paene subiectio (‘the almost visual presentation of events as if actually happening’) is reminiscent of the bold constructions involving deverbal nouns in Thucydides. And that this sort of thing is not confined to technical prose (which was heavily influenced by Greek models) is evident from phrases in Plautus, for instance, such as Persian 385 nunc hominum mores (‘the character of the present generation’), nunc hominum matching exactly Attic τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων. Nevertheless, the article did serve to make this sort of collocation clear and easy, and so was very useful in Greek, especially in theoretical language. Unfortunately, German can match this only to a modest degree.

It is well known that in Greek an attributive determiner could be attached by means of the article after a noun of definite meaning, whether or not the latter already had the article, as e.g. at Thuc. 1. 103. 3 καὶ ἕξθος τῶν Λακεδαίμονιν (‘because of their hostility towards the Spartans’). I cannot set out for you here the many subtle rules which apply in this situation, nor can I present the development of this use with comparison of the corresponding idioms in, say, German or Gothic, e.g. Goth. Marja so Magdalene for Gk Μαρία η Μαγδαληνή (‘Mary of Magdala’, Matthew 27: 56).

There is much talk in the grammar-books of the ‘substantivizing’ force of the article. Here the same applies as in the situation discussed immediately above: the article makes substantivization easy, and hence makes it happen frequently, but it does not bring it about in and of itself, least of all in the case of adjectival expressions. Homer’s line II. 1. 70 ὅς ἤδει τά τ’ ἔστα τά τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ’ ἐστα (‘[Calchas,] who knew both the things that were and the things to come and the

12 This note was added by the author to the original version (Usener 1878: 71) and incorporated by the editors of his Kleine Schriften.
things that were past (the neuter, as in the last example (and cf. II, 1. 117 'inferior things prevail'), and in the masculine of persons, e.g. II, 13. 279–84 τοῦ κακοῦ... τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ ('of the coward... of the brave man'), or 4. 308 οἱ πρόσεροι 'the men of an earlier age'.

However, things went beyond this stage fairly early in Greek, and forms of expression developed which in general could not easily come about without the article. Already in Homer in a few places the article is combined with a genitive if the noun determined by the genitive can be supplied from what precedes. So, after his question at II. 9. 340–1 ἢ μονοὶ φιλέων ἄλοχοι... Ἀτρείδαι 'are the Atreids really the only men who love their wives?', Achilles can continue with ὅσ τις ἄνήρ ἄγαθος... τὴν αὐτοῦ φιλεῖ 'any virtuous man loves his own', where people have wrongly wanted to substitute the combination discussed earlier (II, 82 above) ἦν αὐτοῦ. | Or Od. 22. 220–1 (Agelaus to 'Mentor') κτήμαθ' ὅπωσα τοί ἑστι, τὰ τ' ἐνδοθει καὶ τὰ θύρφη, τοίαν Ὀδυσσήος μεταμέζομεν ('all your possessions, those in your house and your estates, we shall combine with those of Odysseus'), where κτήματι ('possessions') is to be understood with τοίαν Ὀδυσσήος. (The connection of the article with a previously mentioned or implied noun is freer at II. 23. 348, 433, and cf. 22. 211.)—Of phrases involving article + prepositional phrase, there is still hardly a single example in Homer. In a passage such as II. 13. 496 οἱ δ' ἀμφ' Ἀλκαθόων αὐτοσχέδον ὀφρυκήθησαν ('these then drove on in close combat about Alcathous'), the prepositional phrase ἀμφ' Ἀλκαθόω still belongs to the clause as a whole (compare 13. 526, 15. 301); the later usage is really seen only at Od. 24. 418 τοὺς δ' ἐξ ἀλλάων πολίων οἰκόνθε ἐκαστον πέμπον ἄγεν ('those [of the dead suitors] from other towns they [the people of Ithaca] handed over to be conveyed each to his home'), one of the modernisms that are characteristic of the last book of the Odyssey.

After Homer, these combinations were used even without reference back to a given item, in line with the third meaning of the article (II, 134 above). I draw your attention particularly to such abstract expressions as τὰ τοῦ πολέμου 'the business of the war' or κοινὰ τὰ φίλων ('things shared between friends'), etc. Here, too, the Romance languages offer a welcome parallel. While in contemporary French, for example, celui + gen. is usual in such expressions, in the seventeenth century it was still possible to say l’autrui (lit. ‘that of the other’) in the sense of ‘the good of others’ (cf. Suchier 1904–6: 808).

Analogously, in German, too, the article (without a noun) can be combined with a genitive or a prepositional phrase, when the noun can be supplied from the context. In this case, the full form of the article is used (II, 131 above)—e.g. in denen des Vaters, denen in der Stadt ('for those things of the father’, ‘of those people in the town’)—which suggests that the parallel Greek constructions above should still be regarded as instances of the pronominal use of the article; compare
Lat. *ille cum gladio* (‘the man with the sword’, Quint. 6. 1. 48) and the like (and cf. II, 139–40 above).\(^{13}\)

The Bible translations incidentally illustrate nicely how the other languages behave in comparison with Greek in this respect. New Testament Gk *οἱ μετ’ αυτῶν* (‘those with him’), while rendered in Gothic with a formally parallel construction (e.g. Mark 2: 25 *παί μη ἵμμα* and so generally—though cf. Luke 6: 4 *παί μη σις νισανδαμ*, lit., ‘those being with him’), is translated with a relative clause in Latin, Slavic, Armenian, and—remarkably—even in Luther’s version: *qui cum eo erant, die mit ihm waren*, etc. (cf. Meillet 1926a).

As far as I can see, this sort of combination of *article with an adverb* occurs in Homer only in expressions for ‘formerly, in the old days’, ‘in the whole of the past’: τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ πάροιδον, τὸ πρῶσθεν, τὸ πάροιθεν, sometimes with following *γε* or *περ*, while πρῶτον and its synonyms without the article can (and in classical Greek must) mean ‘in an earlier age’. The model for these phrases was surely the common τὸ πρῶτον, τὰ πρῶτα ‘at first, to begin with’, and they are imitated in turn in | Herodotus and Attic by τὸ πάλαι, τὸ παλαιόν, τὸ κατ’ ἀρχάς (‘in ancient times’, ‘in the beginning’) and the like, and also by τὸ / τὰ νῦν, τὸ αὐτίκα, τὸ ἀπὸ τούτος, τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦτου (‘at present’, ‘currently, immediately’, ‘from now’, ‘hereafter’).

In post-Homeric Greek, there are other sorts of combinations of *article + adverb* (as with prepositional phrases), including those with personal reference of the type *οἱ νῦν* (‘men of the present age’). But in general only adverbs of place and time are involved, adverbs of manner being less common since corresponding adjectival forms were available. An apparent exception is offered by τὸ *ἐὖ* ‘the good’, which occurs in the refrain of the parodos of Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon* (121 = 139 = 159 τὸ ἐὖ νυκάτω; cf. 349 τὸ ἐὖ κρατοῖ, both ‘let the good prevail!’), and in Euripides at *Heracles* 693–4 τὸ γὰρ ἐὖ τοῖς ὑμνοισιν ὑπάρχει (‘for I have a splendid theme [lit., the good is available] for my hymns’) and in the famous passage (also parodied by Aristophanes, *Acharnians* 659–64) fr. 918, 3–4 *TrGF* V.2 τὸ γὰρ ἐὖ μετ’ ἐμοῦ | καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ξύμμαχον ἔσται (‘for goodness is with me and justice will be my ally’). Taking this ἐὖ as an adverb is made apparently plausible by Eur. *Bellerophon*, fr. 285, 16–17 *TrGF* V.1 τοῦ ἐὖ τητόμενος | ὅκι ὁδεῖν (‘he [the man who has never had anything] does not know that he is deprived of the good’), but it is incomprehensible how in such an obviously ancient expression a modal adverb could have come to be used rather than a noun. I have no doubt that in τὸ ἐὖ (as the parallelism with τὸ δίκαιον in Euripides suggests) we should recognize rather the substantivized neuter of the Homeric adjective ἐὸς (‘good’). A substantival *ἐὖ* ‘a good thing’ (Lat. *bonum*) is to be inferred from ἐὰν ‘of good things’ (Lat. *bonorum*) attested three times in Homer: *II. 24. 528*

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\(^{13}\) Cf. Apul. *Met.* 1. 12 *illa cum gladio* ‘the woman with the sword’!
δοιος πίθοι...κακών, ἔτερος δὲ ἐάων ('twin vessels...one of evils, the other of good things'); Od. 8. 325 δωτήρες ἐάων ('bestowers of good things'); and Od. 8. 335 δῶτορ ἐάων ('O bestower of good things')—where we might read *δῶτερι like σῶτερ (?)').

The old neuter here was recognized by BUTTMANN (1830–9: I, §35 n. 9.1**), following Apollonius the Sophist, Homeric Lexicon p. 61, 21 Bekker,15 and SCHWYZER (1917/20Ω: 159–61) demonstrated its etymological connection with Vedic forms. We can see the old nom. pl. in Hesychius’ gloss ἰγάθα ‘(good things), with the same long ἐ as ἰ. The gen. corresponding to this nom. would have been originally *ἐέων. The Ionic bards, accustomed in the process of epic composition to replacing their native, Ionic 1st-decl. gen. pl. -εών with -άων, replaced *ἐέων with ἐάων, and thus achieved a good hexameter ending.16

The singular matching this old plural is τὸ εὖ. It is easy to understand why fifth-century speakers could no longer decline the word (as Euripides’ τῶν εὖ shows): in Attic the original gen. would have had to have been *εὔος, there was no model for the formation of a new gen. to εὖ, and hence Euripides treated the word as indeclinable.

As a synonym of τὸ ἰγάθων, τὸ εὖ is still to be found in fourth-century philosophical prose, at Plato, Timaeus 68c and in Aristotle (cf. BONTZ 1870: s.v.). But at the same time it occurs also in adverbial function, e.g. at Plato, Crito

48b τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιήτου, ἄλλα τὸ εὖ ζῆν...τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς | καὶ δικαίως παῦτόν ἐστιν (‘the most important thing is not to live, but to live well...and to live well is the same thing as living honourably and rightly’). Here, then, τὸ εὖ corresponds not, as in Euripides above, to τὸ δικαίον, but to τὸ δικαίως, where ζῆν (‘to live, living’) could be supplied. Plato has similar...

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14 More questionable in fact is δώτηρ in the prec. quot., from 10 lines earlier in the same scene (from the second song of the Phaeacian bard Demodocus). The root of δωτήρες (for expected δωτήρες) is analagous on δωτορ, which is poetic compared with the commoner word δωτήρ, but correctly formed (cf. δῶτωρ vs βοτήρ 'feeder, pasturier', ἀλετήρ vs ἀλετήρ 'defender'); cf. Hainsworth in Heubeck, West, & Hainsworth (1988: ad locc.), Risch (1974: 28–31), with further references, including to the classic account of the two formations by Benveniste (1948). Note that this phrasal epithet of the gods/a god, ‘bestower(s) of good things’, is found also in Hesiod and the Homeric hymns, and has been compared with the epithet of Indra in the Rgveda, dātā vāsi (cf. dātā vāsu and the compounds vāsūdā-, vāsūdāvan-) ‘giver of good things’; see Durante (1962: 28). Both Frisk and Chantraine, each s.v. ‘eos’, object to the comparison with Skt vāsū- that there is no trace in Greek of an original initial *p-, although they both allow the possibility that *esu- and *eswu- were confused in Greek. Cf. n. 16 below.

15 This work, which survives in an abridged version (and in some papyri fragments of longer versions, was compiled c. AD 100. It is important because of the sources on which it drew (notably Apion’s glossary and Aristarchus’ commentaries on Homer), and for its citations from otherwise lost authors (including the Homerist Heliodorus). The standard edition is still that of I. Bekker (Berlin 1833, repr. Hildesheim 1967). For further information, see Haslam (1994) and Dickey (2007: 24–5).

16 This explanation of the stem of ἐάων is still favoured by Frisk and Chantraine, s.v. ‘eos’; for an alternative account, see Szemerényi (1937). Perhaps deliberately in the interests of simplicity here, W. does not raise the question of the initial ἐ- in ἐάων, the usual form of the word; see now Hainsworth in Heubeck, West, & Hainsworth (1988: on Od. 8. 325) with further references, and esp. part two of Nussbaum (1998b), esp. 130–39, with earlier bibliography at 87 nn. 1–2. Cf. n. 14 above.
constructions at *Laws* 2, 667c τὸ ἐὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς (‘goodness and nobleness’), and *Philebus* 45cd τὸ σφόδρα, τὸ μᾶλλον (‘intensity’, ‘greater intensity’), although he was anticipated in it by Euripides at *Hipp.* 264 (Phaedra’s nurse) ὦ̣το τὸ λίαν ἱσσον ἔπαινῳ τοῦ μηδὲν ἄγαν (lit. ‘thus I approve the excessive[ly] less than the “nothing in excess”’; similarly Andr. 866, Phoen. 584), rather freely translated by Wilamowitz (‘bescheidet euch lieber, erzwinge nicht das Glück’, lit. ‘rather be modest, do not force happiness’); on attributive λίαν, cf. II, 139 above.

There are a few other uses of the article which demonstrate its utility for abstract expression. From Plato and Demosthenes on, we frequently find τὸ used to refer to words and phrases as such—e.g. *Phileb.* 20b τὸ εἰς βούλη (‘the phrase “if you like”’), Dem. 18. 88 τὸ δ’ ὑμεῖς δ’ταυ λέγω, τὴν πόλιν λέγω (‘when I say “you”, I mean the city’)—and in this function it is often combined with τοῦτο (e.g. twice at Plato, Prot. 331c). Not surprisingly, this is especially common in the *Cratylus*, which is after all about words. But it is worth remembering here that in this Greek use of the article to adduce a noun the gender of the article was often attracted rather lazily to that of the noun and then even used in the clause, e.g. at Plato, *Theaet.* 206c τί ποτε καὶ βούλεται τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν σημαίνει; ‘what on earth does he actually mean us to understand by “logos”?’, with τὸν λόγον instead of τὸ λόγος (cf. Lehrs 1837: 325–8).

In addition, the article can refer to complete clauses in this way. Demosthenes has περὶ τοῦ with an indirect question at 3. 2 and 9. 7. At Plato, *Rep.* 1, 352d οὐ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄντα τρόπων χρῆ ζῆν (‘the argument is not about any old question, but about the question in what way one must live’), this is prepared for by the preceding περὶ τοῦ + adnominal genitive. This type of construction may have developed from the use of the article to introduce a relative clause (II, 131 above).
A rather more detailed study is called for with regard to the question why in languages with a full-fledged article there are certain situations where, although apparently justified or even required, the article is not used. Two main types can be distinguished: first, cases in which the meaning of the noun is definite, but no expression of definiteness is required; and secondly, those in which the phrase originates in a variety of language which lacks the article.

The first group is treated in extreme detail in the grammars and commentaries, so I shall be brief. In the first place, Greek and German have in common omission of the article from forms of address. In German this applies pretty well without exception, in Greek only when the vocative form is used, or a nominative that regularly replaces the vocative, while in certain types of address the genuine nominative—and with the article—was common. We spoke of this idiom and its origin in an earlier lecture, when we considered alternations between nom. and voc. (I. 307 above). One might add a reference to idioms such as Od. 22. 252 oí ἔξις ‘you six’, or the still clearly pronominal instance at Od. 20. 149 (Eurycleia to the serving women) ἀγρεῖθ’ αἱ μὲν δῶμα κορήσατε (‘come on, you lot, sweep the house’).—It is not surprising that the voc. is used without the article—and indeed, the voc. has this special treatment also in non-Indo-European languages, such as Indonesian—for it makes no sense expressly to indicate that an addressee is known and definite. One or two ancient grammarians had the impression that the vocative particle ὁ was the counterpart of the article in the other cases—that e.g. ὁ πάτερ (voc.) corresponded to ὁ πατήρ (nom.)—and they consequently wished to regard ὁ as the voc. of the article. This perverse theory is first attested in the grammarian Trypho, who lived in the Augustan period, and who was incidentally by no means negligible as a linguist. The view is rebutted at length by Apollonius Dyscolus in his Syntax (1. 73, GG II.2, 62–73), but traces of it still recur later on, and the grammarian we know as Probus (GL IV, 133, 3) even goes so far as to label Latin ὁ as the voc. sg. and pl. form of hic, since hic was in effect the Latin counterpart of Gk ὁ (II, 129 above).

1 See Fernández-Galiano in Heubeck, Russo, and Fernández-Galiano (1992: ad loc.).
2 Cf. the references to the ‘personal article’ in Indonesian languages in Krámský (1972: Index, s.v. ‘Indonesian languages’), again with the caveat quoted in n. 4, p. 557 above.
A subordinate instance of omission of the article may be mentioned in passing. As in German, it is common in Greek not to use the article in titles in the nominative of documentary texts, although their reference is always to definite items. So, e.g. on a fourth-century Attic inscription (IG II². 1668, 2; acropolis, 347/6 BC) ἀναγραφαὶ τῆς σκευοθήκης ‘(there follow) the conditions applying to the equipment store’, or on the famous Heraclea tablets (IG XIV. 645 = Collitz & Bechtel no. 4629, 94) ἄνωθεν Διονύσου χώρων ‘agreement regarding the parcels of land of Dionysus’. Remarkably, the style of ancient documents in Elean differs on this point in normally beginning ἰὸν ἰὸν τὴν ἀρχήν ‘(there follows) the law/the treaty’. The widely accepted explanation of Schömann (see Dittenberger & Purgold 1896: 3) to the effect that ἰον here is still a demonstrative pronoun in the sense of Att. ἰον ἰον ἰον ‘this is . . . ’ has been rightly rejected by Danielsson (1898/9: 82 n. 1); it would sit ill beside the other pronominal uses of the article (II, 131–3 above). On the contrary, ἰὸν ἰὸν ἰὸν is exactly what we should expect, and the only reason why we are not surprised by the normal omission of the article everywhere else is that ἰον ἰον ἰον is in line with predominant usage in the modern languages. If we are to look for an explanation, we must bear in mind that we are dealing with indications which are confined to the written language: the author does not wish to write a whole sentence, but just a keyword to catch the eye, and so uses only the most essential.

The style of officialdom was followed by that of librarians: the article can be omitted from book titles, too, and here again there are parallels available in German. As Behaghel has nicely shown (1911b: 89–90), in German from the fifteenth century on, one finds alongside book titles consisting of a sentence (e.g. dis ist das bottbuch ‘this is the commandments-book’) or comprising a noun with definite or indefinite article (e.g. das buch der medicin ‘the book of medicine’, ein buch von her Lancilot ‘a book of sir Lancilot’) other titles based on a bare noun (e.g. form eines ersamen lebens ‘form of a worthy life’, tractat von den seben gebotten ‘treatise on the ten commandments’), and today this is practically the only usual form. Behaghel holds the model of Latin to be ‘responsible’ for this. I would not wish to deny the influence of Latin, but comparison with Greek shows that modern German usage could perfectly well have arisen without external influence.

While in these two instances the omission of the article has to do with the case function of the noun, in other situations the relevant factor is the meaning of the noun. A particularly important group here comprises proper names, and we begin with personal names. Given that they have definite reference in and of

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3 See e.g. Buck nos. 61–3.
4 W.’s examples are from manuscript catalogues relating to the libraries of Basel, Heidelberg, and St Gall; Behaghel (1911b) gives precise references. Of the first (the Middle High German bottbuch, or Book of the Ten Commandments, by Marquard von Lindau), note the recent edn and comm. by van Maren (1984).
themselves, they do not require the article, and its absence is indeed normal in Gothic and in the modern German written language (and by and large in the modern languages generally), except—unlike in the vocative—the addition of an adjectival attribute entails the use of the article, too. Colloquial speech, however, goes its own way. Precisely because personal names always have definite meaning, in Swiss German they always take the article. This is evidently very widespread in the German-speaking countries, and surfaces in literature, too, whenever colloquial speech is represented there. Even Schiller, in *Wallenstein*, uses the article with personal names when he wants to give direct speech a certain colour, whether of colloquial crudeness or of intimacy: on the one hand, the generals call the despised opponent *der Octavio*, on the other, Wallenstein says tenderly to the son of Piccolomini, ‘Max, du kannst mich nicht verlassen! Es kann nicht sein, ich mag’s und will’s nicht glauben, dass mich *der* Max verlassen kann’ (‘Max! Thou can’t not leave me; it cannot be; I may not, will not think that Max. can leave me’, *The Death of Wallenstein*, act 2, scene 7, tr. S. T. Coleridge, 1800); see now Solmsen (1922: 201).

The Greek use of the article with proper names cannot be reduced to a summary rule, and individual special studies—such as that of Blass on Demosthenes (1889: 6–17)—are particularly instructive. | In general terms, the first thing to say is that from the earliest times both use and omission of the article are attested, in Homer right at the start of the *Iliad*, 1. 11 οὖνεκα τὸν Χρύσην ἡτύμησ’ ἀργητῆρα (‘since he [Agamemnon] had dishonoured Chryses, priest’)—although the article is hard to explain here, and should probably be replaced with οἱ [ = Ἕρ] (‘for him’, i.e. Apollo).5 But more exact observations may be made as well. The article is often used when a person is named for the second time, e.g. at *Il.* 2. 104–7 Πέλοπι . . . αὐτὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς Πελοπ . . . Θεότητα . . . αὐτὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς Θεότητα (‘[Hermes gave the sceptre] to Pelops . . . and Pelops in turn to Thystes . . . and Thystes in turn [to Agamemnon]’); or Herodotus 3. 68. 1–2 Ὄτανης ἤν Φαρνάοσεω παῖς . . . οὐτος ὁ Ὄτανης (‘Otanes was a son of Pharnaspe . . . this man Otanes’)—between here and 3. 70, Ὄτανης is used six times with the article, and thereafter haphazardly with and without; or Thuc. 5. 36. 1 Κλεόβουλος καὶ Ζέναρης followed by τοῦ Ζενάρου καὶ Κλεόβουλον at 5. 37. 1, and there are countless examples in all sorts of texts. Secondly, the article can be used more or less for the sake of clarity, so in the Bible for indicating the case of indeclinable names, e.g. at Matthew 1: 2 ἠβραίῳ ἐγέννησε τὸν Ἰσαάκ (‘Abraham begat Isaac’; cf. *II*, 109, 130 above). [Add.: Similarly in German in *der Ring des Polykrates* (‘the ring of P.’), *die Kraniche des Ibykus* (‘the crane of I.’), names with which no one would use the article in the nominative.] Thirdly, the use of the article seems to carry a connotation of disdain in the case of slaves’ names, e.g. Arist. *Knights* 67 τῶν Ὑλαν, *Peace* 1146 τῶν Μανίν, where the

5 See Kirk (1985: ad loc.) with references to Chantraine (1953: 163–5) and Leumann (1950: 12 n. 1).
article is otherwise unmotivated (see Schulze 1896: 242). In colloquial speech, the use of the article must have become more widespread, as it is the rule in modern Greek (see Thumb 1910: $S_{76}$) as in the German dialects (II, 145 above).

In Greek, divine names are treated by and large just like names of human beings, although νῦν Δία, μᾶ Δία, πρὸς Διός (all, ‘by Zeus!’) constantly occur without the article. The Christian God is called in Greek both θεός and ὁ θεός, but in Germanic the word for ‘God’ is treated as a personal name, as is Christus, and in Gothic this is even extended to fraua ‘lord’ and atta ‘father’ when used as designations of God. The Romance languages generally do the same (Fr. Dieu, Sp. Dios), but It. Iddio (beside Dio) contains a fossilized article (il-). However, as in the case of German personal names (II, 145 above), use of the article is triggered by the addition of an attributive adjective: so, e.g. at 1 Timothy 1: 11, like Gk τοῦ μακάριον θεοῦ (‘of the blessed God’) are both Gothic þis audagin guþs and Luther’s des seligen Gottes, and compare NHG der liebe Gott, Fr. le bon dieu (in English, ‘the dear Lord’, ‘the good Lord’).

Names for members of the family have the status of personal names when used by other family members: German Vater, Mutter, Papa, English Father, Mother, Daddy, etc., and here German dialects differ from the written language just as they do in the case of personal names. In this group belongs also Αττικ βασιλεύς for ὁ βασιλεύς, with reference to the Persian King, in Xenophon, Spartan Constitution 13. 10, 15. 1 ff., of the Spartan kings, and in Cypriot of the king of Idalium on the Idalium Bronze.7 [Add.: In Old Icelandic prose, too, konungr (‘king’) is used without the article (Heusler 1921: §408 n.).] It is nicely observed already by Apollonius Dyscolus at Syntax i. 140 (GG II.2, 115) ‘ἐνταράδεκτον . . . καὶ τὸ ὁ βασιλεύς οἰκέτης, καθ’ δυνάμει κύριον ἐστιν ὄνομα τὸ ὁ βασιλεύς· νοεῖται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐπικρατοῦντος ὁ Πτολεμαῖος (‘it is quite acceptable to say ὁ βασιλεύς οἰκέτης “the king’s servant” [without the article], since ὁ βασιλεύς [with the article] is in effect a name; for if one says “the current ruler”, one understands Ptolemy’), a comment which, in view of the reference to the | Egyptian royal household, looks to be inherited from the Alexandrian grammarians, as is indeed the case of many examples in grammatical works of the imperial period.—This usage is not followed by the modern languages.

The use of the article with names of peoples and the various kinds of geographical names is in many points analogous to the above, both in Greek and in German, and the patterns are easy to observe. So, too, with the names of festivals, such as Παναθηναίοις, Διονυσίοις (‘at the Panathenaica’, ‘at the Dionysia’), Ostern, Pfingsten (‘Easter’, ‘Pentecost’), or with Gk πόλεως (‘city’), which the orators use without the article when they are speaking of their own city (compare ἐν πόλει ‘on the acropolis’

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7 On the script of this inscription, see n. 4, p. 285 above.
The meaning of the noun is not the only factor that can cause the article to be dispensed with. The addition of certain attributes can have the same effect, although here our languages differ more sharply from one another than in the contexts discussed above. The article with the demonstrative pronoun was mentioned earlier (II, 137 above), and in the case of jeder (‘each, any’), and alle (‘all’), both Greek and Romance are slightly different from German: the French for ‘all friends’ is tous les amis; in Greek with ἐκαστός, the article is admitted only after Homer and not consistently. The subtle rules applying to Gk πᾶς (‘all’) you may find in the grammars.\(^8\)

I confess, I am puzzled as to why in NHG, in most of the other Germanic languages, and in part of Romance, there is no place for the article with the possessive pronouns, this being in contrast with its admission in e.g. Italian, and in contrast with Greek usage, where the article is frequent already in Homer—e.g. II. 23. 295 Ἄιθην τὴν Ἀγαμεμνονέν τὸν ἕων τὸ Πόδαργον (‘Aithhe, Agamemnon’s mare, and [the] his own [stallion] Podargos’)—and the rule in Attic, save when the noun is part of the predicate.

We now come to the second of the groups distinguished above (II, 143), those cases of omission of the article originating in a variety of language which lacks the article. One of the characteristics of the poetic style, first of all, is to restrict or avoid the use of the article. In Greek, the form of poetry that is most extreme in this regard is high lyric, including the lyric parts of drama (see Bernhardy 1829: 313; Crusius 1894: 20), although the phenomenon is not entirely foreign to tragic dialogue: so, to pick one example, Wilamowitz (1895) comments nicely on Eur. Her. 1248 that the ordinary Greek for ‘the man in the street, the first person you meet’ is ὁ τυχόν / ἐπιτυχόν, so that in the line εἴρηκας ἐπιτυχόντος ἀνθρώπον λόγου (‘you speak the language of an ordinary man’) Euripides has sought to use omission of the article to ennoble an everyday expression.—Ultimately, this rejection of the article in Greek poetry goes back to the model of Homer, and we have seen (II, 128–9 above) that in Homer its rarity reflects the fact that the epic language reaches back into a prehistoric phase of Greek in which there was no article. But avoidance of the article is by no means always an archaism. Composers of higher poetry favour forms of speech which are physically vivid, and are disinclined to use words which serve to mark mere intellectual connections, in particular grammatical words of all sorts. The same applies to the article, and to the Latin anaphoric eius, on the avoidance of which in high poetry

\(^8\) See, e.g., KG I, §465.6; Cooper (1998: 30.11.8–13).
there is a famous note of Bentley’s on Horace, *Odes* 3. 11. 18.⁹ (ms. add.: Cf. Propertius 4. 6. 67.)

In German poetry, too, the article may be omitted in places where it is normal in ordinary speech. In the *Prolegomena on the Language of Logau*, Lessing¹⁰ (1759) shows how Logau follows this tendency in the case of abstract nouns, e.g. *Aber Neid hat schel gesehen | Und Verhängnis ließ gesehen* (‘but envy squinted and let disaster happen’), and elsewhere, too, e.g. *Man hat den Feind aufs Haupt geschlagen, | Doch Fuss hat Haupt hinweggetragen* (‘the enemy was hit on the head, but Foot carried Head away’). Lessing’s view is that the poet thus turns common nouns into proper names; Behaghel (1911b: 87) assumes Latin influence.—I am not competent to make judgements of this sort on any German poetry, but note that Goethe in his old age has particularly striking examples in the second part of *Faust*, e.g. act 1, scene 3 *zerstreut sich tapf’re Heer im Feld* (‘[the] brave army disperses itself in the field’). For the rest, I refer you back to our much earlier remarks (I, 12 above) on the influences which led in the eighteenth century precisely in poetry to an un-German avoidance of the article.

An avoidance of the article similar to that in poetry is seen in proverbs. Here, too, a prehistoric form of expression is preserved, but what was a retained archaism in the oldest proverbs may in other cases rest on imitation of old material, and was able to win more readily its place as a stylistic feature of the proverb in that it satisfied the requirement of brevity of expression. Two examples from Greek may suffice. While in German we say, *Eine Hand wascht die andere* (Lat. *manus manum lauat* ‘one hand washes the other’), the Greek version is *χείρ χείρα νίττει* (Menander, *Sententiae* 543 Meineke = 832 Jäkel); cf. however Epicharmus, fr. 211 *PCG* I α δε χείρ ταύ χείρα νίζει, and Meleager, 9 Gow & Page α δε χείρ ταύ χείρα (on this proverb, cf. I, 157 above). In the same way, omission of the article is eye-catching as a feature of proverbial expression if we compare Cratinus’ quotation of a proverb in the *Deliades*, fr. 24 *Kock*¹¹ ἂν ἄρ᾽ ἀληθής ὁ λόγος, ὃς δὶς παῖς γέρων (‘the saying is true then, that the old man is in his second childhood’), with Plato’s allusion to it in ordinary speech, *with* the article, at *Laws* 1, 646a ὁ γέρων δὶς παῖς γίγνοιτ’ ἄν. Examples from German proverbs you can gather for yourselves.¹²

⁹ Bentley (1869) *ad loc.* proposes *excetque* for *eius atque* of the mss.

¹⁰ The great poet of the German Enlightenment Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–81) edited for the first time, with K. W. Ramler, the satirical epigrams (*Sinngedichte*) of the Baroque poet Friedrich Freiherr von Logau (1604–55), added some remarks on their qualities, and so drew them to public attention. The examples quoted by W. are on p. 8 of the 16-page introduction (‘Vorbericht’) to the glossary at the end of Lessing & Ramler (1759).

¹¹ Cf., *with* the article, the edition in *PCG* IV, Cratinus fr. 28 ἂν ἄρ᾽ ἀληθής ὁ λόγος, δὶς παῖς ὃς ἐσθ’ ὁ γέρων.

¹² English usage varies: contrast e.g. *A stitch in time* . . . , *A friend in need* . . . with *The cracked pitcher* . . . , *Spare the rod, and spoil the child*, and see Quirk et al. (1985: §§5.26–35).
Related to proverbs are instances where some idiom from an early period when the article was less usual has been bequeathed to the language of today. This is the case of NHG *abhanden* (‘absent, unavailable’; < OHG *aba hantun* lit. ‘away from [one’s] hands’), *vorhanden* (‘available’), and our local Swiss idiom on the address of official letters *zu gehörten Handen* (‘for the attention of’, lit. ‘for honoured hands’), in contrast with *zur Hand* (‘available, there’) and *vorderhand* (‘for the time being’); compare English *beforehand*, *sword in hand*. Note that these forms lack the umlaut normal in the plural of *Hand* (*Hände*), and that *abhanden* in particular reflects a sense of *ab* that is no longer familiar in the written language.\(^\text{13}\) Obsolete inflection is seen in the phrases *auf Erden* (‘on earth, in this world’) and *vor Augen* (‘manifest, visible’),\(^\text{14}\) and the absence of article strikes at least a note of formality, first in noun phrases with a preposed genitive, e.g. ‘Priams Veste war gesunken’ (‘Priam’s fortress had fallen’),\(^\text{15}\) des Hauses Wächter, *des Haupts Krone* (‘guardian of the house’, ‘crown of the head’; on a further factor here, see below), and, secondly, in copulative phrases of the type *Haus und Hof, Stadt und Land* (‘house and home’, ‘town and country’), Rückert’s ‘einst wenn Seel und Leib sich trennen’ (‘some day when body and soul are separated’),\(^\text{16}\) an Haupt und Gliedern (lit. ‘on head and limbs’, ‘root and branch, drastically’), *Ross und Reiter* (‘horse and rider’). And one further example: in the original Hebrew text, the Bible begins with the words, ‘In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth’, which is rendered exactly in the Greek . . . , but which Luther translates in medieval fashion without the article, *Himmel und Erde*. This phraseology without the article is attested to this day. Corresponding to this is French *ciel et terre*, Spanish *cielo y terra*, and the like, and the general tendency in Romance to reject the article in fixed formal phrases (cf. *Meyer-Lübke 1890–1902*: III, 185). English does the same (see G. Krüger 1910–19: II, 931–2, §1982).

Phenomena of this sort are found also in Greek. With the referring expressions for groups mentioned above we may perhaps compare Demosthenes 9. 69 καὶ ναὸτην καὶ κυβερνήτην ‘sailors and helmsmen alike’, as well as the phrase that recurs frequently in Thucydides ναὸς παραδοῦναι καὶ τείχη καθελεῖν (lit. ‘to surrender ships and dismantle city walls’), in which the ships and city walls referred

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\(^{13}\) On *ab*, cf. II, 169 & n. 22, p. 609 below. Cf. also *zuhanden* ‘available’, which in Switzerland and Austria can also mean ‘for the attention of’, in addresses (in German usually *zu Händen*). The absence of umlaut reflects the earlier *u*-stem declension of this word (cf. Gothic *handus*), before its transfer to the *i*-stems; on this and other words for ‘hand’ in Indo-European, see Markey (1984).

\(^{14}\) In these phrases, *Erden* and *Augen* are both old ‘weak’ (*n*-stem) dat. sg. forms. The word for ‘eye’ is reconstructed as an *n*-stem in Proto-Germanic, while ‘earth’ is an *i*-stem in Germanic and its *n*-stem gen.-dat. sg. arises esp. in Middle and early modern High German; for details see the new edn of *D. Wb.*, s.vv., with further references.

\(^{15}\) The opening line of Schiller’s poem *Das Siegesfest* (‘The Victory Celebration’) of 1803.

\(^{16}\) Friedrich Rückert (1788–1866) was a notable poet and translator especially of near-eastern literature, and from 1826 Professor of Oriental Languages and Literatures at Erlangen.
to are always definite. Comparable with German abhanden in respect of the absence of article are Gk ἐν χειρῶν νόμω, ἐς χειρῶν νόμων as expressions for hand-to-hand fighting. The type αὐτοῦς ἔστιν was discussed earlier in this regard (I, 57–8 above). The omission of the article in certain formal expressions relating especially to time, such as ἄπε ἦρε, ἐς ἐω, μνητηρίως (‘at dawn’, ‘since dawn’, ‘at the Mysteries’), can equally well be treated here as (with Krüger 1873–91: I, §50.2 nn. 11–12) among cases of common nouns being treated as names (cf. II, 146 above). In addition, the old locative was fossilized and confined to certain words, or classes of words, before the emergence of the article. Hence οἶκοι (cf. the old ablative in Delphian οἶκω: I, 303 above), and Ἡσμοι, Ἐλευσίνι, Ἀθήναις (‘at the Isthmus’, ‘at Eleusis’, ‘at Athens’), and the like, always without the article, although otherwise, in certain circumstances place names admit the article. 17

Equally, while the postposition -τε ‘to’ was current, the article was lacking, so that we have not only in Homer, naturally, ὡντε δόμουτε (‘to his own house’) without the article but also Attic οἰκαδε, Ἐλευσιναδε, Ἀθηναξε (‘home(wards)’, ‘to Eleusis’, ‘to Athens’). To this we can relate the observation that in French the article is not used with the preposition en save in certain phrases like en la personne de... and in en lettres/sciences (en being an old contraction of en les). So, you say en France, although the country is otherwise la France, and although in other cases you say e.g. au Canada. Meillet (1921d: 190) is quite right to call this use of en without the article ‘une survivance’ (‘a relic’).

One final point. We mentioned foreign influence earlier, under poetic usage, but we find it also in a well-known pattern in later Greek. In Hebrew, the article, although regularly used, is omitted with a noun followed by a word which depends on it (and is hence in the so-called ‘status constructus’) or when a pronominal suffix in the sense of the genitive is attached to the noun. The meaning of the noun is adequately determined by the added element, and there is hence no need for an article; with this we may perhaps compare the omission of the article with the possessive (II, 147 above) and with a preposed genitive (immediately above). In translating such expressions, then, the Greek translators of the Old Testament liked to omit the article in Greek, too, e.g. at Psalm 34: 16 ὄφθαλμοι Κυρίου ἐπὶ δικαίους καὶ ὥτα αὐτοῦ ἐς δέησιν αὐτῶν <the> eyes of the Lord look on the righteous and his ears hearken to their cry’, and this feature occurs partly as a Semitism arising in translation and partly as a Septuagintalism in New Testament Greek (cf. Blass & Debrunner 1913 [=1961]: §259), especially in formulaic prepositional phrases, e.g. Matthew 2: 1 ἐν ἡμέραις Ἡρῴδου ‘in the days of Herod’, Luke 1: 69 ἐν οἴκῳ Δαβίδ τοῦ παιδὸς αὐτοῦ ‘in <the> house of his servant David’.

17 On the omission and admission of the article with placenames and other proper names, see KG I, §§461–2.
Let us recall once again (cf. I, 12 above) the Latinizing omission of the article in certain idioms of German legal language, in order to note a parallel phenomenon. Meyer-Lübke has shown (1890–1902: III, 202–3) that in Italian since the fifteenth century the article is frequently omitted with detto, e.g. in detta città ‘aforementioned city’; he compares Spanish dicha generosidad ‘<the> aforementioned generosity’ and Surselvan18 dits uvischs ‘<the> aforementioned bishops’. His suggestion that this is due to the influence of Latin official and legal language may be regarded as certainly right.—Even the omission of the article in the Romance vernacular parts of the well-known Strasbourg Oaths of AD 842 is now regarded as a Latinism (see Wolterstorff 1920: 91).19

With regard to the article, in one respect German (and English) are richer not only than Latin but even than Greek: they possess not only the definite article but also an indefinite article. While in German and English it is possible to make a threeway contrast between Holz, wood: ein (Stück) Holz, a piece of wood: das Holz, the wood, in Greek the first two are just ἔξωλον in contrast to τὸ ἔξωλον. True, ἡξόλον τι with the indefinite pronoun is also available, but first of all this means ‘any piece of wood’ (NHG irgend ein Holz): it expressly marks indefiniteness, while a piece of wood, ein Holz merely excludes definiteness; and secondly, the addition of an indefinite pronoun is optional, while the use of the indefinite article is obligatory whenever the reference is to an unspecified token of a type. In other words, we have here a genuine enrichment and refinement of the available means of expression.

Now, just as Latin in its later stages acquired a definite article, so the modern descendants of both Latin and Greek possess the indefinite article as well. And significantly, moreover, as in Germanic, this purpose is served by the numeral ‘one’, which indeed often functions as an indefinite, as e.g. in NHG einmal, einst, English once, modern Gk μίαν, Fr. une fois, as opposed to Gk ποτέ, Lat. aliquando, quondam.

Incidentally, both Greek and Latin show us earlier stages in the development of the indefinite article. In Latin, one way of saying ‘anyone’ is unus aliquis;

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18 Surselvan (W. uses the old label ‘obwaldisch’, not to be confused with the modern, German-speaking canton Obwalden in the very centre of Switzerland) is the westernmost of the dialects of Swiss Rhaeto-Romance, spoken in the Surselva, the valley of the Vorderrhein, a tributary of the Rhine, in the Swiss canton of Graubünden/Grisons; for further information, see Haiman (1988).

19 The Strasbourg Oaths are the pledges of allegiance sworn to each other, and against the Emperor, their brother Lothair, by two grandsons of Charlemagne, Louis the German, ruler of the eastern kingdom of the Franks, and Charles the Bald, ruler of the western kingdom. Each spoke the oaths aloud in the hearing and in the language of the army of the other, Charles in Old High German, Louis in an early form of Gallo-Romance, an ancestor of Old French. The oaths are quoted verbatim by the Frankish historian Nithard, another grandson of Charlemagne, in his Latin Books of Histories, 3. 5. His quotations of the Romance version constitute one of the oldest surviving documents in a Romance language clearly distinct from Latin. For the omission of the article, note e.g. Si Lodhuigs sagrament . . . conservat ‘If Louis keeps the oath . . . ’, and contrast the OHG version, with the article, Oba Karl then eid . . . geleistit. See S. Sonderegger’s article in the LexMA, s.v. ‘Straßburger Eide’, with bibliography.
In Wulfila) with sums ‘a man’. 24—The parallelism between languages extends on this matter even to a decisive

Mark 22

Luke

del a in the languages of Africa and of Indonesia (cf. in many parts of the world. There are instances in Sanskrit, in Coptic Egyptian, where it has nothing whatever to do with the number.

examples of 

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marked by the postposed -

pattern only on the second point, as it has no definite article but an indefinite one, development between unrelated languages. Modern Persian, however, fits the relative chronology, more recent than the definite article, and always—or nearly always—derived from the numeral for ‘one’, a striking new instance of parallel relative chronology, more recent than the definite article, and always —or nearly —or nearly

Everywhere, the indefinite article is rarer and, when it is possible to establish a relative chronology, more recent than the definite article, and always—or nearly always—derived from the numeral for ‘one’, a striking new instance of parallel development between unrelated languages. Modern Persian, however, fits the pattern only on the second point, as it has no definite article but an indefinite one, marked by the postposed -i < -ê < -ev (from Old Persian aïva ‘one’) as in märd-i, ‘a man’.24—The parallelism between languages extends on this matter even to a

20 Richard Bentley’s ms. notes on Iliad 1–6 (preserved in Trinity College, Cambridge, ms. B. 17. 17) were transcribed and published by W. A. Wright (1884–5), here at p. 158.

21 Note, however, that N. Dunbar in her edn of Birds (Oxford 1995) on 462–3 λόγος elš translates all these Aristophanic examples of elš as ‘a particular’.

22 Part of the Greek tradition, which is followed by e.g. Luther and the English versions, has not ‘eagle’ but ‘angel’, but of course this does not affect W.’s point.

23 The use of Skt īha- ‘one’ approaches that of the indef. art. in epic and classical Sanskrit, and is used in the plural to mean ‘some’ already in later Vedic; see Ai. Gr. III, §174c, Whitney (1889: §482c).

24 In modern Persian, the indef. art. -i can be used with plural forms, e.g. ketāb ‘some books’ beside ketāb ‘a book’. In colloquial language, the numeral ‘one’ yak can be used as an indef. art., on its own or in

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formal point. In keeping with the weaker accent which the numeral ‘one’ has when it is the article, there is a distinction in Swiss German and English, as in many other Germanic languages, between *e Kind, *en Epfēl (‘a child’, ‘an apple’) and *ai Kind, *ai Epfēl (‘one child’, ‘one apple’). Equally, a Cappadocian dialect of modern Greek has an opposition between the indefinite article *a, *αν and the numeral *αν (cf. THUMB 1910: §56), and in Coptic the indefinite article *ον / *ι is the unaccented form of the numeral *ον (cf. STEINDORFF 1904: §152). The examples could certainly be multiplied.

Richer even than German and English with their three-way contrast, is French, in that English bread can be not only pain but also du pain (and in certain situations de pain), with the so-called partitive article. 27

combination with -ı, e.g. *yak kētāb, *yak kētābı ‘a book’. Note that modern Persian is not altogether without markers of definiteness: there is a (second) particle -ı which links a noun to a following restrictive relative clause (as in, ‘the book which I mentioned’); a particle -e which (in the colloquial language) is affixed to definite individual nouns (and means roughly ‘the one in question’); and a particle ra which follows a definite noun in the accusative. On all these, see Boyle (1966: §§8–9) and Lazard (1989: 275–6).

25 In modern standard German, in writing, the numeral is often marked as such by an accent (e.g. *es war *ein Mann ‘there was one man’, as opposed to *es war ein Mann ‘there was a man’); in speech, the numeral is always pronounced with a stress on the first syllable, while the indef. art. regularly loses the first syllable altogether, leaving only the *n ending, e.g. [n] for *ein, [n2] for *eine, [n3] for *eines, etc.; cf. Hammer & Durrell (1991: §4.1.2).


27 On the partitive article and on the omission of the article in French, see Grevisse §§68–9 and 570–1.
Lecture II, 17

Having dealt with the noun and the other words which have case-forms, I ought to go on to speak first of the verb, and of course there would be plenty to say about it. But we have already spoken at length of the meaning of the forms of the verb (I, 73 ff. and esp. I, 105 ff.), and we shall come to speak under clause structure about the relations which the verb in the clause can or must have with other constituents. And as for the nature of the verb as a part of speech, finally, I refer you to earlier discussion (I, 71–3 above), where I made some comments about movements across the boundary dividing the verb from other types of word. It therefore remains only to say a brief word about the term ‘verb’ itself.

Lat. uerbum is a translation of Gk ῥῆμα. Already in Plato this word is used, other senses apart, also to denote the part of speech of which it subsequently became the Greek name, apparently on the basis of the sense ‘that which is stated of something’; cf. Arist. On Interpretation 3, 16b7 ἐστιν ἄει τῶν καθ’ ἐτέρου λεγομένων σημείων (‘it indicates always that something is said or asserted of something’); note also Skt a¯khya¯ta-, ‘finite verb’, literally ‘that which is stated’ (cf. I, 14 above and n. 36). Π Plato defines the ῥῆμα from another point of view at Sophist 262a as τὸ ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ὅν δῆλον (‘the indication which relates to actions’); cf. VAHLEN (1914: 119–20). For Aristotle, the characteristic feature of the ῥῆμα is that, unlike the δόμομα, it denotes also time (VAHLEN 1914: 118–19). Accordingly, Varro coined as a Latin term for this part of speech the phrase ‘uerbum temporale’, which in turn is the root of the German term ‘Zeitwort’. Usually, of course, Varro calls it simply ‘uerbum’, the standard Latin term thereafter, which is impractical in that uerbum continued to exist alongside it in its general, non-technical sense ‘word’, a fact that Roman scholars like Quintilian (see Inst. 1. § 2) found awkward. In German and in English, there is no such problem.

Of the indeclinable words, those of greatest interest for us are the prepositions and the negatives, and we need to devote a somewhat longer discussion to these two classes.

To begin with the prepositions: we must at once take issue with the ancients and rebuke them sharply for leaving us with such an awkward term. Latin ‘praecpositio’
(in Varro and others, ‘praebervium’) is a translation of Gk πρόθεσις ‘placement in advance’, which is used for the first time of the class of words that we are about to characterize in the little teaching book ascribed to Dionysius Thrax. This term is not attested by the earlier Stoic writers, who included the relevant words under the σύνθεσις (‘conjunctions’) and may have called them ‘σύνθεσις προθετικός’ (‘prepositive conjunctions’; cf. Apoll. Dys. Syntax 4. 5, GG II.2, 436). These words take their name, then, from their position, from the fact that they immediately precede those constituents that they determine. I commented earlier (I, 6 above) that this name is completely wrong given the fact that the preposition is not always immediately adjacent to the word it determines, and secondly that the preposition is not always preposed. I remind you of the phenomenon called ‘anastrophe’¹: it is simply absurd to have to speak of the postposing of these words, when preposing is signalled in their name as their chief characteristic. In reality, the prepositions are indeclinable words, which are often used as adverbs but whose essential property involves specifying the meaning either of a verb or of a case-form in close combination with the relevant form.

Let me begin by offering a few notes on bibliography; as always, I am not aiming at completeness. For Greek I would highlight four works of very different kinds, each of which represents an important treatment of a significant aspect of the study of prepositions.² I have already (I, 30–1 above) cited the book by Tycho Mommsen on the Greek prepositions (1886–95).³ This work admittedly encompasses neither all prepositions nor all aspects of their use, but it is of methodological significance. Few works on Greek grammar rest on such a comprehensive set of observations, from Homer to the late Byzantine writers, and no earlier work elaborates the observations with such incisive statistical information. As I noted earlier, Mommsen’s starting point was an observation made of the Attic orators, to the effect that in the finest Attic writers including Isocrates and Hyperides ‘with’ is always μετά, never σύν. Mommsen developed this, considering the question especially from the stylistic point of view. His work yielded some striking results, e.g. that Xenophon has both μετά and σύν, and σύν indeed twice as often, and that in this respect as in many others he cannot be counted among the pure Attic writers; cf. Gautier (1911: 49) with very good discussion of precisely this point in his excellent book on the language of Xenophon. Indeed, even in late authors, the use of these prepositions can contribute to deciding questions of authorship: e.g. the grammarian Herodian

¹ For ancient definitions and examples, see Lausberg (1998: §713, and Index §1245, s.v.).
³ Note also Tycho Mommsen’s much earlier piece (1876) on μετά and σύν in Euripides.
uses only μετά, the author of the work Περὶ σχημάτων (On Figures) falsely ascribed to Herodian, uses only σῶν (cf. I, 21 above). It is similarly striking that the oldest part of the Septuagint, Genesis, and in the New Testament both the stylistically refined Letter to the Hebrews and the coarsely vulgar Book of Revelation are distinguished from the other works in their respective collections by their avoidance of σῶν.

The historical and comparative aspects of the story, however, are neglected by Tycho Mommsen. He is not concerned with the fact that σῶν is the older word for ‘with’ and that μετά moved only secondarily into its place, and he pays insufficient attention to how the meaning ‘with’ is expressed in different contexts. For if we subject the Attic inscriptions to a closer examination, we find that in Attic usage μετά is preferred with persons, σῶν with things (Meisterhans & Schwyzter 218 §85.34), and it is more or less so already in Herodotus. How this came to be the case will emerge later (II, 240–8 below).

Another very good piece of work is Günther’s article on the prepositions in the Greek dialect inscriptions (1906/7). We shall see later what great discrepancies the dialects show in this area, and how markedly many of them differ from Attic usage, with which we are most familiar.

Among the works which concern prepositional usage in a single author, I would mention here again (cf. I, 37–8 above) that of Krebs (1882) on the prepositions in Polybius. This is another topic that has repaid investigation, as even prepositional usage illustrates, first, the character of Polybius as a writer—in that he allowed his use of them to be affected considerably by his avoidance of hiatus; and secondly, the character of the Koine as a stage of Greek very much further developed than Attic—in that frequently a simple case-form is replaced by a prepositional phrase, and individual prepositions such as ἀμφε, individual constructions such as περὶ + dative, have completely disappeared—so, at 29. 15. 3 περὶ τοῖς ἀκροίς (‘around the heights’) must of course be emended to περὶ τοῖς ἀκροι, which is securely attested at 3. 54. 1.—Another extremely valuable study is M. Johannessohn’s on the use of the prepositions in the Septuagint (1925).

On Latin, I would pick out the treatise by F. Pradel on the meaning and use of the prepositions in early Latin (1901). Naturally, Hand’s Tursellinus (I, 40 above) is still always useful to consult on this subject, too. Latin and Celtic are treated together by Sommerfelt (1920).—On the prepositions in German, there is an extraordinary wealth of material in Grimm (D. Gr. IV, 924–1071). And in a survey of their use in all the Indo-European languages the prepositions are treated in detail by Delbrück in his comparative syntax (1893–1900: I, 643–774).

4 Krebs’s work is developed by Foucault (1972: 107–23).

5 This passage of Polybius is in fact quoted from Plutarch, Aemilius Paullus 16.
Our first question has to be: what are the prepositional words that our languages actually have? If we start with Greek, we can distinguish two groups fairly clearly, at any rate more clearly than in Latin. On the one hand, we have **true prepositions**, that is, words which occur *both* in close combination with verbs *and* governing case-forms. Most of the prepositions that belong here are inherited in this function, as after all prepositions constituted a category already in Indo-European. Greek continues something ancient in its use of ἀνά, ἀπό, ἐν, ἐξ, ἐπί, παρά, περί, πρό, πρῶς, ὑπέρ, ὑπό, and to an extent in that of ἀντί and κατά. A few forms have no exact cognate outside Greek, such as διά (though cf. Lat. *dis-*), μετά (though cf. NHG *mit*), σύν / ξύν. Conversely, a few have been lost (some of which survive in Latin: see II, 158 below), or are seen only in meagre relics. A gloss in Hesychius reads αὐχάττειν ἀναχωρεῖν, i.e. ‘retreat, go back’. The meaning makes one think of Att. χάζεσθαι, and the double ἀ-ττ- in αὐχάττειν suggests Cretan origin, where forms such as φροντίστοντες (cf. Att. φροντίζ-) are attested (BECHTEL 1921–4: II, 699). This leaves α-, which is obviously to be compared with the au- in Lat. *afero* (‘carry away’). This preposition is very rare in Latin, too, and survives there only because the ab(s) used for ‘away’ in the perfect *abstuli* and the participle *ablatus* could not be used before the *f* in the present, | as it would have merged with *ad-fero* in the form *afferō*. The same applies to the second Latin verb compounded with *au*, *aufugio* (‘flee; flee from’). There are cognates of *au* in nearly every branch of the family, more frequently with verbs than with case-forms: OCS *u-běžati*, ‘flee, escape’ (cf. Gk φεβομαι) matches Lat. *aufugio* also in meaning.

Then there are a few new forms which arise within Greek itself. I wish to mention only two as being particularly striking. First, *πεδά*, which is used in the sense of *μετά* in a whole series of Greek dialects. It is probably simply a case-form of the word for ‘foot’. With regard to the *ε* (compared with the *ο*, *ου* of *ποδός, πούς*), recall *ἐκατόμπεδος*, *πεδός* (’100 feet long’, ‘on foot’), and Lat. *pēs*, and as for its meaning, compare Lat. *pedsequus* (‘an attendant’, lit. ‘a follower on foot’) and NHG *auf dem Fuss folgen* (‘follow close on someone’s heels, in the wake of something’).  

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6 Such ἀ-ττ- corresponding to Attic ἀ-ζ- is found also in Elean (e.g. νοσίπτω = Att. ἀνοσίπω ‘propose recall from abroad’), and the alternation is seen even between Attic and Ionic in e.g. Att. ἀφάττω vs Ion. ἀφάζω ‘slaughter’. Note, however, that the usual counterpart to Attic-Ionic ἀ-ζ- (initial ἀ-) is *δδ*- (initial δ-), not only in Cretan but in Boeotian, Thessalian, Elean, and Laconian as well, and that the story of the outcomes of pre-Greek *-dy-*, *-gy-* (and of *-t(h)y-*, *-k(h)y-*) is highly complex and yet to be worked out in detail. See for overviews of the dialects Buck §84 and Rix (1976: §92–3), and for a detailed study of literary examples down to the 4th c. BC, Barber (2006: esp. 313–24).  
7 On Balto-Slavic, and other comparative evidence, see esp. LEW, s.v. ‘au-’, and Vasmer s.v. ‘γ (3)’.  
8 We find *πεδά*, *πεδα-* (for *μετά*, *μετα-) in literary Aeolic (Sappho, Alcaeus) and Doric (Pindar, Theocritus) and, among the epicoric dialects, in Lesbian, Boeotian, Arcadian, and numerous Doric dialects including Argolic, Cretan, and Cyrenaean; cf. Buck §135.5. It is (probably) attested twice in Mycenaean (+ acc.)—including in the phrase *πε-δα wa-tu* perhaps ‘to the town’—alongside *me-ta*
If we now go on to ask how Greek expresses the meaning ‘in’, we find that it differs both from German and from Latin. It is straightforwardly clear that Greek \(\epsilon\nu\) corresponds phonologically exactly to Latin \(\textit{in}\) and NHG \(\textit{in}\). But while in Latin and German \(\textit{in}\) answers not only the question ‘where?’ (+ abl. or dat., respectively) but also the question ‘where to?’ (+ acc.), Greek has another word for ‘where to?’ with the acc., namely \(\epsilon\iota\sigma\zeta\) with the variant \(\epsilon\iota\sigma\). How is this to be explained? To start with, there are two matters of fact to be noted. First, \(\epsilon\iota\sigma\zeta\) and \(\epsilon\iota\sigma\) go back to the form \(\epsilon\iota\sigma\zeta\), which was used earlier and is preserved in certain dialects—a form, then, which is identical with \(\epsilon\nu\) except that it has an additional \(\sigma\). Secondly, it is to be noted that in a good number of Greek dialects—especially in Boeotian and the dialects to the north and west, West Locrian, Phocian, and Thessalian, but also in Elean, Arcadian, and Cyprian—the forms in \(\sigma\) are not used at all. These dialects use exactly the same preposition (+ acc.) for ‘where to?’ as they do (+ dat.) for ‘where?’. In those dialects, then, our preposition is capable of both constructions, just as in Latin and German, and there is no doubt that they have preserved the original state of affairs, and that \(\epsilon\nu\zeta\) (and \(\epsilon\iota\zeta\), \(\epsilon\sigma\)) is an innovation shared by only a part of Greek. The change was brought about by the need for sharper, better-defined expression, for a distinction between ‘where?’ and ‘where to?’, and the model was provided by the antonym \(\epsilon\zeta\zeta\) (‘out of’), with its word-final \(\sigma\). Incidentally, traces are preserved of the original, broader meaning of \(\epsilon\nu\) even in Attic-Ionic: in Homeric \(\epsilon\nu\zeta\-\sigma\zeta\alpha\), \(\epsilon\nu\zeta\-\alpha\zeta\alpha\) (‘opposite, over against’) and Attic \(\epsilon\mu\beta\rho\alpha\chi\nu\zeta\) ‘in brief; | slightly’, we find fixed combinations of \(\epsilon\nu\) with a governed accusative.\(^9\)

Beside these forms, which may be termed ‘true prepositions’, Greek has a second group of words, the so-called ‘improper prepositions’, sometimes termed ‘prepositional adverbs’. These are words which take case-forms, like the old prepositions, but which lack the second key characteristic of the latter group, in that they cannot be compounded with a verb. They are in part extremely old ‘among’ (+ dat.). Hamp (1983) equates Armenian \textit{yet}, and reconstructs a neut. acc. pl. On prepositions as case-forms of nouns, cf. n. 21, p. 396 below, and concerning hands and feet in particular note the old etymology of \(\mu\epsilon\chi\omicron\omicron\nu\) ‘until’ which compares it with Armenian \textit{mer} ‘near’, and derives it from ‘\(\textit{m}-\textit{g}^{5r}\textit{r}-\textit{i}\), i.e., the first syllable of \(\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\), \(\mu\epsilon\alpha\) + the loc. sg. of the word for ‘hand’ (cf. perh. another word for ‘hand’ or ‘foot’ in the second part of \(\epsilon\gamma\gamma\gamma\zeta\) ‘near’). For further references, see Schwyzer & Debrunner 498–9, Frisk and Chantraine, s.vv. ‘\(\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\)’, ‘\(\mu\epsilon\alpha\)’, Aura Jorro, s.vv. ‘me-ta’, ‘pe-da’, and Walde & Hofmann, s.vv. ‘pedisequius’.

9 On \(\epsilon\nu\zeta\), \(\epsilon\nu\), \(\epsilon\iota\sigma\zeta\), note the third section of an article by Brugmann (1883: 181–95) which W. has cited in other contexts. On the dialectal distribution of \(\epsilon\nu\), \(\epsilon\nu\zeta\), etc., see, for brief information, Buck §13.4, and, for a fuller account, Schwyzer & Debrunner 454–7 with further references. On the Homeric hapax \(\epsilon\nu\zeta\alpha\zeta\alpha\) at II. 15. 320, see Risch (1974: §125) and Janko (1994: \textit{ad loc.}) with further references. The original, broader meaning of \(\epsilon\nu\) is seen also in Attic-Ionic compound verbs such as \(\epsilon\mu\beta\alpha\nu\) ‘go into, onto’, \(\epsilon\mu\beta\alpha\lambda\nu\) ‘throw into, onto’; cf. Schwyzer & Debrunner 456, 460. Note that many Indo-European adverbs and prepositions show variants with and without final \(\sigma\), the dialect geography of which is surveyed for Greek by Coleman (1965: 87–8), and which are well reviewed for Indo-European as a whole by Russell (1988) with rich documentation and numerous further references.
words, which were inherited in this single function. One which is not often
added in this group is postpositive -δε (‘to, towards’), which is attached to an
accusative in phrases like οἶκον δέ (‘homewards’), ὀδυμποῦν δέ (‘to Olympus’) in
order to express more sharply the notion of motion towards. In οἶκαδε ‘homewards’ (which contains a neuter plural of οἶκος and φύγαδε ‘to flight’ (made to a
lost fem. *φοξ, ‘flight’), complete univerification has occurred, as it has in a different
way in Ἀθήναζε (for Ἀθήνασαδε), which serves in its turn as model for Μονοιξάζε
formed to the singular Μονοιξία (cf. II, 222 below). Note also the striking hapax
διχά-δε ‘in two directions’ at Plato, Symp. 215b διχάδε διοιχθέντες (‘taken apart,
opened up’).—At an early period, this -δε probably had a variant in the form -δω, as
in Homer ημέτερον δῶ ’to ours’ (lit. ‘to our thing’), where the ancients saw a
word like δῶμα (‘house’).11 Corresponding to this postpositive -δε, -δω is Avestan
-ασά / -άς, which is used in exactly the same way, and NHG zu, which agrees
formally with -δω as OHG ze does with -δε.12 Notice that in German the word has
developed to the status of a full preposition that can combine also with the verb.
This has important lessons for us, and we shall see similar things in Latin.

Equally old are a few other ‘improper’ prepositions in Greek, especially those
which cannot be explained straightforwardly in Greek terms, such as ανευ (with the
dialectal variant ανες) ‘without’, which is found only with the genitive, and also
the various words for ‘until’, including ηχρι and μέχρι and in the dialects
μέσφα and μέστε. Another preposition found only with nouns in the genitive is
ανεκα (‘because of, for the sake of’). It is agreed that it is somehow related to έκών
‘willing’. I would draw your attention to Gk έκητι, which means in Homer ‘by the
will of’ (cf. the negative δέκητι ‘against the will of’), but in Pindar and Tragedy
(in the form έκάτι) ‘because of, thanks to, for the sake of’, and also to NHG
um...willen ‘for the sake of...’. The έν- in ανεκα has yet to be explained.13

10 That is, a ‘collective’ neut. pl. like κύκλων beside κύκλου to masc. κύκλος ‘wheel’ (cf. I, 101–2 above)
rather than the acc. sg. of a lost root-noun *ἔδις; cf. Risch (1969: 831 n. 1) and Frisk and Chantraine, each
s.v. οἶκος, although Schwzyger 458, 624 favours the acc. sg.

11 Cf. ημέτερον δε ‘to our house’, and for the developed use of δῶ meaning unambiguously ‘house’
(though always at the end of the line), note e.g. Od. 11. 501 ἐσ ποτέρος δῶ ‘to my father’s house’; on the
various functions of (-)δε in Greek, see Risch (1969), and, on -δε and βό, Chantraine, s.v. ‘δο’, and Risch
(1974: §126e) with a full list of the Homeric forms in -δε.

12 We cannot know the antecedent of Younger Avestan -δα / -δά, since all word-final vowels were
shortened in that language; on the Avestan forms, Tucker (in progress) has recently shown that here the
postposition followed the locative rather than the accusative. On IE *-δύ/-δέ, see also Dunkel (1982: 3: 190–2).
Compare in Germanic e.g. OHG zuo, modern English in, OE in (all from Proto-Germanic *in) and
OHG za, zi, ze, Old Saxon te, ti, Middle and modern Dutch te (all from Proto-Germanic *ta); there is also a
Balto-Slavic preposition reconstructable as *δύ ‘to, up to’; for further comparative evidence, see LEW,
s.v. ‘da’, and Vasmer, s.v. ‘do’.

13 This remained the standard account of Gk ανεκα until the decipherment of Linear B revealed Mycen.
ε-νε-κα ‘for (the purpose of)’, with no trace of *νω and with regular placement before its governed noun (cf.
II. 1. 298 ενεκα κορης ‘for the sake of the girl’). A recent account sees in *ενεκα the acc. sg. of a root-noun to
IE *h,neh- ‘to reach’, orig. ‘to the attainment of’: see Meier-Brügger (1992: 1, 155, 159), and Frisk,
Chantraine, and Aura Jorro, s.vv.
Other ancient words of this type are in common use even outside combinations with case-forms: ἄμα ('together with'), for instance, which is related ultimately to the numeral 'one' (cf. II, 122 & n. 27, p. 550 above and II, 169 & n. 21, p. 608 below), occurs not only as a preposition with the dative but also as an adverb.

In many instances, these prepositional adverbs come in the course of time to replace the old prepositions, because they express the relation in question more fully and sharply. Compare the tendency in colloquial French—'pour être expres-sif'—to replace inherited sur with dessus, pardessus ('above, on top of'; cf. Meillet 1926: 74). So, from the Hellenistic period on, we find increasingly e.g. ἀπό replaced by μακράν, πόρρω ('far from'); περί, by πέριξ, κόκλω ('around, about'); πρό, by πριν and ἐμπροσθε(n) ('before, in front of'); ὑπέρ, by ἄνω, ὑπεράνω, καθύπερθε ('above, on top of'); ὑπό, by ὑποκάτω, ὑποκάτωθεν ('under, beneath'). These changes can also be related to points about the development of style. So, from the material adduced by Krebs (1884–5) in his study of this group of words in later Greek, we can see how the later prose-writers who represent the natural development of prose style, such as Polybius, Diodorus, and Plutarch, are very free in their use of such preposition-adverbs, while the artificial harking back to ancient models that we see in, say, Arrian or Dio Cassius is manifested also in their attempts to confine themselves to the true prepositions.

Let us turn now to Latin. Latin has in common with Greek a number of prepositions which display both of the main functions already discussed: so, ab, ante, de, ex, in, per, prae, pro, s-ub, s-uper; indeed, Latin even has a few very ancient prepositions which have been lost or become obsolete in Greek, although in general even in its earliest attested stages it has developed as a language much further than Greek. Examples include inter ('among, between'), and also cum + ablative, originally identical with the preverb com-/con-/co-, in both these forms and functions one of the most widely used prepositions in Latin, and which Latin has in common with its closest relatives, namely the Osco-Umbrian languages of Italy and the Celtic languages. That Greek once had it (at least as an adverb), and lost it only because other words emerged in its function, may be inferred from the adjective 

\[ \text{κοινός} \]

which certainly derives from *κοιμ-ιος. 17

14 Cf. Grevisse §988.

15 On the prepositions in Latin, there is a huge amount of useful information, both historical and stylistic, in Hofmann & Szantyr 214–85. On Osco-Umbrian, see, in addition to the individual entries in Untermann (2000), Untermann (1973), and Nocentini (1992).

16 (Notice Lat. -cum also as a postposition after the personal pronouns, in mecum 'with me', etc.) In Celtic, cf. e.g. the Old Gaulish preverb com- and Old Irish com-, co-. On the other Italic languages, see Untermann (2000: s.v. 'com') on the preposition, with cross-references to attestations of the preverb, and further references.

17 This is still the standard view, the only serious alternative being comparison with Mycen. ke-le-me-na, Homeric κείον (Od. 14. 425), and Skt śevá- 'friendly, dear'; see Schwyzer 309, 472, and Frisk and Chantraine, each s.v. 'κοινός'.
Greek has nothing to compare with Lat. *ad*, which is nevertheless inherited, as Celtic and Germanic (Old Irish *ad*, Gothic *at*, etc.) show. In passing I mention Lat. *ob*, which is regarded as a cognate, in another ablaut form, of Gk *ἐν*.

More typical of Latin, however, are not its occasional retentions of old forms, but its great innovations. To a much greater extent than in Greek, the group of old prepositions in Latin is partly ousted and partly enriched by words serving originally other functions. A good number of words which were originally pure adverbs or were used, say, like the improper prepositions in Gk, became in Latin full prepositions, and in particular capable also of forming compounds with the verb. Instances include *post; praeter* and *subter*, the inherited forms extended in *-ter; contrā* and *suprā*; and also *se* ‘without’, ‘apart from’, which is compared with Gk *ἐν* ‘for oneself, apart’ and related to the reflexive pronoun. To judge from Sanskrit, in the case of *trans* (which again has no cognate in Gk), not only the construction with the accusative but also the beginnings of combining with the verb were probably inherited.

The clearest and most interesting case is the following—and here I need to go back a little further. For expressing the notion ‘about’, there were originally two prepositions, in Gk garb *ἀμφί* and *περί*. Strictly, *ἀμφί* means ‘on both sides’, and *περί*, ‘round about’. The meaning ‘on both sides’ is clearly preserved for *ἀμφί* in numerous nominal compounds, not only in very ancient ones like *ἀμφίσθω* ‘for oneself, apart’ and related to the reflexive pronoun. To judge from Sanskrit, in the case of *trans* (which again has no cognate in Gk), not only the construction with the accusative but also the beginnings of combining with the verb were probably inherited.

The use of the Latin examples in this paragraph, as adverbs, prepositions and preverbs, see Hofmann & Szantyr §§131 (post), 132 (praeter), 157c (subter), 121 (contra), 137 (supra), and 138 (trans). Lat. *trans* (cf. Umbrian *trahaf, tra*-, Welsh *traw, tra*-) and Skt *tirās*, Old Avestan *tara*- Younger Avestan *tara*- are all derived in one way or another from the Indo-European verbal root *ṭh₂- ‘to cross, overcome’ (possibly seen in Gk *παρά* ‘penetrating’ → ’clear’); for discussion and further references, see the various treatments in *EWAia*, s.vv. ‘TAR’, ‘tirās’, Untermann (2000: s.v. *trans*), and *LIV*, s.v. ‘terh₂’.

Jasanoff (1976) identifies in the common ancestor of Gk *ἀμφί*, Lat. *amb(i)-*, Old Irish *im*b-, OGH *umbi*, etc. an instrumental or adverbial form in *-*bli of the root-noun *hent- ‘forehead, front’, of which the locative singular is widely recognized in Gk *ὅρα*, Lat. *ante*, Skt *ānti*, etc. ‘in front of’, and the acc. sg. in Gk *ἄντω*.
alongside this strict use. Even in Homer, ἀμφὶ is often used with a case-form or with a verb to mean ‘around’ without specific reference to something being on both sides. Indeed, German um, which is cognate with ἀμφὶ, has also taken on this general meaning. Thus, in passages such as II. 18. 564 ἀμφὶ δὲ κυανὴν κάπετον, περὶ δ’ ἐρκος ἐλασσε, (‘about them he made a ditch of dark metal, and drove around this a fence’, of Hephaestus making the Shield of Achilles; cf. II, 176 below), the poet even uses the two prepositions ἀμφὶ and περὶ precisely in parallel and with exactly the same meaning, and we can infer no less decisively a certain indifference on Homer’s part with respect to the original semantic distinction between the two from the compound adjective περιδέξιος, if we consider the question how it came to have its meaning ‘highly skilled’. Well, Greek had another adjective ἀμφὶδεξιος ‘right-handed on both sides’, i.e. equally skilled with either hand, ambidextrous, and then generally ‘highly accomplished’ (I can pass over its other semantic developments), and Aristophanes coined as its counterpart ἀμφιφίπτερος ‘left-handed on both sides, unskilled, clumsy’ (fr. 526 PCG III.2). Compare ἀμφιστεροδέξιος in the Greek Bible (e.g. Judges 3: 15), whence Christian Latin ambidexter and even ambisinister. Now, this ἀμφιδεξιος was not consistent with the dactylic metre, and in consequence Homer substituted περιδέξιος, which presupposes a weakening of the sense of the contrast between the two prepositions, although we now know much more definitely than before that the epic poets behaved in a very arbitrary fashion with their linguistic material. [Add.: Homer uses metrical lengthening of περὶ—and remember, he allows even εἰνὶ and ὑπείρ—only in the personal name Περιήθος, where the preposition was fixed—otherwise it is avoided. The reason for this is obviously to make it possible to use περὶ and ἀμφὶ interchangeably, with each able to replace the other. This explains the alternation between περιέπειν (‘treat, handle’) in Herodotus and ἀμφιεπειν in epic and later poetry (‘attend to’), and probably also that between ἀμφιεύη, ἀμφιεύη and περιέρυντος (Od. 19. 173), -τον, -τῷ (Hesiod, Theog. 193, 290), epic epithets of islands (lit. ‘flowed about’, ‘sea-girt’), respectively before and after a vowel—we must then, albeit reluctantly, abandon the fine suggestion of MEILLET (1927a: 8) that ἀμφιεύντος as applied to an island goes back to an age when the Greeks knew only islands in rivers, ‘with a stream on both sides’ (as in Indo-Iranian dvīpa- ‘island’, lit. ‘having two waters’). I would note explicitly that ἀμφιεύντος is confined to poetic language, the only examples in prose being Herodotus 4. 163. 3, 164. 3 (not of islands!), where an oracle, i.e. a text originally in hexameters, is paraphrased. (Why epic does not go in for metrical lengthening of most of the other disyllabic prepositions either, is a separate question—though none of the others required it as acutely as περὶ, given the possibility of elision before a vowel and in some cases apocope, neither of which was available to περὶ.)]
Now, while περί remained current throughout the history of Greek, ἄμφι gradually retreated. Apart from a few fixed compounds, it is hardly known in strict Attic prose (II, 208 below). The orators do not use it; Plato has it about a dozen times, Aristotle not at all any more. In its neutralized sense ‘around’, it was superfluous beside περί, and its original meaning ‘on both sides’ was expressed more clearly by means of ἄμφιστροφοθεοθεν and related forms.

Latin per has only its intensive meaning in common with its Greek cognate περί, as in permagnus ‘very big’. For the meaning ‘around’ Latin had at its disposal only amb(i), with its variant am, but while this (unlike Gk ἄμφι) defeated its old rival περί, it was obliged to yield early to a new form that expressed the meaning ‘around’ more sharply: this was circum, strictly the accusative of circus ‘circle’. (Its synonym in combination with case-forms circa is unknown in Old Latin, rare still in Classical Latin until the Augustan period, and not preferred over circum before Livy. That it is not original is seen also in the fact that it is excluded from composition with verbs and from nominal compounds as well, with the exception of the artificial circummoerium at Livy 1. 44. 4.22 It is unrelated to the archaic circumcirca ‘round about’, where -circa is actually neuter plural, and owes its form rather to analogy with other prepositions taking the accusative such as contra, infra, and intra. Another variant, circiter, comparable with praeter, etc., is found from Plautus on with the accusative, but never in composition with verbs.) Well, we can see nicely how this circum gradually encroaches on the territory of the old amb(i), just as in Greek the preposition-adverbs replace the old prepositions. Compare Gk κύκλω + gen., synonymous with Lat. circum, which replaces περί + acc., and even takes the acc. at Herodotus 4. 72. 5 κύκλω τὸ σήμα ‘around the grave-monument’.

In purely adverbial function, amb(i) is preserved in a couple of old compounds, such as ambi-egnus, of a sacrificial animal with which two lambs are offered alongside (it means lit. ‘having a lamb on either side’). But in independent usage for expressing the meaning ‘around about’, it is replaced already in the earliest Latin by circum.—So, too, in general, as a preposition governing a case-form. Let me draw your attention in passing to the old form idcirco (‘for that reason’) and the rather later attested quocirca (‘in consequence or on account of which’); we do not need to go into their morphology, but in their causal meaning (which ordinary circum does not have, but which is not hard to explain) they have points of contact with NHG darum (‘for that reason or purpose, therefore’). Construction with a case-form is attested for amb(i) only in Cato’s | an terminum ‘on both sides of the border’, and may be inferred from compounds such as

22 Livy coins circa-moerium, lit. ‘[that which goes] around the walls’, to explain the old sacred term pōmōrium ‘the formal boundary of a town’ (probably from *post-mōr- [the strip] behind the wall); see Walde & Hofmann, s.v. ‘pōmērium’.
amb-urbium (the annual expiatory procession round Rome) or Am-iternum, the name of the Sabine town on the River Aternus (Varro, Latin Lang. 5. 28; Schulze 1904: 541–2). Compare Α miệngίνης, a region of Macedon on both banks of the River Axios. And one is reminded in this connection of the legionary from Basel, Ambi-renus, who is immortalized on an inscription from Moesia Inferior (CIL XVI. 50, Aquincum, AD 105), though admittedly his name is from a Celtic language, which also had the preposition amb(i); cf. the ethnonyms Ambi-draui (those living on the River Drau) and Amb-isontes (a Raetic people at Pliny, Nat. Hist. 3. 137).—Lat. amb(i) survives best as a preverb in compound verbs, but even here it is frequently confined to the archaic language. For example, Cicero could no longer use ancīdere for ‘cut round’, but only circumāgere. There are differences of meaning between ambigere and circumagere (‘dispute, contend’ vs ‘drive round’), ambire and circumire (‘do the rounds of, canvass’ vs ‘go round’), amicire and circumicere (‘cover, clothe’ vs ‘throw around’). You will notice that in each case the circum compound is closer to the meaning, and sometimes also the form, of the simple verb, and that in this very fact it betrays its more recent formation. We have a very ancient example in amb-ulare, which Fick (1878: 264) regards as a compound of the lost Latin cognate of Gk ἄλαξθαι (‘wander, roam’), and here of course circum could not penetrate. Comparison with the other Italic languages is also instructive: e.g. corresponding to Lat. circumferre as the sacred term for the carrying around of ritual objects for purification is Umbrian an-fer (cf. Bächler 1883: 84–5).23 So completely has circum replaced the older word, that it can even mean ‘on both sides’, e.g. in the Sententia Minuciorum (CIL I2. 584, 8) termina duo stant circum uiam Postumiam (‘two boundary-markers stand on either side of the via Postumia’).24

There is a nice analogy in Late Latin to the emergence of circum. The loanword gyrus (Gk γύρος ‘ring, circle’), borrowed into Latin already by Cicero’s day, had become very common in the imperial period, especially in the colloquial language, whence its survival in Romance. To it were formed the phrases per girum, in giro ‘around’, and the latter is even found governing the accusative exactly like circum, e.g. in Itin. Egeriae 3. 8 in giro parietes ecclesiae ‘around the walls of the church’ (see Löfstedt 1911: 67).25

23 On the Sabellian cognates of Gk ἄμφθι, Lat. am-, see Untermann (1973) and (2000: s.v. ‘am-’) with cross-references to individual compound verbs.
24 This inscription on bronze of 117 BC (Warmingtton IV, 262), found near Genoa, records the arbitration of the brothers Quintus and Marcus Minucius regarding the boundary between two communities; see Vine (1993: ch. 10) with earlier references.
25 Cf. per girum + gen. at Itin. Egeriae 13. 3 per girum ipsius colliculi ‘around this hill’. New improper prepositions emerging from purely adverbial function typically govern first an adnominal gen. and only secondarily a direct, prepositional acc. or abl.; compare e.g. per medium + gen. ‘through, among’ → the French direct preposition parmi ‘among’, and cf. Hofmann & Szantyr 227.
Lecture II, 18

While Lat. *circum*, *sē*, and other words mentioned earlier attained full prepositional status and the capacity to form compound verbs, others, just like the improper prepositions of Greek, are found only with case forms, such as *cis* ‘on this side of’ and its archaic counterpart *uls* (‘on that side of’). In the main, these are words which function both as independent adverbs and as prepositions. The former role is generally the original one, and often it is possible to observe the prepositional usage becoming increasingly favoured over the course of time under the influence of particular models. The inherited word *prope* ‘near’—the base of *propitius* ‘gracious’, lit. ‘close by’, which consequently has comparative *propior* (see WÖLFFLIN 1902)—takes an accusative already in Plautus, and is followed in this in Classical Latin by its comparative *propius* and superlative *proxime*. Again, *inxtā*, in keeping with its origin in *iuscere* (‘to join’), must originally have meant ‘in closest combination’. In Plautus it means ‘alike, equally’ (*Trin*. 197), and in Classical Latin, with the accusative, ‘beside, next to’. In the case of *pōne* (from *postne*, cf. Umbr. *postne* ‘behind’¹), which had an archaic flavour already by Quintilian’s day (*Inst*. 8. 3. 25), prepositional use is attested alongside use as an adverb already at an early period, while the identically formed *superne* (see LEO 1898) is found governing a case-form only in Germanicus, *Aratea* 426–7 *superne* | *Centaurum lucet* (‘shines above [the constellation] Centaurus’).² Similarly, *clam* (‘in secret’) is both a preposition and an adverb already in pre-classical Latin, while its counterpart *coram* (‘in the presence of’) does not have both functions until Cicero, and in pre-classical Latin is purely adverbial, except in the *Lex repetundarum* of 133/2 BC (*CIL* I² 583, 40 *coram eo quei* ‘in the presence of the person who’).³ Incidentally, the ablative construction of *coram*

¹ This is still the standard view of Umbr. *perne postne* ‘in front [and] behind’ (*Iguv. Tab*. VIIb, 11); some take also Umbr. *superne* as an adverb meaning ‘above’ (though most see it as a prep. + acc.). The attractive alternative for *perne* and *postne* is that they are dat. sg. neut. of the derived adjectives in -no-/nā- (‘for that which is in front, for that which is behind’); for details and further references, see Untermann (2000: s.vv.).  
² Housman (1900) refused to accept *superne* as a preposition, and emended *lucet* to *mulcet* ‘touches lightly’ (to govern the acc. *centaurum*, with *superne* as an adverb), which editors have tended to accept; cf. the edn and commentary of D. B. Gain (London 1976), *ad loc*.  
³ This is the radical law passed by C. Sempronius Gracchus concerning the prosecution of former magistrates for misappropriation of money or property. Of the surviving substantial bronze fragments, see now the edition of Crawford (1996: no. 1).
(e.g. in *coram populo* ‘in the presence of the people’) is due probably to phrases such as *praesente populo, praesente amicis*, where *praesente* was in the process of becoming a preposition in the manner of NHG *während* (‘during’), Fr. *pendant*, *durant* (both, ‘during’), *sauf* (‘except, save’).\(^4\) Lat. *coram* + abl. then became in turn itself a model, and under its influence its antonym *clam*, which in pre-classical and still in later Vulgar Latin took the accusative (cf. Terence, *Brothers* 52–3 *clanculum patres* ‘without their fathers’ knowledge’), achieved its Classical construction with the ablative, and the adverb *palam*, synonymous with *coram*, attained in the Augustan period the status of a preposition, again with the ablative, e.g. Livy 6. 14. 5 *palam populo* ‘in the presence of the people’, Ovid, *Ars* 2. 569 *Marte palam* (‘in Mars’s presence’). In poetry and Silver Latin, *procul* and *simul* (‘far from’, ‘together with’) are also used with the ablative.

Another instance of an adverb developing prepositional usage before our eyes involves *intus* and *foras* (‘inside’, ‘outside’). On the model of *in, intus* of place where takes the ablative in Lucretius and Vergil, of place where to, the accusative in the first-century medical writer Scribonius Largus, while Apuleius, on the model of Gk *ἐν τοῖς οίκισι* (‘inside the house’), ventures *Metam.* 8. 29 *intus aedium* with the genitive (cf. also in Apuleius *incoram*, and in the Old Latin Bible *coram*, + gen., on the model of Gk *ἔναρτι*, *ἐν τοῖς* ‘in the presence, of’, etc., which take the gen.). Apuleius allows himself also *Apol.* 50 *foras corporis* ‘outside the body’, again | as a Grecism, like Gk *ἐκω + gen*. In the Latin Bible, we find the genuinely Latin *foras + acc.*, the model for which was *extra* (‘outside, the to the outside of’).

We have slipped down into Late Latin. Let us permit one more example here. The adverb *retro* ‘backwards’, related to the prefix *re-* (II, 168 below), is old, and has the same ending as *intro, citro, ultro* (‘inside’, ‘to this side’, ‘to that side’), but from the second century AD (e.g. Apul. *Metam.* 6. 8), it is synonymous with *post* (even of place where), and as such can take an accusative. Let me adduce two passages from the Bible: first, Mark 8: 33 *ude retro me* (‘get behind me’) for Gk *ὑπάγε ὑπόσω μον*, cf. Luther’s *gehe hinter mich*—in the corresponding passage in Matt. 16: 23, where the Greek original is the same, the Vulgate has the classically correct *ude post me*; secondly, 1 Timothy 5: 15 *iam enim quaedam conuersae sunt retro Satanam* (‘for some have already turned aside after Satan’): Gk . . . *διέσω ὑπό Σατανά: Luther . . . dem Satan nach.*—This prepositional use of *retro* survives in French *derrière* (‘behind’) < *de-retro*.

We were interested in Lat. *circum* also because we saw in it, as in Gk *περά*, the case-form of a noun acquiring prepositional value. This point of origin is even

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\(^4\) In other words, the participle or adjective in an ablative absolute construction is reinterpreted as a preposition governing the accompanying noun in the abl.: *praesente populo* ‘the people being present (ptc.)’ = ‘in the presence of (prep.) the people’; compare the very similar development in the case of Engl. *notwithstanding*, where the Latinate participial construction *X not notwithstanding* yields the prepositional phrase *notwithstanding + X*. 

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more frequent in the case of preposition-adverbs. Note e.g. NHG wegen and trotz
(‘because of’, ‘in spite of’), or Gk δικήν + gen. ‘like, in the manner of’ in tragedy.
Practically identical to one another are NHG dank, Gk χάριν, and Lat. grátia (all,
‘thanks to’), and beside the last is Lat. causā, which is reflected to some extent in
French à cause de and English because of. In Late Latin, beneficio and merito (both,
‘thanks to’) were used similarly with the gen., to begin with only when the cause
to be named was something favourable, but eventually with reference to any
cause: e.g. in a commentary on Lucan, we find miser erant, bellī civilis beneficio,
‘because of the Civil War, they were in a wretched condition’ (for more examples,
see the ThLL, s.v. ‘beneficium’, 1887, 74 ff.).—It is entirely natural that the last-
named prepositions take the genitive, and no less natural is the accusative after
secundum and secus (‘in accordance with’, lit. ‘following’), which originates in
the case of the object of the underlying verb, sequi (‘to follow’). The same applies to
(ex) adversus, (ex)adversum (‘opposite, over against’, lit. ‘turned towards’).

Here belongs another word for which one does not immediately think of
nominal origin, namely tenus ‘up to, as far as’, which is discussed by Wölfflin
(1884b), and by Hofmann (1927: 74–5). Underlying this preposition is an old
neuter noun related to Lat. tendere and Gk τείνειν meaning originally ‘stretching,
extension’. It is preserved in the earliest Latin with the meaning ‘snare’: Plaut.
Bacch. 793 intendi tenus ‘I have set the trap’, while the corresponding word in the
Rigveda means ‘descendants’ (tánas-, lit. ‘extension and continuation of the
line’).6 The nom.-acc. form came early to be used as an adverb in its original
abstract meaning, ‘with extension to, stretching to’, just like other | neuters
formed in the same way, such as Gk τέλος ‘in the end, at last’ (cf. I, 294 above),
and in this instance with the noun denoting the boundary or limit always
preceding tenus. It is interesting that in archaic and Classical Latin it takes more
than one construction, either the ablative or the genitive. The genitive is a
consequence of the nominal nature of tenus: when Cælius writes in a letter to
Cicero (Fam. 8. 1. 2, no. 77 Shackleton Bailey) Cumarum tenus ‘only as far as
Cumae’, the Latin means strictly ‘over the stretch defined by Cumae (as a limit)’.
On the other hand, the ablative in e.g. the formula Tauro tenus in the peace treaty
between Rome and Antiochus the Great (cf. Cicero, For King Deiotarus 36) is
certainly to be understood in a properly ablatival sense, ‘in the stretch from the
Taurus [mountains]’. In the latter case, the archaic preposition finī + abl., revived
by Sallust and others, may have been an additional factor: note e.g. Plaut. Men.
858 osse finī ‘all the way to the bone’, i.e. ‘with the bone as the limit’, or Cato, Agr.

5 On beneficio and merito as prepositions with the gen., see Hofmann & Szantyr 133, with further
references.
6 Cf. EWAia, s.v. ‘tán’, with further references. Alternatively, Lat. tenus is regarded as an old perfect
participle to tendo ‘stretch’ (< *tenus ‘extending’; cf. secus to sequor); cf. Sommer (1900: 63–4) and
Leumann 610.
28. 2 *radicibus fini* ‘to the roots’. Oddly, in earlier Latin, the genitive construction with *tenus* is confined to the plural, the ablative to the singular; not before Ovid and Livy do we find abl. pl. and gen. sg. There is no principled reason to be found for this; it is simply that originally there were some specific phrases which by chance used the genitive of plural nouns and the ablative of singulars, and which were then treated as models.—Because *tenus* was synonymous with *ad* and especially with *usque*, which in post-classical Latin could take the accusative of any noun, we find *tenus* from Valerius Flaccus on also governing the accusative (*Argonautica* 1. 538 *Tainın tenus* ‘as far as the [River] Don’), another of countless examples of analogical extension of construction (cf. I, 61 above, and II, 209–10 below). 8

We should mention here another remarkable Late Latin example of the development of a preposition from a noun. Old French had a word *lez* ‘beside’, which survives today in place names (e.g. *Plessis-les-Tours*, i.e. Plessis near Tours). This is nothing other than the Latin noun *látus* (‘side’), which in Late Latin (first in the combination *de látus*, then with ellipse of the *de*) could take an accusative (or ablative), on the model of, say, *prope*, e.g. *látus se* ‘beside himself’ (see LÖFSTEDT 1911: 67).

At the risk of tiring you, I venture to name one more source of preposition-adverbs. We shall have to concern ourselves later, in part of our study of clause structure, with the question how, in Greek, prepositions came to be used to introduce subordinate clauses. But the converse is found, too: I mean the use of old conjunctions as prepositions. A beautiful illustration of this is provided by Gk *πρίν*. At *Od*. 15. 393–4 (Eumaeus to the disguised Odysseus) οὐδὲ τι αὐτῷ ιππη, *πρίν* ἀρη, καταλέξεα̣ν ‘and there is no need for you to go to bed before (it is) time’. The verb ἦ (‘it is’, sg. 3 subjv.) is omitted, and the resulting *πρίν* ἀρη could be regarded as a prepositional phrase rather than as a clause in itself, but for the fact that the nominative would be odd. Hence, | the phrase appears in modified form in Pindar, *Pythian* 4. 43 as *πρίν* ῥα̣ς (‘before its time’), with gen. on the model of *πρό + gen. 10 We find the same genitive in the first-century BC geographical work falsely attributed to Scymnus of Chios (2nd c. BC) 716 Marcotte ἵνα ὁ Μεγαρείς κτίζωνοι *πρίν* Βουζαντίου (‘which the Megarians founded before Byzantium’), in the 1st-c. AD Jewish-Greek historian Flavius Josephus, and in Aelian’s *Varia Historia* (2nd-3rd c. AD) 151, 5 *πρίν* τοῦ πολέμου (‘before the war’; cf. SCHMID (1887–97: I, 397; III, 83–5; IV, 622). And hence *πρίν* ὄ̣δ instead of bare *πρίν* is found with the

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7 Like *praesente populo* (above), *osse fini* and *radicibus fini* are in the ablative absolute (lit. ‘with the bone / roots [being] the limit’); as a preposition, *fini* normally takes a gen.: cf. Hofmann & Szantyr 267.

8 On the cases governed by *tenus*, see Hofmann & Szantyr 267–8 with further references.

9 The older form *lez* is still in use in Belgium, while in France *les or lès* (e.g. Villeneuve-lès-Avignon) is usual; cf. Grevisse §988.

infinitive in the prose-writers of the Empire, as already in an inscription from Calymna, Collitz & Bechtel no. 3591a, 16 πρὶν οὗ λέγεσθαι τὰν δίκαιν ‘before pleading of the case’.11 (Comparable in general terms is quant et (‘together with’ ← ‘when . . . also . . . ’) in sixteenth-century French, which is based on an abbreviated temporal clause with quand ‘when’; cf. Nyrop (1899–1930: III, §625). Spitzer draws my attention to dialectal Italian quando la guerra ‘at the time of the war’, and Spanish donde ‘at the house of’.)

A similar development is seen in words for ‘until’; on this, see especially Günther (1906/7: 79–80). Gk ἕως and ἐστε and their dialectal variants were certainly conjunctions to begin with, but ἕως takes a noun in the genitive in Hellenistic Greek at any rate, and ἕως ὡς is already in the manuscripts of Herodotus; ἐστε is prepositional in ἐστε ὡς (e.g. in the Lindian Temple Chronicle, FGrH 532, D. 10, from 99 bc12), and otherwise takes the accusative, e.g. in Rhodian ἐστε τῶν ὄρων ‘as far as the boundary-marker’, though again this is not attested until later (note, however, [ms. add.1] from the 3rd c. BC, Archimedes, Sand-Reckoner 3, 2, p. 236, 25 Heiberg ἐστε ποτὶ). The chief models for this secondary prepositional use of ἕως and ἐστε were μέχρι(ς) and ἄχρι(ς), which were themselves used both as prepositions and as conjunctions, though admittedly only the former role is attested in Homer, and their use as conjunctions is clearly secondary. The fact that ἐστε, unlike ἕως, μέχρι(ς) and ἄχρι(ς), is found also with the accusative is due probably to the influence of εἰς.

Outside Attic proper, ἐστε and ἕως meaning ‘until’ are often combined with the true prepositions εἰς, ἐπὶ, and πρὸς; this applies also to Attic μέχρι and in the dialects to ἄχρι, μέτε, and μέττα. Along the same lines, since ‘until’ as a conjunction can also be ὄφρα in Homer, Apollonius of Rhodes ventures to combine ὄφρα too with a preposition, at 2. 805 ὄφρα αὐτοὶ ποτὶ στόμα Θερμώδοντος ‘as far as the very mouth of the ‘Thermodon’.

We turn now to individual points in the use of the prepositions. By and large, we shall consider only the true prepositions, not the preposition-adverbs, on which I have perhaps already said too much!

In principle, the earliest use of prepositions is as adverbs, with no particularly close relation to any other constituent, whether case-form or verb. A case in point is Gk ἀνά used as an appeal, ‘up!’, in Homer and still in tragedy, e.g. at Soph. Ajax 193 (Chorus to Ajax) ἄλλ’ ἀνά ἐξ ἐδράνων (‘but up! Out of your seat’), with a remarkable hiatus. Then there are the numerous cases where the preposition

12 This inscription records dedications, both mythical and historical, to the temple of Athena Lindia, and epiphanies of the goddess at critical moments in the community’s history. The researching and compilation of the document was entrusted to two Lindians, Tharsagoras and Timachidas, by a decree of 99 bc, which was inscribed above the chronicle itself. For further information, see now the edition of Higbie (2003).
forms the predicate of the clause, just as if it were combined with ‘is’ or ‘are’; one used to be told, wrongly, that this involved ellipse of the verb ‘to be’. So, e.g., πάρα ‘is available, exists’, ἐπὶ ‘is on’, μετὰ ‘is in the middle’ in Homer, and later ‘there is a share’, ἰπνο = ὑπεστι (like Homeric ὑπο) in an old inscription from Cuma (IG XIV, 871 = COLLITZ & BECHTEL no. 5269; late 6th c.). The toughest survivor of these is ἐν, a sort of amplified form of ἐν. To begin with, it meant ‘is/are in’, from Hellenistic times on ‘is there, is at hand, there is’, with loss of the local meaning similar to that seen in Fr. il y a. In modern Greek, it has been replaced with /i/ne/, with metathesis of the vowels, which serves simply as the copula ‘is, are’ (as it is already in ancient Corinthian, according to Kretschmer (1923b)!

The standard modern orthography of this form—ἐλπει—rests on a misinterpretation of the spoken form. 13

In Attic this usage is confined to the disyllabic prepositions, as only they had sufficient weight for the task. In later Doric this gave rise to new formations, such as ἐξο for ἐξ in the sense of ἐξεστι, probably on the model of ἀπο (in Timocreon of Ialyus on Rhodes, 5th/6th c. BC, fr. 9 West); on the same pattern, we also have ἐνο for ἐνεστι in Ps.-Epicharmus (P. Hibe 1 = fr. 244, 5 in PCG I14), in spite of the fact that ἐν was already available (cf. Solmsen 1907: 320–1).

In addition, most of the prepositions in early Greek, especially in poetry, remained usable as adverbial determiners of the clause as a whole or of individual constituents, particularly when supported by particles such as δὲ and γε. In Attic, and later too, πρὸς is commonly used this way, e.g. in Plato, Republic 1, 320a καὶ πρὸς γε παννυχίδα ποιήσουσιν ‘and in addition they will hold an all-night celebration’, and even without a supporting particle especially at the end of a clause or line, e.g. Plato, Gorgias 469b καὶ ἐλεεινῶν γε πρὸς ‘and pitiable besides’. This is the basis of προσέτι ‘in addition’. On Euripides’ use of adverbial περὶ where prose would have περί, see Wilamowitz (1895) on Heracles 1035.—Strictly speaking slightly different are cases where the preposition is independent and has the appropriate accent, but relates to a particular noun mentioned earlier. So, e.g. at Soph. Ant. 518, when Creon says, in reply to Antigone’s ἀδελφός ἀλετο (‘a brother had died’), πορθῶν δὲ τίρῳ γῆν ὀ δ’ ἀντιστὰς ὑπερ (‘but he was trying to destroy this land—while the other one stood against him in its defence’), we clearly have to understand τίρῳ γῆς with ὑπερ (‘on behalf of this land’). Similarly, in Homer at Il. 1. 611 ἐνθα καθευδ’ ἀναβάς: παρὰ δὲ χρυσόθρονος Ἡρη (‘he [Zeus]

13 Several variant forms of the sg. and pl. 3 of ‘to be’ are attested in medieval and modern Greek, and the details of the developments leading from ancient ἐν, ἐν to modern standard ἐλπει are controversial; see Jannaris (1897: §985 n. 1), Thumb (1910: §224.2 n. 2). Nevertheless, a two-stage analogical assimilation (both phonological and orthographic) to the other forms of the paradigm, esp. sg. 1 ἐλπει [i]ne and sg. 2 ἐλπι [ise], is more believable than a metathesis of the vowels and a misinterpretation of the spoken form: probably, then, ἐν → ἐν [ene] → ἐλπει [i]; see Horrocks (1997a: 97, 234).

14 Gk ἐν ἐν has recently been read on an Attic vase of about 420 BC found in Sicily; see Kassel & Austin in PCG I, ad loc. for references.
went up there and slept, and beside him was Hera of the golden throne'). —On similar phenomena in German, see Delbrück (1919a: 46), and on Late Latin prae ter ('besides'), pro per ('on that account'), un acum ('also, at the same time'), see Löfstedt (1911: 280–2). The supplying of the noun goes without saying in cases such as Horace, Epistles 1. 2. 16 Iliacos intra muros peccatur et extra ('wrong is done within the walls of Troy and outside'), where the preceding parallel phrase intra muros makes the relation of extra clear (cf. Enn. Ann. 390 Skutsch). —See also immediately below, on adverbial ὑπερ.

In contrast with Greek, Latin and German have largely given up the use of the old prepositions as independent adverbs. On German I cannot go into detail, any more than in our earlier discussion. In Latin, adverbial usage is not attested for any monosyllabic preposition, with the possible exception of de in the archaic idiom susque deque habere (also with ferre and esse) ‘to regard indifferently’ (probably literally ‘up and down’), nor is it attested for the ancient disyllable inter. On the other hand, ante has preserved the old adverbial usage, albeit with a significant shift of meaning, and so, too, to a limited degree has super, e.g. in satis superque ‘enough and beyond’. And because Vergil (and following him Livy) was able to use super in the Greek manner (II, 165–6 above) in the sense of superfest (‘it remains, is left over’), he ventured to extend this even to an attributive phrase, at Aen. 3. 489 (Andromache to Ascanius) o mibi sola mei super Astyanactis imago (= quae mibi sola superfest, ‘O you who are the only image which is left to me of my own son Astyanax’). For prae ter (formed by extension to prae) genuinely adverbial usage is not known in Classical Latin, although the popular language preserved the archaic prae ter-proper ‘more or less, approximately’ (lit. ‘further and nearer’), and because with prae ter ‘except’ the thing excepted was easily supplied from the context (cf. II, 166 above), it came to be used in the sense of praeterea ‘besides, as well’ (in the Elder Pliny with -que).15 In the case of words like post and circum, which became prepositions only in the course of special developments in Latin, adverbial use is only to be expected.

Let us simply recall in passing that adverbial usage is also presupposed in forms derived from prepositions, such as Gk ἐντερα, πρότερος, Lat. deter ior, extremus, Gk ἐντός: Lat. intus, Gk ὑπερθεν, ἀπόπροθεν, Lat. intro, etc., and especially in compounds, whether of the type Gk προπατωρ ‘forefather’, σύνδυο ‘in pairs’ (lit. ‘two together’), Lat. prōnuus, interrex, or possessive compounds (the so-called ‘bahuvṛthīs’; cf. II, 289 below) such as Gk ἐνθεός ‘having god within’, Lat. praeeptus ‘with head forward, headlong’. It is striking that occasionally adverbial usage of a preposition could re-emerge from compounds. So, for example, from the many compounds beginning with ὑπερ- ‘excessively’, we find ὑπερ- (accent?) ‘more than

15 Pliny has praeterque ‘and besides’ no fewer than 30 times in the Natural History (e.g. 20. 161, 23. 150, 29. 30).
normal’, in St Paul, 2 Corinthians II: 23 διάκονοι Χριστοῦ εἰσί; . . . ὑπερ ἐγὼ (‘are they servants of Christ? I am more’), which the other translators render with Lat. plus, Gothic mais, German mehr. Other compounds such as Gk ἐμβολή (‘inroad’, ‘ramming’, etc.), Lat. exitus (‘departure’, ‘exit’, ‘outcome’, etc.) are based on compound verbs, others again, like Gk ἐπάρωρος (‘attached to the soil’) and Lat. obtius (‘in the way’), on combinations of preposition + case-form; Gk ἀπελεύθερος ‘a freedman’ and the like, finally, are back-formed from compound verbs.16

Now, related to this adverbial role of prepositions is one of their two main functions, namely as preverbs. Following others, I mean to use the term ‘preverb’ (‘Präverbium’) specifically of those prepositions which combine with the verb, although in Varro, where the term ‘praueverbium’ is first attested, the word refers to prepositions in their whole range of functions.17 In fact, the relation of a preverb to the verb of which it is a part is no different from that of any other adverb modifying the verb, and Plutarch (Platonic Questions 10. 7, p. 1011D-E) reports an ancient theory which, given its basic viewpoint, is not such a bad doctrine, to the effect that preverbs may be seen as bits and pieces (Gk κόμματα καὶ θραύσματα) of adverbs, ἐν- and ἐκ- in ἐμμεῖναι and ἐκβεῖναι (‘come in’, ‘go out’) being contractions of ἐντὸς and ἐκτὸς (‘inside’, ‘outside’), προγενέσθαι and καθιζεῖν of προτερον γενέσθαι and κάτω ζεῖν (‘precede, come before’, ‘set down’).

Our first question is what preverbs we have. All inherited ‘true’ prepositions, in addition to their role governing case-forms, occur in the classical languages also as preverbs. In addition, there are a few words which are formally and semantically related to them, which, in marked contrast to the preposition-adverbs (which are confined to combination with case-forms: II, 157–65 above) occur only as preverbs. In Greek, αὐ- is the only one I can think of (II, 155–6 above), but there are several in Latin, including, in addition to au-, re(d)- ‘back’ (also in Umbrian) and also dis- ‘apart, away’, which is related to NHG zer- and may be cognate also with the numeral ‘two’ and Gk διά. It never occurs as a free form, and in di-ui-dere (‘divide’) it is combined with a synonymous particle which has otherwise disappeared. This verb conceals, as SCHULZE saw, an old *ui-dere ‘put apart’, the counterpart of con-dere ‘put together’. Sanskrit has a preverb vi- in

16 The second type touched on here (ἐπάρωρος, obtius), often called ‘hypostasis’, involves the turning into compound adjectives of prepositional phrases (ἐπ᾿ ἀρσεν, ὅμια). The first and third types (ἐμβολή / exitus and ἀπελευθερός) are not really compounds at all: ἐμβολή and exitus are regular nominal derivatives of compound verbs, ἐμβάλλω and exeo, respectively; ἀπελευθέρως is an irregular formation inferred from the compound verb ἀπελευθέρω ‘I free a slave’ and hence ‘make a freedman’ on the model of e.g. ἔλευθερός ‘I make free’: ἑλεύθερος ‘a free man’. On the various types of compound in Greek, see Debrunner (1917), Chantraine (1933), Risch (1974: §§67–76), and Meissner & Tribulato (2002) on Mycenaean.

17 I am not sure that this is right: all of Varro’s examples at Latin Language 6, 38 and 82 are preverbs in W.’s sense of the term; and according to the grammarian Scaurus (GL VII, 29), it is ‘others’, not Varro, who use the term ‘praeverbium’ of the ‘local adverbs’ ex in ad ab.
current use with exactly the same function as dis-, and without the ability to combine with a case-form. Its existence as an adverb in Greek may be inferred from the derivative ἰδιός ‘own, private’ (lit. ‘set apart’), and in Latin from nōtium lit. ‘that which deviates’. In dividere, then, the notion of dividing, separating is doubly marked, i.e. dis- was prefixed to the old nōdere, which, because of the general loss of *ni, was no longer sufficiently transparent. Prellwitz (1918) cleverly discovered this same ni in another verb: nūtare ‘avoid’ cannot of course be related to the verb of striving preserved in nūs ‘you wish’, in-nitus ‘unwilling’, and inūtō ‘invite’, and in the right account is suggested by the evolution of the construction of the verb. In pre-classical Latin it takes the dative, e.g. at Plaut. Cas. 211 buic verbo uitato (‘steer clear of this word’), and not until Classical Latin does it take an accusative + infinitive, probably under the influence of fugere (‘flee, run away from’; ms. add.²: there are, however, examples already in Plautus and Lucilius). Taking the older construction as our starting point, we can compare the Sanskrit compound of vi+i (cf. Lat. ire ‘to go’), which means ‘to split up, | go separate ways’:¹⁹ Proto-Latin *ni-itare, contracting to nūtare, is then the frequentative of this verb, meaning literally ‘turn aside, get out of the way’. Noteworthy is also the suggestion of G. von Sabler (1892: 280) that Lat. uituperare ‘find fault with’ (in Plautus also ‘declare invalid’) also contains this ni-, and is related to Gk (strike).²⁰

Another otherwise lost preverb, which was also combined from an early date with the verb ‘to go’, may be seen in Lat. simul ‘at the same time’ (lit. ‘in going together’; cf. I, 280 above). In sim- lurks an old word for ‘together’, cognate with the root of Lat. simul, Gk άμα (both ‘at the same time as, together with’), and Gk α-, α- in compounds such as αδρός, α-κόλουθος, α-λοχος (‘crowded together’, ‘follower, attendant’, ‘partner of one’s bed’).²¹

Not infrequently, a preposition starts life with the capacity to enter a construction with a case-form, then loses it, and ends by being confined to use as a preverb. I should like to begin with a particularly clear example from German. In modern German, ab functions only as a preverb, but in the earliest stages of Germanic it is also a case-preposition: Wulfila translates Gk ἀπό and εξ + gen. with af+d-at., which has cognates in the other old Germanic languages and in

18 These etymologies of ἰδιός and nōtium are due to Brugmann (1904b: 492) and Schulze (1907: 444 n. 1) respectively; for alternative accounts and further references, see Frisk, s.v. ‘ὅς’, and Walde & Hofmann, s.v. ‘nōtium’.

19 EWAia, s.v. ‘vi’, quotes Rigveda 7. 34. 13, where my ētu means ‘let it (the enemies’ missile) go past’.

20 Both Walde & Hofmann and Ermout & Meillet prefer to see in uituperare an old compound of nītum + parare ‘to effect a flaw’ → ‘to find fault’.

21 Gk α- is by regular sound-change from *sn- (initial *s > Gk b, and syllabic *m > Gk ἀ). Cf. Lat. sim-plex: Gk ἀπό, one-fold, simple’, Lat. sem-per ‘once for all’, sin-guli ‘one by one’, and the Gk numeral ‘one’ εἷς < *sem-s. These are all reflexes of *s(ʔ)um-, one of the Indo-European words for ‘one, same, some’; Eng. same and some are indeed related. For further information, see Sihler (1995: §89.1) and Szemerényi (1996: 222 & n. 1).
modern English of: In High German, however, *ab* started (already in the MHG period) to become unusable as a case-preposition. By Luther’s time, this use is forgotten, although it survives in fixed phrases like *abbanden kommen* (lit. ‘to come out of one’s hand’, hence ‘to be lost’) and *abwegs* (‘off the path, to the side, away’), in family names such as *Abderbalden*, and in individual dialects including Alemannic, which is why Hebel and Swiss writers admit prepositional *ab* in their written German, too.\(^\text{22}\)

As a preverb German *ab* is still alive and capable of entering new combinations. More often this sort of restriction to preverbal use goes hand in hand with a limiting of even this function to just a few combinations of preverb + verb. This is the case with Gk *ἀμφί*, Lat. *ambi* (cf. II, 160–1 above), and so too with Lat. *sē*, which in Old Latin is still current as a case-preposition, e.g. in *sē fraude*, *sē dolō* (both, ‘without guile’); the latter yields the adverb *sēdulo* (‘sincerely, diligently’), to which the adj. *sēdulus* is then formed.\(^\text{23}\) In Classical Latin the preverb *sē* is found only in a few old compounds like *sēcēdo*, *sēcerno*, *sēclēdo* (*‘withdraw’, ‘separate off’, ‘shut off’*), etc.; earlier *sēd-eo* ‘go off, apart’ is preserved only in *sēditio* (‘discord, rebellion’). Bold linguistic innovators like Propertius and Tertullian then added new formations, such as *sētebur* (*‘swerve aside’*, Prop. 3. 3. 21) and *sēgredor* (*‘come from’*, Tertull. *On the Soul* 18).—Even more narrowly restricted is *por*-: It is not attested at all governing a case-form, unlike Gk *παρά*, with which it is surely cognate, and as a preverb with the meaning ‘forth, out and away’ it survives only in a few old compounds, including *portendo*, *porrigo*, *pollecor* (*‘portend’, ‘stretch out’, ‘promise’*), and the archaic sacred term *poricio* ‘offer as a sacrifice’ (with one *r* in the best manuscripts at Plautus, *Pseud.* 266, and at Macrobr. 3. 2. 1–5 [five times; cf. also Verg. | *Aen.* 5. 238]) with a heavy first syllable as in *con(iicio* (*‘throw (together)’*), etc. Because of *proicio* (*‘throw or put forth’*) and *porrigo*, *poricio* is often corrupted in the manuscripts to *proic-o* or *porrig-o*-, and the expected perfect *porrieci* and participle *porrectus* are completely displaced in the manuscript tradition by the false spellings *proieci* and *projectus* or *porrectus*, respectively.\(^\text{24}\)

\(^{22}\) Johann Peter Hebel (1760–1826) is famous not only for his *Alemannic Poems* (II, 8 & n. 22 on p. 408 above) but also for his collection of tales, the *Treasure-chest of the Family-friend from the Rhine*, all published in the Alemannic dialect. The article on the preposition *ab* in the new edn of *D. Wb.* (I.1, Leipzig 1965) makes interesting reading: while the old prepositional uses have died out by the 10th c. at the latest, there is the very recent and common use of *ab* before expressions of place, time, and positions in a series (e.g. *ab Berlin, ab lager, ab ersten Oktober, Kinder ab 12 Jahren*). The latest example of *abwegs* in the new *D. Wb.* (I.8, 1979) is from 1873.

\(^{23}\) By hypostasis: cf. n. 16 in this lecture.

\(^{24}\) An alternative view (Leumann 214) is that *-rr-* is the regular outcome of the cluster *-ry-* between vowels, so that *porrieco* and pf. *porrectus* (*vs porrectus from porrigo*) are the expected forms. It is likely that the *y* of *-icio* in the compounds of *iacio* (cf. compounds in *ficio* to *facio*) was regularly lost before *i* (in early Latin poetry, the first syllable of *cōnicio*, etc. is often short) and restored in the classical language on the model of the simplex *iac*-; except in the morphologically opaque compound *amicio* ‘clothe’ < *āmicio*-icio (mentioned by W. above). For details and further references, ancient and modern, see Leumann 128, and on *por-*-, Hofmann & Szantyr 244, 82*, and Leumann 57.
The main reason for this gradual restriction of particular prepositions to preverbal function is probably that for the close specification of case they had competition from fuller and more precise adverbial phrases (II, 158–61 above), while in verbal compounds they were secure.

In Latin, the inherited preverbal function was extended considerably as a result of the tendency to combine preposition-adverbs more closely with the verb (see the discussion above, II, 158–9), although in the cases of contra and supra this attachment to verbs was achieved only relatively late and sporadically.25 A different sort of compound is seen in manu-mittere (‘to manumit, free a slave’), beside which, to judge from the evidence of Romance, the colloquial language had other compounds of manu + verb; and note also male-dicere (‘to curse’) and its opposite, which was subject to complete univerbation in Christian Latin, benedicere (‘to bless’): in its French reflex bénir, all traces of a connection with the verb of saying have vanished. As for the origin of the verbal forms in -e, in compounds like made-facio, made-fio (‘make wet’, ‘become wet’), a convincing explanation has yet to be found (cf. II, 175 below;26 on possum, see I, 69 and II, 56 above).27—There is much of this sort in German. In Greek, on the other hand, there is practically no increase in the number of inherited preverbs (except of course in the parasyntheta, i.e. verbs derived from nominal compounds: cf. II, 191 below). In the corpus of Theognidea,28 line 621 West πᾶς τὸς πλοῦσιον ἄνδρα τίει, ἀ-τίει δὲ πενιχρῷν (‘anyone respects a rich man, and disrespects a poor’), ἀτίειν is a bold nonce-formation, for which ἀτιμᾶν : τιμᾶν (‘dishonour’ : ‘honour’) may have provided the closest model (cf. II, 291 below). Then there is Attic ἀντευποιεῖν, ἐνκακωποιεῖν, and ἀνευπάσχειν (‘benefit in return’, ‘mistreat together’, ‘derive profit together’), in that they presuppose a very close union of εὖ and κακός with ποιεῖν and πᾶσχειν. Note Plato, Gorgias 520c τὸν εὖ παθῶντα . . . ποιεῖ ἀντευποιεῖ . . . εὖ ποιήσας . . . ἀντευπείσεται (‘it makes the one who has benefited do a good service in return; . . . if the performer of the good deed will be the

25 Classical Latin has already contradicico and contrapono, but they are often written as two words; of compounds in supra-, the OLD has only -latus, -scando, -scriptus, and -siuo. See on contral(-) and supra(-) in Latin, Hofmann & Szantyr §§121, 137, and on compound verbs in Romance, Meyer-Lübke (1890–1902: II, §§601, 615) (§§98–616 deal in alphabetical order with all the Latin preverbs in Romance).

26 The 61 verbs in -facio are collected by Hahn (1947), who reviews earlier attempts to explain them (and advances her own, rather unconvincing account). If there is anything approaching a standard view today, it is that of Jasanoff (1977: §§102–3), that the element in -e (like the stem of ε-presentes and imperfects) is in origin the instrumental singular of a root-noun (e.g. *h.rudle-elu, > Lat. rubē ‘in/with redness’). Note that W. argues below (II, 175) for an old free form in -e rather than e.g. -e(is).

27 See e.g. the Romance forms cited by REW, s.vv. ‘manuoperare’, ‘manuparare’, ‘manutenere’. On these several types of compounds in Latin (beneficio; manumitto; salefacio), see Leumann 565–6 with further references, especially on the question of the origin of first elements of the type aile-.

28 This collection of some 1400 lines is probably ‘a composite from two or three ancient (Hellenistic) anthologies of elegiac excerpts’, and contains verses from a number of poets of the 7th, 6th, and 5th centuries, including e.g. Tyrtaeus, Mimnermus, and Solon as well as Theognis of Megara; see M. L. West’s article in OCD with further references.
beneficiary of another such in return’). A striking example from outside Attic is Aeolic ἁλι-βδύειν (‘sink in the sea’). In later Greek, ὁφ’ ἀρτύειν appears to undergo univerbation to ὁφιαρτύειν (‘dress, season food’). For the rest, note especially Lobeck (1820: 560–5, 616–25) on Phrynichus 232 Fischer.

The converse situation—of an old preposition retaining its construction with a case-form while losing its capacity for use as a preverb—is rare. An example is NHG in, which in composition with verbs had to yield to the fuller forms ein and hinein, just as in Latin ex in composition with ‘to be’ yielded to extra: in Paul’s excerpts from Festus, p. 72 Lindsay, Lat. exesto of the old sacred language is glossed with extra esto (‘let him/her be outside, not be present’); commercium exest in students’ language is simply a literal translation of German ist aus (‘is over’).

29 LSJ, s.v. ‘ἀντεπάσχει’, states that ἀντεπάσχει and ἀντεποιέω are by recent editors written divisim ἀντ’ εἰ. (Pl. Gorg. 520c, Xen. Anab. 5. 5. 21, Dem. 20. 124), on the ground that εἰ never enters into direct composition with verbs . . . , but ἀντεποιέω is read in Arist. EN 1179a28, Rb. 1374a24.

30 In full, Commercium exest, incipit fidelitas ‘The drinking-bout is at an end, now the fun (dissipation) begins’. This is German students’ Latin, widely attested from the 18th century on. D. Fwb., s.v. ‘Kommers’, quotes some hair-raising stories of excessive drinking and harassment of young women by large groups of students; note Kluge’s interesting characterization and glossary of German students’ language (1895: esp. 34, 90, 102).
Lecture II, 19

We come now to a **second** point, namely to the question to what extent the preverb achieves complete union with the verb. This immediately prompts consideration of a phenomenon discussed in all the grammars, **tmesis** (ms. add.²: on which note Bekker (1863–72: I, 309 ff.)). We encounter this term already in the works of ancient scholars, though not in the pre-eminent Greek grammarians; in the same sense we also find such terms as ‘διάλυσις’, Lat. ‘*ditiosis*’, and ‘μετατανόωσις’.¹ The ancients, however, do not restrict the term as we do to the separation of preverb from verb, but apply it to all cases where in their view an originally unified word is divided into two parts. Their standard point of reference was the classical language, with the result that they counted e.g. Homeric ἀκρόπολις (lit. ‘the peak of the city’) as a dissolution of ἀκρόπολις (‘acropolis’), while for us the reverse is true, and ἀκρόπολις is the more recent formation.²

Not that there is any doubt that genuine tmesis occurs in poetry. It is attested especially in Roman literature, although the most curious examples are of doubtful validity. The case of *saxo cere-comminuit-brum* (‘with a stone he his occi-split-put’) is often cited from Ennius (Spuria 5 Skutsch = p. 450 Warington), and Vahlen (1903) among others ascribes to him also (Spuria 6 Skutsch = p. 464 Warington) *Massili-portabant iuuenes ad litora-tanas* (*Massili- were carried by young men to the beach-tans*), though the latter is certainly not by Ennius, and *cere...brum* probably not either (cf. Leo 1913: 182 n. 2).³ (On this sort of game in later Latin, see Lucian Müller (1894: 458).) A secure instance is Vergil’s *septem-subiecta-trioni* (*beneath the seven-starred Bear*) at Georgics 3. 381, which we discussed earlier (I, 87, 91 above). And there are also some curious cases in Late Latin, such as *pseudo...christianos, pseudo...apostoli* (see Bögel (1908), and cf. II, 175 below). Here we need to mention only those cases involving the artificial separation of prepositions or similar words. These include privative

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¹ For ancient discussions of the subject, see Lausberg (1998: Latin index, s.v. ‘tmesis’, and esp. §718), though of the terms listed here by W. he indexes only *ditiosis*. On tmesis in Latin generally, see Hofmann & Szánty 217 with further references.

² In Homer the compound ἀκρόπολις occurs only in Od. 8. 494, 504 (vs 6x πόλις ἀκρη); cf. Risch (1974: §76b).

³ *Massili...tanases* (acc. pl. fem.) is said by the grammarian who quotes this line to refer to bottles, which (Warington suggests) may have been empty and broken; see Skutsch (1985: 788) on these lines, with further references.
in-, e.g. at Verg. Aen. 9. 288 inque salutatam linguo I (Euryalus) leave her (my mother) without farewell’, or Ovid, Met. 12. 497 inque cruentatus (‘and not bloodied’, of Caecus). This privative in- is the form serving from the beginning for the negation of nominal compounds, as opposed to the verb and sentence negatives ne- and non. It corresponds exactly to English and German un- and Gk ἄ (v)-, and none of these appear as free forms (though see D. Wb., s.v. ‘un-’, cols 6–5), so that this is an instance of genuinely secondary διάλωσις.—The same is true of certain cases of tmesis of a preposition. Homeric διὰ ὁ ἀμπερές, which occurs three times (II. 11. 377, 17. 309, Od. 21. 422), can hardly be anything but an artificial splitting of διάμπερές (‘right through; throughout’). Among Latin authors, Lucilius and Lucretius in particular allowed themselves quite frequently tmesis of this sort. Some of the Lucretian examples are instructive, especially where they involve a verb. Take first 4. 829 inter quaeunque pretantur and 6. 394 inque pedítur (‘whatever they understand’, ‘and is tangled in’). Now, the simple verbs *pretari and *pedire never existed. Rather, interpretari is derived from interpres (of whatever origin that may be), and impedire parallel to expedire (or formed directly to it), | expedire itself being derived from a prepositional phrase *ex pedâ (cf. Gk ἐκ πέδης lit. ‘out of a fetter’). The same applies to Lucr. 1. 452 seque gregari and 6. 456 conque gregantur (‘and be separated’, and ‘and they band together’; cf. II, 189 below), while on the other hand 3. 860 inter enim iectast (‘for between [now and then] is interposed’) is based on a genuine compound of preposition and verb, but is revealed as secondary by the e of icta, which is unknown in the participle of the simple verb iacio and has its place only in compounds, in line with the well-known Latin vowel-alternation seen in captus : acceptus. The same is true of the u in Lucilius 1137 Marx conque tubernalum (‘and fellow-tentmate’, p. 419 Warnington).6

There is hardly anything comparable in Attic. At most there is e.g. ἐννέταυβλί (cf. ἐνταῦθα ‘here’), ἐνμεντευβένι (cf. ἐντεύθεν ‘from there’) in comedy (Arist. Thesmo.

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4 See the commentaries of P. Hardie on Aeneid 9 (cf. S. J. Harrison on Aen. 10. 794 inque ligatus ‘and encumbered’, with local in-) and F. Bömer on Ovid, Met., and especially, on these and many other examples, Marouzeau’s excellent discussion of ‘dissociation et insertion’ (1949: 130–71).

5 D. Wb. gives five uses of un as a free form; note esp. Swiss German un ‘excessive(ly)’, and the derived adj./adv. unin, or onig!

6 W. alludes to two of the regular rules of so-called ‘vowel-weakening’, which affected (esp. short) vowels in non-initial syllables in archaic Latin in consequence of the regular placement in early Latin of a stress accent on the first syllable of every word. Of relevance here are (a) that short ā, ē, or ō was raised, or ‘weakened’, to i in an internal open syllable (before a single consonant, if you like), but to ē in an internal closed syllable (before more than one consonant): hence, *conficio > conficio, but *confictos > confictus; (b) before a labial consonant (p, b, f, m), the short vowel resulting from (a) above in an internal open syllable is written sometimes i and sometimes ā, hence *ointernalis > ontentralis (though ontilib- is also attested; cf. maximus ~ maximus ‘greatest’, mancipium ~ mancipium ‘formal assumption of ownership’, etc.). For proper statements of the rules affecting Latin vowels in non-initial syllables, see Sihler (1995: §§65–75), Meiser (1998: §§32–4), Weiss (forthc.: ch. 14).
646, and Metagenes [late 5th c.], fr. 6. 5 PCG VII), which have slipped in on the model of forms like τουτογί, νανμενή, with particle - ñ affixed to γε and μέν.

But such bold formations would scarcely have occurred to the poets, had they not found inherited cases of split compounds. In order to demonstrate the original separability of preverbs, we have no need to resort to the oldest evidence of our language family, Vedic and Avestan: German itself gives us sufficient indication. True, German has a number of preverbs which are inseparable, including be-, ent-, er-, ge-, ver-, zer-. But this does not apply to those which are also full prepositions or adverbs, most of which follow the rule that they immediately precede only the finite verb in a subordinate clause, the participle, and the infinitive (or the infinitive particle zu); in a main clause they follow the finite verb, often at a great distance. In this, German has unmistakeably preserved in general terms something truly ancient. This pattern is in accord with the adverbial character of the preverbs discussed earlier (II, 165–6 above). (Note the peculiar tmesis in Wulfila at John 6: 22 mif-ni-gam lit. ‘with-not-came’ for Gk οδ φανεισήλθεν ‘had not entered with them’.)

The closest correspondence with German is to be found in the development of Greek. In Homer, any preverb can be separated from its verb and stand either in an earlier part of the clause, e.g. Il. 1. 40 κατά πίναν μηρίν ἐκηρ ‘I burned fat thighs’, or immediately (or sometimes at a distance) after the verb, e.g. Il. 2. 699 τότε δ’ ηδη ἐχέν κάτα γαία μελανα ‘but already then the black earth held him down’. (At Il. 23. 709 and Od. 5. 260, the preverb comes twice, both in tmesis and attached to the front of the verb.) Of the more frequent compound verbs formed with preverbs, there are only a few in which tmesis is not attested, including apparently καθεύδω (‘sleep’) and κάθημαι (‘sit’), in which early univerbation may be inferred from the fact that in Attic they can be augmented like simple verbs, ἐκαθεύδω, ἐκαθήμην (‘I was sleeping’, ‘I was sitting’). In many places in the Homeric poems, it is impossible to determine whether the preposition really belongs with the verb, in spite of the tmesis, or is to be regarded simply as an adverb.7

Because of the power of the tradition, this Homeric pattern survived for a long time in the language of higher poetry: still in the lyrics of Euripides there are examples of very bold tmesis, e.g. Orestes 170–1 οὐκ... πάλιν ἀνά πόδα σὸν εἰλίξεις μεθεμέναι κτύπου; ‘will you not ... ply your steps backwards and stop the noise?’, and cf. Semonides of Amorgos 26 West ἀπὸ τράπεζαν εἶλε (‘he took away the

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7 So, e.g., at Il. 9. 13–14 ἀν... ἄνατα ἐκρηκτό ‘stood up’, 80 ἐκ... ἐισεώντο ‘hurried out’, 207 ἐν... ἔθηκε ‘placed on [it]’: the important question is whether there is a difference of meaning according as one takes the verb and preverb as a single unit or separately, and if so which meaning is to be understood in the context. Probably, the most striking finding concerning tmesis in Greek since W. wrote is its absence from Mycenaean; see Morpurgo Davies (1985: 86–8) with further references.
However, the pattern in which the preverb follows the verb, although not uncommon in Homer, is not found in tragedy.—Except in high poetry, prefixation to the verb under a single accent becomes increasingly the rule. Even by the fifth century, however, tmesis has not completely disappeared from ordinary Attic speech, as an enclitic or postpositive particle may be inserted between preverb and verb. Instances in Aristophanes’ iambic trimeters, such as Clouds 792 ἀπὸ γὰρ ὀλοίμαι (‘it’ll be the death of me’), Wealth 65 ἀπὸ σ’ ὀλὼ κακὸν κακῶς (‘I’ll put a wretched end to your wretched life’), and Wasps 784 ἀνὰ τοῖ με πείθεις (‘you’re winning me over, you know’), obviously reflect contemporary colloquial speech, as does ἀπὸ γὰρ ἀν ὀλοιτο in the philosopher Melissus (Diels & Krantz, no. 30, B7 §5).

Herodotus’ very similar usage is to be seen in the same terms. He uses various forms of tmesis, though—except in the false reading of the a manuscripts at 7. 164. 2 ἀπὸ πάντα χρήματα ἄγων8—never with more than one enclitic or other postpositive element between preverb and verb (2. 181. 3 με, 6. 114 δέ, 7. 12. 2 δή). These three passages apart, Herodotus attests three types of tmesis. First, he has five times ἀνὰ τε ἔδραμε (or ἐδραμον, ‘sprang up’). Secondly, there is κατὰ μὲν ... κατὰ δέ ... , more rarely ἀπὸ μὲν ... ἀπὸ δέ ... , where the verb follows the μὲν and is to be understood in the same form in the δέ clause (see II, 177 below); at 3. 36. 3, ἀλεσας (‘you have destroyed’) is rightly deleted by Krüger. Most striking is the third type, attested in numerous passages, which involves an aorist being separated from its preverb by an apparently meaningless τ (Attic οὐ ‘therefore’). Apart from a participle at 2. 172. 3 τοῦτον κατ’ οὐ κόφας (‘this he broke up’), this aorist is always gnomic—cf. οὐ with gnomic ἔδοσαν (‘[the fields] give’) in Pindar, Nem. 6. 10—and mostly serves to report a custom: e.g. I. 194. 4 ἀν’ οὐ ἐκήρυξαν ‘they usually hold an auction’ (cf. I, 178 & n. 10, p. 230 above). This use of tmesis with οὐ in the depiction of customs provides a simple explanation of the fact highlighted by Aly (1921: 268), that examples in Herodotus are found almost exclusively in the first half of his work, and especially in book 2, with just one instance in the second half (7. 10ε). The second half contains hardly any descriptions of customs; and the instance in book 7 just mentioned also offers a general observation of the course of human affairs. Aly, who assesses the whole phenomenon in purely stylistic terms, takes the mistaken view that Herodotus freed himself of this ‘mannerism’ in the course of writing his work; on tmesis with οὐ in Ionic, see also Bechtel (1921–4: III, 265–7).

The same sort of tmesis with οὐ or οὐ between preverb and verb is found in other writers of Ionic, including Hipponax (fr. 78, 16 West) and Hippocrates (see Émile Littré’s note in his ten-volume edition [Paris 1839–61], VI, 271–2), and in one or two other places: Epicharmus 32, 6; 122, 3 PCG I; in an epigram of

8 For this, we now read ἀπαντά τὰ χρήματα ἄγων ‘bringing all the money’.
Dorieus (early 3rd c.) quoted at Athenaeus 10, 413a, vv. 7–8; in Callimachus, *Hymn* 6. 75; in Attic, in anapaests in Aristophanes, *Frogs* 1047; and in a metrically obscure line of Archippus (5th/4th c.), fr. 37, 2 PCG II. The only example of this type of tmesis with a form of the verb other than the aorist indicative is in Herondas, *Mimes* 1. 37 κατ’ οὖν λιπησεις (‘you will be unaware’), where οὖν could mean ‘therefore’, and 7. 114 παξ: μήτε προσθήσας μήτ’ ἄπ’ οὖν ἔλησε μιθὲν (‘right! neither add nor remove anything’), obviously in imperfect imitation of the Ionic texts on which his poetry is modelled. (It is possible that we should include also Eur. *Alc* 514 ἂπ’ οὖν τέκνον σῶν πημονὴν εὑρον θεός (‘god keep misfortune from your children!’), although probably οὖν has here its normal meaning.) In all these passages, δν (οὖν) immediately precedes the verb; in the epigram of Dorieus, we should certainly read ἐκαθάρσας τὸν τοῦ κόψας μοῦνος ἑδαιμιστό νν (‘even this [ox] he [Milo of Croton] cut up and ate all on his own’)—as at Herodotus 2. 172. 3, quoted above—rather than the transmitted τονδε | κόψας πάντα κατ’ οὖν μοῦνος ἑδαιμιστό νν. On the other hand, only in Hippocrates and Epicharmus fr. 32, 6 does the aorist have the gnomic meaning predominant in Herodotus.

I have yet to mention our oldest example: *Il*. 19. 94 κατὰ δ’ οὖν ἐτερόν γ’ ἐπέδησεν (not γε πέδησεν). It differs from the other instances only in that οὖν is separated both from the aorist and from the preverb, though from the latter only by an elided particle. It matches exactly Herodotean usage in particular, if, as I assume it is, the aorist is to be understood as gnomic: ‘she (Ate) always ties down one or the other’.

We shall perhaps understand the basis of this peculiar type of tmesis, when we work out the origin of the particle δν (οὖν), which remains completely obscure. In any explanation, one point will have to be borne in mind: from the earliest period, tmesis of other sorts is commonest when the preverb is in clause-initial position, which is not the case with tmesis around δν.

In Attic literary prose from the fifth century onwards tmesis is not used at all, apart from the isolated case at Plato, *Phaedrus* 237a ξύμι μοι λάβεσθε τοῦ μύθου (‘grant me your aid in the tale’), probably a quotation from an older text, and except in certain idioms where tmesis was retained because it was possible to construe the preposition in another way. This is probably the explanation of Attic ὑπό τι ‘a little’, the instances of which are collected by Porson (1820: 143) on

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9 This is fr. 396 in Lloyd-Jones & Parsons (1983: 182); on this poet and his likely date, see the references there.

10 Because the aorist is gnomic and therefore can be reliably expected to have the augment (cf. I, 181 above). Most editors nevertheless print γε πέδησεν, but West agrees with W. On this line, which was atherized by Aristarchus, see Edwards (1991: ad loc.).

11 This is still the case. For references to the various accounts that have been proposed, see, in addition to Frisk and Chantaine, each s.v., Schwzyer & Debrunner 586–7, and, in detail on the particle in Homer, Reynen (1937–8).

12 Or a parody? Socrates begins this speech with, ‘Come then, O tuneful Muses’.
Aristophanes, *Wasps* 1281.\(^{13}\) It would make no sense to take τι as governed by ὑπό; ὑπό really belongs with a verb, as in e.g. ὑποβρέχειν ‘moisten slightly’,\(^{14}\) ὑπόλευκος ‘somewhat white, whitish’. It is instructive to compare ὑπό τι νυστάζειν (in the 4th-c. comic poet Xenarchus, fr. 2, 1 PCG VII) with ὑπονυστάζειν ‘nod off a bit’ (in Plutarch).]

In Latin we have to recognize some variation. In general, the very earliest Latin has already reached the stage that Greek attains in about the fifth century: in other words, old prepositions can be separated from their verb, if at all, only by a monosyllabic enclitic. There are quotations from old prayer-formulae in Festus p. 206 Lindsay *ob uos sacro, sub uos placō* for classical *obsecro uos, supplico uos* (both, ‘I beseech you’), and Ennius attests *Ann. 371 Sk. de me hor(i)tatur* (= *dehortatur me ‘exhorts me not to’*). Probably, that was an archaism already for Ennius, as old Roman comedy knows only *i prae, abi prae*, where the relation between verb and preverb is looser. The phrase *distraxissent disque tulissent* in a canticum of Plautus at *Trinummus* 833—on which see now the excellent remarks of Eduard Fraenkel (1922: 209; cf. 1960: 198–9)—certainly has its origin in the language of higher poetry, and even there it was rather artificial, as *dis-* was never a free form in the living language. On the other hand, *super* and *ante—and circum and praeter*, which emerged as prepositions only in Latin—had greater independence; consequently, they could be separated from their verb even by major constituents of the clause, and are subject to tmesis occasionally even in prose. Even Cicero ventures *ponit ante* (‘prefers’, *On Duties* 3. 71), and tmesis of *superesse* occurs not only in the Augustan poets but also in Cornelius Nepos (*Alcibiades* 8. 1 *erat super ‘was remaining’*) and Tacitus (*Hist*. 1. 20. 1). The same is true of the compound verbs in -ē-facere (II, 170 above): Lucretius still allows *facit ārē* (‘dries out’, 6. 962), and Varro admits *facit putre* and *excande me fecerunt* (‘causes to rot’, ‘made me livid’, *Rust*. 1. 41. 1, 3. 4. 1); also instructive is the instance (discussed by Haupt 1875–6: III, 357) in Seneca, *On the Happy Life* 26. 2 *uos domus formosa . . . insolentes, uos opes . . . obstupe faciunt* (‘a beautiful house . . . makes you arrogant, your wealth . . . stupefied’), where *obstuste* is parallel to *insolentes* and hence to be seen as a free-standing word. This treatment of -ē-facere cannot possibly be subsumed with the instances of artificial tmesis in the poets discussed above (II, 171–2), but presupposes that the formations in -ē that combine with *facio* and *fio* were originally free forms—which sits ill with the theory that the -ē arose from

\(^{13}\) Richard Porson (1759–1808) is still widely regarded as one of the greatest classical scholars of the 18th century, although his talents were tragically underutilized in his sad and short life. His notes on Aristophanes were published by his friend P. P. Dobree. The best and fairest appreciation of his life and work is Page (1959); cf. Sandys (1906–8: II, 424–30), von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1982: 83–4), and Pfeiffer (1976: 159–61).

\(^{14}\) This is Harduin’s conjecture at Theophrastus, *History of Plants* 5. 3. 3, and in ΣArist. *Clouds* 1237–8; otherwise, we have only the pf. pass. ptc. ὑποβρεγμένος ‘slightly drunk’.
Then, curiously, tmesis reappears in Late Latin (for the material, see LÖFSTEDT 1911: 186–8). That classicizing prose-writers should go in for e.g. *moneo praedico denuntio* (‘I warn, nay, I insist’, in Claudianus Mamertus [5th c.], On the State of the Soul 2. 9 and Sidonius Apollinaris [5th c., Letters 1. 9. 7]) amounts to a reasonable moderate archaism, made easier by the looseness of a number of compounds in *prae*-; 15 but it is remarkable that Christians writing semi-vulgar Latin should venture *prode illis est, inter non fuerit* (‘is beneficial for them’, ‘is not part of’, Itin. Eger. 8. 3. 49. 2), *de non sunt* (‘are not lacking’, eight times in Ambrosiaster), even *erat de* ‘was lacking’ (Eugippius [5th/6th c.], Anthology of St Augustine 218 (236), p. 696, 12 Knöll). One might be inclined to see in these the products of an unfinished education with a tendency to archaism, but THURNEYSEN reminds me that *prode* survives in Romance, 16 and therefore cannot have been only a literary form.

In both classical languages, then, the general trend is one of gradual elimination of tmesis. And in modern | German, too, we can observe the same tendency. Individual compound verbs, which were originally separable in the manner sketched above (II, 172), are gradually transferred to the class of inseparable verbs. Goethe and the philosopher J. G. Fichte (1762–1814) could already venture *ich anerkenne* (‘I recognize, acknowledge’), instead of the usual *ich erkenne* . . . *an*, and these days one reads alas all too frequently *es obliegt ihm* for *es liegt ihm ob* (‘it is incumbent upon him’). Something similar is to be observed in French. Normally, one says *il s’en est allé* (‘he has gone away’), but it is possible to document, partly from vulgar speech, partly from older authors, *il est s’en allé* and *il s’est en allé*, where, on the model of the infinitive *s’en aller*, either *en* or *s’en* is put immediately before *allé*. In *s’enfuir* (‘run away’) and *s’envoler* (‘fly away’), which are of exactly the same type as *s’en aller*, the fixed attachment of *en* (< Lat. *inde* ‘from there’) to the verb—spurned by *s’en aller*—has become obligatory: in seventeenth-century French, one still said *fuis t’en*, like *va t’en* today, and not *enfuis-toi*, and Molière has the compromise form *il s’en est en-fui* with repeated *en*, like *il s’en est en allé* in the poet Paul Scarron (1610–60). In *emmener* (‘take’) at least in Old French, the *en* was still separable. 17

There are still a few things to mention in connection with the original separability and independence of the preverb. If in successive clauses the same verb is

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15 Lat. *praedenuntio* is not otherwise attested; the ThLL, s.v. ‘praec’, 372, 65, aptly compares Cic. Verr. 1. 36 *moneo, praedico, ante denuntio* ‘this is my warning, my notice, my advance declaration’.

16 Both as a noun, ‘benefit, advantage’, and as an adjective, ‘worthy’; see REW, s.v.

17 For illustration of W.’s statements about *s’enfuir* and *s’envoler*, see Littré, s.vv. According to Toller et al. (1915–), s.v. ‘emmener’, the very existence of this verb in Old French is controversial, and indeed it is often absent from dictionaries; but cf. FEW, s.v. ‘münaire’, 109a. From Molière, Livet (1895–), s.v. ‘fuir (s’en)’, quotes Médecin volant, scene 13 and M. De Pourrevaugue II, 2, but neither with repeated *en*.
to be supplied with a series of different preverbs, we need use the verb only once, as e.g. in German *hinauf- und hinabfahren* (‘drive up and down’), *auf und ab steigt in der Brust ein kühles Unternehmen* (‘there rises and falls in my breast a bold enterprise’), Goethe, *Iphigenia in Tauris*, act 5, scene 3), and so, too, in Homer, e.g. *II. 18. 564–5 ἀμφὶ δὲ κυκάνεν κάπετον, πέρὶ δ’ ἐρκὸς ἐλασσὸν κααστήρον* (‘about them he made a ditch of dark metal, and drove around this a fence’, of Hephaestus making the Shield of Achilles; cf. *II. 159* above). Conversely, if the preverb remains the same and the verb changes, it may be enough to use the preverb just once, as in German e.g. *hinauffahren und -reiten* (‘drive and ride up’), and in Greek, e.g. Herodotus 7. 59. 2 ἔδοξε τῷ Σέρῃ ὁ Χώρος ἐπιτήδεος ἐνιατάξαι καὶ ἐξαριθμήσαι τῶν στρατῶν (‘the place seemed to Xerxes to be suitable for arraying and numbering the army in’), where the *ἐν*—strictly belongs with the second infinitive as well, or Soph. *Oed. Tyr. 347 ἐμφυτεύσας τοὔργον ἐφράσθαι τε ἢ to have had a share in planning and executing the deed’. Relevant to both cases, however, is the relatively loose connection between these preverbs and their respective verbs (*II. 177* below). The preverb may also be used just with the second verb (in the so-called *άπο κοων=os* construction), as e.g. in Euripides, *Heracles 163 βλέπει τε καντιδέρκεται* (‘looks and stares back at’); cf. *WILAMOWITZ (1895: ad loc.).*

It can also happen that one needs the same compound verb several times, without wishing to repeat it each time in its full form. In this situation in Homer it is common to make two successive clauses begin with the preverb in epanalepsis,18 and to add usually μὲν to the first, always δὲ to the second, and to have the verb only in the first clause, as e.g. at *II. 23. 798–9 κατὰ μὲν δολιχόσκιον ἐγκός θήκ’ ἐς ἀγώνα φέρων, κατὰ δ’ ἀσπίδα* (‘he [Achilles] brought into the arena and set down the long-shadowing spear and the shield [of Sarpedon]’). This pattern remained current in Ionic, and is frequent in Herodotus, although restricted to *κατά and ἀπό*, always with μὲν in the first clause, e.g. 8. 89. 1 ἀπὸ μὲν ἔθανε ὁ στρατηγὸς . . . , ἀπὸ δὲ ἄλλοι πόλλοι (‘the general was killed and many others too’; cf. *II. 173* above). There is a single example in tragedy, at Eur. *Her. 1055–6 ἄπολεῖ πόλιν, ἄπο δὲ πατέρα* (‘he will destroy the city and his father’); according to *WILAMOWITZ (1895: ad loc.),* the lack of further examples is due to chance.—This is unknown in Attic, in keeping with the almost total loss of tmesis in this dialect. We do, however, find something else here, namely that, when a compound verb is to be repeated in a later part of the period or in a new clause, just the simple verb is used. A fourth-century Attic inscription (*IG II2. 43, 36 ff.*), forbids Athenians to acquire (*ἐγκτήσασθαι*) a house or an estate in the territory of their allies, whether by purchase (*πριαμένοι*) or mortgage (*υποθεμένοι*). It then continues, 41 ff. ἡν ἔν πει ὄψηται ἦ κτάται ἦ πιθήται (‘but if anyone buys or

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18 On the various types of repetition of equivalent words, and anaphora in particular (repetition at a distance, at the start of a word group), see *Lausberg (1998: §§614, 629–30).*
acquires or takes out a mortgage on’), where κτάται and τιθήται pick up ἐγκτήσασθαι and ὑποθεμένω, respectively, and τιθήται at any rate is intelligible only if one supplies the preverb. [Add.: The same occurs in literature, too, beginning already in Homer, II. 2. 117–18 ὃς δὴ πολλάων πολίων κατέλυσε κάρηνα ἢδ’ ἐτὶ καὶ λύσει (‘[Zeus,] who has brought down the high towers of many cities and will destroy others yet’)—although Bentley (in Wright 1884–5: 135) and Bekker (1863–72: II, 111) would incline to follow the proposal of Joshua Barnes (1654–1712, in his edition of Homer, 1711) to read καλλύσει for καὶ λύσει. At Soph. Oed. Tyr. 1076, to the Chorus’ words ἐκ τῆς σιωπῆς τήθ’ ἀναρρήξει κακά ‘from this silence, disaster will break forth’, Oedipus replies, ὅποια χρῆζει, ῥηγνύτω (‘may whatever will break forth’), without ἀνα-. And in Plato, Rep. 2, 370ε Adeimantus responds to Socrates’ προσδέησε; (‘will there be a further need?’) with δεήσει. In both these cases, however, the simple verb makes sense even without the preverb.

By way of a coda, let me mention the pattern which occurs quite frequently in Homer whereby the first clause has just a simple verb, while in the second and subsequent clauses instead of its compound just the preverb is used, e.g. at II. 23. 836–8 δρότο... Πολυποῖτης, ἄν δὲ Λεοντῆς κρατερὸν μένω... ἄν δ’ Άιας (lit. ‘rose... Polypoetes, and up the mighty Leonteus... and up Ajax’).
To what extent—this is our *third* question—do combinations of verb and preverb acquire semantic unity, with the preverb serving to modify the meaning of the verb? Here there are various different degrees. On Eur. *Hera...θέλει...συνθέλω δ᾽ ἔγιν᾽* (‘Hera...wishes...and that is my wish, too’), *Wilamowitz* (1895: *ad loc.*) comments that *συνθέλω, συμβούλομαι*, and *συνδοκεῖ* are not real compounds and do not behave as such, as ‘their preposition is still felt to be in all respects an independent adverb’. The same would apply in Latin in the *Twelve Tables 1.7 conperoranto ambo praesentes* (‘they are to argue the case to the end together, both being present’), but we must read *tum peroranto!*—The same analysis holds in Greek for e.g. *κοππί- that some verbs have only in the infinitive. The infinitive attaches itself loosely to a preceding nominal expression, while *κοππί- localizes the meaning of the infinitive in the given substantive, and thus sets up a relation without which the infinitive would often be quite impossible. (Cf. English *they had no house to live in*, and *Deutschbein* (1926: 122 [= 1931: 130]).) For illustrating this idiom, common in Ionic and Attic, let three examples suffice: *Herodotus 2.178.1 ἔδωκε χῶρως ἐνιδρύσασθαι βαιμοῦ καὶ τεμένεια ἐνε γave pieces of land to establish altars and precincts in’; *Arist. Birds* 38 *τίν πόλει...ἐναι πάσι κοινὴν ἐναποσεῖσα χρήματα* ‘that the city was common to all as a place in which to spend their money in litigation’; and *Xen. Symp.* 2.18 *τῶδε τῷ παιδί ήρκεσε τόδε τὸ οἴκημα ἐνιδρύσας* ‘this house sufficed for this boy to labour hard in’. The compounds *ἐνιδρύσεων* and *ἐνιδροῦν* in early Greek, *ἐναποσίνεων* at all periods, are found only in this sort of combination, and this is true of many other compounds in *ἐν- which occur in this construction, such as ἐγκαθηθῶν, ἐνιππεύσαι, ἐνυδαιμονήσαι, ἐνδυστυχήσαι (‘spend one’s youth in’, ‘ride in’, ‘be happy in’, ‘be unlucky in’; for this sort of *ἐν- in a form other than the infinitive, note *Arist. Wealth* 845–6 *ἐνερρίγωσα Ἰ froze in [it].’)—This is not entirely confined to *ἐν-*. As *Wilamowitz* saw (1914: 631–2), *ἐπι- is used in the same way in the fifth-century inscription of the guild of musicians of Miletus (Collitz & Bechtel no. 5495 = SIG 57, 33–4) ῥπτῷν κρέα ἐπιδιαιρεῖν ‘mats/hurdles to divide the meat on’.—In addition, the preverb is often semantically quite independent if it is prefixed to an already

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1 Mommsen proposed *tum*. Crawford (1996: II, 578, 593) prints *conperorante*, but takes it as a compound of *con- and perorare.*

2 On this inscription, note also Danielsson (1914).
compound verb, as in e.g. \(\text{προσπθεν}μίαν\) ‘raise the price of a thing still more’, \(\text{προεμβίβαξεν}\) ‘put in before’—but more on this later (II, 233–4 below).

In other cases, compounding gives rise to a completely new word, and the semantic link with the simplex is lost. Who would suppose that e.g. Lat. *debeo* had anything to do with *habeo*, if we were not led to it by theoretical considerations and the Plautine form *de¯hibuisti* (*Trin.* 426)? But even apart from such extreme cases, it is possible to see that preverbs have significant effects on the meaning and use of the verb.

I drew attention earlier (I, 135 above) to the fact that sometimes compounds of an active simplex have middle inflection. As additional examples here, note Lat. *polliceor: licet* (‘promise’: ‘it is permitted’) and in Greek the use of the verb \(\text{διαμοιμαί}\) ‘swear’, which as a simplex is middle in the future only (\(\text{διαμοιμαί}\)), but in its compounds is predominantly middle, especially when it denotes a legal or other political act. In \(\text{ἐξομοιμαι}\), the middle is very easy to account for. It means ‘reject something (or knowledge of something) from oneself on oath’. Was this compound a model for other particular compounds?—for the middle cannot be explained in semantic terms for every compound in -\(\text{όμοιμαι}\).—Is it legitimate to connect with these the combinations of German compound verbs with the | reflexive pronoun, e.g. *sich ab-arbeiten*, *sich durch-hungern*, *sich ver-laufen*, *sich ver-greifen*, *sich ver-lieben* (‘wear oneself out’, ‘scrape a living, lit. get through [a period] hungry’, ‘lose one’s way’, ‘sprain; attack, encroach on’, ‘fall in love’)?—Less common is the converse, namely a compound with active inflection to a middle simplex, though we do have Lat. *causor*: (\(\text{ac-}\))\(\text{cuso}\) (‘plead a cause; plead as an excuse’: ‘accuse’) and Gk \(\text{ἀναλίσκω}: \text{ἀλίσκομαι}\) (‘consume, spend’: ‘be taken, caught, convicted’)—though the latter does have an active aorist and perfect, \(\text{ἐάλων}, \text{ἐάλωκαι}\); and note the late Greek proverb \(\text{ἐλέφας} \text{μόν} \text{o}χ\) \(\text{ἀλίσκει}, \text{act.}\) (‘the elephant does not catch the mouse’)!\(^4\)

Moreover, a compound verb often differs from its simplex also in its syntactic use. A striking instance is Lat. *surgo* (< *sub(s)-rego*, intransitive) ‘rise, get up’ vs *rego* (transitive) ‘rule, steer’. One might appeal to the concluding line of Plautus’ *Epidicus* 733 (the poet to the audience) *lumbos surgite atque exporgite* (‘get up and stretch your loins’—this being the best reading!\(^5\)) and think of setting up an old transitive verb *surgo*, which would then acquire its regular meaning through

\(^3\) These two very different-looking verbs are treated as originally one and the same by supposing for *lice¯re* a basic meaning of ‘be for sale’: so, *polliceor* was earlier ‘I make an offer to purchase’, *licet* ‘it is available’; see Walde & Hofmann, s.v. ‘liceo’, Ernout & Meillet, s.vv. ‘liceor’, ‘licet’, *LIV*, s.v. ‘*leik-‘, Untermann (2000: s.v. \(\text{ليكיט}\)).

\(^4\) This proverb, used of those who overlook small things, appears in the collections under the names of Diogenianus, 4. 45, and Zenobius, 3. 67, both in vol. 1 of the *Corpus paroemiographorum Graecorum* (ed. F. G. Schneider & E. L. von Leutsch, Göttingen 1839 [repr. Hildesheim 1965]).

\(^5\) This reading is mentioned as a possibility by Lindsay in his apparatus. The manuscripts have either *purgite atque exsurgite* (followed by Leo, Ritschl, and Lindsay) or *surgite atque extollite* (printed by Ernout).
some sort of ellipse, but in the line quoted lumbos is governed only by exporgite (cf. Persson 1918: 451). Rather, surgo is perfectly explicable even as an original intransitive. The sister-forms of rego in the other Indo-European languages often display intransitive use (admittedly, with middle inflection in those languages which preserve the middle); especially noteworthy are certain cognates in Celtic.6 The root reg- was from the outset neutral with regard to the transitive–intransitive contrast, and meant as well ‘take a direction’ as ‘give a direction’. This accounts also for another compound of rego, namely pergo, which throughout early Latin and still in Cicero is almost exclusively intransitive (‘make one’s way’). Because they were so different in form from rego (which is confined to transitive use from our earliest texts on), both surgo and pergo were from an early date free of its influence, while compounds formally resembling the simplex either shared in its restriction to transitive use or were formed only after the restriction had been imposed. It is telling that the more recent compound sub-rigo (attested first in Vergil, Aen. 4. 183) has the transitive meaning ‘cause to rise’.—Here, then, compounding has not so much brought something new into the verb as helped to preserve an archaism, and so we must regard this case as an instance of phenomena to be discussed later (II, 183–5 below).

The same is true of some compounds of peto (‘seek, make for’). As a simplex, this verb is transitive—or at any rate, an object aimed at is always to be understood, or given in a subordinate clause—but suppeto means ‘be at hand, be sufficient’, and the related noun suppetiae (pl.) means ‘aid, relief’; competere before the Empire means ‘come together, meet’, whence compitum ‘crossroads’ (cf. Varro, Lat. Lang. 6. 25); one of the meanings of appetere is ‘come near, approach’ (of time); and expetere is used in old phrases of the falling of misfortune on someone. The basic meaning | of the verb may be gleaned from its Greek cognates πέτομαι ‘fly’, and πίπτω ‘fall’: pet- is the verb of rapid, drastic movement, and to begin with can command at most an accusative of goal. Latin confined the simplex to movement towards a goal, and gradually developed this sense. The above compounds remained closer to the original meaning: with Lat. compitum we can compare Skt sam-pāta- ‘meeting-place, crossing-point’, formed to the same root and with a preposition synonymous with Lat. com-.7

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6 Notably, Old Irish a-t:raig, a-ta:regat ‘rise, get up’, although this verb contains an infixed reflexive pronoun, so that the meaning of the verbal root is better taken as transitive, ‘stretch, raise (oneself)’; see LIV, s.v. ‘h.reg-', for the numerous other cognates of these verbs, and further references. Note that some Celtic forms (e.g. OIr. rigid ‘stretches out’) which Walde & Hofmann and Ernout & Meillet compare directly with Lat. rego (s.v.) are assigned in LIV to the root *reig-.

7 Synonymous but not cognate: Skt saṃ is from IE *sem /*som /*sm ‘together’, which is cognate with the IE words for ‘one’, ‘some’, and ‘same’ mentioned in n. 21, p. 608 above. Lat. cum ‘with’ and cognates (see nn. 16–17, p. 395 above) used to be but is no longer compared with the Vedic particle kaim (which follows datives and infinitives); see EWAia, s.vv.
In a number of instances, the intransitive use of a compound made to a transitive verb will have another explanation. I am thinking here especially of German, where the phenomenon is not uncommon, e.g. *nachgeben* (‘give up, give in’; cf. Gk ἐπιδίδοναι). But we cannot spend any longer on this subject. In any case, the converse is much more frequent, viz. that an intransitive simplex becomes transitive through combining with a preverb, because the verbal meaning acquires from the preverb direction towards a goal or some other closer relation with a nominal element. Thus, in German the intransitive *gehen* (‘go’) has a number of transitive compounds, distinguished from the intransitive ones in having inseparable preverbs, such as *begehen, hintergehen* (‘walk on, frequent’, ‘go behind someone’s back, hence deceive, trick’); in the case of *übergähnen* (‘pass over’), transitive and intransitive uses coexist, hand in hand with separability and inseparability, respectively, of the preverb. We find a similar syntactic contrast between simplex and compound with *bestürmen* = Lat. *oppugnare* (‘to attack’), *erstürmen* = Lat. *expugnare* (‘take by storm’), *überspringen, überschreiten* (‘jump over’ ‘step over’), and Lat. *transire* (‘to cross’). We shall consider below (II, 185) the relation between Lat. *explorare* and *plorare*. There are many examples of compounds with the meaning ‘use something up by performing the action of the verb’; of these the simplex may be intransitive—e.g. Gk *ήφασαν* (‘lit. breakfast away, squander (on breakfasts)’) ← ἀρακιάσαν ‘have breakfast’, NHG *verspielen* (‘gamble away, lose’ ← spielen ‘play’)—or transitive with a different object—e.g. Lat. *eluo* (‘remove by washing’), *ebibo* (‘drink dry, drain; spend on drink’, with the participle *exputum* at Pl. *Trin.* 406). Similarly, with the meaning ‘get rid of’, there are NHG *zerlesen* (‘well-thumbed’, of a book), *entküßen*, *wegküßen* (‘kiss away’, esp. tears). In the sense ‘use up’, Lat. *abutor* takes the accusative in pre-classical Latin, the ablative—on the model of the simplex—only from the *Rheta ad Herennium* on (early 1st c. bc). A particularly well-known example is the word transmitted by Herodotus 6. 129. 4 ἀπορχήσασθαι γε μὲν τὸν γάμον ‘you have danced away your marriage’.—Compounding can also render a verb capable of taking a dative: e.g. NHG *entlaufen, entsagen* (‘run away from’, ‘renounce’), Lat. *inuidere, obtrectare* (‘regard with envy, begrudge’, ‘disparage, belittle’). I cannot pursue these phenomena in detail, since other, related features require our attention.

First, the ability of preverbs to endow a verb with *perfective* Aktionsart (cf. I, 136 above). On Greek (including modern Greek), see especially Brugmann & Thumb (1913: 548–50); on Latin, see the important work of K. H. Meyer (1917) on perfective, imperfective, and ‘perfektisch’ (i.e. of a present state arising from a

8 Compare e.g. *ich übergahnen* (with inseparable preverb) die nächste Sache ‘I skip the next item’ with *ich gehe zur nächsten Sache über* (sep. prevb) ‘I move on to the next item’; colloquially, *hintergehen* can be separable, with the meaning ‘go to the back, go behind’.
past action) Aktionsart in Latin, which is taken further and corrected on individ-
ual details by J. B. Hofmann in his instructive review (1922b). The basis of
Meyer’s theory (1917: 8) is a correct observation of Old Latin usage: Plautus has
the simplex of verbs of motion in the present, e.g. Asin. 108 eo ad forum (‘I am
going to the forum’), Men. 997 quid... homines ad me currunt? (‘why are the
fellows rushing at me?’), but compounds in the perfect, e.g. Asin. 251 abiisti ad
forum (‘you went off to the forum’), Amph. 795–6 ab nau... bu... praeccurrisci
(‘from the ship you ran on ahead to here’); or again, Plautus and Terence have
between them forty times domum ire (‘to go home’) and thirteen times rus ire (‘to
go into the country’) with the present stem, but with the perfect stem domum and
rus are found only with compounds of ire; the same is true, though the instances
are fewer, of ressum (‘to the bottom, to destruction’) with ire and its compounds.
Or contrast Pl. Cas. 485 rus uxorem duces (future—‘you will take your wife to the
country’) with 109 rus uxorem abduxero (fut. perfect—‘I shall have taken my wife
to the country), and so on—though admittedly other phrases involving these
words behave differently.—There is only one possible explanation: perfects in-
cluding reference to a goal presuppose an aoristic sense of the perfect (cf. I, 187–8
above), but this sense is thinkable only for perfective verbs. In other words, the
avoidance of the perfect9 of ire and verbs like it when a goal is referred to must be
due to the fact that they have imperfective Aktionsart, and conversely the use in
these circumstances of the perfect of abire, etc. is an indication of its perfective
Aktionsart. This opposition can be followed into Classical Latin, but Ovid and
Livy often ignore it, showing a weakening of the feeling for different kinds of
Aktionsart.—In the compounds above, the sense of the preverb is not lost in the
process of ‘perfectivization’, though this is often the case with compounds in con-.
According to Schulze (1928: 135), it is because of the perfectivizing meaning of
con- that the frequentative of complecti (‘to embrace’), complexari, is formed late
(Vulgate +), while amplexari appears early (Plautus +).

The preverb can have other sorts of effect on the meaning of the verb. So,
beside e.g. NHG steigen, Lat. scando (‘climb’), we have NHG hinausteigen, Lat.
descendo (‘descend, climb down’). In both languages, the simplex denotes an
upwards movement, the compound a movement down. The meaning ‘up’,
contained in the simplex, is given up when the verb is combined with the
preposition, and there remains only the notion of vertical movement. The shift
of meaning here is easy to explain. The German verb is etymologically identical
with Gk στρείχειν, which has no special connection with vertical, let alone up-
wards, motion, but means simply ‘to step’. Accordingly, we may be able to say
that steigen was really neutral with respect to motion up or down, and that its
regular narrower meaning arose only after the formation of a compound like

9 I have translated ‘des Perfektums’, in ms. add.².
hinabsteigen. We can take the same view of Lat. descendere: given its cognate in Sanskrit (e.g. skándati ‘jumps’), the real meaning of the simplex scandere would be ‘to perform a hurried or hopping movement’, so that here, too, the opposition between compound and simplex could reflect the preservation in the compound of an original, more general meaning.\(^{10}\)

In many other cases, however, the addition of a preposition to the verb entails turning its meaning into its very opposite. Take for example verbs of dressing and the like. In Greek, beside e.g. ἅμψυκται ‘to dress’, there appears later ἀπαρψυκται ‘to undress’ (first in the 4th-c. comic poet Xenarchus, fr. 4, 5 PCG VII ἀπηψυκται·μένας ‘bared’). Here, because the preverb ἀπό contains the notion of separation, this sense is added to the verb itself, which cannot have had it originally, and the meaning ‘put clothes on’ is replaced with ‘take clothes off’. This phenomenon of a preposition producing the opposite meaning of the verb is much commoner than one normally supposes. This is frequently the effect especially of preverbs expressing the meaning ‘off, away’, or the like. So, for instance, in the Roman historian L. Cassius Hemina (2nd c. BC) we read (Nonius Marcellus, p. 144 Lindsay = FRH 6 F25) quae nata sunt, ea omnia denasci aiunt ‘they say that all things which are created pass away’ (lit. ‘are uncreated’).\(^{11}\) Note the similar contrast between e.g. Gk κλώστων ‘spin’ and ἀποκλώστων ‘undo what has been spun’, or between Lat. pleo ‘fill’ and depleo ‘to empty’. And this is not confined just to Greek and Latin: think of German compounds like auffrieren (‘defrost’) or sich entloben (‘cancel one’s engagement’).—We find the same with preverbs of other meanings, too. Note e.g. in the pseudo-Platonic Axiochus 364c the word ἀνασθηλαί ‘to recover’ in contrast with the common verb σφάλλειν (active, ‘make to fall), σφάλλεσθαι (middle, ‘fall’). Because ἀνά often appeared as a preverb in verbs denoting recovery or restoration, such as ἀναφράννεσθαι, ἀνενεργεῖν (‘be strengthened anew’, ‘bring back, restore’), it acquired the ability to transform σφάλλειν into its opposite. Another very instructive example was drawn to my attention by Ewald Bruhn: the verb συγκρίνειν, attested since the fifth century, has in common with its derivatives two meanings. First, it means ‘compare’, which is easy to understand, as from the simplex κρίνειν ‘to judge’, συγκρίνειν ‘to assess by putting together’, is a natural development. But συγκρίνειν means also ‘to combine, mix’, which is in stark contradiction with the basic meaning of κρίνειν, which like its Latin cognate cernere means originally ‘to separate’. | The situation is made clear by Plato’s use of συγκρίνειν, e.g. at Phaedo 72c εἶ συγκρίνοιτο μὲν πάντα, διακρίνομεν δὲ μή, ταχὺ ἂν τῷ Ἀναξαγόρῳ γεγονός εἶ ὀμοῦ πάντα χρήματα (‘if all things were to be mixed together, and

\(^{10}\) On this verb, which has cognates also in Celtic, see Schrijver (1991: 431–2), and LIV, s.v. “skend-‘jump out, away’”.

\(^{11}\) Lat. denasci is otherwise attested only at Varro, Lat. Lang. s. 70. On the prefixation of de- to -sci verbs to indicate ‘the reversal of a process’, see Haverling (2000: 340–2).
never separated, the saying of Anaxagoras would soon be realized, “all things are chaos”), or when at Statesman 282b he sets side by side as two μεγάλα τινέ... τέχνα, ἢ συγκριτική τε καὶ διακριτική (‘two great arts, that of composition and that of division’). Obviously, συγκρίνειν has arisen from διακρίνειν (attested since Homer), in which the basic meaning of the verb, ‘to separate’, was more prominent. Because in many compounds συν- and δια- are diametrically opposed to each other (e.g. in συνλέγειν ‘collect together’ vs διαλέγειν ‘select, separate’), συγκρίνειν was formed as the opposite of διακρίνειν. [Add.: There is an exact parallel to this in Latin. The Latin cognate of Gk κρίνειν is cernere, and its meaning of separating is sharpened by means of the preverb dis- (just as it is in Greek with δια-), Lat. discernere being attested first in Varro and Cicero, the related noun discrimen (‘separation, distinction’) already from Lucilius on (fr. 957 Warminster).] Then, just as in Greek συγκρίνειν was made alongside διακρίνειν, so in Latin a counterpart to discernere emerged in concernere, which is certainly attested in Augustine and other late writers and possibly already in Silius Italicus and Gellius. The story of the emergence of concernere ‘mix’, is made pretty plain in passages such as Augustine, Against Faustus the Manichee 22. 31 sexus utriusque carnali sorte discernitur et carnali commixtione concernitur (‘the sex of each is distinguished in their fleshly incarnation and mixed in their fleshly intermingling’). Medieval Latin concernere, which survives in French and English, sometimes has the meaning ‘consider’, in which sense in Jerome it is just a strong variant of cernere.] The converse of the case of δια- and hence συγκρίνειν may have occurred with verbs of joining, e.g. in Gk διαζεύγνυμι, Lat. diiungo ‘separate’, although these could have been made directly from the simplex forms Gk ζεύγνυμι, Lat. iungo (‘join’), rather than from the compounds Gk (συ)ζεύγνυμι, Lat. (con)iungo, while συγκρίνειν must presuppose the existence of διακρίνειν. Compare French démêler ‘separate’ vs mêler ‘mix’, déprocher ‘put away from’ (ms. add.1: in children’s language) vs approcher ‘bring near’ (see Vendryes 1921: 186).

A couple of other possible meanings need to be mentioned, e.g. that compounds with ἀπο- in Greek, and de- in Latin, express not so much the opposite of the meaning of the simplex as the fact that it has ceased (cf. the Byzantine Gk ἀποβασίλευσ ‘ex-king’): so, e.g., ἀπέσαθε ‘stop eating’, in the comic poet Theopompus (fr. 63, 3 PCG VII; cf. Athenaeus 14. 649b); ἀποδιαρθώνει ‘wake up’, in Aelian; ἀποπλουστεῖν ‘give up wealth’, in late Greek (Gregory of Nazianzus [4th c.]+); desaeuire ‘cease from rage’, in Seneca and Lucan.—Alternatively, and closer to the notion of oppositeness, the preposition can serve more or less

12 Note also in Lucilius the rather more striking (and for the earlier existence of the verbal stem discern-, telling) derivative discerniculum ‘a pin for parting the hair’ (fr. 1095 Warminster).
13 The DMLB gives two main senses for concernere, ‘observe, regard, consider’, and ‘concern, be concerned with, relate to’.
as a negation, e.g. in Gk ἀφαινάτει ‘displeases’; ἀπέοικε ‘is unfitting’; in the Old Latin Bible, abutor ‘not use’; Late Latin discredo ‘not believe, discredit’.

This approach—which is presented more comprehensively and with more examples in Wackernagel (1902)—also makes it possible to understand a Homeric verb-form which has puzzled scholars for a long time. In Genesis 19: 6, we read, τὴν θύραν προσόφεξεν ὄπισω αὐτοῦ ‘he (Lot) closed the door behind him’, which shows that οἶγνυμι, οἶγω can be changed from the meaning ‘open’ to the meaning ‘close’ by combining with a preverb which brings the idea of ‘to, on top’. Accordingly, the verb at II. 12. 340 πᾶσαι (scl. πόλαι) γὰρ ἐπώγχατο ‘the gates were all closed’ is to be taken back to ἐπ-οἶγω, where ἐπ- performs the same function as at II. 14. 169 θύρας ἐπέθηκε (‘she [Hera] closed the doors’).

Sometimes a compound verb preserves an older meaning of the verb than in the simplex (cf. II. 179 above). An especially striking instance is found in Latin. You know the verb *emere* (‘to buy’), and there is nowhere in all of our surviving record where it does not mean ‘buy’. On Italic soil, this meaning is ancient: it is already there in Umbrian, which in general, unlike its other closest relative Oscan, has a number of lexical innovations in common with Latin.15 The meaning ‘buy’ is matched in the compounds *coemere* ‘buy up’ and *redimere* ‘buy back, ransom, contract for’, but in other compounds we find a strikingly different meaning. And yet it is beyond doubt that *adimere* and *demere* ‘take away’, *dirimere* ‘take apart’, *eximere* ‘take out’, and *perimere* ‘get rid of, destroy’ contain this verb *emere*. The same is true of the archaic *abemito* (cf. Paul. Fest. p. 4 Lindsay); of *prömere* ‘bring forth’, where contraction has occurred; and of *sümere* ‘take to oneself’, for which the archaic forms *sürêmít* (= *sumpsit*) and *sürempsit* (= *sustulerit*) guarantee an old present *sómno* < *sub-eso* (cf. *praesch-mium* ‘inducement, reward’, lit. probably ‘anticipation, taking in advance’). We can say, then, that most of the compounds of *emere* presuppose that it means not ‘buy’ but ‘take’ (cf. Paul. Fest. p. 4 Lindsay on *abemito*: ‘emere’ enim antiqui dicebant pro accipere ‘the ancients used emere in

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14 The phrase θύρας ἐπέθηκε φαενάς is a formula in Homer; on the text at II. 12. 340, which has been controversial since antiquity, see Hainsworth (1993: ad loc.).

15 The view of a special relationship between Latin and Umbrian goes back to Grotefend (1835–9: I, praef.); cf. Cull (1856: 106). The simplex *em-* is attested for sure only in Umbrian (*emanτu(r)*, *emp* est), and scholarly opinion on its interpretation is divided between ‘buy’ and ‘take’ / ‘accept’. In Sabellian we also have three compounds of *em-*, in *sub* (Umbr. *sumtu*), *per* (Osc. *pertemust*), and *pert-* (Osc. *pertemust*, etc.), all of which are formed independently of Latin. For details, discussion, and further references, see Untermann (2000: s.v. ‘emanτu(r)*). It has indeed been supposed that in relatively recent prehistory Latin enjoyed more intensive contact with Umbrian than with Oscan. This is on the strength of lexical agreements such as Lat. *tranus* = Umbr. *traf* ‘beyond’ (vs Osc. *pert*), Lat. *res* = Umbr. *ri* ‘matter’ (vs Osc. *genu*), Lat. *populus* = Umbr. *poplom* ‘the citizen-body under arms’, perhaps Lat. *forum* = Umbr. *furo* ‘forum’, Lat. *ostendito* ‘show’ = Umbr. *ostendu* ‘?prepare’. It is important to note that such agreements, if they are not due to the fragmentary nature of our Sabellian record, most probably reflect borrowing, and do not at all undermine the clearly much closer genetic relationship between Oscan and Umbrian as opposed to Latin. Still to be recommended on the relationships between the Italic languages is Jones (1950), on Latin and Umbrian, esp. pp. 67, 74, 80, 82, 83.
the sense of *accipere* [take’]). This is certainly the original meaning of the verb, and it agrees with its cognates in Lithuanian, Old Prussian, and Slavic. \(^{16}\) Only in Italic was its meaning specialized to that of taking through purchase, and all other meanings lost. There is a comparable development in Lat. *comparare* (‘prepare, get together’), which from Plautus on is often used simply of buying, and begins to ousted *emere* already in Imperial Latin, so that in most of the Romance languages the basic verb ‘to buy’ is furnished by the reflexes of *comparare*. \(^{17}\) Most of the compounds, however, were formed at a time when the semantic restriction of *emere* to the sense ‘buy’ was not yet complete; conversely, *coemere* and *redimere* must be younger, in that they are based on the more recent meaning of the simplex.

There are two words of particular interest in this connection. Beside *coemere*, just quoted, there is also the verb *cōmere* ‘put together’ (so still in Lucretius, e.g. 3. 258, 4. 31) and then ‘adorn, arrange in order’, which the contraction shows is older. Moreover, the question has recently been raised whether *coemptio*, the name of a specific ancient form of marriage, might really have meant ‘taking together’, with the sense of buying—which the preposition does not suit—being added at a later date. \(^{18}\) At all events, *emere* was twice compounded with the preposition *con*- , once early on when it still meant ‘take’, and then again later, on the basis of the meaning ‘buy’.

The original meaning of *emere* may have survived also in a form of the simplex. The particle *em!* ‘there!’ , which is common in comedy and attested down to Cicero’s time, though earlier misinterpreted, has been explained by Stowasser (1890: 1087) and Skutsch (1900) as sg. 2 of the imperative of *emere*—*em* instead of *eme*, like *dic*, *duc*, *fac* (‘say!’ , ‘lead!’ , ‘do!’). \(^{19}\) On this account, it would have meant originally ‘take!’ , just as Homeric *ἀγρεῖ* ‘come on!’ is the imperative of *ἀγρεῖν* ‘seize’. Latin *ēn* ‘look!’ , found first in Vergil (Aen. 6. 346), has nothing to do with this *em*, and is rather a loanword, from Gk *ὅποι* (‘look!’).

\(^{16}\) For the comparative evidence, including Lithuanian *iūti* (Old Prussian *iunt*) ‘take, get’ and Russian *imet* ‘have’, see LEW and Vasmer, on Baltic and Slavic respectively, Walde & Hofmann on *emo* and its compounds, and LIV, s.v. ‘*h_em*’ on Indo-European.


\(^{18}\) This idea, whatever its source, seems not to have taken root. That *emo* meant ‘take’ rather than ‘buy’ in early Latin is remarked by e.g. Muirhead (1886: app. B), Rivier (1891: 171); see the references to the debate in Kunkel (1930: 2270) and to earlier literature in Leonhard (1900). According to a standard account of Roman private law (Kaser 1971–5: I, 77–8), marriage by *coemptio* evolved from being centred on a (perhaps) genuine purchase to a ceremony involving a symbolic one; this had emerged as the prevailing view before 1930 (Kunkel 1930: 2270). For a good recent account of the evidence, see Treggiari (1991: 25–8)—though again the meaning ‘purchase’ is apparently assumed, as it is also by (e.g.) Corbett (1930: 78–81). As Kunkel notes (1930: 2270), anything approaching certainty on the history of the ceremony is impossible, given the absence of early evidence.

\(^{19}\) Cf. also Skutsch (1914: Index, s.v. ‘em’) and Stowasser, Petschenig, and Skutsch (1917: s.v).
One more example of separate semantic development in the simplex on the one hand and the compound on the other! Latin plorare means ‘weep’, which sits ill beside the meaning of implorare ‘ask for, appeal to’, and bears apparently no relation at all to that of explorare ‘investigate’. Now, Festus (p. 260 Lindsay) quotes a very ancient Latin law, which I quoted earlier (II, 28 above), with plorare in the sense ‘cry out, call for help in law’ (commented on by Schulze 1918: 497–501). The original meaning survives, then, in the compounds: in the case of implorare this needs no further comment; for explorare, Schulze makes the following attractive suggestion: it could originally have been a term in the language of hunters denoting the chasing out of the game by the baying of the pack, the ‘out-crying’, ‘the causing to become visible by crying’. Hence the meaning ‘investigate as a hunter’, and then generally ‘investigate’. In this connection, Debrunner reminds me of Lat. percontari (‘to question, investigate’; cf. II, 191 below) and French trouver (‘to find’), which start life denoting activities of the boatman and the fisherman, respectively.

And a final point to conclude our discussion. There is an apparent contradiction in setting up (as we have been doing in the last few pages) these idiosyncratic semantic developments for compound verbs, on the one hand, and yet observing in so-called tmesis a certain independence on the part of the preposition vis-à-vis

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20 Szemerényi (1969) explains Lat. plorare, which is otherwise without etymology, as being from *prorare < *pro orare ‘to call ‘over here!’ ’ → ‘to call for help or witnesses’; this account is accepted and developed by Mazzioli (1983).

21 Lat. percontari was correctly explained in antiquity (see II, 191 below), but the etymology of Fr. trouver deserves attention as a key example in the fundamental battle fought between Hugo Schuchardt and the post-Neogrammarians over the relative importance in language and hence in linguistics of speaker-behaviour/cultural facts vs phonetic/grammatical rules, and over the very existence of successive language-states susceptible of being linked by regular sound-changes (see Morpurgo Davies 1998: 287–90). Debrunner was here alluding to Hugo Schuchardt’s importantly modified version of the etymology put forward by the founding father of Romance philology Friedrich Diez in 1860. Diez derived Fr. trouver from Lat. turbare by a sequence of semantic shifts: ‘stir up’ → ‘rummage through’ → ‘seek’ → ‘find’. This was challenged in 1878 on neogrammarians-style phonetic grounds by Gaston Paris, who proposed instead the (unattested) Latin etymon *tropare, which supposedly meant originally ‘deal in rhetorical tropes’ and hence, in musical contexts, ‘compose a melody’, whence ‘compose’ → ‘invent’ → ‘find’. Unlike Diez’s turb- > trouv-, Paris’s *trop- > trouv- broke no sound-laws—the minimum requirement for serious consideration in the neogrammarians view of things—and the musical connection was confirmed by the name given to poets in medieval Provence, Fr. trouvère ‘troubadour’ (note incidentally that already in 1928 the musical terms had been derived from an Arabic loanword t’araba ‘song’!). Paris’s account (republished in revised form in 1909) was challenged in the late 1920s by Schuchardt, who invoked phonetic and semantic analogy in an elaborate rehabilitation of Diez’s starting point in Lat. turbare. Schuchardt compared other Romance words for ‘find’ which had arisen by semantic generalization from the field of hunting (e.g. Span. hallar < Lat. altaflare ‘breathe on’ — ‘detect by scent’) and in particular reflexes of turbare in Italian and Sardinian meaning to flush out game or to drive fish towards poisoned water. Thanks to the discovery of Lat. contropare ‘compare’ in 6th-century Latin, combined with the awkward phonetic special pleading required by turb- > trouv-, Paris’s *tropare reigns supreme in French etymological dictionaries, but the story of the etymology is much richer and perhaps less conclusive than they suggest, and is very nicely told, with full references, in Tuite (2006: §4).
its verb. On this point it should be noted that two words can form a close compound even if they are not adjacent. BRUGMANN coined the happy term ‘distance compounds’ (‘Distanzkomposita’), which he opposes to ‘contact compounds’ (‘Kontaktkomposita’); in the same way, W. HORN (1923: 6–7) distinguishes ‘Fern-’ and ‘Nahkomposita’ (lit. ‘far’ and ‘near’ compounds). One of BRUGMANN’s examples is Fr. ne . . . pas ‘not’, in which neither ne nor pas can be understood on its own; Lat. nē . . . quidem (‘not even’) is similar. This provides a yardstick for assessing compound verbs. In phrases such as Homer, II. 8. 108 (ἐποι) oūs πορ’ ἀπ’ Ἀινέιαν ἐλόμην (‘[the horses] which I [Diomedes] once took from Aeneas’), the ‘distance compound’ type is especially clear: if ἀπό and ἐλόμην did not go closely together, the accusative Ἀινέιαν would be quite impossible (cf. DEBRUNNER 1917: 19).
We come now to a **fourth** point, namely the fact that some verbs occur only in composition with preverbs. Our starting point here can be some statements of the Roman grammarians. They teach that a verb *specio* is attested in Ennius (*Ann.* 408 Skutsch) and survives in the religious language in *aves specere* (lit. ‘to observe the birds’, ‘take the auspices’) denoting the activity of the augurs, but that—apart from the extended form *spectare* (‘to watch’) and nominal derivatives such as *specula* (‘look-out post’) and *speculum* (‘mirror’)—common usage (cf. ‘consuetudo communis’, Varro, *Lat. Lang.* 6. 82) has the verb only in combination with preverbs, as in *aspicio*, *conspicio* (‘look at’, ‘catch sight of’). The verb *specio* is shown to be ancient when we compare the other Indo-European languages, where it matches e.g. Gk *σκέπτομαι* (‘look about’). Similarly, from the simplex *pleo* (‘fill’)—notice *plentur* quoted by Festus (pp. 258–9 Lindsay), and compare Gk *πλήνυμι*—only the derivative *plēnus* ‘full’ survives: from Plautus on, only *compleo* and other compounds are in current use. Equally, only the lexicographers know the Latin verb *supare* ‘to throw’, which has cognates in Slavic and Baltic (and is quite unrelated to *suppare* ‘throw down’, Accius, fr. 578 Warmington); on the other hand, the compound *dissupare* ‘to scatter’ is current at all periods, while *obsipare* (‘scatter, sprinkle at or over’) is archaic and rustic and *insipare* (‘throw in’) is not attested after Varro. The case of *lacio* is similar: Paul’s excerpts from Festus (p. 104 Lindsay) document it in the sense ‘entice, inveigle’, and obviously it occurred in some ancient text, but in our surviving record it is attested only in compounds like *allicio* and *elicio* (‘entice, attract’, ‘lure out, elicit’), although it is

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1 Apart from Ennius, *Ann.* 408 Skutsch (cf. *seen.* 284 Vahlen, a conjecture not accepted by Jocelyn (1967: 234)), and later augural contexts, the simplex *specio*, or *spicio*, is attested in Plautus also in the double etymological figure *nunc specimen specitur, nunc certamen cernitur* (*Bacchides* 399 = *Casina* 516), the second part of which illustrates W.’s point about *cerno* above. See Skutsch (1985) on Enn. *Ann.* 408, and Maltby (1991: s.v. ‘specio’) for ancient accounts of *specio* and its compounds.

2 The root *spek-* is well attested also in Indo-Iranian, and indeed the present-tense stem *spēk-je- may with confidence be reconstructed for Indo-European from Lat. *specio*, Gk *σκέπτο- < *skẹpyo- by metathesis < *spebyo-, Vedic (sg. 1) *pāṣya- and Old Avestan (sg. 1) *spasiā; see LIV, s.v. ‘*spek-’. *

3 See e.g. Festus, pp. 252, 406–7 Lindsay, and Maltby (1991: s.v. ‘suppus’). On the etymologies of *supo* and *suppo*, see Walde & Hofmann, s.vv. ‘dissipare’, ‘suppus’, and LIV, s.v. ‘*seup- “throw”’. The variation in spelling between *u* and *i* is caused by the following labial sound; *cf. libet ~ lubet ‘it pleases’, and n. 6, p. 613 above.
still seen in a simplex in its derivative *lacco* ‘rouse, challenge’. Its frequentative
*lacto* (‘lead on, induce’) occupies an intermediate position, in that it is still attested
down to Varro (*Menippeans* 350, 2 Astbury) but in Classical Latin is known only
in *delecto* and *oblecto* (‘lure, fascinate, delight’, ‘amuse, divert’). The same holds of
pre-classical *temno*, which in Classical Latin is found only in *contemno* (both,
‘scorn, despise’); of *suesso* (‘be or become accustomed [to]’), which occurs as a
simplex in pre-classical Latin but only in compounds in the classical period; and
of *linguo*, which is used once or twice by Cicero, is avoided by Caesar, and is truly
current in Classical Latin only in *relinquo* (both, ‘leave’).—Furthermore, *ruo*
‘churn up, tear down’ (unconnected with *ruo* ‘rush, hurry’) is common in Old
Latin, but in Classical Latin it is confined to compounds such as *di.ru.o*, *è.ru.o*,
*sub.ru.o* (‘demolish, wreck’, ‘uproot, tear out’, ‘undermine’), apart from the legal
phrase *rivì.caesa* (‘minerals and timber already) quarried and felled (at the time an
estate is put up for sale), until the hexameter poets revive the simplex.5 Caesar
and Cicero in his speeches use *euadere* and *inuadere* (‘get clear of’, ‘attack’), but
avoid *uadere* (‘go’), which is common in poetic and colloquial Latin.

Such shifts of usage are apparent in other languages, too, including Greek,
where the simple forms contained in Attic ἀμφιέννυμι, ἀνοίγω, ἀπόλλυμι, κάθημαι,
and κατάγνυμι (‘clothe’, ‘open’, ‘destroy’, ‘am seated’, ‘shatter’) are found only in
archaic and poetic language (and to some extent in Ionic). The simplex διδράσκω
(‘run away’) is known only from a gloss in Hesychius: in literature it is attested
only in compounds with ἀπο-, δια-, | and ἐκ-. The Atticists of the Empire warn
against νιξω and prescribe instead ἀπονιξω (both, ‘wash’), and indeed the simplex
is found in Homer, Doric, and Ionic, but the Attic comic poets and prose-writers
use only the compound, which is already in Homer by the way. If the simplex
appears (in its younger form νιπτω) in the Greek Bible and other Hellenistic and
late texts, its origin, like so much in Hellenistic Greek, lies in Ionic. This contrast
surfaces also in the nominal derivatives. We know the neuter νιπτρον (‘water for
washing’) from tragedy—‘Νιπτρα’ (the ‘Bath Scene’) is also the ancient title of
*Odyssey* Bk 19—and the masc. νιπτήρ (a basin for washing) from the Fourth Gospel
(13. 5). Attic has only ἄπονιπτρον and ποδαπιπτήρ, ποδαπιπτρον (the latter form also
in Homer), which BRUGMANN (1909b: 148) rightly takes back to *ποδαπιπτήρ, *
ποδαπιπτρον, with the second πο lost by dissimilation; cf. ποδαπιπτήρ at Her-
rodotus 2. 172. 3–4 close to twice-repeated σόδας ἐναπονιξεθαί (‘to wash their feet
in’). (The -α of ποδα- can hardly be the accusative ending, although it was seen as

5 It is, frankly, not so clear whether we have the reflexes of two distinct verbs in Lat. *ruo* in its trans. and
intrans. senses. They are treated separately by Walde & Hofmann (with some discomfort), but presented as
one by the OLD (probably in keeping with Latin-speakers’ intuitions); *LIV* assigns only the transitive verb
of Latin to the root *reuH- ‘tear down’, the form of which correctly predicts the long ū of *rīta* (note,
however, that the participles of the compounds of *ruo* all have short ū!); Ernout & Meillet are rather
agnostic.
such by a number of scholars; the variant forms with ποδο- are to be explained as due to assimilation to other compounds beginning with ποδο-.) Again, in Attic, κτείνω practically disappeared in favour of ἀποκτείνω (both, ‘kill’), although the simplex is tellingly preserved in an old oath-formula at Lysias 10. 11; see Latte 1920: 19 n. 37); θνήσκω also died out (except in the perfect τέθνηκα) in favour of ἀποθνήσκω (both, ‘die’; cf. II, 190 below). The status of ἀγορεύειν (‘speak [in the Assembly]’) is peculiar. While outside Attic it is common as a simplex, in Attic it is practically confined to compounds. It was needed in all the places where -λέγω had preserved its meaning ‘collect’ and was hence not available as a verb of saying: this is why we do not have ἀνταγορεύω in Attic, as in ἀντιλέγω (‘speak against’) the meaning ‘collect’ was not in competition with ‘speak’. In the simplex, ἀγορεύειν had become superfluous beside λέγειν, which in Attic always meant ‘speak, say’, and was preserved only in a few fixed expressions, notable among which is the standard call for speakers in the Assembly, τίς ἀγορεύει βούλεται; (‘who wishes to speak?’), where the basic meaning ‘address a public meeting’ (cf. Lat. contionari ‘address a contio’) can still be seen. Later, ἀγορεύειν outside compounds dies out altogether.

As for German, suffice it to draw attention to the large number of verbs which in the modern language are never without the prefix ge-, while in older Germanic languages their simplex forms are still current: so e.g. gebären (‘bear, give birth to’), geniessen (‘enjoy’; cf. Nutz-niessung ‘usufruct’), glauben, gönnen (‘believe’, ‘allow’). They may be compared with the Latin compounds in con-: like con-, ge-serves to strengthen the meaning in a way that we shall consider shortly (II, 190 below; cf. also II, 181 above), and here the stronger expression won out over the weaker.

But before we attempt an explanation, we must make ourselves aware of one distinction. Some of the simple forms discussed so far—such as ἄγγυμι, ἐνυμι, ἡμαι, ἄλλωμι in Attic—were straightforwardly replaced by a particular compound (cf. II, 186 above). Consequently, they are unusable not only as simple verbs but also in direct combination with other preverbs: in strict Attic, συνάγυμι (‘shatter’) or ἐνμαι and πρόσμαι (‘am seated in’, ‘am seated by’) are as foreign as ἄγγυμι or ἡμαί. If further preverbal determination is required, it is achieved by prefixation to the fixed preverb, as in e.g. μεταμφιεύμαι (‘change clothes’), προσστασάλλωμι (‘destroy in addition’), συναποθνήσκω (‘die alongside’), etc. This type of case has a simple explanation. The preverbs belong here from the outset to the particular semantic sphere of those verbs to which they are attached: e.g. ἀμφί ‘around’ is the preverb par excellence for a verb of dressing, κατά ‘down’ for

6 This view goes back to Pott (1833–6: II, 383). It is followed by Bechtel (1914: 279), who refers also to works by Rödiger and Stolz, and is apparently regarded as self-evident by Risch (1974: §§188b, 18a), who gives no references. Schwyzer 446, and Chantraine, s.v. ‘νιχώ’, follow Brugmann and W.
one of sitting, ἀπό ‘off’ for one of spoiling, ruining. Hence it was perfectly reasonable always to add the preverb, as it enabled the meaning of the verb to be expressed more fully and decisively. Naturally, for a given purpose the same preverb was not always chosen in every dialect and every age. In Attic, ἀποκτεῖνο (‘kill’) and ἀπολλυμι (‘destroy’), were favoured at the expense not only of their simple forms but also of their compounds in κατά, although in Homer the latter predominate convincingly over those in ἀπό and match other κατά-compounds which express the idea of complete destruction and consumption (καταδάπτε, κατακαίε, καταφθεῖ, καταφλέγε, etc.).—In the other situation, where the simplex is lost while a whole range of compounds remain current, the explanation is more complicated. Verbs like Lat. specio (‘see, observe’) were a priori capable of a wider range of compounds than, say, Gk θνίσκω (‘die’), and the old compounds were maintained as specio became superfluous, being replaced partly by conspicio in the manner of the German verbs in ge- mentioned above, and partly by its derivative specto (‘look at, watch’).—Here and there, rhythmic factors may have played a part: e.g. pleo (‘fill’) was at a disadvantage compared with compleo because of its monosyllabic forms in the present (pleś, pleť, pleń). The ancient languages had a palpable aversion to monosyllables bearing full lexical meaning.7

As we have already occasionally observed, here, too, the poets tend to preserve archaic states of affairs, and in Silver Latin they are imitated by prose. So, for example, apisci ‘to achieve’, which in Classical Latin had fallen out of use in favour of adipisci, was restored to prose by Livy, and cultivated idiosyncratically by Tacitus in the Annals (where, at 6. 45. 3, apisci even takes a genitive like potior; cf. 3. 55. 1 rerum adepto ‘he [Galba] attained power’); Tacitus also imitates Vergil with haud tennendus ‘not to be despised’ (Hist. 3. 47. 2)—for further details, see Persson’s critical observations on the shorter works of Tacitus (1927: 56–7). And because by now the use of the simplex counted as a prestigious archaism, the poets allowed themselves obsolete simple verbs in place of compounds even | in cases where the preverb was necessary for the sense. So in Greek the verb τέλλω, which is found as a simplex (‘accomplish, perform’) early on, in Pindar and Cretan,8 but already in Homer occurs only in compounds, was used without a preverb in the sense of ἀνατέλλω ‘rise (of the sun)’ by Sophocles (Electra 699), and later by Aratus and Apollonius of Rhodes. The latter ventured

7 From Indo-European on, there is a strong tendency in all the daughter-languages to extend or replace root formations, nouns and verbs comprising just root + ending. It is much easier to cite studies of monosyllabic nouns than of verbs: see, e.g., on Indo-European, Ai. Gr. II.2, 4–47; on Greek, Risch (1974: §§81–3); on Latin, Ernst (1954: ch. 2), Leumann 273–5. Nevertheless, an impression may be gained of the rarity and liability to replacement of such verb formations in Greek and Latin from Risch (1974: §§86, 92) and Leumann 521–32, respectively.

8 The infin. τέλλεν occurs in the Gortyn Lawcode (Buck no. 117; Willetts 1967), X, 42.
also i. 688 τελεμένου éteos (‘as the year comes round’) for Homeric περιτελεμένου éteos.

In this way, entirely new simple verbs were sometimes formed, such as gregare in the first-century poet Statius and later authors for congregare (‘collect together’), which is not a proper compound at all but a so-called prefix-denominative (Π, 191–2 below), or such as cupisco in Augustine for concupisco (‘desire’), although, as we shall see in a moment, the restriction of a verb in -sco to compounds is to be regarded as original.9 (MEYER-LÜBKE, however, REW, s.v., gives cupiscere as the basis of a French dialect word, in which case it must have been colloquial.) Compare also intiminatus in Horace, Odes 3. 2. 18 (‘undimmed’, of honores) for incontaminatus in prose; and cf. SCHWYZER (1927: 443 n. 3).

In individual cases the simplex fell out of use before the start of the tradition of a given language: e.g. Gothic fralisan (‘to lose’) no more has a simplex beside it than its modern German counterpart verlieren does.10 One meets the simplex of Gk ἀπόλαύω (‘enjoy, benefit from’) only in Slavic,11 that of Lat. ap-erio (‘to open’) only in Baltic,12 and Latin lacks the simplex also for percellere ‘knock down’ (beside recellere ‘swing back, recoil’);13 for ex-per-gisci ‘wake up’, beside which Old Latin at least knew forms without ex-;14 and for compellere (‘address, call on’; cf. ap- and inter-pellare), which FROEHEDE (1893: 241–3) ingeniously compares with Gothic spillon ‘announce’,15 and let us not forget Lat. -quinisco, -mineo, and cóníseo (‘to squat’, ‘to project’, ‘be closed [of the eyes]; to close [the eyes]’).16 The

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9 This is true of some verb stems (cf. e.g. taceo–conticesco, timeo–extimesco), but by no means of all (cf. e.g. augeo–augesco, areo–aresco, not to mention the oldest -sco verbs, such as nosco, resco). In her major monograph on the history of -sco verbs and their prefixes and semantic functions, Haverling (2000: 392–3) identifies distinct semantic functions for prefixed and unprefixed -sco verbs in early and Classical Latin, and sets beside cupisco the new unprefixed verbs tacesco and dormisco as evidence of the breaking-down in later Latin of this earlier semantic subsystem.

10 The past participle of this prefixed verb survives in Engl. forlorn. English alone among the Germanic languages has the simplex, lose, perhaps as a result of contamination with loose (German lösen, etc.); see the OED, s.v.

11 Cf. e.g. Old Church Slavonic loviti ‘to hunt, catch’. The root of these verbs may be seen also in Gk (Attic) λεία ‘booty, loot’ (< *lēw-yā) and perh. Lat. licrum ‘profit’; cf. Walde & Hofmann, s.v. ‘lucrum’ and for Slavic, Vasmer, s.v. ‘lož’. 12 Cf. e.g. Lith. vér̄t̄i ‘to open, thread, insert’; see LEW, s.v. ‘lúk’. The simplex may be reflected also in Indo-Iranian; see LIV, s.v. ‘Hēr̄: “shut in, hide, insert”’.

13 The simplex is seen in e.g. Gk κλάω ‘to break’; cf. LIV, s.v. ‘*kelh₂ “to hit”’.

14 According to Paul’s excerpts from Festus, p. 235 Lindsay, pergo could mean ‘wake up’ (expergificatio) in Old Latin. Lat. expergiscers(ō) and expergo are probably by dissimilation from *-per-gr-(isc)-, the root being -gr- seen in Gk κλένω, -γαι ‘wake up’, etc.; cf. LIV, s.v. ‘*h-ger. “to wake up”’, and for an analysis of the Latin forms, Haverling (2000: 401 & Index, s.v.).

15 In origin, the Latin compounds in-pellāre belong together with pellēre ‘to drive’, but specialization of meaning caused them to be regarded as two separate verbs; see Walde & Hofmann, s.v. ‘pello’, Eرنüt & Meillet, s.v. ‘appello’, ‘pello’, LIV, s.v. ‘‘pelle‘‘ “to approach”’.

16 On these verbstems, see LIV, s.v. ‘‘kôn-h- “bend up or down”’, ‘‘mēn- (3) “to project”, and ‘‘Kneigabh “to lean, incline”’, respectively. On con- and oc-quinisco, see Haverling (2000: 401 & Index, s.v.)
loss of the simplex is apparently not quite so old in the cases of *excallo* ‘be pre-
eminent’ and its fellows,17 and of compounds in *-perior*,18 in that derivatives such as *celcis* (‘high, lofty’) and *peritus, periculum* (‘skilled, experienced’; ‘danger’ ←
orig. ‘trial, venture’) exist alongside them. Similar is the case of Gk κέννισσε (‘tell, tell of’; cf. Lat. inesse, etc., also always with the preverb), beside ἀ-σπετος
(‘unspeakable, unutterable’);19 note that Hesychius’ προσεφια (‘-ια in the ms.): προσαγόρευσι belongs rather with προσεπτείν (‘to address’).20 The Latin cognate
of Gk τιθημι, German tun, and English *do* contained in *abdo, condo, credo* (‘put away, conceal’; ‘put together, found’; ‘trust, believe’), etc., is ousted as a simplex
by the extended formation *facio* (‘do, make’); compounds of *facio* are more recent
than those in *-do*.21—On *cumbere : capare* (‘lie’, etc.), *occupare : capere* (‘take’, etc.),
and the like, see Sommer (1914: §321.1b).22

There are many refinements into which I cannot go, such as the fact that often a
simplex yields to the compound not across the board but only in certain functions
(though sometimes, as in the case of Gk ἀγορεύειν (II, 187 above), this represents
a first step towards the total disappearance of the simplex). So, e.g., Lat. *indicere*
replaced the simplex *dicere* in particular phrases, namely where the latter meant
‘announce, proclaim’ (cf. Aulus Gellius 16. 4. 1, and Servius Danielis on Aen. 1.
632). And yet, in general the simplex *dic* has remained current to the present
day. In other cases, the simplex was retained only in subsidiary function: so e.g.
*luo*, lit. ‘I loose’, survived only in the sense ‘get rid of by expiation’, while in its
basic meaning it was replaced by the compound *so-luo* (*< se-luo*), which then
underwent secondary composition (cf. II, 188 above) to *absoluo*, etc. On classical
*desoluere, resoluere* (‘pay out money’, ‘redeem, pay back’) for earlier *deluere, reluere,*
see now Schwyzer (1927: 445).

17 In verbal function, the root *kelH*- is securely attested only in Latin and Lithuanian *kéli* ‘raise up’,
although words for ‘hill, mountain’ in Baltic, Germanic, and Latin (*collis, culmen*) are compared; see LIV,
s.v. ‘*kelH*’.

18 Distinguish *experior* and *opperior* (cf. perh. Gk πείπα ‘experience’, and perh. LIV, s.v. ‘*per- [1] “come
through, go beyond”’) from *omperio, reperio*, compounds of *pario* ‘beget, give birth to’ (perh. cognate
with Gk ἐρεπέρειν ‘provided’; cf. LIV, s.v. ‘*per- “provide”’).

19 The root here is IE *sek* ‘to say’, which survives as a simplex in Baltic (Lithuanian *sakyt*i) and
Germanic (Old Norse *saga*, German *sagen*, English *say*); see LIV, s.v. ‘*sek*’ (2).

20 In more recent works, I have found this word recorded only in Buck & Petersen (1945: 169).

21 These verbs, and their cognates in other branches of the family (including Hittite *tëmmi* ‘I speak’,
Vedic *diddhät* ‘puts, makes’), are all based on the IE root *dleh*– ‘put, make’.
IE *do* became Lat. *fe- in word-initial position, Lat. *-d- in most environments in the middle of the word, hence the initial *f- of the simplex *facio* vs the internal *-d- of the (old) compounds in *-do*—and hence W.’s statement that compounds with word-internal *-f- are recent.
Lat. *fē-c- / fē-c- < IE *dleh-kr / *dleh-kr* shows a *k-*extension to the root, which may or may not be the same in origin as those seen in the Greek aorist ἔθηκα and Phrygian *ädwaer* ‘makes’. For details and further references, see LIV, s.vv. ‘*dleh-kr*’ and ‘*dleh-kr*’.

22 The second of the two types of stem alternation given by W. is the commoner, i.e. between 1st-conjuga-
tion compound and 3rd-conjugation simplex: cf. *educere : dicere, indicare : dicere, and appellare : pellere*
caller in this paragraph.
Relevant in this connection is the fact mentioned above (II, 187) that in Attic the present \( \theta \nu \eta \sigma \kappa \omega \) was forced to yield to \( \alpha \pi \omega \theta \nu \eta \sigma \kappa \omega \) (‘die’), but in the perfect the simplex \( \tau \epsilon \theta \nu \gamma \kappa \alpha \) prevailed: for compounding and Aktionsart are interrelated. There is a similar case in Latin. Of the verb \( \pi \omicron \omicron \sigma \theta \omicron \) (\( \pi \omicron \omicron \sigma \theta \omicron \omicron \) from the classical period on, apart from \( \pi \omicron \omicron \sigma \theta \omicron \) only the forms of the perfect are current with the meaning ‘know’: they alone are attested, and no forms of the present stem, whether in Caesar and Cicero’s speeches, or in Vitruvius and Petronius. The usage of the poets and the prose-writers of the Silver Age should not mislead us on this point (cf. II, 188–9 above). The fact that Tacitus, for instance, while confining himself in the \( \text{Dialogus} \) to the forms of \( \pi \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \), makes frequent use of the present stem in his other works, is just one of the many indications of the great distance between them and ordinary speech: spoken Latin of the age of Tacitus is reflected much more closely in the work of a poet such as Martial, and he knows only forms of \( \pi \omicron \omicron \omicron \). Occasionally, present-stem forms are used by Cicero in his philosophical works, from \( \text{Republic} \) 1. 64 on, perhaps originally as a gentle archaism, most frequently in the translation (\( \pi \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \) te) and paraphrases of the Delphic dictum \( \gamma \nu \omega \beta \iota \sigma \alpha \nu \tau \omicron \omicron \) (‘know thyself!’).—In the present, \( \pi \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \) came to be replaced by \( \kappa \omicron \nu \omicron \sigma \sigma \omicron \), in line with what we said earlier (II, 187) about \( \kappa \omicron \omicron \omicron \), and \( \kappa \omicron \nu \omicron \sigma \sigma \omicron \) gradually replaced \( \pi \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \) even in compounds with other preverbs. In the classical period, we find \( \pi \omicron \nu \omicron \omicron \omicron \sigma \nu \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \) (‘have foreknowledge of’) and \( \kappa \omicron \nu \omicron \sigma \sigma \omicron \omicron \) (‘recognize’), in Silver Latin \( \kappa \omicron \nu \omicron \omicron \omicron \nu \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \) (‘get to know thoroughly’), for earlier \( \pi \omicron \nu \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \), etc., and we should note that only \( \kappa \omicron \nu \omicron \sigma \sigma \omicron \), and not \( \kappa \omicron \nu \omicron \sigma \sigma \omicron \), is continued in Romance, and that in the manuscripts of Plautus at \( \text{Truculentus} \) 152 \( \kappa \omicron \nu \omicron \omicron \omicron \nu \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \) has ousted \( \kappa \omicron \nu \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \omicron \).—There is a similar relation between (pf.) \( \text{memini} \) and (pres.) -\( \text{miniscor} \) (‘remember’): of the present, the simplex is attested for Old Latin (by Paul. Fest. p. 109 Lindsay) only in the form \( \text{miniscitur} \), for original *\( \text{meniscitur} \).\(^{24}\)

23 Lat. \( \text{accognoscere} \) persisted in Old Italian, Old Lombard, and Old French, but survives today only in French dialects (\( \text{FEW} \), s.v.); \( \text{recognoscere} \), on the other hand, is very widely represented in modern Romance, in Spanish \( \text{reconocer} \), Italian \( \text{riconoscere} \), Fr. \( \text{reconnaitre} \), etc.; see \( \text{REW} \), s.v.

24 On the forms and meanings of \( \text{miniscor} \) and its compounds, see Haverling (2000: 400 & Index, s.v.).
As a fifth point, to conclude this discussion, let us note that there are several classes of verbs with a preposition as their first element of which the second element was never, or not originally, available as a simple verb. These include, first, verbs derived from nominal compounds, the so-called ‘parasyntheta’: verbs like ἐκκλησιαζέω ‘to hold an Assembly’, προθυμεῖσθαι ‘strive’ contain the prepositions εἰ and πρό, and hence in Attic have the augment in the middle of the word (ἐ-κλησίασαν, προθυμεῖτο < *προ-ε-), but *κλησιάζεων and *θυμεῖσθαι never existed for εἰ and πρό to be compounded with, and the underlying forms are rather the compound noun ἐκκλησία (‘assembly’), and adjective πρόθυμος (‘eager’). The same applies to Latin verbs like commodāre (‘to put at the disposal of’).

The underlying form of a compound verb could also be a phrase comprising preposition + governed case-form: so e.g. προσονδίξεω ‘to dash to the ground (πρός οὖν δῶς) in Herodotus, the age of which is guaranteed by the corresponding form in Doric ἐ-ποσ-ονδίξε- κατέβαλεν ἐπὶ γῆν (‘threw to the ground’, in Hesychius), with curious placement of the augment. So, too, Vulgar Latin inodiare ‘annoy’, which survives in Fr. ennuyer (REW, s.v.), is based on in odio esse (‘to be disliked’), and similarly German aushändigen, einhändigen (‘surrender’, ‘deliver’) on aus (der) Hand / in (die) Hand geben (‘to give out of [one’s] / into [another’s] hand’).

Harder to analyse are the numerous compound verbs of which the second element is derived from a noun purely for purposes of compounding. These include a number of Latin verbs in con-., such as the problematic considerare (‘consider, reflect on’), or contemplari lit. ‘survey the templum with one’s look’ (hence, ‘look at, contemplate’), or conuásare ‘pack uasa together, pack up (baggage)’, and so on; but this sort of thing occurs with other preverbs, too, e.g. percontari ‘investigate’, which was correctly explained already by Verrius Flaccus (1st c. BC–1st c. AD), according to Festus, p. 236 Lindsay: ‘ex nautico usu, quia conto pertinent cognoscuntque nauigantes aquae altitudinem’ (‘from nautical usage, because sailors test and learn the depth of the water with a pole (contus ← Gk κοντός)’).

German examples include (from nouns) bevölkern (‘populate’), entarten (‘to degenerate’), überbrücken (‘to bridge’), überlisten (‘outsmart’), verköpfern (‘embody’), zerfleischen (‘tear to pieces’), and, from adjectives, entblößen (‘lay bare’), erblindnen (‘go blind’), verfinstern (‘darken, obscure’). In many cases, given the freedom with which denominatives are often formed, the simplex would if necessary have sufficed. In rather coarse German köpfen is used in the sense ‘remove the head from’, and in the phrase um sich scharen (‘to gather people

25 That is, commodāre is analysable only as commod + āre, a factitive verb to the adjective commodus ‘convenient, suitable’, and not as com + modāre (a compound in com- to an unattested verb *modāre).

26 The same etymology of percontor is in Nonius Marcellus and in Donatus’ commentary on Terence, Hecyra 77; see Maltby (1991: s.v.).
around oneself”) the simplex derived from Schar (‘crowd’) is used to mean ‘to make into a crowd’. But the more elevated synonym of köpfen is not *haupten but enthaupten (cf. Gk ἀποκεφαλίζω, Lat. decapitare, neither of which has a simplex), which reflects the need to convey the idea of separation, not expressed in köpfen, by means of the preverb ent-, which is standard in this function. In the same way, for this meaning in English the compound to behead is more normal and elegant than the simplex to head.27 German scharen stands in a similar contrast with Lat. congregare (with con-, ‘together’; on gregare, see II, 189 above). As a result of the need to make clear the sense of the derivative and to set the word beside compounds in the same semantic field, the preverb was felt to be obligatory—indeed, in many cases it made the derivation possible in the first place. On this type of compound, see the fine article by Prellwitz (1903): he terms them ‘prefix-denominatives’ (‘Prahifxdenominative’).

27 Engl. head may still be used to mean remove the head of an animal, fish or tree, but no longer that of a person; see the OED, s.v. ‘head’, verb, I.1.
We come now to the third function of prepositions (beside their use as adverbs and as preverbs), namely their use in combination with case-forms. It is important to say that in terms of language history this use, which often strikes us as the main function of prepositions, is the most recent, and developed only gradually over time. You may remember from reading Homer how we are often unsure whether to take a preposition closely with an adjacent case-form or rather with the verb in the same clause: e.g. at Il. 24. 397, the best manuscript has Μυρμιδόνων δ’ ἐξ ἐμί (‘I am from / one of the Myrmidons’), which is followed by Bekker (1858 [vol. I]), among others, while all more recent editors write ἐξεμί (one word).¹ The result is the same either way: however, you write it, ἐξ serves to determine the relation between Μυρμιδόνων and ἐμί. In many other instances, too, the compound verb with a case-form can mean the same as the simplex with the same preposition governing a case-form: e.g. Lat. exercitus amnem traducitur (‘the army is brought across the river’) says the same as exercitus trans amnem ducitur, and in German er überschreitet die Brücke differs only in a shade of meaning from er schreitet über die Brücke ‘he crosses the bridge’.² Often, too, one and the same clause contains the same preposition twice, both before the verb and before the noun, e.g. Theognis 1022 αὔτίχ’ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς γήρας ὑπὲρκρέματι (‘soon old age is hanging over our heads’), or Caesar, Gallic War 1. 35. 3 ne quam multitudinem . . . trans Rhenum . . . traduceret (‘he [Ariovistus] was not to bring any large body of men across the Rhine’).—Nevertheless, the habit of using prepositions in connection with specific case-forms developed already in prehistoric times.

First, a word about the placement of the preposition in relation to the case-form with which it goes—and here we have to anticipate the lecture on word

¹ The ‘others’ alluded to include Clarke, Wolf, Crusius, Heyne, Payne Knight, and perhaps Dindorf & Hentze and Monro & Allen; more recently, Colin Macleod also printed two words. In his earlier edition of the Iliad (Berlin 1843), Bekker printed one word, as did Parker (Oxford 1849), Fergusson (1851), Leaf & Bayfield and, most recently, M. L. West. W.’s ‘best manuscript’ is the ‘Venetus A’ (Venice, Biblioteca Marciana, Graecus 822; 10th c.); on the manuscripts of Homer, see Davison (1962) supplemented by Haslam (1997) and Nagy (1997).

² The difference of meaning alluded to is surely that überschreitet is more likely to be perfective and schreitet über to be durative (Martin Durrell and Wiebke Brockhaus-Grand, p.c.).
order in general. On this subject great service has been rendered on Old Latin by Degering’s contributions to the historical syntax of Latin (1893) and Leo’s observations on the placement and grouping of words in Plautus (1895).

As we shall see, in classical prose both Greek and Latin, no less than in German and English, the preposition has to come first. There is, however, the difference that, while in German (and English) we always put the case-form immediately after the preposition, this is not always so in the ancient languages. True, a group comprising preposition + case-form is often practically equivalent to a single word: in early Latin orthography, although other words are generally divided, such pairs are often written together. The accent and the treatment of the final segments of prepositions show that they were pronounced closely together with their following noun. Not infrequently total univerbation occurs (see II, 204–6 below), and from the earliest period in both Greek and Latin we find cases where particles, which tend generally to follow the first word of the clause, are attached to a group composed of preposition + case-form. So, Gk δὲ, for instance, in dozens of passages in Homer, e.g. II. 1. 461 ἐπ’ αὐτῶν δ’ ᾧμοβήτσαν (‘they laid raw flesh on them [the sacrificial thigh-pieces]’); or interrogative -ne in Plautus, e.g. Cure. 606 sub gemmāne (‘under the gem-stone’), Pseud. 47 pro ligīmean salute (‘in return for her safety in wood’). And Caesar, who generally uses enim strictly in second position in the clause, can still say, ab his enim or contra opinionem enim (Civil War 1. 82. 2, 3. 94. 4).

Nevertheless, it is commoner for such particles to be inserted between preposition and case-form: in Attic this applies still to γὲ, τὲ, δὲ, μὲν, αὖ, δὴ, οὖν, and in Latin to -que (which in Plautus must be attached to the preposition and cannot yet—as it can in Cicero—be attached to the case-form): I remind you straightforward of absque, where -que meant originally ‘if’ (cf. II, 119 and n. 17, p. 547 above). In the fourth century, Attic goes in some respects further still, e.g. in Demosthenes 20. 3 καὶ ὅλως ἐν οἴμαι πολλοῖς (‘and generally I suppose in many [of your public proceedings]’), or Plato, Laws 7, 797d ἐν ὄς ἐπος εἴπειν <πᾶσιν> οὐ τοῖς μὲν τοῖς δ’ οὖ, πλην...κακοῖς (‘in a word, in everything—not in some and not in others—with the sole exception of the bad’). Admittedly, both cases involve expressions serving to determine the following noun more closely—from a syntactic point of view, ἐν οἴμαι πολλοῖς is no different from ἐν πάνῳ πολλοῖς (‘in very many things’)—and in German (and English), too, such adverbial determiners (and attributive genitives) are placed reasonably enough between the preposition and its governed noun, e.g. in German in sehr weiter Entfernung

3 Until the 1st c. AD, the Romans placed a word-divider in the form of a raised point between words. These ‘interpuncts’ are often omitted in those texts which use them between a preposition and its governed noun (e.g. per Popilium · ‘by the hand of Popilius’), and between a verb and its enclitic pronoun (e.g. misi tibi · ‘I have sent [to] you’). On the latter type, and for further references, see Adams (1996); on the accentuation of preposition + noun, see Allen (1973: 24–5), and on the non-punctuation of prepositions, Wingo (1972: 16).
(cf. Eng. at a very great distance), mit stets wachsendem Eifer (cf. Eng. with ever-growing ambition). But it is precisely this placement that is not everywhere obligatory: note Plautus, *Rop* 1147 *tam in angustum... locum* ‘into such a narrow place’, or Cicero, *De finibus* 5. 26 *quam in optimo... statu* ‘in the best possible condition’ as examples of how in Latin generally such intensives are often separated from their adjectives; see MADVIG (1876: *ad loc.*) on the Cicero passage, with examples also from Greek. One might add here Plato’s μηδ’ εξ ενόσ, μηδ’ ὑπὸ μιᾶς, οὐδὲ δὴ ἐν and the like in the sense of ἐκ μηδενός (‘from nothing’, ‘under no [pleasure]’, ‘through nothing’), etc.\(^4\)

Even freer than Attic prose are tragic dialogue and Ionic prose, where even enclitic pronouns are inserted between preposition and noun, in virtue of the old law governing the placement of enclitics at the start of the clause:\(^5\) so e.g. Eur. *Phoen.* 923 (Creon to Tiresias) ὁ πρόσ σε γονάτων (‘by your knees, I beg you’), Herodotus 6. 69. 4 (Demaratus’ mother) ἐν γάρ σε τῇ νυκτὶ ταύτην ἀναμένωμαι (‘for on that night I conceived you’). And like πρόσ in Greek, so Lat. *per* is often separated from its case-form in oaths in Roman comedy, and not merely by *te*, *ego* etc., which tend to but need not come first in the clause, rather than with reference to the unstressed words to be enclitic on certain types of stressed words, ‘preferential hosts’ (imperatives, relative pronouns, etc.), which tend to but need not come first in the clause, rather than with reference to the second position in the clause as such. Kruschwitz (2004) confirms this for Latin inscriptions.

\(^4\) These examples are at *Phaedrus* 244d, *Alethiades* I 122a and *Phaedo* 100c, respectively; for further examples, see LSJ, s.v. ‘μηδείς’, 1.2; here and s.vv. ‘οὐδὲ’ B., ‘οὐδὲς’ B., the point is made that when a particle or preposition is made to intervene in this way οὐδὲ / μηδὲ is to be understood in its emphatic sense, ‘not even’, but in W.’s examples this is not the case.

\(^5\) That is, Wackernagel’s Law (Wackernagel 1892), which is old in the sense that it goes back to Indo-European! For bibliography, see p. 11 n. 3 above, and note also the important articles by J. N. Adams (1994a, 1994b). On the strength of a detailed study of the placement of unstressed pronouns and forms of the verb ‘to be’ in Latin, Adams suggests that Wackernagel’s Law should be reconsidered in terms of the tendency of unstressed words to be enclitic on certain types of stressed words, ‘preferential hosts’ (imperatives, relative pronouns, etc.), which tend to but need not come first in the clause, rather than with reference to the second position in the clause as such. Kruschwitz (2004) confirms this for Latin inscriptions.
and the phenomenon occurs in Latin, too, e.g. Ovid, *Heroides* 9. 96 *damnis díuēs ab ipsa suis* (‘rich from her own hurt’, of the Hydra’s heads; see NORDEN (1957: 252) on *Aen.* 6. 451–2 *quam...iuxta* (‘beside whom’), and note also SCHULZE (1927: 301), with some examples from Baltic.

Two further cases of insertion deserve to be mentioned. In an earlier lecture (II, 132 above), we discussed *Il.* 10. 224 προ ὰ τοῦ εἰνόησεν (‘[when two go together,] one discerns before the other’) with reference to the meaning of the two cases of ὰ, but this line is noteworthy also because the nom. ὰ stands between προ and τοῦ. One of the features of the figure of speech polyptoton is that the two forms on the same stem should be immediately adjacent,6 and furthermore the nominative must precede an oblique case: the result here is that the preposition is separated from its case-form. The same applies to *Od.* 5. 154–5 ἰαύεσκεν...παρ’ οὐκ ἐθέλον ἐθελούση (lit., ‘he unwilling would sleep beside her willing’, of Odysseus and Calypso) and also to reflexive and reciprocal expressions formed from nom. and oblique case-forms, such as Gk (esp. Doric) πρὸς αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ, παρ’ αὐτοῖ αὐτῶν (‘from one another’), or in the Old Latin Bible *ad alis alium, ab alis alio* (‘to, from one another’), and the like. Fundamentally, the same analysis holds also of expressions like Gk πρὸς ἀλλήλους, NHG *mit einander*, English *to each other* (instead of *each to the other*, etc.), in keeping with what we noted earlier (II, 97–8).

Secondly, sometimes included under this heading is a well-known Latin pattern, namely the dating formula with *ante* with two phrases in the accusative of which only the second goes with *ante*: e.g. *ante diem tertium Nonas Maias* ‘on the second day before the Nones of May’. Ever since Paulus Manutius in the sixteenth century,7 Latinists have agonized over this idiom which strikes modern intuition so oddly. Of the attempted explanations listed by HAND (1829–45: I, 378–83), at first glance the most promising is the view that the formula was originally *ante die tertio Nonas Maias*, with *die tertio* inserted between the preposition and its noun in order to give the phrase unity, and that *ante die tertio* was then replaced by *ante diem tertium*, because speakers were accustomed to an accusative immediately after *ante*, did not find it odd and had a nice parallel in *postmodum* for *postmodo* (‘later, presently’; cf. I, 59 above).—But why should *die tertio* have been inserted in such a blatant fashion? There is another possible explanation. An accusative with *ante* determined by a numeral can denote the interval between two successive actions, as e.g. in *paucos ante annos* in Livy (‘a few years earlier’, 39. 37. 2), *ante biennium* in Velleius Paterculus (‘two years earlier’,

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6 This is a feature of polyptotic *geminatio* or *reduplicatio* in particular; for ancient and medieval discussion and examples of these phenomena, see Lausberg (1998), §§616 and 619, respectively, and on polyptoton in general, §§640–8.

7 The Venetian humanist Paulus Manutius (1512–74) was the third son of the great printer Aldus (the Elder; p. 150 above). He revived his father’s business, and achieved much both as a printer and as a scholar. He commented on the idiom in a note on Cicero, *Letters to his Friends* 3. 12, in his annotated edition of all of Cicero’s letters (Basel 1540).
The same occurs in Greek with πρό: πρὸ τρίτης ἡμέρας underlies Attic πρότριτα ‘on the third day before’ (e.g. at Thuc. 2. 34. 2, where it is often misunderstood), Cretan πρότριτον, προτέταρτον, etc.8—whence in Greek of the Empire πρότριτα ‘the day before yesterday’ for Attic τρίτην ἡμέραν or in the Septuagint τρίτης. If the second action (from which the interval is measured) is explicitly mentioned, this is done, at any rate from the Hellenistic period on, either with an ἥ-clause—as in Cretan πρὸ ἀμερὰν δέκα ἡ κα μέλλωντι ἀναγινώσκεν ‘ten days before the planned reading’; or with a second πρὸ + gen.—as in Theran πρὸ τὸν τάν ἄνωθεν ἡμεν πρὸ ἀμερὰν δέκα ‘ten days before the holding of the Assembly’; or lastly and most commonly with a bare genitive—as in Messenian πρὸ ἀμερὰν δέκα τῶν μνημείων ‘ten days before the Mysteries’, or in the Septuagint, Amos 1. 1 πρὸ δύο ἐτῶν τοῦ σεισμοῦ ‘two years before the earthquake’) without occasion in the Hebrew original (cf. SCHULZE 1901: 15–19).9 This second genitive must be modelled on the genitive of comparison, which is used with πρότερον, ὑστερον, and the like, and therefore related to the genitive at Xen. Hell. 1. 1. 2 μετ’ ὀλίγων τούτων ‘shortly after these things’ (cf. GÜNTHER 1906/7: 149).—The Latin dating formula can be explained in the same way, with ante diem tertium meaning ‘on the second day before’ and being followed by the accusative Nonas Maias because the force of ante diem tertium was just like that of simple ante expressing anteriority. In exactly the same way, Lat. pridie and postridie (‘on the day before’, ‘on the day after’) quite often take the accusative: was this the model for ante diem tertium + acc. or in imitation of it? It is noteworthy that on the model of pridie / postridie eius diei (lit. ‘on the eve / morrow of this day’), in Imperial Latin ante diem tertium may also take a genitive, e.g. in the lawyer Iulius Paulus (2nd–3rd c. AD), Digest of Justinian 50. 16. 132 ante (post) diem decimum kalendarium (‘nine days before [after] the Kalends’); or Priscian 18. 218, 298 (= GL II, 196 III, 316, 1; 370, 10) read this construction instead of the correct accusative in Cicero, Against Catiline 1. 7 (cf. SALONIUS 1922: 45).

We may add at this point something that applies only to poetry, namely the separation of the preposition from its case-form by the line end. So in Pindar, Nemean 10. 31–2 ἀμιλλάται περὶ (accent?) | ἐσχάτων ἄθλων κορυφαίς ‘(whoever competes for the summits of the ultimate games’; cf. perhaps Olympian 6. 5310),

8 Both πρότριτον and προτέταρτον are in IC IV. 81, § 9, the latter also in IC IV. 75A, 6–7 and in the Gortyn Lawcode (= IC IV. 72), XI, 53 (all three inscriptions from Gortyn, 2nd ¼ 3rd c.). In Attic with πρότριτα compare πρόσμετα, in Lysias, fr. 30 Carey, and on an inscription of 396/5 from the Athenian acropolis, IG II2, 1237, B. 61–2.

9 The three inscriptions referred to are: (Crete) IC III.3. 4 = Chaniotis (1996: no. 28), 43 (Hierapytma, early 2nd c. BC); (Thera) IG XII.3. 330 = Collitz & Bechtel no. 4706, C. 160–1 (c. 210–199 BC); (Messenia) IG V.1. 1990 = Collitz & Bechtel no. 4689, A. 70 (94–91 BC). Schulze quotes very appositely the so-called ‘Senatus consultum of the 4th of May’ (Delphi, not before 165 BC) Fouilles de Delphes III.4, 333, C.15 πρὸ ἡμέραν τεσσάρων νομῶν Μαιῶν ‘on the third day before the none of May’.

10 See Hutchinson (2001: 398, ad loc.)
at Soph. Oed. Col. 495-6 λείπομαι γὰρ ἐν | τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι (‘for I fall short in my lack of strength’), and in the comic poet Axionicus, fr. 6 (PCG IV), 1–2 ἴράσθην μετά | Φιλοξένου (‘I desired [to play the parasite] with Philoxenus’). Related to this in Attic is synapheia\(^{11}\) between trimeters, cultivated especially by Sophocles, which allowed him also to end a line with the article.—Roman poets experimented in similar ways: so e.g. Lucretius, 1. 72–3 extra | processit longe flammantia moenia mundi (‘he [Epicurus] ventured far out beyond the flaming ramparts of the world’—note also the separation of preposition and noun); Enn. Ann. 105–6 Skutsch simul inter | sese sic memorant (‘at the same time they talked among themselves as follows’); Hor. Sat. 1. 7. 12 with inter (see II, 202 below).\(^{12}\)

We now come to what is known as ‘anastrophe’, the placement of the preposition after the case-form it goes with. The term ‘anastrophe’ means ‘inversion’ (reuversio at Quint. Inst. 8. 6. 65), and it was used by ancient scholars of any inversion of regular word order, including δακέ-θυμιος for θυμο-δακής ‘heart-biting’ or θεός ὁς in Homer for ὁς θεός (‘like a god’). Its use in reference to the postposition of prepositions, then, is based on the view (suggested by classical usage) that it is normal for a preposition to precede its case-form, the view that also underlies the terms Gk ‘πρόθεσις’, Lat. ‘praeposition’ that we considered earlier (I, 16 & II, 153 above). There is explicit testimony for this view. Aristotle reports at Poetics 22, 1458b31 that a certain Ariphrades derided the tragedians for using expressions that were completely foreign in everyday speech (ἀ οὐδεὶς ἂν εἶπειεν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ), such as δωμάτων ἀπό for ἀπὸ δωμάτων (‘from the palace’), and Ἀχιλλέως πέρι for περὶ Ἀχιλλέως (‘round Achilles’). And Cicero at Orator 154 states that nobiscum (‘with us’) is used instead of cum nobis only in order to avoid homonymy with cunno (dat.-abl. sg. of cunnus ‘vagina’), and that it is only because of this nobiscum that one says also mecum and tecum (‘with me’, ‘with you’). This misled Pliny, according to Priscian 12. 28 (= GL II, 594–5), to claim that the antiquissimi were able to use cum either before or after the personal pronouns.

In Homer, anastrophe of prepositions sometimes accompanies tmesis, e.g. at Il. 2. 699 τότε δ’ ἣδη ἔχειν κατὰ γαία μήλαυα ‘but then already the black earth held him (Protesilaus) down’, for regular κάτεχειν. This is inherited. Also inherited and even commoner is postposition after a governed case-form. In Homer, \(\text{II, 197}\) this occurs with all prepositions, monosyllabic and disyllabic alike. After Homer it is hardly ever found with ἄμφις, ἀντίς, διά or any monosyllables; even Hesiod, and Pindar, who is otherwise so bold in his word order, do not venture to put these prepositions after their nouns. The limiting of anastrophe may have to do in part

\(^{11}\) That is, ‘metrical and prosodic continuity’ serving to define the metrical ‘period’; on this terminology, see West (1987: 3–4).

\(^{12}\) See Skutsch (1988) on the Ennius passage, with further references.
with certain accentual relations: we know that prepositions are generally accented differently when postposed (namely, on the first syllable, just as when they are used as independent adverbs). Relevant in the case of the monosyllables is the tendency against putting a shorter word after a longer one (see below). While epic conventions are not violated by groups such as Αρτέμιδι ἔνω, κακῶν ἔξ, ’Πλον ἔίς (‘with Artemis’, Od. 15. 410; ‘born of cowards’, Il. 14. 472; ‘to Ilium’, Il. 5. 210, 511, etc.), in later poetry τοῦ πρός; ‘by whom?’ at Soph. Oed. Tyr. 525 is completely isolated, and hence many editors print τοῦτος (‘the word’). On the other hand, in the case of most disyllabic prepositions anastrophe is perfectly common in tragedy, even in dialogue, where it usually ends the trimeter. As far as I know, regular Attic preserves this pattern only for περὶ+gen.—Arist. Birds 1517 μηρίων ἄπο (‘from the [sacrificial] thighs’) is probably parodic?—but anastrophe of περὶ is absolutely normal: fifth-century comedy, Thucydides, and Plato offer numerous examples, there are still some even in Aristotle, and there are instances even in inscriptions from the time of the Peloponnesian War (as also in Ionic prose, Herodotus, e.g. 8. 36. 1, and Hippocrates, e.g. Airs, Waters, Places 1).

Athenian oratory, however, shows its exclusiveness also with regard to this archaism. As far as I can see, only its oldest representatives—Antiphon and Andocides—attest secure examples of postposed περὶ, and only one each at that (1. 21 and 3. 34, respectively). It is entirely unknown in the Koine until Diodorus (9. 3. 2), but as soon as the Atticizing movement begins, from Dionysius of Halicarnassus on, it reappears and remains, along with the dual (I, 80–1 above), down to the Byzantine historians. No imitator of the ancients would wish to miss a refinement such as this. It has been rightly remarked as noteworthy that Cicero in a letter to Atticus of March 49 (9. 4. 2 = no. 173 Shackleton Bailey), in which he presents Greek θέσεις πολιτικαί to his friend, uses the words ἢ διὰ παιντός ἰτέων κατάθυνα τῆς ἐλευθερίας πέρι ‘or ought he [the statesman] go through every danger for the sake of freedom?’. Where does he get this turn of phrase from? Imitation is certainly a possibility; we know that Atticism was already current in Cicero’s lifetime.

Why was the old pattern preserved only with περὶ, and why with this only when it had the genitive?—to these questions I cannot yet give an answer. But more important is the converse problem, why anastrophe was constantly in decline and eventually disappeared altogether. Well, already in Homer postposition was the rarer option, especially with monosyllables, and with linguistic phenomena a relative frequency can often turn into an absolute rule. But the growing importance of the preposition may have been a factor, too: from its

13 There is manuscript support (including a 2nd-c. papyrus, P.Oxy. 2180) for τοῦτος.
14 Postposed ἄπο at line-end is common in tragedy, but only here in Aristophanes; see N. Dunbar’s comm. (Oxford 1995), ad loc.
15 Dionysius has five examples of περὶ in anastrophe, Roman Antiquities 1. 44, 67; 2. 44; On the Style of Demosthenes 39, and On Thucydides 20.
beginnings as more a clarification of the case, it became increasingly the principal
determiner of the syntactic role of nominal constituents, and hence came first to
speakers’ attention.

Homer’s use of anastrophe continues an inherited pattern. Indeed, to judge
from Sanskrit, anastrophe may to begin with have been even more frequent, but, as in Greek, so in most Indo-European languages it is in decline. It was present in
the older Germanic languages, but in modern German, apart from the improper
prepositions like wegen (‘on account of’) it is found only in the adverbs composed
of da(r), bie(r), wo(r), hin, her + preposition (such as darin, hierbei, etc.).

In Latin, anastrophe does still occur with case-forms, but even in our earliest
documents its use is dramatically reduced, in striking contrast with its closest
relatives in Italic, Umbrian in particular, in which it is still very widespread.

Down to the classical period and later, anastrophe is common only in two sets of
cases: first, in the combination of cum with the personal pronouns, mecum (‘with
me’), etc. This combination was so well established that no other placement of
cum is found with these pronouns. Indeed, it has even survived into Romance: it
is particularly clear in Ital. meco, teco, seco (along with poetic nosco, vosco), while in
Spanish and elsewhere the preposition is also added on the front in Span. conmigo
‘with me’, etc. As noted above (II, 196), Cicero saw the starting point of this
anastrophe in nobiscum (‘with us’), but in fact the development was exactly the
other way round: only in the singular forms is there an apparent reason for the
constant anastrophe, for they are monosyllabic, and we saw with reference to
Greek (II, 197 above) what that means for the placement of prepositions. For
Latin, note only that Plautus has nos secundum (‘following us’) at Miles 1349,
although otherwise he always puts secundum before its noun. The disyllabic plural
forms then modelled themselves on me, te, and se. Other prepositions as a rule
precede the personal pronouns, even the monosyllables, but most of them were
used with these pronouns very much less frequently than was cum (‘with’), so that
no pattern running counter to the regular postposition could be developed. The
one odd thing is the complete absence of med ab (‘by me’), etc.—Secondly,
practically all the old prepositions are found in anastrophe after the interrogative
and relative pronouns, though this is no longer as widespread in Cicero as it is in
Plautus and | Terence (most frequently with cum), and it is still less common in
Caesar, who postpones apart from cum only inter and only twice at that (Gall. 6.

16 Compare English compound adverbs of the type therefore, hereto, whereupon, henceforth, characterized
as ‘very formal’ by Quirk et al. (1985: §§7-46, 19-37n.).

17 Umbrian postpositions, which are written as part of the preceding governed form, include -a(r),
-ku(m) = va(m), -e = e (also in Oscan; cf. II, 200 below), -p(e(r) = per (cf. Lat. ad, cum, in, pro,
respectively), and the obscure -ta, -tu, -to ‘from’. For details, see Buck (1928: §§299–304), Penney

18 On the development of Spanish conmiigo, contigo, consigo, see Rini (1990).
36. 2, 7. 33. 2); *quem apud* is still found in Porphyry on Hor. *Sat.* 2. 1. 49. There are also the classical adverbs *quoad* and *quapropter* (‘to what extent?; to the extent that’; ‘for what reason?; for which reason’), in noteworthy contrast to *adeo* (cf. *adquo* in the comic poet L. Afranius [*c.* 100 BC], 249, 278 Ribbeck) and *propterea* (‘to this extent’; ‘for this reason’)—though pre-classical Latin attests also *eapropter* and *hacpropter*. A further relevant factor in this second type of anastrophe, apart from the fact that most of these pronominal forms are monosyllabic, is that interrogatives and relatives like to occupy clause-initial position. 19 In Greek we might compare the fact that *ανευ* (‘without’) is hardly ever placed after words other than relative and interrogative pronouns, though there are examples of other sorts at Arist. *Metaphysics* 1071a2 τῶν υδατῶν ανευ (‘without the essences’), and 3 Maccabees 4: 5 αἰδοὺς ανευ (‘without shame’).

Apart from these two sets of cases, by the classical period anastrophe has practically disappeared from Latin prepositions with acc. or abl. (apart from *tenus*), surviving at best after monosyllables, e.g. in *hunc aduersus, hanc iuxta* in Cornelius Nepos (*Conon* 2. 2, *Timothaeus* 4. 3; *Pausania* 4. 4). Even in Plautus it is found almost exclusively with ‘improper’ prepositions (II, 157 above) such as *aduersum, ergā, penes, propter* (‘facing, against’, ‘next to, with regard to’, ‘in the charge of’, ‘on account of’), with just isolated instances of *per* (‘by way of’, *Stichus* 71) and *super* (‘concerning’, *Bacchides* 196). On the other hand, those prepositions which because of their nominal origin take the genitive are placed after their case-forms at all periods, in line with the old law governing the placement of the attributive genitive, just like Gk *χάρων* (nearly always), *ἐνεκα* (often), and in earlier German *wegen* (all, ‘for the sake of’). And yet Lat. *causa* already in early Latin became so closely identified with the true prepositions that Ennius was able to venture *Ann.* 300–1 Skutsch *causa poliendi agri* (‘for the sake of dressing the field’) and Terence, *Eun.* 202 *causa virgis* (‘for the sake of the girl’), and even Cicero to satisfy a stylistic requirement can say *On Friendship* 57 *causa amicorum* (‘for the sake of friends’); see Seyffert & Müller (1876: *ad loc.*). 20 Preposed *gratia* is not found before Quintilian (e.g. 8. pr. 18, 9. 4. 58), but thereafter it is frequent. The archaic preposition *ergo* ‘for the sake of’ (lit. ‘out of the direction’) follows strictly the rule of postposition, and so, too, do *fini, fine,* and *tenus* (all, ‘up to, as far as’), the last even when governing an ablative. Sallust and Ovid are the first to use *fine* before its noun (*Hist.* 3. 52; *Metam.* 10. 536); *tenus* is not so found before the fourth century AD (Ausonius, *Parentalia* 5. 15).

Lucretius (possibly on the model of Ennius) extended such anastrophe as Latin inherited boldly and dramatically in the Greek fashion. He was followed by most

19 Both instances of postposed *inter* in Caesar (above) are after the relative pronoun. Relative pronouns and interrogatives serve as ‘preferential hosts’ also to unstressed personal pronouns and forms of the verb ‘to be’: see Adams (1994a: 147–9, 158–60), (1994b: ch. 7), and cf. n. 5 in this lecture.

20 See Skutsch (1985) on the Ennius passage, with further references.
of the Augustan poets (who were followed in their turn by prose-writers like Pliny the Elder and Tacitus), but only with disyllabic prepositions: Lucretian experiments such as terris ex, uiam per (‘out of the earth’, 6. 788; ‘along the roadside’, 6. 1264) found no imitators.

Even in anastrophe, the preposition is not always adjacent to its case-form. Immediate juxtaposition is the rule with monosyllabic prepositions, but for the rest a certain freedom prevails. The final position in the line (mentioned above) often leads to a marked separation, as e.g. at Eur. Helen 474 Λακεδαιμόνος γῆς δέυρο νοστήσασθ’ ἀπό ‘from the | land of Lacedaemon having come to this place’; once or twice it even leads to such extremes as at Soph. Ajax 792–3, where Ἀλαντός comes in 792 but the πέρι governing it not until the end of 793. The prose of Plato contains similar instances, including cases where πέρι is not clause-final, e.g. Apology 195c.—The same is found in pre-classical Latin and in high Latin poetry, e.g. Plaut. Aul. 654 neque tui me quicquam inuenisti penes (‘and you have found nothing of yours on my person’), or Verg. Aen. 11. 149 fere tro Pallanta reposto procubuit super (‘where the bier had been set down, he threw himself over the body of Pallas’). Separation of this kind can affect even more closely-bound groups, such as qua . . . propter (‘for which reason’) at Plaut. Amph. 815, hac . . . tenus (‘to this day’) at Verg. Aen. 5. 603, al., quo . . . circa (‘for which reason’) at Hor. Sat. 2. 6. 95.

So far we have noticed only in passing instances where the preposition relates to more than just a noun on its own. This occurs first when a noun has an attributive determiner. We find the preposition repeated in this situation in Homer’s ὁνεδ δόμονδε ‘to his (own) house’. This is the only example of this in the languages that concern us here, but, as was noted long ago (by BÜCHELER 1883: 157), exactly the same is found in Oscan on the bronze tablet of Agnone, Sa 1 Rix, A. 1–2 húrtín Kerriín (‘in horto Cereali’, ‘in the garden of Ceres’) and in Umbrian, Iguv. Tab. Ib. 14 vapef-em aviekluf-e (‘in sellas augurales’, ‘to the augural seats’), where a postposition corresponding to Lat. in is added to both elements. It is true that these differ from the Homeric case in having the noun first, but their point of agreement is more important: in both Homer and Osco-Umbrian, we have a postposed preposition which could be felt to be a part of the case-ending. There is no real counterexample to this view in Homer. No other accusative with -δε has a preceding adjectival attribute, although an adjective without -δε follows at II. 14. 255 = 15. 28 and Apoll. Rhod. 4. 548; Apoll. Rhod. 4. 135 Καυκασόν ἄλαδε (‘to the Caucasian sea’) departs from the old pattern. In Umbrian the repetition of the preposition is an archaism:21 later Umbrian texts do offer a few more examples, but the phrase quoted above is replaced at

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21 With repetition of the postposition, cf. not only the Oscan phrase quoted above but also South Picene CH 2 ombrīen akren ‘in Umbrian territory’; see Untermann (2000: s.v. ‘ager’).
Iguv. Tab. VIIb. 51 with uapefe auieclu, with the preposition no longer attached to the adjective.\(^{22}\)—Ernst Fraenkel (1916: 42–7) draws attention to analogous repetition of the preposition (especially when postposed) in the Baltic and Slavic languages; cf. also Vondrák (1924–8: II, 299).\(^{23}\)

In German (and English) in such instances we simply put the preposition in front of the whole group, and this is what happens predominantly in the ancient languages as well. But because these, unlike the modern languages, do not require the elements in an attributive relationship to be anything like adjacent, they often have the preposition between the attribute and the noun. This will be familiar especially to readers of Cicero, who goes much further than Caesar in this regard. | This interposing of the preposition is the rule—or at least preferred—when the attribute consists of a form of the qu-pronoun: note especially fixed combinations such as quemadmodum (‘how?; as’), quam ob rem, qua de causa (both, ‘why?; for which reason’). This belongs under anastrophe (discussed above, II, 198–9), and in this connection note the word order in a law of 81 BC,\(^{24}\) CIL II, 587: I, 33–4, 36, 41; II, 5, 27 quam in quisque decuriam, qua in quisque decuria (‘into / in whichever group anyone is [chosen, etc.]’): here quisque was able to follow in, because in had a closer link with the relative than with the noun. A number of other factors could also favour this kind of word order. Let me take the case of Gk οὐδὲνι / μηδὲνι ξῆν νῦν (‘with no sense’, Plato, Crito 48c, Arist. Clouds 580), where we see the phrase ξῆν νῦν ‘with sense’, which in Ionic and Attic (and still in Polybius, 2. 35. 6, 8, etc.) was a closely bound group that speakers did not wish to separate.—Also related to the tendency to anastrophe is Aeschylus’ occasional separation of a postposed preposition from its noun by the end of the trimeter, although unlike Sophocles Aeschylus has no synapheia between his trimeters: e.g. Agam. 1037–8 πολλῶν μέτα | δούλων (‘with many [other] slaves’), Eum. 114–15 τῆς ξενίς πέρι | ψυχῆς (‘for my very life’);\(^{25}\) there is a similar case in hexameters at Theocr. 22. 30–1 ἄμφοτέρων ἐξ | τοίχων (‘from both sides [of the ship]’); cf. Radermacher (1918: 79–80), although I cannot agree with him all the way.—Similar patterns of placement are found also with those ‘improper’ prepositions which are always or mainly postposed: already in Plautus we find Miles 1164 istius causā amoris (‘for the sake of his love’) and the like. And—if I can

\(^{22}\) By ‘replaced’ W. refers to the fact that Tables 6 and 7 contain a later (and longer) version, in the Latin alphabet, of the material of Table 1, in the Umbrian alphabet, much of which is repeated, though with numerous additions. On the Umbrian forms, see Untermann (2000: s.vv. ‘aviekla’, ‘en’, ‘vapefe’). On the word-order pattern magna cum laude in Sabellian and Latin, see now Clackson (2004b), the latter amplifying several of W.’s observations.


\(^{24}\) This is Sulla’s very detailed statute reforming the quaestorship, the Lex Cornelia de XX quaestionibus, of which one tablet survives, of which see now the edition of Crawford (1996: I, 293–300). On the importance of the relative pronoun in this connection, cf. nn. 5 and 19 in this lecture.

\(^{25}\) Both passages are spoken by Clytaemnestra; Ed. Fraenkel (1950) on the Agam. passage compares also Persians 460–1.
bring this in here—they occur also with a preceding attributive genitive: Caesar, for example, who in general is limited in his use of anastrophe (cf. II, 199 above) has with the qu-pronoun not only quam ad diem, quibus de rebus (‘by which day’, Gallic War 6. 33. 4; ‘concerning which things’, 3. 9. 1), but also quorum ad arbitrium (‘and to their authority’, 6. 11. 3; cf. i. 28. 1; 2. 15. 3).

When an attributive adjective follows, this sort of interposed preposition tends to be confined to poetic language, and so in Latin it is found in Plautus but not in Terence, who rather reflects refined everyday speech: e.g. in Naevius, lacrimis cum multis (‘with many tears’, Punic War 7 Warmington), on the epitaph of one of the Scipios, aetate quom parua (‘with a short life’, CIL I² 11 = Warmington IV, no. 6).—It also occurs, albeit more rarely, when the attribute consists of a following genitive: Homer has it, e.g. Il. 22. 173 ἀστν περὶ Πριάμου (‘round the city of Priam’), Od. 24. 22 οἶκῳ ἐν Αἰγίσθθιο (‘in the house of Aegisthus’), and he is followed by the other dactylic poets, and Pindar loves this pattern, e.g. Olymp. 13. 44 χήρτοις ἐν λέοντος (‘in the haunts of the [Nemean] lion’). It is found once or twice in tragic dialogue, e.g. at Eur. Heracles 1004 στέρνον εἰς Ἵρακλέους (‘against Heracles’ chest’), and even more artificially in Callimachus, Epigrams 41 Pfeiffer, 3 τῳ ἐς παῖδων (‘to one of the boys’). Given what we saw above (II, 199), it is no surprise to find Latin examples in Lucretius, e.g. 3. 776 conubia ad Veneris (‘at the marriage-rites of Venus’), 4. 335 oculis in eorum (‘in their eyes’), and Tacitus, e.g. Ann. 6. 31. 2 ripam apud Euphratis (‘on the banks of the Euphrates’).

A second special case involves two or more coordinated nouns being specified by a single preposition. We are familiar with the preposition being put just with the first noun, but in the ancient languages it was not unusual for it to come only with the second. This is there already in Homer, e.g. at Od. 12. 27 ἦ ἄλος ἦ ἐπὶ γῆς ‘on either the sea or the land’, and in later poets, too, of whom I highlight Alcaeus, fr. 84 Bergk = 345 Lobel & Page ὄκεάνῳ γᾶς τ’ ἀπὸ περράτων ‘from Ocean and the ends of Earth’. As for the Roman poets, who were certainly influenced by Greek, I refer you by way of example to Catullus 33. 5–6 cur non exilium malasque in oras | itis? (‘off with you into exile and the dismal regions!’), and to Bentley’s learned note (1869) on Hor. Odes 3. 25. 2. The relation of the preposition to the two nouns is made more transparent in this situation if anastrophe occurs at the same time, as e.g. at Hor. Epod. 7. 3 campis atque Neptuno super ‘over fields and sea’.—Prose-writers, as far as I can see, avoid placing the preposition with the second noun. There is, incidentally, a parallel to this pattern in that in a number of languages a negative applying to two constituents need be placed only with the second (see II, 310 below).

In addition, we find also in all our languages examples of the preposition placed with each noun to which the relation it expresses applies; this is normal

26 Note, however, that the crucial τ’ ‘and’ here is a conjecture (of Hecker).
in German and English when the coordinated nouns are further apart, and is so natural that examples are unnecessary; cf. C. F. W. Müller (1889: iv) on Cic. Acad. post. 1. 20. Extreme cases, up to fivefold repetition of the preposition, are found in the Septuagint (see JOHANNESOHN 1925: 344–5), here again under the influence of the Hebrew original. Lat. *inter*, however, presents an idiosyncratic case. Here again we can pick up on a note of Bentley (1869), and a particularly interesting one. Note two examples from Horace: Sat. 1. 7. 11–13 *inter* | Hectora Priamiden animosum atque *inter* Achilles | ira fuit capitalis (‘the wrath between Hector son of Priam and fiery Achilles was deadly’), with the first *inter* at line end (see II, 196 above), and Epist. 1. 2. 11–12 *inter* | Hector componere litis | *inter* | Peliden festinat et | *inter* | Atriden (‘Nestor is anxious to mend the quarrel between Peleus’ son and the son of Atreus’). In both passages, Bentley replaces the second *inter* with another word (*olim* and *primus*, respectively), on the grounds, first, that the repetition is illogical, ‘since the very meaning of the preposition *inter* implies two terms, on the one side and on the other. The wrath, then, was not “between Hector” and later “between Achilles” but at one and the same time between the two of them’ (‘cum praepositio illa duos hinc et hinc terminos ui sua et notione designet. Non ergo *inter* Hectorem fuit ira atque iterum *inter* Achillem, sed semel et simul *inter* utrumque’); and secondly, that it violates linguistic usage as shown by e.g. Terence, Andria 352 irae sunt *inter* Glycerium et gnatum (‘Glycerium has quarreled with my son’), or Gk πολλὰ μεταξὺ πέλει κύλικος καὶ χέλειος ἄκρου (lit., ‘many things happen between cup and lip’). Both objections are justified in themselves: when *inter* stands in relation to two nouns by referring to the space or the mutual feelings between them, it is true that the relationship expressed by the preposition does not hold for each noun but for the pair of them together, so that just a single *inter* is required. And | in general the use of *inter*—no less than Gk μεταξὺ, NHG zwischen, English between, Fr. entre, etc.—is governed by this logical requirement. Single *inter* matches its sense particularly nicely when—on the same pattern as Tac. Ann. 4. 5. 1 Misenum apud et Rauennam (‘[one fleet] at Misenum and [the other at] Ravenna’)—it is subject to anastrophe and the preposition is placed between the two nouns, as e.g. at Catullus 7. 5–6 oraclum Iouis *inter* aestuosi | et Batti ueteris sacrum sepulcrum (‘between the oracle of sweltering Jove and the sacred tomb of ancient Battus’), or in Caesar, who is in general so averse to anastrophe, at Civil War 3. 6. 3 Cerauniorum saxa *inter*

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27 This proverb is attributed to Dionysius Thrax (fr. 36 Linke) by a scholion on Od. 22. 9 (of Antinous about to drink when he is shot in the throat).


29 This Catullus example replaces W.’s from Accius, 177–8 Ribbeck = 143–4 Warmington in celsis montibus | pecua atque *inter* colles, which W. quotes with an erroneous metathesis of *inter* and *atque* (cf. Nonius Marcellus, p. 234 Lindsay).
et alia loca periculosa (‘between the Ceraunian rocks and other dangerous places’); it is even nicer when the second noun is linked with -que, as at Verg. Aen. 4. 256 terras inter caelumque (‘between the earth and heaven’, of Cupid), or Livy 22. 3. 3 Faesulas inter Arretiumque (cf. Riemann 1925: 214–15 & nn.30).

In spite of the above, the great critic is wrong, as so often, to curb the transmitted text of Horace—though an author is better served by bold emendation than by thoughtless skating over difficulties. In the first place, is it really the case that language always subordinates itself to logic? And something sensible can be found in the illogical repeated inter, as Kiessling (1910) notes on Hor. Sat. 1. 7. 12: ‘the repeated inter emphasizes the mutual nature of the *ira*. In fact, even the greatest Roman stylist of them all permits himself this repeated inter, and Bentley himself refers to Cic. Paradox. Stoic. 1. 14 *sic te ipse abicies . . . ut nihil inter te atque inter quadrupedem aliquam putes interesse*? (‘will you so belittle yourself as to believe that there is no difference between yourself and [between] any four-footed beast?’). Hand (1829–45: III, 409–10) adduces further passages of Cicero, and others from Livy and the poets, where this repeated inter is found, such as Cicero, *On Friendship* 95 *quid intersit inter popularem . . . ciuem et inter constantem* ‘what difference there was between a demagogue and [between] a constant citizen’.

Bentley sees a Hebraism in the transmitted version of the Horace passage. Following the scholar Thomas Gataker (Adversaria miscellanea (1661), 166),31 he compares Genesis 1: 4 διελθόρισαν . . . ἄνα μέσον τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ ἄνα μέσον τοῦ σκότους (‘he divided between the light and [between] the darkness’), and notes with satisfaction that the Latin Bible translator did not care to put here *inter lucem et inter tenebras*, ‘utpote sermone Latino alienum’ (‘as it was foreign to the Latin language’). Now, this repeated ἄνα μέσον is indeed attested a hundred times in the Greek Old Testament, and it corresponds here to the repeated בֶּן of the Hebrew original. The Hebraizing translator Aquila32 even admitted repetition of מַטּלָבִּים, otherwise unknown in the Septuagint, in order to remain as true as possible to the original (see Johannesohn 1925: 170–4).—But Bentley’s account of Jerome is inaccurate. It is true that Jerome’s normal practice is to use for repeated בֶּן single inter or something similar (e.g. at Genesis 1: 4 divisit lucem a tenebris,

30 I have substituted this reference to Riemann’s Syntaxe for W.’s incorrect reference to Revue de philologie 13, 132, which I have been unable to correct.

31 Thomas Gataker (1574–1654), puritan clergyman and scholar, is probably best known for his edition of the *Meditations* of Marcus Aurelius (London 1652), on which he worked for forty years; see Sandys (1906–8: II, 341–2), Pfeiffer (1976: 144 n. 2), and Brink (1986: 15–16) with further references. I did not have access to the edition of the *Adversaria* cited by Bentley and W., but the edition I refer to (London 1651) is available online at <http://eebo.chadwyck.com/home>.

32 Aquila of Sinope translated the Hebrew Bible into Greek around AD 130. His version was slavishly literal, and was disliked in some circles, but was praised by Jerome and by Origen, who made use of it in his *Hexapla*; see Salvesen (1998). The seminal study of Aquila is Barthélemy (1963); for a useful recent introduction, see Dines (2004: Index, s.v.).
indeed!), but here and there he does have repeated *inter*, e.g. at 1 Kings 14: 42 *mittite sortem inter me et inter Jonathan* (‘cast lots between me and [between] Jonathan’), and in a couple of other places, and even a triple repetition at 4 Kings 11: 17 *pepigt foedus inter dominum et inter regem et inter populum* (‘he [Joiada] made a covenant between the Lord and the king and the people’), and at Genesis 9: 13, where the Greek is content with ἀνά μέσον, the Latin has *erit signum foederis inter me et inter terram* (‘it [the rainbow] will be a sign of the covenant between me and [between] the earth’), like the original text. In other words, Jerome is not quite as set against this Hebraism as Bentley thinks. And for us this Hebrew (and, incidentally, Arabic) usage is a welcome parallel to what Horace and Cicero have, and a further instance of how even unrelated languages can agree in their internal linguistic structure.—Similarly in German, *unter* is found repeated in the sense ‘between’ from an early period, e.g. in the great pulpit-orator Johann Geiler von Kaysersberg (1445–1510), *was unterscheids ist under dir und under eim weltlichen menschen?* (‘what of difference is there between you and [between] a worldly person?’; *D. Wb.*, s.v. *unter*, 1474δ).

In this connection, some of you may recall the repetition of *inter* accompanied by ellipse in the Latin produced by the Prague students in Eichendorff’s *Taugenichts* 33: *distinguendum est inter et inter*, . . . *quod licet Ioui, non licet boui* (‘one must distinguish between and between; what God [Jove] may do a cod [cow] may not’). Does this have its origin in Scholastic Latin of the Middle Ages, or in the language of jurists?

Similar in general terms to this repeated *inter* are the illogical repetitions of *η* at Soph. *Oed. Tyr*. 489–91 τί γάρ ἡ Λαβδακίδαις ἡ τῷ Πολύβου νείκος ἐκείνο; (‘for what quarrel was there either for the house of Labdacus or for the son of Polybus?’), of πόσον in Babrius, *Fables of Aesop in Iambics* 91. 7–8 γνώση | πόσον τράγου μεταξύ καὶ πόσον ταύρου (‘you will learn how much difference there is between a goat and [how much] a bull’)—where Crusius (1879: 180) wrongly sees a Latinism, and more frequently of ἀμα and simul (see Bruhn 1899: 121–2).

So far we have spoken a good deal about the freedom of placement of prepositions in relation to their nouns. In contrast to this, it deserves to be noted that certain **prepositional phrases** must have been firmly fixed and, some of them, very ancient. This is especially apparent when a noun occurs only in a particular prepositional phrase, such as Gk *γενετής*, which—apart from Critias (Diels & Kranz, no. 88, II, 391), Β32 ἄρχομαι δὲ τοι ἀπὸ γενετῆς ἀνθρώπου (‘I begin from the creation of man’)—is attested only in the phrase ἐκ γενετῆς ‘from birth’ in

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33 The reference is to ch. 9 of the romantic novella *Aus dem Leben eines Taugenichts* (‘From the Life of a Good-for-Nothing’) of 1826, the masterpiece of the Prussian poet and novelist Joseph Freiherr von Eichendorff (1788–1857), of which there is a nice English translation online at <http://www.michaelhaldane.com/Translations.htm>.
Homer, Hesiod, Herodotus (4. 23. 5, and probably at 3. 33. 3 for the transmitted ἐκ γενῆς), and then again from Aristotle on. So, too, Attic μάλη ‘armpit’ is found only in the phrase ὑπὸ μάλης ‘secretly’; the noun μάλη that is freely used in Imperial Greek (see LOBECK (1820: 196) on Phrynichus 169 Fischer) has simply been derived from the phrase. Another example is Attic ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ‘anew’, ὑπαρχῆ being apparently unattested as a fully declined noun.

Also ancient are those prepositional phrases which have undergone what is called univerbation and yielded an adverb. Of the numerous adverbs of this sort, those which particularly imply great antiquity for the underlying phrase are those of which the second element, like the nouns just mentioned, is confined to this combination. So, e.g. in Latin we know the old noun *fatis | ‘weariness’, related to fatigare, only from the adverb affatim ‘amply’, the elements of which are still to be seen as separate at Pl. Poen. 534 ubi...edas de alieno quantum usque ad fatim (‘where you can eat and drink at another man’s expense as much as you want and can hold’), as usque makes clear. In Gk ἐνδον ‘inside’ it has been rightly suggested that -δον (>*-δομ) is an old locative of the root dem-/dom-,*4 to which Homeric δῶμα belongs and of which the old genitive is preserved in δεσπότης <*δεμο-πότης. In phrases such as Homer, II. 20. 13 Δῶσ ἐνδον ἀγγέρφατο ‘they were assembled in the house of Zeus’, the basic meaning is still almost palpable. Similarly, Gk ἐξ-αἴφης, ἐξ-απίνης ‘suddenly’ must contain old genitives dependent on ἐξ, though no traces remain of their nouns. Again, Ionic-Attic ἐπισολής ‘on the top’ seems to imply an ancient *πολή. In the fourth century, ἐπιπόλαιος ‘superficial’ and ἐπισολάξεις ‘to be on top’ were derived from it, and in the Augustan period a nom. ἐπισολή formed to it, because of which Diodorus and later writers use ἐξ ἐπισολής instead of bare ἐπισολής.*35

In other instances, it is the otherwise obsolete meaning or construction of the preposition that indicates the antiquity of the phrase. So in NHG abhanden (II, 169 above); or in Gk ἐμβραχυ (II, 156 above), where ἐν- retains the meaning of εἰς, just as in ἐνώπια (ἐνώπια) and ἐναντία (beside ἐσώπα, ἐσάντα) and ἐνδέξια ‘from left to right’; and also in Lat. -eā and -hac after ante, inter, post, and proper. Alternatively, the nominal part of the phrase implies an otherwise obsolete form. So, e.g. Homeric οἰκάδε ‘home(wards)’ contains an unattested neut. pl. of οἶκος, *οίκα (cf. II, 157 above), on the model of which Callimachus coined ἀγράδε ‘to the country’ to ἀγρός; Lat. interim contains an obsolete case-form of is, en, id; and NHG abhanden, just quoted, an old, unumlauted plural form of Hand. There are also semantic oddities, including Lat. admodum ‘very’ (lit. ‘to [the attainment of] full measure’), propemodum ‘nearly’ (lit. ‘approaching full

*4 This standard view (which goes back to Meringer, ZÖG 39, 1888, 152) was challenged by Vendryes (1908/9). Today, Gk ἐνδον is equated with Hittite anda (as is Lat. endo with Hitt. anda). See Frisk, s.v., and Meier-Brügger (1992: II, 68).

*35 See Frisk, s.vv. ‘ἐξαίφης’, ‘ἐξαπίνης’, and ‘ἐπισολής’, and Schwytzer 625 on *ἐπί πολῆς.
measure’), and in Greek the elliptical κατάκρας ‘entirely’, διακενής ‘in vain’, ἐξαντῆς ‘immediately’. I remain slightly unclear about Ionic-Attic παραχρήμα ‘immediately’—is it something like ‘during the need, while it is needed’, in line with the meaning of χρήμα at Hesiod, Works 344?—for which Nicander (Alexipharmaca 614) and perhaps Callimachus (Aetia, fr. 43 Pfeiffer, 14) use παρὰ χρέος, because χρέος is a dialect form of χρήμα.

On the other hand, the Latin phrase dē nouō(d) would not have yielded Lat. dēnuo, had it not already been established at the time when e.g. *uideuā ‘widow’ > *uideuā > uīdua. More or less the same applies to se¯dulo < se¯dolo(d).36

A close link between preposition and case-form is also implied by those instances where they together form the first element of a compound, as in Homeric ἐμπυρβήτης ‘standing in the fire’ as an epithet of tripods, or in | ἀποχειρβιότος ‘living from the work of one’s hands’ in Herodotus and Xenophon, or ἐγγαστρίμυθος ‘ventriloquist’ in Hippocrates and elsewhere.

Finally, we should recall the numerous instances in which, with or without a derivative suffix, nouns or adjectives are formed from prepositional phrases of this kind. There are examples already in Homer, where ἐπάρουφος ‘living in the fields’, εἰνάλος ‘in the sea’, μεταμάξως ‘between the breasts’, and ὑπέρμορα ‘against fate’ are based on ἐπ’ ἄροφης (or ἄροφηγ), εἰν ἄλι (Od. 7. 244, 9. 25), μετὰ μαξίν, and ὑπὲρ μόρον (II. 20. 30, Od. 1. 35), respectively, as καταμήνια (‘menses, menstruation’) is based on τὰ κατὰ μήνα γιγνόμενα (‘what happens each month’). This type of formation was discussed by Usener in his famous article on hypostasis (1878).37 ‘Hypostases’ of this sort may be formed at any period. In Cicero (Timaeus 13–14), the noun proportio emerges in a sense before our eyes from the phrase pro portione (in the speeches), as does the adjective ἀνάλογος in Plato (Timaeus 69b) from ἀνά λόγον (‘in proportion, harmony’). An older example is Attic φροῦδος ‘further down the road’, ‘gone away’ (from earlier *πρό-δδος, as the ancient grammarians themselves saw), the meaning of which is illuminated by Homer’s use of the phrase at II. 4. 382 οἱ δ’ ἐπεὶ οὐν ὕχοντο ἵδε πρὸ δδοῦ ἐγένοντο (‘so when they [Tydeus and Polyinices] had left and were gone on their way’).—Obviously early formations are the Italian place names Amiternum, of the town on the River Aternus (further details above, II, 161), and Interamna, of a number of towns sited inter amnes (‘between rivers’). The last has an exact match in the Swiss name Untersee of the small town lying between the lakes of Thun and Brienz, and in Interlacus of the neighbouring monastery, whose name survives in the town name Interlaken (ms. add.2: cf. D. Wb. XI, 1473, Schweiz. Id. I, 325). There is also the canton Unterwalden, lit. ‘between the forests’. On family names

36 In other words, dēnuo and sedulo show the vowel-weakening (cf. n. 6, p. 613 above) regular for single words, and must reflect fixed sequences of preposition + noun with a single (stress) accent on the first syllable (old short vowels weaken to u before u and before velar (‘dark’) l).
involving prepositions, see Solmsen (1922: 191–2).—I note two further instances: in Laconia, ὀι τῶν παιδῶν ἐπιμελοῦμενοι were called ἀμπαιδες, with ἀμ- for ἀμφε-; and in Late Latin we have subalternus ‘subordinate’, from sub altero. I recall also the denominative verbs of the type προσονδίζειν (‘to dash to the ground’), discussed briefly above (II, 191).
We finally come to the cases themselves. For our present purposes, there can be no question of describing the infinite and subtle variety of actual usage, which is amply set out in the grammars and dictionaries. For Greek let me just remind you of Günther’s piece (cited earlier, II, 154) on the prepositions in the Greek dialect inscriptions (1906/7), which provides a much-needed supplement to the handbooks. The Greek dialects vary markedly among themselves not only in the form of the prepositions but also in their constructions. Anyone who, like us, starts from Attic and Ionic has a number of surprises in store in the dialect texts, including ἐξ with the dative, διά ‘through’ with the accusative, κατά ‘according to’ with the genitive, and others.

Our task here is to give a few general guidelines. In the first place, it is well known that a number of prepositions—in particular those which are inherited from the parent language—occur in construction with more than one case. So, in German inherited an, auf, in, über, unter, vor (which are followed by the new formations neben and zwischen) take either dative or accusative; Latin in, sub, and super, either ablative or accusative. Greek is yet more diverse: Homer combines ἀμφι, ἀνά, ἐπί, μετά, παρά, περί, πρός, and ύπο with any of the three oblique cases, and Indo-European must have had even more diversity than Homeric Greek. In Indo-European a preposition could take any one of four different cases—acc., abl., loc., instr.—and this is preserved in Sanskrit for the preposition ṛddhi ‘on, over, from above’. And each construction expresses a different relation, depending on the meaning of the case-form. The differences between the three alternative constructions of Lat. tenus (‘as far as’; cf. II, 163–4 above), and the two of NHG trotz (‘in spite of’; cf. II, 209 below), are of a different sort.

In most languages the tendency is to reduce this variation over time. We can observe this happening even in modern High German in the case of bei, which is now used only with the dative but which occurs earlier also with the accusative of place where to. This older usage is richly attested in Luther’s Bible and even once or twice still in Goethe, as well as in the dialects.1 Idioms in the written language such as bei Seite gehen, jemanden bei Seite nehmen, and the adverb herbei presuppose this sense, and we may compare also the preverb in beibringen (‘convey,

1 See D. Wb., s.v. ‘bei’, I. A.
impart’ and beiziehen (‘call in, consult’). Conversely, in the case of wider (‘against’) German has lost the original general Germanic construction with the dative (still found in Goethe) and confined itself to the accusative.\footnote{See D. Wb., s.v. ‘wi(e)der’, I. A-B.}

The development is especially clear in Greek. The end point is represented by modern Greek, where, apart from a few fixed phrases such as μετά χαράς ‘with joy’ or ἀπὸ καρδιᾶς ‘from the heart’, with any preposition only the accusative is used.\footnote{On prepositions in modern Greek, see Thumb (1910: §138) and Holton \textit{et al.} (1997: part III, ch. 4). The latter list (405–7) prepositions of Katharevousa origin which govern noun phrases in the acc., gen., or dat.}

But in comparison with Homer, Attic already shows a sharp reduction. First, ἀνά, which in Homer takes all three cases, in Attic takes only the accusative; the few lyric passages where Aeschylus and Euripides have ἀνά with the dative are not relevant. Attic retains μετά with the dative rather longer: all three tragedians admit it, if rarely, in dialogue, and it is found at least in the lyric sections of comedy, but in prose and comic \textit{trimmers} it is not attested, which implies that it was foreign to ordinary Attic speech, where μετά takes only genitive or accusative. Thirdly, περί + dat. starts to disappear in Athens already in the fourth century (on its absence from Polybius, see II, 155 above). It is not found in the orators, save only the oldest, Antiphaon (s. 6), who is followed on this point by Isocrates (\textit{Letter} 9. 10, and possibly by Lycurgus, fr. 52 Sauppe). And (apart from Xenophon, who anyway does not write pure Attic) the prose-writers who have it at all, use it only rarely and almost exclusively in particular combinations: e.g. Antiphaon and Plato use it only with καθδινεῖτε, θάρρειν, δεδείναι (‘take a risk’, ‘be optimistic’, ‘be afraid’) and their synonyms. (However, it is used with the local sense ‘around’ in a few fourth-century inscriptions, in the above passage of Isocrates, and twice in Aristotle.) And again, ἀμφί, which is obsolescent in Attic (II, 160 above), although found with all three cases in Herodotus and in tragic dialogue, is used exclusively with the accusative by Plato, and by and large by Xenophon, though the latter twice admits the genitive (\textit{Anab.} 4. 5. 17; \textit{Cyrop}. 3. 1. 8).—Notice that in every one of these instances of the elimination of a prepositional construction the dative is affected: we shall return to this point.

The tendency to reduce constructions is taken further in Hellenistic prose. In Attic, πρός and ὑπό can still take all three oblique cases, but πρός + gen. is found only three times in the whole of Polybius, only once in the New Testament (Acts 27: 34), and in the papyri of the Ptolemaic period not at all any more. Even πρός + dat. is rare in the New Testament, while ὑπό + dat. (still eleven times in Polybius) is completely unknown in the Septuagint and the New Testament.

Latin, too, shows similar developments, in that \textit{e.g.} \textit{super} is found in representatives of the lower registers such as Vitruvius and Petronius (and probably already in Caesar, too) only with the accusative, while in Plautus it is combined
only with the ablative (see K. Meister 1924/5: 15); with the ablative, it is no longer found in classical prose, at least not in its original spatial sense, although the poets treat it differently: on Hor. *Odes* 1. 9. 5 *ligna super foco... reponens* (‘piling logs on the hearth’), Porphyry comments *supe* *rum uidetur dicere debuisse, sed frequens est in hac figura Horatius ut* (*Odes* 3. 1. 17–18) *destric* *tus ensis cui super impia ceruice pendet* (‘one thinks that he should have used *super* + accusative, but Horace often uses it with the ablative, as e.g. in *the man who has a naked sword suspended over his unholy neck*).

Part of what lies behind this development is the striving for uniformity and simplicity of expression that applies in all areas of linguistic behaviour. Since e.g. περί + gen. followed numerous verbs of emotion, it was superfluous to use the normal dative construction after verbs of fearing and the like, and as a result we find first Andocides 2. 7 οὐ περί ἐμοὶ μόνον ὁπροδείον (‘trembled not only for my sake’) and then similar instances in many later writers. Similarly, περί + dat. for ‘around’ in the spatial sense was dispensable, given that περί + acc. already served that function.

When, however, the functions of a preposition differed sharply according to the case that followed, it was often replaced in one of its functions, either by another, existing preposition, as in German zu now replaces bei + acc., or by a new formation, as is seen very nicely in the case of Gk εἰς for ἐν (II, 156 above).—This is the way in which the semantic contrast arose between Gk -δε (-δω) and its cognates in most branches of the family, on the one hand, and Lat. de (along with -dé in inde, unde, and Oscar dat⁴), on the other (cf. II, 157 above). This preposition originally meant roughly ‘in the direction’, i.e., with the accusative, ‘in the direction towards something’, with the ablative, ‘in the direction away from something’, just as in Vedic, say, the preposition a means ‘to’ with the acc. and ‘from’ (though also ‘as far as, until’) with the abl. Subsequently, one construction or another was replaced by other means, in Latin that with the accusative, in the other languages, that with the ablative.

There was another factor affecting the construction of the prepositions. In an earlier lecture (I, 61), I touched in passing on the tendency for a case construction to be extended from a verb with which it was normal from the outset to another, semantically related verb which originally did not know it. It is hardly surprising that the same linguistic process is to be observed with prepositions, both proper and improper. It is well known that after NHG trotz (‘in spite of’) the original construction with the dative (which prevails in the old combination trotzdem) is increasingly losing ground to the genitive: the influence here is from the genitive after the synonymous ungeachtet (‘regardless of’) and the semantic opposite wegen

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⁴ As a preverb, also in Umbrian daetom ‘gone away, absent, missing’; see Untermann (2000: s.vv. ‘dat’, ‘eite’).
(‘because of’). And in careless speech a genitive construction seems already to be emerging after dank (‘thanks to’), which will have a similar explanation.—In Latin we may compare tenus + acc. (attested from Valerius Flaccus 1. 538 on), in that the model ad, or usque ad caused the recession of the normal ablative and genitive, just as in turn the already old ablative construction after tenus may owe its origin to the model of fini ‘up to’ (II, 164 above).—As for the proper prepositions, the Greek dialects offer an example in the dative-locative that Arcado-Cypriot uses after ἔξ (Arc. ἐς): Cypr. ἔξ τοῖς ἔργοιοι ‘from the house’ (ICS no. 217 = Buck no. 23, vv. 5–6; Idalium, 5th c.), Arc. ἔπες τοῖς ἔργοιοι ‘with regard to the work’ (IG V.2. 6, 54; Tegea, ca 350 BC)5 were modelled on ἐν τοῖς ἔργοιοι ‘in the house’, ἐν τοῖς ἔργοιοι ‘in the work’, those answering the question ‘where from?’ following those answering the question ‘where?’. The dative-locative after ἀπό (Attic ἀπό) in the same dialects will have the same explanation. And yet these dialects have a general preference for this construction after prepositions, and in them the dative-locative was on the way to | becoming the all-purpose prepositional case (cf. Bechtel 1921–4: I, 382).6 Homer also offers an example, in ἄνα + gen. ‘up onto something’, which he uses only (three times in the Od.) in the phrase ἄνα νησίων with βάινειοι, on the model of the commoner phrase (also in the II.) βάινειοι ἐπὶ νησίων (and to some extent also ἐκ νησίων βάινειοι); cf. Rupprecht (1926: 232). In the same way, ἔς ὄβ ‘until’ (eleven times in Herodotus) was triggered by the ablative genitive after μὲχρι (see Solmsen 1912/13: 448–52).—We shall be able to make use of this explanatory principle in what follows.

Now to the main point: while in Greek all three oblique cases are found with prepositions, Latin restricts its proper prepositions to the acc. and abl., using the gen. only with improper prepositions of clear nominal origin, such as tenus, causa, and gratia, and the dative not at all. And it is certain that this limitation is original, as it recurs in exactly the same form (with one exception) in Sanskrit and Old Iranian, and is easy to account for. The Indo-European gen. and dat. are so-called ‘grammatical’ cases: they serve to denote not a spatial relation, like the other cases, but rather the scope (gen.) and the beneficiary (dat.) of the content of

5 Cf. II, 231 below.

6 Cf. Buck §136.1, who illustrates also Arcadian παρ(ά) ‘from’ + dat. and Pamphylian ἔξ ‘out of’ + dat., and, like W., invokes the influence of ἐν (ἐν) ‘in’ + dat. to explain the spread of the dative-locative in these dialects. For more recent discussions involving Mycenaean, where the same phenomenon is attested, and raising various alternative approaches to the use of the dative-locative after prepositions denoting separation (including the effect of a peculiar pattern of case syncretism, or the retention of an old use of the locative), see Morpurgo Davies (1985: 98–100) and (1992: 426 & n. 23), and esp. Thompson (2000–1 [2002]), who gives a good history of the question and sees in the usage a Bronze Age innovation shared by Mycenaean and Arcado-Cypriot against the rest of the East Greek dialects (incl. Attic-Ionic), with important implications for the early history of the dialects including Mycenaean. See also Hajnal (1995: 303–10).
the clause. And since prepositions are originally of spatial meaning, they can serve
to specify only case-forms with spatial reference. This view is confirmed by the
Indo-Iranian exception just mentioned, namely the little word *kām*, which fol-
lows a noun in the dative and means ‘for, for the benefit of’: in other words, both
the case of the noun and the particle are of non-spatial meaning. The Slavic
cognate *kū*, which also takes the dative, is used to express goal and purpose.7

In that case, you will be asking, how do Greek and German come by their
usage that differs from the above? Well, German causes us no problems. The
German dative continues not only the Indo-European dative but also the instr.,
abl., and loc. (I, 300–3 above), and only the three latter cases need be assumed to
account for the ‘dative’ after prepositions, which is instrumental after e.g. *mit
(‘with’), ablative after e.g. *aus (‘out of’, ‘from’), and locative after e.g. *in (‘in’).—
In Modern High German the genitive is used only with improper prepositions
which have arisen from the case-forms of nouns, and with these the genitive is
normal: e.g. *wegen des Todes (‘because of [the] death’) is related to *Weg des Todes
(‘way of death’). Gothic, however, knows the preposition *in with the genitive
when it means ‘because of, on account of’. This has yet to be explained; accord-
ing to Delbrück (1893–1900: I, 766), it has to do with an ellipse. NHG *indessen
(‘meanwhile’; ‘while’; ‘nevertheless’) is not an example, as it goes back to OHG
*innan des, where the genitive (*des) | is governed by an adverb.8 The fact that in
MHG *neben and *zwischen (‘beside’, ‘between’) can also take the genitive reflects
their nominal origins: *neben (lit. ‘on the same level as’) is related to *eben, *zwischen
to *zwei (‘two’).

More or less the same is true for Greek, as far as the dative is concerned. The
Greek forms we call ‘dative’ continue the functions also of the instrumental
and the locative, or rather, to be more precise, in the singular of the 3rd declension and
in the plural of all declensions, the old locative forms have acquired also instru-
mental and datival meaning,9 in the singular of the 1st and 2nd declensions the old
dative forms have acquired also instrumental and locatival meaning,10 though a
few old locatives like *oikoi (‘at home’) did survive alongside. (In some dialects *-oι
instead won out over *-o.) Hence, the combination of the Greek dative with
prepositions causes no difficulty, as e.g. *σὺν τῷ τῷ ἐκ τοῦ (‘together with this or him’)
represents an instrumental phrase, ἐν τούτῳ ('in this place, at this point') a locational one. The dative with prepositions can never be regarded as purely datival. There is one striking thing. The Old Armenian preposition սանդ ‘with’ as a rule takes the locative, but in the singular of the ա- and ո-stems (i.e. those corresponding to the Greek and Latin 1st and 2nd declensions) it takes the dative (see FINCK 1906: 530), even though these stems have usable locative singular forms. So, Gk ἐν οἰκῷ, i.e. ἐν + the old dative, as opposed to (loc.) οἰκοῦ or ἐν + the old locative forms in e.g. ἐν οἰκοῖς, ἐν πόλει, ἐν πόλεως corresponds exactly to the pattern observed in Old Armenian with սանդ. Otherwise in Armenian the dative is found only with ասէ ‘like, in accordance with; for each; after’: the etymology of this preposition has yet to be securely established—according to PEDERSEN (1906: 430–1) it is cognate with Lat. post—but at all events it does not reflect an ancient preposition proper. 11—This agreement between Greek and Armenian is remarkable, especially as these two languages agree against all other branches of the family in other features, too, including the form of the 1st-person pronoun and the numeral ‘nine’; cf. PEDERSEN (1924), and, with further examples, MEILLET (1925b). 12

In the case of the Greek genitive, however, we do not get off so lightly. It causes no difficulty with ատո and էջ, as here it obviously continues the old ablative (cf. I, 303 above). The same applies to the gen. with πρό, as Latin and Oscan use the abl. with prō, just as with ab and ex. So, Gk πρό πυλὰκον ‘before the gates’ really means ‘forth from the gates’. Of the prepositions which can be combined with more than one case, παρά and πρός e.g. take a genitive that is clearly purely ablatical, and with other prepositions, too, the genitive construction is to be understood in part at least as an ablative. So e.g. at Il. 5. 325–6 δν περὶ πάσης πτίεν

11 The equation of Lat. post with Armen. ասէ is still accepted by some: the unexpected reduction of IE *v to Armen. սէ is defended by Beekes (2003: 146) as being ‘in pretonic position’, although without good parallels for this rule (James Clackson, p.c.). The equation is retained by the standard Armenian etymological dictionary (in Armenian – non vidi; James Clackson, p.c.) and by Walde & Hofmann, s.v. ‘post’, but not by Meillet (1936), SCHMIDT (1981), or ERNOUT & MEILLET, s.vv. ‘ab’, ‘po’, ‘post’. For further bibliography on Armenian, see CLACKSON (2004a: 942) and FORSTON (2004: 349).

12 Armenian was not recognized as a separate branch of Indo-European until 1875, having been previously seen as a member of the Indo-Iranian group. The notion of a special relationship with Greek began with the studies by Pedersen and Meillet referred to by W., and grew from the mid-1930s until the 1980s. Clackson (1994) presents a lucid and comprehensive survey of the evidence, and concludes against the hypothesis of a Graeco-Armenian linguistic unity comparable with Balto-Slavic or Indo-Iranian: ‘In my opinion there is not sufficient evidence to suppose any closer link between Greek and Armenian than between either language and Indo-Iranian, and the reconstruction of a Greek–Armenian–Indo-Iranian dialect area is sufficient to account for these agreements’ (CLACKSON 1994: 202; cf. 2004a: 922). The particular point of similarity between Greek and Armenian in the oblique forms of the 1st-pers. sg. pronoun (Gk ἐμέ : Armen. ի էմ, dat. էմ) and the numeral ‘nine’ (Gk ἐνένα : Armen. նուն) is the initial *e-, but in the former case this is paralleled in Hittite and possibly Albanian, and in the latter, the Greek and Armenian for ‘nine’ cannot continue the same form; see CLACKSON (1994: 34, 124–6). The prepositional construction adduced by W. here is one of only two syntactic features proposed for Graeco-Armenian, the other being the use of an ablative preposition (Gk ἐκ + gen. : Armen. ի ‘from’ + abl.) as a way of introducing the agent of a passive verb (see CLACKSON 1994: 22–3, 205 n. 43).
đµηλικίς ἃν湾 ηθερν ὅλων more than all his contemporaries’, | we are reminded of the Latin ablative of comparison and we can compare a corresponding use of pārī + abl. in Sanskrit; the same account is to be given of κατά + gen. ‘down from’, e.g. at II. 6. 128 κατ’ ὀφρανοῦ εἰλήλουθας ‘you came down from heaven’. These two uses do not survive in Attic, but Homeric ὑπό + gen. ‘out from under’—e.g. at Od. 9. 463 πρῶτος ὑπ’ ἀρνειοῦ λυόμεν ‘I first freed myself from under the ram’—is probably the source of most of the pan-Greek use of the genitive after ὑπό.

Many other uses of the genitive after prepositions, however, have nothing to do with the ablative. In contrast with the other branches of Indo-European, Greek often brought adverbial genitives into close relations with prepositions, and then allowed the resulting combinations to stand in place of either a simple genitive or a locatival construction. The genitive is familiar after verbs of taking and of aiming, e.g. after λαμβάνειθαι, ὁρέγεισθαι, πτύσκεισθαι (‘take hold of’, ‘grasp at’, ‘aim at’), and this is matched exactly by the genitive of goal after κατά e.g. at II. 20. 321 κατ’ ὄφθαλμων χένε ἄχλων (‘he [Poseidon] poured a mist down over his [Achilles’] eyes’), followed by κατά in the sense ‘against’, and after ἐπί e.g. at II. 3. 5 πέτονται ἐπ’ Ὑκεανοῦ ῥόαων ‘they make for the streams of Ocean’. (Note that Meillet (1925a: 57) regards this genitive after ἐπί and κατά as ablatival.) Of even closer relevance for the prepositions is the genitive of the space within which an action or process is accomplished. Homer often has the genitive in this sense in πεδίον ‘over the plain’ with verbs of motion, e.g. II. 13. 820 κονιόντες πεδίου ‘raising dust over the plain’. Here belong phrases like that at II. 4. 382 πρὸ ὀδοῦ ἑγένοντο (II, 206 above), although this did not yield a more general use of πρὸ + gen. in the sense ‘forwards in’. On the other hand, διὰ + gen. in the sense ‘through’ is very common from Homer on; διὰ πεδίου is synonymous with the above πεδίου, only clearer, with the result that the ancient grammarians assumed ellipse of διὰ with πεδίου. Against this background, we can perhaps understand the difference between ἐπὶ + gen. and ἐπὶ + dat. In both situations the preposition denotes close contact, but the genitive gradually became usual especially in instances where the action occupied a bit of space and was accomplished within it, while the dative-locative (originally the only case to be used) became confined to reference to the immediate neighbourhood: hence, Att. ἐπὶ θαλάττης ‘at sea’ vs ἐπὶ θαλάττη ‘by the sea’—unless, that is, the genitive after ἐπὶ ‘on’ follows the model of ὑπέρ with ablative genitive.—Conversely, this ἐπὶ + gen. certainly provided the model for Att. ὑπὸ γῆς and κατὰ γῆς ‘beneath the earth’ (cf. II. 13. 565 ἐπὶ γαίῆς ‘on the earth’), and probably also for περὶ + gen. at Od. 5. 130 περὶ τρόπιος βεβαιῶν ([of Odysseus] ‘astride the keel’), where the use of the genitive is different from its normal use with | περὶ (Hesychius, s.v. ‘περὶ τρόπιος’, glosses it as ἐπάνω τῆς τρόπιδος ‘on top of the keel’).—The use, common from Homer on, of ἐπὶ + gen. to mean ‘at the time of, in the days of’, the source of Xenophon’s
ēpī ἁρτύρων13 (‘in the presence of witnesses’, Hellenica 6. 5. 41 = μαρτύρων παρώντων) and of Hellenistic ēpī ‘in the presence of’, will owe its genitive to the model of πρό (‘before’). In Arcadian, the dative is used here, e.g. ēpī Χαυρίδαι ‘in the year of Chaeriedas’ (IG V.2. 343 = Thür & Tauber no. 15, A. 15–16, 32; Orchomenus, 360–50 BC).

Let this brief explanation suffice for now for an understanding of the genitive after prepositions. I hope later to manage a word on I/C237/C244/C223 and C236/C229/C244/C220, but the genitive after C240/C229æ/C223 cannot be explained in just a few words. I should like to make just two more general remarks. First, Attic stands out in comparison with Homer and with the local dialects in its predilection for the prepositional genitive. And secondly, it has recently been maintained, by Ed. HERMANN (1923: 141), starting from a theory of BRUGMANN’s,14 that in Greek the genitive of local domain was able to replace any case after a preposition, and accordingly it has been assumed even for combinations such as ēv + gen. I am unable to agree entirely either with the general proposition or with its application to ēv. The Attic examples adduced by MEISTERHANS & SCHWYZER (214–15, §85.18) to illustrate ēv in this construction are not completely convincing: ἐπί ποδών (‘in the way’) was made on the model of ἐκποδών (‘out of the way’);15 ēv Αἰδών means ‘in (the house) of Hades’ and is based on the same sort of ellipse as in NHG bei Burckharts, English at the Smiths16 and ἐπί ἄριστεράς (‘on the left’) on a third-century inscription (IG II2. 1534, A. 93; c.275 BC) looks more like a blend of the fifth-century phrases ēv ἄριστερά and ἔξ ἄριστερά than a reflex of an ancient use of the genitive. Nothing is proved by the supposed phrase ēv τύρων (‘at theirs’) in Epicharmus, fr. 145 PCG I.

The Latin ablative unites within it the functions of the original ablative (hence its use after ab, de, ex, pro, sine), instrumental (hence its use after cum), and locative (hence its use after in). After praec, sub, and super, we have to reckon with more than one of these three cases: e.g. in Cicero, Nature of the Gods 2. 95 sub terra habitare (‘to live beneath the earth’), we understand terra as a locative—like χθονί in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, 335 τόι ὁπὸ χθονί ναετάντες (‘those who live beneath the earth’), but at e.g. Plaut. Aul. 628 sub terra erepsisti modo (‘you just...

13 This is a conjecture already in Antiphon, First Tetralogy 3. 8.
14 Hermann himself refers to Delbrück (1893–1900: presum., III, 359), but Brugmann had indeed maintained in his Greek Grammar (cf. Brugmann & Thumb 1913: 441) that this was the basic function of the genitive proper, although he later (Brugmann 1902–4: 434–5) restricted this account to the genitive proper after verbs; for further references, see Schwyzer & Debrunner 89.
15 Brugmann & Thumb (1913: §435.3) also take ἐπί ποδών < ἐπί ποδών as a primary instance of the ‘genitive of region, or period of time’ rather than as secondary after ἐκποδών; contrast Schwyzer 386b, 625, and Frisk, s.vv.
16 For the instances of ēv + gen. in Attic inscriptions (esp. of the names of demes and of the names or epithets of deities), see Threatte (1996: 383–5).
crept out from under the earth’ it is obviously purely ablatival (recall our earlier discussion of Gk ὑπό + gen., II, 212 above). I cannot, however, pursue this in detail, nor can I answer the rather tangled question how the three functions of the Latin ablative merged together. Old ablatives in form are the abl. sg. in a long vowel and the abl. pl. in -bus; the abl. sg. in short -ē is originally locatival, and the abl. pl. in -ēs of instrumental origin.17 |

It remains to discuss the **accusative**, which, unlike the other oblique cases, is not really a multi-purpose case (‘Mischkasus’) at all, even outside prepositional phrases. After prepositions, it denotes sometimes an end point, as in Greek after ἐκ, or in Latin and German after in, and sometimes a stretch traversed, as with Gk κατά (‘over, across’), Lat. per, NHG durch (both, ‘through’). So much is clear, but I must devote a few words to certain differences in usage, first among the Greek dialects, and secondly between Greek and Latin.

By and large, the accusative after prepositions was rarer in Attic than in other dialects. In their use of the acc. with παρά meaning ‘by’—as opposed to the dative in Attic, the dialects have apparently preserved an older state of affairs; on this, see Solmsen (1906: 495–500) and Wilamowitz (1914c: 632). The Attic use of διά + acc. only in the sense ‘because of’ also reflects a relatively recent restriction: in Homer and subsequent poets it is used also with spatial reference, with the accusative of extent in space, in e.g. διὰ δῶματα ‘through the house’, οὐφανίαν δὲ αὐθέρα ‘right through the heavenly aether’, and analogously of time in διὰ νύκτα μελανάν ‘through the black night’. With the last example in particular the peculiarly archaic dialect Pamphylian agrees in the phrase διὰ πέθε καὶ δέκα Φέτια (which in Attic would be διὰ πεντεκαίδεκα ἑτη), ‘for fifteen years’ (Bechtel 1921–4: II, 821).18 The more widespread use of the accusative with ὑπό in the dialects is probably another archaism. On the other hand, ὑπέρ των in the sense of ὑπέρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ‘on behalf of someone’, though commonly attested in central Greece, the Peloponnese, and also in Rhodes, is not found before the third century, and hence can hardly be an ancient pattern, but rather one that belongs among the more recent developments to which we shall come shortly (cf. Günther 1906/7: 154–5).19

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17 The Lat. dat.-abl. pl. in -īs is by regular sound-change < -eīs < -oes < *-ois < IE instr. pl. *-ōis. The Lat. 3rd-decl. abl. sg. in -e is by regular lowering of word-final *-i < IE loc. sg. *-i (for this sound-change, compare the nom.-acc. sg. in -e of neuter i-stems such as mari ‘sea’, with stem mari-). The Lat. dat.-abl. pl. in -bus < -bos continues IE dat.-abl. pl. *-bh(y)os (cf. Skt -bhīyās). Finally, of the long-vowel abl. sg. endings, in fact, only the 2nd-decl. ending in -ā < *-ād continues an IE abl. sg. ending (*-ād, of uncertain origin), since in IE in all other types of noun the abl. sg. was identical with the gen. sg.; Lat. 1st-decl. -ā(d), 3rd-decl. -ā(d), 4th-decl. -ā(d) are all analogical on inherited -ād. For further details, see Klingenschmitt (1992), Sihler (1995: 250–1, 258–9, 263, 269, 272), Szemerényi (1996: 165, 183–6, etc.).

18 On Pamphylian, see Brixhe (1976)—this text is his no. 3, 5 (Sillyon, first half 4th c.)—and Schmitt (1977: 94–6).

19 For a survey of the (from an Attic point of view) peculiar aspects of meaning and construction of the prepositions in the other dialects, see Buck §136.
Secondly, anyone comparing Latin with Greek must wonder at the number of Latin prepositions that take the accusative. Most of these are adverbs that have not attained full prepositional status, such as *cis*, *citra*, *ultra*, etc., but the accusative is found also with those which have become in the terms of our earlier discussion (II, 158–61 above) fully fledged prepositions, such as *circum* and *post*. Above all I would highlight Lat. *ante*, which in taking the accusative stands in sharp contrast to its exact cognate Gk ἀντί. Now, *circum* models its construction on that of *amb(i)*, which it replaced (II, 160–1 above), and *ante* takes its construction probably from that of *post*. The use of *ante* developed, in other words too, as a counterpart to *post*: *antequam*, unknown in earlier Latin, and Late Latin *anterius* and *anteritas* are modelled on the corresponding formations with *post: postquam*, *posterior*, *posteritas* (‘after’ [conj.], ‘later’, ‘posterity’; cf. I, 246 above). With *post* itself, however, to judge from the evidence of Indic and Iranian, the accusative is inherited, and the same is true of *trans*—though in fact the same evidence indicates that it was general practice to use the accusative of a noun if the action of the verb was happening to one side of it. The Indic synonyms of Lat. *supra*, *infra* and *prope* = *propter* (of space) take the accusative like the Latin forms (‘above’, ‘below’, ‘near’), and Lat. *inter* + acc. has a perfect semantic and syntactic match in Vedic (and Old Persian) *antar*.

Latin, then, has merely developed further an ancient survival—or rather one should say, Italic, for *extra* + acc. has an exact cognate in Oscan, *supra* + acc. one in Umbrian, and the Umbrian synonyms of *trans* and *infra* take the same construction, too. In the course of time, Latin then acquired new material. Karl Otfried Müller, who with his sense for linguistic history far excelled the classicists of his generation, rightly compared (1880: 207 [on Festus p. 226, 18 Lindsay]) the accusative that Sallust, Livy, and others have after *dextra* ‘to the right of’ and *sinistra* ‘to the left of’ with that after *infra* and *supra* (cf. also II, 162–4 above).—Greek lost this accusative, because it preferred to replace precisely those words with which the construction was inherited (such as *inter*, *post*, and *trans*) with more recent, fuller expressions that took the genitive; still, with Lat. *inter* + acc., we can compare Attic μετὰ χεῖρας or μεθ’ ἥμεραν (‘by day’, Lat. *interdiu*).

Alongside this contrast between Greek and Latin, a striking parallelism may be seen. It was noted earlier (II, 207) that prepositions in modern Greek take the accusative almost without exception. The development in this direction

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20 Cf. Avestan *antar*; see EWAia, s.v. ‘ántár’, with further references.
21 W. is referring to Oscan *ehtrad* + acc., Umbrian *subra* + acc. (cf. *super* + locative!), Umbrian *tralaf*, etc. + acc. or loc., and Umbrian *hondra* + acc., the last formed, quite differently from Lat. *infra*, on the root of ‘earth’, hom-; For details and further references on all these Sabellic forms, see Untermann (2000: s.vv.).
22 On Karl Otfried Müller (1797–1840), professor in Göttingen from 1819, see Unte (1990b).
began early. Remember what I observed just now about ὀπέρ + acc. ‘for’ in the dialects other than Attic, and note that περί + gen. is already in Aristotle, as Eucken (1868: 64–8) and Diels (1894: 307 n. 1) have shown—though admittedly the difference in meaning between the two constructions is slight. But from the beginning of the imperial period the expansion of the accusative construction is absolutely clear in texts written in more or less popular language. Here, too, as often, we can find examples in the New Testament, e.g. in Mark 4: 38 ἐπὶ τὸ προσκεφαλαίων καθεύδων ‘sleeping on the cushion’ (where the codex Bezae²³ has ἐπὶ προσκεφαλαίων in the Attic manner), or Matthew 13: 56 αἱ ἀδελφαί πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἶσαν ‘the sisters are with us’ (for Attic παρ’ ἡμῖν). The codex Bezae even has at John 11: 55 πρὶν τὸ πάσχα ἐν τῷ πάσχα ‘before the Passover’, with the use of πρὶν discussed above (II, 164–5). Accordingly, in later papyri and inscriptions we find ὑπὸ κέλευσμα | ‘under orders’, μετὰ λόγου ‘by reckoning’, διὰ χειρόγραφον ‘in handwriting’, and the same with preposition-adverbs in e.g. διὰ τῶν κύριων, μνήμων χάριν (‘apart from the lord’, ‘for the sake of a memorial’). And this sort of thing is not quite unknown even in somewhat higher literature. Authors of the imperial period replace ὑπὸ μάλης (discussed above, II, 204) with ὑπὸ μάλην (Lobeck (1820: 196), on Phrynichus 169 Fischer), and Joannes Laurentius Lydus, who wrote under Justinian I (r. 527–65), even has μετὰ θεόν ‘with God’ and the like. (For references and further information on all this, see Rademacher (1925: 137–46) and Kuhring’s telling dissertation (Bonn 1906) on the use of the prepositions in the Egyptian papyri.) The same usage is attested indirectly in a Christian inscription which Rademacher interprets differently. In the phrase Γαεανή ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλιτος γλυκυτάτη (‘for Gaiane, sweeter than honey’; Calder & Cormack (1962) no. 252b, Lycaonia, late 4th c.), any sort of earlier Greek would have required the accusative (cf. Psalm 19: 10 γλυκύτερα ὑπὲρ μέλι καὶ κηρίων ‘sweeter than honey and drippings of the honeycomb’), but since with ὑπὲρ meaning ‘above’ or ‘for’ the usual accusative was regarded as vulgar, the genitive as appropriate to the written language, the author of this inscription thought he had to avoid the accusative with ὑπὲρ, and hence committed the opposite error.

This is matched by popular usage in Latin, as early as the first century AD, where in the graffiti from Pompeii (CIL IV) we find 215 a puliinar and 221 cum sodales (‘from the couch’, ‘with his companions’), in Petronius’ Cena

²³ The codex Bezae, or codex Cantabrigiensis, is one of the five oldest manuscripts of the Gospels and the Book of Acts. It is a Greek–Latin bilingual, made probably in the 5th c., perhaps in southern France, and preserved in Lyons from the 9th to the 16th c. It takes its name from the Protestant scholar Theodore Beza, the successor of Calvin, who rescued it in 1562 from the sack of Lyons and in 1581 gave it to the University of Cambridge. Its Greek text is peculiar in its omissions, additions and rephrasings. See now the detailed study of Parker (1992) and the essays on palaeographical and textual issues in Parker & Amphoux (1996).
Trimalchionis, 39. 12 prae mala sua and 46. 2 prae litteras (‘because of their troubles’, ‘because of your learning’), and later de, ex, pro, and coram again with the accusative rather than the ablative. Relevant to the development in Latin, however, is the fact that in most declensions the ablative and accusative singular forms fell together in pronunciation, a factor absent from Greek.24

24 On the Pompeii graffiti, see Väänänen (1966: esp. 120–1) and (1981: §247); on Petronius, Boyce (1991: 64–5); on the same phenomenon in some early 2nd-c. AD papyrus letters, Adams (1977: 36–7); on the falling together of Latin case forms, Coleman (1976).
Lecture II, 24

There remains a general point to make about the combination of prepositions with case forms. It happens in pretty well every language that has such combinations that they come to be used increasingly and encroach on the use of bare case forms. In Alemannic, e.g., the genitive has been mainly replaced by a phrase with von, the dative (except in the pronoun) by a phrase with an (more rarely in). Other modern Germanic languages behave similarly, e.g. English with of in place of the genitive (though the 3 genitive marker is retained in certain instances), and to for the dative; and the Romance languages use the reflexes of Lat. de and ad, respectively, in the same way.\(^1\) Neither High German nor the ancient languages have gone in for such a wholesale abolition of the oblique cases, but they do take the first steps along this road. The Romance idiom serves notice already in Plautus, where the starting point is seen in passages such as *Pseud.* 1164 *dimidium de praeda dare*, which can mean either ‘from the booty | give a half’ or ‘give half of the booty’. The phrase *lucri* (gen.) *facere* ‘turn to one’s profit’ in Plautus and still in Classical Latin is rivaled in Terence by *Brothers* 817 *de lucro putare esse* ‘to count as profit’, and in place of the partitive genitive of an indefinite amount Plautus has at *Stichus* 400 *discam de dictis melioribus* ‘I shall learn some better jokes’. For further examples from later Latin, and bibliography, see LÖFSTEDT (1911: 103–9).—Analogously, from an early period in popular Latin *ad + acc.* is attested in the sense of the dative, e.g. in AUDOLLEN T (1904: 197, no. 139, 7–8; 1st c. BC) *nec ad deos nec ad homines acceptus est* (‘[just as a dead man] is welcome neither to gods nor to men’), and according to BRÉAL (1885: 219) in *datum ad* on the inscription from Furfo (a law of 58 BC, *CIL* I. 756 = *ILLRP* 508, 7 & 11–12).\(^2\)

Our starting point in Greek can be two statements of the ancient grammarians. The Atticist Phrynichus, 396 Fischer (cf. LOBECK 1820: 421), finds fault with the phrase *καὶ τὸ ἀπομακρυνθὲν ἐν ὕπνῳ* on the grounds that one ought rather to say simply ἀπομακρύνθην, without the preposition. That is indeed the case in all forms of earlier Greek: as a neuter ἀπομακρύνθην could be used in the nom.-acc. with an unspecified case-meaning (I, 293–4 above). This was not sufficiently clear to later gener-

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\(^1\) On the demise of the case system in Old and Middle English, see Lass (1992: 110–11). On the replacement of the Latin genitive, dative, and ablative with prepositional phrases in Romance, esp. French, see Harris (1978: 41–5).

\(^2\) In the last-mentioned inscription, however, it is *datum ad + acc.* of a thing rather than of a person.
ations, and hence from the start of the Empire the preposition was added on the model of καθ’ ἐπινοῦ (‘in sleep’) and the like. The complementary word ἐπιπαρ ‘in a wakeful state, in reality’, later acquired the preposition, too. (ms. add. 2: Phrynichus 353 similarly criticizes Lysias for using ἀκολούθειν ‘to accompany’ with μετ’ αὐτῷ ‘with him’ rather than with a bare dative.)

The ancients also observed that in this regard Homer differed markedly from later Greek. The Homeric scholar Aristonicus (I, 20 & n. 7, p. 31 above), who followed Aristarchus and whose comments on Homer we know from the scholia, feels the need on numerous occasions to notice the ‘omission’ of a preposition by the poet (see Friedländer 1853: 25–9). This includes the omission of διά with πέδωιο ‘over the plain’, discussed above (II, 212), and the omission of ἐν with datives of place where and of ἐλε with accusatives of place where to. He takes his standard for comparison from his own language, and so sees the Homeric forms as mere departures from the norm; for us, since we conversely take Homer as our starting point, these are just instances of an evolution from a prepositionless form of expression to one in which prepositions are used. I draw particular attention to the frequent supposed ‘omission’ of περί + gen., which Aristonicus states for ἀκαχῆμενος, ἀχέωνα, ἀχνήμενος (all ‘distressed, grieving’), ἐπιμέμφεσθαι (‘to blame for’), ἀλοφύρεσθαι (‘to lament for’), χιλοῦσθαι, and χώεσθαι (both ‘to be angry over’). Homer was able, precisely with verbs of emotion/the expression of emotion, to put the noun indicating the source of the emotion in the bare genitive. In later Greek this no longer sufficed, as the adverbal genitive underwent a gradual general decline, in Latin as well as Greek. A preposition had to be added to signal the semantic relation between noun and verb more precisely. The replacement of the non-adnominal genitive with περί + gen. or other prepositional phrases can be observed elsewhere in the history of Greek. Greek has, for example, a verb περιδόδοσθαι, fut. περιδώσομαι meaning ‘to bet’ (probably lit. ‘entrust to one another’, to judge from its Sanskrit cognate pariday- ‘entrust to’) — with middle inflection, like ἀποδόδοσθαι, fut. ἀποδώσομαι (‘to sell’). Now, Homer gives the word for the thing bet in the genitive (just as Sanskrit uses the genitive with verbs of playing and betting of the thing for which one plays or bets), but Aristophanes uses περί + gen. with this verb. Occasionally, the later form occurs already in Homer, so e.g. Od. 7. 191–2 καὶ περί πομπής | μνησόμεθα (‘we shall take thought also concerning his [Odysseus’] conveyance’), although in Attic μιμήσκεσθαι can still take a bare genitive. Compare how in modern German the once-usual genitive after verbs such as lachen, schelten, danken (‘laugh’, ‘scold’, ‘thank’) has been replaced by prepositional phrases. 3

3 Namely, lachen ob, vor, von, zu, schelten über, wegen, danken um, für; cf. D. Wb., s.vv. ‘lachen’ (3), ‘schelten’ (3e), and the new edn (Leipzig 1983) s.v. ‘danken’ (3).
But even the adnominal genitive is to some extent replaced by prepositional phrases, though it was never completely ousted. The subjective genitive, e.g., is replaced out of the need to indicate the agent as initiating the action of the verbal noun: hence e.g. Herodotus 3. 16. 7 αἱ ἐκ τοῦ Ἁμάσιος ἐντολαί ‘the instructions from Amasis’, and Thuc. 8. 21. ἦ ἐν Σάμῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἑπανάστασις ‘the uprising in Samos made by the people’. We shall return later to the second example and related forms, when we come to discuss the verbal construction of deverbal abstract nouns. A very widespread instance of replacement is, from the fourth century BC, that of the possessive genitive by παρὰ + the genitive of a noun denoting a person, particularly frequent being παρ’ ἡμῶν in place of ἡμέτερος.—Striking in the extreme are the prepositional periphrases used for the adnominal genitive by Polybius. He permits himself an extension of the use of περί + acc., normal after verbs of action, not only to cases such as i. 20. 10 ἀπειροὶ τῆς περὶ τᾶς πεντήρεις ναυτηρίας ‘inexperienced in the building of the quinqueremes’, but also to e.g. i. 40. 7 τῆς περὶ τῶν ἄνδρα μεγαλοφυκχίας ‘of the greatness of spirit of the man’ (more precisely: ‘concerning the man’), and even, several times, ἡ κατὰ τὸν ἥλιον ἀνατολή ‘sunrise’ (3. 113. 1, 114. 8; II. 22. 6), and other similar things. This was not just a personal predilection of Polybius, as there are similar instances in Diodorus and the papyri.—The dative is also sometimes replaced in this way in Polybius: when it has an instrumental sense, by μετὰ + gen., reminiscent of the use of ‘with’ in the modern languages: e.g. i. 49. 10 τοὺς μισθοφόρους θηροῖς μετὰ κηρύγματος ‘he assembled the mercenaries with an announcement’. In this passage and others like it (see Krebs 1882: 59), a trace of the original sociative meaning of μετὰ may still be sensed, but this has completely vanished in instances such as this, on a papyrus from the imperial period, PGM no. VII, 226 γράψε μ[ετ]ὰ μέλανος γράφικος ‘write in ink’ (see Kuhring 1906: 35).5

There is a great deal more of this sort to discuss from all three of our languages, including the constructions used to replace the old partitive genitive (cf. II. 217 above). There are also different types of replacement to distinguish. Sometimes the preposition matches the basic meaning of the case-form to which it is added, as when Lat. urbe ‘from the city’ is replaced by the more precise ex urbe. Sometimes the replacement is occasioned by a reinterpretation of the verbal action, as when the old dative after δέχεσθαι (‘receive’ from someone in the dat.) is replaced by παρὰ + gen. (already in Homer, incidentally: cf. e.g. II. 24. 429 [παρὰ + gen.] with 2. 186 [dat.]). The dative is to be understood in a locatalive sense, as e.g. in the old ([late 6th c.] epigram from Melos, Kaibel (1878),

4 On expressions of agency in ancient Greek, see now George (2003).
5 Kuhring finds μετὰ in the instrumental sense only in magical papyri; his example, quoted by W., is from Wessely (1893: 27), v. 234. For the magical papyri in translation, note Betz (1992), here p. 122. On the use of the prepositions by Polybius, Krebs is now amplified and nuanced by Foucault (1972: ch. 5, esp. 110–13).
no. 740 = CEG 418 παι Διός, ‘Εκφάντοι δέκαι τοῦ ἀμενθῆς ἀγαλμα (‘child of Zeus, receive this blameless offering from Ecphantus’), where Ecphantus is he from whose hands something is received, just as, say, Wulfila translates 1 Cor. 11: 23 παρέλαβον ἀπὸ τοῦ Κωρίου ‘I have received from the Lord’ with ik andnam at fraujin (dat.) ‘I have received at the Lord’s hands’. In just the same way both the dative and παρά+gen. are used as alternatives after ὠνείσθαι and πρίασθαι ‘buy’ (from someone).

Reinterpretation also lies behind the tendency of late Greek to substitute eiš+acc. for the second accusative (of the predicate) after verbs of making and for the nominative of the predicate after verbs of becoming; on this, see now Reiter (1925: 650–1), and especially Debrunner (1926b: 140–2). This idiom is known particularly from the Greek Bible, e.g. Acts 13: 47 (quoting Isaiah 49: 6) τέθηκα σε ἐις φῶς ἔθνων : Lat. posui te in lucem gentium : Luther ich habe dich den Heiden zum Licht gesetzt (‘I have set you to be a light of the gentiles’); or 2 Cor. 6: 18 (again with an Old Testament model) ἔσομαι ὑμῖν ἐις πατέρα καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐσεαθέ μοι εἰς νίκα καὶ θυγατέρας : Lat. ero nobis in patrem et vos eritis mihi in filios et filias : Wulfila wairþa izwis du attin jah jus wairþiþ mis du sunum jah dauhtrum : Luther so will ich . . . euer Vater sein und ihr sollt meine Söhne und Töchter sein (‘and I will be a father to you, and you shall be my sons and daughters’). Notice the frequent agreement of the translations with the Greek original: it was common in various languages to mark the goal or end point of a verb of making or becoming with a prepositional phrase that served to indicate goals in general. Another instructive passage is John 16: 20 ἣ λύπη ὑμῶν εἰς χαράν γενήσεται (lit., ‘your sorrow shall become [into] joy’): here Wulfila’s so saurga izwara du fahedai wairþiþ corresponds exactly to the Greek expression—as this du (cf. German zu, English to) is absolutely normal in Gothic even with the verb ‘to be’—but the Latin version has uertetur in gaudium (lit. ‘will be turned into joy’), Luther, soll in Freude verkehret werden, Weizsäcker, wird zur Freude ausschlagen. Debrunner rightly comments (Blass & Debrunner 1913 [= 1961]: §145.1) that in the Greek text μεταστραφήσεται εἰς χαράν (‘will be turned into joy’) would be thinkable and that then eiš would no longer be odd. On the translations of this eiš in various versions of the New Testament, see Cuendet (1925).—In the Bible this idiom | was suggested by the corresponding form, l- (‘to’), in the Hebrew, but the same and similar things are found also in secular texts in both Greek and Latin in the later period, and how easily this sort of construction could become established even without a foreign model, is shown also by the construction of machen in German. That which something is made into can be expressed with a bare adjective, but if it is a noun, it must be in the dative after zu—although

6 For δέχομαι ‘receive’ + dative of the dedicator, Hansen, on CEG 418, compares CEG 367 (Laconia, 5th c. BC).
Luther could say e.g. 2 Chronicles 11: 22 *er gedachte ihm König zu machen* (‘he thought to make him king’), and even Schiller could still venture *da sich Vieilleville . . . Meister von der Stadt gemacht hatte* (‘since Vieilleville had made himself master of the town’); on German *zu* in this sense, cf. *GRIMM* (1865–90: VII, 82–3), and *D. Gr.* IV, 981–2.

Occasionally, it is true, we meet the opposite development, viz. the use of a bare case-form in place of a prepositional phrase. For instance, Lat. *incumbere* in the sense ‘devote one’s energies to’ in Cicero takes *in* + acc. in line with its physical meaning, ‘lie down on’, but then in Silver Latin a bare dative. This probably reflects not so much the fact that *incumbere* in its physical sense, like other compound verbs in *in*-, could take the dative—cf. e.g. *Rhet. Her.* 1. 18 *gladio incubuit* (‘he [Ajax] fell on his sword’), as opposed to *incumbere in gladium* in Cicero, and *incumbere gladium* in Plautus, *Cas.* 308—rather, the determining factor was probably its near-synonym *studere* (‘devote oneself to’ + dat.), on the model of which, indeed, *incumbere* could also take an infinitive (Verg. *Geo.* 4. 249, *Tac. Hist.* 2. 10. 2). This change of construction, then, is based on natural evolution, but when the pilgrim Egeria writes 39. 5 *ingressus est discipulis* (‘he [the Lord] went in to the disciples’), for *ad discipulos*, she is simply getting things the wrong way around (cf. II, 216 above on ιππότ + gen.). The author has, ‘in her striving to avoid the vulgar . . . *ad*-constructions in place of the dative, unintentionally replaced a normal *ad*-construction with a dative’ (LÖFSTEDT 1911: 10–11; cf. 323). The poets naturally take the same approach to prepositions as to the article (II, 147–8 above): both from a predilection for the archaic, and from an aversion to mere grammatical words, they often omit prepositions where in ordinary speech they are required.

Let me mention another point analogous to the omission of the article. In certain fixed phrases, even in everyday speech, the use of case-forms without prepositions could sometimes be maintained against the general rule. Here belong phrases of the type *αὐτοῖς ἵπποις καὶ ἀρμασί ‘along with the horses and the chariot’ (cf. I, 57–8 above): while elsewhere the Greek dative has retained its sociative meaning only when supported by *σῶν*, here the earlier state of affairs has survived from the time when the idiom was formed, even though from Homer on *σῶν* is occasionally added (e.g. II. 12. 112).

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8 I have substituted the Tacitus example for W.’s second (*Aen.* 12. 774, where *uoluit* comes between *incubuit* and the infinitive); as Mynors notes on the *Georgics* passage, the ThLL, s.v. ‘incumbo’, 1074, 40, cites only it and the Tacitus.
9 Nowadays, we would call Egeria’s dative here ‘hypercorrect’ or ‘hyperurbane’. It is an instance of proportional, or four-part, analogy operating between linguistic registers: uneducated *dare ad* + acc. : educated *dare* + dat. :: uneducated *ingredi ad* + acc. : educated *x* → *x* must be *ingredi* + dat. For discussion and further references, see Hock (1991: 205–6).
But here we should note in particular something familiar from elementary grammar, in Latin and in part also in Greek, namely that the normal prepositions for indicating place where, from, where to are avoided with names of towns and small islands and a few common nouns denoting places, especially 'house, home'. On the facts in Old Latin, see Heckmann (1905/6).

In Latin, then, for place 'where' the ablative is used in the singular of the 3rd declension and the plural of the 1st and 2nd declensions, and in the singular of the 1st and 2nd declensions forms in -ae and -i: e.g. rure, Athenis, Delphis, Romae, domi ('in the country', 'at Athens', 'at Delphi', 'at Rome', 'at home'). In the forms in -ae and -i, the ancient grammarians could see only genitives, and in formal terms they could be genitives—even domi is assured as a genitive in Old Latin by passages such as Plaut. Amph. 187 ut salui poteremur domi ('that we should reach home safe and sound'), or Trin. 841 domi cupio ('I am eager for home'). But a genitive would make no sense, and it was one of the earliest achievements of comparative linguistics to explain this puzzling -ae and -i as locatives (cf. I, 45 and n. 1, p. 66 above). Closer study then showed on the basis of Latin phonology itself that these forms indicating place 'where' are to be distinguished from the genitive: the genitive ending has an inherited pure long -i, which in Old Latin contracts with an i in the stem (e.g. Aisclapi: cf. classical Aesculapii, with two i’s), while the forms with locative meaning ended in Old Latin in -ei (from *-oi: 10 cf. Gk -oι), whence the absence of contraction in e.g. Sunii ‘at Sunium’ (Ter. Eun. 519). The -e in the 3rd-decl. sg. and the -os in the 1st- and 2nd-decl. pl. can also be seen as locative endings. 11 It is easy to explain the variant forms rurī ‘in the country’ and Kartaginī ‘in Carthage’, beside rurē and Kartagine: as the ending -e indicated also place ‘where from’, the loc. -i of the 2nd decl. was extended to the 3rd for more precise distinction. [Add.: Extension of this use to forms that were not originally locative is seen in foreign plural town-names in the Latin 3rd declension, such as Cato, On Agriculture 135. i Calibus ‘at Cales’, 12 and later Sardibus, Trallibus, etc. ]—In perfect parallel to these locatives, in the same categories of words, we find the accusative of place ‘where to’, e.g. rus, domum, Romam (‘to the country’, ‘home’, ‘to Rome’), and the ablative of place ‘where from’, domo, Roma. Note that only the old abl. form domo is so used, and not domū, which (except possibly at Plaut. Mil. 126) is not attested before Cicero.

10 Lat. final -i < -e can continue either *-oi or *-ei (that is, the thematic vowel *-e/o- + loc. sg. ending *-i). There are reflexes of both endings in IE languages, even in one and the same branch of the family (in Greek, beside οἴκου, note οἶκοι, ἐξεί 'there', αἰεί 'always'); of the Italic languages, Oscan and South Picene unambiguously attest -ei. See Klingenschmitt (1992: 93–5), Szemerényi (1996: 184, 186), Meiser (1998: §§94.11, 95.5).

11 Certainly, -e continues (loc. sg.) *-i, but -e (in the 2nd decl.) goes back rather to instrumental pl. *-dis; cf. n. 9, p. 663 and n. 17, p. 667 above.

12 I have substituted the Cato example for W.’s ‘Megaribus at Plaut. Persa 137 (cf. acc. pl. Megarīs at Merc. 646)’, since Megaribus is surely ablative, and, to judge from Bennett (1914: 376–7) there is no example in Plautus of such a 3rd-decl. pl. place name.
Attic shows analogous forms in these groups of words for indicating place where. Here, too, we meet old, prepositionless locatives: οἶκος, Κολλυτοί, Μαραθῶν, Ἀθῆναις (‘at home’, ‘in [the deme] Collytus’, ‘at Marathon’, ‘at Athens’) — the last with an ending which, to judge from the evidence of Attic inscriptions, served until the 420s BC as the standard ending of the 1st-decl. dat. pl.: e.g. δραχμέσι, παμίασι (‘drachmas’, ‘stewards’). These endings were then extended beyond their original sphere to nouns which had lost the old locative form; -οί was used even for feminines in -α, e.g. Κυκνυνοί (‘in the deme Cicynna’), and in the plural in Μεγαροί | from neut. pl. Μέγαρα; conversely, -ησι (−ασι after ε, ι, ρ) appeared even in 1st-decl. sg. names of demes, such as Κεφαλήσι, Δεκελείαισι.

Besides these forms we also find once or twice in the same function the singulars Νεμέα and Φολή, and the plural Δελφοίσι. — As for place ‘where from’ and place ‘where to’, these groups of words again receive special treatment in Greek, though Attic has nothing exactly corresponding to the prepositionless cases of Latin: only the dialect of Delphi offers a form that matches Lat. domo in Ροῖκω from one’s own resources. Otherwise, place ‘where from’ is marked by forms in -θεν, e.g. Att. οἶκοθεν, Βαρτίθεν, place ‘where to’ by forms with suffixed -δε, e.g. οἰκάδε, Έλευσίναδε, Αθήναζε (=Ἀθήνας-δε). The bare accusative of goal with verbs of going is poetic: note Od. 14. 167 = 19. 313 οἶκον ἔλευσας and in parody in the fourth-century comic poet Eubulus Θῆβας ἡλθον, Κόρινθον ἡλθον (‘I went to Thebes / to Corinth’, fr. 52, 1; 53, 1 in PCG V).

Greek, then, does not quite correspond to Latin. Only for place ‘where’ does Attic have a prepositionless case, and this has already assumed more the character of an adverb than has its Latin counterpart. Gk οἶκοι cannot take an attributive determiner any more than οἰκάδε or οἶκοθεν can — note, however, the words of the devoted Atticist Ulpian of Syria, a character in Athenaeus, 9. 406d Ἐλευσίνι τῇ ἐμῇ οἶδα τινα πανήγυριν ἀγορένην (‘I know of a festival held in my own Eleusis’).

In Latin, on the other hand, domi can be accompanied by meae, alienae, Caesaris (‘in my house’, ‘in another man’s house’, ‘in Caesar’s house’), and the like — cf. Cic. Rep. 1. 19 domi quae non ca est . . . (‘in a home other than that which . . . ’) — and uiciniae (‘in the neighbourhood’) by meae and proximae, and Plautus can even say Rud. 741 Athenis . . . Atticis; and even in the acc. and abl. there are some instances of this sort, such as Enn. Trag. 218 Jocelyn domum paternam (‘to my father’s house’), Plaut. Merc. 831 mea domo patria (‘from my paternal home’). — Still, even for place ‘where from’ and ‘where to’, Attic has confined certain inherited forms to particular categories of words, in fact precisely to those in which the

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13 The ending -ασι/ -ησι was retained (and became distinctive) in locatival function after -ας, etc. became standard for marking dat. pl. For further examples and references, see Meisterhans & Schwyzer 120–1 §48.12 and above all Threatte (1996: 96–101); I have substituted δραχμέσι for W.’s δίκησι, which is largely restored (and omitted by Threatte).

14 Cf. Jocelyn (1967: ad loc.).
prepositionless locative is used: -δε, which Homer attaches to all sorts of nouns, is unknown in Attic outside these categories, and -θεν is otherwise used only in formations from pronouns (e.g. πόθεν) and pronominal adjectives (αὐλοθεν).—As for the 2nd-decl. loc. sg., it occupies a special position in that it never takes a preposition, even in its occasional appearance in other forms such as Gk *μυχοί, ἐνδοι (both, ‘inside’), 15 and Lat. temperī, uesperī, postrī-dīē (‘at the right time’, ‘in the evening’, ‘on the day after’). It hence lent itself that much better to an idiom that excluded the use of a preposition.

As for the question why the word for ‘house’ had a special status: since spatial relations to home were especially important and were referred to particularly often, an archaism could easily be preserved. A similar special treatment of the word ‘house’ is shown for other Indo-European languages by Delbrück | (1893–1900: I, 553); I would add that Avestan -da, cognate with Gk -δε, occurs only as a postposition with a word for ‘house’. 16 Along with ‘house’ go a few other, semantically related nouns, including ‘door’, in ‘at the door’, ‘out of doors’: Att. θύραςι, θύραζε, θύραθεν (and epic θύραφι), and Lat. foris, forās. Greek and Latin agree more weakly in words meaning ‘country, field’: the case-forms of Lat. rūs are matched in Greek dialects other than Attic by ἀγρόθι, ἀγρόθεν, ἀγρόνη, ἀγραδε (in, from, to the country). Then in Latin we have uiciniae ‘in the neighbourhood’ (only in pre-classical Latin), and also belli and militiae (‘in wartime’, ‘on campaign’) in opposition to domi; in Old Latin note the alliterative phrase domi duellique (lit., ‘at home and at war’), and compare OHG heimi (or heime) und in here (SCHULZE 1918: 511 n.). I leave open the question whether these other locatives are inherited: at all events belli and militiae occur without domi only in poetic and artificially archaizing texts. 17

For names of towns, our best starting point is Attic. In Attic, this sort of prepositionless expression is normal: (a) of places within Attica, i.e. the city of Athens itself and the demes, provided their names are suitable morphologically: e.g. Ἐλευσίνη, Ἐλευσανόθεν, Ἐλευσινάδε (‘in, from, to Eleusis’); (b) of neighbouring towns: Aristophanes uses Μεγαρί, Μεγαράδε, Μεγαρόθεν (‘in, to, from Megara’) in dialogue, and other comic poets have Θήβαςι, Θήβαζε, Θήβηθεν (‘in, to, from Thebes’); (c) of places famous throughout the Greek world: Ἰαθμοί, Πυθοί, Ὀλυμπιάσι, Δελφοίς, Νεμέα (‘at the Isthmus [of Corinth]’, ‘at Pytho [i.e. Apollo’s temple at Delphi]’, ‘at Olympia, Delphi, Nemea’). Otherwise, Attic uses prepos-

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15 The former is in a gloss in Hesychius in the form μοχοι· ἐντός Πάφωι μοχοί = ‘inside’ at Paphos [in Cyprus]; the latter is the Doric equivalent of Attic ἐνδοι.
16 W. has in mind Younger Avestan vaśmunda ‘homewards, to the home’. Thanks to Tucker (in progress), we can now add visāsa, with the same meaning, but also forms (previously interpreted as ablatives) in which the same particle / postposition -δα is added to words meaning ‘earth, ground’, ‘darkness’, ‘power, reign’ and the relative pronoun. For details, see Tucker (in progress).
17 Archaising examples include (for belli alone) Cic. Rep. 2. 56, (for militiae alone) Cic. Laws 3. 6, Sall. Jug. 84. 2. The only poetic example quoted by KS I, 484 is Ter. Self-Tormentor 112 (where belli could depend on gloriam); see also Heckmann (1905/6: 319).
itional phrases. In parallel with the first three of the just-quoted locatives of Panhellenic places, the treaty at Thuc. 5. 18. 10 has ἐν Λακεδαίμονι (‘in Sparta’). And Xenophon, who certainly refers (like Arist. *Birds* 406) to an Attic deme as Ἀλμουντάδε, with reference to Pontic towns uses at *Anab* 4. 8. 22 εἰς Τραπεζοῦντα and 5. 7. 16, 30 εἰς Κερασοῦντα, and similarly Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon all use ἐν (τῷ) Σκύθων in contrast with the so-frequent loc. Μαραθῶν. The same was probably true of the other dialects. It is nice to see for instance the distinction made on a mid-fifth-century Argive inscription (SIG 56), where the universally familiar Cretan city Knossos appears in the forms Κνώσοι (also ἐν Κνώσοι), Κνώσωδε, Κνώσωθεν, while the obscure Tylisos is referred to with ἐν Τυλισώί, ἐν Τυλισών, ἐκ Τυλισῶ—although in the neighbouring town of Vaxos it appears as Τυλισσό (Collitz & Bechtel no. 5132, B. 6). The Cretan inscriptions in general attest numerous prepositionless locatives of this sort.—Obviously, for those place names mentioned every day, the ancient official form without preposition was as firmly retained as in the case of the word for ‘house, home’. On this basis we may suppose that in Latin, too, the use of forms without a preposition was as firmly retained as in the case of the word for ‘house, home’. On this basis we may suppose that in Latin, too, the use of forms without a preposition was as firmly retained as in the case of the word for ‘house, home’. On this basis we may suppose that in Latin, too, the use of forms without a preposition was as firmly retained as in the case of the word for ‘house, home’.

In Attic inscriptions from the time of Alexander on, we read e.g. ἐν Ἐλευσινί instead of Ἐλευσῶν (possibly even, under the influence of ἐν + dat., the bare dative in -ω in place of the locative in -οι: e.g. Ἡφιώ, Πανάκτῳ), 18 and on Crete in the Hellenistic

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18 For references, see Meisterhans & Schwyzer 208 §84.23, and above all, for all the Attic evidence on locativial expressions in all declensions with and without prepositions, Threatte (1996: 367–85). In the parenthesis, I have added the word ‘possibly’ and removed W.’s first example, ἔν Ἰσμω, since such a locativial use of the dative without ἐν was ‘clearly avoided’, according to Threatte (1996: 370), who knows only loc. Ἐσμοι and ἐν Ἰσμῷ.
period one resorted to putting ἐν in front of the common locative forms, e.g. ἐν Πριανσοῖ, ἐν Καῦδοι. In one Cretan inscription of 116/15 BC from Delos, there is a curious repeated opposition between Κωσωί and Αστοί, in the locative, and ἐν Ὀλύτη, with ἐν+dat. (Collitz & Bechtel no. 5149 = SIG 712, e.g. A. 5–7, B. 57–8). Forms of place names in -θέν and -δέ were probably always rivalled by prepositional phrases with ἐκ+gen. and ἐλς+acc.—In Latin the omission of the preposition with names of towns was already felt to be unnatural by the Augustan period. At all events, the Emperor himself ‘with names of cities did not hesitate to use prepositions...’, the omission of which causes a certain loss of clarity, though it is stylistically more pleasing’ (Suetonius, The Divine Augustus 86. 1).

Here, too, as with words for ‘house, home’, there are parallels in other languages. In Old Persian, the bare locative form is used only in singular place-names and in adverbial expressions; with common nouns a preposition, -ā, is used (see Meillet 1915: 192 [= 1931: §371]). On the other hand, Old Persian differs from Greek and Latin in treating not only names of towns but also those of countries in this special way. This treatment of names of countries was not intrinsically unnatural, but the Greek and Latin practice has been well explained by Madvig (1875: 293–301): Rome is a point where, Italy in contrast an area within which, something happens, and hence Lat. Romae, like Fr. à Rome, vs Lat. in Italia and Fr. en Italie. But apart from this, even in Latin the distinction was not always consistently made. The inconsistency of usage with names of islands is well known (see Wölflin 1892: 581). In Old Latin, names of foreign countries in general are often treated like names of towns, e.g. at Livius Andronicus, Odyssey fr. 15 Warmington Graeciam redire (‘to return to Greece’), Plaut. Curc. 339 quid ueniam Cariam (‘why I am coming to Caria’). In the case of Aegyptus, which has an ending like that of a town name, the abl. and acc. without a preposition remained for a long time in regular use. In Imperial Latin, since old idioms were no longer really current, both the use of the preposition with town names and its omission with names of countries are found side by side; Quintilian condemns both as solecisms (Inst. 1. 5. 38).

19 Of the numerous examples, note e.g. IC III.3, 4 and IC IV, 184 = Chaniotis (1996: no. 69). I have removed ‘ἐν Ἰουττοῖ’, for which W. must mean ἐν Ἰουττοῖ, which seems not to be attested (cf. IC I.18, 8 ἐν Λιθτοῖ).

20 Hence, like Bābirauv ‘in Babylon’, we have e.g. Pārsaiy ‘in Fars’, Arminiyaiy ‘in Armenia’, and adverbial duiraiy ‘afar’, nipadiy ‘on the track of’; see in addition to Meillet, Kent (1950: §§251, 270.iv) and Schmitt (1989b: 72, 81).

21 This was in a lecture delivered in 1871 (= Madvig 1971: 259–65).
Lecture II, 25

No less than a case-form, an adverb can equally well be determined (‘governed’) by a preposition, except that with an adverb so-called univerbation is even more frequent (cf. II, 204–6 above). This is very familiar in German, as e.g. in nachher, vorhin (‘afterwards’, ‘beforehand’), von dort, für jetzt (‘from there’, ‘for now’). In the ancient languages, things are not quite so simple. First, we must exclude those combinations of preposition and adverb in which the adverb is specified by the preposition in virtue of its own old adverbal meaning: e.g. Homeric ἀποτῶλοιν, which is in contrast with σχεδόν (‘close by’) at Od. 9. 117, means not ‘from afar’, but ‘off in the distance’; similarly pro in Lat. propalam (‘openly, publicly’) serves to emphasize the idea of openness. Nor are we concerned here with words like Hellenistic καθώς ‘as’, which is known to represent a blend of its old synonyms καθά and ὥς.

For present purposes, we need to start from two sets of forms: first, those in which a case form has been fossilized into an adverb, which then can easily occur with the preposition that suits its original case function. So, in Homer, e.g. ἐς αὔριον (or αὔριον ἐς, ‘to tomorrow’), as well as ἐν-ἀντα and εἰς-ἀντα (both, ‘right opposite’): cf. II. 23. 116 πολλὰ δ’ ἀνατα κάταντα πάραντα τε δοξημά τ’ ἤλθον (‘and frequently upward, downward, sideward and aslant they went’)—ἀντα and ἄντι are suggestive of an earlier fully declined stem ἄντι.¹ So, in Latin, desubito beside subito, which is similar to and may have provided the model for derepente beside repente (all, ‘suddenly’).—Secondly, somewhere between the case-form and the adverbal construction is Homer’s use of prepositions with nouns in -έντο, which have no well-defined case function in Greek, but are cognate with case-forms in other Indo-European languages. Homeric examples include ἐκ πασσαλόφι and ἀπὸ πασσαλόφι beside the synonymous ἀπὸ πασσάλον, etc., and here belongs Boeotian ἐπὶ πατρόφι, which, as Solmsen saw (1901), is presupposed by the term ἐπιπατρόφιον ‘patronymic’ (CAUER & SCHWYZER no. 462, A. 28, 29–30; Tanagra, 3rd c. bc).² Corresponding to Gk -φι is Lat. -bī, and we can therefore

1 These preposition-adverbs are conceivably fossilized case-forms of IE *h₂ént- ‘face’ (cf. Hittite hant-); cf. II, 156 and nn. 8 and 21, pp. 592 and 596 above.

2 In fact, thanks to Mycenaean, we know that until about 1200 bc Gk -φι did have a well-defined case function, which included its inherited role of instrumental plural (n. 3 in this lecture below). Indeed, it is possible that the basis of ἐπιπατρόφιον is the comitative use of the bare case form ἀπατρόφι ‘with their
include here Old Latin inibi, interibi (‘in that place’, ‘in the meantime’), and in addition abhinc, in-de, un-de (‘from here’, ‘from there’, ‘from where’), if these contain old ablatives in *-m.  

On the other hand, a number of adverbs that were never case-forms are also combined with prepositions in this way. In Greek we can see a gradual development of this pattern. Homer is very conservative, and has this sort of formation almost exclusively with adverbs of place in -θη and -θευ. In the latter case this is particularly easy to understand: in ἔξ ὃμοθευ (‘from the same place’) and ἔξ (or ἄπο) οὐρανόθευ (‘from heaven’), ἔξ and ἄπο really serve to sharpen the ablative relation expressed by -θευ, and we saw in an earlier lecture (I, 299–300) how close the adverbs in -θευ stood to the ablative genitive: at Hesiod, Shield 7, ἄπο κρηθευ from the head’ is in coordination with βλεφάρων ἄπο ‘from the eyelids’, an ordinary genitive. Hoffmann (1891: 307) neatly connected this Homeric usage with Cyprian ἔσ ποθ’ ἔρπες ‘where do you come from?’ (with ἔς from ἔξ) in Hesychius. And still in the Greek Bible we find, e.g. Mark 5: 6, ἄπο μακρόθευ formed to μακρόθευ ‘from afar’.

The counterpart of ἔξ-θευ is formed by ἔς περ ὀπίσω of ‘until later’ (Od. 20. 199): adverbs in -σω originally answer the question ‘where to’ just as those in -θευ answer ‘where from’—ἔξοπίσω, rather than ὀπίσω, for ‘backwards’ being presumably analogical on ἔξ ὀπίθευ (‘behind’)?—As far as I can see, apart from these very reasonable combinations, Homer has just a single example of preposition + adverb, namely καθ’ ἄπαξ ‘once and for all, outright’ (Od. 21. 349).

There is also μετάξε in Hesiod (Works 394), if, as Schulze ingeniously proposed (1888: 262), it is to be analysed as μετ’ ἄξε and originally meant ‘after today’.

Later Greek usage goes much further than Homer. The more the emphasis of a prepositional phrase came to rest on the preposition, and the less the case-form mattered (cf. II, 207–11 above), the easier it was to make an adverb, unmarked for case, depend on a preposition. Even so, in Ionic and Attic such combinations are

fathers’ names], which was no longer understood and therefore recharacterized; cf. πατροφαστί with the same meaning in a late 3rd-c. BC treaty from Nemea. On these words and developments in our understanding of Gk -φι since Solmsen, see Morpurgo Davies (1969 [1970]) and Thompson (1998), both with further references.

3 Gk -φι(τ), Mycen. -πι continues the IE instr. pl. ending *-bbis, and is most obviously cognate with Skt instr. pl. -bhis; its connection with Lat. -bī (< *-bhei) is indirect but not to be excluded. See n. 14, p. 376 above and the references there. As for the ‘old ablatives in -m’: it is traditional and still current practice to reconstruct for Indo-European for the instr. sg. and pl. and the dat.-abl. pl. parallel sets of endings in *-bh- (*-bh, *-bbis, *-bh(y)os) and *-m- (*-mi, *-mis, *-mos), which are thought to have a common origin, although the details of their prehistory still elude us. The *-m- endings are standard in Germanic, Baltic and Slavic, the *-bh- endings everywhere else; for details, see Szemerényi (1996: 160, 161) with notes and further references, and for early literature on the etymology of Lat. inde, etc. (although without mention of an ablative in *-m-), see Persson (1893: esp. 223, 240) and Walde & Hofmann, s.v.

4 On Greek adverbs in -θευ and their recharacterizing with ablative prepositions, see also Lejeune (1939: esp. 178–9, 400–1).

5 The form μεταξε was restored from statements in grammarians for μεταξί of the manuscripts; with *-ξε Schulze compared Skt adhá ‘today’ (cf. EW Aïa, s.v.). See Schwizer 625 n. 2, and West (1978a: ad loc.), who compares the Homeric Hymn to Hermes 125 τά μεταξασ ‘thereafter'.
found nearly always with the force of the least marked case, the accusative. Particularly common is εἰς with adverbs of time such as ἀεὶ, ποτὲ, νῦν, ἐπειτα (‘always’, ‘at some time’, ‘now’, ‘then’), and for these the old phrases εἰς αὔριον and εἰς δ(τε) (‘until tomorrow’, ‘until when’) may in part have provided the model; παρ’ αὐτίκα (‘immediately’) is also to be understood as παρά + accusative (cf. the synonymous παρ’ αὕτα lit. ‘by these very things’). On the model of ἐπὶ πλέον, Herodotus has ἐπὶ μᾶλλον, and comparable with Homeric καθ’ ἀπαξ is εἰς τρίς (‘three times’) already in Pindar (Olymp. 2. 68). Like εἰς, its synonym μέχρι can in spite of its genitive construction be combined with adverbs, μέχρι ὧν ‘until late’ in Thucydides, μέχρι τότε ‘until then’ in Thucydides and Herodotus, and many other instances, including μέχρι ποί/ὅποι (‘until what point’), in fourth-century writers (Xen. Hell. 4. 7. 5; Plato, Gorg. 487c), even μέχρι δεύρο, for which Thucydides still has to say μέχρι τοῦ δεύρο (‘until now’, 3. 64. 3). |

Such combinations with ἀνό and ἐξ are not found until the Hellenistic period, where they go hand in hand with the growing simplicity of case usage after prepositions—though ἐξ ὧν at Arist. Birds 334b is doubtful on textual grounds. Examples include ἀνό πέρυσι ‘from the previous year’ in St Paul (2 Cor. 8. 10) and others, and the Septuagint offers πρὸς ὧν, πρὸς προῖ, and πρὸς δείλις (‘toward evening’, Genesis 24: 11; ‘at daybreak’, Judges 19: 26; ‘toward evening’, Genesis 24: 63); cf. JOHANNESSEHN 1925: 260, and RAHLS cited there. The Atticists of course rage against them: here, too, I have made use of L.obeck (1820: 45–8), in his learned excursus prompted by Phrynichus’ remarks against ἐκτοτε and ἀπόπαλαι, ἐκπαλαι. 7

The situation is similar in Latin. Apart from the cases mentioned above (II, 225–6), there are practically no examples of this sort in pre-classical or Classical Latin, and Skutsch’s eloquent discussion (1902: 95–9), is misleading. Old combinations such as exinde, deinde, and proinde (‘thereafter’, ‘then’, ‘accordingly’) are reminiscent of the Greek combinations of preposition + adverb in -θεν (II, 226 above) and are to be analysed in the same way. 8 Whether Plautus really said ante meridie and post meridie (‘before noon’, ‘after noon’), as Useñer thought (1878: 79 = 1912–13: I, 260), remains controversial, even though it is certain that the word for ‘midday’ occurred originally only in the locative (cf. II, 35 above). And in the case of a máne or a máni ‘from early morning’, whether we must start from the adverbial use of máne or whether we may assume that it contains the vestige of an old noun, is uncertain, not least because the etymology of the word is still unclear. 9 In Lucilius 528 Marx (cf. 545 Warmington) demagis

6 Schroeder’s δ(τε) is generally adopted; see N. Dunbar’s comm. (Oxford 1995), ad loc.
7 Phrynichus prescribes instead εἰς ἐκεῖνον and εἰς παλαιοῦ, respectively (29 and 95 Fischer).
8 Contrast W.’s remark at the top of II, 226 above that the Latin forms may contain old ablatives in -m, and n. 3 in this lecture above.
9 Lat. máne is now generally regarded as the acc. sg. neuter, in adverbial function, of the adjective *máni ‘good’; cf. Walde & Hofmann and Ernout & Meillet, both s.v.
for the rest’ (cf. Span. *demas* ‘apart from that’), *de* is an intensifier and does not govern *magis* (cf. Bücheler 1882: 524–5). In *usque ad pridie* . . . (‘until the day before . . .’) and similar phrases in Cicero (Letters to Atticus 2. 9. 4, 11. 2; 3. 17. 1, nos 29, 32, 62 Shackleton Bailey), and also in *ex/in ante diem* . . . (‘from/until the day before . . .’), the model is provided by nouns denoting days such as *Kalendae* (the first of the month). Really, we do not find genuine examples of this type until the imperial period. Then Vitruvius (On Architecture 5. 6. 8) uses *a peregrē* ‘from abroad’ in contrast with *a foro* ‘from the public square’, and Pliny (Nat. 17. 227) ventures *a foris* ‘from outside’. Just as the latter looks to be modelled on Gk *ἐξωθεὶν*, *so insemel* (‘at one time, together’, first in Statius, Silvae 1. 6. 36) resembles Gk *εἰς ἀπαξ*. Then, however, the popular language, especially as it is revealed to us in Christian texts, is completely flooded with expressions of this type: *a modo* ‘from now on’, *ad tunc, de longe, ex nunc, in palam* (‘until then’, ‘from afar’, ‘from now’, ‘into the open’), *de susum* (‘from above’, mentioned by Quint. 1. 5. 38 as a fault), and so on. Often a Greek model is evident. Many phrases of this sort survive today in the Romance languages: so e.g. Fr. *assez* (‘enough’) goes back to Lat. *ad satis*, Fr. *arrièr* and *derrièr* to Lat. *ad retro* and *de retro* (‘behind’, ‘to the back’, ‘at the back’).—In Latin, too, the grammatical theorists objected to these combinations: Marius Victorinus comments (GL VI, 202, 16–17) that ‘all the experts say that prepositions should not be attached to adverbs’, but then refers to the usage of the ‘ueteres’ (‘ancients’), who permitted themselves *de repente* and *de subito* (both, ‘suddenly’)—though neither of these examples is to the point, as they both involve old ablatives. Cf. Nonius Marcellus, pp. 832–4 Lindsay, and HAND (1829–45: I, 60–1).\footnote{On the highly problematic form *demagis* and its interpretation, see now the detailed discussion of Adams (2007: 374–7), who is sceptical about the use of this word by others as a Spanish regionalism, and even about the security of its attestation in the Republic—rather than in the late Empire, where it looks more at home. Warmington translates it with ‘very much more’ (with intensive *de-*: cf. W.’s comment here). Adams (n. 24) simply with ‘more’.}

This brings us to **combinations of more than one preposition**. With preverbs this is found in all the languages that concern us here, though German lags far behind Greek—and Latin, too—in this respect. (For collections of the Greek material, see Schubert (1893), and, for verbs with three preverbs, Grosspietsch (1895).) Overall, the tendency to combine more than a single preverb with the verb increases, because speakers liked to express themselves in ever more precise and complicated ways, because simple compounds easily fell into disuse or developed an idiomatic meaning, and finally, probably also because speakers...
were less and less afraid of long words. Even so, we cannot speak of a steady
development in this direction. Teichmüller tried to show (1881) that Aristotle
often combines just one preposition with the verb where Plato had used two, e.g.
in ἐπάγεων and ἐπιφέρεων for Plato’s ἐπανάγεων and ἐπαναφέρεων (‘ascrbe, refer;
infer’). But what is particularly remarkable is that Homer is not at all reserved
in this respect, and indeed has examples of verbs combined with three prepo-
tions, the maximum attainable in Greek, e.g. Od. 6. 87 ὑπ-ἐκ-προ-ῥέω ‘flow forth
out from under’. This is not surprising, as Homer shares this freedom with
Sanskrit, including already Vedic, and incidentally with Old Irish, in which as
many as five preverbs can be combined with a single verb: in other words,
Homer is merely retaining an inherited Indo-European feature. A particularly
dramatic example is προπροκυλινθόμενος ‘rolling on and on’ (which comes twice,
Il. 22. 221, Od. 17. 525). Collitz has shown (1882: 291) that this is merely a trace
of the habit (richly attested in Vedic with pra, the cognate of Gk πρό, and with
other prepositions, too) of repeating the preverb when the action of the verb is
depicted as indefinitely repeated. By and large, Greek has rid itself of the ancient
and widespread habit of expressing iteration of an idea by repetition of the word:
προπροκυλινθόμενος is a vestige of an ancient pattern extending into the epic
language. Later epic poets, from Apollonius of Rhodes on, took delight in
imitating it with various verbs. Apollonius even ventured the derivative
προπροκαταγόνην (‘rushing down and on’, 2. 595), and προπρό as an adverb and
as a preposition with a noun (‘on and on, eagerly’, 3. 1013; ‘right in front of’ + gen., 3. 453).

In striking contrast to Homer is Pindar, who hardly ever has more than one
preverb. From his victory odes I can adduce only ἐπεμβεβαιῶτας (‘riding on [the
chariots]’, Nem. 4. 29, which echoes Homeric ἐπεμβεβάως at Il. 9. 882),
ἐξανιστάται (‘they migrate from’, Pyth. 4. 49), and προσήνετε (‘addressed, called
upon by name’, Pyth. 4. 97 and 9. 29). And the last can hardly count as an
example, because, as is clear from the augment, ἐννέπω was regarded by the

12 Cf. in the very next line, Od. 6. 88 ὑπ-ἐκ-προ-λίῳ, of Nausicaa and her maids releasing the mules from
the harness.

13 For example, vy-ati-kram- ‘pass by’, and in Vedic anu-pra-jhā- ‘trace, discover’, abhy-ā-han- ‘strike,
wound’. Renou (1930: §112b, final n.) states that the accumulation of two or three preverbs is frequent,
although he gives no examples. On the other hand, he states that repetition of the type seen in Vedic
pra-pra- became early obsolete, although he notes instances of ayyati-, upopa-, adhyaddhi-.

14 Of the approx. 1200 compound verbs attested in Old Irish, 108 have three preverbs, 21 have four,
and 3 have five. It is important to note, however, that they arise through a process of accretion, preverbs being
added one at a time to pre-existing compounds, on the whole question of the origins and development of
the verbal complex in Insular Celtic, see now McConé (2006), here esp. ch. 4.

15 Collitz argues here that ‘iterative’ (in Sanskrit, ‘anrežita’) compounds represent an IE type, an idea
taken further by Dunkel (1982/3: 192); cf. EAIA, s.v. ‘pra’. With Gk προπρό and Vedic pra-pra we can now
compare, as Collitz could not, Hittite parā parā. Collitz compares also e.g. the Latin reduplicated
pronouns tete, meme, see with Vedic tvāmtvam, etc. On the life and work of Hermann Collitz
poet as a simplex. Did the poet’s stylistic instinct rebel against the accumulation of grammatical words? Compare what Dornseiff has to show (1921a: 18–19, 89, 134) on Pindar’s oscillation between compound and simple forms.

Another archaic feature is the tmesis that occasionally occurs between two such preverbs. This is attested in Greek, e.g. at Od. 14. 349 κατὰ μᾶκος ἀμφικαλύφας (‘wrapping my rags around and over [my head]’), Anacreon, fr. 58 Bergk = 406 Page ἀπὸ δ’ ἔξειλετο, Eur. Iphe. Taur. 1278 (lyr.) ἀπὸ δὲ...ἔξειλεν (both, ‘took away’); and similarly in Gothic at 2 Cor. 8: 18 ga-b-þan-mip-sandidedum imam broþar (‘we have sent with him our brother’, for Gk συνεπέμψαμεν μετ’ αὐτοῦ τὸν ἀδελφόν), where ga- and mip- immediately before the verb are separated by two enclitics.16

Latin is also capable of such forms from the earliest period on. Already in the Senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus of 186 BC (CIL I2. 5817), we have compromitere ‘exchange promises’, and Löfstedt has lately shown (1911: 92–4) how common such combinations are in Late Latin. Apart from the colourless con-, the commonest preverb in this function is per-, properly with an intensifying force (‘very much, completely’), but often serving simply to make the compound more resonant, e.g. pertransire in Pliny (‘pass right through’, Nat. 37. 68). The resulting forms are often strange, e.g. coadimpleo ‘fill’ or perdiscooperio ‘uncover’.

The latter contains, on a strict historical linguistic analysis, four preverbs, but coopereire ceased to be thought of as a compound fairly early, and operiere was not so regarded even in the earliest Latin. It also happens that the same preverb is prefixed twice, as in adalligare in Pliny (‘tie on, attach’, Nat. 17. 211, etc.), or concolligere in later Latin (‘gather together’). The sense of ad- and con- was no longer clearly perceived, because of their assimilation to al-, col-, and this double placement of the preverb has nothing to do with Homeric προπορ- (above).—I would also draw attention to concrucifigere ‘crucify together’, recrucifigere ‘crucify again’, in which, as in Gk ἀντεπτοιεῖν (‘to benefit in return’; cf. II, 170 above), a non-prepositional compound verb has acquired a preverb.

It is to some extent clear from the examples that we have already seen that not all instances of this phenomenon are of the same type (cf. Debrunner 1917: 81 §162). We can distinguish more or less three groups. The first comprises combinations in which the preposition immediately before the verb has formed a

16 Namely, the composite (indeed, pleonastic) -uh + þan, each meaning ‘and, but’, with elision of the -u- and assimilation of -uh- to -ff- (Krahe & Seebold §45.2).
18 Like operio ‘I open’, operio ‘I close, cover’ is a compound, with preverb *op-, based on the Indo-European root *Hwer-; cf. n. 12, p. 636 above.
19 The ThLL, s.v., cites only the Old Latin Bible (frequently, Exodus 3: 16, etc.) and Origen on Matthew 18: 73. Compare consossatus ‘stitched together’, in the letters of Claudius Terentianus (P. Mich. VIII, 468, 8; early 2nd c. AD); cf. Adams (1977).
close union with it, and the verb is no longer usable as a simplex. We have talked
about these more than once in other contexts (II, 168, 188–90 above), so suffice it
here to refer to Homeric δι-αφύσω, ἔξ-αφύω (‘draw away, ‘draw out’; on ἀφύω ∼
ἀφύσω, see SCHULZE 1892: 311–12), προ-καθίζω (‘to perch’); to μετ-αμφιέννυμι
(‘change clothes’), and περι-αμφιέννυμι (‘clothe on all sides’) in Plato; to the
Latin forms in Plautus and later writers abscondo, comprehendo, exporgo, exsurgo
(‘conceal’, ‘take hold of’, ‘stretch out’, ‘arise’), recomminiscor (‘recollect’, beside
the more usual, and classical, reminiscor); and to German er-b(e)-armen (cf.
Gothic arman ‘to pity’), ver-g(e)-önnen (‘to grant’). We may note that in Latvian
it is only in such cases that two preverbs may be combined at all (see ENDZELINS
1923: 480).20

Secondly, there are those instances where a ready-made compound, clearly
regarded as such, is prefixed with a second preverb in order to signal a second
relation. In German this state of affairs is especially clear when a compound verb
with inseparable prefix (II, 172 above) is prefixed with a preposition that retains
its full force, as e.g. in ab-bestellen, vor-enthalten, an-erkennen, ab-verdienen
(‘cancel an order’, ‘withhold’, ‘recognize’, ‘work off, discharge’); also where mit is prefixed
to an already compound verb to express an action jointly carried out, in forms
such as mit-einsteigen, mit-anfassen (‘embark together’, ‘lend a hand’); cf. Gothic
miþ-ana-kumbjan (Gk συνανακείθαι ‘to sit at table with’), miþ-in-sandjan (Gk
συναποστέλλειν ‘send out with’). Very similar is the loose attachment of
Gk συν- in Greek (cf. II, 177 above), which as far as I can see makes its first appearance before
compounds in Aeschylus, in e.g. συγκαθέλκειν ‘together drag down’,
συγκαταβαίνειν ‘come down together’ (Septem 614, Eumenides 1046). The same
analysis applies to the prefixation of ἐν-, especially in the idiom represented in
ἐν-διατάζει, ἐν-αποστείασαι (‘draw up in’, ‘spend in’; cf. II, 177–8 above), and to that
of προσ- ‘in addition’, as well, reminiscent of the corresponding adverbial use of
πρός (II, 166 above), e.g. in προσεπεξηύρον ‘they (the Plataeans) in addition
(προσ-) devised against (·-πε(ι)-, their besiegers’) at Thuc. 2. 76. 3. There is a
nice example of ἐπν- in a similar sense in Herodotus, 4. 122. 3 διαβάντων τούτων οἱ
Περσαὶ ἐπὶδιαβάντες ἐδίωκον (‘when they [the Scythians] crossed the river, the
Persians crossed over as well and pursued them’). But I cannot pursue these in
detail, and I want just to add a few quick points: in Latin, note (a) the frequent
use of re- before all sorts of compound, (b) the loosely-prefixed super- in the
classical poets, and (c) cases like dis-conducit ‘is harmful to’ in Plautus (Trin. 930),
where the preverb has a negative force (cf. II, 183 above and 296 below); and note
that in both Greek and Latin the first preverb often serves merely to sharpen the

20 The same applies to Lithuanian (Senn 1966: §389); cf. on verb prefixes in Latvian and Lithuanian,
including on their role in affecting aspect, in addition to Endzelins and Senn, Mathiassen (1997: 118, 159–61)
meaning of the compound verb, e.g. in Hellenistic Greek διαποθήσκω, ἔξαποστέλλω (‘keep on dying’, Polybius 16. 31. 8; ‘dispatch, send out or away’), in Plautus disperso, disperea, dispersatio (‘destroy utterly’, ‘perish utterly’, ‘smash to pieces’); on cases of this sort in Late Latin, see II, 229 above.

But not all multiply compounded verbs are based on simple compounds. It is also possible for two prepositions first to combine with each other and for the resulting complex then to be prefixed to a verb: in German e.g. voraus-setzen and vorüber-gehen (‘presuppose’, ‘go past, bypass’) are not extensions of aussetzen and übergehen, but rather contain the pre-existing compounds voraus and vorüber (‘ahead, in advance’, ‘past, over’).

This brings us to the question to what extent prepositions can combine together when they are not used as preverbs. | In Homer we find a whole series of compound prepositions attested not only as preverbs but also as adverbs or governing nouns or both: we find -προ attached to ἀπο-, δια-, and περι-, and -εξ (or -εκ) after δια-, παρα-, and ὑπο-, and possibly ἔξυπερ αἰετῶ at Pindar, fr. 531 = Paean 8. 7ο Maehler (B2, 107? Rutherford; cf. SCHRÖDER 1923: 544),

for both functions in a single clause, note Eur. Or. 142 (Electra to the Chorus) ἀποπροβατ’ ἐκεί’ ἀποπρό μοι κοίτας (‘keep away over on that side, please, away from his bed’). And this is no poetic artifice: ὑππρό (for ὑπο-πρό) + gen. ‘before’ is attested in Thessalian (II, 132 above), and ἐπές (for ἐπη-ἐξ) + dat. ‘with reference to’ in Arcadian (IG V.2, 6 = Buck no. 19 = Thür & Taeuber no. 3, 54; Tegea, c.350 bc), and we are about to see further examples from Ionic. It may even be that the extended forms in Homer ἀπόπροθη ‘far off’ and ἀπόπροθεν ‘from afar’ were once normal outside poetry, though διάπροθη in Nicander of Colophon (Alexipharmaca 3; 2nd c. BC) is certainly an artificial formation.—In some cases the first of the two prepositions is more important for the meaning, and hence παρέξ (‘along, past, clear of’”) takes not only a gen. but also, and in fact more frequently, an acc.

A few of these Homeric combinations survive in high poetry, especially in tragedy. They also serve as models for new formations. The poet of the Hymn to Apollo permits himself 11ο ἄπεκ 22 μεγάρῳ (‘out of the hall’) on the model of Homer’s διέκ μεγάρῳ, and Apollonius of Rhodes and later poets venture, on the model of the Homeric compounds in -πρό (including the preverb προπρό-: II, 228 above), to use ἐππρό as an independent adverb in the sense ‘further forwards, onwards’ (eleven times in Apollonius, 3. 1338, etc.; cf. e.g. Callim. Hecale, fr. 238 Pfeiffer, 22).—Writers of strict Attic jettisoned this habit (though a number of

21 In his Teubner edition of 1908, Schröder printed ἐξόπερθ’ αἰετῶ. This single word is now read as two: ἔξ ὑπερ (‘and above the pediment or gable (αἰετῶ) sang six golden Charmers’); cf. Slater (1969: s.v. ‘αἰετῶ’) and on the whole passage see above all Rutherford (2001: 210 ff).

22 The variant ἄπεκ is preferred by Humbert, ἄπα by e.g. Monro & Allen and West.
compound verbs may contain this sort of prepositional group as their preverbs, e.g. verbs beginning with παρεξ-). In Ionic, however, at least the type in -εξ remained current in ordinary speech. One of these, πάρεξ ‘apart from’, which stands out with its accentuation (known from the grammarians\(^{23}\)) and its retention of -εξ rather than -κ even before a consonant (ms. add.\(^2\): cf. Apollon. Rhod. 2. 1010), was even inherited from Ionic into the Koine and was still in use there in the imperial period (Herodian, GG III.2, 932); note then that its appearance in pseudo-Plato, Epinomis 976d represents a departure from pure Attic. Homeric διεξ is found in Archilochus, fr. 46 West διεξ (or διέκ, which amounts to the same) σωλήνος εἰς ἄγγγος ‘through a pipe and out into a vessel’; Homeric ὑπεξ is in Herodotus, 3. 116. 1 ὑπέκ τῶν γρυπῶν ἄρπάζειν ‘(the story goes) that they (the Arimaspians) snatch (it, gold) out from under the griffins’—though this could be from the epic Arimaspea.\(^{24}\) And an ancient μετεξέτεροι ‘some among many, certain’ (perhaps also ‘others’, which must be the original meaning) and μετεξέτερος ‘some, a certain amount of’, frequent in Herodotus and Hippocrates, mostly with the partitive genitive. A phrase such as Herodotus 1. 95. 1 Περσάων μετεξέτεροι must have meant originally ‘some from the midst of the Persians’ (cf. Funk 1876: 148). We must not be misled by Nicander’s use of εξέτεροι, εξέτερος in the same sense, for the learned poets of the Alexandrian period love to clip compounds: the same Nicander has ἔποναὶ ὑπέποναι (‘say, tell’) and ἄνεκής for διανεκής (‘continuous, unbroken’), Euphorion of Chalcis (3rd c. BC) πλάμενοι for περιπλάμενοι (‘moving round’); see Lobeck (1837: I, 166).

In addition to the sets of forms in -πρό and -εξ, there is also ἀμφιπερί (lit. ‘on both sides and round about’), attested in epic as an adverb, a preverb, and a preposition, beside which note II. 17. 760 περί τ’ ἀμφί τε τάφρον (‘on both sides of the ditch’) and the Hymn to Demeter 276 περί τ’ ἀμφί τε, with each element standing independently. Compare also Callimachus, Hymn 4. 300 περί τ’ ἀμφί τε νῆσοι (‘the islands round and about’); cf. O. Schneider’s ed. [Leipzig 1870] ad loc., and [ms. add.\(^2\)] Hecale, fr. 34, 13 Pfeiffer), and the noun περιαμβῆς ‘a turning round and round’, of the pestle in a mortar, in the comic poet Eupolis (fr. 473 PCG V). One might also add Homeric πρό φὼσὺδε ‘forth to the light’, at II. 16. 188 = 19. 118, and Apollonius 4. 1768 μετὰ νῆαδ’ ἰκέδαι (‘to come to the ship’),\(^{25}\) and let us not

\(^{23}\) Herodian, GG III.2, 931–2 reports παρέξ for Homer, πάρεξ for Herodotus.

\(^{24}\) W. means that Herodotus may have taken the word from his source, the poem Arimaspea, to which he refers at 4. 13 for further information on the world far to the north of Greece. He tells us that this poem was composed by Aristeas of Proconnesus (who according to 4. 15. 1 lived more than 240 years before Herodotus) on his miraculous reappearance seven years after his sudden death and the disappearance of his body. Aristeas claims to have travelled among the Issedones, and to have heard their accounts of more remote peoples, including the one-eyed Arimaspoi, who steal gold from the griffins who guard it. On Aristeas, see Bolton (1962).

forget the prefixing of μέχρι and the like to other prepositions (II, 165 above). Doric ἐναντίον, which was borrowed into the Koine and there enlarged (on the model of ἀπεναντίον and κατεναντίον) to ἀπέναντι and κατεναντι, is to be analysed in the same way as ἐναντία and related forms (cf. II, 156, 205 above). Finally, προπαράθερ, which itself is probably just a strengthened form of πάροθερ (all, ‘before, in front [of]’): in an original combination of πρό and παρά, πρό would have to come second (cf. II, 233–4 below).

How alien learned Greeks of the later period found the Homeric compound prepositions of the type ὑπέξ, may be gathered from a statement of the brilliant author of the work Περὶ ὧψους (On the Sublime). In chapter 10. 6, he praises the sublimity of the simile at II. 15. 624–8, and comments on line 628 τυθὼν γὰρ ὑπὲκ θανάτου φέρονται (‘for only just are they carried away from under death’) as follows: ‘by the forced combination of naturally uncompoundable prepositions (ὥσ προθέαις ἀνθρέπτους οὖσα συναναγκάσας παρὰ φύσιν καὶ εἰς ἀλλήλας συμβιασάμενος), the poet has tortured his words to correspond with the emotion of the moment; he has in effect stamped the special character of the danger on the diction’.26

In Latin, too, the combination of two or more prepositions is not confined to preverbal use. Lat. insuper ‘on top, in addition’ is attested throughout our Latin record; in pre- and post-classical Latin, it is occasionally used as a preposition with the accusative meaning ‘up onto’. The analogous desuper ‘from above’, contested at Caes. Gallic War 1. 52. 5,27 is securely attested from Vergil (Aen. 12. 295) on as a replacement of earlier de supero; it, too, is used later with nouns, e.g. in the Old Latin Bible at Judges 3: 21 sumpit gladium de super femore (‘he [Ehud] drew the sword from the top of his thigh’), which according to Augustine (Discourses on the Heptateuch, bk 7, ad loc.) is a licence of the translator, ‘quod Graecus ἀπὸ ἀνωθεν habet; nam locutio minus Latina est’ (‘since the Greek has ἀπὸ ἀνωθεν, for de super is hardly Latin’). We spoke earlier of the archaic praeter-propter (‘more or less, approximately’; II, 167 above); circumcirca is reminiscent of Gk ἀμφισερή (‘round about, on all sides’), although circa looks like a neut. pl.; and the old exaduersus, exaduersum is probably derived from ex aduerso (all, ‘opposite’) attested in Plautus and Lucilius (cf. J. B. Hofmann 1926b: 39).

A mass of further combinations springs up in Imperial Latin; see Hamp (1888). In some cases the first preposition ‘governs’ the second, as in the just-quoted de super femore and as in the combinations of preposition + adverb discussed earlier

27 Recent editors (Klotz, Seel, Hering, Du Pontet) print it without remark. Cf. Hofmann & Szantyr 282 with further references.
It remains to say a word about the order of the prepositions so combined. In general this is determined by the sense of the compound. With reference to Homeric usage, it is well observed by Hermann Fraenkel (1924: 278) that the preverbs which characterize the action of the verb itself stand next to the verb, while those which fit the action into the surrounding context come first: a clear example would be εἰσ-ανα-βαίνειν (‘go up into or onto’). Metrical factors also played a part in poetry, hence we find in Homer on the one hand ἀμφὶ περὶ on the other περὶ τ’ ἄμφι τε in either case the reverse order would not have fitted the hexameter. Again, at II. 2. 267 we should expect not ἐξυπανέστη but rather *ὑπεξανέστη, as Homer repeatedly uses the combinations ὑπ-εξ- and ἐξ-ανα-, and even has ὑπ-εξ-ανα- in ὑπεξαναδώς (‘rising up out of’, II. 13. 352), while he has no other examples of ἐξ-ὑπο-, ὑπ-ανα-, let alone ἐξ-ὑπ-ανα-; but *ὑπεξανέστη would have yielded an impossible trochee -ν in the middle of the line. 30—In addition, there were certain inherited placement patterns. In one instance this is especially clear. Schubert shows (1893: 203) that preverbal πρό- in Attic more often precedes than follows another preposition, but that in Homer it is the other way around. This can be stated more precisely and at the same time justified in historical terms. Homer has πρό in first position only in καθίζων (of birds ‘perching’, II. 2. 463), where clearly πρό is prefixed to the established compound καθίζω (cf. II, 229 above); otherwise in Homer πρό is always immediately before the verb, after one or even two other prepositions. The closest correspondence with this is in the compounds of πρό which function as adverbs or prepositions, such as ἀπὸπρό, etc. (II, 231 above), where πρό is always in second position. This goes back to Indo-European: | the Celticist Strachan has shown (1899: 612–13) that the Vedic and Old Irish cognates of πρό (prá and rv-) also almost invariably

28 On these Romance prepositions/adverbs, see FEW, s.vv. ‘abante’, ‘de ex’, ‘postea’; on their Latin antecedents, Hofmann & Szauny, 224, 243, 264, 283.
29 The former three times Il., 2. 305, 21. 10, 23. 191, once Od., 11. 609; the latter only Il. 17. 760.
30 That is, with one light syllable between two heavy syllables.
follow other preverbs, and Jackson (1900) has since shown the same for Avestan.\(^{31}\) Even in Latin, in the few cases where pro is combined with other preverbs (with emo anditto), pro is immediately in front of the verb (ex-promo ‘bring out’, com-, ex-, re- promitto). This ancient rule was later abandoned in Greek, when the need arose to combine πρό in its temporal sense ‘beforehand’ with compound verbs (cf. II, 178, 238 above; on πρόπατ, II, 232 above), and thus this contrast between Homeric and Attic (and probably Ionic) usage is explained. [Add.: The oldest example of προ- of time with a true compound is probably Semon. Amorg. 22 West προυκτονεαι (‘you finish before’).—For prepositions used as preverbs, a number of other fixed rules of placement can be shown. At Babrius 12. 1, for the unmetrical μακρων ἐξεπωτήθη (‘flew out a long way’) apparently offered by the tradition, Lachmann\(^{32}\) suggested μακρ’ ἄνεξεπωτήθη, but, while ἐξ-ανα- is attested from Homer on, ἄν-ἐξ- is unheard of: the sole example in the dictionaries, ἄνεκπτοιγενε in the 6th-c. Byzantine poet Paulus Silentiarius, Description of Hagia Sophia 285 Veh, was long ago corrected within the tradition to ἄνεπτοιγενε (‘startled’; cf. P. Friedländer 1912: 274); in the Babrius passage above, on the other hand, μακρων ἐξεπωτήθη was achieved long ago as the correct reading.—Other preverbs, too, follow ἄνα- only very rarely. On Homeric ἄνέπαλτο (‘leapt up’, II. 8. 85, 20. 424, 23. 692), on which Apoll. Rhod. 2. 825 ἄνεπάλλευς is based, see H. Fränkel (1924: 280), who regards it as an old mutation of *ἀνέπαλτο (‘jumped up’).\(^{33}\) Otherwise, I can find only ἄνασυντάττεις ‘re-assess war-tax’ in Hyperides (fr. 151; whence ἄνασυντάταξις in the lexicographers), ἄναδιαρθροῦ (‘give articulate form to’) in Theophrastus, and ἄνακταξις (‘refracture’) in a medical writer.\(^{34}\) Von der Mühll draws my attention to the fact that ἄντι- regularly precedes other preverbs, and indeed I can find no exception. The frequently attested καταντιβολεῖν ‘entreat earnestly’, first in Aristophanes, fr. 603, PCG III.2 καταντιβολεῖτον αὐτὸν ὑποπεπτωκότες (‘the two of them fawn on him and entreat him’) amended by Kock without just


\(^{32}\) In his edition (Berlin 1845); for bibliography, see the recent Teubner edition (1986) by M. J. Luzzatto & A. La Penna.

\(^{33}\) The problem alluded to here, which was essentially solved by H. Fränkel, is neatly summarized by Leumann (1910: 60): we have in Homer and later literature the verbs πάλλομαι ‘hop, jump’ and ἄναπάλλομαι ‘jump up’, which agree in form with πάλλομαι ‘shake’ but in meaning with ἄλλομαι ‘jump’. Fränkel showed that (ἄνα)πάλλομαι ‘jump (up)’ was an invention within the Homeric tradition based on the false segmentation of -παλτο as -παλ-το (as if from πάλλομαι) instead of correct -παλ-το (from -παλ-μαι). Leumann (1910: 60–4) gives a slightly modified account of the details of the relations between the various forms. For references, see also LSJ, s.v. ‘ἀναπάλω’; Frisk, s.v. ‘πάλλω’; and G. W. Mooney’s edn of Apollonius (Dublin 1912) on 2. 825 ἄνεπάλλευς ‘leaping out against’ (of a wild boar), which is of interest as it can only be from (‘correct’) ἄνε-παλ-μαι.

\(^{34}\) ἄνακταξις is still recognized, in Paul of Aegina (7th c. AD) 6. 109, p. 162 Heiberg. Only διαρθροῦ, however, without ἄνα-, is now printed in Theophrastus, On the Causes of Plants 1. 22. 1, 2. 16. 4.
cause to κατ’ ἀντιβολεῖτον, is not a counterexample, as ἀντιβολεῖν is not a compound verb, but a parasyntethon,35 and the form previously registered as καταντίπνει in the 12th-c. Byzantine novel of Eustathios Makrembolites, Hysmine and Hysminias 8. 6 (p. 229, 29 Hercher) was long ago replaced on the strength of the best manuscripts by καταντικρύς ἀντιπνεῖ (‘blows directly against’).36]

35 That is, ἀντιβολεῖν is not a compound of ἀντί + βολεῖν, but a derived verb (ἀντιβολ + εῖν) from the deverbal noun ἀντιβολή ‘confrontation’. Kassel & Austin, the editors of PCG, accept W.’s defence of καταντιβολεῖτον (though they attribute κατ’ ἀντιβολεῖτον to Brunck rather than Kock).

There still remains one point to discuss to which extensive sections tend to be devoted in systematic presentations of syntax, namely the meaning of the individual prepositions in their various uses. One lecture is not sufficient for a comprehensive account, and so we have to confine ourselves to highlighting certain general points and selected examples. On this subject numerous similarities can be seen between Greek and Latin, and between them and other languages. One concerns the development of abstract meaning from physical. For instance, one of the peculiarities of Silver Latin is the semantic shift of *citra* from ‘this side of’ to ‘without’ (this affects *citra* alone, as its erstwhile synonym *cis* was obsolete by the time of the Empire). This usage begins with Ovid, and we can see its genesis beautifully illustrated in his work. First, he says to Augustus at *Tristia* 2. 127 *uita datast citraque necem tua constitit ira* ‘my life was spared, and your anger stopped this side of death’ (i.e., ‘did not go so far as to make you sentence me to death’), with a bit of physical meaning still present. This physical sense is faded at *Trist*. 5. 8. 23 *peccauit citra scelus*, although we could still paraphrase, ‘in my *peccare* I did not go as far as *scelus*’. Here we have *citra* used of a potential but unattained highpoint of an action, but even that is not implied at e.g. Quintilian, *Inst*. 1. 5. 64 *citra reprehensionem loquetur* (‘will speak without deserving censure’), which expresses a simple lack. Here the Celtic languages have a nice parallel to offer: Old Irish *cen* (which may be related to *citra* etymologically as well) means originally ‘this side of’ but usually just ‘without’ (Thurneysen 1946: 501). Incidentally, just like *citra*, the semantically related *intra* (‘within, inside’) occasionally acquired the meaning ‘without, short of’ in Imperial Latin (like Gk ἐνρός at Thuc. 5. 90). Similar to the first Ovid passage above is Seneca, *Epist*. 97. 5 in *tra comperendinationem fides promissi mei stabit*, ‘my promise will be carried out faithfully within the legally permitted period of postponement’, while similar to the more developed usage is Quint. *Inst*. 11. 3. 8 *eius scripta intra famam sunt* ‘his (Hortensius’) writings fall short of that reputation’.—Or let us take Gk ὑπέρ + gen. ‘above’. With verbs of perception, thinking, and speaking, it shows—not in Attic, but in many other dialects and once or twice already in Homer—the...
meaning ‘with regard to’, e.g. at Il. 6. 524 ὑπὲρ ἀθένεις αἰσχρὲ ἀκοίω (‘I [Hector] hear shameful things said about you [Paris]’), and from the end of the fourth century this is standard Greek. In Polybius it is used in this sense interchangeably with περὶ + gen. As ὑπὲρ begins with a vowel and ends with a consonant, while περὶ does the reverse, the alternation is very convenient for the avoidance of hiatus. It occurs, however, even where hiatus is not at issue, e.g. at Polybius 10. 16. 7, where ὑπὲρ τοῦτο τοῦ μέρους εἰρηνικά (‘concerning this part I have already spoken’) refers back to 10. 16. 6 περὶ τοῦ μηδένα νοσφιλεσθαί (‘concerning the fact that no one appropriates it’). Now, let us not forget that in German ὑπὲρ in this sense is usually über (lit. ‘over’), and in French sur, which continues Lat. super + abl., which is used already by Cicero with verbs such as agere and scribere in the sense of Gk περὶ + gen., ‘about, on the subject of’.

Related, though not identical, to this case is ὑπὲρ in the sense ‘on behalf of; for’, frequent in Attic. Although Lat. super at first does not know this meaning, Vergil can still write Aen. 4. 233 nec super ipse suā multār laude laborem (‘and [if] he does not strive over fame for himself’), on which Servius comments: ‘i.e. “pro sua laude”, et Graecum est schema; sic enim Demosthenes ὑπὲρ τοῦ στεφάνου, i.e. “pro corona”’ (‘he means “for the sake of his glory”, using the same Greek usage as Demosthenes in ὑπὲρ τοῦ στεφάνου, i.e. “for the sake of, in defence of the crown”’). In order to defend something, you position yourself in a sense over it. Conversely, in Lesbian, Thessalian, and Cypriot, περὶ was used to mean ‘for’ (Schulze 1911: 359).2

Just as an abstract meaning arises and comes to prominence, so the physical meaning fades, as we can observe e.g. in the case of ὑπὸ + gen. (Johannessohn 1925: 174);3 ἀντὶ has shed the physical meaning ‘opposite’ as early as Homer, although it is preserved outside Ionic-Attic.4

Furthermore, these days we are wont to do more justice again to the theory—earlier discredited by an absurd book by Abel (1884)—according to which the meaning of a word can shift into its exact opposite, so-called ‘enantiosemia’;5 cf. Nöldeke (1910) on ‘words with the opposite meaning’. Meillet points out (1922b: 99) that you can easily fall into using a word that means the opposite of what you want to say: words with opposite meanings are indeed associated with each other, and hence often assimilated to each other formally, too;

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2 On περὶ = ὑπὲρ in these dialects, cf. Bechtel (1921–4: I, 110–11, 200, 442) and LSJ, s.v. ‘περὶ’ (A.V).
3 On the weakening of the local sense of ὑπὸ in the process of its emergence as the standard marker of the agent of a passive verb in classical Greek (English ‘by’), see now George (2005: 61–71, 103–15), with remarks on the agent-marking function of ἐκ, παρά and πρὸς as well.
4 The physical meaning ‘in the face of’ is attested in Cretan and Locrian, and there are even a few Attic examples, such as ἀντὶ τοῦ Μνησταντίου ‘face to face with the Minotaur’ (IG II2. 1534A, 98; Athens, 274/3 BC); see Buck §136.8.
5 On Carl Abel (1827–1906), who lived part of his life in England (cf. Abel 1882, in English), and whose ideas influenced Freud, and the notion of enantiosemey, see Morpurgo Davies (1998: 339), with references to a detailed study by Giulio Lepschy.
cf. Schuchardt (1922: 206), with reference to Goethe’s statement that ‘every word awakes its opposite meaning’. It seems that prepositions also furnish examples of this phenomenon. Very recently Dietrich Schäfer has shown (1921: 378–81) that in Medieval Latin cis and citra are often used to mean ‘beyond’. One might say that this was a misunderstanding based on the imperfect learning of those for whom Latin was not a living language, but Latin of the Middle Ages really cannot be called a dead language. Moreover, we can show that prepositions have this sort of opposite sense even in the earliest period: Gk ὑπό and Lat. sub, for example, mean ‘under’, but the corresponding comparative and superlative forms Gk ὑπέρος (in ὑπέρα ‘yard at the top of the sail’, ὑπέρος ‘pestle’) : Lat. superius, Gk ὑπαρχος : Lat. summus mean ‘higher’ and ‘highest’, respectively, which is matched by Gk ὑπέρ, Lat. super (‘over’). In Germanic there is an opposition even in the positive grade between Gothic uf ‘under’ and German ob ‘on top’. On Lat. sub meaning ‘upwards’ in compound verbs, see K. Meister (1924/5: 32–5). I recently had the experience in a meeting of hearing a certain Herr Niederer (lit. Mr Lower) constantly referred to by someone there as ‘Herr Oberer’ (lit. Mr Upper)! (See II, 182–3 above on compound verbs; on the confusion of opposite words in child language, see Jespersen (1922: 120 [= 1925: 99]). Note the important monograph of Hans Sperber (1915) on the semantic development of the preposition über.)

In one connection in particular, prepositions are especially instructive. It is well known how much the meaning of a word is conditioned by its combinations with other words, and how it can be thereby subject to modification and change of meaning. This must affect prepositions particularly strongly, as in the main they serve purely as secondary determiners of other words. When they are used in combination with nouns, it is mainly the case of their noun that exerts the strong influence. Consequently, in Greek we often find in association with multiple case constructions almost contradictory meanings conveyed by a single preposition: this is so in the case of κατά, for example, which with the gen. can mean ‘against’, with the accusative ‘according to’; παρά and πρός can mean ‘from’ with the ablative genitive, ‘to’ with the accusative; and Oscan -en with the ablative means ‘from . . . on’, while with the locative and accusative it means the same as Gk ἐν and εἰς, Lat. in, German in (all, ‘in’ or ‘into’). This is the explanation of a number of differences of meaning between etymologically related prepositions in different languages, including that between Gk ἔτε, ἐκτίω and their cognates, on the one hand, and Lat. de and its Oscan and Celtic cognates, on the other (cf. II, 209

6 This is from Goethe’s novel Die Wahlverwandtschaften (Elective Affinities, 1809), part 2, ch. 4, ‘Jedes ausgesprochene Wort erregt den Gegensinn’.

7 The Oscan postposition -en + abl. is clear only in eisuen ziculud ‘from this day on’ (Tabula Bantina 16). Because of its meaning, some have separated it from Lat. in and compared it instead with inde ‘thence’; see further Untermann (2000: s.v. ‘en’).
and n. 4, p. 661 above). In all such cases, depending on the case of the noun, the reference is to either the starting point or the goal or resting point of an action determined by the preposition.

In other cases, if a noun habitually combined with a preposition suffered a shift of meaning, the preposition might as a result itself acquire a new meaning, which would then be used in new combinations. It is in this way that Jacobsohn has proposed that the formal Old Latin phrase *apud aedem* with the gen. of a god’s name (‘in the temple of’ so and so) arose at a time when *aedes* still meant ‘hearth’, and so meant originally ‘at the sacrificial hearth’. Then, when *aedes* had come to mean only ‘temple’, *apud* was understood in this phrase as meaning ‘in’, and consequently, on this model, and on the model of the equally ancient *apud forum* (originally something like ‘at the area by the gate’), and perhaps of one or two other combinations, *apud* ‘in’ gradually arose, to begin with probably only in the lower registers. This is attested in Plautus and again from Tacitus on, while in Classical Latin *apud aedem* was discarded (Varro, fr. 102 Goetz & Schoell = Terentius Scaurus, *GL VII*, 31, 7) and only *in aede* was used.

Extreme diversity of meaning becomes apparent, when we go on to compare prenominal and preverbal usage. At first glance, there is no detectable link between *ἀνά* ‘according to’ (e.g. in *ἀνά λόγον* ‘according to a due reckoning’) and *ἀνα* ‘again’ (e.g. in *ἀνακτάθαι* ‘to reacquire’); Lat. *de*- in *deferro* (‘convey to a destination’) and other compound verbs agrees with Gk -δε but not with Lat. *de* + abl., ‘down from’. Again, Lat. *con*- and *cum* are simply different forms of a single ancient word for ‘together, with’ (II, 158 above), but *con-* is influenced by its being prefixed to verbs, obviously in its form, and even more so in its meaning. True, the idea of community that predominates still in *cum* is not entirely lacking in *con-*: we spoke earlier (I, 284) of the *Di consentes* as the gods that *are with* one; in Roman comedy, *Commoniores* is used to translate Gk *Συναποθνῄσκοντες* (‘Dying Together’); on *con-* for *συν-* in loan-translations, see Debrunner (1916: 30), and note also *coire, consentire* (‘come together’, ‘agree’), etc. But in the majority of cases, *con-* corresponds not to Gk *συν-*, but rather to *κατα-*, and even if *consulere* (‘to consult’) originally meant, on Thurneysen’s convincing interpretation (1907a: 179–80), ‘bring together, call together’, its attested usage it has lost the basic meaning not only of the verb but of the preverb, too.

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8 With the root of Lat. *aedis* cf. that of *aestus* ‘heat’ and Gk *αἴθω, αἴθωμα* ‘kindle, burn’, etc., all from IE *h₂ eidh-*, see LIV, s.v., and Walde & Hofmann and Ernout & Meillet, both s.v. ‘aedes’.

9 On the history of the meaning of the Latin preposition *apud*, see Gagné (1931: here at 98), who, like Hofmann & Szantyr 224, refers to Jacobsohn only as reported by W.

10 These are the titles of (lost) plays by Plautus and (his model) the 4th-c. poet of Greek New Comedy Diphilus of Sinope, respectively; our source for this is Terence, *Brothers* 6–7, who used a scene of Diphilus’ play omitted by Plautus.

11 That is, of the consuls convening the senate, with the root *sel*-, as in Gk *εἰλον* (ἐλι-) ‘took’; see Walde & Hofmann, s.v. ‘κόσιλία’, and LIV, s.v. ‘*selh₁*-’. 
Another instructive instance is Gk ιπρό-, Lat. pro-. This is discussed in my Studies in the Language of Homer (Wackernagel 1916: 66 n., 238 ff.), and here I want only to bring out a few points that relate to our present context. As an adverb and a preverb this word means in Latin and Greek not only ‘forth, forwards’, but also ‘forth, away, further’, which it cannot mean as a preposition. For its use as an adverb, note the comparative formation προτέρω (‘further, forwards’) in Homer. Although the associated adjective πρότερος means (mainly) ‘former, earlier’, the ancient commentators emphasize that προτέρω is used in the sense of προσωπέρω ‘further’, e.g. at Iliad 3. 400–1 where Helen asks Aphrodite, ἕ τι ποτὲ προτέρω πολέμων ἑν ναιομενῶν | ἄξιεις; ‘or will you lead me further yet somewhere among well-built cities?’ or of time at Odyssey 24. 475 ἕ προτέρω πόλεμον τεύξεις ‘or will you further cause war?’ In both cases it corresponds exactly to Skt pratarám, pratará m ‘further’,12 and cf. Lat. proporro ‘furthermore, moreover’ in Lucretius, 2. 979.13

The same emerges from compounds such as Gk πρόρριξις ‘uprooted’, Lat. profundus ‘bottomless’. As for προ- as a preverb, suffice it to note such striking instances as Gk προφόρθιμι ‘send forth, drive forward’ —in Attic this exists alongside the curiously remade form προφύημι,14 attested only in compounds, after ἀπό-, εἰς-, ἑκ-, ἐπίσης- and Lat. proficisci ‘set out’, lit. ‘make oneself on one’s way’.15 An example common to both languages is seen in Gk προδίδωμι ‘betray’, intr. ‘fail’: Lat. prodō, which means not only ‘give forth’ but also ‘transmit; abandon; betray’, and in Ennius (Annales 413 Sk.) and Vergil (Aeneid 1. 252) ‘to ruin’ (see Festus pp. 254–5 Lindsay, and Servius on Aen. 4. 231);16 cf. Skt pra-da- ‘give away’.

From the beginning of our Greek record, this ancient inherited meaning of the preverb προ- is visibly in retreat before the meanings associated with its prepositional usage representing one of the nuances of the idea ‘before’. The meaning that particularly gains ground constantly in Greek is that of temporal priority (which in Latin is rare for the preverb and unknown for the preposition). Hints of this meaning are seen already in Homer, e.g. in forms related to προγίγνομαι (‘come forward, stand forth’), which originally had nothing to do with priority

12 On these forms, see Ai. Gr. III, 405, and EWAia, s.v. ‘prathamá’.
13 Elsewhere in Lucretius, 3. 275, 4. 890, proporro means rather ‘again, at the next stage’.
14 This curious verb is attested above all in the future and the aorist (προφύημι, προφύηκα), only rarely in the present, and the question is whether its resemblance to ἐγίμι and its forms is primary or secondary. The old account deriving it from the root of φέρω ‘carry’ and comparing Skt bhārati ‘carries’ seems to have been largely given up. Chantraine, s.v. ‘πρέβημι’, accepts the equation with προφύημι, and with the anomalous aspiration he compares φρούρος — προ-ορός; cf. Frisk, s.v. ‘πρέβημι’, and Schwyzer 689 for the earlier literature. cf. I, 128 above.
15 A back-formation on the participle profectus: see Haverling (2000: 399–400 & Index, s.v.).
16 This last-suggested meaning is doubtful. Skutsch (1985) on the Ennius passage disagrees: ‘not perdere (Festus) but “to expose and abandon to almost certain loss”; he compares Livy 22. 44. 7. Likewise, commentators and translators of Verg. Aen. 1. 252 favour ‘are betrayed’ over ‘are ruined’.
in time, witness Lat. *pro-igne* ‘bring forth’, Skt *prá-jan* ‘be born’, Avestan *fra-zainti-‘descendants’,17 this meaning is not attested in Homer for the finite verb, but it is already there in *próγγονος*, *proveyésteros* (‘early born, older’, of sheep at Od. 9. 221; ‘older’). In later Greek it has a much stronger presence: e.g. *proédóvna* acquires from Xenophon on the meaning ‘give in advance’, and this semantic shift is reflected in Hellenistic Gk *pródoma* ‘a prepayment, advance’.

In the context of the above, I might say a word more about combinations of *pró* with verbs of saying and speaking. Bekker has noted (1863–72: II, 21) that these verbs do not form compounds with *pró* in Homer except at Od. 1. 37 ἔπει *pró* οἱ ἐπομεν ἡμεῖς ... μητ’ αὐτῶν κτείνεν μήτε μνάσθαι ἄκοιτω (‘since we [the gods] had told him [Aegisthus] in advance ... neither to kill the man [Agamemnon] nor to woo his wife’). He therefore feels justified in deleting the *pró* in this single passage, and thus, in keeping with the whole tenor of his textual criticism, restoring the digamma on the front of ἐπομεν.18 In this we shall not follow him, especially since Jäger has shown (1926: 74 ff.) that Hermes’ speech at Aesch. *Prometheus* 1071 ff., which includes *prōλέγω*, is closely modelled on the *Odyssey* passage.19 Even his original observation, correct | and acute as it is (as, indeed, is everything in the *Homerische Blätter*), must not lead us to suppose that this sort of *pró*-compound is recent. The Indo-Iranian languages attest the compound verb cognate with Gk *proepei* in their earliest texts, and thus guarantee the great antiquity of the formation:20 it is just that Homer does not use all inherited material in equal measure. But here, in the one place where he has preserved it, he has preserved it pure: this *pró* οἱ ἐπομεν in the *Odyssey* (which we must translate as ‘we had warned him’) agrees beautifully not only with the Indo-Iranian verbs, which mean ‘announce, give notice’, but also with early usage in other forms of Greek. In Herodotus, *προαγορέυεν* (along with *προεπεί*ν, *προερό*, *προείρησα*) usually has the meaning ‘give notice’, and in Attic ‘officialese’ it and its cognates mean ‘decrees, declare’ (Lat. *édicere*), as it does mostly in Thucydid, too, e.g. in *πόλεμον προαγορέευεν* ‘declare war’, with which compare Arist. *Birds* 556 ἡρόν

17 On these words, see Walde & Hofmann, s.v. ‘pró’, and esp. *EWAia*, s.vv. ‘JAN’, ‘prá’, with further references.
18 The stem of ἐπομεν, ἐπίτε - Skt *vuc*- is from IE *we-wik*- (which in Homer may or may not have the augment), a reduplicated aorist of the type *ẹvén* ≈ Avestan *a-γγ-ν* (in ἐπεθνόν ‘slew’, cf. φόνος ‘slaughter’) on the root *we/jik*- (seen in Lat. *vix*, Skt *víc*, etc.); for further detail, see Rix (1976: §234). Sihler (1995: §506), Szemerényi (1996: 281). Immanuel Bekker (cf. n. 3, p. 79) continued F. A. Wolf’s project to reconstruct Aristarchus’ text of Homer, most famously by building on the work of Richard Bentley and others in printing digamma in his *Carmina Homericarum* of 1888, an example followed by some in Germany, Holland, and Britain until the end of the 19th century; see the excellent elucidation by Kopff (1999) of Wilamowitz’s brief allusion (1982: 117 [ = 1921: 52]) to this chapter in the history of scholarship.
19 On Werner Jaeger (1888–1961), whose first professorship was at Basel (1914–15), see Calder (1990).
πόλεμον πρωτίδαιν 'declare a sacred war', and Dem. 9. 13 ἐκ προφήταις πολεμήσειν ('[do you imagine that Philip] will go to war [only] after advance notice?'). Only once or twice in Thucydides does it mean 'mention in advance', (which becomes commoner later), and in the sense 'predict' it is used by Herodotus (1. 74. 8), Xenophon, and Aristotle but by no writer of pure Attic. The same is seen with nominal derivatives: προφήταις means 'prediction' in Hippocrates, but in Attic only 'proclamation, public notice'. As for προλεγεῖν, the meaning 'predict' is often found already in the fifth century alongside 'order, state publicly', while προλεγέμενα 'above-mentioned' at Herodotus 6. 122. 1 is one of the linguistic signs of the late origin of that chapter. 21—In that older, inherited use, προ- means something like 'out from oneself', 'far and wide (audible)'. [Add.: The supposition that it did not mean 'in advance', 'before' with verbs of saying in the earliest Greek is not contradicted by its occurrences in the highly archaic (to some extent probably archaizing) sacred inscription from Cyrene (LSHG Suppl. no. 115; end 4th c. BC): B. 30–1 ὄνυμαξεί προεπτὼν and 33 ὄνυμαστὶ προερεῖ are translated by RADERMACHER (1927: 183, 185) as 'he shall call him before by name' and (with a reference to προλέγονται at Pindar, Nem. 2. 18) 'he will name him with distinction', but neither of these translations is justified by the context, which concerns rather the making of a general announcement. Correct translations are given by WILAMOWITZ (1927: 167) as 'he will call him by name announcing' and 'he will announce mentioning by name'.—For the rest, what is said here calls for more detailed discussion. Here I can add only that πρόλογος (the part of a tragedy or comedy before the entry of the chorus), first attested in the literature in Aristotle (Poetics 1452b19), is hardly from προλέγειν, but is rather a compound of πρό + λόγος. 22

Given the above context, we can now make sense of the word προφήτης (on which see FASCHER 1927: 1–11, 169–73). 23 In our normal use of the word, 'prophet' means someone who can predict the future, and 'to prophesy' the corresponding activity, and we are consequently inclined to regard Gk προ-φήτης as meaning

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21 Herodotus 6. 122 is absent from the best family of manuscripts, and disturbs the logical flow of the narrative from 121 to 123. For further detail, see the commentary of W. W. How and J. Wells (2 vols, Oxford 1912), ad loc.

22 In principle, either a determining compound (the λόγος 'speech' that is πρό) or a prepositional governing compound (that which is πρό λόγου 'before the story'); neither Debrunner (1917), nor SCHWYZER, nor CHANTRAINE (1933), nor FRISK or CHANTRAINE in their etymological dictionaries, nor RISCH (1974) comment on the formation. Note that the word πρόλογος is used of an introductory monologue in a Euripidean tragedy already in Arist. Frogs 1119.

23 I substitute this reference to Fascher (ms. add. 1) for the one printed, ‘Geffcken Griech. Prophetentum’, about which I am uncertain (προφήτης is not discussed in Geffcken 1920) and which may rest on a p.c. (ms. add. 1): ‘Geffcken gives the same explanation [i.e. as Fascher] on Greek prophecy—the last three words were added later). Geffcken’s remarks on prophecy in his history of Greek literature (1926–34: 1, 53–4 & nn.) are consistent with W.’s account here but not explicit on the word προφήτης.
‘predictor’. But it was shown already by Henricus Stephanus in his *Thesaurus* that this interpretation is completely wrong.\(^\text{24}\) Stephanus (*s.v. προφήτης, 2094c*) fittingly equates προφήτης with the ύποφήτης that we meet in the words of Achilles to Zeus of Dodona at II. 16. 234–5 ἀμφὶ δὲ Σέλλωι | σοὶ ναιουσ’ ύποφήται (‘around you dwell the Selloi, your interpreters’). Indeed, like ύποφήται here, προφήται normally denotes those who announce to mankind the will of a divinity, who are intermediaries between god and man. Hence we find phrases such as Δίὸς προφήτης ‘the speaker of Zeus’, ‘the one who announces his intention’, or in an oracle at Arist. *Birds* 972 ἐμῶν ἐπέων προφήτης ‘announcer | of my words’, and so on. At *Timaeus* 72b, Plato characterizes the προφήτης as τῆς δὲ αἰνιγμῶν φήμης καὶ φαντάσεως ύποκριτής (‘an expounder of the riddling oracle and vision’). In its transition to the Greek of the Bible, προφήτης remained true to this meaning. In the Septuagint it normally serves to translate Hebrew *nabi’*, which denotes the one who speaks at the will of God and declares what is inspired by Him. An instructive passage is Exodus 7: 1, where Jehovah says to Moses, δεδωκά σε θεών Φαραώ’ καὶ Αραὼν ὁ ἀδελφός σου ἐσται σου προφήτης, in keeping with the Hebrew text, ‘I wish to make you for Pharaoh like to a god; and Aaron your brother will be your speaker’. In the days when theology and philology still went hand in hand,\(^\text{25}\) the scholar J. F. Schleusner (1820–1: IV, 511–12)\(^\text{26}\) was able to compare this passage with Pindar fr. 150 Macler μαντεύει, Μοῖσα, προφατέσῳ ὦ ἐγὼ (‘Muse, be my oracle, and I shall be your interpreter’), and Eur. *Bacch*. 210–11 (Cadmus:) ἐπεὶ σὺ φέγγος, Τειρεσία, τὸν οὖν ὀρῆσ, ἐγὼ προφήτης σοι λόγων γεννήσωμαι (‘since you, Tiresias, are blind, I shall become your announcer of events’). It is also used in this way in the New Testament.—Since what is announced in the name of the divinity often contains an instruction about the future, it was easy for stress to be laid on this element of meaning and for προ- to be interpreted as meaning ‘in advance’. When and by whom this was first consciously done, I do not know. At all events, Byzantine scholars tended to interpret the word in this way: note Zonaras, p. 1773 ἡ μὲν προφητεία πρὸ τοῦ γενέσθαι λέγει τὰ ὠστερον γενησόμενα, ἡ δὲ ύποφητεία τὸ γενόμενον ἢ τὸ γενόμενον λέγει (‘prophecy says what will happen later before it happens, while hupophêteia says what is happening or what has happened’).\(^\text{27}\)

\(^\text{24}\) The *Thesaurus Graecae linguæ* (4 vols + 2 suppl. vols, Paris 1732) is the most famous work of the Paris printer Henri Estienne (1528 or 1531–98), the eldest son of the great Robert (1503–59), and was the standard Greek dictionary until the 19th c.; see the 1925 preface to LSJ on the later editions of Stephanus’ *Thesaurus*.

\(^\text{25}\) This period is nicely illustrated by the works and figures discussed in North (2006) under the memorable title ‘The Spirit imitates Polybius’, with copious bibliography—on the birth of modern critical theology, note the references in n. 4, esp. that to Scholder (1966); I owe these references to Philip Alexander.

\(^\text{26}\) Schleusner’s great lexicon of the Septuagint is, in Philip Alexander’s words (p.c.), ‘a truly astonishing work’ that is still worth consulting and still very close to the hearts of modern students of the Septuagint (cf. Lust 1990).

\(^\text{27}\) On the 11th/12th-c. historian Ioannes Zonaras, and the 13th-c. lexicon falsely ascribed to him (which is sometimes called the *Lexicon Tittmanianum*, after its first and only editor, J. A. H. Tittmann), see Ziegler (1972), Alpers (1972), and Dickey (2007: 102).
In actual fact, προφήτης belongs with προεπείν, discussed above—note Plato, Rep. 10, 619c τοῖς προφητεύεισιν ὑπὸ τοῦ προφήτου (‘the interpreter’s warning’)—and the underlying notion is of speaking out and of announcing publicly. Curiously, the underlying verb προφήμια is attested only late, but we can certainly compare πρόβασις in the sense ‘instruction’ at Herodotus 2. 139. 2, where ‘pretext’, the normal meaning of πρόβασις, does not fit, and similarly Lat. profari ‘to declare’ (whence Varro’s profatum ‘axiom’—in Gellius 16. 8. 2), which is often used in poetry of declarations of divine will or knowledge (Livius Andronicus, fr. 10 Warmington; Lucr. 1. 739 = § 112; Petron. 89, line 4 [in verse]).

[Add.: The history of the word προφήτης throughout Greek literature and the inscriptions is traced in great detail by E. Fascher in his fine book Prophētēs (1927). For ancient Greek, his results agree completely with what I have argued here: from his instances of the combination of προφήτης with the genitive theou (‘god’) and the like, I would pick out to supplement mine Eur. Ion 42, 413, 1322, Plato, Rep. 2, 366b, ps.-Plato, Alcibiades II 149a, 150a, and Bacchylides 10 Snell & Maehler, 28. In the Septuagint, there is unmistakable reference to prophesying the future, especially in the derivatives προφητεύων and προφητεία (Fascher 1927: 102–48; conclusions: 148–52). This is certainly not based, however, on an interpretation of προ- as meaning ‘in advance’: it is rather that prophecy was part of the calling of those referred to by the translators as προφήται. In the same way, the philosopher Philo Judaeus (1st c. AD) ascribes to the προφήτης a τῶν μελλόντων κατάληψις (‘an apprehension of the future’, Who is the Heir 261 [Loeb, vol. 4]), and in several places in the New Testament, too, the word clearly has the same reference, e.g. at Acts 7: 52, where the prophets are said to have προκαταγείλαντες περὶ τῆς ἐλευσίως τοῦ δικαίου (‘announced in advance about the coming of the Just One’), or 1 Peter 1: 10 προφήται οἱ περὶ τῆς εἰς υἱὸν καθότους προφητεύουσαντες—in Latin: prophetae qui de futura in nobis gratia prophetauerunt; in Luther: die Propheten, die von der zukünftigen Gnade auf euch geweissagt haben (‘the prophets who prophesied of the grace that would come unto you’).—For the Byzantine interpretation of προ- in the sense of ‘in advance’, note, in addition to the passage of Zonaras above, the comment of Triclinius28 on Theocritus 22. 110 ὑποφήτης: προφήτης ἔστιν ὁ προλέγων τι ἐσόμενον, ἥγουν ὁ τὰ μέλλοντα προλέγων, ὑποφήτης δὲ ὁ προφήτου ἐξηγούμενος καὶ τὰ δυσνόητα σαφηνέζων (‘a prophetes is someone who predicts the future or some future event, while a hypophebes is one who explains the words of the prophetes and interprets the obscurities’; cf. Fascher 1927: 29 n. 1).—Incidentally, φαιβητεύων, attested only in Hesychius, who glosses it with χρησιμοδεῖν (‘to deliver oracles, prophesy’), and

28 The Byzantine scholar Demetrius Triclinius (c.1280–1340) is one of the more important commentators on a number of classical and Hellenistic authors. On his place in the tradition of Theocritus in particular, see Gow (1950: I, lxxiv) and Dickey (2007: 63–5); for orientation on his works and their transmission in general, see Dickey (2007: 15 & Index, s.v. ‘Triclinius’).
of which the η is assured by the alphabetical ordering of the lemmata, has no connection with verbs in ἀπευθεῖν, but represents a blend of φοιβάζειν (‘prophesy’←Φοιβός, Phoebus Apollo) with προφητεύειν (‘be a prophet’).

As far as the Greek prepositions are concerned, the greatest diversity of meaning is found probably in the case of μετά, which outside Ionic-Attic is found mostly in the form πεδά (cf. II, 156 above), and with meanings which sit oddly beside its origin in the word for ‘foot’. It can therefore serve as good illustration of the number of different functions into which the use of a preposition can divide. Before a noun, μετά means ‘after’ or ‘with’; as a preverb, it can also mean ‘around’ in the sense of ‘differently’. And this already takes us a good way towards a correct appreciation of the main point. (In addition to the dictionaries and the already oft-cited work of Tycho MOMMSEN on the Greek prepositions (1886–95; cf. I, 30–1, II, 154 above), see especially the fine treatment by FUNCK (1876).)

Seventy years ago the brilliant Sanskritist Rudolf ROTH remarked (BÖHTLINGK & ROTH 1855–75: I, iv) with reference to the Sanskrit vocabulary, ‘In cases where in later usage the basic meaning of a word is obscured, fragmented into apparently unrelated pieces, like a worn out or broken coin, then one can reach back into the treasure of the Veda, to find there the complete, intact coinage, and the statement of its original value’. Homer’s significance for the Greek language is similar to, if not quite as great as, that of the Veda for Sanskrit, and at all events in our present case ROTH’s words are almost literally true.

It emerges that the fundamental meaning of μετά (as of its derivative μεταξόν) is ‘in the middle of, among, between’. This sense is current in Homer in combination with the dative, e.g. έκχηλος μετά πάσιν ‘pre-eminent among all’, μετά χειρῶν ‘between the hands’, μετὰ ποσαί ‘in between the feet’, and once or twice with the accusative: II. 2. 143 μετά πληθῶν ‘in the midst of the crowd’, II. 9. 54 μετά πάντας ὑψηλάκας ‘among all your contemporaries’, Od. 22. 352 μετά δαίτας ‘during the meals’, the latter construction reminiscent of the Latin accusative with inter. But in prepositional function this meaning is no longer current in fifth-century Ionic and Attic, save in the phrases μετά χεῖρας ‘under the hands’ and μεθ’ ἡμέραν ‘during the day’, although it survives in many compounds based on prepositional phrases, as ancient features generally often survive longer in compounds than in incidental collocations. There are numerous examples also in technical language: note e.g. μετακιόνιον and μεταστόλιον ‘space between pillars’ in the inscribed contract detailing the construction of a stone arsenal (IG II². 1668, 36. 63; Athenian acropolis, 347/6 BC), and new compounds including μετά in this sense could still be formed in the fourth century. So, Epicurus called his inter-

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29 It is tentatively supposed that μεταξόν represents simply a combination of μέτα + ξύον; cf. LSJ, s.v., Schwyzer 633, Schwyzer & Debrunner 487, and Frisk and Chantraine, each s.v. ‘μέτα, μετά’.
spaces between the worlds, where the gods enjoy their blessed existence, μετακόσμιον (Letter to Pythocles 89), aptly rendered by Cicero as intermundium (Nature of the Gods 1. 18). This, however, must be the basis of the adjective μετακόσμιος ‘reaching beyond the world, of the beyond’ in Philo Judaeus (On the Confusion of Languages 134, On Dreams 2. 13030); cf. in the lexicographers (including Photius [II, 286 & n. 12, p. 759 below] and the Suda) μετακόσμιον τοῦ κόσμου κρείττονα (‘greater than, surpassing the cosmos’).—Compounds of this sort are found already in Homer (including the peculiar μεταμόνιον [‘vain, idle’] < *μεταμεμόνιος, and so lit. ‘windy’31), and elsewhere in Greek, too. Note Elean μετεκέχηρον ‘the period between two (Olympic) truces’, and the name of the festival that extends beyond the Ionic-Attic area Μεταγειτήνια, what would be in Latin Intervivicia (‘the festival between neighbours’)!32 | —In Hellenistic Greek this compositional μετα- ‘between’ is replaced by μεσο- (from μέσον ‘in the middle between’), not only in new formations such as Μεσοποταμία ‘the land between the rivers’, μεσομήσπερ (pl.) ‘space between the thighs’, and μεσοβασιλεύς (rendering Lat. interrex), but also over time in numerous replacements for old μετα-, including μέσαυλος for μέταυλος ‘door between the aule and the inner part of the house’ and μεσοπύργοι in Polybius (9. 41. 1) for Thucydides’ (3. 22) μεταπύργιον ‘space between two towers’, and so on. [Add.: Hesychius’ lexicon contains both μεσοικέται μέτοικοι and μετοικέται κατά μέσον οίκοιντες.—The Atticists and the archaizers rejected this μεσο-. For translating Lat. interrex, instead of μεσοβασιλεύς (with μεσοβασιλεία, μεσοβασιλείου ἀρχῆ) used by Dionysius of Halicarnassus and others, Appian paraphrases with δ ἐν τοσῷδε βασιλεύς and τὸν καλούμενον μεταξὺ βασιλέα (lit., ‘the so-called “in-between king”’, Civil War 1. 98, §§457, 458 Mendelssohn & Vieereck). Cf. also the entry in the second-century grammarian Moeris μέταυλος Ἀττικῶς μέσαυλος Ἑλληνικῶς, and LOBECK (1820: 194–5, 53) on Phrynichus.33]

Connected with this first meaning is the meaning ‘with’. We know this mainly for μετά + gen., although it is neither conditioned by the gen. nor confined to it. Compare e.g. Od. 10. 204 ἄρχον δὲ μετ’ ἀμφισβήσεως ὀπασσα ‘with each troop I provided a leader’, or in Arcadian IG V.2, 262, 16 πε (= πεδα) τοίς φοικιάται(ς)

30 At On Dreams 1. 184, Philo seems to use the word in the Epicurean sense.
31 This ancient etymology is still generally accepted; cf. Chantraine (1933: 43), Schwzyzer 37, 263, and Frisk and Chantraine, both s.v. ’μετακόσμιον’.
32 For the numerous occurrences of μετεκέχηρον, see the index to Dittenberger & Purgo (1896). With the Athenian and Milesian festival Μεταγειτήνια compare the Athenian epithet of Apollo Μεταγειτῖνος, and the second month of the Ionic-Attic year Μεταγειτῶν (approx. August–early September; cf. Πεδαικητήρ on Rhodes, Cos, and Chalcedon); on the origin of the name, see Broncer (1949) and Parke (1977: 31 & n. 35), who rejects the (ancient) interpretation of the name as meaning ‘changing neighbours’ in favour of that implied by W., ‘involving the neighbourhood’.
‘together with the household’,\(^{34}\) though we should recall that Arcadian has a penchant for the dative after prepositions (cf. II, 209–10, 213, and 231, and n. 6 on p. 662 above). Conversely, the genitive is also attested with the meaning ‘among, in the midst of’, e.g. at Archilochus fr. 133 West ὀὗτος αἷδοιος μετ’ ἀστών οὐδὲ περίθημος δανόν (‘no one has honour or glory among his fellow-citizens once he is dead’; cf. Theognis 339 μετ’ ἀνθρώπων ‘among men’). No, the construction with the genitive is due entirely to the meaning ‘between’, and either it represents a sort of partitive genitive or it is simply imitating the construction of μεσοςον, μέσον (‘in the middle [of]’), etc., and, because the genitive in the course of time won out completely (in keeping with a trend discussed earlier, II, 208, 213 above), the more recent meaning ‘with’ is attested nearly always with the genitive.—The emergence of the meaning ‘with’ is not hard to explain. Being in the midst of a crowd entails being together with it and its members, and there are many passages where both meanings directly coincide, such as II. 10. 208 ἄσσα τε μητίωσι μετὰ σφίς ‘whatever counsel they devise among themselves’ or ‘with one another’, Od. 16. 140–1 μετὰ δήμων...πίνε καὶ ἤσθε ‘was drinking and eating in the midst of the servants’ or ‘with the servants’, or Arist. Birds 34 ἀστοὶ μετ’ ἀστῶν ‘as citizens among citizens’ or ‘with (other) citizens’. And in a period when the old meaning of μετά was long gone, it was still possible to say, Luke 24: 5 τί ζητεῖτε τὸν ζωντα μετὰ τῶν νεκρῶν; ‘why do ye seek the living among the dead?’, more precisely ‘in the company of the dead’ (Lat. cum mortuis). Other languages also offer parallels: e.g. Gothic mif means not only ‘with’ (German mit) but also ‘between’, e.g. at Mark 7: 31 mif tweihnaim markom: Gk ἀνὰ μέσον τῶν ὄριων: Lat. inter medios fines (‘through the midst of the borders [of Decapolis]’).

To begin with, in keeping with its origin, we find μετά in this sense, ‘with’, only with plural forms of nouns denoting persons. But the pure idea of togetherness became increasingly prominent, and hence the singular became possible, the first examples of which are in Hesiod, Theogony 392 μετὰ εἶτο (‘with him’), Lat. secum; cf. 401 οἷον μεταναίτας εἶναι ‘to be his co-dweller’), and in the Homeric hymns, 20. 2 μετὰ Αθηναίης (‘with Athena’). With this development we can compare the fact that ἐν ‘in the presence of’, which strictly makes sense only with a dat. pl. (as e.g. at Soph. Ant. 459–60 ἐν θεοῖς τῶν δίκην | δόσειν, ‘to pay the penalty [lit.,] in the midst of the gods’), comes to take singular forms, too, e.g. at Arist. fr. 278 (PCG III.2) δίκην δοῦναι πράδικον ἐν τῶν φίλων τῶν σών ἐν (‘to pay the penalty arbitrated by one of your friends’).—In this way μετά could be used interchangeably with σῶν, as e.g. at Eur. Andr. 1060 (Peleus to the chorus) σῶν πατρί δ’ οἴκους ἦ τίνος λείπει μέτα; (‘did she leave the house with her father, or with whom?’).

With nouns denoting objects μετά in this sense seems not to be attested before the fifth century, e.g. Pind. Olymp. 1. 60 μετὰ τριῶν τεταρτον πόνον ‘beside three, a

\(^{34}\) On this inscription (= Buck no. 17, Thür & Tacuber no. 8; Mantinea, 5th c. BC), see I, 105, 224 above.
Combinations with exclusion of the other meanings, finest... after the peerless son of Peleus'), and generally in later Greek to the adverbs, after, whether of being later in time or of standing behind in a line. (In compound)

Perfectly common to find more quickly here than with the dative or genitive, and already in Homer it is 'into the midst of the throng of ships'. But the meaning of the preposition developed meaning 'towards, at someone/something', i.e. also with the singular, e.g. maid') — for dialectal

This sense is already in Homer; cf. II, 246, 248 a ἐντὸς ἐπέτει ἐρρυσφε μετ’ ἀμφίπολον βασιλεία ('then the princess threw the ball to a maid') — for dialectal πεδά, πετά + acc. of a noun of place, 'towards', see Günther (1906/7: 127) — and then also in the meaning 'behind, after', e.g. Od. 6. 260 μεθ’ ἧμιν δούρατος ὄψιν ἐρωταῖοι ‘went after the throw of the spear’. The emergence of this last sense was decisive for the subsequent use of the preposition. A few times in Homer with nouns denoting persons (e.g. II. 23. 354 μετὰ τὸν ἐν λάχε... Εὐμήνιος 'and after him Eumelus was drawn', or II. 2. 674 κάλλιστος... μετ’ ἀμύμονα Πηλείωνα 'the finest... after the peerless son of Peleus'), and generally in later Greek to the exclusion of the other meanings, μετά + acc. expresses simply the notion of coming after, whether of being later in time or of standing behind in a line. (In compound adverbs, μετά in this sense is already in Homer; cf. II, 246 below.)

Combinations with μετά as a preverb can be set in part in parallel with its uses as a preposition. With μετά ‘in the midst of’ belongs e.g. II. 2. 481 βοέσσι μεταπρέτει ἀγρομένην ('he [the bull] is conspicuous among the assembled cows'), 18. 370 δόμον ... μεταπρεπε’ ἀβανάτοιοι ‘a house... outstanding among those of the immortals’. A most interesting verbal adjective also belongs here, namely μετέωρος, earlier μετήρος, made to the verb attested in its Aeolic form in II. 10. 371, πεδάρειν 'lift up'. In Homer the adjective means ‘floating in the air’, and this sense can still be glimpsed in later usage: among the φυσικόί of the Greek scientific age, τὰ μετέωρα is the term for atmospheric and in part sidereal phenomena. Ultimately, we have to start from the meaning ‘floating in the middle’, i.e. between heaven and earth (cf. e.g. Plaut. Miles 1395). It is appealing to connect μετήρος with ἄηρ as Kretschmer does (1892: 449–50), as if it were ‘situated in the midst of the air’, but its synonym μετάρασιος speaks for a verbal origin.35—

35 W. himself argued (1887) that μετάρασιος, the Ionic and poetic equivalent of Attic μετέωρος, was formed to *μέτ-άρ-τος < *μετ-άρ-τος just as e.g. ἀμβρόσιος was to ἀμβρότος. This remains the standard view; cf. Frisk and Chantraine, both s.v. μετάρασιος.
Another very clear example of μετά = ‘between’ is μεθέλεσκε at Od. 8. 376, ‘kept catching (the ball), before it hit (the ground)’, ‘kept intercepting’, Lat. intercipiēbat. To be understood in the same way are Homeric μετέειπον (‘spoke among’), μεταπαύεσθαι, etc., ‘stop in the middle’, and compare Hesiod’s μετάδουσι ‘thudding in between’ (Works 823), the epithet of the few bad days that fall among the good.\(^{36}\) Funck (1876: 135–6) includes here also μεθήμι (common from Homer on), which would then originally have meant ‘let loose among’.

Approximation to the meaning ‘with’ is seen in Homer e.g. at II. 22. 498 (an imagined child to the orphaned Astyanax) οὐ σῶς γε πατήρ μεταδίνται ἥμιν ‘your father does not dine among (with) us’, and the meaning ‘with’ is clearly there at II. 23. 207 ἵνα δῆ καὶ ἐγὼ μεταδάσσομαι ἵρων ‘so that I (Iris), too, may share in the sacrificial meal’, although this is the only example in Homer of the later very widespread type of compound verb with μετά- expressing a share of something in the genitive. These verbs are clearly distinct from those with συν-, which denote rather a common action without any notion of sharing or being together. Compare the pairs μετέχειν (‘have a share in’; note Sappho, fr. 35 Lobel & Page, 2 οὐ γὰρ πεδέχεις βρόδων ‘since you have no share in the roses [of the Muses]’) : συνέχειν (‘keep together’), μεταλαμβάνειν (‘get a share of’) : συλλαμβάνειν (‘gather together’), μέτεσθαι (‘there is a share’) : συνεῖναι (‘to be with’), and so on. In virtue of its basic meaning, μετά involves belonging to a group, while συν expresses an incidental state of togetherness.

The older meanings of μετά + acc. (II, 243 above) are reflected in compound verbs such as II. 23. 389 μετέσσωντο ποιμένα λαϊῶν ‘he rushed after the shepherd of the people’ or II. 13. 567 ἀπίόντα μετασπόμενος ‘following after him as he went away’. They also underlie Ion.-Att. μεταπέμπεσθαι ‘summon’, lit. ‘send for someone for oneself’ (also active, μεταπέμπειν, in Thucydides), μετέθειν ‘go after’ someone/ something, and its abstract noun μέθοδος; and also | probably Homeric μετακλαίειν ‘weep for’, ‘send tears after’ someone. On the other hand, ‘after’ of time is rare with μετα- the preverb, and hardly attested in Attic. An apparent example in pseudo-Epicharmus, fr. 263 (PCG I) οὐ μετανοεῖν ἀλλὰ προνοεῖν χρή τὸν ἀνδρα τὸν σοφὸν (‘the wise man ought to give thought not after but before the event’) reflects a temporal twist to the usual meaning of μετανοεῖν ‘to regret’ in order to achieve the contrast with προνοεῖν. In earlier Greek, the counterpart of Προμηθεύς is Ἐπιμηθεύς, of the προγόνοι, ἐπίγονοι, and in Sophocles (Antigone 389) insight after the event is ἐπίνοια. So, the original opposite of προ- ‘before’ is ἐπι-, and not μετα-.

The most prominent use of μετα- as a preverb, namely to signal change, shows no immediate connection with μετά the preposition, but here again one does well to go back to Homer. A starting point in this connection is offered by II. 15. 52

\(^{36}\) Other interpretations of μετάδουσι (which occurs only here) include ‘falling changeably’ and ‘of changeable thunder’, although convincing formal and semantic parallels are lacking; see West (1978a: ad loc.).
'rename', and so on, and it is still used in modern scientific terminology.

Where a shift from one thing to another was intended. Homer has e.g. 'in another direction, elsewhere'. So we have in Homer e.g. change of direction, and to be used with verbs of motion simply in the sense of movement in a particular direction can entail a change of direction, even apart from those meaning 'turn' or 'incline'—στρέφω, τρέπω, κλίνω, etc.) movement in a particular direction can entail a change of direction, μετα- compounded with such verbs gradually came to be interpreted as referring to a change of direction, and to be used with verbs of motion simply in the sense of 'in another direction, elsewhere'. So we have in Homer e.g. μετοχλίζεω 'lever aside' (II. 24. 567), μετά νότα βαλών 'turning his back' (II. 8. 94), μετάβασθι 'go to another theme!' (Od. 8. 492). It then came to be used with other verbs, too, where a shift from one thing to another was intended. Homer has e.g. Od. 5. 286 ἡ μάλα δὴ μετεβολευσαν θεοί ἄλλως ἀμφ' Ὀδυσσὴ 'have changed their plan for Odysseus', where ἄλλως is to be noted—or should we here, precisely because of the ἄλλως, take μετα- in the old sense of 'among themselves' (II. 244 above), i.e. exactly as at II. 1. 140 ταῦτα μεταφρασόμεσθα καὶ αὐτὶς ('these things we shall consider among ourselves' on a later occasion)? After Homer, this meaning becomes firmly established: μεταπείθειν 'change someone’s mind'; μετονομάζεων | 'rename', and so on, and it is still used in modern scientific terminology. Here belongs e.g. the eighteenth-century coinage metacentrum as the term in hydrostatics for the 'shifting centre' of a ship.

In a number of compound verbs in μετα- and their derivatives, if we compare Homeric and Attic usage, we see a shift of meaning which corresponds to the gradual development of the use of μετα-. So e.g. in Homer μετείναι means 'to be among', Attic μέτεστι 'there is a share in'; at Od. 18. 402 κέλαδον μετέθηκεν means 'caused a din among us', Attic μετέθηκεν, 'changed the position of', Lat. transpōsīt; alongside μετέώρος (II. 244 above), Euripides attests μεταῖρω 'lift and move, shift'.—A similar change of nuance is seen in μέτα as an adverb. In Homer it means 'is in the middle' (e.g. Od. 21. 93); in Herodotus and Attic, 'there is a share

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37 This must be the translation that W. intends, although μεταφράζομαι is generally taken as 'consider after', with μετα- then meaning very much the same as καὶ αὐτίς.

38 The hydrostatic and shipbuilding term metacentre was coined (métagentre) by the French geodesist Pierre Bouguer (1698–1758). A ship is stable or unstable according as the metacentre (also known as the centre of gravity) is above or below the centre of gravity; see the Century Dictionary, s.v.
available`; on an old Attic vase (Kretschmer 1894: no. 63, 89–90), we have μετά καγώ (sc. πίομαι) ‘I too with them (am drunk)’ (see Schulze 1896: 251–2); and finally in Pindar (Pyth. 4. 64), Ionic, and the Koine, μετά means ‘afterwards’, whence μετανύικα ‘immediately afterwards’ in Herodotus.—Striking forms in Homer are μετέπειται and μετέπισθε, and in the Hymn to Demeter, 205, μεθύστερον (all, ‘afterwards’). In all these combinations, μετά seems to mean ‘later in time’ (cf. II, 243 above).

As a coda to the above, let me be permitted a word on μετανάστης, which comes in Homer at II. 9. 647–8 (Achilles to Ajax) ὦς μ’ ἀσύφηλον ἐρεξεν ὡς εἶ τιν’ ἀτύμητον μετανάστην (‘how he [Agamemnon] made me disgraced among the Argives, like some unhonoured refugee’; cf. 16. 59). In Herodotus, 7. 161. 3, it is used of migrant peoples, and later, too, it, and its derivatives, has the meaning ‘migrant’. Now, since in Thucydid and other writers the migration of a people is referred to as μετανάστεια, Joh. Schmidt (1889: 346–7) analyses the word as μετανά-στης, and has met with general agreement. But there are two strong reasons for rejecting this analysis for Homer: first, Homer never uses μετα- in the sense of ‘changing’ in front of an already-compounded verb, and the combination μετ-ανα- in particular is unparalleled; and secondly, ἀνίστασθαι in Homer always means ‘to stand up’, and never ‘to move on’, Lat. proficisci, the meaning assumed by this interpretation of μετανάστης. These objections fall away if we go back to the explanation that was standard before J. Schmidt and analyse the word as μετανά-στης, i.e. a variant of Hesiod’s μεταναίης (Theogony 401; cf. II, 243 above) and parallel to Attic μέτοικος, Argive πεδάζοικος, and Hesychius’ μετοικέται: κατὰ μέσον οἰκοῦντες (‘those who dwell in the middle, in the midst’). It denotes, then, a tenant (a possible meaning also on Schmidt’s interpretation), and that a tenant (lit. ‘with-dweller’) should be ἀτύμητος (‘unhonoured’) requires no justification. And, now that we know how often μετα- in established compounds was reinterpreted in keeping with later usage, the meaning of the word in later Greek need cause us no more concern. In deverbal nouns in later Greek, μετα- more often expressed change than the meaning ‘with’, and, while verb-forms involving -νασ- such as Homeric ἐνάσθην had been lost, μετανάστατος, μετανάσταται, and their underlying verb were still current, and the combination of preverbs μετα- + ανα- was known in other words. Hence, μετανάστης also suffered a reinterpretation. This word was correctly treated by Funck (1876: 134), whose remarks are ignored in more recent studies. On the concept of the ‘metanastes’, see now Nilsson (1927: 38 n.), with reference to Finsler (1914–18: I, 198). 39

39 (Nilsson refers to p. 120 of the 3rd edn (1924) of part 1 of Finsler (1914–18).) On the etymology of μετανάστης, Joh. Schmidt was followed by Ernst Fraenkel (1909) and Chantraine (1933: 314). W. Schulze (see Leumann 1950: 183–4 & n. 30) took the word from ιμεταναίω, but with μετα- in the sense of ‘changing’, hence ‘migrant’. Frisk, s.v., follows Funck and W.
I should like finally to go back to the introduction to this section (II, 241), where we saw that μετά- in compounds with a governed noun even in Attic can still mean ‘between, amid’. But even this type of compound occasionally has later usage imposed upon it: we find μετά in the sense ‘after’ in Attic μεθέρητος of the days ‘after the feast’, and similarly, μεταδότης (which at Od. 4. 194 must mean ‘in the middle of dinner’) from the fifth century on is understood as ‘after dinner’: in Pindar, fr. 12.44 Maehler, 2 and in Plato (Critias 115b), μεταδότης means ‘dessert’.—At Od. 9. 221 μετάσσαλ means ‘the middle ones’, 40 while in the Hymn to Hermes 125 τὰ μετάσσα is ‘thereafter’ (cf. II, 226 & n. 5, p. 682 above).

We are still not at the end of our sketch of the diverse fate of μετά. Aristotle’s great work on the πρώτη φιλοσοφία (lit. ‘first philosophy’, i.e. fundamental principles) was placed by those who collected and catalogued his works immediately after the Physics, and as a result of its position was superficially entitled τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ (lit. ‘the things after the Physics’). A distant analogy to this is seen in the A fine Aufidii Bassi, the title of the Elder Pliny’s historical work that followed immediately on from the conclusion of that of Aufidius Bassus (1st c. AD). In this case, however, the connection referred to the contents and was intended by the author, which does not apply to the books τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ. In the course of time, the real, purely superficial, sense of the title Metaphysics was forgotten and it was supposed to indicate that the πρώτη φιλοσοφία went beyond questions about nature. To the best of my knowledge, this view is found first in the 14th-century summary of Aristotelian philosophy by George Pachymeres (1242–c.1310), 41 who was followed by the author called Herennius (see Heitz 1889), in the following words: ‘μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ λέγονται ἀπερ φύσεως υπερήρται καὶ ὑπὲρ αἰτίαν καὶ λόγον εἰσίν (‘the work is called Metaphysics because it transcends nature and concerns cause and argument’). This is how the title has been generally understood since the end of the Middle Ages. The most distinguished testimony to this is the statement of Immanuel Kant (quoted by Eucken 1879: 183 n. 1), ‘The ancient name of this science, μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, in itself gives an indication of the species of knowledge | at which its purpose was directed; the aim is to go by its means beyond all objects of possible experience (“trans physicam”) . . .’.

Later, especially in the nineteenth century, the term ‘metaphysics’ taken in this sense then became a model for new names of philosophical disciplines and concepts (see EISLER (1910), s.v., and, even richer and more precise, BRADLEY

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40 This is the view also of Chantraine (1933: 34), ‘d’âge moyen’, while others, including LSJ, s.v., and Heubeck in Heubeck & Hoekstra (1989: ad loc.), take μετάσαλ as ‘those born later, after’.

41 Of this exegetical compendium, the Φιλοσοφία, in 12 books (of which 30 mss. survive), only the Logic was printed in Greek (Paris 1548); everything else was published in the Latin translation of Philipp Bech as In universam fere Aristotelis philosophiam epitome (Basel 1560). Pachymeres is much better known for his history of the period c.1255–1308; see Hunger (1978: I, 37 and 44–7–33) on the Φιλοσοφία and the historical works, respectively.
in vol. VI.2 of James Murray’s *A New English Dictionary*, s.vv.42). So, Schopenhauer used ‘*metalogisch*’ of the foundations of logic, and Lewes used ‘*metempirical*’ of what lies beyond the empirically observable.43 The fields of ‘*metageometry*’ and ‘*metamathematics*’ are concerned with what lies beyond Euclidean geometry, and what lies outside the remit of traditional mathematics, respectively. Similarly: ‘*metabiology*’, ‘*metachemistry*’, ‘*metapsychology*’. An even bolder step, yet more remote from the starting point of the usage, is the formation not merely of names for scientific disciplines but of terms for technical concepts corresponding to these disciplines: e.g. a ‘*metaorganism*’ or a ‘*metaelement*’ is an organism or element of a higher order.—Once or twice, incidentally, coinages of this sort were ventured long before the nineteenth century—and here I am not counting the twelfth-century *Metalogicon* of John of Salisbury, as the author intends the title to mean ‘defence of logic’.44 In 1615, John Donne spoke of a ‘meta-theology’ and a superdivinity above that which serves our particular consciences’, and in 1647 Hudson glossed Lat. *extra-regalia* as ‘Metapolitical matters’.45 In a related sense, Karl Freiherr vom Stein referred pejoratively to people who wished to build practical politics on philosophical systems as ‘*Metapolitiker*’46 (possibly in imitation of the common English use of *metapolitics*, *metapolitical*, *metapoliticians*).—Even the chemical industry has exploited this use of *meta-*: I recently read an advertisement in French for a new remedy, ‘la métaspirine’, ‘twice as effective as ordinary aspirin’. On its own, *Meta* denotes a form of condensed alcohol, which is presumably intended in this way to be signalled as something particularly good!47

42 The new *OED* gives very much the same account, s.v. ‘meta-’.
43 That is, the post-Kantian German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), and the English philosopher George Henry Lewes (1817–78), who also wrote a famous biography of Goethe (1855), and was the partner of the novelist Mary Ann Evans (George Eliot).
44 The *Metalogicon* of 1159 is one of the best-known works of the philosopher and historian John of Salisbury (1115/20–1180), Bishop of Chartres from 1176. The work, in four books, defends the study of logic, grammar, and rhetoric, the traditional arts of the trivium, against contemporary charges of irrelevance, and argues for the unity of the verbal arts with philosophy and for the need of a solid training in the liberal arts in order to actually become wise and succeed in the “real world”; see Guilfoy (2005), with full bibliography.
45 John Donne, *Essays in Divinity a 1615* (1651), 129, and M. Hudson, *The Divine Right of Government* (1647), II. X. 156, quoted by the *OED*¹, s.vv. ‘meta-’ and ‘metapolitical’, respectively.
46 The reference here is to the great Prussian statesman and reformer Heinrich Friedrich Karl Reichsfreiherr vom und zum Stein (1757–1831), who after his retirement from politics in 1819 devoted himself to historical research and founded the immediate forerunner of the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*. His word *Metapolitiker*, however, has not, to the best of my knowledge, survived in any German dictionary.
47 *Meta* is the trademark of a product made and sold in tablet form (*Meta-Tabletten*) as a form of solid fuel by the Swiss, latterly Basel-based pharmaceutical company Lonza (est. 1897); this is presumably the same as the French trademark *meta* datable to 1924 by the *TLF*, s.v. ‘*métdéhyde*’. The name is surely an abbreviation of the main ingredient of *Meta*, (*German*) *Metaldehyde* (*English* *metaldehyde*), a polymer of acetaldehyde, a substance produced by the oxidation of alcohol, which could then at a stretch be characterized as ‘condensed alcohol’. It is however highly toxic, and its principal use is as a pesticide, esp. against slugs and snails. If W.’s concluding comment is not in jest, he must be guessing at the intention of Lonza’s advertising executives.
Lecture II, 27

We come now to another extremely interesting group of words, the **negatives**, means of expressing negation, although we cannot spend as long with them as we did with the prepositions.

Are negatives, in either a contrary or a contradictory sense, an essential component of language? For expressing an opposite meaning, there are often simple pairs of words available, such as *white : black, true : false, assert : deny, love : hate*; for expressing a lack, there are prepositions such as *without, apart from*, and verbs like *miss, lack*—note how often in Latin *carere* (‘to be lacking’) is used where we would say *not have*. Further, the contents of a clause can be negated without the use of a negative particle, either by making the clause a question, or by putting it into the past—as at Verg. *Aen. 2. 325 fuimus Troes, fuit Ilium* (‘we are Trojans no longer, Ilium is no more’)—or even by giving it an ironic colouring or by changing the intonation (see VENDRYES 1921: 91). A prohibition for the future can be signalled with a word meaning ‘enough’ or by the (positive) command to protect or restrain oneself from something, as in Lat. *caue or parce* (‘beware!’, ‘spare!’) + infinitive.

I could go on like this—we know that even gestures and inarticulate noises can indicate a negation or refusal.

Nevertheless most speech communities have felt the need for special linguistic ways of expressing negation. In his book on the principal types of language structures (1893: 20 ff., et passim), MISTELI gives rich documentation of the admittedly very various means—in part very different from those of our languages—with which speakers have sought to satisfy this need.

A set of negatives is part of the original inventory of the Indo-European languages, too. It will be our task to consider how this part of their linguistic inheritance has been used, developed, and modified by the languages which concern us here. Particularly fine work in this area has been devoted to the Germanic languages. In addition to J. GRIMM’s German grammar (*D. Gr. III*, 684–727), whose collections of material are important for one point in particular discussed below (II, 256), I would mention especially DELBRÜCK (1910b), on negative clauses; BEHAGHEL (1918b), on negation in the Germanic languages; and last but not least, the acute and substantial work of the outstanding Danish linguist and specialist in English philology JESPERSEN (1917), on negation in English and other languages—in addition, see now W. HORN’s piece on negation
in English (1925). Occasionally, we shall have to take account of the Romance languages as well: on these I refer you especially to the fine account of ways of expressing negation in Diez (1882: 1071–91; = III, 387–412 of the French translation); it is in any case only right to name in the course of these lectures such an outstanding and truly groundbreaking scholar as Friedrich Diez.1—There is much to be learnt for Greek and Latin, too, from the above-mentioned studies devoted to more modern languages.2

The proper particle for negative statements (but not prohibitions) in our languages was originally ne˘ (together with the fuller variants nē and nei for use in certain circumstances). Its etymology, like that of so many Indo-European words, is uncertain. More fruitful, in my opinion, than either the attempts made since Bopp (1833–52: III, 535–7 §371) to compare it with pronouns containing n-, or those based on particles of quite different meaning advanced by Ed. Hermann (1919), Lattmann (1920), and others, is Jespersen’s observation (1917: 6–7) that an initial nasal is found also in the prohibitive particle me¯ and in the negative particles of many non-Indo-European languages, and that this could stem from a primitive interjection of opposition accompanied by a gesture involving the contraction of the nasal muscles; cf. Hamilton (1899: 7) on negative compounds in Greek, who adduces American languages and Turkish.

Indo-European *nē, however, has been progressively replaced in nearly every daughter language, and survives as a free-standing negative neither in Greek nor in Latin nor in modern German. The clearest traces of its original value are to be seen in Latin. In Latin, nē is preserved in close combination (1) with the verbs ‘wish’, ‘know’, and ‘be able’, in nolo, ne-scio, ne-queo (lit. ‘I have not the strength’, cognate with Gk κοπιος;3 cf. II, 61 & n. 13, p. 477 above)—note that ne parcunt in the dictionaries and old grammars reflects a false reading at Plaut. Most. 124 reparcunt (‘they spare’);4 (2) with indefinite pronouns and their replacements (see below),

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1 Friedrich Diez (1794–1876) occupied the first chair of Romance philology, in Bonn, from 1830. Although he began his career as an editor of literary texts, his comparative grammar of the Romance languages (3 vols, 1836–44) was modelled on Grimm’s Germanic grammar, and laid the foundations for historical and comparative Romance philology; see further Malkiel (1976) and Morpurgo Davies (1998: 124, 192).

2 Among the more important recent publications on negation from a typological linguistic point of view are: Dahl (1979), an analysis of sentence negation in a sample of 240 languages; Payne (1985), a standard point of reference in subsequent work; Dryer (1988), on the placement of negatives in 345 languages; Croft (1991), interesting on the utility of synchronic typology in historical linguistics; Forest (1993) [in French]; Kahrel & van den Berg (1994), studies of negation in 16 very diverse languages; Bernini & Ramat (1996), on negation in European languages; and Miestamo (2004), like Payne (1985), on ‘standard’ negation (i.e. of declarative main clauses). On Latin, note the recent monograph of Orlandini (2001). For bibliography on Greek, see Meier-Brigger (1992: I, 108–11).

3 This etymology for Lat. (ne)queo is expressly rejected by Walde & Hofmann, s.v. ‘queo’. The standard account, which goes back to Osthoff and Brugmann, takes a completely different starting point, in the impersonal passive neque tur ‘it is not gone, it is not possible’, and of course removes this item from W.’s list of instances of ne˘ in Latin; for further references, see Ernout & Meillet, s.v. ‘queo’.

4 Cf. Truc. 877 refacere ‘to restore’; see Lindsay (1907: 130).
c.g. in né-quis (pre-class. only), ne-uter, nullus, nemo, nihil, and with pronominal adverbs, e.g. in numquam; (3) with the enclitic copulative particle in ne-que (with apocope, ne-c); (4) in the curious nec = non (‘not’), or né . . . guidem (‘not even’). This sort of restriction is not at all surprising. The MHG cognate ne and its variants n-, en-, and in- occur predominantly with auxiliary verbs, e.g. ich en-mac: Lat. nequeo (‘I cannot’), nu en-welle got : Lat. nolit deus (‘may god not wish it’), ich en-weiz : Lat. nescio (‘I know not’), neizwér : Lat. nescio quis (‘someone’; cf. II, 117 above), and before non-verbal enclitics, e.g. ne-weder : Lat. neuter (‘neither of two’), nob (Gothic nib) : Lat. neque (‘and not’). In both Latin and MHG, the simple negative particle maintained its old value best in close combination with words frequently used with it. In English, too, old né was blended with forms of the verbs ‘be’, ‘have’, and ‘will’. Shakespeare still uses nill as the negative of will, and it survives in the modern idiom willy-nilly ‘whether one likes it or not’.—Similar perseverance with a simple negative (in a language where fuller forms are otherwise normal) is seen in French ne (< Lat. nōn), which is used partly in combination with the same verbs as those adduced from Latin and Middle | High German, e.g. je ne peux, je ne sais (‘I cannot’, ‘I know not’), partly in other old phrases like n’importe (‘it matters not’); cf. also naguère ‘recently, once’ < OFr. n’a gaire ‘there is not long’.—Similar parallels could be quoted also from Slavic.

For Latin there are one or two items to add to the four groups of forms mentioned above. There are two old combinations of particles: (a) qui-ñ, lit. ‘how not?’ (I, 26 above), the quasi-imperatival use of which (I, 213 above) strongly resembles that of MHG wande ne (lit. ‘why not?’, in questions with the force of commands, and in wishes); and (b) nisi (of which an older variant nesi with the secondary meaning ‘without’ is attested by Festus, p. 164 Lindsay): note here the initial position of the negative, which is seen also in its Gothic synonym niba, nibai (‘unless, if not’, < ni-iba(i)), and is quite in accord with the sense, as the content of the main clause is negated if the conditional clause is true (nisi = in

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5 The different forms reflect the place of the word in the sentence and whether it is accented or unaccented; see de Boor & Wisniewski §8.

6 For example, in Taming of the Shrew, II.1, 273 ‘And will you, nill you, I will marry you’; cf., more recently, Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings, appendix A.1 (v) ‘I must indeed abide the Doom of Men, whether I will or I nill: the loss and the silence.’

7 On the development of French ne from Lat. nōn, see FEW, s.v. ‘nōn’. On French naguère, see FEW, s.v. ‘waigaro’ (b); with the latter, Germanic (Old North Frankish) reconstructed form, cf. OHG (ne) . . . uueigiro ‘not very much, little, nothing at all’.

8 Russian nedávno ‘recently’ is similarly composed of negative ne- and the word for ‘for a long time, a long time ago’. But W. probably intends this remark more generally. Indeed, such combinations are more frequent and prominent in Slavic, since *ne survives as the standard negative particle, which in Russian for example ‘can attach to any major constituent, with local scope’ (Timberlake 1993: 868); moreover, all negative pronouns and adverbs are manifestly of the Latin néquis, numquam type, e.g. Russ. niktó ‘no one’, nikogda ‘never’; for a sketch of negation in Old Church Slavonic, see Huntley (1993: 172–5) and Lunt (2004: 163–6), and on the other Slavic languages, see the various contributors to Comrie & Corbett (1993: Index, s.v. ‘negation’).
effect, ‘except if’), while, if the more recent negative non follows the si, the content of the conditional clause itself is negated. Lat. sin ‘if on the other hand’ contains not, as has been supposed, the negative particle but rather interrogative -ne: see Wackernagel (1892: 419–25).

In addition, the noun nefas, as Delbrück saw (1893–1900: III, 534), goes back to an old sentence *ne fas (est) ‘it is not right’, which we discussed earlier (I, 297–8 above). To the examples given there, let me add Verg. Aen. 3. 365 novum dictuque nefas . . . prodigium (‘a strange portent, monstrous to say’), where nefas is treated as an adjective, the expression going back to quod dictu nefas (est) (‘what is a wrong to say’).—Very similar to nefas is ne-cesse (est), which probably contains an old infinitive of cedere (‘it is not to escape, inescapable’). Of the two pre-classical variants, necessus and necessum, the former has borrowed its ending from the semantically related opus (rather than showing the nominative of an abstract noun in -tus), while necessum follows the general pattern of neuter nouns (including necessarium est). At Lucr. 2. 289 and 6. 815, necessum and nesse are apparently substantivized like nefas and Gk τὸ χρῆ (‘necessity’; cf. I, 71 above); necessarius, necessitas, and necessitudo (‘necessary, ‘necessity’) stand in the same relation to nesse as temerarius to temere (‘accidental’ : ‘by accident’), or impunitas to impune (‘impunity’ : ‘with impunity’). As for the meaning of nesse, Skutsch has offered (1902a: 197 n.) a nice comparison from Arabic, where strong obligation or necessity is expressed with the sentence lâ bûda lit. ‘there is no escape’ (hence ‘must, have to’).

Finally, the archaic ne-frend—explained by Festus, pp. 156–7 Lindsay, as ‘qui frendere non potest’ (‘that cannot bite’)—apparently preserves a verbal *ne-frendeo, to which it would stand in the same relation as nescius (‘unknowing’, already in Plautus for the typologically older inscius) to nescio; in the popular language of the Empire, nescius was in turn remade to nesapius (Petronius, 50), as sapere (Fr. savoir) was replacing scire as the common word for ‘know’ (on this word, see Schuchardt 1898).—More or less the same is found in neglego (‘not heed, neglect’) and negotium, with the enlarged form of the negative, neg-, the basis also of negare ‘to say no, say not’. As Otto Hoffmann (1901: 135) recognized, negotium is to be seen in the same way as nefas, and has its origin in sentences such as Plaut. Merc. 287 negotiumst ‘there is not leisure’, i.e. ‘I have business’. 11

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9 For the regular Latin sound-change *-dt- > -ss- between vowels, compare e.g. *sedtum > sessum, supine of sédere ‘to be seated’, *etdi > ēsse, pres. infin. of ēdo ‘I eat’ (cf. n. 7, p. 350 above).

10 This enlarged form has been variously analysed as ne- + the particle γ(í) < IE *jhi (cf. Gk γά, Skt -hi, Lith g(í)), or as containing a particle comparable with Gk γά, as being no different from nec with c > g in a voiced phonetic environment; see LEW, s.vv. ‘né’, ‘-qa’, Walde & Hofmann, s.vv. ‘nego’, ‘negotium’, Ernout & Meillet, s.v. ‘neg-‘, Bader (1962: §42), Leumann 387.

11 Hoffmann compares also Ter. Ad. 419 non hercle otiumst ‘by Hercules, there is no leisure’; with negare ‘to say neg(i)’ (see the prec. n.) he compares, for the particle, Lith. nè-g(i) ‘no’, and for the formation of the verb, Gk aînçew ‘to say alai’. 11
The fuller form \textit{nei} (II, 250 above), whence \textit{nī}, is met in Latin as the introductory particle for negative conditional clauses, i.e. in the sense ‘if not’, and in addition in \textit{quidni}, \textit{quippeni} (both, ‘why not?’), and \textit{nimirum} (‘no doubt’);\textsuperscript{12} \textit{nē} we shall deal with under prohibitions (II, 259, 278–80 below).

Greek does not show such clear traces of ancient \textit{nē} as Latin does. Still, Homeric \textit{vōis} ‘not knowing’ allows us to suppose an earlier *\textit{vē} \textit{foīda} ‘I don’t know’, with long for short \textit{e} as in the augmented form \textit{heīdē} (suggested tentatively by Debrunner 1917: 29 §56), and \textit{vēσtis} ‘fasting’ reflects an earlier *\textit{vēδ-} ‘not to eat’; \textit{vēσtis} may even be based directly on sg. 3 *\textit{vēστι}, cf. Lat. \textit{nōn ēst} (‘s/he does not eat’). It is certain that the old negative *\textit{ne}- is not contained in the much-discussed \textit{νέποδες} at Od. 4. 404 \textit{φώκαι νέποδες καλής ἀλοσύνης} (‘the seals, the descendants of the lovely sea-goddess’), although so distinguished an etymologist as August Fick (1911) wanted to take the word as meaning—impossibly—‘bottomless’. The ancient interpretation of it as meaning \textit{ἀπόγονοι} (‘descendants’), which cannot be made up out of thin air, must be right.\textsuperscript{13} To *\textit{νέπως} (Lat. \textit{nepōs}) a plural \textit{νέποδες} could be formed at a time when the nominative of the word for ‘foot’ still had its original form *\textit{πως}; as a feminine, \textit{νέποδες} would be comparable with Lat. \textit{dia nepos} (II, 26 above).

In modern German, the ancient negative is seen in the \textit{n} of \textit{nicht}, \textit{nie}, \textit{nein} (‘not’, ‘never’, ‘no’), and other negatives, and incidentally also in that of \textit{nur} (‘only’) < OHG \textit{niwāri} ‘unless it were’,\textsuperscript{14} which originally began with a negative and so matched Lat. \textit{nonnisi} (‘not unless, only if’). In the course of time, the negative was dropped as being unnecessary, just as it is understood with English \textit{but} (lit. ‘outside’) when it means ‘only’.

But all the above are just traces and vestiges. By and large, in all these languages fuller forms of expression came to be preferred, in order to allow the clearest and most decisive negation possible, for which the monosyllable that fused with its surroundings was apparently not sufficient. In German the role of the old negative was taken over by \textit{nicht}, which originally meant ‘nothing’, modern \textit{nichts} ‘nothing’ being an extension of \textit{nicht}. The old meaning of \textit{nicht} survives still in the phrases \textit{mit( )nichten} and \textit{zu( )nichte machen} (‘not at all’, ‘to annihilate’), and is presupposed by the verbs \textit{vernichten}, \textit{zerichten} (‘destroy’). In earlier NHG a trace of earlier usage survives in e.g. Luther’s \textit{tut er uns doch nicht, Das macht, er ist

\textsuperscript{12} On \textit{nei} and \textit{nī}, see Hofmann & Szantyr 447, 667–8 (also 421 on \textit{nimirum}, and 458 on \textit{quidni}, \textit{quippeni}).

\textsuperscript{13} On the various ancient interpretations of \textit{νέποδες}, see LSJ, Frisk, and Chantraine, each of them s.v.; Chantraine begins his paragraph on the etymology of the word rather nicely with: ‘Inspired by the ancients, modern scholars have proposed a series of improbable explanations’! The account favoured here by W. is associated with the great 3rd/2nd-c. Alexandrian scholar Aristophanes of Byzantium, and is today generally regarded as the most plausible; see Chantraine, s.v., and West in Heubeck, West, & Hainsworth (1988: \textit{ad loc.}).

\textsuperscript{14} OHG \textit{niwāri}, or \textit{ni wāri}, comprises the negative particle \textit{ni} and the sg. 3 past optative of \textit{sin} ‘to be'.
gericht't (lit. ‘but he [the Devil] does nothing to us, [if] he does it, he is judged’). In the case of German, then, quantitative negation has come to replace simple negation. | The same applies to English not, which has the same etymological basis as nicht (Gothic ni waiht), and indeed we find in Latin nihil and in Greek from Homer on oùt and oûdev (in Ionic and poetry, also the plural form oûdâma) not only in their original meaning ‘nothing’ but also meaning ‘not’, and as in German in the case of nicht, so in modern Greek oûdev has become a straightforward negative in the form δε(v).—In Old Latin there is also noenum (= n’ oînom), which means lit. ‘not one thing’, oïnos being the earlier form of inus, but which is used only in the sense of ‘not’, e.g. at Plaut. Aul. 679 noenum . . . queo comminisci (‘I cannot imagine’). Indeed, it is assumed that the general negative particle non arose from *nòinom (with -di- from -e+oi-). This non became at an early date the all-purpose negative particle to such an extent that it even replaced ne- in compounds (above). Ennius already permits himself non quit (‘cannot’, Trag. 221 Jocelyn); Plautus has e.g. Asin. 215 non tu scis? (‘are you unaware?’), 465 non edepol scio (‘I don’t know’), and Terence, Mother-in-Law 572 non quitast (‘she couldn’t’), etc., non being favoured especially when there was a need of emphasis. By the classical period, archaic neuis and neuolt have completely disappeared in favour of non uis, non uult (‘you [sg.] do not wish’, ‘s/he does not wish’), and although Cicero calls in general for nequire (‘to be unable’, Orator 154), in the sg. 1 he has always non queo and at Sext. Rosc. 72 he allows himself non queant. In the Romance languages, nolo and nequeo have completely disappeared, and only a few paltry traces of nescio remain. And let us note here already non ullus, non usquam, and the like, common especially in poetry. With Lat. noenum, compare German nein and esp. Old Icelandic -a(t) ‘not’ ← *(n) . . . aina(t) lit. ‘(not) . . . one thing’ (cf. Heusler 1921: §§120.2, 345).

By what route did the words for ‘nothing’ acquire this function? Probably in two different ways. First, it was possible to say, without negating the clause, that ‘no part’, or ‘nothing’, of the subject or object took part in the proposition of the clause, which actually amounts to negating the clause itself. Here belong German negative sentences with nicht+gen.: still today we can say, hier ist meines Bleibens nicht (lit. ‘here is nothing of my staying’, ‘I am not staying here’). In

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15 This is from the best-known of Martin Luther’s hymns, ‘Ein’ feste Burg ist unser Gott’ (‘A Mighty Fortress is Our God’), composed around 1527–9.
16 Gothic waiht is neuter and found only after the negative, but cf. the fem. i-stem waihts ‘thing, matter’.
17 Gk δε ‘not’ is probably attested as early as the 6th c. (P. Oxy. 1874. 13); see Browning (1983: 57), and on the emergence and use of the modern particles δε(v) and μη(v), Janaris (1897: §§1796–1828), Thumb (1910: §§284–3), and Holton et al. (1997: 418–24).
18 Cf. Gk oïvós = oïvô the one on dice, Gothic ains, Old Irish òen ‘one’, all, like Lat. oïnos, from IE *h₂i-oi-no- ꞌ(the same root ꞌoi- with other suffixes is seen in e.g. Gk oët- (f) os ‘single, alone’, Avestan aë-rna ‘one’, Skt e-kə ‘-one’). For the Latin sound-change oï > õ in a non-final syllable, cf. loïds > liðis ‘game’, conoīnem > communem ‘common’, Poenicum > Punicum; see further Sihler (1995: §58), Meiser (1998: §47.3).
general, however, words for ‘nothing’ acquired the meaning ‘not’ simply as accusatives of content or respect: e.g. II. 1. 412 ἀριστοῖν Αχαῖοιν οὐδὲν ἔτισεν means strictly speaking ‘he (Agamemnon) honoured the best of the Achaeans (Achilles) in nothing’, ‘showed him no honour’.

Other words for quantitative negation sometimes occur in place of words for ‘not’. These include words for ‘never’: numquam in Plautus, never in English, nimmer in southern German dialects (on which see now W. HORN 1925), and negative adverbs of manner (e.g. Gk οὐδαμή, οὐδαμῶς, Lat. nullo modo, Fr. nullement, all ‘not at all, in no way’) and place (e.g. Gk οὐδαμοῦ, Lat. musquam at Plaut. Mil. 1199, both ‘nowhere’); cf. Ed. Fraenkel (1916: 26–8)—I recall also what was said in an earlier lecture (II, 67 above) about Lat. nullus (‘not any’ in the sense ‘not’).

Other linguistic resources, too, have been used for creating new negatives, mainly from the need to make negation clearer and stronger. There are numerous examples, especially in popular and poetic speech, of the use mainly of properly quantitative terms; see the abundant collections of Grimm and Diez in the works cited above (II, 249). It is no surprise that different languages often use the same words. In Romance, e.g., the reflexes of Lat. gutta and mica (‘drop’ and ‘crumb’) were commonly used for forming negatives, the one matched by Gk οὐδαμή, NHG Tropfen (both, ‘drop’), the other by NHG Brot, Brosame (‘crust’, ‘crumb’). [Add.: Other words used for strengthening the negative include the names of coins of small value. An example is German keinen Deut, nicht einen Deut (‘not a doit, mite, whit’), attested since the eighteenth century and still in use today with no thought of its original meaning: in fact, it is a loan from Dutch geen duit, niet een duit, where duit is the name of a copper coin. The same applies to Low German nit ein meit (attested since 1500, but no longer current), in Alemannic also nit ein mite, which is borrowed from Dutch niet een mijt (niettemijt), which refers to a coin minted in the late Middle Ages in Flanders and Brabant called mite, mijt (i.e. mite, the insect) because of its small size. Also from the Dutch, like the German phrases above, are English not to care a doit, not a mite. On all the above, see Edw. Schröder (1926), 202–5 on duit–deut, 205–11 on mijte–meit, who mentions also German expressions such as nicht eine Spur, which ultimately goes back to Spierchen (‘blade, ear of grass’; D. Wb., s.v. ‘Spier’, 2.).] Many expressions of this sort were and are used just occasionally, in a given situation or emotion; others became standard, even obligatory.

We are most familiar with this in French, where the proclitic ne (from Lat. nōn) as a verb- or sentence-negative is sufficient on its own only in exceptional cases

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19 Formerly used by southern German writers, nimmer is now avoided in written German in favour of nicht mehr or nimmermehr; cf. D. Wb., s.v.

20 See the D. Wb., s.v. ‘Meit masc., Meite fem.’, esp. §6.

21 See the etymologies in the OED, s.vv. ‘doit’ (‘the eighth part of a stiver or the half of an English farthing’), and ‘mite’ (‘a Flemish copper coin of very small value’).
(II, 250–1 above) and usually requires the addition of *pas* or *point*. The former, *pas* < Lat. *passum* (‘step’, acc. sg.), will have been normal first with verbs of motion; *point* as a negative intensifier continues a Latin idiom, viz. *punctum* in the sense of the absolute minimum of something, e.g. in *punctum temporis* frequent in Cicero for ‘an instant’, which in Imperial Latin could be simply *punctum*: note Seneca, *Letters* 49. 3 *punctum est quod uinimus et adhuc puncto minus* (‘the time for which we are alive is but a point, even less than a point’). Now, there is a lesson and a pointer for us in the fact that these words, originally just intensifiers, can stand alone as negatives: because of their constant collocation with *ne*, they became infected with its negative meaning, as if by ‘contagion’, as French linguists put it.22 In educated speech *pas* and *point* occur alone only in incomplete sentences without a verb, e.g. *pas un mot*! ‘not a word’, *point du tout* ‘not at all’, but lower registers admit e.g. *je veux pas*, and in questions such as *avais-je pas raison?* this omission of *ne* is attested even in high literature from the seventeenth century on.23 We shall encounter this sort of ellipse of the negative particle with quantitative negatives again, where we shall have occasion to say more about it.

Further, caution or politeness or irony may cause a speaker, instead of expressly negating the validity of an utterance, to say that it holds only in a small degree. Gk *µεκιστά* and Lat. *minime* (both, ‘very little, in the smallest degree’) are well known, and we may perhaps compare German *am allerwenigsten* (lit. ‘least of all’, hence ‘let alone’). The emphasis with which such words are used has led to their having a stronger effect than the bare negatives. Even the comparatives corresponding to the above superlatives | often have a negative sense: e.g. the Greek lexicographers24 explicitly teach that *µetov* (‘less’) can mean *οὐδαμῶς, οὐδὲ δλως* (‘not at all’). On the other hand, Aelian’s *εἴ δὲ µετὸν* ‘if not’ (*On the Characteristics of Animals* 17. 19) is a Latinism, and indeed Lat. *minus* is particularly developed in this sense. Already in an old verse-inscription on the sarcophagus of one of the Scipios, who died very young before he could hold public office, we read (*CIL* I.2. 11, 7 = p. 6 Warminster; mid-2nd c. BC) *ne quairatis honore qui minus sit mandatus* (‘lest you ask why he was not entrusted with public office’), where a more restrained negative is particularly appropriate. This use of *minus* is absolutely regular in *si minus* (or *sin minus* = *si non*, and even more so in *quominus*, which differs only by a shade of meaning from *quin*, which contains the old negative particle *né* (II, 251 above). It is inherited into Romance: in Fr. *mécontent* ‘unhappy’, *mécroire* (along with *mécrait*, ‘disbelieve’, *mésaise* ‘unease’, and other forms, *mé(s)*-) continues Lat. *minus*. Spitzer draws my attention to certain uses of It. *meno* and Sp. *menos* as well.—This idiom is known also in

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22 This sense of *contagion* is noted by DHLF, s.v.; the more usual word is *contamination*.

23 For both literary and colloquial examples, see Grevisse §982c.

24 Including perhaps the most important of the Byzantine scholars, Photius, the 9th-c. patriarch of Constantinople, in his *Lexicon*, s.v. ‘µετον’; on Photius, see Dickey (2007: 101–4, *al*.).
Germanic. Old English þy læs þe, the antecedent of modern lest, offers a fairly exact parallel to Lat. quominus; and similarly Old Icelandic síðr ‘less’ is used also to mean ‘that . . . not’. An explicit negative is often replaced also by Lat. uix, NHG kaum, schwerlich, English hardly, scarcely.

Here is yet another variation. When Horace refers to a girl’s finger at Odes 1. 9. 24 as male pertinaci (lit. ‘badly holding on’), he means that it is scarcely or not at all tenacious; cf. the very similar male repugnanti (‘faintly resisting’) in Petronius, Satyricon 87. 3. Horace’s commentators compare his use of male parentem for repugnament (lit. ‘badly obeying’, ‘resisting’, Epistles 1. 20. 15), male salsus for insulsus (‘badly witty’, ‘unfunny’, Satires 1. 9. 65), male sanus for insanus (‘badly healthy’, ‘unwell’, Epistles 1. 19. 3). We find male sanus also at Verg. Aen. 4. 8, where Servius comments, ‘male plerumque “non”, plerumque “minus” significat’ (‘male sometimes means “not”, and sometimes “less”’), and indeed Vergil offers also Aen. 2. 23 male fidus for infidus (compare the phrase mala fides ‘bad faith, faithlessness’), Aen. 2. 735 male amicus for inimicus (‘hostile’), and Geo. 1. 105 male pinguis for sterilis (‘infertile’). Similarly Ovid has male gratus for ingratus (‘ungrateful’, Amores 2. 18. 23, Heroides 7. 27). And this is not an isolated idiom of Latin. Ancient commentators noted Isocrates’ use (On the Peace 32) of kakóς eisótes in the sense of ἄγνωστος ‘unaware, unknowing’; cf. the same at e.g. Xen. Cyr. 2. 3. 13, and there are exact counterparts to the examples from Horace and Vergil in French compounds like maladroit ‘unskilled’, malhonnête ‘dishonest’, malpropre ‘unclean’. Is all this, like minus above, based on the figure of litotes?

By way of conclusion to this section, we must look at the two most important Latin and Greek replacements of the old negatives. First, Lat. haud. Thurneysen has suggested (1907: 179), with reference to Celtic words for ‘lie, falsehood’ which permit formal comparison with haud, that the Latin word originally had the same meaning. We would then suppose e.g. that haud was first used independently in the sense ‘no’, and then gradually encroached on the functions of nē- and nōn. In comparison with these latter forms, haud always played a modest role; for a good account of its actual usage, see the dissertation of H. Planer (1886). It is very common in Old Latin, but recedes from an early date. Quite a few classical authors

25 OE þy læs þe, lit. ‘by which (the) less that’, comprises the instrumental of the demonstrative/relative pronoun, the word for ‘less’, and the relative particle. For details of its syntax, see Mitchell (1985–7: II, §§2928–36), who considers (§§2934–5) and rejects the possibility that the Old English sequence is a loan-translation of Latin quominus.

26 This is registered and illustrated in the dictionaries, but oddly not by Heusler (1921).

27 Cf. OLD, s.v. ‘male’ (6), ‘(usu. w. adj as a quasi-neg.) Not properly, ill’.

28 On male sanus, see A. S. Pease’s edn (Cambridge, Mass. 1935; repr. Darmstadt 1967), ad loc.

29 On litotes, see Lausberg (1998: §§86–8), who introduces it as ‘a periphrastic combination of emphasis and irony’; cf. Wales (2001: s.v.).

30 Including Old Irish gàu, gào, gò; see Walde & Hofmann, s.v. ‘haud’.
do not use it at all, including Varro and the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, and it is then avoided also by Augustus in his *Res gestae*, by Seneca in his prose works, and by the Younger Pliny. Caesar, writer of the purest prose, uses it just once (Gallic War 5. 54. 5 haud scio). That it was not part of the popular language, at least in the imperial period, is to be inferred from its absence from Vitruvius, Petronius’ *Cena Trimalchionis*, and the Romance languages; also noteworthy is its absence from Catullus’ light poems, 1–60—although, in spite of this, it has been wrongly conjectured at 29. 8.\(^{31}\) In view of this, the extremely frequent use made of *haud* by Livy, who even coins *hauddum* on the model of *nondum* (‘not yet’), must represent a departure (understandable in his case) from the normal usage of ordinary language. This is supported by the fact that Tacitus uses *haud* constantly in his historical works, but avoids it in the *Dialogus*\(^{32}\)—To date, scholars have agonized in vain to discover differences of meaning between *haud* and *non*. All we can say is that *haud* is used particularly for negating adjectives and adverbs, while with verbs its use was early confined to one or two collocations. In Cicero it comes more frequently with *scio* (also *sciam*) than with all other verb-forms put together, and the sole example in Caesar is of *haud scio* (above); otherwise, its most common collocation is with *dubitare* (‘to doubt’). Of the pronouns and indefinite pronouns in pre-classical Latin, only the emphatically indefinite forms in *-quam* are found after *haud*, though these are strikingly common, and prompt the formation after Plautus of *haudquaquam* alongside *nequaquam* (‘by no means, not at all’).—To go into these phenomena in detail and relate them to the probable origin of *haud* is for the moment impossible.\(^{33}\)

Unlike *haud*, the Greek replacement of the old negative took over all of its functions and became the sole form available. In place of old *né* we find *où*(κ) (with, in places, the variants *oùκα* and *oùχί*) all over the Greek-speaking world from the very beginning of our record.\(^{34}\) How this came to be, we do not know.

All attempts until now to produce an etymology of *où* have failed—including the most recent of which I am aware, that of Güntert (1922).\(^{35}\) Given that we have recently become aware of the great influence exerted on the language of the Hellenes by that of the pre-Hellenic population of Greece, it may occur to

\(^{31}\) C. J. Sillig conjectured *haut idoneus* ‘not appropriate’ for *aut Adoneus* ‘or Adonis’ (in his edn of 1823), and was followed by B. Schmidt (Leipzig 1887).

\(^{32}\) On the more Ciceronian and (within limits) conversational style of Tacitus’ *Dialogue on the Orators* compared with that of his historical works, see the introduction to R. Mayer’s recent edition (Cambridge 2001), §9, with references to earlier discussions.

\(^{33}\) For bibliography on Lat. *non* and *haud*, see Hofmann & Szantyr 452–4.

\(^{34}\) And now we know that *où*, and possibly *oùκα* is attested already in Mycenaean. For details and bibliography, see Aura Jorro, s.vv. ‘*o*-u-’, ‘*o*-u-ki-’, of which the latter may be the negative pronoun *oùκε* rather than *oùκα*; cf. Meier-Brügger (1992: I, 110).

\(^{35}\) Güntert takes Gk *où* from IE *u(d)s* ‘out’. Others have compared it with (e.g.) Lat. *au* ‘away’, *haud* ‘not’, Armenian *o*. For more information and references, see Schwyzer & Debrunner 591 & n. 5, and Frisk, s.v., and see most recently Dunkel (1987).
someone to see an ancient loanword in õw as well.\footnote{Relevant studies of which W. is probably thinking include those of Kretschmer (1896), Fick (1905) and (1909), the 1st edn (1913) of Meillet (1975), and the work of Debrunner (1918) and most recently (1926a). W.’s statement about the importance of pre-Greek languages in the (pre)history of Greek remains true, though naturally Mycenaean must now be taken into account. For a good, clear, recent attempt at a ‘consensus view’ of the coming of the Greeks to Greece and the geographical distribution of the 1st-millennium dialects, see Horrocks (1997a: 10–15) with further references; specifically on ‘pre-Greek,’ note the surveys of esp. the scholarship by Furnée (1972: 29–98, esp. 68–79) and Katicˇic´ (1976: I, 16–97), of esp. the evidence and methodology by Chadwick (1969) and Morpurgo Davies (1986), and the annotated bibliography of Meier-Brügger (1992: I, 69–70).} We now know that in all languages not only names of abstract and concrete cultural objects but even pieces of the linguistic mint can be of foreign origin: I recall Lat. (b)\textit{auc} (‘hail!, be well!’), which comes from Punic (I, 71 above); the numerous Greek interjections seen in the spoken Latin of Plautus (\textit{attatae, babae, bombax, eu, eugae, eugpeae}, etc.); and õ\textit{a}i, which is found in later Greek in imitation of Lat. \textit{uae}. Note also in German the call of encouragement \textit{allons}, and curses such as \textit{munedie} (< Fr. \textit{nom de Dieu}) or \textit{sappermost} (< sacrament).\footnote{The new edn of the \textit{D. Wb.} quotes examples of \textit{allons} from the 1660s to the 1960s; on the use, and variants, of Swiss German \textit{munedie} and \textit{sappermost}, see \textit{Schweiz. Id.}, IV, 769 and VII, 655–6, respectively.} In Baltic, the Lithuanian and Latvian words for ‘yes’ (Lith. \textit{fè}, \textit{jò}; Latv. \textit{jā}) are borrowed from German. And equally negatives could be borrowed if they sounded more powerful than the native, inherited forms. An instance of borrowing of this sort (albeit a partial one) is seen in the English privative prefixes \textit{non-} and more recent \textit{a-}, the former from Latin, the latter from Greek (cf. II, 266 and 295 below).—Nevertheless, we shall do well to look further for connections with Indo-European forms, and it may be that the substitutes for the negative particle that we saw elsewhere, we shall do well to look further for connections with Indo-European forms, and it may be that the substitutes for the negative particle that we saw elsewhere.

It is instructive that in the New Testament õ\textit{a}i served to express a strengthened negation, although this cannot be traced in later Greek in imitation of Lat. \textit{uae}. Note also in German the call of encouragement \textit{allons}, and curses such as \textit{munedie} (< Fr. \textit{nom de Dieu}) or \textit{sappermost} (< sacrament). In Baltic, the Lithuanian and Latvian words for ‘yes’ (Lith. \textit{fè}, \textit{jò}; Latv. \textit{jā}) are borrowed from German. And equally negatives could be borrowed if they sounded more powerful than the native, inherited forms. An instance of borrowing of this sort (albeit a partial one) is seen in the English privative prefixes \textit{non-} and more recent \textit{a-}, the former from Latin, the latter from Greek (cf. II, 266 and 295 below).—Nevertheless, we shall do well to look further for connections with Indo-European forms, and it may be that the substitutes for the negative particle that we saw elsewhere, we shall do well to look further for connections with Indo-European forms, and it may be that the substitutes for the negative particle that we saw elsewhere.
especially ‘no’, a usage which survives in modern Greek ὑπάλληλος ἡμᾶς ‘no’—which, according to Hatzidakis (1919), should really be written ὑπάλληλος ἡμᾶς, as it arose from ἐγὼ ἴμη = ἐγὼ ὑπάλληλος ἡμᾶς (‘not I’). Reflexes of ὁ, ὄς, and ὁ ὑπάλληλος survive today in Pontic (see Hatzidakis 1919), for the rest, modern Greek has replaced ὁ, which had obviously become too unemphatic, with δὲν (from ὁ ὑπάλληλος).

Although in its use of ὁ Greek deviated further from the inherited forms than our other languages, it also preserved the archaic feature of possessing a second negative, μη; that is, in addition to the word for negative statements, it uses a special one for prohibitions—a duality preserved still in modern Greek (in δὲν vs μη). In this feature Greek agrees with its oldest-attested sister-languages, Indic and Iranian, and in addition with Armenian and Albanian, and also with Tocharian, recently discovered in documents from central Asia (cf. II, 6 above, and n. 15, p. 405): indeed, in the younger form of Tocharian, so-called Tocharian B, mā, the cognate of Gk μη, has even become the all-purpose negative.41 On the other hand, Balto-Slavic, Germanic, and Celtic have no trace of a special prohibitive particle, and, where Greek uses μη, they use just the standard negative. This contrast within the Indo-European family may reflect dialectal variation within the parent language (see Meillet 1922a: 313, 379 [cf. 1937: 353, 370–1]). At all events, the Greek pattern reflects something archaic, and is mirrored also in non-IE languages, e.g. in the Hebrew opposition between lo’ = Gk ὁ and ’al = Gk μη.42

It was easy, however, for developments within the language to lead to the abandonment of an original distinction of this kind. The contrast between negation and prohibition was adequately signalled by intonation and by the form of the verb (if the clause contained one). Equally natural is the victory of the negative over the prohibitive form, if for no other reason than that it was the more frequent—and not only in narrative and description, where this goes without saying. Still, it was possible for the prohibitive to prevail: as we have just seen, in Tocharian B it did just that. In excited speech it is easy to put a negative statement in the form of a prohibition. Suffice it to mention the emotional use, familiar particularly from the letters of St Paul, of Gk μη γένοιτο, lit. ‘let it not be’ to mean ‘certainly not’. And we shall see later (II, 281–4) how Greek came in


41 The forms alluded to are: Tocharian B mā (Thomas 1958; Krause & Thomas 1960–4: I, §292). Albanian mos < *mati < *mē k’ē (cf. Gk μητέρα; Orel 2000: 9, 73, 259), Armenian mē. To the oldest relatives of Greek among the Indo-Iranian languages (notably, Avestan mā : mā (also Old Persian) and Sanskrit mā : mā) we can now add the even older Anatolian relations, notably Hittite natta : lē. We reconstruct with confidence IE *mē : *mē. It has been suggested that the latter is in origin the imperative of the IE verb *mēh-: prevent, stop; for recent bibliography on both particles, see EWAia, s.vv. ‘na1’, ‘ma’.

42 The prohibitive marker *’al(a) is said to be an innovation of West Semitic (i.e., the common ancestor of all the Semitic languages except Akkadian and Eblaitic). It is attested in all West Semitic languages except Arabic, although in the South Semitic group it has become generalized as the standard verbal negation; see Faber (1997: 8, 11). For an outline of Hebrew usage, see Steiner (1997: 167–8), and on the other Semitic languages, see Lipinski (1997: §§47.8–16) and the contributors to Hetzron (1997: Index, s.v. ‘negation’).
general to use μή frequently in statements rather than prohibitions. We might also compare the fact that the Greek verb ἀρνείονθαι in Homer means only ‘refuse, prohibit’, but later also ‘deny’ (of one’s own state or action, with loss of the volitional nuance) and eventually simply ‘say no, say that not’—which is why the grammarians say that οὐ expresses ἀρνησις (‘denial’), while μή signals ἀπαγόρευσις (‘prohibition’).43

With its own shade of meaning, μή enters all the combinations in which οὐ is found: μήτε, μήδε, μήδεν (first at II. 18. 500, quoted above, I, 175; cf. Π, 282, 306 below), μηκέτι (with κ borrowed from οὐκέτι!), μηδαμ-, μήχι, etc. Only οὐτίδιανος II, 259 ‘nothing worth’ | is not replaced by *μητίδιανός, even in prohibitions or conditional clauses.

The use of Gk μή is matched almost exactly by that of Lat. ne (II, 275–80 below). This semantic agreement between μή and ne, in addition to their both ending in long -e-, can hardly be by chance. Latin has either assimilated inherited *mē to the other negatives by replacing the labial nasal with the dental nasal, or, because of the rhyme between the forms, has given the functions of *mē to inherited ne (Π, 250 above). (We cannot concern ourselves here with the spellings nei and nt for ne, which are frequent in the second century and the first half of the first century bc and thereafter occur only once or twice.44)—The only places where ne does not agree with Gk μή are a few old collocations such as ne quidem (Π, 185 above), néquáquam (‘by no means’), néquiam (‘to no purpose, without cause’)—with which the adjective néquam ‘worthless’ is probably somehow related: here the old form has for some reason been retained with a long vowel.—Unlike Greek, Latin gradually replaces the prohibitive particle with the ordinary negative. Catullus is the first to use non in prohibitions, at 66. 80–1 non prius . . . tradite. Quintilian (1. 5. 50) is aware of non féceris as a mistake for ne féceris (‘do not do [it]!’, ne+pf. subjv.). From Cicero’s letters on, nēc is used instead of nēue after positive commands, e.g. in Letters to Atticus 12. 22. 3 (no. 261 Shackleton Bailey) habe tuum negotium nec . . . existima (‘make it your business, and don’t consider . . . ’); cf. Blase (1903: 245), and on Late Latin usage, Hofmann (1926: 39). In the same way, utinam ne (‘if only not’), dum ne, dummodo ne (both, ‘provided that not’) yield to utinam non (already in Classical Lat.), dum non (first in the encyclopaedist A. Cornelius Celsus [early/mid 1st c.], On Medicine 5. 18. 23), dummodo non (first in Ovid, Metam. 13. 151, Tristia 1. 1. 14).45—The Romance languages have lost all trace of a second negative.

43 Cf. e.g. Choezobuscus (8th/9th c.), Epimenismi in Psalm, p. 10 Gaisford, and in his commentary (under the name of Heliodorus) on Dionysius Thrax (GG I.3, 100, cf. 432). On these works, see Dickey (2007: 80–1).
44 That is, nt for ne is found on a few occasions in late-Republican/Augustan poetry, chiefly in Lucretius; for some details, see Hofmann & Szantyr 535 (e).
45 For some details and further references, see KS §§48.2, 222, and Hofmann & Szantyr 535, 617.
Both the old negatives and their more recent replacements in the Indo-European languages serve in the first instance to negate either the whole clause or the verb, which often amounts to the same thing. This function also conditions their placement. Delbrück (1893–1900: II, 521; cf. 1888: 542–3) has inferred from Sanskrit the rule that the negatives stand either at the head of the clause or immediately before the finite verb; often, of course, both positions are the same. This rule may reasonably be regarded as Indo-European. It is preserved in Avestan. It holds apparently for the Gothic Bible (see Koppitz 1901: 12–24). And there are clear traces of it in Greek and Latin: first, in their strong tendency to place negatives in first position. For Latin I recall the common clause-opening sequence non ego, or to pick one instance at random, the beginning of Horace’s sixth satire, where the poet starts the whole poem with a non and takes five lines over the first sentence. Remember also | that if a negative clause is joined to a preceding clause with ‘and’, then neque is usually put at its head (neque enim if it is explanatory)—or one might say that the negative is anticipated. A surprising parallel to this is found in a distantly related language, Latvian. In Latvian generally the second part of the main rule (on which more below) applies, the sentence negative ne fusing with the verb to form a single word; if, however, the negative þ attached -dz ‘and’ is linking two clauses, then it comes first in its clause (see Endzelins (1923: 813 n.), with reference to the parallel in Lat. neque).1—

A similar fondness in Greek for clause-initial position could easily be demonstrated with reference to Homer. For later Greek I content myself with a mention of the instances in Hesiod with ἄρα and γάρ: Works 11 οὐκ ἄρα μονὸν ἔην Ἔριδων γένος (‘then there is after all more than one species of Strife’; cf. I, 185 above); 411 οὐ γάρ ἔτωσον ἐργὸς ἀνήρ πῖμπλησα καλιήν (‘for the man whose work is in vain does not fill the granary’).

No less clear is the other tendency, namely to place negatives immediately before the verb. Immediate telling examples of this are the close compounds in Latin and Germanic of the type nescio and nolo (‘know not’, ‘wish not’, II, 250 above). Note the occasional complete univerbation of negative and verb that we

1 In Baltic, the negative—quite generally—is placed immediately before the negated constituent and usually fuses with it, the combination being pronounced and written as a single word; see Senn (1966: §§129–31) and Mathiassen (1996: 176–7) on Lithuanian, Mathiassen (1997: 164) on Latvian.
find also in Gothic *nist and Old Irish *ni ‘is not’, which go back to *nēst < *nē-ēst (Thurneysen 1946: 110, 152–3). The three Baltic languages—Lithuanian, Latvian, and Old Prussian—also normally put the negative immediately before the verb (cf. above).—For Latin I recall the familiar grammar-book rule that non must be placed immediately before possum; we could add that writers who replaced the ne- of nequeo with non (II, 253 above), tended to keep the non immediately before queo. There are striking examples with prohibitive ne¯st, too. When ut and nē are used in combination, in both Old and Classical Latin, ut tends to come at the beginning of the subordinate clause with nē separated from it and standing immediately before the verb. This applies especially to official language, e.g. in the senatus consultum concerning rhetoricians and philosophers (161 BC), quoted by Suetonius, On Rhetoricians 1, uti Romae ne essent (‘that they [rhetoricians and philosophers] be not allowed to live in Rome’), or in Cicero, In Defence of Sestius 33 lata lex est . . . ut lex Aelia, lex Fufia ne valeret (‘a law was passed that the Aelian Law and the Fufian Law should be invalid’). This same tendency causes e.g. dum ne (II, 279 below) to be separated e.g. at Livy 3. 21. 6 dum ego ne imiter tribunos (‘provided that I [L. Quinctius Cincinnatus] do not imitate the tribunes’), although the law regarding the placement of weak pronouns is also relevant here.2—It is therefore a reflection of an ancient pattern that in the Romance languages including French the reflex of Lat. nōn is obliged to come immediately before the verb, from which it can be separated only by enclitic pronouns.3

Almost exactly the same rule applies to δέ(ν) and μὴ(ν) in modern Greek, which thereby provides valuable evidence of what was current in later | colloquial Greek. It is harder to demonstrate regular word order from literature, especially of the high style, than from the spoken language of everyday. Nevertheless, already in Homer we can show close links between a preposed negative and a following verb. The verbs ἀλέγειν and ἀλεγίζειν ‘be concerned about’ are always negated in Homer (save only at Il. 9. 504). In line with the general rule, the oν(κ) here stands without exception either at the head of the clause or, more commonly, immediately before the verb. In fact, the link between negative and verb is so close that, on the basis of the recurring participial phrase oνκ ἀλέγοντες, the man’s name ὄδηκάλέγων is coined at Il. 3. 148. Of course, this name is not to be understood in the reproachful sense of passages such as Od. 19. 154 δμων . . . ονκ ἄλεγοῦσας (‘my maids . . . irresponsible ones’), but rather denotes the man who

2 Wackernagel’s Law, again (cf. II, 194 & n. 5, p. 643 above); on the placement of unstressed ego (and tu), see esp. Adams (1999).
3 The French preverbal enclitic pronouns are sometimes presented as inseparable prefixes, which oust even the preverbal negative ne (and one might add that in colloquial registers preverbal ne has almost entirely disappeared in favour of postverbal pas, etc.); for an excellent account of the developments from Latin to French, see Harris (1978: 24–9, 118), and, on the foreshadowing of the Romance pattern in colloquial Latin, Adams (1994a).
knows how to deal with evil opponents, corresponding to the words οὐκ ἀλέγω as spoken by Zeus, Hera, or Eumaeus confronting Antinous (II. 8. 477, 483; Od. 17. 390): as such, this is a fitting name for a δημογέρων πεπνυμένος (‘wise elder of the people’), as Ucalegon is called.

The same pattern is found with οὐκ ἐθέλω again from Homer on, which explains οὐ for expected μή e.g. at II. 3. 288 εἴ δ’ ἄν ἐμοὶ τιμήν τίνεν οὐκ ἐθέλωσον (‘if they refuse to pay me honour’). Note also the participial phrase οὐκ ἐθέλονν (‘unwilling’) frequent from Homer on, and the word order in Aristophanes, Clouds 798 ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐθέλει γάρ μανθάνειν (‘but he [my son] refuses to go to school’). This agrees with the treatment of negated verbs of wishing in other languages. Admittedly, this does not apply to the synonym βούλεσθαι, but then on all of its thirty-eight occurrences in Homer βούλεσθαι is positive. The same is true in other archaic poetry, though here the verb is generally rare. Pindar, e.g., has it only once (fr. 118 Maehler), and here too it is positive. The first example of negated βούλομαι seems to be at Anacreon, fr. 361 Page ἐγὼ δ’ οὔτε ἄν Ἀμαλθής | βουλομένη κέρας οὔτε . . . (‘I would not wish for the horn of Amalthea but . . . ’), the second at Aesch. Pers. 215–16 (Chorus to Atossa) οὗ σε βουλόμεσθα, μήτερ, οὔτε ἄγαν φοβεῖν λόγοι | οὔτε θαρσώνειν (‘O mother, we would neither alarm you unduly by our words nor yet raise your hopes too high’). In the difficult question of the original and essential difference between (ἐ)θέλειν and βούλεσθαι (on which see most recently Rödiger 1917), this state of affairs cannot be left out of account. It cannot possibly be by chance that βούλεσθαι is never negated in its early attestations. I draw your attention particularly to the Homeric passages where negated (ἐ)θέλειν and positive βούλεσθαι are set side by side, such as Od. 9. 94–6 οὐκέτ’ ἀπαγείλαι πάλιν ἦθελεν οὐδὲ νέσσαι, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ βούλοντο . . . μένειν (anyone who ate the lotus ‘no longer wished to report back or return to us, but they wished only to remain there’; similarly II. 1. 112, and Od. 17. 226 ff. and 18. 362 ff.), and also to Democritus, B62 (Diels & Kranz no. 68) ἀγαθὸν οὗ τὸ μή ἀδικεῖν ἀλλὰ τὸ μηδὲ ἐθέλειν (‘good is not refraining from committing an injury but not even wishing to do so’) in comparison with B89 ὁ ἀδικεῖν . . . ὁ βουλόμενος (‘the one who injures [you] . . . the one who wishes to do so’). A further syntactic distinction between the two verbs is that βούλεσθαι from Homer on can also take a nominal | or pronominal object, while this is unheard of with (ἐ)θέλειν, except in the Hebraism θέλειν τιά ‘to delight in someone’ in the Greek Bible; see Debrunner (1916: 19–20).

The combination of negative and verb gives me occasion also for a semasiological observation. For ages our Greek grammars have taught that certain verbs take the negative when what is negated is not their meaning but that of an infinitive dependent on them, as e.g. in Herodotus 7. 46. 1 οὗ συμβουλεύων

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4 That is, the she-goat who suckled the infant Zeus, whose horns contained nectar and ambrosia.
In most of these cases the desired meaning is best expressed if we render the verb and negative together with a verb of opposite meaning. So, for example, in the passages quoted above from Herodotus and Xenophon, ὁδὸν ὑμᾶς ἔχετε would be ‘advising against’, ὁδὸν ὑμᾶς ἐχεῖν would be ‘believed that … not’; similarly, ὁδὸν κελεύον becomes ‘I forbid’, ὁδὸν φημεῖ, ‘I deny’, Russian ne stal + inf. ‘he started not to’, and ne veleno + inf. ‘it was ordered not to’ (cf. II, 251 above and n. 8, p. 714).

In most of these cases the desired meaning is best expressed if we render the verb and negative together with a verb of opposite meaning. So, for example, in the passages quoted above from Herodotus and Xenophon, ὁδὸν ὑμᾶς ἔχετε would be ‘advising against’, ὁδὸν ὑμᾶς ἐχεῖν would be ‘believed that … not’; similarly, ὁδὸν κελεύον becomes ‘I forbid’, ὁδὸν φημεῖ, ‘I deny’, Russian ne stal, ‘stopped’. One might wish to define the whole phenomenon as follows, that the negative in these cases has not merely contradictory force but actually denotes the contrary of the positive. That would be not inconceivable in itself: cf. OCS ne navide˘ti ‘hate’ vs navide˘ti ‘love’; Serbo-Croatian n¨estati ‘disappear’ vs stati ‘remain’ (see VONDRAK 1906–8: II, 400 = 1924–8: II, 339). Or, to take an example from further afield: the Old Persian verb gaub- ‘say’ in the middle voice with the genitive means positively ‘declare oneself for’, but with the negative ‘declare oneself against, refuse obedience to’. Even in Greek, ὁδὸν χαιρεῖν will mean ‘to his regret’, and even among privative formations we shall find instances of contrary meaning. Still, those cases from which we started are probably rather to be explained in the same way as TOBLER | (1902–12: I, 196–200) explained Fr. il ne faut pas que tu meures ‘it is necessary that you stay alive’ (lit. ‘it is not necessary that you die’), namely that the negative has moved to the governing verb because
this is the core of the complex. To Fr. *il ne faut pas* corresponds exactly *II. 2. 24 = 61 ὁ χρῆ παννύχιον εὐθεῖαν βουληθόρον ἀνδρα* (*a counsellor should not sleep all night*); on the French construction, see also *Spitzer* (1927).

To return to the placement rule for the sentence negative: I do not have the data to be able to say exactly how often it is broken by Homer in individual cases. That sentence-opening particles like ἀλλά or ἐπεὶ (*‘but’; ‘when, since’*) should come first goes without saying, but in a simple sentence *οὐ* and *μή* probably never come later than the verb, unless of course it begins the clause, as e.g. at *Od. 18. 409* (Telemachus to the suitors) διώκω δ’ οὖ των ἐγογέ (‘I am hustling no one out’). Later writers, especially poets of the high style, went much further than Homer in the liberties they took. Cf. *Wilamowitz* (1891?) on Eur. *Hipp. 699* (p. 204) ἡδονον ὁντὸν ἀβουλόμην ‘I didn’t find what I wanted’.7—In German, the sentence negative nicht normally stands later than the verb, except in a subordinate clause, when the verb comes last; nicht precedes the verb only if it is strongly emphatic. This regular placement, which often hinders clarity, has to do with the nominal origin of nicht (*II, 252–3* above; the same applies to English not). NHG ich weiss nicht stands in the same relation to MHG ich enweiz as Gk βοιμών ἀλέγοντες οὐδὲν (‘caring nothing for the altars’, *Aesch. Suppl. 752*) does to Διὸς οὐκ ἀλέγοντες (‘having no care for Zeus’, *Hymn to Apollo 279*).

Even in the earliest Greek and Latin, the negatives were not confined to the negation of clauses and verbs only. Starting from clauses of the type *οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκορανή* (‘multiple kingship is not a good thing’, *II. 2. 204*), with nominal predicate, speakers were able to establish the convention of applying the negative to an adjective alone. From a sentence like *II. 5. 783* (and elsewhere) τῶν τε σθένος οὖκ ἀλαπαδῶν (‘[wild boars,] whose strength is not easily exhausted’) it is only a short step to *II. 4. 330–1 πάρ δὲ Κεφαλλήνων ἀμφὶ στίχες οὖκ ἀλαπάθαι | ἔσταιαν (‘and beside him [Odysseus] stood on either side the not insignificant ranks of the Cephallenians’). Equally, the negative with the verb was early extended from the finite verb to the infinitive and the participle—in the latter case replacing the once regular ἄ(v)- (cf. *I, 283* above, *II, 287* below). Note e.g. *II. 8. 246 νεῦσε δὲ οἱ λαῶν σον ἐμεναι οὐδ’ ἀπολέσθαι (‘he [Zeus] nodded that his [Agamemnon’s] army would be saved and not be destroyed’), and 17. 5 οὐ πρῖν εἰδυια τόκοι (‘not previously having experience of giving birth’; on οὐκ ἀλέγοντες, see *II, 261* above).

I cannot here go into detail on the development of this wider use of the negative in Greek and the other languages. Let me highlight just one notable phenomenon, the occasional close combination of the negative with a noun

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7 Wilamowitz (1891) translates, ‘Die hab’ ich nicht gefunden’ (‘this I didn’t find’). W. S. Barrett in his commentary (Oxford 1964) observes that the position of the negative indicates ‘what I found was not what I wished to find’.
(excluding adjectives used as nouns as at Thuc. 1. 22. 4 τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες, lit. ‘the unstorylike[ness]’, ‘the absence of a romantic element’). There are examples in Greek from the fifth century on. We may begin with three instances in Euripides, each of which represents a special type. The least striking is at fr. 831 TrGF V.2 (πολλοία δοῦλοι τούμορι αίσχρων,) καὶ δὲ φρήν ... τῶν οὐχὶ δοῦλον ἑστ’ ἐλευθεροτέρα ‘(many slaves, although they bear the shameful name of slave,) their spirit is freer than that of non-slaves’. Nouns which, like δοῦλος, denote a person with reference to their nature or activity, are more like adjectives than are other nouns, and can therefore easily be treated like adjectives: τῶν οὐχὶ δοῦλων could be expanded into a clause, with δοῦλοι negated as the predicate (‘of those [who are] not slaves’). Similar to this case are a good number of later examples, including Plato, Gorgias 459b ὁ μὴ λατρῶσ ... ἀνεπιστήμων, δὲν ὁ λατρῶς ἑπιστήμων ‘one who is not a doctor does not understand what the doctor understands’, and Rep. 4, 422b δνοῦν μὴ πύκταιν (‘for two non-boxers’). Philodemus speaks of ὁ μὴ ρήτωρ (‘the non-orator’, Volumina rhetorica II, 270 Sudhaus), just as Quintilian does at 2. 15. 17 cum ... credibilia ... etiam non orator inueniat (‘since even a non-orator finds credible things to say’), and compare also Horace, Satires 2. 3. 106 (si quis emat scalpra et formas) non sutor ‘(anyone who bought knives and lasts) without being a cobbler’, and Ovid, Met. 5. 61 et comes et ueri non dissimulator amoris ‘his comrade and one who had not concealed his true affection’, which is to be taken with what was said earlier on agent nouns, II, 54 above).

More peculiar is a second Euripidean example, Bacchae 1287 (Cadmus with Agaue) δύστην ἀλῆθει, ὡς ἐν οὐ καίρῳ πάρει ‘wretched truth, you have come at such a bad time’!’. The positive form, ἐν καίρῳ ‘at the right time’, is standard Attic. This sort of prepositional phrase with immediately preceding negative is found from Homer on, e.g. at Od. 2. 251 (Leocritus to Mentor) οὐ δ’ οὐ κατὰ μοίραν ἔειπε, where what is denied is not speaking as such but speaking κατὰ μοίραν (‘appropriately’). The negative tends to precede also when the prepositional phrase alone is negated, as at Thuc. 3. 62. 4 οὐ μὴ μετὰ νόμων ἡμαρτεν ‘the errors committed (by the city) in a lawless condition’. By inserting the negative between preposition and noun, so relating it closely to the latter, Euripides achieved a much more incisive expression than if he had said οὐκ ἐν καίρῳ. He could have justified his liberty on the basis of the phrase οὐ καίρως (ἐστι) ‘it is not the right moment’, where οὐ is a sentence negative—cf. Aesch. Prom. 523 οὐδαμῶς καίρως γεγονεν (‘it is not at all the time to speak [of this]’), Soph. El. 22 οὐκέτ’ ὄκνειν καίρως (‘it is no longer the time for hesitation’).

The third instance relates to a wider context: Hippolytus 195–6 δ’ ἀπειροσύνην ἀλλον βιότον κοικ ἀπόδειξιν τῶν ὑπὸ γαίας (‘through our inability to know another life, and the non-revelation of the things beneath the earth’). The combination of οὐ with a noun in -ασις represents an extremely telling agreement between Euripides and Thucydides, in which the poet’s attachment to contemporary
intellectual life receives linguistic expression. Abstract thinkers of that age coined a large number of new forms in -σις: βούλησις (‘wish, purpose’), for example, occurs first precisely in Thucydides and Euripides. Now, Thucydides loves to treat these abstract nouns as far as possible like verbs, and consequently he also negates them as verbs. | So, e.g. at 1. 137. 4 γράφας . . . τήν τῶν γευσιῶν, ἦν ψευδὸς προσέποιησατο, τότε δὲ αὐτῶν οὐ διάλυσαν (‘he [Themistocles] wrote [to Artaxerxes] of the non-destruction of the bridges at that time, which he falsely made out was due to him’; cf. II, 139 above), and similarly he has 3. 95. 2 οὐ περιτείχισας (‘non-blockading’), and 5. 35. 2 οὐκ ἀπόδοσας (‘non-return, failure to return’; cf. Philo, Embassy to Gaius 261 διὰ τῆς οὐκ ἐν τάξει κυνήσαεως ‘because of his [Gaius] irregular movement’), and with other types of verbal abstract nouns, e.g. 7. 34. 6 ἐπαναγωγῇ (‘putting out to sea against’), 5. 50. 4 ἐξουσία (‘permission, eligibility’). This use of the negative with abstract nouns (including even non-verbal abstracts) remained common in theoretical discussions: note e.g. Plato, Theaetetus 201ε οὐδ' ἦν μὴ οὐδ' (‘existence or non-existence’), Charmides 167c-d τῶν μὴ ὀφειν καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀκοον (‘lack of vision’, ‘lack of hearing’), Gorgias 478c μηδὲ κτήσας (‘not even having [it, i.e. trouble]’), in Aristotle ἐν πάσῃ ἑπομονή (‘non-tolerance, Posterior Analytics 97b24), ἐκ μὴ μεγεθῶν (‘of things which are non-magnitudes’, On Coming-to-be and Passing-away 316b5), and in the Stoic Chrysippus of Soli (3rd c. BC), fr. 175 (SVF II, 50) ἐν κακία, ἐν ὄν ἀρετῇ (‘the state of being not bad’, ‘non-virtue’). And from the philosophers it was borrowed, like so much learned idiom, into ordinary speech: note e.g. Aristophanes, Ecclesiazusae 115 δεινὸν δ' ἔστιν ἡ μὴ μπεβία (‘inexperience is a dangerous thing’)—derived from μὴ ἐμπεβόμενος (‘not experienced’).—Ionic thinkers go to some extent even further, e.g. Democritus, B 257 (no. 68, Diels & Kranz) κατὰ δὲ ζώον ἔστιν ὁν φόνον καὶ μὴ φόνον οὔς ἔχει (‘with certain animals, the situation with regard to killing and not-killing is as follows’), and even with concrete nouns Anaxagoras, B 10 (no. 59, Diels & Kranz) τῶς γὰρ ἐν ἐκ μὴ τρίχος γένοιτο θρίξ καὶ σάρξ ἐκ μὴ σαρκός; (‘for how could hair come into being from not-hair, or flesh from not-flesh’)?—All of the above was imitated in Latin: e.g. Lucretius 2. 930–2 gigni posse ex non sensibu’ sensus . . . oriri posse a non sensu sensum (‘that sense can be generated from the insentient’ [repeated]); Cicero, Academica 1. 39 arbitrabatur . . . nec . . . quod efficeret aliquid . . . posse esse non corpus (‘[Zeno] thought that anything capable of acting [on another body] could not itself be a non-body’; cf. Zeno, fr. 90 [SVF I, 25]); and, apart from the language of the philosophical schools, Quint. 12. 10. 29 uel omnino non uoce potius (‘or rather not a sound at all’, of the pronunciation of the letter F), 4. 1. 73 non exordio (i.e., a part of a speech other than the introduction).

We have not quite reached the end. We encounter a new type in the Greek Bible, e.g. at Deuteronomy 32: 21 αὐτοὶ παρεξήλωσαν με ἐπ’ οὐ τῷ θεῷ . . . κἀγὼ παραξηλώσω αὐτοῦς ἐπ’ οὐκ ἐδεικτεῖ they have stirred me to jealousy against what
is no god . . . so I will stir them to jealousy against those who are no people' (the second part of which is quoted by Paul at Romans 10:19), and Hosea 2: 23 ἐρόω τῷ ὦ λαῷ μου, λαός μου εἰ σοῦ 'I shall say to Not my people, “You are my people”’, picking up 1. 6, 9, and 10, where ὄν-λαος-μου is a sort of name; Paul refers to this passage too, at Romans 9: 25 καλέσω τὸν ὦ λαόν μου λαόν μου ('I will call them my people which were not my people'). All three instances of ὄν + noun are conditioned by the use in the original of Hebrew lo’ ‘not’ as a negative prefix, and the fact that the Greek translator has remained literally true to the original. It is instructive to observe how later translators came to terms with this Hebraism in the Greek text. Both Wulfila and the Latin New Testament based on the pre-Vulgate translation retain the original idiom: Romans 10: 19 ego ad aemulationem uos adducam in non gentem : Gothic ik in aljana izwis brigga in unpiudom, and Romans 9: 25 vocabo non plebem meam plebem meam : Gothic báta þo ni managein meina managein meina—i.e. Gothic uses in the one case ni, in the other the privative prefix un- (cf. II, 285, 291 below). By contrast, in the Old Testament passages, where the Vulgate is independent of the Old Latin Bible, Jerome goes in one of two ways depending on the nature of the passage. | In Hosea, where it involves a sort of name, he retains the Hebrew/Greek idiom: dicam non populo meo, Populus meus es tu, while in Deuteronomy he paraphrases it in good Latin: in eo qui (quod in the codex Amiatinus9) non erat deus . . . in eo, qui non est populus. Luther, on the other hand, uses a relative clause in every instance.

From its frequent combination with nouns and adjectives, the sentence negative eventually developed into a proper prefix negating the meaning of the noun/adjective. In Baltic and Slavic, the old negative *nē came to replace completely the privative prefix *ny- (which we shall discuss later, II, 284–97 below). In the modern languages of western Europe, this prefix has survived, but alongside it the ordinary negatives very often combine with nouns and adjectives. German nicht- (in the language first of mystics, then of jurists—see Bohner 1904: 166), French non- (also pas- in casual modern speech, e.g. pas-fumeur ‘non-smoker’), English non- (of partly French, partly Latin origin), more rarely no- are all

8 The Hebrew original of the Deuteronomy passage has lo’-el ‘a non-god’ and lo’-ām ‘a non-folk’; see Steiner (1997: 168).
9 The codex Amiatinus is the oldest—and is regarded as the most accurate—surviving manuscript of the Latin Vulgate version of the Bible (very nearly complete). It was made in one or both of the twin monasteries of Jarrow and Wearmouth in AD 716, one of three copies commissioned by Abbot Ceolfrid, and intended as a gift for Pope Gregory II; it takes its name from the Monte Amiata near Siena, where it resided, in a convent, from the 9th century until 1786, when it was removed to its present resting-place, the Laurentian Library in Florence. For recent bibliography, see Longo, Magrini, & Palma (2000); there is an informative essay in Italian and English online at &lt;http://www.florin.ms/aleph4.html#amiatinus&gt;.
10 Note, however, that other prefixes competed with ne- in privative function, notably the preposition meaning ‘without’ (Russ. bez, Lith. bė); cf., on Baltic, Senn (1966: §374) and LEW, s.vv. ‘bė’, ‘nė’; on Slavic, Vasmer, s.vv. ‘bes’, ‘nė (1)’, and Lunt (2001: §23.4).
frequently attested in this manner and appear constantly in new formations, in the first instance with verbal nouns. 11 An old example containing an extinct second element is Fr. nonchalamant (which has been borrowed by other languages), along with its obsolete infinitive/abstract noun nonchaloir (‘neglect’—Provençal noncaler). This continues Lat. non calēns, non calēre, only with the metaphorical use of calēre ‘feel warm’ — ‘feel interested, excited’, which is attested already in Classical Latin. In Latin, non is normal from an early date with the participle and infinitive, and found even with the infinitive used as a noun (e.g. in Cic. Fin. 2. 18 hoc non dolere ‘this freedom from pain’). In nonchalamant, then, a relatively loose connection has simply become a close one. 12 But this sort of negation is common with other sorts of verbal noun, too, as in German Nichtbraucher (‘non-smoker’), English non-conformist, which are reminiscent of the ancient examples of the non orator type above. This sort of negation is often used when the negative is intended to contain no polemical or sinister connotation, as in Goethe’s famous words, ‘ich bin kein Unchrist, kein Widerchrist, aber doch ein dezidierter Nichtchrist’ (‘I am no Un-Christian, no Anti-Christian, and yet a decided Non-Christian’). 13 It may also be used to exclude the contrary meaning, as in the words of a seventeenth-century English theorist, ‘between volition and nolition there is a middle thing viz. non-volition’. 14 And finally it is used generally where the privative prefix would produce an awkward or unfamiliar combination.

The word utopia is a case apart. It stems from the pen of the noble English Chancellor Thomas More, known to us through the work of Holbein. 15 In a work of 1516, which was met with great acclaim, he drafted in verse the plan for a form of human existence modelled on ideals related to those of Plato’s Republic. He named the land where this was supposedly a reality | ‘Utopia’, and its king, ‘Utopus’, and entitled the work after the name of the country. The name is quite clear: More himself renders it in Latin with Nusquamia, from which it is sometimes called in German Nirgendsheim. He derived it, then, from Gk ὄντας, and wished to imply that the world he sketched did not exist anywhere.

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11 On French non(-), normally hyphenated only before nouns, see Grevisse §971; Grevisse does not discuss this use of pas(-) (save §734b, on pas grand’chose ‘person or thing of no significance’), but cf. Littére, s.v. ‘pas (2)’, §3. On English negative prefixes, see Quirk et al. (1985: Appendix I, §21).
12 On Fr. nonchalant, etc., see further FEW, s.v. ‘calēre’, II.1 (in the sense ‘to be important’).
13 In a letter (of 29 July 1782) to J. C. Lavater (1741–1801), the Swiss poet and physiognomist.
15 That is, the artist Hans Holbein the Younger (1497/8–1543), who worked for more years in Basel than in London. W.’s audience will have known in the Basel Museum of Art the pen-and-ink drawing preparatory to one of Holbein’s portraits of More, a gift of the artist to his Basel patron Erasmus, who had given him a letter of introduction to More when he left Basel—obliged to do so by the Reformation—for his first stay in London (1526–8).
After More, there emerged the secondary use of the original place name to denote far-fetched hopes and plans which cannot possibly be realized.—It is obvious that the formation of this word does not fit any pattern. This was pointed out emphatically already by Joseph Scaliger (1586: 189–90),¹⁶ and French humanists of the sixteenth century remodelled it in jest into Eutopia (‘Goodland’) and Udepotia (‘Neverness’, from Gk οὐδέποτε). The characters introduced by More in the work include an Ademus, as well as the Achorii and Alaopolitae, and their names are formed with the normal privative ἀ- + δῆμος ‘people’, χώρος ‘place’, λαός ‘people’.¹⁷

¹⁶ The key passage (p. 190) runs, ‘... in Utopia. Quod verbum, quanquam ornato & docto Anglo confictum, tamen Graecum non est. Et qui ὀπτονίαν Graecum putant, ii quid sit Graeca componere nesciunt’ (‘... in Utopia. This word, although coined by a distinguished and learned Englishman, is nevertheless not Greek. And those who think that ὀπτονίαν is Greek do not know how to make Greek compounds’).

¹⁷ The alternative Eutopia is implied in one of the prefatory poems, the Hexastichon Anemolii, in the 1st edn (Louvain 1516), while Udepotia was suggested by Guillaume Budé in his letter to Thomas Lupset, prefaced to the 2nd edn (Paris 1517) and retained in the 3rd, which was made by John Froben at Basel in 1518. On the long tradition of commenting on the names in Utopia, see Romm (1991), who makes frequent reference also to the Dutch humanist G. J. Vossius, and has interesting discussion of More’s allegedly deliberate ambiguity, even ‘duplicity’, in the coining of his names, including Alaopolitae (of which the first four letters could mean ‘blind’ as well as ‘non-people’) and even Utopia itself. On the appended verses and letters in the wider humanist context of Utopia, see Allen (1963).
In addition to the simple negatives discussed so far, languages possess also nominal and adverbial expressions which indicate the scope of the negation, whether over time (e.g. *never*, German *nie, niemals*), in space (e.g. *nowhere*, German * nirgends, nirgendwo, -wohin, -wober*), for all modalities (e.g. Lat. *neutiquam* ‘by no means’), for all people or things (*nobody, nothing*, German *niemand, nichts*), or finally for particular sets of objects (adjectival *no*, German *kein*). Two distinguished Czech linguists, Gebauer and Mourek, on the basis of logical considerations, have termed this class of negatives ‘quantitative’, as opposed to the simple negatives that we have dealt with so far, which they call ‘qualitative’.

As Delbrück correctly observes (1910b: 6–7), this opposition can be usefully applied to a particular synchronic cross-section of a language, but falls apart when confronted with a historical approach. [Add.: The absence of quantitative negatives outside the Indo-European languages is observed by Havers (1927: 197), with reference to Westermann (1921: 126–7) on the Kpelle language of Liberia; he compares typologically Latin expressions such as *non uideo quemquam* (‘I don’t see anyone’).]

In the Indo-European languages the scope of the negation was originally indicated by the addition of an indefinite, and hence enclitic, pronoun or pronominal adverb to the negative particle: Homeric *οὐ ποτέ, οὐ ποθί* (‘not ever’, ‘not anywhere’), *οὐ πη, οὐ πωσ* (both, ‘not in any way’), *οὐ τις, οὐ τι* (‘not anyone’, ‘not anything’), etc.—and the same groups with prohibitive *οὔτις*—are a true reflection of the original forms. Of these combinations *οὔτις* in particular was subject early on to univerbation, though negative and indefinite are also found separately. Already in the *Iliad* we find the derivative of *οὔτι* (‘nothing’), *οὔτιδανός* (‘worthless’, I. 293, etc.). You certainly remember the trick played by Odysseus on the Cyclops, which was effective precisely because Polyphemus’ complaint at Od. 9, 408, *Οὔτις | μὲ κτείνει δόλω νείδε βίργην* (‘Noman is killing me by trickery, not by violence’), is answered by the other Cyclopes with a syntactically conditioned change of the negative particle at 410 *εἴ μὲν δὴ μὴ τίς σε βιάζεται* (‘If then no one is doing violence to you’). As to the question of what to do about the accent—given

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1 Cf. Gebauer (1885), and II, 274 below; Mourek (1902) and (1903), and Delbrück (1910b: 6–7) on Mourek’s work on negation in early Germanic languages.
that as a personal name Ὀὔτις requires a circumflex, as a pronoun, an acute—Vendryes (1904) and others have made some penetrating observations.2

There are traces of this original pattern in other languages, too, including nēquis in pre-classical Latin (II, 250 above), Lat. neuter (‘neither one’ of two), which matches OHG ne wedar, although the corresponding sequence in Greek οὐ / μὴ + πότερος (II, 114 above) was either never tried or was early lost; recall also Lat. necubi (‘nowhere’) and similar forms. Corresponding to Ὀὔτις in Gothic is ni hwæs (with or without the indefinite particle hun after it), in which the negative is not closely attached to the pronoun but obeys the general rules of placement applicable to it; so, too, Gothic ni hwænæ: Gk οὐ ποτε (‘not ever’).3

Everywhere, however, the need was felt for fuller, more dramatic forms of expression. Here, too, it is best to begin with Greek. In the negation of nouns and adjectives—at first apparently in the neuter, to which nearly all the examples in Homer and Hesiod, and all of those in Pindar, are confined—it was regular to deny the existence of an object by means of the intensified phrase ‘not even one’, i.e. in Greek with οὐδ’ ἐν, μηδ’ ἐν. If Homer shows only sparse hints of this, it is because in this as in so much else he is lagging behind the current language of his contemporaries and fellow countrymen. This emerges, first of all, from an individual instance in which the poet speaks as it were out of character: this is in the bold compound οὐδενόσωμα ‘worth no notice, regard’ (of walls at II. 8. 178), based on the phrase οὐδενός ὁμα ‘no one’s regard’ (see Bechtel 1914: 256). Secondly, the examples of the collocation in the Syracusan Epicharmus and Rhinthon of Tarentum (early 3rd c. BC) show its early spread throughout the Greek world.4 Indeed, in Lesbian and Ionic it was so well established (at least in its neuter form) and so unified as a single word, that a word δὲν ‘something’ could be abstracted from it. Hence in Alcaeus, fr. 320 Lobel & Page καὶ κ’ οὐδέν εκ δενὸς γένοιτο (‘and nothing may come out of something’, i.e. ‘one may labour to no purpose’), and in Democritus B 156 (quoted by Plutarch, Diels & Kranz no. 68) διορίζεται μη μάλλον τὸ δὲν ἦ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι, δὲν μὲν δομαξὼν τὸ σώμα, μηδὲν δὲ τὸ κενόν (‘he determines that Thingness exists no more than Nothingness does, using “Thingness” to denote substance and “Nothingness” to denote the void’).5

In the face of this new formation, the combination of the negative with the indefinite gradually receded. Hence, while the earlier Ionic writers still have both,

2 On the details of how Odysseus’ Ὀὔτις ‘No(r)man’ trick might have worked formally and accentually, see W. B. Stanford’s commentary (London 1947) on Od. 9. 408, Leumann (1950: 48)—with the criticisms by Rank (1951: 64–5)—and the remarks and references to more recent literature in Heubeck in Heubeck & Hoekstra (1989) on Od. 9. 364–7 and 408–12.

3 On the Gothic forms, see further GED, s.v.v. ‘-hun’, ‘huan’, ‘hwæs’, ‘ni’.

4 Cf. e.g. Epicharmus, fr. 98, 131 οὐδ’ ἐλι, Rhinthon, fr. 13 οὐδ’ ἂν κ’ ἄνων ‘not a single dog’ (both in PCG I, of which see the Index, s.v. ‘οὐδές’ for further examples).

5 Two other ancient authors, Galen and Simplicius, attribute the use of δὲν to Democritus (A37, A49 Diels & Kranz no. 68). On the origin and meaning of the word in Alcaeus and Democritus, see esp. Moorhouse (1962).
Herodotus has only οὐδεὶς, μηδεὶς, as is nicely illustrated in the phrase at 3.140. 2 ἡ τις η ὁδεῖς (lit. ‘either someone or no one’, i.e. ‘hardly anyone’; cf. BECHTEL 1921–4: III, 170), and he even uses the plural οὐδένες (‘nobodies’, 9.58). In Attic, apart from tragedy, of the older | pattern only adverbial οὐτί, μὴτι is retained, and so, too, in later Greek; the existence of μήτις ‘no one’ cannot be inferred for Attic from passages such as Plato, Laws 11, 925c ἐμπόδια γίγνεται τοῦ μή τινα ἔθελεν πείθεσθαι (‘[countless things in life] prevent anyone [lit. no one] from being willing to obey’). Naturally, τις can also occur as a separate word from the negative, even in cases where we would use the quantitative negation corresponding to οὐδεῖς: for instance, John 10: 28 καὶ οὐχ ἀρπάσει τις αὐτὰ ἐκ τῆς χειρὸς μου (‘neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand’) is rendered in the Latin Bible as: et non rapiet eas quisquam de manu mea (lit. ‘and not anyone . . . ’), but Luther writes, und niemand wird sie mir aus meiner Hand reissen (‘and no one . . . ’, as in modern English versions). This occurs as a matter of course with clause-initial μη: cf. II, 275–8 below.)

Modelled on οὐδεῖς, μηδεὶς are οὐδέτερος, μηδέτερος, replacements for *οὐ / μη + πότερος, which were either never formed or early lost (II, 268 above). Their existence at the time of Homer is guaranteed by οὐδετέρως ‘in neither direction’ at II.14.18; the form οὐδάλλος at Theocr. 6.46 is based on the fact that ἀλλος is often synonymous with ἐπέρος (II, 98 above).—Equally, the corresponding adverbial formations are replaced with forms containing οὐμ-, which is an old prevocalic stem form of εἰς, and is seen also (in some cases with transfer to the 1st and 2nd declensions) in the Herodotean plural forms οὐδαμῶν, οὐδαμοί (‘none’, gen. pl., nom. pl.), etc.: hence e.g. οὐδαμοὺ (‘nowhere’). Still, ποτὲ and πω were preserved next to the negative even in Attic, except that, on the model of the οὐδεῖς group of forms, intensive οὐδὲ was imposed in front of them, which does not really suit an indefinite; in Arcadian6 there is also the analogous μηδέποθι ‘nowhere’.

Efforts were made at an early date to define more clearly the form contained in οὐδεῖς and its companions. In Attic this was realized in the reintroduction of the rough breathing of εἰς: hence οὐδ-εἰς, etc., and hence the origin in the fourth century of the forms that remained regular until the Atticizing period, οὐθεῖς, μηθεῖς, μηθαμοῦ, μηθέτερος, etc. The pronunciation with hiatus also gave rise to οὐδὲ εἰς, μηδὲ εἰς, frequently attested in poetry (not only Attic), e.g. in (pseudo-) Hipponax, fr. 64 West χρόνος δὲ φευγέτω σε μηθεὶς ἀργῶς (‘let not one moment escape you in idleness’); Epicharmus, e.g. fr. 213 (PCG I) τί τώνυθε χαλεπόν; οὐδὲ ἐν (‘what of these things is difficult? Not one’); Aristophanes, e.g. Wealth 138 οὐ βούν ἄν, οὐχὶ ψαιστόν, οὐκ ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἐν (‘not an ox, or a barley-cake, or anything else’).

Related to this—though it is probably rather a surviving archaism—is the fact that

6 Again, in the 4th-c. Tegean inscription IG V.2.6 = Thür & Taeuber no. 3 (cf. II, 209 above), A.II.34.
οὐδεὶς, οὐδὲτερος, etc. undergo tmesis and ἄν or a preposition can come between the two elements, e.g. in οὐδ' ἄν εἶς θύσεεσ (‘no one would sacrifice’) at Wealth 137, μηδὲ μεθ' ἐτέρων ‘neutral’ in Thucydides 2. 67. 4, 72. 1, lit. ‘with neither of the two sides’), and so on.—More remote from οὐδεὶς is ἕνα μὴ καταλείπεσθαι ‘not a single man be left’ in Xenophon (Anab. 5. 6. 12), μιᾶν ἥμεραν οὐ ‘not for a single day’ in Demosthenes (30. 33). In the Greek Bible, εἶς is very commonly followed by the negative but not immediately; this reflects Semitic influence (Blass & Debrunner 1913 [= 1961]: §302).

This sort of use of the numeral ‘one’ is found in nearly every language: denial for a single entity | entails denial of the occurrence in the smallest degree thinkable. Expressions involving ‘one’ occur in part incidentally in relatively free combinations (such as German nicht einer, English no one, Fr. pas un, Lat. ne unus guidem), in part as established and fixed terms of quantitative negation, like English none and like German kein, in which the negative particle has disappeared (see II, 273 below).—Related to this is the use of a form based on the numeral ‘one’, which when used positively serves as an indefinite pronoun. This is the situation of Lat. nullus, as illus appears to be a diminutive of unus. In the phrase nullus unus (as in German kein einziger ‘not a single’ or Nibelungenlied, 19th Adventure, 1130, 2 deheinem einem wibe niht des hordes lân [‘no man of any sense should] entrust this hoard to any woman’), the negation is intensified by repetition of the numeral ‘one’. Alternatively, an indefinite is combined with the numeral ‘one’, as in Fr. ne . . . aucun, It. non . . . alcuno, while It. nessuno (lit. ‘not one itself, not even one’) is reminiscent of the original meaning of Gk οὐδεὶς. (There are parallels also in Baltic and Slavic.7)

But other types of new formation also emerged to express quantitative negation. A fuller form of the indefinite came to replace the simple form. So, Lat. numquam, nusquam (‘never’, ‘nowhere’) corresponding to the use of quisquam in negative clauses (II, 117 above). So, Gk ὀστισοῦν in place of τίς at e.g. Theognis 64–5 χρῆμα δὲ συμμελεύς μηδεὶς μηδ' ὀστιοῦν | σπουδαίον (‘but share with no one no serious matter whatsoever’). Especially noteworthy, however, is the use of nouns denoting broad groups. This includes first the personal negatives, German nie-mand (with the use of the word for ‘man’ that is first attested in Gothic), English nobody, Fr. ne . . . personne (cf. dialectal French n’armo [Auvergne], etc., containing Lat. anima according to Meyer-Lübke, REV, s.v. ‘anima’, 8 which is reminiscent of English not a soul, German keine Seele).

In origin, Lat. nemo is of this type (II, 124 above). It was recognized already by the ancient grammarians that it contains the word homo (‘man, person’), and Karl

7 Cf. e.g. Lithuanian nėkšas, Russian nikto ‘no one’; see LEW, s.v., Senn (1966: §284), and Vasmer, s.v.
8 For other forms and further detail, see FEW, 2nd edn, vol. XXIV, 383, s.v. ‘anima’ (3b).
Otfried Müller (1880: 100, 5 [on Festus p. 89, 8 Lindsay]) then saw that what we have in the negative is the well-attested earlier form *némo, i.e. némo is by contraction from *néhémo. Curious, but on closer inspection instructive, is the fact that in Classical Latin nemo is strictly confined to the nom., acc., and dat. (for the facts, see Neue & Wagener I, 745–6, II, 524–8). The absence of the ablativ is easy to understand: at an early period *ne hémé could never occur, because the ablativ of a noun denoting a person is found only with a preposition or in the ablativ absolute. But in a prepositional phrase, because the negative—even a quantitative one—really belonged to the clause as a whole, ne could not come between the preposition and the case-form, but had to come before the preposi-

tion, as in the Greek example quoted above μηδὲ μεθ’ ἑτέρων (‘neutral’), and the like. And in the ablativ absolute there was no place for *ne hémé, as the participle was originally negated with in-, and not with ne or non. If you wanted to say, ‘without anyone knowing’, you originally said, as Cicero does in Against Piso 89, omnibus inscientibus (lit. ‘all being unknowing’), as we see also in inscientibus cunctis (Livy 7. 5. 3) and ignaris omnibus (Sall. Jug. 91. 1, Livy 2. 12. 4); this type is seen also in inuitis omnibus (Cic. Vat. 11) for ‘as no one was willing’ (lit. ‘everyone being unwilling’; cf. II, 274 below). Only later do we find the substitute form nullo in this kind of collocation, first in Valerius Maximus 4. 1. 8 v. 104 Briscoc nullo uolente intercedere (‘no one wishing to intercede’), and with nullo sciente first in Flavius Vegetius Renatus (late 4th/earlier 5th c.; Epitome of the Art of War 3. 10. 8 Reeve). So, the exclusion of nemine from Classical Latin reflects ancient usage; ab nemine and (cum) nemine in Plautus (Miles 1062, Cistellaria 87) are understandable slips. And it is no less understandable that later writers then dropped the classical rule, and prose-writers from Tacitus on (Hist. 2. 47. 18, Ann. 16. 27. 6) admitted nemine without a qualm. This later usage also explains why the ancient grammarians do not know the classical exclusion of the ablative and hence also fail to pay particular attention to the pre-classical instances of nemine. Stürenburg (1832: 95–6), in his commentary on Cicero, In Defence of Archias, was the first to bring to Latinists’ attention the absence of nemine from the classical language.

The situation of gen. neminis is harder to explain. Apart from the pre-classical examples (below), it is attested only in the thoroughly eccentric Christian poet Commodian (3rd c., Africa), and, unlike abl. nemine, neminis is not used by any writer of good Latin under the Empire—which is why the Latin grammarians take explicit exception to it (e.g. Charisius, p. 203 Barwick = GL I, 159, 26–7). But why is it avoided? Given that the absence of nemine can be explained so well,

9 Commodian’s notoriously unclassical language and versification are probably ‘better attributed to a desire to innovate and write poetry with appeal for ordinary uneducated Christians than to incompetence’ (J. H. D. Scourfield, OCD, s.v. ‘Commodianus’).
there must be a reason for the non-appearance of neminis, too, but it is not easy
to find one. May one perhaps propose the following? From the point of view we
adopted in the case of nemine, the use of neminis after a verb appears perfectly
normal, as at Enn. Trag. 140 Jocelyn quos non miseret neminis (‘who have no pity,
for no one’), and Plaut. Capt. 764–5 neminis miserere certumst (‘I am determined
to feel pity for no one’), where obviously the negation in neminis applies to the
whole clause. But might there perhaps have been a different convention in the use
of the genitive next to a noun, such that it was not normal to put a negative
immediately before the genitive, which could have fused with it? In adnominal
use the negative does indeed have a looser connection to the clause as a whole. In
support of this approach, one might point out that in Homer the corresponding
negative οὐ τέο, οὐ τέυ occurs only with verbs—the counterexamples at II. 18. 192
and Od. 21. 306 would disappear if the text were correctly given by editors.10
If this account is along the right lines, we would have to suppose that neminis did
not become established in the language because it | was excluded from use next to
nouns. In that case the instances in Ennius and Plautus (above) with their
adverbial use of neminis would be preserving something ancient which was later
lost, while Lucilius at 1062 Warmington neminis ingenio tantum confidere oportet
(‘it is not right to trust anyone’s talents to such an extent’) would be going in the
opposite direction, away from the ancient pattern (unless neminis was originally
acceptable in clause-initial position—cf. II, 259–61 above). The syntactic relation
of neminis in the two instances quoted from Cato is unfortunately unknown.11

For classical writers, however, who needed both a genitive and an ablative
form for ‘no one’, it was more convenient to stick to nullus for these purposes,
rather than going against the tradition by using a full declension of nemo. No
restrictions attached to the use of the case-forms of nullus, partly because it was a
more recent formation than nemo, partly because in many instances the ablative of
nullus was justified even by the terms of the earliest usage: in e.g. nullo modo, the
n'- applied equally to the clause as a whole.

In analogous fashion to the words for ‘no one’, in the case of the meaning
‘nothing’, general words for ‘thing’ appear in place of the neuter indefinite
accompanying the negative particle. The clearest examples are English nothing
and French rien < Lat. rem. German nicht(s) (cf. II, 124 above) and English
nought and naught contain the word which is used in Gothic in the form waihts
to translate Gk πράγμα ‘thing’ (and after ni to translate Gk οὐδὲν, μηδὲν). There are
also more metaphorical words in use (cf. II, 254 above). In Latin, for example,

10 At II. 18. 192, W. may be thinking of Wilamowitz (1916: 170–1), who argued for οὐ θεό with some later
manuscripts; for a defence of οὐ τέο / τέυ (printed also by M. L. West), see Edwards (1991: ad loc.). At Od.
21. 306, W. presumably means that τέυ is to be taken as masc., with οὐ (‘from no one’), rather than as fem.,
with ἐπιγένος (‘any kindness’).
11 Both are in a single corrupt passage of Festus, pp. 158–9 Lindsay; cf. Orat. fr. 65.2, p. 67 Jordan.
nihil emerged as a fixed and normal word for ‘nothing’, beside which in Old Latin we still find ne(que) . . . bilum and non . . . bilum, e.g. in the ancient writer (Ennius?12) quoted by Cicero at Tusc. 1. 10 neque proficit bilum (“[Sisyphus] does not advance at all”), and Lucilius 1981 Warmington non proficis bilum (“you make no progress at all”); and both occur also in the ablative, e.g. Plaut. Truc. 560 neque . . . quern . . . bilum minus propere quam poterit (“he will never perish any less quickly than possible”), and Lucil. 490 Warmington delectes te, bilo non rectius uiuas ‘though you may amuse yourself, you wouldn’t live a whit more rightly’. On the original meaning of bilum there is discussion already in the ancient scholars: Varro (Lat. Lang. 5.111) compares it with hilla, the diminutive of hira ‘intestine’; according to Verrius Flaccus (1st c. BC/AD) in Paul. Fest. p. 90 Lindsay, bilum putat esse, quod grano fabae adhaeret (‘they think that a bilum is what sticks to the seed of a bean’, i.e. a tiny particle). Modern etymology has yet to achieve an explanation of the word.13 [Add.: Other words for ‘nothing’ are discussed by Hofmann (1951: 81–2), and Niedermann (1927: 351–2), including non flocci te facio, and non hettae te facio (‘I regard you as worth not a thing of very small value’) — the latter, according to K. Meister (1921: 223 n. 4), is from Gk ητα, like English not one iota (or jot), German nicht ein Jota, Ital. non un acca.] The more intensive negative phrases such as nemo quisquam, nihil quidquam, nemo unus (‘not a single person or thing’) speak for themselves.

In adverbs of place and time, other sorts of substitute were involved. In the ancient languages, speakers were by and large content with forms based on the indefinite and the numeral ‘one’. But as early as | Gothic we find in addition to the indefinite ni . . . hwanhun ‘never’, the specifically Germanic ni . . . aiw, which is occasionally combined with it (e.g. John 8: 33 ni . . . aiw hwanhun). The aiw corresponds to Lat. aeuum (‘time, an age, lifetime’), so that the phrase originally meant ‘as long as I live’.14 It survives in modern German nie. The positive counterpart is je ‘always, ever’; cf. Gk αιει, orig. the loc. of the same word, i.e. lit. ‘in my lifetime’. Old Germanic aiw is apparently concealed also in the first syllable of English ever, never.

It is evident, both from the above and from earlier discussion, that in all these various types of negation, even the negative itself was subject to variation: in Greek it was replaced by oν and then also by oδε, in Latin it alternated with non, not to mention the Greek alternation between μη and oν according to the type of

12 So Marx (1904–5: II, 436–7) on Lucilius 1375 (not in Warmington); cf. Ennius, Annals 6–7 Skutsch terraque corpus | quae dedit ipsa capit neque dispendi facit bilum ‘and earth herself who bestowed the body takes it back and causes nothing (not a whit) to be wasted’. (The lines have also been attributed to Lucilius, e.g. by T. W. Dougan in his ed. of Cic. Tusc., Cambridge 1905.)

13 Ernout & Meillet, s.v., are as agnostic as W.; Walde & Hofmann, s.v., rehearse various possibilities, including the equation of bilum with filum ‘thread’ (already implicit in Varro, Lat. Lang. 5. 113).

14 Gothic aiw is the acc. sg. fossilized in adverbial function of the masc. i-stem aiws (Gk aiω ‘time, eternity’; see GED, and Streitberg (2000), both s.v. ‘aiws’.}

II, 273
clause. But there are two further points to note. In French it is a peculiarity of the quantitative negatives aucun, personne, rien, jamais (<Lat. iam magis) that, while in normal clauses they still have ne with them, and originally have their negative meaning only in virtue of the presence of ne, elsewhere they are used as negatives even in the absence of ne. So, e.g. rien (like its Provençal cognate ren) can stand on its own meaning ‘nothing’, jamais ‘never’, and plus ‘no longer’. We find even un rien for ‘a nothing’ already in Molière.15 This phenomenon was touched on earlier (II, 254 above) with reference to Fr. pas and point, and may be illustrated also with German kein (‘no, not any’ = Lat. nullus), which is abbreviated from nekein or enkein < OHG nihein ‘not even one’. A negative has been lost also in the clause-type ich singe nicht, es tage denn (‘I won’t sing as long as it is not dawn’);16 cf. WILMANNS III, 285, and similarly German nur (‘only’) and English but (in the sense ‘only’) also reflect the loss of a superfluous negative (cf. II, 232 above). We shall see below an analogous loss in the case of German weder (‘neither’). Close to the French idiom above is the occasional negative use of modern Greek καθές ‘no, no one’ and τίτορε ‘nothing’ (THUMB 1910: §153).17—On this type of ellipse, see most recently JESPERSEN (1917: 19 ff.), W. HORN (1925), and on Slavic, Ernst Fraenkel (1926: 298–9).

It also came very naturally to express all these sorts of meanings by combining the negative with a word for ‘all’, thus making the negative universally applicable. This idiom is recognized and familiar in both Old and Modern French (TOBLER 1902–12: I, 193–4), e.g. in La Bruyère we have not only maxime usée et triviale que tout le monde sait et que tout le monde ne pratique pas ‘a familiar, trite maxim, which everyone knows and which no one follows (lit. everyone does not practise)’, where the antithesis suggests this sort of expression, but also without that sort of context e.g. toute autre doctrine ne leur plaît pas ‘no | other teaching pleases them’.18 This has been seen as a peculiarity of French, but the same occurs for one thing also in Slavic, where in Old Czech you could say e.g. ne-jmám věbo (lit. ‘I do not have of all’, as if we had in Greek οὐκ ἔχω παντός) to mean ‘I have nothing’ (see GEBAUER 1885: 182–5)—though admittedly this did not survive, and in

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15 For instance, in Tartuffe, I, 5, 307; cf. Livet (1897: III, 335). This masc. (NB!) noun ousts the inherited fem. une rien ‘a thing’; see Littré, s.v. ‘rien’ (20), and DHLF, s.v., 1808.

16 This is Wilmanns’ translation into modern German of ich singe nicht, es welle tagen (in which the second, conditional clause lacks a negative), a line of Walther von der Vogelweide (c.1170–c.1230), the most famous of the Middle High German lyric poets; for details, see Paul et al. (1998: §441).

17 These modern Greek indefinite pronouns, which may stand alone as negatives, reflect, respectively, the indefinite particle κάν (κάνιν) + et (‘one’) ‘even one’ → ‘anyone’, and τι ποτέ ‘anything whatever’ → ‘anything’; see Jannaris (1897: §§94–5), Horrocks (1997a: 232–4).

18 These quotations from the essayist and moralist Jean de La Bruyère (1645–96) are from, respectively, ch. 11 (‘De l’homme’) of his famous Caractères, ou Les moeurs de ce siècle (Characters, or: The Manners of This Age) of 1688 (9th edn 1696), and from the preface to his French version of Theophrastus’ Characters (published in the same volume).
Modern Czech it would mean ‘I don’t have everything’.

—This idiom is found also in Semitic: Hebrew kol ‘all’ in combination with the negative lo’ means ‘no, not any, nothing’, and this has also coloured the Greek and Latin of the Bible-translators: e.g. at Ezekiel 44: 9 the Septuagint and Jerome stick closely to the form of the original: πάσας οίνος ἄλλογενής... οὐκ εἰς εἰς τᾶς ἀγιᾶς μου, omnis alienigena... non ingredietur sanctuarium meum (‘no foreigner... shall [lit. all, any foreigner shall not] enter my sanctuary’), while Luther translates according to the sense, es soll kein Fremder... in mein Heiligtum kommen. The same occurs as a Semitism also in the New Testament (see Blass & Debrunner 1913 [= 1961]: §302.1), e.g., with repeated πᾶς, Revelation 18: 22 πᾶς τεχνήτης πάσης τέχνης οὐ μή εὑρεθῇ ἐν σοι ἐτί (lit. ‘and any craftsman of any craft shall not be found in you any more’); Luther: kein Handwerker einiges Handwerks soll mehr in dir erfinden werden. The Latin translation in the New Testament, too, follows the original slavishly, while Luther always expresses himself in accordance with the sense, and Wulfila alternates, behaving like Luther at e.g. Luke 1: 37 and Ephesians 4: 29, but rendering Ephesians 5: 5 πᾶς πόρφιος... οὐκ ἔχει with hwazuh hors... ni habaiþ (lit. ‘any whoremonger does not have’; contrast Luther’s kein Hurer... hat).

RADERMACHER (1909: 7, 10) calls this use of πᾶς oů a ‘splitting’ (‘Spaltung’) of oûdeis, and addsuces examples from literature closely related to the Bible.—Once or twice, however, this idiom occurs in classical authors where Semitic influence is out of the question. By chance, I recently came upon Propertius 2. 28. 13 semper, formosae, non nostis parere uerbis ‘you beauties, you never know (lit. always you don’t know) how to spare your words’. True, non nostis is synonymous with nescitis, but even so semper nescitis or quinis nescit would be an instance of the usage in question. Even Apollonius Dyscolus can say Syntax 1. 14, GG II.2, 16–17 πᾶς λόγος ἀνευ τούτων οὐ συνκλείεται (‘any sentence without these [either noun or verb] is not complete’), which Priscian translates as nulla oratio sine is compleetur (17. 12 = GL III. 116, 7).—Also relevant here, even if we are not so struck by them, are combinations of πᾶς, etc. with a privative, such as Heraclitus, B 1 (no. 22 DIELS & KRANZ) τοῦ λόγου τοῦτο... ἀέι ἄξιωτοι γίνονται ἀνθρώποι ‘men will never understand this logos (lit. will be always uncomprehending)’, or Lat. omnibus inscientibus, etc. (II. 271 above). On the other hand, the German phrases immer nicht, immer noch nicht (D. Wb., s.v. ‘immer’ [6]) express an insistent emphasis on non-action (lit. ‘always not [yet]’), i.e. not quite the same thing as nie, noch nie (‘never’, ‘never yet’).

19 Gebauer gives as the Modern Czech equivalent nemám níčeho, lit. ‘I not have of nothing’; cf. Short (1993: 511), who characterizes the use of the genitive as the object case after a negative as confined to archaizing styles or semi-idiomatic expressions.

20 Such combinations may be ambiguous in Biblical Hebrew (though never in modern Hebrew), and the scope of the negative (i.e. whether it negates just the word for ‘all’, ‘forever’, etc., or the verb and hence the whole sentence) is sometimes clarified through word order; see Gesenius §152, Steiner (1997: 168).
Obviously to be kept separate from the above are, first, cases where a word for ‘all’ accompanies the negative in order to strengthen it, as in Homeric οὐ πάγχυ and οὐ πάμπα, Attic οὐ πάνι, Hellenistic οὐχ ὀλως, οὐδ’ ὀλως (all with noteworthy preposing of the negative!), Lat. omnino non ‘absolutely not’, and so on; and secondly cases where only the word for ‘all’ is negated, rather than the content of the clause as a whole. It is noteworthy that here, too, the negative particle sometimes stands next to the verb as the core of the utterance, and not, as one would expect, next to the word for ‘all’: so e.g. Xenophon, Anabasis 2. 5. 35 οἱ δὲ πάντες μὲν οὐκ ἦλθον, Αριάως δὲ καὶ . . . ‘not all of them came, but Ariaeus and . . . (did come)’, although here πάντες is preposed for the sake of the contrast. So, too, at 1 Corinthians 15: 51 πάντες μὲν οὐ κοιμηθησόμεθα, πάντες δὲ ἀλλαγησόμεθα (‘we shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed’): Wulfila allai auk ni gaswiltam . . . : Luther wir werden nicht alle entschlafen . . . . And similarly Julius Pollux (2nd c. AD), Onomasticon 3. 29 φ ἀεὶ μὲν οὐ χρηστέων . . . ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀκατονομάστων πιστευτέων (‘he [Menander] is not to be used on every occasion . . . although in the case of objects without names [i.e. not in the lexica?] he is to be trusted’). But even without an antithesis there is the proverb all that glitters is not gold, Fr. tout ce qui reluit n’est pas or (cf. German nicht alles, was glänzt, ist Gold). Tobler (1902–12: I, 193) has already explained the good sense behind this pattern of word order: what it conveys is that ‘being gold’ may not be predicated of the subject ‘all that glitters’. Tobler reminds us that the pattern is admitted even in German, except that the ‘all’ is then emphatic (as in the Greek instances above). So, e.g., in Schiller’s poem Das Siegesfest, line 49 alle nicht, die wiederkehren, mögen sich des Heimzugs freun (‘not all who return can take delight in their homecoming’; cf. 48 denn nicht alle kehren wieder ‘for not all return’); in Jeremias Gotthelf’s novel Zeitgeist und Bernergeist of 1851, ch. 13 (II, 10 of the Berlin 1852 edn) alle können den Hof nicht erben (‘not everyone can inherit the farm’); and in the folksong, eine jede Kugel die trifft ja nicht (‘not every bullet hits its target’).21 For English examples, see Jespersen (1917: 87–8).

21 The last is part of a departing soldier’s reassurance to his beloved, in verse 5 of the popular ballad Fridericus Rex, unser König und Herr by the poet and novelist Willibald Alexis (1798–1871).
Lecture II, 30

With regard to the prohibitive particles Gk μή and Lat. né (II, 258–9 above), there are some further special points to report, in addition to what they have in common with the simple negative particles (which we have already discussed). We considered earlier (I, 213–16) how the use of the mood of the verb with these particles has shifted in main-clause prohibitions compared with the situation in Indo-European. But in both Greek and Latin these particles serve also to introduce subordinate clauses, a function favoured by the frequent placement of the negative in clause-initial position (II, 259–60 above).

In the first place, μή- and né- clauses can serve, just like positive clauses of wishing, to justify an appeal or a declaration of will in the preceding clause. A sentence such as Il. 10. 65 (Agamemnon to Menelaus) αδθι μένειν, μή ποσ ἀβροτάξεμεν ἀλλήλαιν ('stay there, lest by chance we two miss each other') has exactly the same structure as e.g. Il. 23. 71 (Patroclus’ ghost to Achilles) θάπτε με ὅτι τάχιστα πώλας Αἵδων περῆσω ('bury me as quickly as possible let me pass inside the gates of Hades'). In both cases, the subjunctive clause can be rendered either with an independent clause—'stay here: (for) I don’t want us to miss each other'; ‘bury me: (for) I wish to pass through the gates of Hades as soon as possible’—or with a subordinate clause introduced by ‘to prevent’ or ‘in order that’. It is noteworthy that Nicanor (I, 22 above) in cases of this sort vacillated between strong and weak punctuation; see FRIEDLÄNDER (1857: 29–30). We can recognize the close connection between the subjunctive clause and the preceding clause in the asyndeton between them; in speech, the link would have been marked also by intonation.

In the above example, the μή-clause indicates something refused by the speaker himself at the time of speaking. To that extent it still has the character of an independent clause. An attached μή-clause of this type can also, however, convey a refusal that justifies the action of another participant, e.g. at Il. 5. 844–5 Ἀθηνή | δὼν Αἵδως κυνέην, μή μιν ἰδον ἀβριμος Αρης ('Athene put on the cap of Hades so that mighty Ares should not see her’). Here, the μή-clause would make no sense on its own. It can be understood only through its connection with the preceding

1 Richardson (1993) on Il. 23. 71 compares 22. 418 λίασωμαι ‘let me supplicate’, which is virtually a final clause.
clause, and the refusal is thought of not from the narrator’s viewpoint, but from that of the agent reported in the immediately preceding clause. The μή-clause has thus acquired unequivocally the value of a subordinate clause. In the above example, this value emerges clearly from the optative in the μή-clause, which is conditioned by the preterite in the preceding clause (cf. I, 26, 238–9 above). The same applies to clauses in which someone tells of his or her own earlier actions, e.g. Od. 9. 100–2 (Odysseus to the Phaeacians) κελόμην...έσταύρως...νηών ἐπιβαίνεμεν... | μή πώς τις λωτοῖ φηγον νόστοιο λαθηται (‘I commanded my companions to board the ships, for fear that by chance one of them should eat some lotus and forget his homecoming’), or, with shift of mood, 376–7 πάντας έσταύρως θάρσων, μή τίς μοι ὑποδείας ἀναδυή (optative; ‘I tried to hearten all my companions to prevent anyone faltering out of fear’).—The Latin negative purpose clauses with ne¯ developed in an exactly analogous way.

Already in Homer, negative purpose clauses are introduced not only with bare μή but also with ἵνα μή, ὡς μή, ὰφρα μή, and later also with ὅπως μή (‘so that not’). Since positive purpose clauses usually began with ἵνα, ὰφρα, ὡς, etc., speakers liked to introduce negative ones too in the same way, and carried on adding those particles before the μή. The alternation of introductory particles may be seen in the selfsame phrase, e.g. at Il. 11. 704–5 τὰ δ’ ἀλλ’ ἐς δήμον ἔδωκε | δαιτρεύειν, μή τίς οἱ ἀτεμβὸμενοι κίοι ἱς (‘the remainder he [Neleus] gave to the people to divide in such a way that as far as was in his power no one should go defrauded of their proper share’) compared with Od. 9. 41–2 κτήματα...δασάμεθ’, ὡς μή τίς μοι ἀτεμβὸμενοι κίοι ἱς (‘we divided the spoil, so that as far as was in my power no one should go defrauded of an equal share’). Indeed, even the hypothetical particle, which was completely foreign to the independent μή-clause, is admitted alongside μή, though only three times in the Odyssey, in ὡς ἄν μή (2. 376 = 4. 749, and 16. 84).—In the face of this tendency, bare μή gradually fell into disuse in clauses of this type. It survives only rarely in Herodotus and Attic, and not at all in certain orators, including Lysias and Hyperides; for details, see Ph. Weber (1884–5). Even so, μή meaning ‘lest, to prevent’ is still occasionally to be found even in the Koine and into the imperial period (see Radermacher 1911: 158 [= 1925: 195])—and even in modern Greek (Thumb 1910: §280).

II, 277 In Latin, by contrast, simple ne¯ remained standard, although, especially in the earlier language, ut ne is also not uncommon (or ut...ne: II, 260 above). This is comparable not only with Gk ὡς μή in purpose clauses, but also with utinam ne in main clauses of wishing, e.g. at Enn. Trag. 208–9 Jocelyn (the start of the Medea) utinam ne in nemore Pelio securibus caesa accidisset...trabes (‘would that the timber...had not fallen hewn by axes in a Pelian grove’), where from the classical period on utinam non is more normal (cf. II, 259 above).—The same applies to quis (‘how’) ne in Terence, Andria 333 ego id agam, mihi qui ne detur ‘I shall work to prevent her being given to me’—where Donatus comments: ‘üeteres frequenter
ne pro non dicebant’ (‘in early Latin ne was frequently used for non’) — and possibly also to quo ne in Horace, *Satires* 2.1.37; *Hand* (1829–45: IV, 36) documents quo ne also for one or two late writers. By contrast, in Cicero, *Letters to his Friends* 7.2.1 (no. 52 Shackleton Bailey) praefinisti quo ne pluris emerem ‘you fixed in advance the price above which I may not make the purchase’, a prohibition is embedded in a relative clause (cf. Livy 34.6.14, etc.). Different again is the rhetorician Rutilius Lupus (early 1st c.) 1.9 (p. 7, 11 Halm), quaeritis maximis sumptibus faciendis, quo modo ne tributa conferatis (‘you seek at very great expense to avoid paying tribute’), a passage translated from the Athenian orator Stratocles (4th–3rd c.), where quo modo ne can only be understood as a translation of Gk ὅπως μή. 

Greek and Latin agree in developing from prohibitions words for ‘let alone’, i.e. where the speaker refuses to talk about something: Gk μητί (γε), μη ὅτι, etc., Lat. nēdum (also nē, nē ut). I cannot go into detail on this.

Greek and Latin also have in common the use of the prohibitive particle to introduce clauses of fearing. This particle can also introduce an independent clause of fearing (and this is the starting point for the subordinate construction). For example, at *Il.* 16.128, Achilles, on noticing the fire among the ships, says, μή δὴ νῆας ἐλωσί καὶ οὐκέτι φυκτὰ πέλωνται ‘(I fear) they may now capture the ships, and there may no longer be a means of escape’. In this type of expression, the speaker in a sense fends off from himself what is feared. But a μή-clause of this type can be attached to a verb of fearing, e.g. at *Od.* 5.473 δεῖδω, μή θῆρεσσιν ἔλωρ καὶ κύρμα γένωμαι ‘(I fear I may become a prey and spoil for wild beasts’). The μή-clause then indicates what is in the mind of the person afraid, and enters clearly into a relation of dependence on what precedes. The next step is the same as in the case of purpose clauses: fear felt by other people and fear felt in the past by oneself can be indicated in the same way, sometimes with a shift of mood. Even modern Greek has retained this pattern, though πῶς (roughly, ‘that’) and similar words are also used. — The origin of the construction in the notion of fending off is completely forgotten when the verb stands in the indicative. Even this more advanced stage of development has already been reached in Homer, e.g. *Od.* 5.300 δείδω μή δὴ πάντα θεὰ νημερτέα εἶπεν ‘I am afraid that everything the goddess said is true’.—Latin clauses of fearing with nē are exactly like those in Greek with μή, except that in Latin the indicative is not admitted. 

This negative form of clauses of fearing, strange to German eyes, is not confined to Greek and Latin. It is best known to us in French, as e.g. in *je crains que tu ne sois malade* (‘I fear that you are [lit., not] ill’), but it is also there in

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2 These include Boethius (5th–6th c.), *Consolation of Philosophy* 2.7.
3 See further, on Greek, KG II, 130; Denniston (1954: 143–4); Schwyzzer & Debrunner 707; on Latin, Hofmann & Szantyr §331.
4 In modern Greek, a verb of fearing can be followed either by the simple complementizer δή / πῶς or by μή (=), μήπως, (νά μή); see Thumb (1910: §268.3), Holton *et al.* (1997: 451–2).
English *lest*, formally comparable with Lat. *quominus* in that it contains *less* (cf. II, 255 above), which is still used after verbs of fearing no less than in purpose clauses. Even in German there are examples: St Paul’s words at 2 Cor. 11: 3 φοβοῦμαι μὴ πῶς . . . φθαρῇ τὰ νόηματα ὑμῶν (‘I fear lest by any means your minds should be corrupted’) are rendered by Luther with *ich fürchte, dass nicht . . . eure Sinne verrückt werden*. —Latin is more consistent than Greek in that it uses alongside *uereor ne* ‘I fear that . . . ’ the construction *uereor ut* ‘I fear that . . . not . . . ’. This *ut* is the same as that used in positive prayers, such as *ut de perduint* ‘may the gods destroy you’ (cf. also *utinam*). So, a sentence like Hor. Sat. 2. 1. 60 *ut sis uitalis*, *metuo* was originally intended in the sense, ‘I am afraid: (yet) may you have long life!’ On the synonymous Gk *μὴν οὗ*, Lat. *nē nōn*, see below, and note *οὐκέτι* (‘no longer’) in Achilles’ words at II. 16. 128, quoted above.

From clauses of purpose and fearing Gk ἡμαρτάνεις-clauses came to be used also after verbs of ensuring, taking care, and the like, as e.g. in Plato, *Theaet.* 145b ὃ ἔγκειται μὴ παῖζον ἐλεγεν (‘make sure he was not speaking in jest’), where we might translate μὴ with ‘whether . . . not’ (German ob . . . nicht), or indeed Theocr. 12. 36–7 Λυδίη . . . πέτηρη . . . , χρυσόν ὑποίη πεῦθονται, μὴ φαῖδος, ἐτήτυμον ἄργυρομοιβοί (‘the Lydian touchstone by which money-changers try true gold to see it be not false’), where Bücheler (1875: 47) wanted to change what he saw as a ‘structura incondita’ (‘crude construction’): VAHLEN (1891) saw the truth. Furthermore, in Greek of the Roman Empire, μὴ is used after ordinary verbs of asking (cf. KG II, 394, §553.3 n. 3). More or less the same is found in Latin, where e.g. *circumspicere nē* means at first ‘look around to prevent’ (so perhaps at Plaut. *Mil.* 955?), but then in Varro, *Rust.* 2. 10. 1 *cum circumspiceret*, *ne quid praeterisset* (‘as he glanced around to see if he had overlooked anything’) it must mean ‘check whether’, i.e. with an indirect question. In later Latin, nē is well established in the sense ‘whether’. In the Latin Bible, Luke 3: 15 διαλογιζομένων πάντων . . . περὶ τοῦ Ἰωάννου, μὴ ποτε αὐτὸς εἶη ὁ Χριστός (‘as they all mused concerning John, whether he were the Christ’) can be translated literally as *cogitantibus omnibus . . . de Ioanne, ne forte ipse esset Christus*—Wulfila does the same: *ḥagkjandam allaim . . . bi Iohannein, niu*6 *austfo sa wesi Xristus*; but contrast Luther: *und dachten alle von Johannes, ob er vielleicht Christus wäre*. —This provides the basis for constructions in Vulgar Latin such as in the 3rd-century veterinary text *Mulomedicina Chironis*, 10 *aquam ostendis ne bibere uelit* ‘show him (the horse) water to see whether he wishes to drink’,7 which lead in turn to Late Latin *nē* meaning

5 Vahlen took ἐτήτυμον as an adverb qualifying ἕως, ‘truly false’; I have followed the text, punctuation, and translation of Gow (1950), q.v., *ad loc*.

6 That is, negative ni + interrogative particle -n.

7 On this anonymous text, see now Fischer (1989), and Adams (1995: 6 n. 29, and Index, s.v.). The instruction quoted by W. is rendered into ‘good’ Latin by the later veterinary writer Vegetius, who used
‘in case, if’ | —on this usage, see Löfstedt (1911: 268) following Ahlqvist II, 279 (1909: 103–6).8

Apart from clauses of purpose, clauses of fearing, and clauses related to purpose after verbs of wishing, requesting, warning, and preventing (where Greek generally prefers the infinitive), we see in Latin a start made to introduce ne¯ (with long ě attested at e.g. Plaut. Curc. 36) even in conditional clauses. This involves conditionals containing a prohibition the observation of which determines the validity of the main clause, and they are introduced with dum. We have this several times in the famous Senatus consultum de Bacchanalibus of 186 BC,9 e.g. 8–9 (= 16–18) nisi...is...de senatus sententiad, dum ne minus senatoribus centum adesent, quom ea res cosoleretur, iousisent ‘unless he (the praetor urbanus) has commanded it on the basis of a decision of the Senate, provided that no fewer than a hundred senators were present when the matter was debated’. I would note here that ne with the comparative (as above) is common in the language of public affairs and business in other types of directive clauses with a striking attraction of the negative particle to the comparative, e.g. in the same senatus consultum, 22–3 haice utei...exdeicatis ne minus trinum noundinum ([and the Senate decreed that you] are to announce these provisions [in your assembly] over a period of not less than three weeks’),10 or at Livy 30. 37. 6, etc. It is found even without a subjunctive verb, e.g. at Cicero, Laws 2. 66 noluit quid statui nisi columellam tribus cubitis ne altiorem ‘he (Demetrius) did not wish anything to be erected (over a grave) except a small column no more than three cubits high’.—In some cases dum and ne are separated, e.g. Plaut. Capt. 338 quiduis, dum ab re ne quid ores, faciam ‘I’ll do whatever you wish, provided that you ask for nothing against my own interests’. In Classical Latin dum ne survives mainly—though not exclusively—in the official language, while the fuller dummodo ne (attested already in pre-classical Latin) survives somewhat longer. Other synonyms in subjunctive clauses are modo ne and tantum ne ‘only provided that...not’. Note also the use of simple ne at Cicero, Laws 2. 36 tu uero istam Romae legem rogato: nobis nostras ne ademeris ‘you, however, may introduce this law at Rome: just don’t take ours away from us’.—Like Gk εἰ μή, δὲ μή, so Lat. dum ne, dummodo ne are also found without a verb, at least in letters, where they may be translated ‘just not, except’: e.g. Cicero, To Atticus 12. 44. 4 (no. 285 Shackleton Bailey) scribas te nihil habuisse, quod scriberes, dummodo ne bis verbis ‘write that you had nothing to say, just not in so many words’ (similarly 6. 1. 4, no. 115 Shackleton Bailey dum ne negotiatori ‘just not for businessmen’).

the Mulomedicina, as aquam etiam offeres ut, si uoluerit, bibat ‘you should also offer him water so that, if he wishes, he may drink’.

8 On ne in Late Latin, see further Hofmann & Szantyr 542.
9 CIL I.2. 581: cf. n. 38, p. 525 above for further references.
10 On the problematic phrase trinum noundinum, see Primavesi (1995).
Except in *dum ne* and related phrases, Latin *nē* is not used in conditional clauses. We must not confuse *nē* with *nē ‘if not’, as is sometimes done, and the negative with *si* is either *nē* or *nōn* (cf. II, 251 above). In Greek, however, from Homer on, *μή* is usual in conditional clauses. Homer does not apply the rule consistently, but in Attic *ὅ* is generally found in | conditionals only if it belongs very closely with the verb (cf. II, 261 above) or another constituent, or if the ‘if’-clause contains something that is actually true. This use of *μή* is in conflict with the prehistory of the particle, and cannot be compared with Lat. *dum ne*, etc., as Greek *εἰ μή*-clauses, unlike Latin *dum ne*-clauses, have no sense of conveying a demand. No, we have here a striking innovation of Greek, which to the best of my knowledge has yet to be explained. One might be inclined to connect it with the use of *εἰ* and related forms in main-clause wishes and appeals. If these are negative, *μή* is required, and one might suppose that it was extended from here to subordinate, i.e. conditional, clauses. The problem is that these independent *εἰ*-clauses are nearly always positive. I know only one counterexample in Homer, at II. 16. 97–9 (Achilles’ prayer to sack Troy with Patroclus alone) *ἀλγὰρ . . . μήτε . . . μήτε . . .* where *μή* does not even immediately follow *αλ*.

One might consider another explanation. It is well known that optative and jussive expressions can also be used with concessive force: this is the reason for e.g. Latin concessive clauses introduced by *quamuis*. From the meaning ‘conceded that’ it is possible for ‘given that’ and ‘if’ to develop. Krüger (1873–91: I, §54.4 n. 2) documents this nicely with imperative clauses, e.g. Antiphon the Sophist (5th c.), B49 (no. 87 Diels & Kranz) *φέρε δή προελθέτω ὁ βίος . . . αὖ τῇ ἡ ἕμερα . . . κανον δαύμονος ἄρχει ‘come now! If life is prolonged (lit. let life go forward, *scil. so that one marries), . . . this day is the beginning of a new destiny*. In Latin, the use of *ut* + subjv. in such clauses when they are positive—as in the famous line of Ovid, *ut desint uires, tamen est laudanda voluntas* (‘even though I lack the strength, yet the will is praiseworthy’, *Letters from Pontus* 3. 4. 79)—is matched by *nē* if something negative is conceded or granted, e.g. Cic. *Tusc.* 2. 14 *ne sit sane summum malum dolor, malum certe est ‘granted that pain is certainly not the greatest evil, still it is certainly an evil*. Was it then once possible to use *μή* in clauses of this type, meaning ‘given that . . . not’, and was this *μή* then reinforced by the regular conditional particle *εἰ*? The striking thing is that neither *μή* nor, say, *ὅπως* *μή* is attested in this sense—II. 7. 353 *ἂν μή ἐξεμεν ὅδε* (‘where we do not act as I suggest’) cannot be used as an example. Furthermore, this sort of expression seems in general to be more at home in an intellectual age.

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11 It seems that this is still the standard view: see Schwyzter & Debrunner 322, 594–5, and note also Gildersleeve (1902: 132–6).
13 Does W. mean that II. 7. 353 cannot be used because the line is spurious, and that Aristarchus was right to athetize it? Or does he mean that here *ἂνα* (or, with Aristarchus, *ὠ̄* *ἂν*) means the same as *ἂν* ‘if’, with ‘a relatively easy extension [in the meaning of *ἂνα*] from local to circumstantial, or concrete to abstract,
Whatever view is taken of the origin of this use of μή in conditional clauses, it is very ancient and common to all Greek dialects: suffice it to note αἰ μά (= εἰ μή) in early Elean documents.\textsuperscript{14} The usage has deep roots in Homer, where it already occurs also, albeit not very frequently, in relative and temporal clauses with hypothetical colouring, e.g. Od. 11. 490 (Achilles in the Underworld) ἀνδρὶ παρ’ ἀκλήρω, ὦ μή βίωτος πολὼς εἰη (‘for a man without land of his own, who has not much to live on’). Later, the use of μή in subordinate clauses is extended | further still. This is already the case in Attic, where the construction occurs inter alia in relative clauses with causal overtones containing something factual, e.g. at Thuc. 8. 76. 6 οἳ γῆ μήτε ἀργύρων ἐφοιν ἕτι πέμπεν . . . μήτε βούλευμα χρηστόν ‘since they (the Athenians) had neither money to send them (the army in Samos) . . . not good advice (to offer)’.

Post-classical Greek goes even further, especially in the imperial period (see Green 1902). Here we find also ἐπεὶ μή, ἐπειδὴ μή ‘since . . . not’, ὅτι μή ‘because . . . not’ or ‘that . . . not’ (emended away at Antiphon, speech 5. 21\textsuperscript{15}), διότι μή ‘because . . . not’, and even μέχρι μὲν μὴδεὶς ἀφικτὸ παρ’ ἡμῶν (‘as long as no one appeared from us [Athenians]’) in the sophist Aelius Aristides (2nd c. AD).\textsuperscript{16} In a sense, then, μή has assumed the character of a negative serving simply for any kind of subordinate clause. The first to give the correct assessment of this phenomenon was the well-known American Hellenist Gildersleeve (I, 32–3 above). His account (1880) is supplemented by the rich material contained in W. Schmid’s learned and useful work on Atticism in the works of its chief exponents (1887–97: V, 162, Index, s.v. ‘μή’). From imperial prose Schmid can document even the use of μή instead of οὐ in a simple main clause, e.g. at Aelian, On the Characteristics of Animals 2. 49 (οἱ κόρακες τοὺς γειμαμένους σφάς μή τρέφοντων ‘crows do not feed their parents’ (cf. II, 283–4 below).—This departure from the classical language was noticed already by the ancient linguists: a first-century AD grammarian referred to it as the Ἀλαβανδιακὸς σολοικισμός (‘the Alabandian solecism’; Stephanus, s.v. Άλαβανδα’), which must be based on observations of the members of the school of rhetoric which flourished in Carian Alabanda around 100 BC. Much in this most recent use of μή is certainly literary affectation. It is unknown in the modern colloquial language, except that the

\textsuperscript{14} Cf. e.g. Buck no. 62 (Olympia, 6th c.) αἰ δὲ μᾶ συνάν ‘but if they do not act together’, with μᾶ for μή, the very open σ of Elean being written with α (Buck §15); cf. however, Buck no. 61 (Olympia, before ξ80) αὶ ζῆ μέ.

\textsuperscript{15} On the Murder of Herodes 21 ἄτι <οὖ τῇ ἔ> μή προνοίᾳ μᾶλλον ἐγινευτο ή νίχη ‘that these things happened not by design <on my part> but rather by chance’, with Jebb’s conjecture, for ἄτι μή προνοῖα of the manuscripts.

\textsuperscript{16} This is from speech 6, On Sending Reinforcements to those in Sicily: the opposite argument, §33 Lenz & Behr (p. 382 Dindorf). In §40 of the same speech, the use of μή for οὐ averts hiatus, but that is not the case in this passage; see Pernot (1981: 108, 126), and KG II, 447 n. 1.
negatives οὔτε, μήτε and οὔδε, μηδέ, which also serve as conjunctions, are used interchangeably (see Thumb 1910: §285).17

Parallel to the above development is the increasing use of μή with participles and infinitives. In both cases, the use of the prohibitive particle is a Greek innovation, albeit one that is found already in Homer. Admittedly, Homer uses μή with the participle only in clauses expressing the will or a wish of the speaker, e.g. Od. 11. 613 μὴ τεχνησάμενος μηδ’ ἀλλό τι τεχνήσαιτο (‘may the craftsman who wrought it [Heracles’ baldric] never make another!’; cf. Od. 4. 684, II. 13. 48). The same applies to Hesiod, Works 591 (ἐνή) βοῶς ὑλοφάγου κρέας μή πω τετοκνίησ (‘let the meat be of a cow put out to graze who has not yet had a calf’), and to the Hymn to Hermes 92 καὶ τε ἵδων μή ἵδων εἶναι (‘and be unseeing of what you have seen’). Gildersleeve (1897a: 244) rightly characterizes as a step beyond epic usage the instance in Pindar, Nem. 4. 30–1 ἀπειρομάχας ἐῶν κε φανεῦν λόγον ὁ μή ξυνεῖς (‘a man who does not know the proverb [‘it is right that the doer suffers also’] would obviously have no experience of battle’). This secondary use of μή with the participle originates in negative conditionals: δ μή ξυνεῖς is roughly equivalent to εάν τις μή ξυνεῖ (‘if someone does not know’). The normal Attic use of the negatives is best illustrated by a passage of Xenophon, Anab. 4. 4.

15 εἴδοκεί . . . πολλὰ ἦδη ἀληθεῦσαι | τά δντα τε ὡς δντα καὶ τά μή δντα ὡς οὐκ δντα (‘he had the reputation for bringing in accurate information: when he said something was there, it was there, and when he said it wasn’t, it wasn’t’), where the final words correspond to ἀ ἄν μή Ἰ, λέγει ὡς οὐκ ἔστι (‘whatever is not there, he says is not there’). In later Greek, the use of μή with the participle expands considerably until it becomes the standard participial negative. In certain parts of the New Testament, ὦ is hardly found at all any more with the participle, and in modern Greek μή alone is regular.18

With the infinitive, μή is most naturally used when it functions as an imperative (I, 266–7 above), as e.g. at II. 16. 839 (Hector quoting Achilles to the dying Patroclus) μή μοι πρὶν ἵναι ‘do not come back to me before . . . ’; in Vedic, even here the plain negative, not the prohibitive, is used, while Young Avestan appears to agree with Greek.19 It is equally natural in prayers, as at II. 2. 413 (Agamemnon’s prayer) μή πρὶν ἔπ’ ἥλιον δόναι καὶ ἐπὶ κνέφας ἀλθεῖν ‘let not the sun set and the darkness descend before then’, and after δός ‘grant’ (cf. I, 267–8 above), e.g. Od. 9. 530 (Polyphemus’ prayer) δός μή Ὀδυσσήᾳ πτωλιπόθθνον οίκαδ’ ἱκέσαι (‘grant that Odysseus, sacker of cities, may not reach his home’). It also makes sense, once it is admitted with the infinitive at all, in oaths, e.g. Od. 2. 373 (Telemachus to Eurycleia) ἀλλ’ ὄμοσον μή μητρὶ φίλῃ τάδε μυθησάσθαι (‘but swear that you will

17 Holton et al. (1997: 423) mention and illustrate only οὔτε . . . οὔτε.

18 Furthermore, unlike usual μή in modern Greek, this μή will usually not appear as μήν, even if the next word begins with a vowel or voiceless consonant; cf. Holton et al. (1997: 423).

19 For some Vedic examples, see Whitney (1889: §982cd); on Avestan, Reichelt (1909: §§684, 698).
not tell this to my dear mother'; cf. I, 746–7). But already in Homer μή is used in denials of fact, not only after verbs of swearing, as at II, 23. 585 (Menelaus to Antilochus) ἀμωμὴν μή τι ἐκὼν τὸ ἐμὸν δόλῳ ἀρμα πετόμας 'swear that you did not deliberately baffle my chariot by trickery', but elsewhere, too, e.g. II, 18. 500 (in the lawsuit on the Shield of Achilles) ὃ δ’ ἀναίνετο μηδὲν εἴλαβα ‘the other party denied that he had taken anything'—exactly like Ar. Knights 572–3 εἰ δὲ πον πέσοιεν ... ἤρμοντο μή πεπτωκέναι ‘if they ever chanced to fall, they denied that they had fallen'. (For a parallel in main clauses, see II, 283 below.)—In general, here, too, we can see a steady growth in the use of μή. In Attic, two types of instances deserve to be highlighted. Since ὀστε + infinitive can also express a desired consequence, which hence called for μή, ὀστε μή became generally common in Attic, even with purely factual consequences. The negative with the substantival infinitive is always μή, without exception. The starting point here were instances such as Aesch. Agam. 206–7 βαρεία μὲν κηρ τὸ μή πιθέαται, βαρεία δ’ εἰ τέκνον δαῖξω (‘not to obey is a heavy doom, but heavy too if I slay my child’), where, as the parallel εἰ-clause shows, the infinitive has hypothetical force and hence calls for μή. On the strength of cases like this, μή became the standard negative with this use of the infinitive. Later in the same play, we have 568–9 παροίχεται δὲ τοῖς μὲν τεθηκόσιν τὸ μή ποτ’ αὖθις μηδ’ ἀναστήναι μέλεν (‘[toil] is over for the dead, so that they will never care even to rise again'). Here the infinitive reports a fact: ‘for the dead the thought even of rising again is gone’. We must not be unsettled by the unnecessary use of μή here (quite apart from its repetition), just as at Thuc. 2. 49. 6 ᾗ ἀπορία τοῦ μή ἡσυχάζειν ... ἐπέκειτο ‘the desperate feeling of being unable to keep still ... was oppressive', and very frequently elsewhere (cf. below).—As with the | participle, so with the infinitive, the New Testament has nearly always μή. On the general steady expansion of μή + infinitive in later Greek, see especially the works of Gildersleeve and Schmid (II, 281 above). Modern Greek cannot furnish a comparison here, as it has very largely lost the old infinitive (cf. I, 275–6 above).

The distribution of οὖ and μή in combination with nouns and adjectives can be left to one side, since in general the same applies to them as to infinitives and participles. For example, the μή-phrase (in bold) in Thuc. 4. 87. 4 οὐδὲ ὀφείλομεν ... μή κοινὸς τινὸς ἄγαθον αἰτία τοὺς μή βουλομένους ἐλευθεροῦν (‘we ought not to free those who do not wish it except by cause of some common good’) is equivalent to εἰ μή κοινὸς τινὸς ἄγαθον αἰτία ὑπάρχει (‘unless the cause of some common good obtains’); and similarly in Theocr. 6. 19 τὰ μή καλὰ καλὰ σέφανται (‘foul has seemed fair’), τὰ μή καλὰ = ἀ ἄν μη καλὰ η (‘whatever is not fair’; for examples of a close link between μή and nouns, see II, 264–5 above). A peculiar combination, common especially in tragedy, is δ’ / η μηδὲν ‘the worthless one’, and τὸ μηδὲν ‘nothing’ (also without the article), which is much more frequent than οὐδὲν (cf. Bruhn 1899: 150–1).
By way of conclusion to this section, I must come back to independent clauses. Here, too, the use of Gk μη, unlike that of Lat. nē, expanded considerably, and several types of main clause have μη without prohibitive meaning and hence with the verb in the indicative. First, there are statements containing μη as a straightforward negative following an oath formula, as at II. 15. 36–42 (Hera to Zeus) (‘[let Earth be my witness . . . ] it is not by my will that Poseidon the Earth-shaker is afflicting the Trojans’), or Arist. Birds 194–5 (the Hoopoe) μα γην μα παγιδας μα νεφελας μα δικτυα; μη γω νόημα κομψότερον ήκουσά πιω (‘by Earth, by traps, by bird-nets, by snares, I never heard a more ingenious scheme’). Obviously, the pattern normal in promises on oath has been extended to statements on oath; compare the use of μη with the infinitive after verbs of swearing (II, 282 above), and also the shift in the meaning of ἀπρείσθαι (II, 258 above).—Secondly, there are cases like Od. 9. 405–6, where the other Cyclopes ask the moaning Polyphemus, ἢ μη τις σεν μηλα βροτῶν ἀδικοντος ἐλαίνει; ἢ μη τις στ’ αὐτόν κτείνει δάλῳ ἥ’ βίοπην; Here we can translate, ‘hopefully, no one is driving off your flocks against your will, or trying to kill you by trickery or force?’ (cf. Od. 6. 200). In unreal questions of this kind, what is asked is also wished for, and hence μη is used. Accordingly, throughout post-Homeric Greek until the late period, μη is regular in questions which hope for or expect a negative answer (this is more accurate than what was said earlier, I, 235 above). Apart from simple μη, we find also μη τι, ἀρα μη (< ἢ ἀρα μη, i.e. Homeric ἢ μη with the addition of ἀρα), μοῦν (μη οδν), occasionally with pleonastic μη or οὐ or οδν. |—No less easy to understand than the two cases above is μη with indicative ὀφελέων + infinitive of an unfulfilled wish, e.g. II. 9. 698 (Diomedes to Agamemnon) μηδ’ ὀφελες λίσσεσθαι . . . Πηλείωνα ‘you should not have appealed to . . . the son of Peleus’, relatively common in Homer, and also in later writers. The form would have required negative οὐ, the sense led inescapably to μη; cf. Lat. utinam ne (II, 277 above).—On the completely unmotivated use of μη for οὐ in main clauses in Imperial Greek prose, see II, 281 above.

20 See further Schwzyer & Debrunner 589, and Chantraine, s.v. ‘οδν’.
Lecture II, 31

We cannot omit, even in a syntactic study, expressions of negation using the so-called privative prefix: Gk ἄ(ν)-, Lat. in-, Osco-Umbr. an-, Germanic un- all go back to a single form *") (the so-called ‘sonant nasal’), which represents simply an old ablaut form of the old sentence negative ne (II, 250–2 above).1 The occasional Gk ν- before the lengthened initial vowel of the second element is attested in prose only in ν-ηρεμία ‘windlessness’ (cf. Homeric νῆρεμος ‘windless’, to ἄνερεμος ‘wind’) and ν-ωδός ‘toothless’ (to ὀδόος ‘tooth’). We still await a satisfactory explanation, but probably ν- is simply a variant of ᾽(ν)-; νη- before consonants, as in Homeric νηκερδία ‘useless’, appears to be a poetic innovation (cf. Debrunner 1917: §56).2—On the occasional tmesis of Lat. in- and German un-, see II, 171 above.

The term ‘privative’ goes back to antiquity, stemming indirectly from Cicero and Aristotle. Aristotle uses στέρησις to mean ‘negation’ and στερητικός ‘negating, negative’, while Cicero translates these terms as follows, Topica 48: ‘sunt enim alia contraria, quae priuantia licet appellemus Latine, Graeci appellant στερητικά. praeposito enim in priuat urubem ea ui quam habet si in praeposito non fuisset, dignitas indignitas’ (‘there are other opposite forms which we may call priuantia in Latin, and the Greeks call στερητικά. For if in is put in front, a word is deprived of the force that it would have without in, as in dignitas vs indignitas’).

1 We now term this vowel-less ablaut form the ‘zero grade’. Before a consonant *") behaves like a vowel (*")—, and yields regularly ἄ- in Greek and Sanskrit, *en- which becomes regularly in- in Latin, and un- in Germanic (compare Gk ἄναντος, Skt ajñātus, Lat. ignōtus < *enmyōtus, Gothic unkunþs, all ‘unknown’). Before a vowel, one might expect simply consonantal n- but one finds either the regular reflex of *")— (e.g. in Latin and Germanic) or a short vowel before the nasal, e.g. in Greek and Sanskrit (compare Gk ἄνυδρος, Skt an-uḍrā ‘waterless’); the latter outcome looks as if it is from *)— and the IE form is sometimes so represented—on this issue, see Sihler (1995: §94) and Szeméry (1996: 50–1). The discovery of the nasalis sonans (*") and *m- and of the liquid counterparts (*") and *r- goes back to work by Brugmann and Osthoff respectively in 1876; see further Szeméry (1996: 46–9), with references to the early literature. On negative compounds in Indo-European, see Frisk (1941) and Puhvel (1953).

2 Some instances of initial n + long vowel in Greek negative compounds can be explained as arising by regular sound-change from *)— before a root-initial laryngeal (e.g. νῖρρησις ‘unwaking’ < *)η-βρ-έταις, νιρής ‘not eating’ < *)η-βδ-τῖς, νημερτής (earlier να- ‘unfailing’ < *)η-μερ-εῦς). Most of them, however, including νῆρεμος and νωδός, will not work so simply, and must have some sort of analogical explanation: i.e. inherited να-, νη-, να- arising by regular sound-change are reinterpreted as prefixes and attached to other roots (e.g. before Gk κερδο’ one would expect simply ὄ- < *)η-). Cf. Rix (1976: 73) and, with some discussion, Sihler (1995: §108).
This Ciceronian term furnishes the basis for the formation of the term *privatius* (with the suffix -(t)iuus, used in many other grammatical terms), which is used by Aulus Gellius of *ne-* (Attic Nights 13. 23. 19) and *ne-* in *mesanus* ‘insane’ (s. 12. 10), and by Priscian of *in-* (14. 50 = GL III, 53, 23–4; cf. Gloss. Lat. II, 159, 25 *privaticia: στερητικός*). Among more recent work on privative formations, note especially the excellent dissertation of H. A. Hamilton, *The Negative Compounds in Greek* (1899), which is important particularly for the semasiological and stylistic evaluation of these forms (pp. 35–53).³

Originally, given that (as we saw earlier, II, 259–63 above) *nē* and its replacements served only to negate the clause as a whole or the finite verb, the only means of negating a noun or adjective, if such was required, was with the privative prefix. In the course of time, however (cf. II, 263–7 above), the sentence negative came to function also as a general word negative, and competed with the prefix in practically all its contexts of use, though often with a slight difference of meaning. And in all languages, apart from the sentence negative other substitutes have become established instead of the prefix (cf. II, 294–7 below).

Of the languages that concern us here, it is German—and Germanic in general—that makes the richest use of the prefix. It may be legitimate to say that it is prominent already in Wulfila. Admittedly, cases where Gothic has *un-* and Greek *oδ* or *μή* and the converse, where Gk ἀ- is rendered with Gothic *ni*, more or less balance out: in the participle, the privative formation is still available in Gothic but lost in Greek (II, 287 below); on the other hand, certain Greek derivatives cannot be imitated in Gothic, which has to say *ni gαlαuβjαn* for Gk ἀπιστείν (‘be faithless, fail to believe’) and *ni fраjβα* for Gk ἀγνοεῖν (‘fail to understand, perceive’). Very striking, however, is the bold *unþiudom* ‘non-peoples’ for Gk ιπτίυδομ (II, 265 above), and also noteworthy are the cases, not altogether infrequent, where Wulfila renders a positive word in Greek with a Gothic privative: e.g. *unsels* for πονηρός, *unþiβαι* for τὸ κακὸν (both, ‘evil’), *unleþs* (lit. ἄκληρος) for πένης (‘poor’), *unhulþα*, *unhulþο* for δαίμων, δαίμόνιον (‘demon, devil’)—as it happens, lots of words for negative meanings. This capacity and fondness for compounds in *un-* can be seen still today in modern German, to which we shall return below; for a nice presentation, see Euling, D. *Wb.*, s.v. ‘un-’, cols 1–34.

The use of the prefix is particularly prominent in verbal nouns. This corresponds to the use of *nē* (and its replacements) with the finite verb. It is attested especially early and preserved until today with verbal adjectives in -(t)oς and related forms. The age of forms such as Lat. *ineptus*, *incestus*, *insulsus*, and *irritus* (‘lacking in judgement’, ‘unclean, unchaste’, ‘unattractive, unfunny, dull’, ‘not ratified, invalid’) is seen in their root-vocalism, which differs from the corresponding

³ See now Moorhouse (1959: 47 ff.) and Risch (1974: §77a) with further references on individual points.
positive forms aptus, castus, salsus, and ratus (‘fitting’, ‘chaste’, ‘witty’, ‘valid, established’; cf. II, 172 & n. 6, p. 613 above); the age of Lat. initus (‘unwilling’) and Homeric ἀναλεὺς ‘insatiable’ is apparent in the fact that neither the positive form nor (apart from Lat. ulla ‘thou willst’) the underlying verb survives.⁴ There is no positive form either for Gk ἀδυντον, ἀίστος, ἀκήρατος (‘place not to be entered, sanctum’, ‘unseen’, ‘inviolate’; on which see SCHULZE 1892: 233–7), ἀνήμορος, ἀπαστός (‘not bound by oath’, ‘fasting, not having eaten’) nor for German unbeschadet, unbeholfen (‘irrespective of’, ‘ungainly’).

Great antiquity can be demonstrated particularly nicely for Gk ἀφθιτος and ἀμβροτος (both, ‘immortal’). A scholiast on II. 13. 22 teaches: ‘τὸ ἀφθιτον ἐπὶ πράγματος, τὸ ἀθάνατον ἐπὶ θεοῦ’ (‘ἀφθιτον is used of a thing, ἄθανατον, of a god’). Henricus STEPHANUS, who knew this distinction from a scholiast on II. 2. 186, did not want to accept it, but W. DINDORF showed that it is entirely in keeping with Homeric usage.⁵ Not until Hesiod (Theog. 389, 397) and the Hymn to Hermes 326 is ἀφθιτος used of divinities, though in later writers, especially Pindar, this usage is absolutely regular. Originally, then, the scholiast’s observation will have served to distinguish Homer from later poets, and so may go back to Aristarchus. Now, Homer’s restricted application of ἀφθιτος is curious because he often uses the underlying verbs φθίνεσθαι and φθινόθεν (‘to waste away, perish’) of the death of mortals and analogously the compounds φθισίμφρος and φθισιμβροτος (‘that destroys men’) as epithets of πόλεμος, μάχη, and αἰγίς (‘war’, ‘fighting’, ‘aegis’). This conflict in use is explained by the fact that ἀφθιτος was inherited, and, to judge from Vedic, precisely as an epithet of things. Indeed, the Homeric collocation κλέος ἀφθιτον (‘imperishable fame’, II. 9. 413, also in an old Delphic epigram in the form κλέος ἀπθιτον) has an exact correspondence in Vedic.⁶

No less ancient and inherited is ἀμβροτος ‘immortal’, an Indo-European epithet of the gods. The cognates in Indic and Iranian are also used as proper referring-expressions for the gods, like Lat. immortalis (which itself is probably

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⁴ Gk ἀναλεύς has been compared with Skt anala ‘fire’ (— ‘the insatiable thing’—this has, however, been suspected of being a loanword); for the root, cf. Lat. alere ‘to nourish’ (often used of feeding a fire), and cognates in Celtic and Germanic; cf. Frisk and Chantraine, each s.v., and LIV, s.v. ‘h,el’.


⁶ In addition to the Delphic epigram (Collitz & Bechtel no. 1537; Crissa, 6th c.), we now know the phrase κλέος ἀφθιτον in a good number of inscriptions from various parts of the Greek world, including Asia Minor, Rhodes, and Italy (Padua) as well as Attica (most famously in one of the epigrams on the Persian Wars, from c.479 BC, SEG 40 [1990], 28). Homeric κλέος ἀφθιτον and the Vedic phrases akhśiti śravah and śravah...aṅkṣitam (all, ‘imperishable fame’) were equated by Adalbert Kuhn in 1833, in an article on verbal stem-formation. Kuhn’s rather casual comparison marked the beginning of the now-thriving field of Indo-European linguistics devoted to poetry, poetics, and poetic formulae. On ‘imperishable fame’, see most recently Watkins (1999: 12–13 & ch. 15); on the field of Indo-European poetics, see Schmitt (1967; 1968; 1973), Watkins (1995), and now above all West (2007).
extended from an earlier *immortus). Gk ἄμβροτος did not achieve this sort of substantival use, and already in Homer is more of a mere ornamental epithet of divine objects. Where the meaning ‘immortal’ was expressly required, ἀφθιτός was replaced by the new formation ἀθάνατος, as in the common Homeric phrase ἄθάνατος καὶ ἀγάμος (‘deathless and ageless’, e.g. Il. 8. 539, Od. 5. 218).—The specific connection of this word with the food of the gods—that we find in Gk ἁμβροσία—is also inherited, as Vedic amītā (a drink bestowing immortality) shows.\(^7\)

Incidentally, the usual translation of poetic βροτός as ‘mortal’ is strictly speaking misleading. In Homer the word refers to dying only once or twice at most—perhaps, for instance, at Od. 5. 218.\(^8\) Phrases like θνητὸς βροτός (‘a mortal man’, Od. 16. 212), βροτός . . . ὅσπερ θνητὸς τ’ ἔστι (‘a man, though he be a mortal’, Il. 18. 362–3), ζωοὶ βροτοί (‘living men’, Il. 18. 539), βροτοῖο πάλαι καταπεθνήωτος (‘of a man who died long ago’, Il. 23. 331) exclude the literal, etymological meaning. It is easy to see why this meaning was lost. Apart from βροτός and ἄμβροτος, Greek, unlike Latin, lost the inherited group of words for death and dying, doubtless out of fear of mentioning the thing by name.\(^9\) As far as the verb is concerned, Germanic and Celtic do the same as Greek, and it is telling that in Avestan the Zoroastrians used the inherited verb only of evil beings, for the death of the pious using instead a verb of going.\(^10\)—We may happily take it that in Aeolic, where βροτός has its origin, the word meant simply ‘human being’, just like its cognates in Iranian (cf. modern Persian mard ‘man’, mardam ‘human being’).\(^11\) Note that

\(^7\) The allusiveness of W.’s statement here is appropriate: an inherited connection with the food of the gods is plausible enough, but it is unclear how this arose, especially in view of the morphological difference between Gk ἁμβροσία and Ved. amītā. In an influential article, Paul Thiemé (1952: 15–34) urged the importance of distinguishing two senses of Gk ἁμβροσία and of its Indo-Iranian cognates and Indo-European antecedents: (1) ‘not dead, alive’, and (2) ‘immortal’; he derived Gk ἁμβρόσιος from a lost neuter noun *ambroton, which matches exactly Vedic amītā, and had according to him an extended sense, derived from (1), ‘enlivening; containing or bestowing life’, which is more doubtful. Certainly, the suffix *-tos serves two, quite different functions in Gk βροτός, ἁμβροτός ‘(in)capable of death’ and the participial Skt mṛt, mṛtus ‘having undergone death’, and it is probable that at least the meaning of the (positive) βροτός is derived from the negative compound ἁμβροτός, where the ‘potential’ meaning of the suffix is usual. See further Leumann (1950: 127) and Chantraine and Frisk, each s.v. ‘βροτός’, and, on Vedic amītā-, Rivelex, s.v.

\(^8\) Odysseus to Calypso: ‘she (Penelope) is βροτός, while you are deathless and ageless (ἄθανατος καὶ ἀγάμος)’.

\(^9\) Taboo can alternatively lead not to loss but to distortion of a word, the classic case in Indo-European being the word ‘tongue’, see Hock (1991: 303–5) with further references. Still worthy of note is Meillet (1926b).

\(^10\) That is, miriicte for the daevas, and -iinnitus (cognate with the German causative leiten ‘to lead’) for the aburus; cf. Bartholomae (1904), s.vv. ‘mar’—(i), ‘raeth’, and for further information on the roots in Indo-Iranian and Indo-European, EWĀia, s.vv. ‘MAR’, ‘márta’—, ‘martya’—, ‘mṛtyu’—, and LIV, s.vv. ‘mer—’ ‘disappear, die’— and i. ‘leit—’ ‘go (away)’—’. The root may survive in Gk μαραίνω ‘to wither’, and we can now compare Hitrite mer— ‘to vanish away’.

\(^11\) Cf. also Armenian mard. An Aeolic origin is supposed because of the -po for expected *-pe in βροτός < *m(b)ro-tos < *mṛ-tos (cf. Lesbian and Boeotian στρατιος vs Attic στρατός, Thessalian πέρα vs Attic pēra), although po, op for expected po, op is occasionally found also in Arcado-Cyprian and Mycenaean; see Rix (1976: §75), Meier-Brügger (1992: II, 116–17) with further references, and Sihler (1995: §95).
Cesias (in Photius, *Bibliotheca*, ‘codex’ 72, I, 135–6 Henry) rendered the word *μαρτιχόρα*, the Iranian name for a fabulous beast, as *ἀνθρωποφάγος* (‘man-eater’; cf. Lagarde 1866: 223–4).\(^{12}\) For Aristotle, *βφρός* is simply a synonym of *ἀνθρωπός*, if only an *ἀγνωστότερον* δύναμ (‘a less intelligible term’); see *Topics* II, 287 6. 11, 140a5–6 and 5. 4, 133a30–3, and cf. Ammonius’ comm. on Aristotle, *Peri hermeneias*, CAG IV.5, p. 38, 9–14 Busse *τὸ* *ἀνθρωπό* δύναμ καὶ τὸ *μέροφ* καὶ τὸ *βφρός* σημαίνει ταῦτά (‘the words “ἀνθρωπός”, “μέροφ” and “βφρός” signify the same thing’), a passage which includes a derivation of *βφρό* from *μοιρής* (lit. ‘allotted’). Notice in Hesychius *μορφός*· *ἀνθρωπός* καὶ *μορτοβάτην*· *ἀνθρωποβάτην* (‘trodden by man’, of a boat).\(^{13}\)—Lat. *mortalis*, too, should not be rendered glibly as ‘mortal’: it is really an elevated equivalent of *homo* (‘human being’), which incidentally for its part denotes human kind as earth-born—cf. *χαμαγγενέων* *ἀνθρωπόω* (‘of earth-born men’) in the Homeric hymns, Hesiod, and Pindar—as opposed to the heavenly ones, *dini*, θεοί οὐρανίων, *caelestes*.\(^{14}\)

On the other hand, English phrases such as *uncared for*, *unheard of*, *untaught to speak* may serve as particularly strong testimony to the survival of this type of privative compound right up to the modern day (on these, see Jespersen 1917: 145).

Conversely, the old practice of negating the true participle with the privative prefix gradually declined, at the earliest date in Greek. To the examples of old in- in Latin adduced in our earlier discussion (I, 283 above), let me add *imparentem* ‘disobedient’ (i.e. ‘*non pares*’, Paul. Fest. p. 96 Lindsay) and *infitentes* (ἀρνούμενοι, Gloss. Lat. II, 82, 51), which works like Gk οὐ φημι, etc. (II, 262 above) and means ‘denying’; one or two ancient scholars wrongly inferred from the latter a finite verb *infitetur* ‘denies’ (see K. O. Müller (1880) on Paul. Fest. 112, 10 [= p. 100, 5 Lindsay]). In keeping with this is the fact that ‘not wishing’ in early and Classical Latin is *inuitus*, and that *nolens* is not found before Seneca (e.g. *Letters* 99. 19 and often) and Quintilian (1. 1. 12, 20, etc.). Further Old Latin examples are given by Delbrück (1893–1900: II, 530), who also characterizes *ἀφρονέωντες* at II. 15. 104 (Hera to the gods) *ζηνί μενεαίνομεν* *ἀφρονέωντες* (‘we are idiots to quarrel with Zeus’) as formed like *ἀδέκουτες* (‘unwilling’; cf. I, 283

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12 The histories of Persia and India by the 5th-6th-c. doctor and historian Cesias of Cnidus are among the more generously represented of the 280 (mostly otherwise unknown) classical books (*codices*) quoted or summarized by the 9th-c. Byzantine scholar St Photius, twice patriarch of Constantinople, in his most important work known as the *Bibliotheca*, or *Myriobiblion*. For bibliographical orientation, see Dickey (2007: 103–4), and for an excellent introduction, Wilson (1994: 1–22), who happily includes Cesias, who amounts to more than twenty pages, in his selections from Photius in translation (1994: 54–78). With the second element of *μαρτιχόρα* cf. Āvestan *xātar* ‘to eat’.

13 On the other hand, Hesychius includes also *ἐμορτέων*· *ἀπέθανεν* ‘died’, and *μορτοβάτην* has been taken as ‘trodten by the dead’, of Charon’s boat in the underworld.

14 The root of *homo* is indeed in origin the same as that of Lat. *humus* ‘earth, ground’, Gk γῆν ‘earth’, *χάμι* ‘on the earth, ground’. These and numerous other cognates (including English *grow* < *guma* ‘man’) reflect the Indo-European root *dhgrh*<sub>2</sub>*om*– *earth*; cf. Mallory & Adams (2006: 120).
above).—Unlike the Latin gerundive in -\textit{ndus}, the Greek verbal adjective in -\textit{tēos} cannot form negatives with the privative prefix.

Of other verbal nouns with the privative prefix, I would pick out by way of example \textit{αδώνης} at Hesiod, \textit{Works} 355 δῶτη μὲν τις ἐδωκεν, \textit{αδώνης} δ᾿ ὄφ τις ἐδωκεν (‘to a giver one gives, to a non-giver no one gives’),\textsuperscript{15} and \textit{ἀκύρος}, which has an exact cognate in Avestan (see II, 61 \textit{Ftn.} and n. 13, p. 476 above). Notable also are the root-nouns, of which e.g. Gk \textit{ἀξιος} (‘unyoked’) is certainly inherited, as both Latin—\textit{inlux}, in \textit{inunges bounes} ‘unyoked oxen’ as sacrificial victims (Festus, p. 101 Lindsay)—and Sanskrit\textsuperscript{16} have exact cognates. Related to privative root-nouns are the privative verbal abstracts in Gk -\textit{ia}, Lat. -\textit{ia} (and -\textit{iēs}), in the same way as \textit{inscientia} and \textit{inscitia} (‘ignorance, lack of knowledge’) are to \textit{insciens} and \textit{inscritus}. This type also includes many obviously ancient formations. Latin examples include \textit{inedia} ‘fasting’, which corresponds to the verb stem \textit{vēd-} ‘to fast’ that we can infer for Greek (II, 252 above); *\textit{infitiae}, surviving only in the phrase \textit{infinitas ire} ‘to deny’ (cf. \textit{infitens} ‘denying’, above); \textit{illunies} ‘the state of being unwashed’, used by Lucilius, 728 Warmington in a list including the invented near-synonyms \textit{imbalnities} and \textit{imperfundities} (‘bathlessness, perfusionlessness’).

Greek has equally old examples, including \textit{ἀκρασία} ‘lack of self-control’ | (to \textit{κρατεῖν}); \textit{ἀμβία} ‘ignorance’; and, with a different vocalism (\textit{a}) in the root, \textit{ἀδιαρροια} ‘constipation’ in Hippocrates (Erotian, \textit{Collection of Hippocratic Words}, p. 29, 21 Nachmanson).\textsuperscript{17} Note especially certain names of divine or semi-divine figures: from a third-century inscription from Erythrae (\textit{SIG} no. 1014, B67) we know of the \textit{Ἀβλαβίαι}, who are regarded as related to the Erinyes;\textsuperscript{18} compare the phrase in the \textit{Hymn to Hermes}, 393 ἐπ’ ἀβλαβίασ νόοιο ‘honestly, without deceit’, Cicero’s use of \textit{ἀβλάβεια} to translate \textit{innocentia} (‘harmlessness, inoffensiveness’) at \textit{Tusc.} 3. 16, and Cretan \textit{ἀβλοπίαι} (with or without \textit{δικαίοις} meaning ‘fairly, harmlessly’).\textsuperscript{19} Another such name is \textit{Ἄμαλθια} (Anacreon, 361, 1 Page, quoted above, II, 261), which is related to Gk \textit{μαλθακός} (‘soft’; so already \textit{Benfey} 1839–42: I, xiii) and with it to the Vedic \textit{mardh}- ‘to neglect, forsake’, which is particularly often used with a negative.\textsuperscript{20} With its variant \textit{Ἀμάλθεια} (or

\textsuperscript{15} It seems necessary to regard \textit{δῶτης} as abstracted from some other compound(s), the sequence being -\textit{δῶτης} > \textit{δῶτη} > \textit{ἀδώνης} (West 1978a: \textit{ad loc.}), q.v. for discussion and further references.

\textsuperscript{16} The closest cognate in Sanskrit, \textit{ayuj-}, means ‘odd (of numbers)’; cf. Vedic \textit{ayuj-} ‘without a companion, equal’; see \textit{EWAsA}, s.v. ‘YOJ’.

\textsuperscript{17} The grammarian Erotian (1st c.) compiled a large lexicon of obscure words to be found in thirty-seven Hippocratic treatises, set out in the order of their occurrence in the texts. Of this an abridged version (in alphabetical order in part) and some fragments survive; for a bibliographical orientation, see Dickey (2007: 45–6).

\textsuperscript{18} This inscription (= \textit{IK} II, no. 201, A34; 300/260 bc) concerns the sale of priesthoods. These goddesses are named euphemistically (lit. Harmlessnesses), just as the Erinyes are sometimes called \textit{Eυμερεῖδες}, ‘the gracious ones’.

\textsuperscript{19} Cf. e.g. \textit{IC} II. V.2, 10; V.4, 2; IV. 75, A9–10; 81, 12–13.

\textsuperscript{20} Cf. Vedic \textit{nā mardhāti} ‘does not forsake, takes care of’, \textit{āmardhant-} ‘unremitting, constant’. The semantic distance between Indo-Iranian *\textit{mardh-} and Gk \textit{μαλθακός}, English \textit{mild}, etc. has caused
Greek  

A word more needs to be said about the privative formations to verbal abstracts in -ti- and -tu-. Germanic has both types, e.g. in Gothic unmahts 'weakness' (from an i-stem) vs unlustus 'lack of desire, reluctance'. Latin has examples in -tus, e.g. incultus ('uncultivated condition') and intactus ('intangibility') negating cultus and tactus, and incestus 'sexual impurity' to pre-classical castus 'ceremonial state of abstinence'; in Lucretius 1. 454 tactus corporibus cunctis, intactus inani (touch to all bodies, intangibility to the void), of inalienable properties, intactus was rejected as a nominative by Lachmann (1882: ad loc.), but assured by Diels (1923–4: ad loc.). Diels sees in these negative formations a Latin innovation, though in Greek there is ἄπασις (= ἄπασία, 'fasting'), ἄφραστος (= ἄφραδια, 'thoughtlessness'). Apart from these, however, Greek has hardly any examples of these types, making instead to positive abstracts in -tia, -τία, -τία, e.g. Hesiod, Works 372 πίστεις τί δ' ἀρ' ὀμίος καὶ ἄπιστια ὀλέαν ἀνδρας (lit. 'trustings and mistrustings alike have ruined men'). Democritus opposes the pairs τέρψις: ἀτερπήσις, ἔγνεσις: ἀδίκεια ('joy': 'unpleasantness', 'understanding': 'want of understanding', no. 68, 85, 147, 183, 188 Diels & Kranz), Plato ῥάξις: ἀταξία ('order': 'disorder', Laws 2, 653ε), controversy over whether, and if so how, to connect them. See LIV, s.v. 'st', and EWΔἰα, s.v. 'MARDH', with further references.

21 In Attic literature (notably in Thucydides and the tragedians), we find e.g. ἄφθοια ~ ἀφθεία 'benefit', and ἀφθία 'aversion' for expected ἄφθεια, but note also Homeric νομελή, and δεμοκρατία in Herodotus; see, in addition to Bechtel, Chantraine (1933: 88), Schwyzer 468–9, and on the suffixes in Homer, Risch (1974: §§41, 48).

22 Cf. IG IV. 752, 6 (Troezen, early 2nd c. BC) and now IV. 71, 77, 12 (Epidaurus, 200/190 BC).

23 Osthoff's account has convinced neither Walde & Hofmann nor Emont & Meillet, qv., s.v. 'indutiae'.

24 An action against state-debtors who had got their debts cancelled without paying (LSI, s.v.).

25 Harrison (1968–71: II, Index, s.v. 'γραφή') lists also ἄδικον, ἀναμαχίαν, ἀπροσαίαν.

26 The perceived barbarousness of intactus led Lachmann to delete the line, and he was followed by Munro. As parallels to intactus Diels added incultus, incultus, indigestus, and refers to Wolfflin (1887) for further examples. Bailey also puts up a robust defence of the line.

27 The line is probably not of Hesiod, but from a collection of maxims circulating in the 4th c. BC under the name of Pittheus; see West (1978a: ad loc.).

28 See Diels & Kranz I, Index, s.v.; the form ἀτερπήσις is ascribed by Lucian to Heraclitus, no. 22, C3, Diels & Kranz.
and so on, though Hippocrates does attest ἀναρίστης ‘not taking breakfast’ (On Regimen IV [or On Dreams] 90. 6 July = VI, 656, 13 Littré). On the other hand, the privative formation of the corresponding adverbs in -τά (with the variant -τεί) is current from Homer on, Homer himself attesting ἀνιδρωτά ‘without sweating’, whence ἀναιμωτά ‘without bleeding’, and also ἀμαχητά, ἀμογητά, ἀνωστά, ἀδεχητά (‘without battle’, ‘without toil’, ‘unlooked for’, ‘against one’s will’). These formations in -τά function like the absolutes inherited from Indo-European (cf. I, 281–3 above); they correspond to Lat. inconsultu at Plaut. Trin. 167 me apsente atque insciente inconsultu meo ‘. . . without consulting me’, and the frequent iniusu. Compared with iniusu, iniusus ‘unbidden’ first used by the Augustan poets is a secondary formation (see Norden 1957: on Aen. 6. 374–5), in the same way as the old and common Gk ἀνώμοτος in the sense ‘not sworn, not bound by oath’ (as e.g. in Demosthenes 21. 86, Plato, Laws 12, 948 d) is to ἀνωμωτί (Herodotus 2. 118. 3).—Cf. also adverbs of the form ἀ . . . τος in Greek, and in . . . to, in . . . tim in Latin.

Closely modelled on the verbal use of the negative is the ancient Homeric verbal compound ἀκερασκόμης, epithet of Apollo, ὁς οὐκ ἐκερασε τὴν κόμην (‘who did not cut his hair’).

Equally ancient and inherited is the use of the privative prefix in compounds of the type sometimes called ‘possessive’ (after a particularly prominent aspect of their use), although comparative linguists generally use the convenient and unambiguous term of the Indian grammarians ‘bahuvrīhi’. With the privative prefix they mean, ‘lacking x’, ‘where x is not’ (x being the referent of the second element). In German they survive only with an additional suffix, as e.g. in untadel-ig (‘blameless’), and are otherwise replaced by forms in -los, -frei, ohne-, and the like. In Greek and Latin, however, they are very productive. The diverse forms that they show in Greek need not concern us here. As to their meaning, an instructive example is Gk ἄθεος (attested from the fifth century), as it shows precisely how inadequate the term ‘possessive’ is. Notwithstanding German gottlos and English godless, Gk ἄθεος must be paraphrased not as οὐκ ἄθεος oὐκ ἑχει (‘who does not have gods’), but rather as ὁς θεοὺς οὐ νομίζει (‘who does not acknowledge gods’). And it does not refer merely or even mainly to the person who denies the gods on theoretical grounds, but rather to one who acts against

29 ‘Absolutive’ (which W. introduced in the lecture on the supine and the gerund) is a term of Sanskrit grammar (alternatively named ‘gerund’ or ‘indeclinable participle’) for fossilized forms of the verbal action noun in -tv-. for simplex verbs, in Vedic -tvā, -tv, -tvya, in the classical language just -tvā e.g. nītvā ‘after leading, by leading’, drṣṭvā ‘after seeing’; verbs compounded with a preverb make their absolutive in -ya or -tya (with long -i in Vedic, probably the instr. sg. of the action noun in -(ti), e.g. amādṛṣṭya ‘after seeing’. See further Whitney (1889: §§989–94) and Coulson (2006: 67–8), and Haspelmath & König (1995) on ‘converbs’ of this type (cf. p.370 n. 18 [& p.352 n. 12] above).

30 Like the names of the other types of compound distinguished by the Indian grammarians, bahuvrīhi (lit. ‘[one who has] much rice’, ‘a rich man’) is an example of its type (cf. n. 44, p. 461 above).
the ordinances or sanctuaries of the gods. Like our *gottlos* and *godless*, however, 
*άθεος* is used, already in Pindar and Sophocles, to mean simply ‘evil’ in general, although Sophocles, in keeping with his tendency to reuse familiar words in new ways, also uses it both adjectivally and adverbially in the sense of ‘godforsaken’, ‘without the help of the gods’ (e.g. OT 254, 661, *Electra* 1181), possibly on the model of Homeric *άθεει* (cf. below).—In Latin we find that apart from primitive forms like *iners*, *inops* (‘unskilful’, ‘resourceless’), and the early-obsolete forms *improles* and *incomitem* (‘without offspring’, ‘without companions’), privative compounds are especially frequent in *-us* and *-is*. Even in Imperial Latin, Greek compounds such as *άσεληνος* or *άσεκνος* can be rendered with *illūnis*, *illiberis* (‘moonless’, ‘childless’). In one or two instances, the adverbial use of the neuter in *-έ* (< *-έ* 
33) is older than the fully declined adjective in *-is*. This is certainly the case with *impūne* (‘with impunity’), privative to *poena* (‘penalty’), of which the adjective *impunis* is formed as late as Apuleius (*Metam.* 3. 6). Lat. *impūne* has an exact match in the Greek privative adverbs in *-ή*, such as *άμυθι* in Archilochus (‘without reward’, fr. 34 West), *άωρι* in Aristophanes (‘at an ungodly hour’, *Eccl.* 741), *άσυνθι* and *άσυλι* και *άσυνθι* (‘inviolably and without truce’) in numerous dialect inscriptions; see Bechtel (1921–4: I, 102, II, 762). These adverbs and others formed like them occur already in the early period with the ending *-έ* (possibly locatival), e.g. in Homer (*Od.* 18. 353) ὠκ *άθεει* ‘not without the will (or aid) of the gods’, Cretan *άμολε* ‘without legal dispute’ (*IC* IV. 75, D4–5).

In comparison with the above types, which correspond to the use of the ancient particle *nē* as the verb and sentence negative, other privative formations are, originally at least, less prominent; Delbrück (1893–1900: II, 533) is probably right to suppose that they arose from negated verbal nouns. To begin with, numerous adjectives had no privative counterpart—although in antiquity not a single scholar commented on this, and in more modern times probably no one before Lobeck (1853–62: I, 213–14). In many cases, the absence of a quality—or the presence of its opposite—was expressed from the first by simple words. Our

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31 This point had been well illustrated in German in the lexicographical part of Bruhn (1899: §§144–7, esp. 277), in English in the second part of L. Campbell’s essay on the language of Sophocles in the introduction to his edition of the plays and fragments (2nd ed., 2 vols, Oxford 1879–81), pp. 87–105. Most recently on this theme, see the contributors to the section on Sophocles’ diction in De Jong & Rijksbaron (2005).

32 Leumann (387; cf. 398) still refers principally to W.’s discussion here, and to Frisk (1941: 32–41). Note the important recent monographs on compounding in Latin by Bader (1962), and Oniga (1988), and the alphabetical glossary by Lindner (1996), although only Bader has anything to add on negative bahuvrīhis in particular (§§419–20, 434, 444, 469).

33 On this sound-change, cf. n. 17, p. 667 above.

34 The current online version of the Packard Humanities Institute Greek epigraphical database contains 28 examples of *άσυνθι* all of them with *άονθι* (e.g. *IC* II. III.9, 11–12), and the other nineteen from Asia Minor.

in Plato is built on the noun θέρμη (‘warmth, heat’; Phaedo 106a)—’stupid’, and ‘hollow’, and this list is not intended to be complete. On the other hand, there are also some striking disagreements among our languages (cf. II, 294 below). For example, German forms a privative to gut and schön (‘good’, ‘beautiful’), but neither Greek nor Latin can do this with their respective words. Conversely, Greek has ἄκακος (lit. ‘un-bad’), which has no exact match in German. This Greek word, however, is not attested in the meaning ‘harmless, innocent’ until the fourth century; it originally meant ‘un-harmed, having experienced no ill’ (Sappho, fr. 171 Lobel & Page) and hence belonged with the bahuvrihis (above). In the case of the colour terms, modern German does without privatives, as do Greek and Latin, but earlier in Germanic we find OHG unrot, unswarz (‘unred’, ‘unblack’), Old and Middle English ungreen, and Dutch ingroen.—There are also certain types of formation which do not make privatives: this is true, for instance, of Latin adjectives in -ax before the Augustan period, as far as I can see; the earliest examples of such privatives are inaudax in Horace (‘not daring’, Odes 3. 20. 3), and inefficax in Seneca and later writers (‘ineffectual’, On Anger 1. 10. 3; cf. Plin. Nat. 34. 109): with regard to the latter, note that in a letter to Cicero, Caelius was still obliged to say parum efficax (‘ineffective’, Letters to his Friends 8. 10. 3, no. 87 Shackleton Bailey). Equally, Greek adjectives in -ός are never found with privative ἁ-, except the late ἄθηλος (‘not womanish’), and possibly ἁ-μβλός (‘blunt’).35 Admittedly, they are generally rare in the second element of compounds. Privatives to compounds beginning with εν- (i.e. ἀ-εν-) are very rare.

The privative prefix is used even more rarely to form the negative of a non-verbal noun in Greek and Latin. Indeed, in Latin it is not really used at all, for, while e.g. inopia does represent the negation of opēs (pl., ‘wealth’), it is in the first instance the abstract noun of inops (‘without resources’), and in principle the same relation holds between fortuna and infortunium (‘fortune’, ‘misfortune’), and between cura and incuria (‘care’, ‘lack of care’); on impōs, lit. ‘non-master’, see II, 56 above. | Such formations were ventured in high poetry in Greek, on the model of compounds properly intended as bahuvrihis. So, in Ajax’s famous words in Sophocles’ play, 665 ἔχθρον ἀδώρα δόρα κοῦκ ἄνησιμα (‘the gifts of enemies are no gifts and of no benefit’), the privative ἀδώρα is to be taken as ‘non-gifts’, though etymologically it means ‘not consisting of gifts’ (see DEBRUNNER 1917: 58 §117). On this peculiar idiom, which can involve different stems (e.g. Soph. Phil. 534 ὁικος ὁικησις ‘a dwelling that is no dwelling’), see most recently

35 Gk ἁμβλός is compared with μαλακός ‘soft’ and/or μύλη ‘mill, millstone’, but in either case surely with a prothetic ἁ- other than the privative prefix; seeCHANTRAINE, and FRISK, each s.v.
Gustav Meyer’s study of the stylistic use of nominal compounding in Greek (1923: 103–4). Latin writers who imitate this have to resort to privatives in -tus, as e.g. in Cicero, *Philippics* 1. 5 *insepulta sepultura* for Gk τάφος ἄταφος (‘a burial that was no burial’), or in an unknown Roman tragedian (fr. 42, v. 80 Ribbeck) *innuptis nuptiis* for Gk γάμος ἄγαμος (‘a marriage that is no marriage’).—In imitation of tragedy, where such privative compounds can stand even in a predicative relation to their simplex nouns (cf. Soph. *Ajax* 665, quoted above), the philosophers also ventured to use this sort of pattern. So, e.g. Plato, *Laws* 6, 766d πάσα ἡ πόλις ἄπολις ἀν γίγνοτο ‘the whole city would become a non-city’, Aristotle, *Physics* 1. 8, 191b6 (ὁ ἰατρός ἰατρεύει καὶ ἁνίατρος γίνεται ἢ ἰατρός ‘(the doctor) practises as a doctor or becomes a non-doctor qua doctor’, Theophrastus (in Plutarch, *Lycurgus* 10. 2) τὸν πλούτον ἄξηλον καὶ ἀπλούτον ἀπεργάσασθαι ‘he made wealth an object of no desire and even un-wealth’, and so on. Another example is ἀσύρματη in the sense of ‘not real πάθη’ in Antiphon the Sophist, B 5 (no. 87 DIELS & KRANZ). Compare Pausanias 6. 22. 3 ταύτας τὰς ὀλυμπιάδας... ‘ἀνολυμπιάδας’ οἱ Ολείοι καλοῦντες οὐ σφας ἐν καταλόγῳ τῶν ὀλυμπιάδων γράφοντας ‘the Eleans call these Olympiads non-Olympiads, and omit them from the list’. Other philosophical terms containing the privative prefix +a noun may be taken as negated verbal nouns, e.g. the Stoics’ use of ἀσύμβαμα to denote an impersonal verb (lit. ‘a non-σύμβαμα’, ‘not a full predicate’; Priscian 18. 5 = GL III, 211, 26).

In Germanic, negating nouns by means of privative compounding became usual at a very early date—again probably starting with verbal nouns. Gothic *ungiundom* ‘non-peoples’ we discussed earlier (II, 285 above), and Luther even ventures to translate Gk βάρβαρος as Ungrieche (‘non-Greek’), which is used by others after him. Very similar to this word is one of the terms used in Greek inscriptions by the first Sasanid king of Iran Sapor/Shapuhr I (AD 240–72), when he refers to himself as OGIS 434, 2–3 βασιλεὺς Ἀριανός καὶ Ἀναριανός ‘king of the Aryans and the non-Aryans’, though this is a literal translation of the Iranian versions (roughly *Erān ve Anērān*), where the negative compound functions either as a noun or as an adjective.36 There is a hapax in Homer at *Od*. 18. 73 ἡ τάχα Ἡρος Ἀριος ἐπίσπαστον κακόν ἐξεί (‘indeed, soon Irus will be no Irus but will have trouble which he brought upon himself’). Did the coiner of the insult still use Ἡρος as a common noun? Or did he wish in ridiculing the beggar to go one better than the *Iliad*’s form Δύσπαρι (lit. ‘evil Paris’, *II*. 3. 39 = 13. 769)? | Compare also *Od*. 19. 260 = 597 = 23. 19 Κακοίλον οὐκ ὀνομαστήν (lit. ‘evil Ilium, which

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36 This formula in *OGIS* 434 = no. 259 in Canali De Rossi (2004) is found in two other trilingual monumental inscriptions of Sapor/Shapuhr I, nos 260 and 261 in Canali De Rossi (2004), the latter the king’s famous *Res gestae*. On the Iranian forms, which are written in both Middle Persian (the official language of the Sasanid dynasty) and Parthian (the official language of the preceding, Arsacid dynasty), see Nyberg (1964–74: II, 18, 71) and, specifically on the formula, Back (1978: 282–3). And see now Wieschöfer & Huyse (2006), esp. the paper by P. Huyse.
should not be named’), and nostri ádikoáρχοι (‘our unjust rulers’) in Cicero, Letters to Atticus 2. 12. 4 (no. 30 Shackleton Bailey) punning on the name Dicaearchus (lit. ‘just ruler’).

Indeed, the privative prefix even penetrated the home-territory of nē and its replacements by negating even the finite verb, albeit only very sporadically and under particular conditions. The best-known example is Theognis 621 πᾶς τις πλούσιον ἀνδρὰ τίει, ἀτίει δὲ πεινχρόν ‘everyone honours the rich man, and dishonours the pauper’ (cf. II, 170 above). The model here was the opposition between ἀτιμάν/ἀτιμάζειν and τιμάν (‘to dishonour’ vs ‘to honour’): here, as in ἀπίθησε, ἀπειθεῖν (‘disobey’), Aeolic ἀοννέτημι (‘fail to understand’), Homeric ἀελπτέόντες (‘having no hope’), Lat. improbare (‘treat as improbus, unsatisfactory’), Gothic unsweran (for Gk ἀτιμάζειν ‘dishonour’, beside unswer for Gk ἀτιμὸς ‘dishonoured’), the negative prefix originates where it belongs in the underlying privative adjective/noun, whether or not the latter is actually attested. Speakers could be misled into regarding ἀ(υ) - as a verbal negative prefix especially by contexts in which the simplex and the privative parasynthetion stood side by side, as in Plato, Parm. 156b ἀνόμοιον γε καὶ ὁμοιον ὅταν γίγνηται, ἀνάγκη ὁμοιόνθαλι τε καὶ ἁνομοιόνθαλι: (‘and when it [the One] becomes like and unlike, must it not be assimilated and dissimilated?’). This explains also Hermippus (5th-c. comic poet), fr. 28 (PCG V) ἀ τόθ’ ἑσθήν, ταῦτα νῦν ἀνήδομαι (‘what I then enjoyed I now do not enjoy’), though another factor in this type is the influence of verbs in ἀνα- (‘away, back’) of the type ἀνεύχομαι ‘take a prayer back’ (Plato, Alcib. II 142d, 148b). (Of doubtful attestation is ἀνεμιάρβαι ‘not to be decreed by fate’ in pseudo-Plutarch, On the Views Held by Philosophers 1. 27. 4. p. 885a.)

There are one or two examples in Latin, too. Although infestetur (‘denies’) is just an invention (cf. II, 287 above), we find in Pliny, Letters 3. 1. 2 iuuenes confusa... non indecens ‘irregularity is not unfitting for the young’. Pliny’s replacement of classical dedecent in this way must have been induced by the adjective indecens (attested since the beginning of the Empire; and cf. indecenter at Quint. Inst. 1. 5. 64).—A controversial case is ignoscere (‘to forgive’). Some see in the first element the preposition in, but the existence of the German idiom ein Einsehen haben (‘to have an insight, understanding, sympathy’) does not adequately explain the Latin. Others regard it as a privative formation, and compare expressions such as Gk ἄμνηστία (lit. ‘not remembering’, hence ‘amnesty’) or Biblical German der Übertretungen nicht gedenken (‘forgive us [lit. not remember] our trespasses’). This would sit well with the fact that ignoscere can take an accusative (as an alternative to a dative) of the offence forgiven, but noscere does not mean ‘remember’, and neither Lat. ignorare or nescire nor Gk ἄγνοειν has the sense of

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On these Homeric name-plays, see Russo in Russo, Fernández-Galiano, & Heubeck (1992: on Od. 18. 73).
forgiving. Were this view nevertheless correct, we should have to suppose that an original *ni-gnoscere (conceivable as a parallel formation to nescire\textsuperscript{38}) became ignoscere on the model of the participles ignōtus and ignoscens (replacing *ni-gnoscens) analogous on insciens\textsuperscript{39}—There are hardly any secure examples in Germanic. From the English poet Algernon Swinburne (1837–1909), JESPERSEN (1917: 149) cites unknown ‘not know’ and unlove ‘not love’,\textsuperscript{40} but it is important to note that English un- comes very close to privative meaning when functioning as Lat. dis- (German ent-), as e.g. in Shakespeare’s lecherie, Sir, it provokes and unprovokes (Macbeth, II. 3, 32). The German examples | that are sometimes adduced (such as Goethe’s officialese ich werde unermangeln (lit. ‘I shall unfail’),\textsuperscript{41} or Swiss German es hed-mi u g’freut (‘it pleased me enormously’, Schw. Id. I, 298, s.v. ‘un-’),\textsuperscript{42} although of interest, do not involve forms of the finite verb.

\textsuperscript{38} With į by regular sound-change from ē before gn (cf. signum < *segnum < *sek-no-m ‘sign’ ← ‘something cut’).

\textsuperscript{39} The etymology of Lat. ignosco ‘forgive’ remains unclear, but with the weight of opinion favouring those, such as Ed. Hermann (1936), who identify the prefix with the preverb in- (cf. aignosco ‘recognize’) rather than with the negative; see most recently Haverling (2000: 379). Note that W. later (1932a) retracted what he says here and compared Lat. ignosco instead with Skt *anu-jña- ‘agree with, pardon’, seeing then in Lat. in- in this word the reflex of the preverb *enu- ‘along, according to, past’; this account is upheld by Bader (1962: §52), although it is not without difficulties, on which see Walde & Hofmann, s.v.

\textsuperscript{40} From the poem ‘Hertha’, v. 19, in the collection Songs before Sunrise (orig. publ. London 1871). The OED, s.v., distinguishes two verbs unknow, the other meaning ‘to cease to know, to forget’, but only one verb unlove, being uncertain about the sense claimed for it here; in general on un- with verbs in English, see the OED, s.v. ‘un- (1)’, 14.

\textsuperscript{41} Or unermangeln?: the D. Wb., s.v. ‘unermangeln’, quotes from Goethe only Letters XVII, 196 (Weimar edn) ‘werde sogleich schuldigst zu besorgen ohnermangeln’ (‘I shall not fail immediately most dutifully to see to’); in the Letters, there are two further instances of ohnermangeln (VII, 176; XXX, 11) but none of unermangeln; cf. Bohner (1904b: 180).

\textsuperscript{42} Cf. u g’elmit, u g’windet ‘snowed very heavily’, ‘was very windy’!
Finally, we need to address two questions which occupied us also in connection with the sentence negative. First, the occasional shift of meaning in privative forms. On this, we should first note Lat. *infitens* and *infitiae* (II, 287 above): like Gk ὁφημί (II, 262 above), with which they are etymologically related, these words mean ‘denying’, ‘denial’, i.e. it is not the verb itself that is negated but its object, and just as Lat. *non spero* can mean ‘hope that . . . not’, so Gk ἀἐλπιστός and ἀνέλπιστος (lit. ‘unhoped for’) can be applied to something that one hopes not to see.—Furthermore, like the verb and sentence negative, the privative prefix expresses not only contradictory but also contrary negation. To the modern examples adduced by Jespersen (1917: 144), we may add from the ancient languages e.g. Gk ἀσθενής ‘weak’, ἀνωφελής in Plato in the sense of ‘harmful’ (see Sauppe (1884: 85) on Protagoras 334a), Lat. insanus ‘mad’, indignus ‘scandalous’, inanomenus of the kingdom of Hades at Ov. Met. 10. 15. Jespersen goes on to observe that the privative form often negates only a part of the meaning of the simplex, and this is also found in Greek. Attic ἄκακος (‘guileless, innocent’), e.g., negates κακός only in its ethical sense, and to begin with only with reference to some of the bad qualities denoted by κακός. Even the intensive meaning that German *un*- has acquired from words which started life as privatives, such as Unzahl, Un ding, Ungeheuer (‘huge number’, ‘absurdity’, ‘monster’), is found in Latin, in Late Latin at least (see Löfstedt 1907: 117–19).2

One more point on semantics. Following van Ginneken (1907: 208) and Noreen (1903–24: V, 267), Jespersen (1917: 144) teaches that the privatives have in the main a ‘depreciatory sense’. This we can understand. A privative expression (and often a negative in general) is used in order to note the absence of something normal and regular, or the disappointing of an expectation; cf. Chrysippus, fr. 177 (SVF II, 51), and Choeroboscus, quoted in the Etymologicum magnum, p. 639, 52–640, 10 Gaisford.3 In this sense the observation is generally

1 Both contain reflexes of the Indo-European root *bh₁h₂*; see further LIV, s.v.
2 Löfstedt adduces (e.g.) infatetus, indignus = ulde facetus, ulde dignus (‘very witty’, ‘very worthy’).
3 So, Chrysippus says, for instance, that we don’t call an ox ἄχτρος ‘lacking a tunic’, or ourselves when we are in the bath ἄσποδτος ‘without shoes’; similarly, Choeroboscus states that it is ‘impossible’ to say of an ass that it is ἀπριχός ‘lacking in skill’, since the privative signals the absence of a natural attribute and skill is not something we expect an ass to have, although we can say that it is ὁβ ἀπριχός ‘not proficient’ (or ‘not a grammarian’?!). On Choeroboscus, see I, 73–4 and n. 3, p. 102 above; for bibliographical orientation on
true of the modern languages. There are particularly blatant examples in German, including _Unart_, which is _bad habit_ in English and _mauvaise habitude_ in French, and _Unkraut_ (‘weeds’, French _mauvaises herbes_). _Jespersen’s_ remark applies also to the ancient languages, to Greek in particular, but to a lesser extent, it seems to me, especially if one considers the two most ancient categories, namely the deverbal formations and the bauhuríthis (II, 285–9 above). Of the Homeric forms that can be regarded as bauhuríthis and which are not neutral in terms of value judgements—as are e.g. ἀναιῶμον or ἄσπυρος (‘bloodless’, ‘sleepless’)—if I have counted correctly, more than a third have a favourable meaning: beside ἀκτήμων and ἀκληρος (‘without property’, ‘without an estate’) there is ἄπήμων (‘without suffering’), and beside ἀνήφωρ and ἀναλκις (‘unmanly’, ‘cowardly’), ἀμύμων (‘blameless’). Indeed, probably as many as half of Homeric adjectives in ἄ- express something positive, and as for those in ἄτος, in particular both of the inherited forms ἄμβρωτος and ἄφθιτος denote something desirable, as does ἄπήμαντος (‘unharmed, free from suffering’). It is also noteworthy that the Greeks showed no sign of avoiding forms in ἄ(ν)- in name-giving, where forms of good omen were important. Were the Greeks more disposed than we are to regard the bad as normal, and were they consequently led more frequently than we to note the absence of the bad with pleasure? To English _true_, German _wahr_, _wahrhaft_ correspond in Greek the privatives ἀληθής, ἀτρεκής, ἀφευδής, and to English _speak the truth_, German _wahr reden_, corresponds Gk ἀφευδεῖν, ἀληθίζειν. A word such as ἄφθονος (lit. ‘ungrudging’) for ‘generous’ is also significant, as the starting point was φθόνος (‘jealousy, ill-will’), whether of gods or men (cf. II, 290 above).—Nevertheless, as I said, even with Gk ἄ(ν)- an unfavourable nuance prevails. Think, for example, of series of words in tragedy intended to underline regrettable circumstances, as e.g. in Euripides, _Iph. Taur._ 220 ἄγαμος ἀτεκνὸς ἄπολις ἄφιλος (‘unwed, childless, stateless, friendless’); see G. Meyer (1923: 103–4). There are similar cases already in Homer, e.g. II. 9. 63 ἄφρητορ, ἀθείμοιο, ἀνέστιος ἐκεῖνος (‘that man [who likes internal discord] is without clan, law, and hearth’), or _Od._ 1. 242 ὁξεῖτ’ ἄιστος ἄπνεος (‘he [Odysseus] is gone, unseen, unheard of’)—though Homer also has the more cheerful pairing ἀγήραυν ἀθάνατον τε (‘ageless and deathless’). In line with this is the frequent use of ἄ(ν)- in the sense of δύο- or φαύλως (already emphasized by the ancients): in other words, something that is present but imperfect or inadequate is referred to in hyperbole as not being there at all. Examples of this sense adduced by Aristotle ( _Metaphysics_ 4, 1022b34–8) and the scholiast to Dionysius Thrax §6 ( _GG_ I.3, 502, 8–18) include ἀμορφός, ἀόρατος, ἄπους, ἄπτόρηνος, ἀτυχής, ἄφωνος (‘misshapen’, ‘hard to see’, ‘with bad feet’, ‘with
only a small stone’, ‘ill-fated’, ‘with a poor voice’); and note ἀγλωόσσος meaning more or less ‘barbarian’ (Soph. Trach. 1060). We may also recall instances such as Soph. El. 492–3 ἀλεκτρὸν αὐνμφα...γάμων ἀμιλήματα (‘the urge to marriage involving an accursed bed, an accursed bridal’), of the marriage of Aegisthus and Clytaemnestra. As for Latin, Seneca discussing the word ingratus comments at De beneficiis 5. 13. 3 ‘inlitteratum non ex toto rudem dicimus, sed ad litteras altiores non perductum; sic qui male vestitum et pannosum uidit, nudum se uidisse dicit’ (‘we use the word unlettered of someone who is not wholly without education but who has not advanced to higher letters; similarly, if you see someone badly dressed or in rags, you say you saw him naked’). This illustrates the more general use of negatives to denote something meagre or bad.

The inherited privative prefix (Gk ἄν-, Lat. in-, Germanic un- < *n-) has not remained the sole marker of its function. In the first place, the sentence negative has often been admitted in its place, more or less tightly connected to the word to be negated (cf. II, 266 above). Further, widespread bilingualism has led to the use side by side of the divergent forms assumed by the prefix in different languages, which in turn has offered the possibility of various shades of meaning. For example, English religious has two negative counterparts: unreligious, formed with the Germanic prefix, has the contradictory sense, ‘not religious’, while irreligious, formed with French (Latin) in-, stands in a contrary relation to religious and means ‘godless, frivolous’. But the best example here is the recent fashion of sticking the Greek prefix a- on the front of modern, non-Greek words, in order to avoid pejorative connotations and any implication of hostility towards the positive counterpart: the colourlessness of a- makes it ideal for this purpose. In particular, because immoral (German unmoralisch) implies a criticism, it is supposed necessary to coin a-moral (German amoralisch, French moral, amoralité) to refer to what lies beyond good and evil. Similarly, we have also German a-logisch, a-sexual, a-historisch, a-sozial, a-tektonisch (cf. English alogical, asexual (Jespersen 1917: 147), abistorical, asocial, atectonic), even the bold German form Apronominismus (used by Dickhoff 1906: 31 n. 2). The popular German non-word anormal (for abnorm, ‘abnormal’) owes its birth not to any expressive need, but to an ignorant mixing of anomal (‘anomalous’) with the positive normal (‘normal’).—This modern use of a- is most natural in new forms made to words of Greek origin and without a competitor in un-, as in e.g. aseptisch ‘aseptic’, lit. ‘free from sepsis, rotting’, as well as several of the examples above.

Other substitutes for the privative prefix are similar or identical to the replacements of the sentence negative. Similar in meaning to Fr. mal- in this sense (cf. II, 255 above) is Germanic mis-, which in German before a verb is often completely synonymous, or nearly so, with the negative, e.g. in misslüken, misbilligen, misstrauen (‘be unsuccessful’, ‘disapprove’, ‘mistrust’), and which in English mischief, misfortune corresponds to German un- in Unglück (‘misfortune,
accident').—Of special interest for us, however, is the Indo-European prefix *du-, productive in Greek δυ-, which in several instances alternates with ἁ(ν)-: so, e.g. δύσαινος, δυσαεβής, δυστυχής (‘unholy’, ‘impious’, ‘unfortunate’), δυσνομή (‘lawlessness’) used by Solon, fr. 4, 31 West as a metrical replacement for ἁνομή (see JÄGER 1926: 82 n.), δυσ(φ)θειεῖν ‘have no strength’ in Hippocrates (On Diseases 2. 58, 67), and δυσόμοιος in place of regular ἁνόμοιος (‘unlike’) in the 5th/4th-c. comic poet Strattis, fr. 85 (PCG VII). On Homeric δυνάμιμορος ‘deeply unfortunate’ a scholiast comments (II. 22. 428): (ὁ ποιητής) δεδηλασίακε πρὸς ἐπίτασιν τὸ γὰρ δὺ- καὶ ἁ- ταύτων δηλοῦσαι (‘he [the poet] has doubled the prefix in order to intensify the meaning, for *dus- and a- mean the same thing’). Gk δυκλέης (beside ἄκλεης) has an almost exact cognate in Old Irish do-chlu ‘without fame’,5 while the corresponding Gothic tus- and OHG zur- also show an approximation to privative meaning: e.g. OHG zurlust is synonymous with Gothic unlustus | and modern German Unlust (‘reluctance’). Likewise, Armenian t- < *du- alternates with inherited an- as a privative prefix.6 We shall return to dus- below.

In addition, other forms of similar meaning were able to compete with and sometimes partly or completely replace the privative prefix. These include, understandably enough, the prepositions meaning ‘out’ and ‘without’. Corresponding to German unteilhaft, Gk ἀμοιρός (‘without a share in’) is Lat. expers (cf. Gloss. Lat. V, 602, 34 in partes: expertes, sine parte), corresponding to Gk ἄναίμων is Lat. exsanguis (‘bloodless’), and the Old Church Slavonic for Gk ἀθέος is bezbugū (bez ‘without’), which conveys the same idea as English godless, German gottlos, Gothic gudalaus. In Greek, ἁ- alternates with ἁνο- and ἐξ-: so e.g. Sophocles refers to the Black Sea, the Euxine, originally Άξενος, as ὀρμὸς ἀπόξενος (‘anchorage inhospitable [lit. without guests]’, Oed. Tyr. 196), and Hesychius glosses ἀπόδεηνος as ἀδεηνος (‘supperless’), ἀπόθεα (Soph. fr. 267, TrGF IV) as ἀθεά (‘godless’). Lat. absimilis (attested from Caesar on) is synonymous with German unählich (‘dissimilar’), and the same is seen in other languages including Old Irish; on this use of dé/-de- ‘of, from’ and ess- ‘out of’, see Thurneysen (1946: 544).7—On Lat. uē-, which has privative meaning in uēsanus and uēcors (‘insane’, ‘senseless’), a consensus has yet to be reached.8

In our discussion of the preverbs, we noted that they often turn the meaning of the verb they precede into its opposite (II, 182 above), and are occasionally synonymous with negatives (II, 183 above). Both effects are manifested especially

5 From *duklonio-: see LELA, s.vv. ‘do-’ (2), du-’, ‘clu’, and ‘dochla’, and on the Old Irish pejorative or negative prefix de-, du- ‘bad’, cf. Thurneysen (1946: 231).
6 For examples, see Hübschmann (1897: §391).
7 On the former, see also LELA, s.v. ‘de’, ‘de’.
8 We still lack an agreed etymology for this ‘pejorative’ suffix, which can mean ‘too much’ (e.g. in ἀνπαιλίδους ‘excessively pale’) as well as ‘too little’. Ernout & Meillet, s.v., favour comparison with the inherited preverbs meaning ‘away from’, Lat. an-, Skt an-, etc.; for references to various alternative accounts proposed, see Walde & Hofmann, s.v., and Leumann 399, 401–2.
in Lat. dis-. Earlier (II, 183) I mentioned only *diungere* (‘to separate’) and related forms, but we see the meaning of the verb transformed into its opposite also in e.g. *dissuadere* (‘persuade not to’), and the prefix functioning like the negative in *diffidere, displícere, diffíteri (= *infitias ire!* ) (‘distrust’, ‘displease’, ‘deny’). It is no accident that each of these three words stands in opposition to a compound in con-, which called for dis- as its counterpart. But we have this use of dis- also with adjectives, where it functions like the privative prefix, e.g. in *displácidus* attested in the glossaries as the probably late replacement of *implácidus* attested from Horace on, and already at an early date in *disímilis*, which corresponds to Gk ἀνόμωος, German *unähnlich*. Beside *disímilis* is the verb *dissimuláre*, and in Old Latin its opposite is *consímilis*; since in addition the underlying meaning of the simplex *similis* (according to its etymology) is that of being together,9 *disímilis* belongs in either case with the type *diungo*.

Lat. *diffícilis* (‘hard to do, difficult’) is treated as a compound of the same type, but everything that makes comprehensible the privative meaning of dis- in *disímilis* is lacking in *diffícilis*. Either *diffícilis* has been formed on the model of *disímilis* in a purely superficial way (which, given the semantic and phonological differences between *facílis* and *similis*, is not likely), or we must try a completely different approach in order to explain it. As the Latin *Thesaurus* notes (ThLL, s.v., 1082, 55), *diffícilis* corresponds to Greek adjectives | in δυσ-. The glossaries and Priscian, too, equate it with Gk δυσχερής and δύσκολος (‘difficult to handle’, ‘difficult of mood’), and the Vulgate translates Gk δυσνόητα as *diffícilia intellectu* (‘things difficult to understand’). Given this, I venture to propose *duffícilis* as its original form. If, as we have seen, dus- has survived in Latin’s close relative Celtic, it is possible that it was still preserved in the earliest Latin. The change of *duffícilis* to *diffícilis* reflects both the i of the following syllable and the fact that, while no other Latin word begins with duff-, there are numerous Latin words in diff-.

We have already devoted a great deal of time to expressions of negation, but there are still a few questions to consider that we really cannot avoid. First, the question how far and in what sense a clause can contain more than one negative (apart from the coordination of individually negated constituents).

I should like to begin with the clearest and simplest case, the collocation of negative particle + privative compound, which has been most comprehensively treated by the Latinist Carl Weyman (1887). In Greek, this pattern can be traced back to Homer, who has something of a fondness for it. I recall the frequent combination ὁ γὰρ ἄκοντε πετέαθην (‘and the two of them flew off not unwilling’, e.g. in the phrase τῶ 8 ὁ γὰρ ἄκοντε πετέαθην)
and above all the fact that in Homer some privative formations never occur without the negative. An example is the common verb ἀπιθηεῖν ‘disobey’, incidentally attested only on the stem ἀπιθῆς-, in aorist and occasionally future forms, which are the only possible source of the forms with the opposite meaning πιθῆς-, πιθῆσεις ‘obey, trust’ that are so completely different from the transitive πεπιθηκόν (‘persuade’), aor. subjv.). Similarly, ἀμελεῖν (‘to neglect’) always has a negative in Homer, as do the very rare ἀγκουστεῖν and ἀπιστεῖν (‘not to heed’, ‘to disbelieve’), and ἀγνοεῖν (‘not to know’) is hardly ever not negated. The same is true of the adjectives ἀγνός, ἀδήριτος, and ἀπείρητος (‘unknown; unknowing’, ‘without strife’, ‘untried; untrying’), and of the archaic adverbs discussed above (II, 289–90): ἀθεεῖ, ἀνιδρωτί, ἀνουτητί are always negated, ἀναιμωτί nearly always. There are similar instances after Homer: e.g., as far as I can see, ἀτυχεῖν in the sense ‘fail to receive’ is usually negated.

This pattern is found in Latin, too, from Plautus on. Among the classical poets, Vergil seems especially to have cultivated it: it is hardly by chance that his haud ignota loquor (‘not unfamiliar things do I say’, Aen. 2. 91) and haud incerta cano (‘not uncertain things do I prophesy’, 8. 49) correspond to nota loquor, nota cano, nera cano, certa loquor in Tibullus, Ovid, and Propertius.11 BOHNER (1904b: 185) refers to a nice observation of Chateaubriand in the Génie du christianisme, II, book 2, ch. 10,12 where the French Sprachkünstler sees a peculiar tenderness in the merely suggestive non ignara mali in Dido’s words comparing herself to the shipwrecked Aeneas as a companion in misery (Aen. 1. 630 non ignara mali miseris succurrere disco ‘not ignorant of suffering myself, I am learning to help those who suffer’), and tries to give a general explanation of Vergil’s fondness for negative expression in terms of his whole personality.—The use of privative compounds only in combination with a negative is apparently not unknown in Latin: e.g. inficiens (‘inactive’) is attested only in Varro in the phrase non (or neque) esse inficientem (Rust. 3. 16. 8, Lat. Lang. 6. 78); and the admittedly very late form infortis is found only in non infortissimus Graium (‘not the weakest of the Greeks’, Carmen de figuris 165 [n. 5, p. 513 above], of Ajax).13

11 See e.g. Ov. Met. 2. 570 and Tib. 2. 3. 59 nota loquor, Ov. Ars amatoria 1. 297 nota cano, Prop. 3. 13. 61 certa loquor, Tib. 2. 5. 63 (cf. Ov. Ars 1. 30) nera cano, Ov. Heroides 15. 60 nera loquar, etc. etc.; see R. Malby’s commentary (Liverpool 2002) on the Tibullus passages. Some of these—and also Verg. Ed. 6. 9 non inimissa cano ‘I sing things not-unbidden’—have been taken to echo Callimachus, fr. 612 Pfieffer ἀμέριμνον Ϝ++]δεῖν ἐδείω ‘I sing nothing that is not attested’, which may also lie behind the Aen. 8 example; see Buchheit (1965: 117) on Tibullus 2. 5 and the Aeneid, and Tueller (2000: 364 and 365 n. 11), with further examples of this type, especially in Vergil.

12 On p. 675 of the usefully annotated edition by M. Regard (Paris 1978) of this defence of Christianity, one of the most influential works of the great French politician and writer François-René de Chateaubriand (1768–1848), which gained him the favour of Napoleon and contributed to the revival of religion in post-Revolution France.

13 In fact, the ThLL, s.v., cites also two examples of infortis ‘weak’ without the negative from the 5th/6th-c. Sermon on the Confusion of the Devil and Hell, significantly a Latin translation of a Greek original, where infortis seems to translate Gk ἄνωθεν ‘unnaturally, cowardly’.
This sort of combination is very common in German, naturally more in some writers than in others. BOHNER (1904b) shows that it—and litotes in general—is used especially by Goethe in his old age, which fits with the whole tenor of the style of his later poetry.

What is true of the privatives is true also of formations in ne- (II, 250–3 above). Homeric νήσις (‘unknowing, inexperienced’) is never without οὐ, and Lat. haud nescio, haud nescius are used in the same sense as haud/non ignoro, haud/non ignorantus (‘I am not unaware’, ‘not ignorant’, i.e. well aware, experienced)—although neque nescio at Plaut. Epid. 332 is different (see II, 302 below). We should also remember non/haud negare (‘not to deny’) and the combinations of negative + preposition Gk οὐκ ἄνευ = Lat. non sine = German nicht ohne = English not without. In the same sense as οὐκ ἀθέεται or οὐ θεόν ἀέκπερτοι (‘not without the help/against the will of the gods’, Od. 18. 353, 3. 28), Homer has also II. 5. 185 οὐ . . . ἄνευθε θεῶν and Od. 2. 372 = 15. 531 οὐ τοι ἄνευ θεῶν (both, ‘not without a god’). How this phrase in particular came to be inherited throughout later Greek literature and even into Latin, e.g. in Vergil’s non sine numine diuom (‘not without the will of the gods’, Aen. 2. 777, etc.), Horace’s non sine dis (‘not without the gods’, Odes 3. 4. 20), is shown by Weyman (1887: 549–50 and nn.).

This sort of indirect affirmation arises in the first place from the wish not to say too much, indeed to do no more than exclude the opposite. I refer by way of example to a quotation from an unknown orator in the Rhet. Her. 4. 50 huic quidem pater — nolo nimium dicere — non tenuissimum patrimonium reliquit (‘his father left him a patrimony that was—I do not wish to exaggerate—not the slenderest’). And note also the juxtaposition of the positive with the double negative, e.g. in Cicero, Letters to his Friends 12. 17. 2 (no. 204 Shackleton Bailey) suspicatus sum te a iudicio nostro, . . . ut doctum hominem ab non indocto, paullum dissidere (‘I have suspected that you differ slightly from my judgement—a case naturally of a learned man differing from one not unlearned’). Cicero modestly calls himself non indoctus as opposed to Cornificius, the doctus homo, exactly as Alcibiades in Plato’s Symposium (218a) attributes to himself a ψυχή μη ἀφώς (‘a soul not without beauty’), although Socrates earlier (209b) referred to it in a similar context as ψυχή εὐφώς (‘a beautiful soul’). Another lovely instance is Catullus 8. 7 quae tu uolebas nec puella nolebat (‘which you were keen for, and your girl not unkeen’), where the positive wish of the lover is set against the non-reluctance of the beloved; in nice agreement with this is the passage of Ulpian (Digest 14. 4. 1. 3) cited by Weyman with reference to | Catullus, where uelle is equated with voluntas (active wishing), non nolle with patientia (passive acceptance).—But often the modesty of the expression is only apparent, as generally with litotes.14 The speaker is deploying restrained language in an effort to make

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14 For a systematic study of negatio contrarii ‘negation of the opposite’ in the function of litotes in Latin, see the thesis of M. E. Hoffmann (1987).
the hearer favourably disposed; he wants the hearer to read more in his words than what is actually said. In refined stylists, the desire for *variatio* also plays a part, and in poetry certainly metrical considerations as well. In Horace, for example, the complete synonymy of *non sine* with *cum* emerges from the fact that it is used even with *multus*, at *Odes* 4. 13. 17 *multo non sine risu* (‘not without much laughter’; cf. *Ars* 281). It is also common to make a positive statement as emphatic as possible by putting the negated privative immediately after it, as e.g. at *Il.* 9. 70 ἐσκε τοι, οὐ τοι ἀεικές (lit. ‘it is right for you and not unseemly’), Hesiod, *Th.* 551 γνώ ὃ οὐδ ἡγνοῖσε δόλον (‘[Zeus] saw and did not fail to perceive the trick [of Prometheus]’), Hippocrates, *Epidemics* 7. 3 (V, 370, 13 Littré) αὐτὸς ἐωτιῳ ἔκνηδε τὸ πάθος οὐδ ἡγνόει (‘he himself noticed his own ailment and was not unaware’), and so on.—I cannot, however, go into every stylistic refinement, nor can I deal with adjectives like Homeric ἄνάπνιστος ‘well-known’ or Attic ἄνάπηρος ‘mutilated’, in which ancient scholars wanted to see double negation—more recent scholars, notably LOBECK (1853–62: I, 193 ff.), have preferred to see in ἄνα- the preposition ἄνα used as an intensifier, as in ἄνάμεστος, ἄνάπλεως (both, ‘full up, quite full’); on modern Greek ἄν-α-, see PAPADOPOULOS (1921: 122). Finally, on cases where negation is overdone, such as Livy’s *haud impigre*, Lessing’s *nicht ohne Missfallen*, see I, 61 above, albeit in a different context; on this, cf. POLLE (1898: 18–20) and JESPERSEN (1917: 79). Ed. FRÄNKL reminds me of Lucan 1. 642 *nulla sine lege* (lit. ‘without no law’, the reading known to Priscian 18. 255 = *GL* III, 337, 10–15), where the inferior manuscripts have *nulla cum lege* (in keeping with the required meaning ‘with no principle’, of the cosmos).\(^{15}\)

\(^{15}\) The latter are followed on this point by most modern editors, including Housman in his edition of 1926.
Clauses containing a **quantitative negative** (II, 267–75 above) call for closer consideration. Here we find in all our languages from the earliest period examples of clauses containing a sentence negative as well, or several quantitative negatives, or both together, without the negative character of the clause being affected. We are surprised by this pleonastic form of expression, but it is simply manifesting the urge to convey the negation on all the constituents of the clause which allow it (Jespersen 1917: 71), or, as Cauer so nicely puts it (1912: 50), the negative mood is extended over the whole clause.

For an account of the use of this form of expression in a very wide range of languages, see Jespersen (1917: 65 ff.). In Greek it is current from Homer until late Greek, and speakers were not afraid of great accumulations of negatives, as in Plato, *Phaedo* 78d ὁδὲ πάντες ὁδὸν ὁδὸν ἀλλοιοῦσιν ὁδὸις ἐνδέχεται; (‘does [each absolute essence] never in any way admit of any change?’), or Parm. 166a ὁδὲν ὁδὸν ὁδὸν ὁδὸν κοινωνίαν ἕχει (‘[the other things] have no communion in anyway whatsoever with anything [which is non-existent]’).—Such liberty was originally available in Latin and German, too. Note e.g. Enn. *Trag.* 140 Jocelyn *quos non miseret neminis* (lit. ‘who don’t pity nobody’), and Plaut. *Men.* 1027 nec meus servus numquam tale fecit ‘and my slave has never done such a thing’, and see especially Marx (1904–5) on Lucilius 551 = 578 Warmington *nil neminem habere* (‘no one has anything’). And later it is found not only in one or two poets (e.g. Sulpicia, Tib. 4. 7. 8 ne legat id nemo ‘that no one should read it’) and writers of less-than-strict classical prose (including Varro and Petronius), but even in Cicero, *Verr.* II 2. 60 *debet Epicrates nummu nummu numnum nemini* ‘Epicrates owed no one a penny’—though Against Vatinius 3 nullum . . . sermonem . . . nulla numquam de re (‘no conversation ever about any subject’) is to be seen as a simple anacoluthon.¹

In German the old pattern survives into modern colloquial speech, especially in the dialects. Goethe e.g. always admitted it in his letters, though he does not use it often (cf. Behaghel 1918b: 241–4 for a survey including (243) the German classics).—A category apart comprises cases where *nemo*, etc. is as it were divided

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¹ Cf. *Letters to his Brother Quintus* 3. 4. 1, and the *Handbook of Electioneering* (attributed to Cicero’s brother Quintus), §20. Sulpicia’s phrase is now read as *me legat ut nemo*. 
up by a following *neque . . . neque* or *non . . . non* (e.g. Cic. *Nat.* 1. 121 *neminem nec deum nec hominem* ‘no one, neither god nor man’).

But early on, in both Latin and German, objections to this usage were raised by those of a pedantic way of thinking. The logical nature of the Romans is manifested elsewhere in the language, too: I recall e.g. the precision in their use of the distributive numerals. And the influence of the German schoolmaster on the written language is well known. *Gottsched’s* pronouncement (1762: 500) is typical of the man and his age: ‘The doubled negation, which was still usual in good writers in the 18th century, must now be completely eliminated from good style. . . . The only people to use it still today are the vulgar masses.’ This reaction against a natural pattern of speech affected the form of written texts, too. In Goethe’s poem ‘King in Thule’ (1774), the last line was originally *trank nie keinen Tropfen mehr* (lit. ‘drank never not a drop more’; I, 81 and III, 27 of the Hamburg edn): the poet later himself corrected *keinen to einen* (‘not a’ to ‘a’), with an inelegant hiatus, while in an old reprint of the poem *nie* (‘never’) is deleted; in the poem ‘Meeres-Stille’ (‘Calm Sea’; I, 242 Hamburg), Goethe had to leave as it was the double negative in *keine Luft von keiner Seite* (lit. ‘no air from no side’). In other cases, texts have been affected in the same way by those transmitting them. At Plaut. *Men.* 1027 (quoted above), the correct *numquam* has been emended to *umquam* in all the manuscripts except *B*; at *Miles* 1411 iura te non nocitutum esse homini de hac re nemini (‘swear that you will not harm anyone at all for this’), the Ambrosian palimpsest *A* (n. 18, p. 309 above) omits *non*; at Cic. *Verr.* II 2. 60 (also quoted above), one of the manuscripts omits *nullum*. On the same phenomenon in the transmission of Shakespeare, see W. *Horn* (1925: 9). |

On the other hand, with this type of negative (as with that discussed above, II, 297 ff.) it also happens that two negatives can cancel each other out. Understandably, this is most developed in Latin, where putting the quantitative negative before *non* serves to convey a universal affirmative, e.g. *nemo non* says that there is no one to whom the clause does not apply, and means ‘anyone, everyone’. [. . .]* Rather different are instances where the *non* goes with the verb *poss* ‘be able’, and the quantitative negative with its dependent infinitive, as at Cic. *Tusc.* 1. 11 (si enim sunt,) *nusquam esse non possunt*, which means ‘(if they exist,) they cannot be nowhere, i.e. they must be somewhere’.—If, on the other hand, the *non* precedes, it says that the clause is not completely invalid for any person, thing,

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2 This poem and ‘Glückliche Fahrt’ (‘Prosperous Voyage’) inspired an overture by Mendelssohn and a cantata by Beethoven, both of which bear the names of both poems.

3 I have removed the following sentence: “This is found also, by the way, with *neque*, e.g. at Cic. *Verr.* II 1. 107 C. Voconium, qui lege sua hereditatem ademit nulli neque virgini neque mulieri”. Cicero’s point here is that the *lex Voconia* was not retroactive, so that this phrase must mean, ‘C. Voconius, who by his law actually deprived no one, neither unmarried girl nor woman, of her position as heiress’. In general, *neque . . . neque* (also *non . . . non* and *ne . . . quidem*) does not cancel but rather specifies a preceding negative; cf. II, 302 below, on precisely this point, and see further KS §149 n. 8.
place, or time, which is an indirect way of saying that it is true for at least part of
the domain in question, e.g. non nemo means ‘some people’.

In Greek, by and large, neither of these patterns is used. In particular, the sense
of Lat. nemo non, etc. is generally expressed by means of a relative construction,
with a negative in both the main and the subordinate clause—incidentally, this has
parallels in every language, including Latin, e.g. nemo est quin . . ., non possum
quin . . ., fieri non potest quin . . . (‘there is no one but that . . .’, ‘I cannot but . . .’, ‘it
cannot be but that . . .’). Note e.g. Soph. Ant. 4–6 oūdev γἀρ οὐτ’ ἀγεινών . . . οὖτ’
aἰσχρόν . . . ἔσθ’, ὅποιον οὐ ... οὐκ ὅπωςα (with an accumulation of negatives in
both clauses!), which comes to mean ‘I have seen every sort of pain and outrage’
(cf. I, 61 and n. 9, p. 86 above). In this construction, ἔστι early on becomes fixed in
form, and can be used even in statements about the past, e.g. at Herodotus 2. 120.
3 αὐτοῦ Πριάμου οὐκ ἔστι οὔτε οὐ δύο...τῶν παιδῶν μάχης γενομένης ἀπέθνησκον
‘whenever there was a battle, two (at least) of Priam’s own sons would fall’; cf.
Soph. Ajax 725, with the clauses in the other order. A further stage is represented
by e.g. Thuc. 3. 81. 5 οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ ἔννεβη ‘everything thinkable occurred’, with
omission of ἔστι (lit. ‘there is nothing which did not happen’; cf. Soph. OT 373);
and a further step again is taken in e.g. Plato, Phaedo 117d οὐδένα ὅτινα οὐ
cατέκλασε τῶν παρόντων ‘he made each of those present break down’, where the
quantitative negative has been attracted into what was originally the relative
clause, i.e. οὐδέσις ὅσις οὐ (lit. ‘no one who . . . not’) has become equivalent to
πᾶς (‘everyone, anyone’).—The quotation of Xen. Symp. 1. 9 at Athenaeus 5, 188a
tῶν παρόντων (τῶν ὄρωντων in Xen.) οὐδείς ἤν δὲ οὐκ ἐπασχέ τι τὴν ψυχὴν ‘each of
those present was somewhat affected in his soul’ is more in keeping with general
usage than the shorter version in the manuscripts of Xenophon himself, οὐδεὶς οὐκ
ἐπασχέ τι . . . , but cf. e.g. the oracle at Herodotus 5. 56. 1 οὐδείς ἀνθρώπων ἀδύκων
tίσι οὐκ ἀποτισεὶ (‘no one of unjust men shall not pay a penalty’).

In German, patterns corresponding to the Latin occur here and there from
Middle High German on. Behagel | (1923–32: II, 83–4 §579) explains this as
due to the influence of Latin, but must we really suppose dependency on the
model of Lat. nonnihil (‘not nothing, something’) for e.g. Swiss German das ist
niid nüt ‘this must mean something’ (lit. ‘this is not nothing’), and the like
(Schweiz. Id. IV, 869, s.v. ‘nüt’)?

A sentence can contain more than one negative even if there is no quantitative
negative in the picture. In Greek it is quite normal to add a second οὐ, an οὐδὲ, or
an οὔτε . . . οὔτε later in the sentence after a first οὐ or οὐδὲ, without affecting the
meaning (cf. Soph. Ant. 5–6, quoted above).—This occasionally happens even in
Latin (cf. n. 3 in this lecture). Even in the classical language a negation with non
is sometimes applied additionally to individual constituents by means of ne . . . quidem
or neque . . . neque. As a rule in this situation non precedes, but in Petronius,
Satyricon 58. 5 the plebeian Hermeros says, nec sursum nec deorsum non cresco ‘I’m
not growing, neither up nor down’ (cf. another freedman at 42.7), and compare Cato, Agr. 66. 1 teso aeneo neque nucleus . . . ne utatur ‘he should not use a bronze vessel nor the stones (of olives)’. Furthermore, in comedy and still in Varro (and the archaizers, e.g. Gellius 17. 21. 35), a clause is sometimes introduced with neque and the negation then repeated later with haud or non, e.g. Plaut. Bacch. 1037 neque ego haud committam ‘and I won’t allow it’, and possibly Epid. 532 neque . . . nescio ‘and I don’t know’(?). 4 Scaliger noticed this similarity with Greek usage in Varro, but he wrongly regarded it as a Grecism, when it simply reflects the fact that in such cases Latin speech is no less natural than Greek. On Varro’s usage, see Scaliger (1573: 232) on Rust. 1. 69. 3 and Keil (1891) on 1. 2. 23.

The doubling of negatives for the sake of emphasis (in Greek, esp. μή μή) requires no explanation, but we must consider the question whether, when a qualitative negative is repeated, each has its own value, and thus the power to cancel the other out (as we have just seen may be the case in clauses with quantitative negatives). In the account of Stoic logic at Diog. Laert. 7. 69, we read ὑπεραποφατικὸν ἐστὶν ἀποφατικὸν ἀποφατικὸν, οἶνον ‘οὐχὶ ήμέρα οὐκ ἐστὶν’, τίθηι δὲ τὸ ‘ἡμέρα ἐστι’ (‘a double negation is the negation of a negation, e.g. “It is not not-day”, which asserts that “It is day”’). This sort of sentence is actually found e.g. in Sanskrit in cases of repeated na. 5 In ordinary Greek, a sentence formed exactly like that of the Stoic logician was scarcely thinkable, but nevertheless special formal conventions or conceptual contexts could yet lead to ‘hyperapophatic’ sentences. There are even two examples in Homer, each of its own particular kind: at II. 4. 223–4 ἐνθ’ οὐκ ἀν βρίζοντα ἰδοις Ἀγαμέμνονα δίον | οὐδὲ καταπτώσσοντ’ οὖθεν οὐκ ἐθέλοντα μαχέσθαι ‘then you would have seen brilliant Agamemnon not dozing, not cringing back, not disinclined to fight’. We saw in our earlier discussion (II. 261 above) that οὐκ ἐθέλων is equivalent to ἀκών, ἀρνούμενος (‘unwilling’, ‘refusing’), and here therefore it is parallel to βρίζοντα and καταπτώσσοντα (‘dozing’, ‘cringing’) —though instead of οὖθεν οὐκ ἐθέλοντα we might have had ἄλλα ἐθέλοντα ‘but willing to fight’, as in the next line, ἄλλα μᾶλα σπείδοντα μάχην ἐς κυδιάνειραν (‘but driving eagerly into the fighting where men win glory’). The two negatives between them, then, yield indirectly a positive sense.—The situation is different in the second Homeric example, Od. 24. 251, where the as-yet-unrecognized Odysseus says to Laertes, whom he sees working hard and afflicted by poverty, οὔ μὲν ἀργήγης γε ἀνάξ ἕνεκ’ οὗ σε κομίζῃ ‘it is anyway not on account of idleness on your part that your master does not look after you’. The collocation οὖν κομίζῃ is not such a tight unit as οὐκ ἐθέλων—but note the related privative ἀκομιστή (‘lack of comfort, privation(s)’) at Od. 21. 284.

4 It is likely that nescio was in an early, lost copy (the ancestor of seven early manuscripts), but scio is in the Ambrosian palimpsest (n. 18, p. 309 above), and is printed by most modern editors.

5 Macdonell’s example (1916: 236) is ná li paśáro ná bhunįnjantį ‘for cattle do not not-eat, i.e. they always eat’.
Rather, the poet chooses this negative form of expression because he has previously made Odysseus say that while in the garden nothing was ἀνευ κομιδῆς (‘without careful attention’, 247), Laertes himself ὄνκ ἁγαθὴ κομιδῆ ἔχει (‘no good care attends’, 249). With the first ὁδ he then negates the ἀεργήθη as a reason for this neglect that he has couched in negative terms, but the repetition of ὁδ does not yield a positive sense for the clause as a whole. This instance is more complicated than the II. 4 passage, which is in keeping with the relatively modern character of Od. 24.—A third instance comes from a completely different register of the language: 1 Corinthians 12: 15 and 16 (often inaccurately translated) (ἐὰν εἶπη ὁ πούς (in v. 16, τὸ ὀός), ὃτι ὀόκ εἶμι χείρ (16, ὀφθαλμός), ὀόκ εἶμι ἐκ τοῦ σώματος,) ὁδ παρὰ τούτῳ ὀόκ ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος (‘if the foot [in v. 16, the ear] says, Because I am not the hand [16, the eye], I am not of the body,) it does not follow from this that it is not a part of the body’. Paul, then, is concerned to show that a negative claim is not justified, i.e. to say No to a negation. (For examples from Plato and the orators, see KÜHNER & GERTH II, 205.)—Yet another type (frequent in Ionic and Attic) is attested first in Demodocus of Leros, fr. 2 West Λέριοι κακοί, ὀόχ ὁ μὲν ὀς δ’ ὀό, πάντες πλὴν Προκλέος (‘Lerians are bad: I don’t mean that some are and some aren’t, but they all are except Procles’; cf. II, 132 and n. 23, p. 563 above), where the first negative negates the whole phrase denoting heterogeneity (ὁ μὲν, ὀς δ’ ὀό).

In Latin, too, it is not usual to make a simple affirmation by repeating non, but here, too, there are one or two reasonable exceptions. For example, in his speech In Defence of Milo 2 non illa praesidia . . . non afferunt oratori aliquid ‘it is not the case that those guards . . . have no effect on an advocate’, Cicero’s purpose is to make this clause agree in form with two preceding negative clauses, each introduced with non, i.e. to use the figure of anaphora. 6—Apart from individual cases like this, affirmative double negation in Latin occurs in the first place in the classical construction non possum non + inf. ‘I cannot but, I must’; cf. Fr. il ne peut pas ne pas aimer (‘he cannot help loving’), Ital. non posso non ricordare (‘I cannot but remember’), and JESPERSEN (1917: 52). Secondly, it is found in the conjunction nec non, which serves | rather like Gk καὶ μὴν to underline fairly emphatically the existence of something further, often with the addition of etiam or quoque. It was noted long ago that nec non is not present at the start of our Latin record and is not found in all types of Latin. 7 It seems not to be used by Caesar; Cicero does use it, but hardly ever with non immediately after nec, and often with a very great distance between the two words (e.g. On the Orator 2. 15). It is frequent in Varro, more so in the books De re rustica than in the scholarly discussion De lingua

6 That is, ‘the intermittent repetition of the beginning of a colon or a comma’ (Lausberg 1998: §§629–30).
7 Cf. e.g. Hand (1829–45: IV, 111), Draeger (1878–81: II, 68–9); for further references, see Hofmann & Szyntyr 778–9.
Latina, which implies a colloquial origin for *nec non*, and this is supported by its use in Vitruvius and Petronius. It was introduced to poetry by Vergil, and he is followed by literary prose of the Silver Age (see Löfstedt 1911: 95–7).

And finally, we come to the (perfectly understandable) **combination of a prohibitive and a factual negative** together in a single clause. There are examples already in Homer, which allow us to see how this situation comes about. First, a prohibitive μή-clause can be followed by a second clause which is still included in the prohibition but which contains something that is negated and hence has oν: so e.g. II. 16. 128 (Achilles) μή δή νήσας ἐλώσαι καὶ οὐκέτι φύκτα πέλωνται ‘let them not take the ships, and (let not) escape become no longer possible’ (cf. 5. 233). It can also happen, however, that something negated is prohibited in the first place, and this results in oν following immediately or very soon after μή. This involves sometimes clauses of purpose (e.g. II. 24. 569, 584–6), sometimes clauses of fearing, whether a verb of fearing actually precedes—e.g. II. 10. 39 (Menelaus to Agamemnon) δείδω μή oν τίς τοι ὑπόσχηται τὸ δὲ ἔργον ‘I fear no one will undertake this endeavour for you’ (cf. 15. 164)—or not—e.g. II. 1. 28 (Agamemnon to Chryses) μή νῦ τοι ἡραῖσμη σκήπτρον καὶ στέμμα θεοῖο ‘for fear your staff and the ribbon of the god be no help to you’; cf. 1. 566). This μή oν survived throughout Greek, even though in earlier tragedy it is avoided after verbs of fearing, and Xenophon has the curious variant μή...μή at Memorabilia 1. 2. 7. It is faithfully preserved in modern Greek φοβάμαι μήπως δεν (‘I fear that...not’),8 where δεν is the regular replacement for oν (cf. II, 233 above), and it has an exact match in Lat. *nē non*, in line with the essential synonymy between Gk μή and Lat. *nē* (cf. II, 233 above).—While in general here we have to refrain from using the testimony of more remote languages, it is perhaps legitimate to refer to the lovely parallel in a passage of the great inscription in Old Persian of King Darius (Bisitun 4. 48–50): here, a negative clause of purpose introduced by ma¯, the cognate of Gk μή, is followed by a second clause, coordinated with the first, where the ma¯ still applies but where something to be prohibited is negated: this is accordingly negated with the cognate of Lat. *ne¯* and synonym of Gk στέμμα, Old Persian naïy. Here, then, we have a syntactic structure identical to that in II. 16. 128 (quoted above).9

In later Greek, there is also μή oν used in questions expecting the answer Yes, as the counterpart of those introduced with μή or μήτι and expecting the answer No (cf. II, 283 above). Note e.g. St Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, 10: 18 μή oυκ ήκοισαν; : Lat. *numquid non audierunt?* ‘have they not heard?’. (On μή oν with pleonastic oν, see II, 308 below.)

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9 The Old Persian text runs: ‘for this reason it has not been inscribed, lest (ma¯) whoso shall hereafter read this inscription, to him what has been done by me seem excessive and it not (naïy) convince him’; for the text and further information, see Kent (1930: 129–32, 192 on naïy), Schmitt (1990a; 1991).
In addition, in Greek, at least from the fifth century on, it was possible to use μή after οὖ—either immediately after, or with just an enclitic between them—in order to make a strong negative statement about something in the future. It was realized long ago that such clauses are in fact negated clauses of fearing, with the ellipse of a word for ‘fear’. This is consistent with the oldest type of οὖ μή-clause, namely those with aorist subjunctive, which we find in Aeschylus and Parmenides, e.g. Aesch. Septem 38 (Etocles) οὖ τι μή ληφθώ δόλῳ ‘I will not be surprised by trickery’. This origin for οὖ μή is further corroborated by the fact that a second negative clause is attached simply with μή, e.g. in Aristophanes, Wasps 394. (Philocleon praying to Lycus) κοῦ μή ποτὲ σου παρὰ τὰς κάινας οὐρήσω μηδε ἀποπάρῳ (‘and never again will I piss or fart against the reed-fence of your shrine’).—Further, since οὖ μή-clauses always refer to the future, from Sophocles on they can also take a future verb, e.g. Soph. El. 1052 (Electra to Chrysothemis) οὖ σοι μή μεθέφωμαι ποτὲ ‘I will never follow you’. Given, however, that οὖ with a 2nd-person future has developed from a question into an expression of a command (cf. I, 205 above), οὖ μή (or just μηδε after such an οὖ-clause) with a 2nd-person future can express a strong prohibition, e.g. at Arist. Frogs 462 οὖ μή διατρίψεις . . . ; ‘don’t waste time!’, Eur. Hipp. 498 (Phaedra to the nurse) οὖχι συγκλήσεις στόμα καὶ μή μεθήσεις . . . λόγους; ‘shut your mouth, and don’t utter words!’; cf. Lobeck (1866) on Ajax 75, and Hug & Schöne (1909) on Plato, Symp. 175a9. The use of οὖ μή has moved even further from its starting point when it appears combined with the future infinitive at Eur. Phoen. 1590; when it yields οὐδείς, οὐδέν (etc.) μή for ‘none at all’ in fourth-century Attic; when Plato ventures even Gorgias 517a πολλοῦ γε δεὶ μή ποτὲ τις ἐργάσῃται ‘under no circumstances does anyone come anywhere near equalling their achievements’, with πολλοῦ γε δεὶ (lit. ‘it lacks much’, ‘it is far from being the case that’) in the sense of οὖ.

This οὖ μή was originally a stronger negative than οὖ, but through frequent use it gradually lost its emphatic character. This is apparent especially in the New Testament, on which see most recently Ballantine (1897) and Gildersleeve (1897b). Here we find also e.g. John 18: 11 (Christ to Peter) οὖ μή πῶ οὐτό; as a negative ‘ought’-question, ‘should I not drink it?’; compare, in a fragment of a comedy by an unknown author (PCG VIII, fr. 707) μή λάβω; ‘should I not take it?’. |
By way of conclusion to our look at multiple negation, let me quote a comment of the Roman jurists Servius Sulpicius and Gaius relating to the *Twelve Tables, Digest of Justinian* 50. 16. 237 ‘duobus negatiuis uerbis quasi permittit lex magis quam prohibuit’ (‘by two negative words the law as it were permits rather than prohibits’). We would love to know what sort of double negative is here referred to!

We still have to consider one further aspect of the use of the negatives. Apart from the cases discussed so far, they are subject to pleonastic use, which is strictly speaking illogical. In written German and English, efforts are made to avoid this sort of thing, but there are examples in nearly every language, and it is instructive to see again what a great measure of agreement there is between languages, and how particular types of pleonastic negation may be traced across the widest range of languages.

I shall not go in detail into cases where only the linguistic historian can recognize that the negation is in fact pleonastic. An example of this would be the nicht in German *sich nicht entblößen* (‘not to be afraid’); the positive *sich entblößen* originally meant ‘to embolden oneself; not to be afraid’, and only acquired the addition of the negative because it was misunderstood and formally assimilated to synonymous negative verbs such as *sich nicht scheuen/fürchten, sich nicht schämen* (‘not to be afraid’, ‘not to be ashamed’). In other cases, however, speakers are aware of the logical error. First, in Greek, after a verb of denying, forbidding, or preventing, that which is denied, forbidden, etc. is conveyed in a subordinate clause introduced by ὅ/u or in an infinitive with μῆ. There is an example already in Homer in II. 18. 500 ὅ δ’ ἀναίνετο μὴ δεν ἐλέσθαι (lit. ‘he denied to have taken nothing’, ‘he said that he had taken nothing’; cf. I, 175, II, 258, 282 above and nn.). Certainly, τι could have stood in place of μὴ δεν, but, because the content of the utterance was negative, the negation was expressed not only in the verb but also in the reported utterance. Corresponding to this in Latin is the construction of verbs of hindering and preventing with *quominus*, which, as we saw in an earlier lecture (II, 255 above), merits a place among the negatives, and which retains its negative force after positive expressions such as *stat per aliquem* (‘it is due to me, my fault [that . . . not]’). As for the infinitive construction, Latin—which in general treats negation more logically than Greek—agrees broadly with modern German, though there are still bold exceptions such as Q. Curtius Rufus (1st or 2nd c.), *History of Alexander* 5. 3. 13 *abnuens deprecationem pro illis non conuenire fortunae, in qua esset* (‘asserting [lit. denying] that intervention on their behalf was not fitting to the fortune in which she [the mother of Darius] found herself’), which in Greek would be something like ἀρνομενη μῆ προσήκεων (lit. ‘denying that it was not fitting’). This is reflected in the Romance languages: in French, for instance, *que*-clauses after *empêcher* and *éviter* (‘prevent’,
‘avoid’) generally have *ne* with the verb, and one finds the same in early modern English after *deny* and *forbid*. Consequently, we cannot be surprised that there are examples also in High German: the *D. Wb.*, s.v. ‘nicht’ (7., so-called ‘pleonastic’ *nicht*, cols 709–12), gives numerous instances from Luther to Ludwig Tieck (1773–1853), and *Wilmanns* (III, 282–4) devotes a special excursus to the phenomenon, including rich documentation of it from Middle High German. I content myself with a reference to the well-known line of Schiller’s play *Wilhelm Tell* (1804), III. 1, 76 verhüte es Gott, dass ich *nicht* Hülfe brauche (‘God prevent that I should (*not*) need help’). Gotthold Lessing even has it several times with the infinitive after *hindern*, in the Greek manner (see the *D. Wb.*, s.v. (7), for references).

This sort of pleonasm is found also after other negative expressions, e.g. ἀπορία τοῦ μὴ + infin. (lit. ‘impossibility of not … ing’) in Thucydides, 2. 49. 5, and Hippocrates, *On the Sacred Disease* 1 (VI, 352, 6 Littré), ἄδόνατος οὐδὲν ἄλλο ‘incapable of anything else’ in Euripides, *Andromache* 746 (cf. also the Homeric *Hymn to Demeter*, 256–7 and Polybius 2. 37. 11). In Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 4. 3. 8, 1124b30 πλὴν δὲα μὴ ἔι ἐρωνείαν ‘except whatever is said ironically’, the negative is comparable with that sometimes found after words for ‘without’ in modern languages, e.g. in Grimmelshausen’s *Simpicissimus*, ch. 19, *init.*, lobte ich jedermann ohne mich selbst *nicht* (‘I praised everyone except (*not*) myself’), or in a letter of Wilhelm von Humboldt (Wilhelm and Caroline von Humboldt in their *Letters*, III, 99), ohne *nicht* … zu empfinden ‘without (*not*) … feeling’, or in Swiss German ohne nīt (lit. ‘without nothing’), possibly on the model of Fr. *sans rien*, and so on. The next case is perhaps more striking.

There is a well-known rule in French that in a *que*-clause after a comparative clause, *ne* is used with the verb.14 The same was known in modern High German until well into the nineteenth century: Goethe calls Winckelmann *mehr als kein anderer im Geist mit den Alten verwandt* (‘more than any other related in spirit with the ancients’),15 and uses *nie* and *niemand* in the same way, and Schiller writes in *Die Piccolomini* (the second part of the Wallenstein-trilogy), III.1 *fin.*, *wir müssen das Werk…weiter fördern, als es in Jahren *nicht* gedieh* (‘we must advance the work further than it has (*not*) flourished in years’; see *Wilmanns* III, 270–1). The German pattern may rest in part on French influence, but there has always been a tendency for speakers to negate something that a comparative expression ranks below something else. There are isolated examples already in ancient Greek, e.g. Thuc. 3. 36. 4 πλὴν δὴν διαφθείρα μᾶλλον ἢ ὁ τοῦς

14 That is, in a comparative clause of inequality, and usually—though not always—after a positive main clause; see further Grevisse §§981d.g.
15 That is, Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717–68), the great pioneer of the scientific study of ancient, especially, Greek art and archaeology; the phrase is from Goethe’s *Winckelmann and his Century* (1805) (VI.2, 386 in the Munich edn).
aɪrɪəʊs ‘to destroy the whole city rather than (not) (just) those responsible’.—
Related to this is the use of the negative in place of—rather than alongside—the
particle of comparison, something that is found in the most diverse languages
(see Ernst Fraenkel 1911: 236–9). Fraenkel starts from an instance in Homer,
ll. 1. 169–71 (Achilles to Agamemnon) πολὺ φέρτερον ἑστην ῥὶ ὀίκαδ’ ὄμεν . . .
οδδὲ . . . ἀέξεω ‘it is much better to go home . . . and not . . . to increase’, which
has an exact parallel in colloquial English I am greater nor he, in Luther’s Weisheit
ist besser weder Gold (lit. ‘wisdom is better nor gold’, Proverbs 16: 16), and in the
Swiss dialects;16 on the underlying meaning ‘and not’ of nor and weder, see, for rich illustration from the Swiss dialects,
Schweiz. Id., s.v. ‘weder’, III, and for an instance in Homer, ll. 308–9 (Achilles to Agamemnon) πολὺ φέρτερον ἑστην ῥὶ ὀίκα
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neither praise it nor criticize it', which incidentally is quite different from the structures discussed on II, 301 above.

In Latin we can compare the preference for *quìn, rather than *nê or *quominus, after negative verbs of negation; in Valerius Maximus, 8. 7. 4, there is even ne non after negated interpellare (‘to interrupt’).\(^{18}\) I would also draw attention to Varro, Rust. 2. 9. 10 ne nec non ita panem boreacium dandum ut non potius eum in lacte des (‘barley-bread is better given soaked in milk’; see KEIL (1891) on this passage), and we can probably include here also Rust. 3. 2. 16 quo non uides epulum aut triumphum aut collegia non epulari (‘[how rarely is there a year] in which you do not see a banquet or a triumph or the clubs not feasting?’).

Finally, we must say a little about the words normally used for linking negative clauses or constituents with others. The inherited way of negating two or more elements is to introduce | each with the negative compounded with the old copulative particle, Lat. neque...neque, Gk oûτε...oûτε and μûτε...μûτε, Gothic nih...nih (see NECKEL 1913: 12–15), and German noch...noch, now obsolete but attested even in Schiller.\(^{19}\) On one point here, Latin diverges sharply from Greek, in that while Greek adds τε to both the prohibitive μûτ and the factual negative oû, in Latin we have not *nê-que but nê-ue (with apocope, neu). This is doubtless an innovation, as the Greek pattern is found also in Sanskrit (*nà ca, mà ca), and—of particular significance for any assessment of Latin—Oscan and Umbrian (neip, neip).\(^{20}\) But it is a very early innovation in Latin: already in the Twelve Tables we find, not neue...neue, but 10. 1 ne sepelito neue urito (‘he is not to bury nor cremate [a dead man in the city]’) and 10. 4 genas ne radunto neue lessum...habento (‘[women] are not to mutilate their cheeks nor to hold a funerary lament’), with the conjunction only in the second member (see below). Now, a disjunctive expression suits the coordination of negative elements at least as well as a copulative one, as with negatives there is no accumulation, but I confess I do not see why -ue should be preferred in prohibitions in particular. On the replacement in Late Latin of neue with ne uel, probably out of a desire to make the meaning ‘or’ more prominent, see LÖFSTEDT (1911: 317).

Just as the copulative particle can be omitted from the first of a series of coordinated positive elements, so in linking negatives Gk oû...oûτε is admissible (oûτε...oû is rare and hardly found outside poetry), and Lat. non...neque, ne...
neue and German nicht...noch completely regular. In Latin it is to be noted that after nolo and nequeo (‘I wish not’, ‘I cannot’; cf. II, 250, 253 above), which of course contain the same old negative as nēque, the continuation of their negative meaning into a second constituent can be signalled with neque, e.g. at Plaut. Poen. 1129 mirari noli neque me contemplarier ‘don’t be amazed nor look at me!’, or Ter. Eun. 547 nequeo satis mirari neque conicere ‘I cannot wonder nor guess enough’. The same occurs in Cicero, Caesar, and Livy after negare, e.g. Cic. Fin. 1. 30 negat opus esse ratione neque disputatione ‘he denies that there is need of calculation nor discussion’; see MADVIG (1876) on this passage, and cf. Juvenal 3. 109, with nihil.

Now, oūrē and the corresponding forms in other languages are not the only means available for joining a following negative element. In Greek, if the first element contains oū or μή (and sometimes even after oūrē, μητε), the preference is for oūδε, μηδέ. These particles generally mean ‘not...either’ or ‘but...not’, but their use in the sense of Lat. neque, neue is in such close agreement with the Avestan negative conjunctions, factual (Old Av. nāē-dā, Young Av. nāē-da) and prohibitive (Young Av. mā-đa), both meaning ‘and not’, that one is tempted to suppose that both languages have preserved here an old inherited feature. If so, oūδε and μηδέ should perhaps be kept separate from the clausal conjunction δέ ‘but’. [Add.: In the great inscription of sacred laws from Cyrene (4th c.), Bz-3 oūχ υπώροφο[ος] τέω ανδρί τ’ ένταλ οūδε μιασεί (interpretation uncertain: ‘not under the roof of her husband will she be and neither will she cause pollution’), WILAMOWITZ (1927: 164) sees oū...τε in the first element followed by oūδε in the second; however, as MAAS (1927: 1953) saw, here, too, we must read (what is simply required by A18) τένται in the sense ‘will be’, i.e. sg. 3 of τέλομαι ‘I shall be’, attested at Dreros, in eastern Crete.21]

The fact that the negative is often used without a conjunction before each element (oū... , oū...; not... , not... , etc.) requires no explanation. In all of our languages, this is found almost exclusively in poetic and rhetorical language. We can also note without comment that sometimes the negative is used only with the first element, later elements being linked with ‘and’ or ‘or’. What is striking, however, is the universal tendency not to express the negative until the second element, even though the first is also to be understood as negated. On this pattern in Greek, see especially WILAMOWITZ (1895) on Eur. Heracles 237 in his

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21 The Cyrene inscription is more readily accessible in SEG 9. 72 or LSCG, Suppl. no. 115 (where, however, Sokolowski still prints s’ éνται). Apart from the Dreros inscription (SIG 127 = Buck no. 120, vv. 46 & 63; 3rd/2nd c.), Doric τέλομαι (for πέλομαι ‘be, become’) is attested on Crete also at Hierapytna (IC III. iii.4 = Chaniotis (1996: no. 28), v. 68; c.200 BC). For the assimilation of -λο- to -τ- (attested esp., although not exclusively, in Cyrene), cf. κατεσθύν for κατεδάθη (several times in the inscribed sacred laws), and a further example of τένται is now attested (SEG 9. 3, 38; early 4th c.).
discussion of the σχήμα ἀπὸ κοινοῦ. There are no instances in Homer, but after Homer there are quite a few examples with οὖτε in poetry—e.g. Pindar, Pyth. 10. 29 ναυσί δ’ οὖτε πεζὸς ἰὼν ‘going neither by ship nor on foot’—and with οὐδὲ in both poetry and prose; for a rich collection of examples from both, see Kühner & Gerth II, 291. Note that the usage is at home also in quite non-literary language. Wilamowitz (1922: 469) rightly compares an instance in a third-century BC inventory from Delos, IG XI.2. 161, B61 ἀνθρωπαντίσκος χρυσός σχέλος οὐδὲ χείρα ἔχων (‘a gold figurine having [neither] leg nor arm’; cf. 162, B48). Recently, further examples have come to light on inscriptions (see Wilamowitz 1924: 10–11): from Thasos (IG XII, Suppl. 347; 4th c. BC), γλεῦκος μηδὲ οἶνον (‘[neither] sweet new wine nor other wine’; DAUX 1926: 214, 216); from Delos (ID IV. 509, 1–2; late 3rd c. BC), ἀνθρακας μηδὲ ῥυμοὶς μη[δὲ . . . μη πωλεῖν] (‘[neither] coal nor logs nor . . . are to be sold’; WILHELM 1915: 23–30); from Sardis (mid-2nd c. BC), ἃ γάμοι οὐδὲ γονεῖς ‘who has neither husband nor parents’ (published by Robinson 1923; cf. Wilamowitz 1924: 11).

This type was certainly present in Common Germanic (Neckel 1913: 13), and can be traced from the early Germanic languages (though not Gothic) down to modern English and German: e.g. in the hymn-writer Paul Gerhardt (1607–76), du noch sonst ein Menschenkind | habt ein Recht in dieser Welt (‘you nor any other human child | have a right in this world’), and in Alfred, Lord Tennyson, thou nor I have made the world. The same occurs in Romance with ni.

As for an explanation of this curious phenomenon, we are entitled to suppose with Neckel that the close proximity of the negative to both elements enabled it to be applied to both, as in other cases of an ἀπὸ κοινοῦ construction, including with prepositions (cf. II, 202 above). Also relevant is the fact that Gk οὖτε—in Attic, also οὐδὲ—presuppose the negation of the first element.

In sharp contrast to this signalling of negation on one element only is German weder . . . noch (‘neither . . . nor’), which explicitly marks that the negation applies equally to each conjoined element. The weder goes back to earlier ni wedar, | related to the indefinite (h)wedar ‘one of two’. Formally, it corresponds to the synonymous English whether, and so with the negative means literally ‘neither of two’, and gives notice that there are further negated elements to come. On the loss of the negative with the first element, and of that with weder itself, see

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22 Also called ‘zeugma’, that is, ‘the one-time placement of a part-element [in this case, the negative], which is associated with several mutually coordinated elements in the same way’ (Lausberg 1998: §699, cf. 701).

23 Note that the word read by Wilamowitz as γάμοι is unclear, but is read by Buckler & Robinson (1932: no. 111, 11).

24 From the hymn ‘Nicht so traurig, nicht so sehr, | meine Seele, sei betrübt’ (‘Not so sadly, not so much, be thou troubled, my soul’).

25 Tristram to Lancelot in ‘The Last Tournament’ (1871), v. 203, the tenth piece in Idylls of the King.

26 For French, this is barely acknowledged by Grevisse §974.2, but it is well illustrated by Littré, s.v. ‘ni’ (15).
the remarks above (II, 252, 273). Secondary developments include *weder... weder* in e.g. *bin weder Fräulein weder schön* (‘I am neither a virgin nor beautiful’, Goethe, *Faust I*, 2607), and the use of *weder* in the sense of ‘and not’—both involve an assimilation of the use of *weder* to that of *noch*.27

Greek and Latin counterparts to this Germanic idiom would involve putting *Gk οὐδέτερον, μηδέτερον* and *Lat. neutrum* in first position in corresponding structures, but as far as I know this is not attested. This is genuinely surprising, for in coordination of positive elements it was always common in all sorts of languages to emphasize the equal validity of both elements explicitly by the addition of a word for ‘both’. Even Greek and Latin go in for this, as e.g. at *Il. 3. 179* (Helen describing Agamemnon) ἀμφότερον, βασιλεὺς τ’ ἄγαθὸς κρατερός τ’ αἴχμητής ‘both, a good king and a strong spearman’ (see further below). Admittedly, this usage is especially pronounced in German. It is telling that Luther often introduces a *beide* in his Bible translation where the original text has just copulative particles: so e.g. at *Philippians 4: 12* ich bin in allen Dingen und bei allen geschickt, *beide* satt sein und hungern, *beide* übrig haben und Mangel leiden, which renders ἐν παντὶ καὶ ἐν πάσιν μεμόνημαι, καὶ χροτάζεσθαι καὶ πεινάν, καὶ περισσεύειν καὶ ὑστερεῖσθαι. Both the Latin and the Gothic versions manage here and elsewhere without such an addition, although the Authorized Version of the English Bible agrees with Luther’s in this sort of situation, and even goes further: *every where and in all things I am instructed both to be full and to be hungry, both to abound and to suffer need*. This enables us to understand a little better how German and English differ from Greek and Latin in their use of *weder* and *neither*.—As a tailpiece to this last point, however, I might perhaps bring out the fact that German *entweder* (< MHG *eintweder* containing *deweder* ‘one of two’) and English *either* (of similar origin and hence meaning literally ‘one of two’) when introducing a disjunction correspond very closely to the Greek use of δύονθα δέτερα before ἦ... ἦ (‘of two things one, either... or’, e.g. at Plato, *Theaet. 187c*), or French *de deux choses l’une* before on... ou. Gk πότερον and Lat. *utrum* (orig. ‘which of two?’) introducing a pair of alternative questions again illustrate the same phenomenon.

When a positive element follows a negative one, the rule in Latin, provided there is no emphatic contrast, is to use *neque*, just as when the first element is negative. In Greek, however, ὁδὲ is never used in this situation, and although in Homer, Herodotus, and tragedy ὁδὲ is admitted here—e.g. *Il. 5. 287* ἡμβροτες ὁδ’ ἐπιχεῖς (‘you missed and did not hit’)—writers of proper Attic prefer καὶ ὁδ’ or ἀλλ’ ὁδ’. JESPersen | (1917: 115–16) points out a distinction between Germanic and French idiom in this sort of combination of clauses: in a German, Danish, or

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27 On German *weder... weder* and *weder* ‘and not’, see further D. *Wb.*, s.v., II.6 and II.7 (cols 12840, 12841).
English translation of the famous words from the battle of Waterloo, *la Garde meurt et ne se rend pas* (lit. ‘the Guard dies and does not surrender’), 28 the *et* would be systematically rendered with the word for ‘but’. Jespersen’s explanation of this is that Germanic has a stronger sense of contrast between positive and negative than does French. It would perhaps be worthwhile to study Greek and Latin practice from this point of view. We might note for example Quint. *Inst.* 1. 5. 52 *quaedam tamen et faciem solecismi habent et dici uitiosa non possunt* (‘still, some things have the appearance of a solecism but cannot be said to be faulty’).

The converse situation—a negative followed by a positive—does not really concern us here, except in that here, too, the first element can have *ouête, µête* in Greek and *neque* in Latin, and here again, in spite of the contrast, the conjunction used is ‘and’, although we would expect ‘but rather’: so, e.g. Herodotus 1. 63. 2 *ôkos µête aλiøtheîen èti oi Αθναιοι διεσκεδαιμονι τε ελεν* (‘so that the Athenians would no longer stay together but be scattered’), or 4. 94. 1 *ouête αποθνήσκεσων εωντων νομίζουσι (οι Γέται) λέναι τε τον απολλύμενον παρά Σάλμοξιν δαῖμονα* (‘the Getae believe that they do not die but go while dying to the god Salmoxis’), and further Plaut. *Miles* 185–6 *ut ne quoquam de ingenio degrediatur muliebri earum et disciplinam optineat colere* [tell Philocomasium] not to depart one inch from women’s ways but rather to abide strictly by their tactics and training’ (cf. Lorenz 1886: *ad loc.*).

On one particular point let me be permitted one more remark. Familiar to you all from your reading of Latin at school is the opening of the first of Horace’s *Satires*: *qui fit, Maecenas, ut nemo . . . contentus uiuat, laudet diuersa sequentes?* (‘how comes it, Maecenas, that no one lives content but each praises those who follow different things?’). We all understand the words correctly without difficulty, but if we look more closely, we notice that the subject has changed and that instead of *nemo* (‘no one’) its opposite *unusquisque* (‘each person’) has to be understood as the subject of *laudet* (‘praises’). Propertius 4. 1. 17–19, e.g., has to be taken in the same way: *nulli cura fuit externos quaerere diuos . . . annuaque (annua at Lachmann) accenso celebrare Parilia füeno* (‘no one was concerned to seek foreign gods . . . but to celebrate the feast of Pales with burning straw’). 29 This licence is confined neither to these two passages, nor indeed to Latin: note, e.g., Soph. *fr.* 354, 6–7 (TrGF IV), Ar. *Frogs* 1065–6, Plato, *Rep.* 8, 561b, Dem. 20. 74, and for further information *Kühner & Gerth II*, 567. 30 An interesting case very similar to the Horace example above is in St Paul, 1 Corinthians 10: 24 *µηδείς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ

28 The subject of much controversy, these words are attributed either to Cambronne or to Michel, two of Napoleon’s generals at Waterloo.

29 See on this passage the commentary (Cambridge 2006) by G. O. Hutchinson, who also prints *at* (for *-que*), comparing, although not entirely happily, Prop. 1. 6. 21–2.

ζητεῖτο, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ ἐτέρου: Vulgate: nemo quod suum est quaerat, sed quod alterius ('let no one seek his own good, but the good of his neighbour'). Here the inferior manuscripts add at the end the word ἐκαστὸς required by the sense, as does Erasmus’ edition, the basis of Luther’s translation, so that Luther here has sondern ein jeglicher, was des andern ist ('but each what is of the next man'). Indeed, ἐκαστὸς must already have been in Wulfila’s exemplar, whence his version...ak anfáris hwarjizuh (lit. ‘but of another each’).—Similarly, given an earlier negative verb such as Lat. negare, nescire, nolle ('say not’, ‘know not’, ‘wish not’), or Gk οὐκ ἔσω, οὐ κελεύω, οὐκ ἐπιτρέπω ('not to allow’, ‘not to order’, ‘not to entrust’), | the positive counterpart often has to be supplied in a later, contrasting clause—indeed, the same applies also to verbs which are not negative in form, such as Lat. uetare, obesse ('to forbid’, ‘to hinder’), Gk ἀπαινᾶν ('to forbid'), etc. On this phenomenon, see, apart from the standard grammars (including KÜHNER & GERTH II, 566–7), SEYFFERT & MÜLLER (1876: 387–8) on Cicero, ON FRIENDSHIP 59; JESPERSEN (1917: 59–61) adduces parallels from English and Danish.
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